Chief, Plans and Operations, DPTMS
FORT POLK, La. — When I started this book, I realized it was the first book exclusively on World War II I have reviewed. This has not been an intentional exclusion.
I have read dozens of books on World War II, it’s just that out of the largest CSA reading list ever, it actually has a relatively low number of books dedicated to this war.
As I looked at the title, I wondered out of all the great books on World War II out there, why would the Chief want us to read a book about the army of the Nazi regime, and an army that lost the war?
That question was answered within the first few chapters.
While this is an historical account, it doesn’t read like one. The author is a gifted and talented writer that can take a subject that has been written about in thousands of books with a fresh approach, unlike the textbook style of many World War II history books.
The author, Robert Citino, is no stranger to the German army or ways of war in World War II. He has authored several books on the subject that have marked him as “the authority” on the German army. He makes a point in the introduction to ensure the reader this is not a “what if” book that many authors of the German army in the war are often plagued by. In fact, in my opinion, his factual based and exhaustive study dispels many myths of the German army in World War II.
Citino takes aim at the mystique of Rommel, the notion of many that Germany ever had a chance of winning the war (logistics and manpower alone make this almost an impossibility — at least for the goals Hitler had in mind), the train of thought that the German army was superior in training, equipment and doctrine, and, my favorite, the development of the “blitzkrieg.” I learned — as you will when you read this book — the Germans didn’t invent it, nor did they even use the term.
The blitzkrieg style of warfare was developed in the interwar years as a result of the stagnant and costly price of World War I. Mobile warfare and a combined arms fight were not exclusive to Germany and were in development internationally in the interwar years. The Germans just validated it on a grand scale first and refined it before the rest of the world.
What I liked about the book most was how the author, using the German army of 1942 as a vehicle, managed to explore and weave together all three levels of warfare: From tactical, to operational all the way through strategic. Plus, he managed to take the reader through those levels and explain how they are all interrelated as well as the how and why decisions at every level, relate to the next. The read is an education in cause and effect of the levels of warfare with a masterful writing style that educates the reader in a seamless and enjoyable way.
Many historians like to purport the theory that Hitler and his meddling with his generals lost the war.
The author points out that while he certainly didn’t help it, the often vaunted German general staff failed as well. While the general staff became masters on the art of operational maneuver (the author explains why), overconfidence and underestimation of the enemy as well as a terrible intelligence system contributed to the destruction of the German army — as well as the Allied forces. I think maybe this is one of the reasons the Chief wants us to read this book. There is a lesson here for the leader and staffer alike.
Conversely, one of the things that intrigued me about this book was the discussion on what we now call mission command and they called mission tactics. The German army’s highest successes came early on when individual commanders had been empowered to exercise authority and exploit battlefield opportunities.
As success and confidence grew, operations became more and more complex, and subsequently more controlled by higher command, thus closing the door on what led to initial success.
Although I had read about the German “mission command” culture previously, one term I had never heard used in reference to the Germans in World War II was revealed in this book. This term is one we here at the Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk are familiar with: Decisive action. That’s right, we didn’t come up with decisive action; the word and deed have been around
and in use for many generations.
The author says it best in the book as he quotes it from the German army field operations manual of the time: “The first criterion of the war remains decisive action. Everyone, from the highest commander on down to the youngest Soldier, must constantly be aware that inaction and neglect incriminate him more severely than any error in the choice of means.”
He goes on to sum it up in a quote: “The most essential thing is the deed”.
If that alone doesn’t make you want to read the book while here at the home of the Joint Readiness Training Center — the epicenter of modern-day decisive action — then I don’t know what will. If you read nothing else from this book, pick it up and read chapters one through five. I think the lessons and the “meat” the CSA wants us to get out of this book are in these chapters.
You not only will be glad you did, but be better for it. If you check it out from Allen Memorial Library here on post, my apologies for the dog-eared pages — too many things I wanted to remember and go back and reference. Consider them your “cliff notes.” I didn’t highlight anything,
but it’s all in my own notebooks now. Fill yours as well: There is a lot here to think on and learn.
Author: Robert M. Citino
Allen Memorial Library
CALL #: MS 540.54 CIT