

~~RESTRICTED~~

The FIRST YEAR

PARTS I-IV

Reel 215



OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
SPECIAL STAFF, U.S. ARMY

HISTORICAL MANUSCRIPT FILE

CALL NUMBER

8-3.1
CA 1
V 1
C 1

TITLE

The First Year of the Occupation - Occupation Forces in Europe
Series - 1945-1946

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: *Unclassified*

OFFICE OF ORIGIN

AUTHORITY *ME 804 11 May 48*

Office of the Chief Historian, European Command
Frankfurt-AM-Main, Germany

REVIEWED

By *RS Thomas*
Date *3 Sept 48*

RETURN TO ROOM

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
SPECIAL STAFF OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OCS FORM 340
1 SEP 50

815217

OCCUPATION FORCES IN
EUROPE SERIES

1945-1946

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN EUROPEAN COMMAND

~~RESTRICTED~~



HEADQUARTERS
EUROPEAN COMMAND

II would provide a place for this digression and digression discussion. In that chapter it could be placed to follow "Terms of Surrender" data. This is a particularly aggravated case in that not only is definite topical material scattered between two volumes but, also, within one volume, subtopics are misplaced under faulty chapter headings.

An inexcusable evidence of duplication is found in Vol. II wherein demobilization personnel statistics are presented. A better arrangement for this item could have been devised than that presented by the present page 26 and pages 36 to 39 of Volume II wherein the same sets of figures are belabored to the confusion of the reader.

Another example of faulty arrangement occurs in Chapter XII, Vol. II, since much of what is therein presented repeats and amplifies material contained in Chapter III of Vol. I and Chapter IX of Vol. I.

Possibly the best arrangement in this series is encountered in Vol. III. This presents a very complete story with a minimum of repetition.


4. A summation of criticism would indicate that:

- a. Too little is told concerning the effect of the occupation upon the Germans.
- b. Too much emphasis has been placed upon topical arrangement so that repetition and duplication abound.
- c. Too many incidents have been included which do nothing to increase the reader's knowledge of how occupation worked.
- d. The reader is furnished a great mass of information about how we strove to occupy Germany and then, for the most part, is left to guess how occupation worked.
- e. No effort was made, apparently, to help the reader by the inclusion of any maps or sketches. A few would have helped.

On the credit side it can be said that a great mass of information, at present poorly arranged, is presented in the volumes.

5. It is recommended that:

- a. The manuscript be filed for reference use.
- b. That its present classification of "Restricted" be maintained.
- c. That a copy of this review be filed with the manuscript.


R. S. THOMAS

APC 757
August 1947

SUBJECT: Occupation Forces in Europe Series


TO : All concerned

1. The War Department has directed that the history of the military occupation of Germany and Austria in World War II be recorded and interpreted as the events transpire. The agency which is responsible for preparing this history is the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command.

2. The Occupation Forces in Europe Series, publication of which was begun in 1947, consists of a series of studies, monographs, and narratives of the history of the occupation. From time to time, the Occupation Forces in Europe Series will include a summary volume giving a narrative history of the occupation. All the studies or volumes published in the Series for the year 1945-46 or a subsequent year make up the official history of the occupation for that year.

3. Each publication in the Occupation Forces in Europe Series is based upon a thorough study of the correspondence, directives, and other documents relating to the subject. It serves also as a digest and summary of the pertinent passages of the reports of operations which are made periodically to the Office of the Chief Historian by all staff divisions and major units of the European Command. Each publication in the Series, before being issued, is reviewed by the staff divisions or subordinate command whose responsibilities indicate a primary interest in the subject matter.

4. All persons to whose attention these publications come are invited to forward to the Office of the Chief Historian, European Command, APC 757, their comments and criticisms, in order to make available all facts from which a definitive history may be prepared in the War Department.


LUCIUS D. CLAY
General, USA
Commander-in-Chief

~~RESTRICTED~~

24 Nov 49

8-3.1
C A I
D I
C I
1862

The First Year of the Occupation



REVIEWED
By J. S. Thomas
Date 3 Sept 48

Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46

FORM 804-1A
File # 8-3 (1st year) OC
Volume # 1

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN
EUROPEAN COMMAND
FRANKFURT - AM - MAIN, GERMANY
1947

1. CLASSIFICATION CHANGED TO: Unclassified
AUTHORITY M8 804 11 May 48

~~RESTRICTED~~

PART ONE

The Transition from Combat to Military Occupation (8 May — 17 July 1945)

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF HISTORIAN
HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN COMMAND
UNITED STATES ARMY

1946 - 1947

Chief Historian Colonel Harold E. Potter, Infantry
Chief Archivist Gillett Griswold

OCCUPATIONAL HISTORY BRANCH

Chiefs

Colonel David R. Kerr, Inf; Colonel Wilbur S. Nye, FA; Colonel A.C.M. Azoy, CAC; Lt. Colonel William S. McCrea, Inf.

Executive Officers

Lt. Colonel Malcolm S. Eakin, FA; Lt. Colonel John R. Ulmer, Inf;
Captain Arthur Gottlieb, CAC.

Chief Historical Consultant

* Joseph R. Starr, Ph.D.

Editorial Staff

Laura Towne, M.A.; Madeline E. Lannelle, B.S.; William D. Amis

HISTORIANS

Military Staff

Colonel Leslie E. Jacoby, FA; Colonel Arnold R.C. Sander, Inf;
* Colonel Charles E. Morrison, Cav; * Lt. Colonel George L. Pitre, Inf;
Lt. Colonel Tremaine K. Field, Inf; Major George C. Penny, AGD; * Major
Leonard L. Lerwill, Inf; * Major Harold W. Brown, Inf; 2d Lieutenant
Martin F. Detels, Jr., Inf; * Staff Sergeant Frizelle Gable, WAC.

Civilian Staff

Linda Bennett; * Arthur R. Burnet, A.B.; * Charles E. Campbell, A.B.;
Francis Chase, M.S.; Robert W. Coakley, M.A.; * Margaret L. Davis, A.B.;
Thomas A. Donovan, A.B.; Sophie R. Dornbusch, M.S.; Ruth McClung
Fleshman; * Marcus W. Floyd, A.B.; Marthe Frey, A.B.; * Frederic W.
Ganzert, Ph.D.; * Margaret L. Geis, M.A.; * Bernard V. Hall, M.A.;
Mildred V. Hester, A.B.; Margot Hoffman; Virginia G. Kritikos, A.B.;
* Elizabeth S. Lay, M.A.; Kordyan Lewandowski, M.A.; Walter S. Long,
A.B.; * Jean E. Malcolm, M.A. (Cantab.); * Josephine T. Melendy, A.B.;
* George F. Muller, M.A.; * Albert Norman, B.S.S.; * Drusilla J. Norris,
B.S.; * George J. Olszewski; Betty O'Regan; * John C.E. Smith, B.A.
(Cantab.)

(*) Contributors to this volume.

THE FIRST YEAR
PART ONE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
CHAPTER I: The Defeat of Germany	1
CHAPTER II: The United States Forces on V-E Day	32
CHAPTER III: The United States Forces in Transition	47
CHAPTER IV: The Assumption of the Occupation Mission	77
CHAPTER V: The Maturation of the Policies and Organization of the Occupation	90
CHAPTER VI: The Manpower Problem	128
CHAPTER VII: Organization and Functioning of the Occupation . .	148
CHAPTER VIII: Accomplishments of the Occupation	167
CHAPTER IX: Three Examples of United States Occupation	183
FOOTNOTES :	223
CHARTS:	
European Theater Organization, 17 July 1945, following	89
European Theater Organization, 30 June 1946, following	182

2. The Act of Signing.

The provisional German Government (1) authorized Col. Gen. Gustav Jodl, Chief of Staff, to sign the instrument of surrender. He arrived at Reims in a United States C-47 airplane on 6 May and was taken directly to Supreme Headquarters. An Allied delegation including General Smith, Gen. Carl Spaatz, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Force, Maj. Gen. Francis Sevez of the French Army, Gen. Ivan Sousloparov of the Soviet High Command, and a number of others met the German general in the War Room in the Industrial College of Reims. The instrument was signed at 0241, 1 May. After placing his signature on the paper, General Jodl was granted permission to speak. Addressing the group in German, he said:

With this signature the German people and armed forces are, for better or worse, delivered into the hands of the victors. In this war, which has lasted more than five years, they have both achieved and suffered more than perhaps any other people in the world. In this hour, I can only express the hope that the victor will treat them with generosity.

None of the Allied officers replied to General Jodl's remarks. The surrender was confirmed at Berlin at 0045 hours on 9 May with Admiral von Friedeburg, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, and Col. Gen. Paul Stumpf of the Luftwaffe signing for the German High Command. Air Marshal A. W. Tedder signed for the Supreme Commander and General Zhukov for the Soviet forces, with Gen. Jean Lattre de Tassigny of France and General Spaatz of the U.S. Strategic Air Forces as witnesses.

3. Text of the Act of Surrender.

The document which General Jodl signed read as follows:

1. We the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and simultaneously to the Soviet High Command all forces on land, sea, and in the air who are at this date under German control.

2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval, and air authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours Central European Time on 8 May and to remain in the positions occupied at that time. No ship, vessel, or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery, or equipment.

3. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commanders, and ensure the carrying out of any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and by the Soviet High Command.

4. This act of military surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by any general instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of the United Nations and applicable to Germany and to the German armed forces as a whole.

5. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control, failing to act in accordance with this act of surrender, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Soviet High Command, will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate.

4. General Eisenhower's Actions.

After the signing, the Germans were brought into the presence of General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, who asked them if they understood the terms and if they were prepared to carry them out. They replied in the affirmative. General Eisenhower then went into

the War Room and delivered a victory address, in which he credited the triumph to teamwork among the United States, Great Britain, and "elements of almost every oppressed country in Europe." Later, he telephoned to Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 12th U.S. Army Group, who, on hearing that the enemy had surrendered, instructed his field commanders to stand fast and avoid exposing their troops to danger.

5. Announcement of the Surrender.

The German radio station at Flensburg announced on 7 May 1945 the surrender by authority of Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz, acting as Hitler's successor. (2) There had as yet been no official statement from the Allied powers, since 1500 hours on 8 May had been set as the time for the announcement. Associated Press correspondent Edward Kennedy sent a news dispatch telling of the surrender before the time for the release, and newspapers carried the story before it was officially announced by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill. It was originally planned to make simultaneous announcements from Washington, London, and Moscow, but Premier Stalin did not make any announcement until 9 May.

THE COMPLETION OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

6. The Collapse of Organized Resistance to United States Troops.

As the Germans announced their unconditional surrender, the

Allied armies were storming the last Nazi strongholds in Central Europe. In France, one reinforced division, the 66th Infantry Division, was containing the enemy garrison at St. Nazaire and Lorient on a front of about 112 miles. Some small areas in northern Yugoslavia, western Latvia, France, the Channel Islands, and along the Elbe River were still in German hands. Only in Czechoslovakia did fighting on any considerable scale by United States troops continue. The little fight left in the Germans was mostly directed at the other Allies. The piecemeal capitulation of the Wehrmacht that took place during the days preceding final surrender seemed part of a deliberate plan of the German High Command and the Dönitz Government to surrender as many of their forces as possible to the Western Allies before acknowledging the simultaneous victory of the Red Army.(3)

7. Continued Resistance to the Soviet Forces.

On 8 May, the only announcement from Moscow was a communique summarizing another day of fighting between Soviet and German forces. Stalin's order of that day reported that the "troops of the Fourth Ukrainian Command, continuing their offensive after stiff fighting, today occupied the large town and railway junction of Olomouc, an important bastion in the German defense on the Moravia River line." A communique from the German High Command confirmed the continuance of fighting in Moravia and in the north.(4) Breslau fell to Marshal Koniev's forces after an 84-day siege.(5) Dresden, the last large city remaining in Nazi hands, surrendered on 8 May.(6) In Austria, the

Third Ukrainian Army occupied the towns of Waidhofen, Lebing, and St. Michael two days later. A week after the official end of hostilities, fanatical Germans were still resisting in Berlin. SS troops in civilian disguise were setting fires and flooding subway tunnels. The principal building destroyed was the city hall.(7)

8. Capitulation to British Forces.

a. It was more than seven hours after hostilities had officially ended before the Channel Islands surrendered and the only part of the United Kingdom which had been in Nazi hands was liberated. There was no active resistance, but the Germans, who had held the islands since 20 June 1940, remained there until the bitter end. The destroyer Bulldog waited three days within firing distance while negotiations went on. Surrender terms were signed at 0700 hours on 9 May, on the quarter-deck of the Bulldog. Great crowds of excited islanders overwhelmed the landing troops who assured their liberation. The inhabitants were hungry, but so were the Germans, who had been cut off from supplies for many weeks.(8)

b. Also on the morning of 9 May, Dunkerque surrendered to the First Canadian Army,(9) four days after the surrender of all other enemy forces in the area.(10)

c. The next day, London announced the surrender of two widely separated German forces in the Courland district of Latvia and on the Greek Isles of Crete and Milos. On 11 May, a naval communique reported the surrender of all German garrisons, totalling

20,000 men, in the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean Sea.(11)

d. In Norway as late as 20 May, armed Germans were still requisitioning fresh vegetables and other food, as well as liquor, clothing, and various types of equipment, from the populace.(12) A raid on 10 June at Lillehammer, German Headquarters in Norway, by 600 British soldiers resulted in seizure of important records and the apprehension of 50 officers, 100 enlisted men, and 127 Wehrmacht women. Defeated Germans had been living in fantastic style in a resort hotel there on stocks they had accumulated in Norway.(13)

e. Copenhagen had been formally handed over to the Allies on 10 May and turned over to the Danes by the British on the same day, but a month after V-E Day the Nazis were not out of Denmark. Col. Gen. S. Lindeman, the highest-ranking uncaptured Wehrmacht commander, was directing the final evacuation and maintaining German authority in the area. No Allied personnel was allowed to enter without permission.(14)

9. The Last German Pocket Contained by United States Troops.

For some time there remained a patch of about one thousand square miles of "free" German territory between the United States and Soviet forces, where German soldiers, under their commanders, roamed at will. This area lay south of Zwickau and east of Rodewisch, near Plauen, and extended to the western limits of the Soviet position near Annaberg and south roughly to the Czech border. Both the United States and Soviet forces whose fronts touched this territory had orders not

to "invade" it. Road blocks were established to keep refugees within the area and to prevent the German forces from attempting a counter-invasion. Aside from some 5,000 refugees camping gypsy-style along the roads, there were about 16,000 German troops garrisoning in small towns. All the troops were unarmed, their weapons having been turned over to the 87th Division, but they still had their own officers and regular military organizations and were considered as uncaptured troops. The delay was caused by indecision over the boundary between the United States and Soviet Zones. Instructions to the armies, dated 19 May, established the boundary in this area as a line between Karlsbad and Chemnitz, thus placing about two-thirds of the disputed district under the control of the Ninth U.S. Army and one-third under Soviet control pending final changes to ultimate occupation zones. It was several days before positions could be taken up, and meantime the remnant of German troops was in a state of desperation and terrorizing the towns and countryside while foraging for food.(15)

10. Disposition of United States Forces Immediately after V-E Day.

a. The United States forces reported little enemy opposition. The principal American concern was the detention of German troops and civilians who were fleeing from the advancing Soviet forces in such numbers that roads were blocked. Liaison planes maintained a constant land and sea search to prevent individual or organized escape.(16) The majority of incidents were considered to be sabotage or the activities of a nascent underground movement.(17)

b. The 12th Army Group was deployed on a 550-mile front across Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Germany. For the Ninth U.S. Army, offensive operations ended by 1 May, after which date it maintained a watch on the Elbe River, the decision having been reached that this army should halt along the line of the Mulde and the Elbe River rather than meet the Soviet forces in a headlong advance.(18)

c. Organized resistance against the Fifteenth U.S. Army in the area bordering the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France ended on 18 April.(19) The Lorient garrison did not capitulate until midnight of 7 May. Enemy forces in St. Nazaire held out longer, supposedly for the purpose of destroying installations, but surrendered unconditionally as of midnight 8 May.(20) The French Navy occupied the port on 11 May, and reported no apparent demolition.(21) The XXII Corps was alerted by Fifteenth Army Headquarters on 9 June for movement to Czechoslovakia. A week later all its units had taken up their new positions in that country.(22)

11. The End of Resistance in Austria.

a. To assist the 15th Army Group in Italy and Austria, the 12th Army Group was ordered on 22 May to prepare to move two corps through the Alps into Carinthia to relieve the British. The following day these corps began the movement south, but after reconnaissance and a request from the British this movement was delayed until the congested area could be cleared. Meanwhile, the situation improved and the forces held on alert for movement to Carinthia were reduced

to one corps on 14 June and were entirely relieved twelve days later.(23)

12. The Naval Finish: Kiel and the Submarine Surrender.

a. Under the terms of surrender all German warships, auxiliaries, merchant ships, and other craft at sea were ordered to report their positions to the nearest Allied wireless telegraph station. These ships were then to proceed to Allied ports and to remain there pending further orders. Submarines at sea were ordered to surface, to fly a black flag or pennant, and to proceed to such ports as directed.(24) The white ensign or United States colors were hoisted on all ships and craft found in German ports.(25)

b. All forward operating U-boat bases had been located for some time on the Norwegian west coast, notably at Trondheim and Bergen. These bases were well equipped with workshop facilities and stocks of spare parts and torpedoes to permit operation of craft for some time without fresh supplies. It was known that the crews' morale was high. At Kiel, the largest U-boat base in German home waters, about one hundred U-boats were present on 2 May, but by 4 May almost half of them had departed for unknown destinations.(26)

c. By 1800 hours on 9 May, only six U-boats had reported their positions and another five had entered ports. The first U-boat to surrender gave up to a U.S. Navy plane off England and was escorted to Portland harbor by British naval craft. By 10 May, fourteen had answered the surrender order and two had actually reached British ports. The following day, ninety midget submarines complete with

crews and equipment were located at Lynaas, Denmark, and at Schouwen and Overflakkee on the Netherland coast.(27) Seven U-boats were found intact in the harbor at Helgoland.(28) The island of Helgoland was formally taken over on 11 May by a force of Royal Marines, and the garrison and civilians were evacuated. The town of Helgoland had been completely destroyed.(29)

d. The U-boat fleet was slowly being rounded up by Allied vessels and impounded in ports all over the world. On 14 May, a submarine surrendered off Cape May, New Jersey, and the next day another surrendered at Portsmouth, New Hampshire.(30) On 16 May, nineteen surfaced U-boats were sighted off the coast of Norway and were ordered to the west coast of Scotland to surrender. It was estimated that at least fourteen others were at sea and unreported.(31) British Admiral Max Horton, commander of the western approaches at Londonderry, North Ireland, said on 17 May that it was possible some German submarines might not yet have received surrender instructions. By that time more than one hundred submarines had been found at bases, but of the fifty to seventy enemy underwater raiders on missions at the time of surrender only thirty-four had been accounted for on both sides of the Atlantic.(32) Early in June a large German submarine appeared off the Portugese coast and sent up a distress signal. Its crew members were interned after they had scuttled the craft.(33) One other arrived at Scapa on the morning of 4 June,(34) but German submarines still prowled the Baltic Sea like pirates, refusing to

surrender. Soviet planes searched the sea for the raiders and several battles between aircraft and submarines took place.(35)

13. The Close of the Campaign in Czechoslovakia.

a. The resistance met in Czechoslovakia by United States and Soviet forces was considerably more extensive than elsewhere. It was the only region where air and ground operations continued without a halt after announcement of the surrender on 8 May. The German forces continually opposed or fled from the Soviet forces, while the United States forces were alerted again and again for actions that never materialized.

b. One Soviet force entered the suburbs of Prague from the southeast, another crossed the frontier from Saxony about sixty miles north of the Czech capital, and still another drove south from Moravska-Ostra.(36) On the night of 9 May, Marshal Stalin issued an order of the day proclaiming the liberation of Prague, although the city had been under air attack from German planes that afternoon.(37) Confusion was created by the German-held Prague radion, which forecast continued resistance because, as it said, the German Government had not actually capitulated to the Soviet Union as to the other Allies.(38)

c. The Third U.S. Army was directed to continue its advance to an agreed line of contact with the Soviet forces in both Czechoslovakia and Austria.(39) On 5 May the 4th Armored Division, after attacking in Czechoslovakia to the northeast, was ordered to halt its advance, and after that it marked time until the unconditional

surrender. When the 16th Armored Division took Pilsen in Czechoslovakia on 6 May, the eastern line was secured and only routine consolidation of positions was then necessary.(40) Commanding generals of units of the Third U.S. Army were furnished an operational directive on 10 May which provided that units in Czechoslovakia areas would:(41)

Establish defended road blocks at once on all main roads leading into corps areas from the southeast, east, and northeast.

Place signs well in front of these defended road blocks reading: "In compliance with the terms of surrender, German military personnel are forbidden to pass beyond this line."

Stop troop and hospital trains from coming inside our lines by performing such minor demolitions as are necessary.

d. Germans who refused to surrender were subjected to constantly increasing pressure from the Soviet forces. Final collapse of German resistance in Czechoslovakia and the surrender of 420,052 hold-out troops was announced on 14 May by the Soviet High Command.(42) Occasional gunfire continued in Prague streets for some days as Soviet and Czech forces routed German soldiers from cellars and attics. In spite of this danger, President Edouard Benes of Czechoslovakia made a dramatic return to the city on 15 May after six years of exile.

e. The 12th Army Group on 14 May directed that the advance to the south would continue until contact was made with the Soviet forces or with the 15th Army Group.(43) In addition, Third Army was given full authority to put down any resistance. Consequently, the movement proceeded as planned, although mobility was hampered by

poor roads and icy conditions.(44) As late as 18 May, instructions from the 12th Army Group to the Third Army emphasized that its positions in Czechoslovakia held at the end of hostilities should be maintained with the use of all necessary force to restrain all movement of German military or civilian elements in the west. As Czechoslovakia was not considered enemy territory, military government was not invoked in the technical sense. Emergency civil affairs detachments were formed and equipped by the Third Army from service and combat troops. These detachments were deployed to exercise control of civil administration pending United States withdrawal.(45) Instructions were issued by Supreme Headquarters on 6 July for gradual reduction of forces in Czechoslovakia in proportion to the reduction of Soviet troops in the country.(46)

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE GERMAN HIGH COMMAND AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

14. Assumption of Command by the Dönitz "Government" and Negotiations for Surrender.

The collapse of the German forces was paralleled by the disintegration of the German High Command and Government. Intelligence reports indicated that a jockeying for position had taken place among the various top-ranking German leaders following the reported death of Hitler in late April or early May 1945.(47) In a broadcast to the

German nation on 1 May 1945, Admiral Dönitz stated that Hitler was dead and that he had been nominated by Hitler to succeed him as Germany's Chancellor and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht.(48) During the early days of May, emissaries of the German High Command and of the Dönitz "Government" were already conferring with Allied authorities at Supreme Headquarters (Forward), then located in Reims, France. The German officers who had negotiated the surrender of their northwestern armies on 5 May 1945 remained within the Allied lines to negotiate a complete German surrender.(49) On 6 May Supreme Headquarters directed the Moscow Military Mission to inform the Soviet High Command that the proposed unconditional surrender terms had been presented to Admiral von Friedeburg, the emissary of Admiral Dönitz, on the afternoon of 5 May 1945. Admiral von Friedeburg transmitted a message to Admiral Dönitz requesting authorization to sign an act of unconditional and simultaneous surrender or that Dönitz send the Commander in Chief of the Army, the Commander in Chief of the Navy, and the Commander in Chief of the Air Force to Supreme Headquarters for the signing of the surrender.(50)

15. Establishment at Supreme Headquarters of a Liaison Detachment from the German High Command.

Shortly after the surrender, a liaison detachment from the German High Command was set up at Supreme Headquarters (Forward). Detailed instructions for the composition of this detachment were issued by Supreme Headquarters. It was to consist of fourteen officers

and a number of enlisted men and to include a general officer in charge, two officers each from General Staff, "A" Branch, "Q" Branch, and Air Staff, one medical officer, two signals officers, and two naval officers.(51) On 9 May addition of the following German officials was ordered: the Secretary of State for the Reichspostministerium, the ranking radio officer of the Luftwaffe, and, from the German High Command, the ranking signal officer with one senior staff expert on military wireless and cable matters, and the ranking code and cipher officer.(52) Orders were issued by Supreme Headquarters on 13 May 1945 announcing the installation of the German High Command Liaison Party at a point six miles outside of Reims, France.(53)

16. Establishment at Flensburg of the Allied Control Party.

In the meantime, Supreme Headquarters had arranged to set up its control party at German High Command Headquarters, the seat of the Dönitz Government, located at Flensburg, Germany, near the Danish frontier. A control party of twenty-five United States and British officers and fifty-two enlisted men under the command of Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rocks, U.S. Army, was authorized on 11 May 1945.(54) The Soviet authorities were informed and invited to send a similar party. The Soviet General Staff informed Supreme Headquarters that they would send to Flensburg a control group consisting of fifteen officers and additional supporting personnel, to be under the command of General Trusov.(55) The setting up of a control party over German

elements in southern Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia was also contemplated.(56)

17. Posthostilities Negotiations between the German High Command and the Allies.

a. Various negotiations and other contacts continued to be made between the Allied Commands on the one hand, and the German High Command Liaison Party at Reims, France, or the German High Command at Flensburg, Germany, on the other. For instance, General Jodl, at Reims, protested that the Soviet forces were continuing bombing operations against the Germans in the East Prussian Army Sector.(57) On the other hand, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Army, in a message to General Eisenhower, noted that the Central and Southern Groups of the German forces did not cease resistance at 2301 hours on 8 May 1945 and did not remain in their places and lay down their arms as required by the Act of Capitulation. At 1600 hours on 9 May 1945 these forces were not capitulating, but were resisting the Soviet Army and moving westwards. General Eisenhower directed the German High Command at Flensburg to issue orders to the Central and Southern Groups effecting full and immediate compliance.(58)

b. Some confusion arose as to the procedure for correspondence between Supreme Headquarters and the German High Command. This matter was clarified in a letter issued by Supreme Headquarters on 13 May 1945, which stated that Supreme Headquarters would deal with the German High Command only through the Supreme Headquarters Control

Party at the German High Command Headquarters. The German High Command Liaison Detachment at Supreme Headquarters existed purely as an advisory body to the Supreme Headquarters staff divisions and was not used as a means of communication between the German High Command and Supreme Headquarters.(59) Apparently this letter was not complied with immediately and further directions had to be issued to the German High Command through the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at the German High Command Headquarters. These new directions noted that Supreme Headquarters had received many messages from the German High Command Liaison Detachment at Supreme Headquarters and that it was not at all clear whether the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg had seen these messages. It was pointed out that it was essential that the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg should censor all messages issued by the German High Command, including those to the Liaison Detachment. It referred back to the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg, for their primary action, a letter to the German High Command Liaison Detachment from the German High Command Headquarters at Flensburg which proposed the setting up of a radio network by the High Command so that its orders could be heard, not only by German military authorities, but also by German troops.(60)

c. On 14 May 1945, after charges were made from abroad that ill-advised messages had been broadcast over the Flensburg radio, the Supreme Headquarters Control Party at Flensburg was directed to establish control over the Flensburg radio station and to censor any

messages coming from it.(61) German radio stations continued to make propaganda broadcasts, however, and on 20 May it was again pointed out that German authorities could use broadcasting facilities only when the Allied military authorities wished and after they had censored the proposed broadcasts.(62)

d. Supreme Headquarters decided to use German Reichspost facilities to the fullest possible extent to supplement their own military signal communications network. An attempt was made to secure the return of Reichspost telecommunications personnel to their proper places of employment. The assistance of the German High Command in this matter was authorized on 23 May 1945.(63)

18. Strengthening of Allied Controls in Southern Germany.

Information from reconnaissance elements indicated that there were southern elements of the German High Command in the vicinity of Berchtesgaden and that there was a wide dispersal and possibly deliberate concealment of documents. On 24 May it was decided to reinforce local control groups in southern Germany with additional United States and British officers. Radio links between the control groups at Flensburg and those in the south were to be arranged.(64)

19. The Arrest of Admiral Dönitz and His Followers.

a. In the meantime, the question of arresting Admiral Dönitz and the members of the German High Command and Government came more and more to the fore. Admiral Dönitz himself and most

members of his government were slated for arrest by Supreme Headquarters following a conference between Ambassador Murphy and the British political adviser at Supreme Headquarters.(65) Supreme Headquarters, however, requested that the Soviet Union be contacted before action be taken. In the meantime, steps were taken to reduce and eliminate the "excessive functions" of the Dönitz Government.(66) On 18 May 1945 Supreme Headquarters was informed through General Trusov, the senior Soviet representative at Flensburg, that the Soviet Government had "nothing against the arrest of all members of the so-called government of Admiral Dönitz."(67)

b. The German High Command Liaison Detachment at Reims was ordered closed down effective 23 May 1945. The members of this detachment were to be disposed of by the provost marshal of Oise Base Section and by G-2 and A-2 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters.(68)

c. The German High Command itself was closed down on 24 May 1945. At 1000 hours on that date, Admiral Dönitz and his staff were summoned on board the former German luxury liner Patria, the Headquarters of General Rooks and his Supreme Headquarters Control Party. Upon their arrival they were met by General Rooks and representative officers of the British and Soviet forces and placed under arrest. At the same time, British troops marched into Admiral Dönitz' schoolhouse compound at Flensburg and took all its occupants prisoners. Thus ended the German High Command and Government at Flensburg.(69)

20. Disbandment of the German High Command, South.

On 17 June 1945 it was decided to disband the German High Command in southern Germany in much the same manner as had been done with the Flensburg Government in the North. The Allied Control Party was to move to the Ministerial Collecting Center area near Kassel.(70) The disbandment of the German High Command South completed the liquidation of all surviving military elements of the German Government.

21. Establishing Control over German Ministries.

Now that the "government" and all elements of the German High Command were eliminated, the task of gathering together and controlling the scattered elements of the German ministries remained. The Plan GOLDCUP, drawn up by Supreme Headquarters during hostilities to establish contact with the Soviet forces after the defeat of Germany and to secure control over all German ministries located in the area subject to General Eisenhower's command, was implemented to some extent in the middle of May 1945. This plan had provided for the setting up of several ministerial control parties to search for the various German ministries and a Ministerial Control Group in charge of all these parties.(71) Ministerial control parties had already been directed to proceed to Flensburg on 15 May 1945.(72) Effort was to be made to locate all German ministries in the United States and British areas with the ultimate aim of concentrating all elements of the national government in one center.(73) The Ministerial Control Group, along with the Soviet Mission at Flensburg, assumed a

local control over elements of the German High Command in the north. Questioning of members of the former High Command revealed that most of the High Command's documents had been sent south. The setting up of ministerial control parties in the south and of coordinating agencies between them was recommended on 26 May 1945.(74) Control of the German High Command North officially passed from the Allied Control Party to the Ministerial Control Group on 28 May 1945. Brigadier Watkins, in command of the Ministerial Control Group, was also responsible for coordinating activities between the Allied Control Party of the German High Command North and the Allied Control Party of the German High Command South.(75)

22. Establishment of the Ministerial Collecting Center.

The Ministerial Control Group appointed a committee to locate a suitable area where the personnel and archives of the various German ministries could be assembled. This grouping of German agencies was to be known as the Ministerial Collecting Center. It was finally decided to use the areas of Eschenstruth, Fürstenhagen, and Lichtenau, about fifteen miles southeast of Kassel, in the northern part of Land "Hessen".(76) Supreme Headquarters agreed on 5 June 1945 to reserve this area for the Ministerial Collecting Center.(77) The objects of the Ministerial Collecting Center included safeguarding of German archives and records for the Allied Control Council and providing a collecting center for such members of German ministerial staffs as might be required for interrogation or as archivists.

After all the required information had been secured, the Allied Control Council would determine the fate of the various ministries.(78)

23. Movement of the Ministerial Collecting Center from the Kassel Area to Berlin.

a. The establishment of the Ministerial Collecting Center near Kassel was a joint United States-British undertaking and was intended as a temporary measure pending the establishment of a quadripartite ministerial collecting center. Officers in charge of the Ministerial Collecting Center recommended that a committee be chosen to make a survey to find a permanent location in Berlin for the records of the ministries, following the disbandment of the Ministerial Collecting Center near Kassel. It was not considered desirable to attempt establishment of a quadripartite collecting center either in Kassel or in the Soviet Zone.(79)

b. At the Potsdam Conference it was decided that the five chief ministries would be moved to Berlin by 1 November 1945 and that the Ministerial Collecting Center near Kassel would be completely closed out by 1 February 1946. A conference was held on 15 October 1945 to determine the present and future requirements of the Ministerial Collecting Center.(80) It soon appeared that difficulties stood in the way of a quadripartite agreement concerning the Ministerial Collecting Center and that an early removal to Berlin would be extremely difficult. Many American military officials felt,

however, that the five ministries mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement should be removed to Berlin, even though they were established in the United States Sector of Berlin under exclusive United States control. They could remain in this sector pending quadripartite agreement. Such ministerial records as were not to be removed to Berlin were to be placed in a central depository.(81) Orders for the removal of the Ministerial Collecting Center from the Kassel Area to Berlin were issued by the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) on 5 January 1946.(82) This move in which all documents required by the occupation forces or by any future German governments were transferred, was completed by 1 February 1946, when the Ministerial Collecting Center was reconstituted at Berlin-Tempelhof under the command of the 6889th Berlin Documents Center.(83) Only fifty German civil servants were moved from Kassel to Berlin.

THE SEIZURE OF CONTROL

24. Establishment of Control Over Civil Population.

The last stage in the initial assumption of control in Germany came with the putting into force of certain enactments and proclamations directed toward the civil population, which were later ratified by the quadripartite authority.(84) All entertainment was forbidden. People were allowed to keep their radios, but music was not allowed. Instead,

the Allies used this outlet for broadcasting world news, instructions, and public proclamations. Over-all registration of a temporary nature was put into effect. The use of postal and telephone communications was not permitted. A curfew was strictly enforced and travel by any means except on foot or bicycle was prohibited. Motor travel was permitted to doctors, nurses, and clergymen visiting outlying districts. Repair of the badly damaged German railway system was begun immediately, but only for military use. The work previously carried out by slave labor now fell to the Germans themselves.

25. The Setting-up of Military Law.

The laws of warfare protected the property rights of the vanquished Germans and placed other limitations upon the powers of the conqueror. The laws proclaimed by the occupying powers in Germany dissolved the Nazi Party, suspended German laws containing Nazi principles, closed German courts, dissolved the special Nazi courts, prohibited various kinds of private and public communication, made Allied military currency legal tender, blocked German foreign exchange transactions, froze German property abroad, and established control over all German-Government and Nazi property at home and abroad.(85)

a. The law dissolving the Nazi Party listed fifty-two offices, organizations, and institutions, and eight paramilitary organizations which were prohibited. All funds, property, equipment, accounts and records were to be preserved intact and delivered to

Military Government. Officers or persons in charge were to be responsible for carrying out these provisions, and any punishment, including death, could be inflicted for failure to comply.

b. The Nazi laws abrogated included the law for the protection of national symbols, the law against the creation of political parties, the law securing the unity of party and state, and another concerning insidious attacks against the state and the party and for the protection of party uniforms. Others were the "Reich" flag law, the Hitlerjugend law, the law for protection of German blood and honor, the "Reich" citizenship law, and decrees of the fñhrer concerning the legal status of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei. Later, other laws were suspended. Limitations were placed on punishment. Only those punishments expressly provided by law, and no cruel or excessive punishments, could be inflicted. Detention without a specific charge and punishment without a lawful trial were prohibited.

c. The Volksgerichtshof, the Sondergericht, and all courts and tribunals of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter-Partei and of its associated organizations were abolished. Ordinary and administrative courts were suspended temporarily, pending their denazification. All cases involving any of the United Nations or any of their nationals, cases involving military law or personnel, and claims for money against the German Government were removed from the jurisdiction of German courts. In addition, military government

courts could assume jurisdiction of any case, or review any case.

All death sentences were to be reviewed.

d. All telephone, teletype, telegraph, and radio services and all internal, external, and transit mail services were suspended. All items in transit were detained by postal authorities. The only post-office functions allowed to remain in operation were savings-bank and other financial services. All employees of the communications systems were to continue to report to their places of duty and were to be responsible for the preservation, maintenance, and repair of facilities. All privately owned communications equipment had to be declared. The law provided for a system of censorship for all correspondence, personal papers, and documents carried either by the post or by civilian travelers and for all communications by telephone, teletype, telegraph, or radio, when such services should be restored. Violations could be punished by death.

e. The printing, production, publication, distribution, sale, and commercial lending of all newspapers, magazines, periodicals, books, pamphlets, posters, printed music, and other printed material, of sound recordings and motion picture films were prohibited, and all theatrical and radio activities. The Ministry of Propaganda and the laws of review were abolished, and the funds, property, equipment, accounts, and records of the ministry were taken over. Violations of this law also might be punished by death.

f. Another law provided that Allied military mark notes of

denominations equivalent to other mark currency were to be used for all transactions, and any punishment short of death was authorized for violations. All money transactions between Germans and people outside of Germany were prohibited without specific permission from Military Government. All persons owning or controlling foreign assets, or owing any obligations whatever were required to report it. All foreign currency, checks, drafts, bills of exchange or other instruments of payment were to be delivered to the nearest branch of the Reichsbank.(86)

26. The Apprehension of Nazi Personalities.

The Western Allies entered Germany with well-laid plans for the seizure of control. Much thought had gone into the selection of targets--the strategic points which, if seized, would put the Allies in full control of the situation. Some of the targets were persons: the leading personalities of the Nazi Party, the German Government, and the armed forces. The surrender, suicide, or capture of the top members of the Nazi hierarchy was so rapid that three weeks after V-E Day only a few top Nazis were at large. Hitler's death seemed sure, but was not actually established. His decision to die in Berlin rather than flee to Berchtesgaden appeared to have put an end to the contingency of top Nazis holding out in the mountains and building a "no-surrender" legend for use in reviving nazism among whatever die-hards might survive defeat. Joseph Goebbels, Heinrich Himmler, and Gen. Admiral Hans von Friedeburg committed suicide by swallowing poison. Hermann Goering, Grand Admiral Karl Doenitz, Field Marshal

Wilhelm Keitel, Julius Streicher, Col. Gen. ^{A/Fred} Gustav Jodl, and former labor minister Robert Ley were in custody. Rudolph Hess was still a prisoner in Great Britain. A number of high-ranking officers were captured with their troops.(87)

27. Other Targets of Control.

Other targets destined for seizure were agencies or institutions. These included the Nazi Party and all its auxiliary organizations, the civil administration, and the agencies and means of communication and information.

a. Organized government had for the most part broken down; as a matter of fact, not much government was needed, for the people were too stunned by the sudden collapse to offer much resistance. Military Government detachments in each Kreis, together with weekly meetings and inspections, made it possible to head off any unauthorized activity that threatened. The time was used by Military Government in defining its own organization and in making preliminary studies and evaluations. The necessary changes in German government were obvious. Nazi influence had to be removed, as well as the military character and the central controls. Many appointments to local German offices, made during combat, had to be changed.(88)

b. Other targets were economic or industrial. These included war plants, key industries, and concentrations of economic power and wealth. The disposition of German industry so as to make restitution for the damage suffered by the victims of German aggression

and to deprive Germany of the power to make war was one of the most difficult problems. Partial restoration of industry was of course necessary in order to effect any kind of rehabilitation and to prevent starvation. Within a few days after the surrender, the Ford plant at Cologne was turning out trucks for the use of Military Government in transporting displaced persons. Two boiler plants reopened and a few sawmills were producing lumber for essential bridges and houses; a threadmill was supplying raw materials for clothing; and shops were reopening wherever possible. While no final policy of industry control had as yet been established, the immediate policy was to reopen factories whose products were of help to the Army in its task of maintaining order and in supplying such imperative civilian needs as food, medicine, disinfectants, soap, fertilizer, power, and so forth. Other legitimate industries were permitted but not encouraged. Any luxury enterprise was subject to labor requisition if additional personnel was needed for essential work. The climax to the seizure of control over German industry came on 5 July 1945, when United States officers took over the management of all plants and branches of the I.G. Farbenindustrie, the largest chemical firm in the world and Germany's major producer of war materials.(89)

28. Assumption of Four-Power Authority in Germany.

The ultimate step in the seizure of control came with the Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945, announcing the assumption of joint control in Germany, by the governments of the United States,

Great Britain, the Provisional Government of France, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.(90) On 14 July General Eisenhower proclaimed that U.S. Forces, European Theater, had been established under his control and that all military laws and orders issued under his authority as Supreme Commander remained in effect.

Chapter II

THE UNITED STATES FORCES ON V-E DAY

THE STRUCTURE OF COMMAND

29. Machinery for Coordination.

A global conflict necessitating the highest degree of collaboration between the Allied forces led to the establishment of an organization that was capable of both integrated and separated command. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff exercised control over the Army and Navy; the British War Office exercised control over the British military forces; while the Combined Chiefs of Staff was made up of representatives of the two nations and issued instructions in the name of both governments to operational commands. The Allied Expeditionary Force was composed of the U.S. Army, the British Army, and elements of the armies of the liberated countries. Two measures were taken to effect coordination between Supreme Headquarters and these countries: an Allied Contact Section was established in Supreme Headquarters, to which representatives of the Allied governments were

assigned; and missions were maintained in the various countries.

30. Machinery of United States Organization.

Even within the United States command, organization was on a complex triple basis, comprised of Supreme Headquarters, Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and the Communications Zone--all working in a closely interrelated pattern of responsibilities.

31. Supreme Headquarters.

a. The Supreme Commander. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower was Supreme Commander of all United States and British forces in northwestern Europe, as well as of all other national elements forming part of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and in this capacity he received instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He was assisted by a chief of staff, by a general and special staff, and by a number of political advisers who were specialists on the European countries with which Supreme Headquarters was dealing.

b. Distribution of Personnel. Supreme Headquarters included both United States and British officers, distributed, so far as possible, in equal numbers in the staff division and sections. The general practice was for the chief of a division to have a deputy of the other nationality.

c. General and Special Staffs. Of the two sections of the general staff, one dealt with general operations and the other with air operations. The naval and air staffs operated under their respective

commanders. The special staff included the Adjutant General, the Engineer, Signals, Medical, Psychological Warfare, Public Relations, Air Defense, and Headquarters Commandant.

d. Major Commands under the Supreme Headquarters. The major commands under the Supreme Headquarters were the 6th, 12th, and 21st Army Groups, the Naval task forces, and the tactical air forces. Field forces, with few exceptions, were assigned to the army groups, which were tactical echelons. On 20 July 1945, the 6th Army Group was disbanded, and its forces transferred to the 12th Army Group.

32. Functions of the United States Elements of Supreme Headquarters.

As well as performing the functions allotted to them under the Allied scheme of organization, the United States elements on the Supreme Headquarters staff were responsible for certain functions in connection with United States troop matters, generally when these involved two or more major commands or were matters of policy.(1) Matters relating to personnel and relations with civil populations were assigned to the United States element of the G-1 Division. United States military censorship and administration of military intelligence units were the responsibility of the United States element of the G-2 Division. The G-3 United States element dealt with inspections of United States troops directed by the Theater Commander, training policies, operation reports, signal communications,

experiments with new items, Theater troop basis, organization of units, and issue of equipment. Administration and planning of major subordinate commands, allocation of service troops, supply, transportation, construction, captured enemy materiel, employment of indigenous labor, and civil affairs supplies were allotted to the United States element of the G-4 Division.

33. Channels of Command

In 1944 the division of authority was, briefly, on the following lines: All Theater duties, except those of decision and policy affecting more than one principal United States command, were the responsibility of the Commanding General of the Communications Zone; in United States matters on which the Theater Commander had to take personal action, the appropriate senior officer of the United States element of Supreme Headquarters acted in an advisory capacity to the Theater Commander.(2) In April 1945 the chiefs of the general staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters were designated acting chiefs of the equivalent divisions of the European Theater of Operations.(3) The relation between these two staffs was indicated by Lt. Gen. W. B. Smith, Chief of Staff, as follows:

It seems to me that the guiding principle of operation is that General Eisenhower, as American Theater Commander, is using the staff of the Line of Communications (Communications Zone) to perform the usual functions of a Theater staff. Consequently, every precaution must be taken to insure that this staff is kept well in the general picture. Short-cuts which might confuse or militate against the effective use of the Line of Communications staff in its American administrative functions must be carefully

avoided, and full coordination must be assured. Until routine methods of operation are established, this will require the careful attention of all concerned, particularly in routing telegrams and papers for action.

THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF ITS HEADQUARTERS

34. Location and Relation to Other Headquarters.

On V-E Day the European Theater of Operations, which was the second component of United States command, had its headquarters in Paris. The Commanding General, General Eisenhower, and the Chief of Staff were in Reims with Supreme Headquarters, and the chiefs of the general and special staff divisions functioned jointly with the Headquarters of the Communications Zone. Acting chiefs of the general staff divisions had been designated at Supreme Headquarters,(4) but most of the work was performed by the Paris staff.

35. Operational Problems.

The Theater Commander delegated all possible responsibilities to major commands, but reserved the determination of policies, objectives, and priorities, and the issuance of orders affecting more than one command.(5) Major commanders were authorized direct communication with British agencies, the War Department, or with each other on technical and routine matters; all other communications were routed through Theater Headquarters.

36. Duality of Theater Headquarters.

Two organizations could, and did, act as Theater Headquarters:

one, the general staff of Supreme Headquarters, and the other, the general staff of the Communications Zone. In an attempt in 1944 to clarify the division of authority between these two bodies, a staff study was submitted by the G-4 Division of Supreme Headquarters containing a proposal to place the Commanding General of the Communications Zone under the operational control of Supreme Headquarters, (6) which would have allotted a greater measure of supervisory responsibility to that Headquarters. No action was taken, however, along these lines until April 1945, when members of the general staff of Supreme Headquarters were designated acting chiefs of the corresponding divisions on the staff of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations.

37. Elements of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and their Functions.

a. Functions of the Deputy Theater Commander. On 15 May 1945 the duties of the Deputy Theater Commander were transferred to staff sections, and no further deputy was designated until 15 March 1947. (7)

b. General and Special Staffs. The functions of the general staff of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, were performed jointly by the general staffs of Supreme Headquarters and

of Communications Zone. The special staff was made up of the chiefs of the administrative and supply services and was, for the most part, identical with the special staff of the Communications Zone. Exceptions were the Inspector General, the Chief of the Artillery Section, and the Chief of the Military Labor Service, who did not have corresponding duties with the Communications Zone, and the London Munitions Assignment Board, which was considered as a special staff section of Theater Headquarters rather than a Communications Zone agency.

c. Major Commands under the European Theater of Operations.

Major commands under Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, were also under Supreme Headquarters, but the control of the first-mentioned headquarters, prior to the dissolution of combined command was administrative rather than tactical. As well as the commands already cited,(8) the following were under the administrative control of Headquarters, European Theater of Operations: Communications Zone, Ground Forces Reinforcement Command, and the First Airborne Army, while the Office of Strategic Services, the Air Transport Command, and the Army Airways Communication System were attached.

THE COMMUNICATIONS ZONE AND ITS ORGANIZATION

38. Functions of the Communications Zone.

The Communications Zone, the third component of United States

command, was the organization that dealt with operations and the administration of supply units. It was authorized to deal directly on routine supply matters with the New York Port of Embarkation and the Headquarters of the Army Service Forces, War Department. After the establishment of Theater Headquarters in Frankfurt, Germany, Communications Zone was the major headquarters functioning in the liberated countries. In addition to these functions the Commanding General, Gen. John C.H. Lee, was the Theater Executive for the maintenance of Theater records and for carrying out the administrative functions that were common to the whole Theater.(9) The Theater chiefs of administration and supply were technical advisers to the Theater Commander and served on the staff of the Commanding General of the Communications Zone. Later, with the modifications of Theater organization, more duties were assumed by Headquarters, European Theater of Operations. Functions originally assigned to the Commanding General of the Communications Zone included: recommendations to the Theater Commander concerning Communications Zone boundaries, and Theater matters of supply, equipment, hospitalization, salvage, captured enemy equipment, transportation, funds, property, accountability, and preparations for the posthostilities period. He was also responsible for the indoctrination of personnel arriving in the Theater, for directives concerning the services, strength reports, casualty reports, prisoners of war, reclassification of officers, censorship, military intelligence, graves registration, quarters, and records and reports.(10)

39. General and Special Staffs.

The general staff of the Communications Zone was composed of the usual five divisions and the Office of the Purchasing Agent, who served also on the special staff of Theater Headquarters. The staff officers of the Communications Zone general staff had functions in connection with Theater Headquarters as well. The special staff comprised the Judge Advocate, Adjutant General, Chief of Chemical Warfare, Chief Quartermaster, Chief Surgeon, Chief Signal Officer, Chief of Transportation, Chief Engineer, Chief of Ordnance, Provost Marshal, Antiaircraft Officer, Chief of Claims, Chief of the Army Exchange Service, Chief of Information and Education, Historian, and Chief Chaplain.

40. Major Commands, Communications Zone.

The major commands under the Communications Zone were Advance Section, Oise Base Section, Seine Base Section, United Kingdom Base, Continental Advanced Section, Delta Base Section, Channel Base Section, and Normandy Base Section, the last two of which were fused on 1 July 1945 and redesignated Chancor Base Section(11)

THE DEPLOYMENT OF FIELD FORCES ON V-E DAY

41. Order of Battle.

The V-E Day battle line, extending from southeast Germany

through Austria and Czechoslovakia, north up across Germany to the extreme northwestern tip of that country, contained a total of sixty-one United States combat divisions: forty-two infantry, four airborne, and fifteen armored.

a. The Southern Section of the Line. On the right, or south, of the line was the 6th Army Group, sometimes referred to as the "Southern Group of Armies," commanded by Gen. Jacob L. Devers, with headquarters at Heidelberg. This group comprised the First French Army and the Seventh U.S. Army, which was made up of the following major units: (12) the 12th Armored Division and the 45th, 63d, and 100th Infantry Divisions; the VI Corps, including the 10th Armored and the 44th and 103d Infantry Divisions; the XV Corps, including the 20th Armored and the 3d, 42d, and 86th Infantry Divisions; the XXI Corps, including the 101st Airborne Division and the 36th Infantry Division.

42. The Northern Section of the Line.

The opposite end of the line was held by the XVIII Corps (Airborne), composed of the 5th and 7th Armored Divisions, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 8th Infantry Division. This corps operated with the British Second Army under their 21st Army Group.

43. The Central Section of the Line.

Between these two groups all forces were under Gen. Omar N. Bradley, commanding the 12th Army Group with headquarters at Wiesbaden.

The 12th Army Group contained the First, Third, Ninth, and Fifteenth U.S. Armies. The Fifteenth Army area comprised the Rhine provinces; the other armies in this group were disposed tactically over the rest of Germany.

a. The First Army had the following major units under its command: the 78th Infantry Division; the VII Corps, including the 3d Armored and the 9th, 69th, and 104th Infantry Divisions; the VIII Corps, including the 6th Armored and the 76th, 87th, and 89th Infantry Divisions.

b. The Third Army was composed of the following: the 4th and 70th Infantry Divisions; the III Corps, including the 14th Armored and the 99th Infantry Divisions; the V Corps, including the 9th and 16th Armored Divisions and the 1st, 2d, and 97th Infantry Divisions; the XII Corps, including the 4th and 11th Armored and the 5th, 26th, and 90th Infantry Divisions; the XX Corps, including the 13th Armored and the 65th, 71st, and 80th Infantry Divisions.

c. The Ninth Army comprised the following: the XIII Corps, including the 35th, 84th, and 102d Infantry Divisions; the XVI Corps, including the 29th, 75th, 79th, and 95th Infantry Divisions; the XIX Corps, including the 2d and 8th Armored and the 30th and 83d Infantry Divisions.

d. The Fifteenth Army was made up of the following: the 66th and 106th Infantry Divisions; the XXII Corps, including the 17th Airborne Division and the 94th Infantry Division; the XXIII Corps,

composed of the 28th Infantry Division.

44. The Reserve.

The First Allied Airborne Army, containing the 13th Airborne Division, formed the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, Reserve.

CONFORMATION TO THE NATIONAL ZONES OF OCCUPATION

45. Situation on V-E Day.

The question of the zonal division of occupied territory had been a matter of discussion among the Big Three since the early planning conferences. Since the second Quebec conference the United States authorities had known that they would have the southwestern zones of Germany and that the zones assigned to the occupying powers would correspond generally to zones of operation during combat. The end of hostilities, however, found the armies of the various powers dispersed over areas not within their respective contemplated zones. The United States battle line on V-E Day extended from southeast Germany and Austria, north through Czechoslovakia, and across Germany to its extreme northwestern tip. One of the first problems, therefore, was the early withdrawal of troops from the occupation zones of the other powers and their realignment in their own zone.

46. Decision on the French Zone.

In the spring of 1945 the major powers agreed that France should join in the occupation, and the Provisional Government of the French Republic on 1 May 1945 signed the Agreement on the Control Machinery for Germany, which had been prepared by the European Advisory Commission. On 13 May Ambassador John M. Winant informed the French of the area proposed for their occupation.(13) The French reaction was favorable. Subsequent agreement between the United States and French Governments established the area as the Kreise of Oberwesterwald, Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn, and St. Goarshausen; the Bezirke of Freiburg and Konstanz; the Kreise of Bühl, Baden-Baden, and Rastatt; and the area of Land Württemberg comprising Leonberg, Böblingen, Nürtingen, Göppingen, Ulm, and the northeast portion of Münsingen.(14) The European Advisory Commission expert subcommittee approved the agreement on 5 July,(15) and the necessary amendments were drawn up and later published to the Protocol of 12 September 1944, which had delineated the zones of occupation in Germany.(16)

47. Operations to Conform with Delineation of French Zone.

At the end of June the War Department instructed Supreme Headquarters to withdraw from the area of the French Zones in Germany and Austria, and to make arrangements for the temporary accommodation of a token French force in British or United States Sectors of Berlin. The absence of a final decision on the sectors in Vienna precluded

any action there.(17) Operations began on 5 July with the handing over by the Fifteenth Army of the relevant Rhine area.(18) On 10 July Trier, Koblenz, the Landkreise of Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn, and St. Goarshausen, the Saarland, and the section of Land Hessen west of the Rhine River were transferred to French control,(19) and at the same time Tirol-Vorarlberg was placed under French jurisdiction in Austria.(20) Reciprocally, the VI Corps of the Seventh Army had relieved the French on 8 July of the sector of the Länder Württemberg and Baden that was designated for the United States Zone.(21)

48. Operations to Conform with Delineation of British Zone.

The first operation connected with the transfer of territory to form the British Zone took the form of an evacuation by the Ninth U.S. Army on 7 June.(22) Three days later General Eisenhower informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the outline plan for complete transfer, which arranged for the transfer to the Second British Army, over a period of three weeks, of territory held by United States forces in Hanover and Westphalia, and the assumption of command by the 21st Army Group of its sector of the Rhine Province by 27 June.(23) The completion of operations, however, took longer than had been planned. Magdeburg was cleared on 4 July, and the next day the British took over control of their Rhine area from the Fifteenth U.S. Army.(24) Complete control of their Zone in Germany passed to the British by 9 July,(25) while the first adjustment between British and United States troops in Austria took place on the same day, when the 101st

Airborne Division handed over their small area of Steiermark.(26)
Final British-American adjustment in Austria came with the handing over to the British on 28 July of the sector in Steiermark occupied by the 11th Armored Division.(27)

49. Operations to Conform with the Delineation of the Soviet Zone.

In the drive during April 1945, the Third and Ninth U.S. Armies had moved eastward through central Germany to the Elbe River and had penetrated the contemplated Soviet Zone.(28) According to the plan drawn up for the necessary transfer, the 12th Army Group should hand over, beginning 1 July, the part of the Soviet Zone occupied by United States troops.(29) Following a meeting between Marshal Zhukov and Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay in Berlin, detailed plans were concluded for the occupation by the Soviet forces of the Wismar "cushion" in one day and of the Magdeburg bulge in two.(30) The operations were completed in Germany by 4 July,(31) but final adjustments of the areas in Austria were not accomplished until 19 September.(32)

50. Other Operations in Connection with Occupation of Zonal Areas.

Certain other operations were carried out during the period. On 24 May, the Bremen Enclave, including the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven, was occupied by United States forces.(33) On 6 July the first detachment of United States troops moved into Berlin and began to take over control of the United States Sector there.(34) Plans

were drawn up for the gradual reduction, in proportion to the withdrawal of Soviet troops, of the Third U.S. Army forces in Czechoslovakia.(35)

51. Final Extent of the United States Zone.

On 17 July 1945 Theater Headquarters announced that zonal adjustments had been completed, that all areas assigned to the United States for military occupation were held exclusively by United States troops, and that all United States forces had withdrawn from areas to be occupied by other powers. In the final delineation of zones, the United States was allotted the following areas in Germany:

Land Bavaria, excluding Landkreis Lindau; Land Hessen east of the Rhine River; Provinz Hessen-Nassau as it existed prior to July 1938, exclusive of Landkreise Oberwesterwald, Unterwesterwald, Unterlahn, and St. Goarshausen; the northern parts of Länder Baden and Württemberg south to and including Landkreise Ulm, Württemberg, Böblingen, Leonberg, Pforzheim, and Karlsruhe; and the Bremen Enclave.(36) In Austria, the United States Zone comprised Land Salzburg and that part of Land Oberösterreich lying south of the Danube.(37)

Chapter III

THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN TRANSITION

THE NEW MISSIONS OF THE UNITED STATES FORCES IN EUROPE

52. Change of Mission in Europe.

a. With the end of hostilities, the Allies moved on to the second stage of their task, the aims and objectives of which had been declared by Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt, and Marshal Stalin after the Crimea Conference, as follows:(1)

It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism and to ensure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism; remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production; bring all war criminals to justice and swift punishment and exact reparation in kind for the destruction wrought by Germans; wipe out the Nazi Party, Nazi laws, organizations, and institutions; remove all Nazi and military influence from public offices and from the cultural and economic life of the German people; and take in harmony such other measures in Germany as may be necessary to the future peace and safety of the world.

These missions were primarily the concern of Military Government at all echelons, but they inevitably affected the mission of all the United States forces insofar as the latter participated with Military Government in the accomplishment of the new objectives.(2) The cessation of hostilities, too, and the occupation of Germany and Austria brought in their train specific new functions for the various services, which led to adjustments in command and command channels.(3)

b. In general, the missions of the United States forces in Europe following the defeat of Germany had been outlined by the War Department in 1944.(4) It was assumed that partial demobilization would be possible and that about 400,000 men would be needed in the Theater a year after the end of hostilities. All ground forces, except some service units in the United Kingdom and North Africa, were to be concentrated on the Continent. First priority had been given to support of the war against Japan, and withdrawal of forces was to be accomplished only by such transportation as remained after this priority had been met.

c. During the period of combined command 12th Army Group, in cooperation with 6th Army Group, was made responsible for the occupation of Germany, and the United States element of the Supreme Headquarters general staff was responsible for planning for the Theater administration. Chiefs of services were responsible for planning within their own services and maintained considerable direct control with the general staff divisions of Supreme Headquarters.

Theater chiefs of supply services under Supreme Headquarters and European Theater of Operations continued as chiefs of services following the termination of combined command.

d. The occupation of Germany was the more important of the two main missions confronting the Theater Commander. Since many of the important decisions regarding the occupation were expected to come from the Allied Control Authority and from sources other than military, it was necessary that the military headquarters in Germany be oriented with the United States element of the Allied Control Authority. The second main mission confronting the Theater Commander was the redeployment of United States forces, and at the close of the war in Germany enormous pressure was already being felt in the direction of expediting redeployment, both to assist the war in Japan and to return other forces to the United States. The headquarters which was to handle redeployment needed close contact with the War Department on supply and shipping and had to be closely tied to the personnel administration of the Theater as a whole. It was essential for a single agency to control the line of communications, which would be through France and Belgium until facilities were provided in Bremerhaven.

IMMEDIATE ADJUSTMENTS IN COMMAND AND DEPLOYMENT

53. Supreme Command in Germany.

The agreement reached between the Allied powers in November 1944 on the control machinery in Germany vested the supreme authority in the Control Council, which was composed of the commanders in chief of the four occupying forces.(5) The Allied Control Authority was the Allied central governing machinery for Germany, the United States component of which was the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany).(6)

54. Supreme United States Command in Europe.

The original plan provided for early termination of combined command and establishment of a separate United States headquarters to take over those functions in connection with United States troops that had been performed by Supreme Headquarters. A 4-month period was allowed for carrying out the transfer of command functions. Instead developments after V-E Day caused the 3-way transition to be accomplished in less than one month.(7) On 28 May 1945 General Eisenhower announced his decision on the separation of Theater Headquarters and the Headquarters of Communications Zone in a telegram to General Marshall, which ran:(8)

Despite difficulties created by separation of the Theater Communications Zone Headquarters we have decided to make no basic change in organization for the present. Instead, our G-4 Division will be reinforced with technical experts from each of the special branches in order that the general staff may have here the information on which to base its instructions to the Communications Zone Commander.

The official designation of the new Theater Headquarters as Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, was made known on 18 June,(9) and on 20 June composition of its staff and its location at Frankfurt am Main were announced in a general order.(10)

55. Special Provisions for Command in Austria.

Entirely different treatment was to be accorded in Austria. It appeared early that there would be serious disadvantages in making Austria a subordinate part of the European Theater.(11) The status of the United States commander in Austria would have been below that of the British, French, and Soviet commanders. A special G-5 section would have had to be created to handle Austrian matters if policy direction had been given through the G-5 Division at Frankfurt, and the distance involved would have made it difficult to maintain close touch. The plan was, therefore, to sever all connections between the two countries as soon as possible. The resulting arrangement for Austria was that, while the United States forces there were attached to the European Theater for supply and administration, the United States commander in Austria reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military government and political matters.(12)

56. Adjustment of Communications Zone Functions.

The functions of the supply services naturally fell into two divisions, operations inside Germany and operations outside Germany. The latter category was delegated to the Communications Zone, while

the Theater staff was responsible for operations within Germany with the exception of Bremerhaven, where the control of Communications Zone was necessary to unify the shipping program. Communications Zone had an important new mission: responsibility for redeployment, including the withdrawal of units from Germany, their staging, reorganization, and reequipment in France, and their shipment overseas. In addition to matters of supply, Communications Zone was responsible for the administration of its own forces outside of Germany.

57. Adjustments in Deployment.

With the announcement on 16 July (13) of the termination of combined command and the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, the U.S. Army in northwestern Europe reverted to a normal command relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the War Department. Theoretically, the occupational troop basis of Plan ECLIPSE came into effect. The planning had been directed toward an "Army Type Occupation Force"--that is, a force strong enough to occupy a conquered country and meet any tactical need that might arise, and at the same time to furnish security against subversive actions of a former enemy and give logistical support to the Military Government of the zone. It was assumed that two field armies, with ten divisions organized into three corps would be required. The Third and Seventh U.S. Armies were selected for the task. Planning by the 12th Army Group, (14) later approved by Supreme Headquarters, (15)

had provided for the division of the occupation zone into two military districts, each equipped with an army headquarters. The United States Zone was, accordingly, divided into the Eastern Military District, which comprised the portion of Land Bavaria under United States control and which was occupied by the Third Army, and the Western Military District, which comprised the remainder of the United States Zone, and which was occupied by the Seventh Army. Except for disarmament and disposal of enemy property, district commanders were responsible for the primary missions of the occupation and also, as far as possible, for service functions within their districts.

REORGANIZATION OF THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION AND THE SERVICES OF SUPPLY

58. Transfer of Communications Zone Functions.

The responsibility for all Communications Zone functions in Germany had been assumed by the armies by 1 July 1945, except in special instances where other arrangements had been made. Depots, hospitals, pipelines, and prisoner-of-war cages in territory destined ultimately to become British or French areas continued to be the responsibility of Communications Zone until turned over to the Allied nation concerned.(16) After the establishment of Theater Headquarters in Frankfurt, the responsibility for the operation of through truck and rail lines passed from the Communications Zone to the armies.

Operation of reception centers, movement of displaced persons, and maintenance of redeployment facilities were assigned to the 12th Army Group. The Ninth Army supported the units in Berlin until the Seventh Army (Western Military District) was ready to assume this task. Though Continental Advance Section continued to function until 1 July, its functions were transferred to the Seventh Army, except for supply of the First French Army, the operation of the Saar coal mines, and prisoner-of-war enclosures.(17) The service chiefs of both organizations worked together on the reassignment of personnel. Oise Intermediate Section assumed responsibility for the supply of the First French Army, while Fifteenth Army took over the functions in connection with coal production and prisoner-of-war enclosures.

59. Lines of Communication.

The Communications Zone extended and operated lines of communication into Germany to the intermediate boundaries of the armies, and it operated installations necessary to the accomplishment of its mission.(18) Military motor transportation was controlled by army groups, air forces, and Communications Zone agencies in Germany as assigned. District commanders supervised the allocation of civilian transportation. Rehabilitation and operation of ports, railroads, inland water transportation, through transportation, and such depots, shops, and other installations in Germany as were required formed the responsibility of Communications Zone. Oise Intermediate Section assumed the functions in France formerly the responsibility of the

two sections which moved into Germany, while Channel, Normandy, and Delta Base Sections and Seine Section were responsible for other areas outside of Germany.

60. Service Responsibilities.

Some apprehension was expressed by the Communications Zone that the new organization would result in a double system of requisitions from the Theater on the New York Port of Embarkation.(19) Maj. Gen. R. B. Lord, Chief of Staff, held that detailed administrative planning for Germany was similar to that for the liberated countries, and he contended that service planning by two general staffs would result in confusion. In place of the proposed plan he recommended:

That the authority and responsibility of the Commanding General of the Communications Zone be extended over the whole Theater except that portion occupied by the armies in an operational role, and further excepting responsibility in Germany for those matters pertaining to military occupation to enforce the will of the conqueror upon the country.

That planning be accomplished by the issuance of over-all planning directives by the Theater Commander (that is, the United States portion of the Supreme Headquarters staff) on the Theater level to the Army groups and to the Commanding General of the Communications Zone.

The position of the Supreme Headquarters planning staff was outlined in a reply to Major General Lord:(20)

It is stated that coordination of service planning by two general staffs would cause confusion. That is, to a certain extent, true. Communications Zone did exactly that twice in the pre-D-Day period—once with Advance Section and Communications Zone proper and once with Forward Echelon and Communications Zone

proper. It did cause some confusion, but not insuperable difficulties. This is a real objection but the only one. The only alternative is formation of entirely separate service planning staffs on Theater level.

We recommend separate services in Germany, under supervision of the zone staff direct, and have already ordered the Chief of Transportation, in line with this policy, to create a special planning staff to deal with Supreme Headquarters. If Communications Zone moved to Germany to perform these functions, a new organization similar to Communications Zone would have to be built up in France.

The chiefs of services, acting under the supervision of the United States element of the Supreme Headquarters general staff, prepared the plans for the functioning of the services within Germany which were incorporated in the final Theater organization plan.

61. Service Commands.

Troop units assigned to the Military Pipelines Service, Military Railway Service, Motor Transport Service, and the Signal Communications Service had been under the control of the chiefs of services and had operated on a Theater-wide basis. After the termination of combined command and the almost entire exclusion of Communications Zone from responsibility in Germany and Austria, the organization of these service commands was modified.(21) The Military Railway and Motor Transport Services were redesignated Theater service commands and placed under the direct command of the Theater Chief of Transportation, while the Signal Communications Service was placed under the Theater Chief Signal Officer.(22) The Military Pipelines

Service, pending its liquidation, remained under the Communications Zone. The Inland Water Transport Service became a Theater agency under the Theater Chief of Transportation. The plan for these changes was submitted by the headquarters of the Communications Zone, but action was initiated by Theater Headquarters.(23)

62. Additional Service Functions.

Various other services were faced with new responsibilities after the assumption of the occupation mission by the United States forces. Among these were the following:

a. Transportation Corps arranged for railway operations in Germany, using indigenous railroad personnel. Transportation agencies on the operating level were maintained in Berlin.

b. The Medical Corps was confronted with a serious public health problem in Germany.

c. The Signal Corps had an additional problem in interzonal communications in Germany, for which the German civil and military communications systems were utilized.

d. The Quartermaster Corps dealt with the disposal of enemy quartermaster equipment and supervised the supply systems of the German forces prior to their disbandment.

e. Reequipment of organizations in connection with the redeployment program provided the Ordnance Service with a task of considerable magnitude, while in Germany many problems arose in connection with the disposal of enemy equipment.

f. The disposal of large quantities of enemy war material that had been captured both in the liberated countries and in Germany was the responsibility of the Chemical Warfare Service, while it also had functions in connection with the equipment of units scheduled for redeployment to the Pacific.

g. Redeployment laid a heavy burden also on the Corps of Engineers, which was responsible for the construction of staging areas and for their winterization. In Germany the Corps had a heavy program to accomplish, including the destruction of enemy fortifications, the rehabilitation of German facilities for military headquarters and military communities and the construction and repair of bridges, highways, buildings, and utilities. While much of the actual work was done by German labor, supervision was in all instances the responsibility of the Corps of Engineers.

THE BEGINNINGS OF REDUCTION

63. Inactivation of Army Groups and the Reassignment of Armies.

The reduction of organizations in the Theater began immediately, and by July the army group formations had been eliminated. As early as May, the Seventh Army was absorbed into the 12th Army Group,(24) and the withdrawal of the First French Army to the French Zone(25) permitted the complete inactivation of the 6th Army Group on 20 July.(26)

On 26 July 12th Army Group became nonoperational,(27) with the transfer to U.S. Forces, European Theater, of the Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Fifteenth Armies. The personnel of Headquarters, Special Troops, 12th Army Group, was assigned to Headquarters Command, U.S. Forces, European Theater, on 1 August 1945.(28)

64. Redeployment of Armies.

On 15 May the First Army closed its Weimar Headquarters(29) and was transferred from 12th Army Group to Normandy Base Section.(30) It was then readied for redeployment to the Pacific, and embarked on 22 May.(31) The Ninth Army transferred its responsibilities to the Seventh Army on 15 June,(32) and started its move to the assembly area on 7 July.(33) On 28 July it sailed for the United States.(34)

THE BEGINNINGS OF REDEPLOYMENT

65. Ports and Processing Areas.

The ports used at this time for the redeployment of troops were Le Havre, Marseille, Cherbourg, Antwerp, Glasgow, and Southampton. Most of the units going direct to the Pacific were processed through the port of Marseille by Delta Base Section,(35) while those bound for the Pacific by way of the United States went through the Normandy assembly area, which was operated by the 89th Division.(36)

66. Shipments from May to 17 July 1945.

a. Redeployment operations began on 12 May 1945. Before the end of the month nearly 90,000 men had been shipped.(37) Of these 21,564 were being sent to the Pacific via the United States.(38) The remaining 61,597 men were casualties, including men eligible for discharge, patients, recovered Allied military personnel, and others.(39) No direct shipments to the Pacific were made during the month.(40)

b. In June a total of 313,298 men were redeployed. Of this total, 23,479 men formed direct shipments to the Pacific. Indirect shipments totalled 124,163 men. Casuals, consisting mostly of men eligible for discharge and patients, made up another 165,656 of the June shipments.(41) Major units shipped during June included the III, V, VII, and XIII Corps, the XVIII Airborne Corps, and the 86th, 95th, 97th and the 104th Infantry Divisions.

c. By the end of June, the redeployment program was progressing satisfactorily. The total forecast for the May-June period called for redeployment of 424,025 men.(43) Of this quota 402,459 men were redeployed.(44) The casual quota was not met, 191,760 men being shipped(45) against the quota of 193,800,(46) but the quota for indirect redeployment was exceeded, 187,220 being shipped,(47) against a forecast of 167,473.(48) Direct shipments to the Pacific fell short of the forecast, the main reason being the change in plans, which called for shipment of a unit's organic equipment thirty-five days ahead of the unit.(49) If equipment was

shipped thirty-five days in advance on slow-moving freighters and if all space on fast-moving troop ships was used, the unit and its equipment could arrive at approximately the same time. The forecast figure for shipments direct to the Pacific for May and June was originally 62,602.(50) This was reduced in June to 21,000.(51) Against this latter quota of 21,000 there were 23,479 men shipped directly to the Pacific.(52)

d. During July the shipping quota for that month was exceeded, but the May-June backlog could not be made up. Against a forecast for out-shipment of 385,910,(53) 391,058 were shipped.(54) Of this number 227,141 men were in units bound for the Pacific via the United States, 72,238 were in units going direct to the Pacific, and 91,679 were in casual units.(55) July shipments included the VIII Corps, the 13th and 20th Armored Divisions, and the 2d, 4th, 5th, 8th, 28th, 44th, and 87th Infantry Divisions.(56)

THE DISBANDMENT OF THE GERMAN ARMED FORCES

67. The Two Aspects of Disbandment.

The disbandment of German armed forces after 8 May 1945 operated smoothly and according to plan. There were two distinct operations: the liquidation of all command functions of the German armed forces,(57) and the gradual release of the members of the German armed forces held in American custody.

68. Status of the Disarmed Forces after the Surrender.

a. Except for war criminals and security suspects, all members of the German armed forces captured after cessation of hostilities were treated as disarmed German forces. After 4 May 1945 captured Germans in Germany could be reclassified and their status changed from prisoners of war to disarmed Germans. The United States supplied and maintained enemy prisoners of war until they were discharged. All enemy prisoners held by the United States outside of the occupied countries were treated as prisoners of war until they were released. The disbandment of the German disarmed forces and certain paramilitary organizations was the responsibility of army group and zone commanders. The planning, organization, and execution of the program was assigned to army and military district commanders within their respective areas.(58)

b. Non-Germans were statistically segregated from Germans in national groups to await disposal by their respective governments. Soviet nationals were physically segregated and accorded special treatment under the terms of the agreement signed with the Soviet Union on 12 February 1945.(59)

c. The German armed forces were estimated to number about 11,000,000. Of these, 7,200,000 were in the jurisdiction of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. Under the international agreement calling for the handling of prisoners of war according to the zones in which their homes were located, the share of the United States forces in the process of disbandment is represented by the

figure 4,800,000. By the end of May 1945, figures of the Provost Marshal's Department indicated that there were 1,913,402 prisoners of war held by the United States forces in the European Theater.(60)

69. Successive Steps in the Disbandment of the Enemy Forces.

a. The first group to be released were the members of the Volkssturm, that group of German men who, disqualified from service in the Wehrmacht because of age or other reasons, served the army in an auxiliary capacity. After the authorization of the "disarmed-enemy-forces" status on 4 May 1945, members of the Volkssturm who had been prisoners of war or who were subsequently captured while in uniform were processed as members of disarmed enemy forces and then discharged. Members captured not in uniform were permitted to return to their homes without processing.(61)

b. On 15 May 1945, Supreme Headquarters authorized the discharge of men of German nationality who were farmers, coal miners, transport workers, or in other key industries, provided that they lived in the area in which they were imprisoned and provided that they were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the S.S. Likewise, all German women residing in the territory in which they were confined were to be released, with the same excepted categories.(62)

c. Three days later, Supreme Headquarters authorized the release of all prisoners of war over fifty years of age who lived in the locality in which they were imprisoned, providing they were not war criminals, security suspects, or members of the S.S.(63)

d. On 5 June 1945 nationals of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg who were prisoners of war of the United States forces, or in the status of disarmed German forces not wanted for war crimes by a country other than their own, were released to their respective governments.(64)

e. General discharge was authorized late in June for all Germans except war criminals, security suspects, those in automatic arrest categories, and those whose homes were in the Soviet Zone. Those living in the Soviet Zone were held until an agreement on their transfer was reached with the Soviet authorities. At the same time it was announced that war criminals would be discharged and interned and that automatic arrestees and security suspects could be discharged if held in custody for interrogation.(65)

f. All nationals of the United Nations still held, except Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, dissident Yugoslavs, and Polish not claiming Soviet citizenship, were released to their governments in July 1945. At the same time, all neutral nationals other than those with ardent Axis sympathies were released, provided they were not security suspects or wanted as war criminals by a country other than their own.(66)

70. Other Aspects of Disarmament and Disbandment.

In the first months of the occupation, the United States forces also disarmed and disbanded all paramilitary organizations, including the German intelligence service, the Gestapo, the political

police, the SS, and the SA. All the property of these organizations was confiscated, their records and headquarters were seized, and the entire membership or their leaders above a certain grade, as prescribed in the directives in effect, were arrested. The German General Staff was broken up by the simple expedient of holding as prisoners of war all of its members who were found. All military academies and officers' training schools were located and closed.

THE REPATRIATION OF LIBERATED PRISONERS OF WAR

71. Basic Policies for Return of United States Prisoners of War.

The War Department prescribed that all persons who had been prisoners should be returned to the United States unless they elected to remain overseas, which very few did.(67) For purposes of shipping, they were assigned priority over other casualties except the sick and wounded. The Prisoner-of-War Executive Branch of the G-1 Division of Supreme Headquarters had formulated the policy that all prisoners, upon cessation of hostilities, should remain in their camps to avoid being classed as displaced persons. The original plan contemplated that a government might still be operating in Germany at the time of the surrender and that assistance might be received from German authorities in charge of prisoner-of-war camps. When the surrender actually occurred, however, practically all German authority had ceased. Officers were assigned to field forces to assist in liberating

prisoners of war, and a special division was established in the office of the Theater Provost Marshal.

72. Numbers of Recovered Allied Prisoners.

There were 91,252 United States and 168,746 British citizens recovered from German camps. Liberated prisoners were moving to the rear in a steady flow by the end of March, and by 30 April 14,174 United States nationals had been recovered from enemy custody and returned to the Communications Zone, some of them having been liberated by the Soviet forces and returned by way of Odessa. The repatriation of United States prisoners of war was completed in June. On 15 March 1945 it was estimated that the total number of Allied nationals held by the Germans was 2,173,764.(68) Many of these, particularly Poles, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians, did not return to the country of their origin, but became displaced persons.

73. Treatment of Other Nationalities.

The regulations issued by Supreme Headquarters provided for the care of all liberated prisoners of war, although the obligation of the United States was not the same for all nationalities. Similar treatment was given to United States and British citizens, but for others, ration scales and other responsibilities differed.(69) Theater Headquarters issued comprehensive instructions regarding the treatment of recovered prisoners, and camps were operated at Stenay, Epinal, Brussels, Liège, Reims, Namur, and Sedan. Camp Lucky Strike was one

staging area for returning prisoners and another was Camp Wings, where many were brought by air. Both camps were situated near Le Havre.

74. United States Personnel with the Underground.

Prior to D-Day the underground organization on the Continent, which included more than 35,000 French, Belgian, Netherland, Luxemburg, Danish, and Czech citizens, had assisted approximately 3,000 United States fliers to return to England.(70) After D-Day the advancing armies uncovered a similar number of fliers who had been shot down but avoided capture. Theater directives provided that those who had been out of United States or Allied control for more than five days should be sent to the reception center operated by Seine Section in Paris, where they would be interrogated by military intelligence authorities.

75. The Standfast Agreement.

During the early part of the German retreat few Allied prisoners were recovered, because the Germans moved their inclosures farther into Germany. On 21 February 1945 the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed through diplomatic channels that the Germans leave prisoners of war in place, with the understanding that persons so recovered would not be returned to military service. The Germans accepted this proposal, and it was made effective on 22 April 1945.(71) On 29 April the Third U.S. Army overran the prisoner-of-war camp at Moosberg and

liberated 100,000 prisoners, including 15,568 of United States nationality. There was a marked increase in the number returned during May, when the use of air transportation increased, and by 9 May the daily rate of processing at Le Havre was 30,000 United States and British prisoners.

THE CARE AND REPATRIATION OF DISPLACED PERSONS

76. Estimate of Numbers of Displaced Persons.

Owing to the meager intelligence available, there was a wide range in early estimates of the number of displaced persons in Europe. In June 1944 it was estimated that there were 11,332,700 displaced persons (including refugees) in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Luxemburg, and Germany, 8,935,400 of whom were displaced persons in foreign countries and 2,397,300 refugees in their own countries. They came from twenty different countries and were the concern of as many governments.(72)

77. Planning, Procedure, and Personnel.

a. Planning for the handling of displaced persons had been begun in late 1943 by Supreme Headquarters, the Allied Governments, and representatives of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The basic plans, amended by later experience, became the directives guiding operations. An agreement reached between the

Soviet Union and the Western Powers at the Crimea Conference provided for the exchange of displaced persons and liberated prisoners of war.

b. Displaced persons uncovered by military forces were assembled at collecting points and directed to transit points or areas, where they were given food, temporary shelter, and medical care. They were then taken to assembly centers and cared for while awaiting repatriation. When uncovered in rapid military advance, displaced persons were instructed to stand fast until arrangements were completed for collecting them in assembly centers. As early as conditions permitted, United Nations displaced persons were returned to reception centers in their own countries, where their governments assumed full responsibility.

c. Responsibilities in connection with displaced persons were shared by several agencies and categories of personnel: the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, at first in conjunction with the Supreme Commander and later in sole authority;(73) the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees;(74) the various military missions of Supreme Headquarters;(75) the staff sections of Supreme Headquarters;(76) the Combined Displaced Persons Executive of Supreme Headquarters (after its establishment on 14 July);(77) and the military commanders.(78) After April, when the problem became more acute, the armies and army groups organized special displaced persons military teams to direct operations and supplement the military government detachments.(79)

78. Operations.

A limited number of repatriations had been made prior to the entrance of United States forces into Germany. These involved nationals of France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The early stage of the campaign in Germany uncovered only a small number of displaced persons, which was due to the German policy of evacuating their slave workers eastward. United States troops uncovered fewer than 100,000 displaced persons in the whole of the Rhine Province and the Saarland west of the Rhine. By the end of February, however, the Germans appeared to have lost all control over foreign workers, and in the small area of the Remagen bridgehead alone over 3,500 displaced persons were found by the Allied forces on 7 March. With the ensuing major drives across the Rhine in that month, Allied armies found themselves confronted with millions of displaced persons.(80) The flow of Western Europeans being repatriated from Germany increased rapidly until on 15 April Belgians were returning at the rate of 500 daily, and French were passing through transit reception centers en route for their homes at the rate of 2,000 a day. Early in May these numbers increased to a peak of 5,000 Belgians and 20,000 French, as well as 1,000 Netherlands every twenty-four hours. During April 140,000 Western European displaced persons were repatriated from 12th Army Group area, and 30,000 from 6th Army Group area, most of them French, with Belgians making up the next largest group.(81) By the end of July, the situation with regard to displaced persons was as shown in table I.(82)

Table I

Status of Displaced Persons as of 31 July 1945

NATIONALITY:	REMAINING ON HAND IN OUTSIDE		TOTAL	REPATRIATED FROM 1 JULY 45 TO 31 JULY 45		TOTAL REPATRIATED AND ON HAND	PERCENT REPATRIATED
	CAMPS	CAMPS		31 JULY 45	31 JULY 45		
BELGIAN	2,056	3,917	5,973	10,444	268,000	273,973	97.8
CZECH	5,686	3,692	9,378	59,994	100,000	109,378	91.5
NETHERLAND	2,296	4,025	6,321	48,000	261,000	267,321	97.6
FRENCH	4,905	11,341	16,246	47,100	1,449,000	1,465,246	98.9
GREEK	8,476	3,725	12,201	—	61	12,262	—
LUXEMBURG	85	8	93	5,000	11,000	11,093	99.1
POLISH	812,067	102,588	914,655	23,681	40,000	954,655	4.2
SOVIET	398,994	136,579	535,573	69,869	1,639,000	2,174,573	75.4
YUGOSLAV	81,828	16,500	98,328	39,559	42,000	140,328	29.9
OTHER ALLIED	86,693	3,439	90,132	1,029	13,000	103,132	12.6
ITALIAN	238,959	28,312	267,271	67,881	237,000	504,271	17.0
BULGARIAN	577	3,592	4,169	—	—	4,169	—
OTHER ENEMY	320,218	9,792	330,010	23,901	49,000	379,010	12.9
TOTAL	1,962,840	327,510	2,290,350	396,458	4,109,061	6,399,411	64.2

OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES AND OBLIGATIONS

79. Punishment of War Criminals.

a. Background to the Establishment of Judicial Machinery.

The apprehension, prosecution, and bringing to justice of Axis war criminals was one of the war aims of the United Nations which was constantly reiterated before and after the end of hostilities. In the immediate posthostilities period much was accomplished toward the establishment of the final machinery. The first international agency established to investigate war crimes was the United Nations War Crimes Commission, which convened for the first time in London on 20 October 1943. This commission furnished the Theater Commander with lists of suspected war criminals, accused by different governments.(83)

b. Military Responsibilities.

Supreme Headquarters instructed army group commanders to apprehend and keep in custody all war criminals. Suspects were not segregated from other prisoners of war, but their cards were marked to identify them as such. Their trials had to await the end of hostilities. Group commanders were authorized to appoint commissions for the trial of persons charged with "such violations of the laws of war as threaten or impair the security of United States forces."(84) This power could be delegated down to division level. The restriction limiting trial by military commanders to persons in this category was removed on 19 June 1945 by command of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.(85)

After that time, war criminals could be tried before military government commissions or military government courts regardless of the nationality of the victim.(86) The only exceptions were persons wanted by other governments and the high political figures to be tried before the international tribunal. All commanders who had general court-martial jurisdiction were authorized to appoint military commissions for the trial of war criminals. Sentences were to be reviewed and approved by the authority appointing the commission. Death sentences required confirmation by the Theater Commander or his designee.(87) This authority was not revoked until 26 June 1946, one year after the war.(88)

c. Interrogation of Former American Prisoners of War.

After the end of hostilities, the amount of work to be completed by the War Crimes Branch increased considerably. Particularly important during May and June 1945 was the immediate interrogation of some 90,000 American ex-prisoners of war, who were scheduled for immediate return to the United States. Special care was taken to preserve the evidence that had accumulated in concentration camps and other centers of mass murder.(89)

80. Establishment of Judicial Machinery.

The bringing to justice of all war criminals and their swift punishment was specified at the Crimea Conference as one of the prime objectives of the occupation.(90) On 12 May 1945 President Truman appointed Col. Joseph V. Hodgson as U.S. Commissioner on the

United Nations War Crimes Commission.(91) This appointment was followed on 22 May by that of Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson as U.S. Counsel for War Crimes.(92) A month later, the Combined Chiefs of Staff authorized Supreme Headquarters to try war criminals, subject to certain limitations.(93) This authority was later delegated to U.S. Forces, European Theater, and formed the basis for the trial of war criminals not brought before the International War Crimes Tribunal at Nürnberg. The plan for this tribunal was drafted at a meeting of delegates of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union which convened in London on 26 June 1945. The draft prepared at this meeting was ratified at the Potsdam Conference. The first comprehensive directive on the trying of war criminals was issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 8 July 1945.(94)

81. The General Board.

The General Board was established on 17 June 1945,(95) to prepare a factual analysis intended to present the strategy of the campaign as it had been planned and as it actually had been carried out and to formulate recommendations pertaining to such changes in tactical and administrative doctrines, techniques, organization, and equipment of the U.S. Army ground and air forces as were indicated by the analysis to be desirable. The Board was also to make studies and recommendations on special problems referred to it by Theater Headquarters.(96) The Board was assigned as a special unit within the headquarters of the Fifteenth U.S. Army and shared its commanding

officer. Gen. Jacob L. Devers was president of the General Board, in addition to his other duties, and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, deputy president.(97) On 4 July 1945, General Gerow succeeded General Devers as president.(98) Gen. George S. Patton,Jr., became president of the General Board on 14 October 1945.(99)

82. Disposal of Surplus Property.

In connection with the disposal of surplus property, the office of the Central Field Commissioner for Europe was opened in Paris on 4 July 1945.(100) There were in the Theater approximately 10,480,000 long tons of surplus material valued at \$10,322,000,000. The Army had the task of guarding and maintaining these stocks until early in 1946, when they were first disposed of in large quantities.

OTHER EVENTS OF IMPORTANCE TO 17 JULY 1945

83. General Eisenhower's Visit to the United States.

Ceremonies honoring General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower were held in London on 12 June 1945 and in Paris on 14 June 1945, before his return to the United States by air for homecoming receptions on 16 June. Air Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder became Acting Supreme Commander, and Gen. Jacob L. Devers, Acting Theater Commander. Gen. Omar N. Bradley took over the temporary command from General Devers on 17 June and served until General Eisenhower's return to the Theater on 12 July 1945.

84. Partial Relaxation of the Ban on Fraternization.

During June and July, certain relaxations were authorized in the hitherto complete ban on fraternization. On 12 June General Eisenhower announced to a press conference that the nonfraternization policy had been relaxed insofar as it applied to "very young children,"(101) while on 14 July 1945 a further relaxation was permitted, allowing United States and British troops to converse with German adults in streets and other public places.(102)

85. Visitors and Inspectors.

Supreme Headquarters and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discouraged visits to the Theater prior to the end of hostilities, but some were made in April and May. Three Mexican general officers, Lt. Gen. Eulogio Ortiz, Maj. Gen. Jose Beltran and Brig. Gen. Ramon Rodriguez, arrived in London 30 April 1945 on a trip which resulted in an apology to the British by United States officials when the British complained they had not been notified that the Mexicans were coming.(103) The tour included Supreme Headquarters at Reims, 12th Army Group Headquarters at Bad Wildungen, Third Army Headquarters at Erlangen, First Army Headquarters at Weimar, Ninth Army Headquarters at Brunswick, and installations at Paris. The three Mexicans departed on 8 May 1945. One of the first congressional committees to arrive was the special subcommittee of the Committee of Agriculture of the House of Representatives. This group came to London in the latter part of May 1945 seeking information on food production in Great Britain and

on the Continent. Congressmen and Congressional committees had been confined largely to Great Britain, but when active operations ended an increasing number came to the Continent. Senator W. Dahlquist of Minnesota interviewed General Clay in June to obtain information of interest to the Minnesota Editorial Association. In the same month a committee which included Gen. William Knudson, C.B. Thomas of the Chrysler Corporation, J.B. Mooney of General Motors, R.J. Roberg of the Ford Motor Company, Gibson Carey of Yale and Towne, and R.R. Deupree of Proctor and Gamble was in the Theater in connection with repair and rebuilding of motor vehicles. The first group of motion picture executives arrived in July. They were followed by other representatives of the motion picture industry and by several tours of editors and publishers.

Chapter IV

THE ASSUMPTION OF THE OCCUPATION MISSION

AGENCIES PREPARING FOR THE TASK OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

86. Planning Groups.

The agencies planning for the military government of Germany included the European Advisory Commission; the military section of the British Control Commission for Germany; the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany); several commissions, agencies, and divisions in Supreme Headquarters; and staff officers of the European Theater of Operations, the Communications Zone, and the army groups. Some of the plans for territory that later came under Theater staff became an element of some importance in shaping the future of Army and military government policies under General Eisenhower, particularly with regard to the occupation of Austria. High-level decisions were made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the Department of State was involved in many of the negotiations and became increasingly important after consideration of peace treaties was started.

87. The European Advisory Commission.

The establishment of the European Advisory Commission followed agreements reached at the Moscow conference in October 1943. Members of this commission were John C. Winant of the United States, Sir William Strang of Great Britain, and Ambassador F.T. Gousev of the Soviet Union. Among the accomplishments of the Commission was the preparation of the terms of surrender and the original plans for the governmental machinery for Germany.

88. Training of Personnel and Delegation of Power.

From the first it was recognized that the occupation of conquered territory imposed problems requiring specially trained personnel. Specialists were, therefore, recruited and trained for military government duties. These persons were assigned as members of G-5 staff divisions, military government detachments, and other related organizations. During combat operations and for some time thereafter, military government detachments were supervised by the G-5 divisions in regular command channels. The Supreme Commander delegated his powers as military governor to the commanding generals of the army groups, who in turn delegated their powers to subordinate commanders. Usually a tactical unit, on taking possession of a town or area, did only what was absolutely necessary in the way of restoring law and order and providing relief for the inhabitants. The tactical unit soon moved on and transferred its military government responsibilities to the unit which was assigned area responsibility in the rear.

89. Development of the United States Element of the Allied Control Authority.

a. From the United States point of view, the most important of the agencies planning for military government was the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany), which became the United States element of the Allied Control Authority.(1) The mission of this body as conceived by the Joint Chiefs of Staff was brought to the attention of Supreme Headquarters in August 1944,(2) and a nucleus planning staff was formed immediately.(3) This staff was under the direction of Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham, former commandant of the School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia, who later became military adviser to Ambassador Winant.

b. Accomplishments of the planning staff of the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) in the first few weeks following its organization included conferences with British elements of Supreme Headquarters regarding divisional problems, reconnaissance on the Continent for a location to an advanced section, and the preparation of various plans for the administration of the occupation through an organization built on divisions dealing with subjects such as finance, prisoners of war and displaced persons, politics, transportation, and internal affairs. By 5 February 1945 the group had completed plans for the seizure and control of the German Foreign Office, the Chancellery, the Nazi Party headquarters, and the transportation system. Meanwhile the Fifteenth Army was planning for the occupation of Berlin,

and the request of the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) for the activation of Headquarters Command was submitted to the Fifteenth Army by Supreme Headquarters on 17 February 1945.(4)

c. On 5 March 1945 the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) was organized as a command with Brig. Gen. Wickersham as commanding general.(5)

d. On 25 March 1945 the Headquarters of U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) was transferred from Bushy Park, Surrey, England, to Versailles, France,(6) except for a rear echelon, designated the U.S. Group Control Council (Rear), which operated in England until 16 May 1945.(7) Advance Headquarters, which had been opened at Versailles on 9 February 1945, with Col. L.W. Jefferson in charge, was absorbed by the main headquarters.

90. Division of Responsibility between Group and Theater Staff.

While the headquarters was still in England, much consideration had been given to the problem of the relationship between the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) and the Theater staff, and a meeting was held on 16 March between representatives of both organizations.(8) It was decided that more of the responsibility for the control of Germany should be given to the Theater staff, a decision which involved the revision of approved European Advisory Commission draft directives. Further details were taken up in a joint staff study carried out by both bodies. On 31 March 1945 long-range requirements for army, navy, and air disarmament and demobilization were excluded from the scope

of planning, as well as other policies for the United States Zone. From this time it was established that all policies with regard to Germany were to be developed in conjunction with the United States element of Supreme Headquarters, for approval by the Commanding General, European Theater of Operations.(9)

b. A further clarification of the relationship of the Deputy Military Governor and the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) to the Theater staff was issued on 29 April 1945.(10) So far as Germany was concerned, the Theater staff was specifically charged with the execution, implementation, and supervision within the United States Zone of United States and Allied Control Authority policies. When the responsibility for the government of Germany passed to Allied civilian control, the functions of the control agencies-- the Deputy Military Governor, the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany), and military government elements of staffs in the United States Zone-- were to be withdrawn from United States military command.

THE BERLIN DECLARATION AND THE INAUGURATION OF QUADRIPARTITE CONTROL

91. The Function of the Berlin Declaration.

At the time of the signing of the surrender, General Eisenhower emphasized that the surrender was a purely military one, and that political and economic terms to be imposed upon Germany by the political heads of the Allied nations would follow.(11) The first announcement

of what these terms would be came scarcely a month later. A Control Council consisting of the commanders in chief of the armies of the four powers met in Berlin as representatives of their countries to discuss the policies. Members of the Council were General Eisenhower, Marshal Zhukov, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, and Gen. Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. In these four men the governing powers over Germany were vested. Decisions could be reached only by unanimous vote of the Council members. On 5 June 1945 these decisions were made public in the Berlin Declaration.(12)

92. The Terms of the Declaration.

The Berlin Declaration stated that there would be no central German Government. The administration of the country was to be vested in the victorious powers. The governments of the four Allied nations would determine the boundaries of Germany, or any part thereof, and the status of Germany, or of any area of German territory. A series of articles set forth the following requirements: the surrender to Allied representatives of all persons with Nazi affiliations; the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany; the stationing of Allied forces and civil agencies in any or all parts of Germany, as determined by the Allies; and the imposition of additional political, administrative, economic, financial, military, and any other requirements arising from the defeat of Germany, as seen necessary by Allied representatives. Any failure on the part of the German authorities or people to fulfill their obligations was

to be met with suitable action by the Allied representatives.

93. The Entry of United States Troops into Berlin.

Lieutenant General Clay, Lieutenant General Weekes, and Marshal Zhukov at a meeting in Berlin on 29 June 1945, planned for the move into Berlin of United States and British troops to be completed between 1 and 4 July.(13) Accordingly, the preliminary reconnaissance party of 2,000 men, together with two detachments of Berlin District Headquarters and Headquarters Command troops, moved into Berlin on 1 July.(14) On the following day a reconnaissance party of 3,000, including a number of U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) personnel, moved in.(15) Headquarters buildings were chosen for both the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) and Berlin District at the Luftgau Building and the Telefunken Radio Engineer Research Laboratory, and by 7 July they had been occupied.(16)

94. Problem of the French Sector in Berlin.

A problem arose with regard to the French Sector in Berlin similar to that which had arisen regarding the French Zone of occupation. When the decision was made at the Crimea Conference to invite the French to participate in the occupation, the area of their Berlin Sector was not defined. In a subsequent meeting of the European Advisory Commission on 1 March, the British representative had suggested that Reinickendorf should be part of the French Sector, while subsequent British proposals named Zehlendorf and Steglitz.

The decision was to be left to the commanders in chief, acting jointly.(17) Finally, at the end of July, the French accepted the British offer of the districts of Reinickendorf and Wedding to form their sector of Greater Berlin.(18)

95. The United States Sector of Berlin.

The United States Sector of Berlin comprised the six districts of Zehlendorf, Schöneberg, Tempelhof, Kreuzberg, Steglitz, and Neukölln.

96. Inauguration of Quadripartite Control.

With the entry into Berlin of the Western powers, quadripartite control could be inaugurated. On the municipal level this was, in terms of the European Advisory Commission's decision of 14 November 1944, to take the form of an inter-Allied governing authority, later designated the Allied Kommandatura Berlin, composed of the commandants appointed by the respective commanders in chief and operating under the general direction of the Allied Control Authority.(19) The Kommandatura functioned as a council, and, through the oberbürgermeister of Berlin, exercised control over all municipal affairs. The commandant of each sector administered law and order in his sector, in accordance with the policies of the Kommandatura. The position of chairman rotated among the four commandants. In its internal organization, the Kommandatura was divided into all the departments of a municipal government, staffed by representatives of the four occupying powers. The first meeting of the Kommandatura, with Marshal Zhukov presiding, inaugurated formal quadripartite control on 11 July,(20) and was

followed on 30 July by the first formal meeting of the Allied Control Council, presided over by General Eisenhower.(21)

THE BEGINNING OF THE OCCUPATION IN AUSTRIA

97. Planning for the Occupation of Austria.

a. The assumption of quadripartite control was a slower process in Austria and was not completed until August 1945. Planning, however, had started in 1944, and from the beginning, a clear distinction had been made between the status of Germany and Austria.(22)

b. It was originally decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff that the Allied planning organization in England would coordinate plans for the occupation of Austria with those for Germany, but that Austria would be initially under the Mediterranean Theater because forces for the occupation could be provided more quickly from there.(23) The U.S. Group Control Council (Austria) was established in the Mediterranean Theater on 27 January 1945,(24) and the London planning staff started its move to Italy early in February 1945.(25)

c. In December 1944 the proposal that Austria be divided into three zones was made by the Soviet representative to the European Advisory Commission. In March 1945 the four-power occupation of Austria was being considered by that body, but agreement was not reached until early in July.

d. Events early in April 1945 forced changes in the plans for Austria, Soviet forces crossed the Austrian border early in April and captured Vienna on 13 April. Meanwhile, the weakening resistance of the Wehrmacht in Germany indicated that United States forces could invade Austria from the northwest more easily than from the south. Part of General Eisenhower's forces were turned south, therefore, and penetrated into Austria before the Germans could assemble their forces in the mountain "redoubt" of southern Bavaria and western Austria. Control was transferred from the Mediterranean to the European Theater of Operations, except that the former Theater was directed to furnish military government personnel and the headquarters staff for the occupation forces.(26)

98. Interim Period of Tactical Military Government.

After V-E Day it was necessary to continue tactical military government in Austria for a few weeks until military government field detachments were in position. When the first members of the military government planning staff arrived at the end of May, they found a confused situation, due to the territorial disposition of units. Troops in Austria comprised all or parts of two army groups, two field armies, four army corps, and twelve divisions, many of which were partly in Germany and partly in Austria. Consequently, their instructions and policies were not exclusively directed towards Austria. During the early period Austria had to be treated on the same lines as Germany.(27)

99. Development of an Austrian Command.

This situation was improved, however, in July. On 5 July 15th Army Group was reorganized and redesignated the U.S. Occupational Forces Austria.(28) The Headquarters Company II Corps, 11th Armored Division, 42d Division, and 65th Division, previously assigned to Third Army and 12th Army Group, were assigned on 6 July to the newly formed U.S. Occupational Forces Austria,(29) the commanding general of which was Gen. Mark Clark.(30)

100. The Place of Austria in the European Theater Organization.

The command directive for Germany and Austria, which was adopted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 28 June 1945, provided that General Eisenhower as Commanding General of the European Theater should delegate to the Commanding General of the United States forces in Austria such operational control as he considered necessary, and that two divisions should be assigned to Austria.(31) This provision was elaborated in the Allied Forces Headquarters document that established the U.S. Occupational Forces Austria. General Clark was made directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military government and political matters, while remaining under the European Theater on matters of supply and administration.(32) Responsibility for the logistical support of forces in Austria was delegated to the Third Army, and later to Continental Base Section. Thus, the Austrian command assumed its place within the European Theater, retaining, however, a considerable measure of independence as regards

policy, military government, and operation.

THE TERMINATION OF COMBINED COMLAND

101. The Dissolution of the Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Realignment of Command.

a. The Supreme Commander relinquished command of all elements of the Allied Expeditionary Force on 14 July 1945. The Commanding General of the U.S. Forces, European Theater, assumed command of the 12th and 6th Army Groups, United States naval elements, Ninth Air Force, Communications Zone, and the United States elements of the SHAEF Missions to France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and Norway.(33)


b. The British War Office assumed control over the 21st Army Group and the British elements of the SHAEF Missions to France, the Netherlands, and Norway. British army elements of these missions reverted to the command of 21st Army Group, while the Royal Air Force elements reverted to the British Air Ministry, which also assumed command of the Royal Air Force in Norway. The British War Office assumed command of all land forces in Norway, and the British Chiefs of Staff acted as agents for the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but no change was made in the command of Norwegian naval and air forces until they were transferred to the Norwegian Government. The British Admiralty assumed control of British naval elements, and the French

High Command took over the First French Army. The Army Detachment of the Alps did not revert to French command until 10 July 1945.

c. For two weeks the United States element of the Supreme Headquarters staff functioned in the dual capacity of officers of Supreme Headquarters and of U.S. Forces, European Theater. It was a period of adjustment and organization involving the disposal of records and termination of Supreme Headquarters functions. The discontinuance of Headquarters Command, Supreme Headquarters, was ordered effective as of 16 July 1945, a move which marked the end of the joint command of United States and British forces,(34) and the final stage in the assumption of the occupation mission. The constitution, and the interrelation of units, of the United States forces in the European Theater as of 17 July 1945 is shown in the accompanying chart.

EUROPEAN THEATER ORGANIZATION

17 JULY 1945



NOTES:

- a. SIXTH ARMY GROUP NOT INCLUDED BECAUSE IT CONTAINED NO TROOPS & WAS DISBANDED 20 JULY 1945 TWELFTH ARMY GROUP BECAME NON-OPERATIONAL 26 JULY 1945.
- b. THIRD & SEVENTH ARMY COMMANDERS ALSO COMMANDED THE EASTERN & WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS RESPECTIVELY
- c. UNDER TECHNICAL CONTROL OF THEATER QUARTERMASTER.
- d. OCCUPIED & CONTROLLED BY FIRST AIRBORNE ARMY.
- e. FOR ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPLY ONLY.
- f. OPERATIONAL CONTROL ONLY
- g. BOTH IN SAME AREA - BREMEIN ENCLAVE

Chapter V

THE MATURATION OF THE POLICIES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE OCCUPATION

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

102. Preparations for the Conference.

a. Toward the end of June 1945, U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District, and Headquarters First Airborne Army were entrusted with the responsibility of organizing and preparing a site for the proposed "Big Three" conference. On 16 June 1945, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, then commanding Berlin District and First Airborne Army, received instructions to proceed to Berlin to confer with representatives of Marshal Zhukov regarding the use of a neutral meeting area for the proposed three-power conference which was then scheduled to begin about 15 July.(1)

b. General Parks and his party arrived in Berlin on 22 June 1945 and were conducted by their Soviet hosts to Babelsberg, a residential town just east of Potsdam. A preliminary ground reconnaissance party arrived in Babelsberg the next day. The Soviet forces at first

permitted the Americans 50 officers, 175 enlisted men, and 50 vehicles in Babelsberg; but by the time the principal American conferees had arrived on 15 July, the military personnel in the compound had increased to 3,238 officers and men.(2)

c. The target date set for the completion of all work at Babelsberg was 13 July, two days before the date scheduled for the arrival of the first conferees. It was estimated that approximately 4,800 persons, including an official party of 500, accompanying administrative personnel of 300, press representatives numbering 500, and security, air force, and service personnel of 3,500, would make up the American representation at the conference.(3)

103. Sessions.

The Tripartite Conference popularly known as the Potsdam Conference, opened on 17 July 1945, when the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, J.V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, each accompanied by the foreign secretary of his government, met in the Cecilienhof, at Babelsberg, near Potsdam. Clement R. Attlee, soon to replace Churchill as British prime minister, was also present with the British delegation. After the ninth meeting, the conference was interrupted for two days and resumed on 28 July, when the results of the British general election had been declared. Attlee, as the newly elected Prime Minister, now replaced Churchill in the Conference, which continued until 2 August 1945.

104. Agreements.

Agreement was reached on the political and economic principles of the policy to be followed by the occupying powers with regard to Germany. These principles were, on the whole, those agreed upon in the Crimea Conference in February 1945. In the Tripartite Conference at Potsdam, they were amplified. In addition, certain problems of an international character were discussed, such as the future boundaries of Poland and the expulsion of German civilians from newly liberated areas.

a. Political Principles.

The agreement provided for the general denazification of Germany, for the removal from office of all persons with former Nazi affiliations, and for the punishment of war criminals. Efforts were to be directed towards a decentralization of political structure and a development of local responsibility, to be accomplished by the restoration of local self-government on democratic principles and the encouragement of all political parties. For the time being, no central German Government was to be established.

b. Economic Principles.

In the organization of German economy, primary emphasis was to be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries. All production of war materials was prohibited. During the period of occupation, Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit.(4)

c. Reparations.

Reparation claims of each of the occupying powers were to be met by removal of property from their respective zones of occupation and by appropriation of German external assets. The Soviet Union, in addition, would receive from the western zones, in exchange for an equivalent value of food and other commodities later to be agreed upon, 15 percent of such usable capital equipment from the metallurgical, chemical, and machine manufacturing industries as was not necessary for the German peace economy; and another 10 percent of such industrial equipment as was unnecessary for the German peace economy, to be transferred from the western zones without payment or exchange of any kind in return.(5)

d. General Occupation Policies.

The Conference adopted as general occupation policy that the commander in chief of each zone would exercise supreme authority in his own zone and that the four commanders would act jointly in matters affecting Germany as a whole.(6) Treatment of the German population was to be uniform throughout Germany as far as possible.(7)

e. International Policy.

Agreement was reached on certain matters of international policy. Although the western frontier of Poland--the future boundary between Germany and Poland--was not yet definitely determined at the Conference, it was decided that, pending settlement of the frontier,

all former German territory lying east of the Oder River, including that part of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Soviet Union, should be under the administration of Poland and should not be considered a part of the Soviet Zone of occupation in Germany.(8) It was also agreed that German civilian populations residing within the limits of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary would be expelled and sent into occupied Germany. It was stressed that these transfers must be effected in an orderly and humane manner. The governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, which had been expelling the German civilian population prior to the meeting at Potsdam, were directed to suspend further expulsions pending a study by the Allied Control Council, which was to determine, among other things, the equitable distribution of these expelled Germans among the four occupation zones.(9)

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN THEATER AND THE SERVICES FORCES

105. The Adjustment of Theater Organization.

The period from 18 July to 31 December 1945 was one of considerable reorganization, at all levels, of the elements constituting the European Theater.

a. The army group formation was eliminated by the disbandment of 6th(10) and 12th Army Groups(11) and the redesignation of 21st

Army Group Headquarters as Headquarters, British Army of the Rhine.(12) The area occupied by the United States, exclusive of the Berlin Sector and the Bremen Enclave, was divided into the Eastern Military District and the Western Military District.(13)

b. On the major command level, September saw the discontinuance of the Assembly Area Command and the transfer of its functions and personnel to Oise Intermediate Section.(14) In December, United Kingdom Base was discontinued and its functions and personnel were transferred to London Area Office;(15) the Bremen Enclave ceased to exist with the transfer to the British of that territory, except for the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven;(16) and on 29 December, a new command, Continental Base Section, was formed from Headquarters, Advanced Section.(17)

c. A change also occurred in Theater command: on 11 November, General Eisenhower left the Theater and Gen. George S. Patton served as temporary Theater Commander until 26 November, when Gen. Joseph T. McNarney arrived and became Theater Commander.(18)

d. There was a major organizational change in the Air Forces on 16 August, when the U.S. Strategic and Tactical Air Forces was redesignated U.S. Air Forces in Europe and reorganized into an occupation air force.(19) The 9th Air Force became the basic unit, with units of the 8th, 12th, and 15th Air Forces. The Air Transport Command and the Army Air Forces Communications Service were attached to and received logistical support from Theater Service Forces, as directed by Theater Headquarters.

106. The Reorganization of Service Forces.

The major organizational change, however, concerned the Service Forces, which at the beginning of the period functioned under the control of Headquarters, Communications Zone.

a. Preliminaries to the Change.

The functions of the chiefs of services had been defined in the Theater organization plan of 12 June 1945. They were to remain under a subordinate headquarters, with their activities somewhat reduced in scope from what they had been during combat.(20) Several of the elements of the Communications Zone staff had been transferred to the new Theater Headquarters when it was established in Frankfurt am Main on 1 July 1945, and the plan for that headquarters called for a separation from the Communications Zone, with which it had been closely interwoven up to that time. Planning for the new service headquarters started in July, and on 21 July the announcement was made that Theater administrative and supply services would be combined and that a new headquarters, to be known as Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, would be activated on 1 August 1945.(21)

b. Establishment of Theater Service Forces, European Theater.

The order which called for the reorganization was published on 21 July 1945,(22) and the new Headquarters became operative on 1 August, with Lt. Gen. John C.H. Lee continuing in command until 29 December, when his place was taken by Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder.(23) The newly activated headquarters took over all installations and

functions which had previously been assigned to the Communications Zone. It was divided into a main echelon at Frankfurt and a Rear echelon at Paris. The Paris headquarters was the normal channel of communication with Army Service Forces and the Zone of the Interior ports until 3 December 1945.(24) Each staff division, however, was directed to establish its main headquarters at Frankfurt as soon as practicable, and after 3 December the principal functions, except redeployment, were performed there. On 1 August the total personnel employed by the service forces amounted to slightly more than 2,000,000.(25) The headquarters included a general and a special staff, the Theater chiefs of services being special staff officers for the commanding generals of both the Theater and the Theater Service Forces. The relationship between the two staffs remained the same as under the Communications Zone.(26)

c. Reorganization of Subordinate Commands of Theater Service Forces.

With the inauguration of Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, certain technical commands were established under the commanding general:(27) the Theater Motor Transport Service, the Military Railway Service, and the Theater Inland Waterways Transport Service, all three being under the technical command of the Chief of Transportation, United States Forces, European Theater; the Military Pipelines Service, until its inactivation on 1 October;(28) and the American Graves Registration Service, which was redesignated American

Graves Registration Command on 1 October 1945 and assigned to the supervision of the Theater Chief Quartermaster.(29)

ESTABLISHMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY GOVERNMENT

107. Over-All Trend.

The trend of organization in Germany took the form of a gradual evolution from military to civil government. During combat operations, military government was secondary to military operations, and although the responsibility for military government was assigned to the Supreme Commander, this responsibility was subordinate to that of defeating the enemy. Full responsibility remained with the military commander until the military government machinery could be set up. In the period immediately following the end of hostilities, therefore, the military government detachments that took up their positions with tactical units had only local jurisdiction.(30) Their integration into a military government for larger areas came later.

108. Territorial Basis for Established Military Government.

That one of the prime requisites for a system of military government was a settled territorial subdivision of the area to be governed had been recognized in the early directives, which called for the establishment of military government on the pattern of existing German political and administrative areas. The exigencies of combat,

however, had led to a changing distribution of area responsibility among tactical units in which the following of local administrative boundaries was more or less a matter of chance. The friction which developed from the ensuing conflict of jurisdiction led to the policy of following German internal boundaries for all purposes connected with military government, which became standard practice under static conditions. The first major step in the direction of stabilization came in September 1945, with the division of the United States Zone into the three states of Grosshessen, Württemberg-Baden, and Bavaria, each with a state government empowered to enact state legislation and exercise other state governmental powers, subject to the supervision of Military Government, regional offices of which functioned in each state.(31)

109. Early Chain of Military Government Command.

With the stabilization of the occupation came the definition of a chain of command for military government, passing from Theater Headquarters to the commanders of Third and Seventh Armies, also designated as the commanders of the Military Districts, and from them through a "Territorial military government detachment chain of command," which ran parallel to the German civil administrative chain of command.(32) This was the first complete chain of command for military government and it was notable in that it was independent of the tactical chain.

110. Development and Stabilization on the Headquarters Level.

A corresponding evolution and final stabilization occurred in the headquarters organization of military government. The original bodies from which the final organizations of the Office of Military Government developed were the G-5 Divisions of Supreme Headquarters and Headquarters, European Theater of Operations, and the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany).

a. G-5 Division.

In the early period, G-5 Divisions functioned at Supreme Headquarters, European Theater of Operations and Communications Zone, the last two of which were interrelated. At the dissolution of Supreme Headquarters, its G-5 Division was consolidated with the G-5 Division of the European Theater of Operations and became the G-5 Division of U.S. Forces, European Theater. The responsibilities of this division were the control and supervision of the normal functions of German civil government at all echelons below the national level. It was composed of nine branches: executive, internal affairs, legal, financial, economics, trade and commerce, displaced persons, public health, and industry. On 1 October, the G-5 Division was redesignated Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone).(33)

b. U.S. Group Control Council (Germany).(34)

On the same date, the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) was redesignated Office of Military Government (U.S.).(35)

111. Division of Functions.

These two units composed the military government staff of the Theater Commander. The functions of the Office of Military Government (U.S.) were: to furnish the United States element of the Allied Control Authority for Germany; to develop major military government policies for, and to supervise military government activities in, the United States Zone, covering local government and civil services, education and religious affairs, public welfare, postal service, finance, courts and prisons, displaced persons, economics, industry, newspaper, radio, and theaters. The functions of Office of Military Government (U.S.Zone) were: to supervise within the Zone United States military government policies; to supervise United States civil affairs in liberated countries; to supervise restitutions, supply, control, coal, currency depositories, rail transportation, safety, health, denazification, displaced persons and refugees, and election returns; to direct military government in the Bremen Enclave through the commanding general of Bremen Port Command.

RELATIONS BETWEEN THEATER HEADQUARTERS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT

112. Measures toward a Separation.

Experience brought a more efficient division of functions and responsibilities between the military command and the military

government authorities. In general, the tendency was to classify any matter relating to the control of the civil population and the political, economic, and cultural life of Germany as a military government responsibility, and any matter concerning the security of the zone or requiring a large personnel for guard duty or administration as the responsibility of the purely military elements of the occupation forces. Immediately after the redesignation of the G-5 Division as the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), military government activity began to be further separated from other Theater functions. In October 1945 a memorandum was issued to all branch chiefs of the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) instructing them to make a detailed study of the problems within their area of responsibility in the light of the following principles: The field forces of the Army and Theater Headquarters would have no direct military government functions, but would be available to maintain the security of our forces and the authority of military government when required. The administrative and technical services of the Army would provide the following: administrative support; rations, clothing; and petroleum stocks; and pay of United States military and civilian personnel in the military government organization. In all other matters, the military government organization would depend upon German civilian agencies and personnel for supplies and services. Direct communication was authorized between the regional offices and the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone); control of the German civil authorities was to be carried out at the regional level.(36)

113. Transfer of Information Control Functions.

The Information Control Division, which was a staff division of Theater Headquarters, was discontinued on 10 December 1945(37) and its functions were reallocated to military government offices.

114. Responsibility for Displaced Persons.

At the time of the inauguration of the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), responsibility for formulation of policy on displaced persons passed to the new organization. Control and supply of displaced persons, however, was left with the tactical forces, and a number of detachments which had been detailed to this study continued to operate under corps and Army control.(38)

POLICIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

115. Final Establishment of Occupation in Austria.

a. One of the earliest major accomplishments of this period was the final establishment of the occupation in Austria.(39) On 19 August the advance headquarters of U.S. Forces Austria moved into Vienna; after a series of conferences with Soviet officials, the commanders in chief of the other three occupying powers Gen. Mark Clark, Lt. Gen. Sir Richard McCreery, and Gen. Marie-Emile Bethouart, moved into the city on 23 August. The Soviet forces were under the command of Marshal Ivan S. Koniev.(40)

b. By September 1945 the United States Sector of Vienna was established, comprising the districts of Neubau, Josefstadt, Alsergrund, Währing, Döbling, and the northern part of Hernals adjoining Währing.(41) On 11 September the Allied Control Council met for the first time.

c. Two of the major achievements of quadripartite control during this period were the extension through the whole of Austria of the power of the Provisional Government under Dr. Karl Renner on 20 October, and the preparations for, and supervision of, the first free elections for the national and provincial legislatures of the postwar period. This was held on 25 November 1945, with approximately 93 percent of the registered voters participating. Eighty-five Volkspartei members, 76 Social Democrats, and 4 Communists were elected to the Nationalrat, or lower House of Parliament; Volkspartei majorities were elected to the provincial legislatures in all the Länder except Vienna and Kärnten (a Land of the British Zone), where socialists formed the majority. Leopold Figl, chairman of the Volkspartei, was elected chancellor of the new government, which was formally approved on 14 December by the Executive Committee of the Allied Control Council.(42)

116. Denazification.

a. One of the major purposes of the occupation of Germany was to eradicate from German life all evidences of nazism; one of the first steps was to attack the Nazi Party itself. It was dissolved,

its funds and property were confiscated, its records and headquarters were seized, and its leaders were arrested and interned. All Nazi schools and newspapers were abolished, and Nazi propaganda was prohibited. All auxiliary organizations of the Nazi Party, including the youth groups, were swept away. All laws and practices based upon the Nazi philosophy, or involving discriminations on grounds of race, color, religion, or political opinions, were suspended by the military commanders and later repealed by the Allied Control Council. By the end of 1945, approximately 110,000 Germans had been arrested, of whom almost 50,000 were in automatic arrest categories. About 80,000 enemy civilian internees were in the custody of the army.

b. Denazification of the German government and institutions was begun in the earliest stages of military government. In the reconstitution of the civil administration, appointment of Nazis was avoided with the greatest care. Naturally, some crept in by falsifying their records, but they were thrown out later. In the early months of the occupation, the efforts of the military government authorities were concentrated upon the denazification of the government, and especially of its essential services. Denazification of the police was announced officially as complete in December 1945. Military Government Law No. 8, which became effective on 26 September 1945, began the process of denazifying German industry, business, and institutions other than the government. It excluded members of the Nazi Party from all employment in which they would have responsibility or authority, restricting them to the lowest clerical positions and

common labor. All Germans were required to register with the authorities, stating the facts as to their membership in the Nazi Party, and the trial of all members of the Nazi Party above nominal participants was contemplated.

117. Civil Government.

a. The first obligation of an occupying power is to restore and maintain law and order. The victorious Allied armies found in Germany no national government worthy of the name and hardly any county and local governments capable of functioning with any degree of efficiency. The whole governmental structure was so completely tied to nazism that it crumbled, along with the party and military machines. In the circumstances, the conquerers had to man the essential services in order to get public utilities to functioning, to furnish a police force in order to forestall an outbreak of crime and sabotage, and to set up its own courts in order to try offenders expeditiously. After these first urgent steps were taken, the occupying force could begin setting up local and high administrations and turning back to the inhabitants a degree of responsibility for their own government.

b. No branch of the German government was more thoroughly nazified than the police and the courts. In the United States Zone, it was necessary to tear them down almost completely and build anew. The Nazi national police, the Gestapo, was broken up completely; so also was the political police. Some elements of the criminal and

municipal police and of the local fire departments were found to be untainted and suitable for incorporation in the new organizations. With these as nuclei, new personnel was screened, employed, trained, and put into service in the new Military Government police and fire departments. By November the new police had been so successful in winning the confidence of all concerned that the military commander had begun to issue arms and ammunition to them.

c. All German courts were closed and justice was administered exclusively in military government courts. The notorious Nazi People's Court was abolished. Personnel was sought to man new German courts and in August 1945 German courts gradually began to function under Military Government supervision.

d. After provisional governments had been established generally at the municipal and county levels, three Länder, or states, were constituted on 19 September 1945, each headed by a minister president. All the members of the Land governments had to be confirmed by the appropriate Office of Military Government. On 17 October 1945 was inaugurated a consultative council known as the Länderrat, composed of the ministers president of the three Länder and the German chief administrator of the Bremen Enclave.

118. Political Progress in Germany.

a. Revival of Political Parties.

Stimulus was given to political organization and activity by the announcement on 2 August 1945 of the decision of the Tripartite

Conference in Berlin to permit and encourage throughout Germany, as a step toward the reconstruction of German life on a democratic and peaceful basis, all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion. Up to this time all political activity had been banned in the United States Zone. Although the ban continued in effect during all of August, informal and preparatory organizational work began, with communists and social democrats most active. On 27 August a revised directive was promulgated for the United States Zone, under which military government officers might accept and approve applications to form "democratic political parties to engage in political activities at Kreis level." (43)

b. Party Newspaper.

In Berlin four organized parties were already functioning when United States forces occupied the United States Sector of the city, the Soviet military authorities having granted them permission to organize. Each party published a newspaper, whose editorial office and printing establishment were in the Soviet occupied area, and all papers were subjected to Soviet censorship. (44) The first party papers in the United States Zone appeared on the streets of Munich on 26 January 1946, the day before the first elections were held in Bavaria. (45)

c. Increase of Political Activity.

Political activity was comparatively great in the larger cities during September. In the smaller cities, however, it was

slight, and in most rural districts it was nonexistent. There was no mass demand for political organization. That which occurred was inspired by a few leaders, most of whom had been active before 1933.(46) Organized political activity increased during October, although the public, absorbed in the business of merely keeping alive and preparing for the coming winter, showed little interest. In October, the communists applied for authorization to organize on a Land level in Bavaria and there was some indication of organization on a national level. Communist programs appeared to be in close agreement in all zones.(47) On 23 November political parties were authorized on a Land level,(48) and organization got well under way in the United States Zone in December for the local elections scheduled for the last two Sundays in January.

119. Labor Unions.

a. One of the points agreed upon in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin was the right of the German people to form free trade unions. General Eisenhower said in his message of 8 August to the German people: "You will be permitted to form local unions and to engage in local political activities. An initial aim of trade unions and political parties should be to help in the measures necessary now to prepare for the coming winter."

b. By July 1945 interest in the organization of unions was growing, and a material increase in labor organization was expected as a result of the decision of the Tripartite Conference.(49)

Unions were already being formed in nine of the fifteen Kreise of northern Württemberg. In Stuttgart, there had been active labor organization since the first days of the occupation and the leadership was of an unusually high type. In Nürnberg, fifty work councils had been permitted to organize on a provisional basis. Meetings of labor groups were held in Mannheim, where a well-organized general trade union was operating. Initiation fees were usually one Reichsmark and the low dues were computed on a sliding scale based on earnings. Almost without exception, the labor organizations were initiated by pre-1933 leaders. Workers were admitted regardless of craft or industry. Political, confessional, and previous trade-union commitments were deliberately avoided, and a strong desire to break with the past was evident. Denazification was the first objective.(50)

c. During August activity leading to the formation of trade unions increased throughout the United States Zone, and one organization operating on an interzonal basis was reported to be active in the British and Soviet Zones.

120. Reparations and Restitution.

The principle that Germany would be required to restore the property removed by her from occupied countries was announced in the Allied Declaration of 5 January 1943 at London. The principle that Germany would be required to deliver reparations in kind was agreed to by the Allied Governments in the Yalta Conference. The Potsdam Agreement elaborated upon both of these principles. Until

near the end of 1945, little progress was made in either reparations or restitution, as detailed international agreements were needed in both fields. Reparations in kind were made extensively in one form even during the first months of the occupation, large numbers of German prisoners of war being held as elements of the labor force of Allied countries. A beginning was made in the dismantling of German industry for reparations deliveries when 156 plants in the United States Zone were marked for this purpose by the Economic Directorate, and twenty-four of these were allocated as "advance reparations" on 1 October 1945. By the end of November, the dismantling of ten of these had been finished or was in progress. Only small quantities of artistic and industrial material were restored to their rightful owners from the United States Zone in 1945, as the Allied Powers had at that time not agreed upon a definition of restitution.

121. Economic Problems.

a. The economic life of Germany was paralyzed after the surrender. The war took a tremendous toll in damaged factories, broken lines of transportation, disruption of the systems of distribution, and depletion and dispersion of the labor force. German economy probably reached its lowest ebb in June 1945, when industrial production was not over 2 percent of existing capacity and the normal food ration was only about 900 calories per day. The prospects of recovery were poor, since Germany was divided into four zones whose borders were practically insurmountable economic barriers across which almost no

trade was carried on during the first year of the occupation.

b. The Potsdam Agreement was a milestone in the development of economic policy for Germany in its assertion of the principle that the whole country should be treated as an economic unit. No progress was made, however, in bringing about the economic unity of Germany. The agencies of the United States forces of occupation charged with the economic control of Germany were therefore forced to proceed with a policy looking to a limited rehabilitation of the United States Zone.

c. Certain kinds of economic endeavor were stimulated as much as possible: agriculture, brown coal production, railways, inland water transport, electric power. Postal communications were brought back into operation by October. Where possible, plants providing essential peacetime items like soap, leather, shoes, and textiles were allowed to resume production. By the end of 1945, industrial production had risen to about 10 percent of existing capacity, and the normal daily ration had been increased to 1550 calories. To maintain the latter, however, it was necessary to begin, in January 1946, the direct importation of foodstuffs from the United States.

d. Steps were taken during these early months of the occupation to prevent Germany's war industry from coming to life. A comprehensive survey of industry for the purpose of identifying war plants was begun in May 1945, and no plants capable of being diverted to war production were allowed to reopen. The demilitarization of German industry was begun in November with the destruction of the first war plant.

122. The Restoration of Freedom.

The accomplishments of military government during the first few months of the occupation may best be summed up in terms of the rights and liberties of the individual German citizen. As a consequence of the Allied victory, Germany was freed from the domination of one of the most ruthless dictatorships of modern times. The instruments of oppression--the Nazi hierarchy, the military caste, the intelligence service, the Gestapo, the political police, and the concentration camps--had all been swept away. All political prisoners had been set free, unless there was a good reason related to security for holding them. The bombardment of Nazi propaganda in the press and by radio was silenced; in its place, the Germans had the beginnings of a free press and radio. Religious freedom had been reestablished, and the surviving Jews had been freed from Nazi persecution. A good beginning had been made in reopening the schools and in providing free education without political and militaristic propaganda. Limited public rights had been granted in the freedom to associate in political parties and trade-unions, and to hold some kinds of public assemblies. The Nazi domination of the theater, motion pictures, music, and art had been broken. To be sure, the German population had been plunged by war into want for the necessities of life--food, clothing, and shelter. It cannot be said that the German citizen enjoyed the full rights of a citizen of a democratic state--but the groundwork had been laid for the freedom of the individual and the regeneration of the German nation.

123. Destruction of German Fortifications.

a. During the early months of the occupation, German military installations such as airfields, ordnance plants, and weapons emplacements were identified, surveyed, and inventoried. All large ammunition dumps and storage depots of the German armed forces were found. All installations that were a hazard to the occupying forces or the civil population were promptly destroyed, placed under guard, or marked with warning signs. The destruction of mine fields, underground factories, and permanent fortifications was a task that was to continue for a long time. By the end of 1945, the network of fortifications and defensive works was almost completely surveyed, but only about one-quarter demolished.

b. German defensive works and fortifications were divided, for the purpose of destruction, into two groups. First priority was given to those installations which constituted an immediate hazard to occupation forces or which could immediately be utilized for war purposes without additional construction or production. Second priority was given to those installations which could not be utilized without additional construction for resumption of German war industries. The Allied Control Authority set the target date of 6 June 1951 for complete destruction.

124. Surplus Property.

No reliable estimates of the amount of surplus property were made before about 1 October 1945. It was then estimated that there were in the Theater 10,480,000 long tons of surplus material valued at \$10,322,000,000. Although the Office of the Foreign Liquidation Commissioner was established in September 1945 and negotiations were begun for the sale of surplus property in Europe, relatively slow progress was made until 1946 due to the lack of complete disposal instructions and the limited dollar credit of prospective buyers.

125. On V-E Day the United States forces had 36,260 pieces of requisitioned property in the United Kingdom and the liberated countries. By November 1945 these real estate holdings had been reduced to 28,000. Real estate holdings in the occupied areas of Germany and Austria by this time totaled 27,000 pieces. The highest priorities for new construction were given in 1945 to the redeployment program and the repair of Bremen and Bremerhaven as the principal ports of supply for the occupation forces.

126. Black Market Curbs.

On 15 September 1945, General Eisenhower prepared a statement which was read to all troops, explaining regulations designed to curb black marketing. Troops were ordered not to sell or exchange articles issued or sold to them by the Army, while Germans were forbidden to deal in these goods.(51)

127. Further Relaxation of Nonfraternization Order.

In Austria, all restrictions on fraternization were removed on 24 August 1945, except when this involved known Nazis or was directed toward marriage. Later, in November, marriage with Austrians was allowed. In Germany a similar, though slower, development was taking place. On 1 October 1945, the Allied Control Council lifted all restrictions on fraternization, except for marriage and billeting. Control over these two aspects was reserved to commanders of the United States, British, and French Zones. The Council's action did not affect to the Soviet forces, since they had not adopted any regulations governing fraternization. In a message to United States troops, General Eisenhower stressed the strict prohibition against marriage with Germans and billeting of troops with German families.(52)

128. Administration and Repatriation of Displaced Persons.

Every possible effort was made to repatriate United Nations displaced persons before winter, in view of the anticipated shortages of food and fuel in Germany. Some categories of displaced persons presented especially difficult problems: these were stateless persons, nonrepatriable persons, and the Jews. By August 1945, it was the policy of the United States that stateless and nonrepatriable persons, such as Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, and ex-enemy nationals persecuted because of race, religion, or activities in favor of the United Nations, should be granted the same assistance as United Nations displaced persons. Special centers were established for these people,

with United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration teams in charge. Numerous special Jewish assembly centers, such as those at Zeilsheim, Landsberg, and Wolfratshausen, were established. In order to prevent a breakdown of morale, the Central Tracing Bureau made every effort to trace members of families who had long been separated. In October 1945, special rations were authorized for persons persecuted under the Nazi regime. Efforts were also made to employ nonrepatriable displaced persons, and by the end of 1945 steps had been taken to effect a complete registration, showing their skills. Work projects were being developed, in cooperation with the military authorities, and displaced persons were given first priority on these projects. In November and December 1945, transportation difficulties revolving around the lack of fuel resulted in a static period of repatriation movements. Only 40,785 displaced persons were repatriated in November, and 578 in December, leaving 313,444 in camps and 167,644 outside the camps. The total number of displaced persons repatriated by the end of December 1945 was 2,709,127.(53)

129. The Repatriation of Liberated Prisoners of War.

a. By the end of June 1945, repatriation of 91,252 liberated American prisoners of war was regarded as complete, although 114 remained in hospitals.(54)

b. The vast majority of liberated prisoners of war of all nationalities except Polish and Yugoslav were repatriated by the month

of August 1945. In the early fall of 1945, the policy as respects Poles was that they would be repatriated only if their homes were west of the line fixed in 1939 as the line of demarcation between the Soviet and German spheres of control, and if the individual was willing to be repatriated.(55) Yugoslavs were not to be repatriated pending a decision by the State Department.(56) A law enacted in Yugoslavia on 23 August 1945 deprived of citizenship all members of the Yugoslav Army, liberated from German custody and resident abroad, who did not declare their readiness to be repatriated before 15 December 1945.

c. The practice of forming Civilian Guard Companies and Labor Service Companies from ex-prisoners and displaced persons not desiring repatriation, mostly Polish in nationality, was instituted in the summer of 1945.

d. The official end of operations in the repatriation of recovered allied military personnel was marked by the rescission of the Theater standing operating procedure on 1 October 1945.

130. The Punishment of War Criminals.

a. Establishment of the International Military Tribunal.

Plans for an inter-Allied war crimes tribunal were drafted by representatives of the occupying powers at London in a conference which began on 26 June. The conference drafted a charter and established the International Military Tribunal, before which Nazi organizations and major criminals whose crimes had no particular

geographic location were brought to justice. Under the terms of the charters, war crimes were defined in three categories: crime against peace, crimes against humanity, and crimes against international laws and usages of war.(57)

b. Number of War Criminals.

The task ahead was a big one. The Central Registry of War Criminals and Security Suspects, originally located in Paris, already had the names of approximately 18,000 alleged war criminals in its files. By the end of 1945, 5,000 more names were under preparation. To try these, together with all the members of the organizations found guilty by the International Military Tribunal, presented a problem of tremendous proportions. It was estimated that to try 100,000 individuals so that each would appear before a tribunal composed of three judges, would take the time of 375 judges for a period of four months, if one hour were allotted to each accused.(58)

c. Responsibilities.

By Theater directive of 20 September 1945,(59) staff responsibility was placed on the Theater Judge Advocate, whose office thus became the principal agency for the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. In addition, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, was given the responsibility for the apprehension of the persons designated by the Theater Judge Advocate as suspects or witnesses.

d. Delegation of Responsibility to German Courts.

In order to lighten the gigantic task of trying all war

criminals, a plan was submitted to the War Department on 5 December 1945 wherein it was proposed that special courts be constituted by Military Government, with the Office of Chief of Counsel controlling the flow of cases as a part of its authority to direct the trial of Axis war criminals.(60) Provided the victim was not a United Nations national, the accused was to be tried before a German court unless he was a major war criminal wanted by the International Military Tribunal. This plan was approved on 18 January 1946.(61) The burden of the Theater Commander with respect to punishment of war criminals was reduced further by a law of 20 December 1945, issued by the Allied Control Council, according to which the main group of persons to be tried before German criminal courts were those who had committed crimes on racial, religious, or political grounds. By this measure the German people were made to share some of the responsibility for the punishment of the guilty among them.(62)

e. Major War Criminals.

The Committee of Chief Prosecutors for the Investigation and Prosecution of War Criminals prepared a list of major war criminals which was announced on 29 August 1945. The names on the lists were:(63) Hermann Wilhelm Goring, Rudolf Hess, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Robert Ley, Alfred Rosenberg, Hans Frank, Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Dr. Wilhelm Frick, Julius Streicher, Wilhelm Keitel, Dr. Walter Funk, Baron Constantin von Neurath, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach, Karl Dönitz, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel, Albert Speer, Martin

Bormann, Fritz von Papen, Alfred Jodl, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, Erich Räder, Hans Fritzsche. These defendants were tried in the war crimes trials at Nürnberg which opened on 21 November 1945.

f. Other Trials.

By the end of 1945, considerable progress had been made. In September the Luneberg trials had begun, with an indictment against forty-nine war criminals;(64) on 8 October, in Wiesbaden, seven Germans were placed on trial for the mass murder of 500 Polish and Soviet slave laborers in a mental hospital;(65) the Dachau concentration camp cases were being tried before a military commission;(66) and the groundwork for other cases, such as the Malmedy Massacre and Mauthausen concentration camp atrocities, was rapidly being laid.

THE POLICE-TYPE OCCUPATION

131. Changing Concepts of the Occupation.

a. By the fall of 1945, it had become clear that the occupation forces would not have to cope with a strong resistance movement in Germany, as had been feared before the end of hostilities. German plans for underground activities had been in a formative stage at the time of the unconditional surrender, and the early apprehension of key figures of the SS, SD, and Gestapo had deprived a potential resistance of its leadership. In the early months of the occupation, the most serious threats to security were offered by disorderly displaced persons and German youths, some of whom were disposed to

form secret organizations of a subversive character. There was no further need for the overwhelming show of force which had been made in achieving the victory and during the first months of the occupation.

b. Many of the short-term objectives of the occupation were quickly accomplished. These included measures such as the disbandment of the German armed forces, the destruction of the Nazi Party and its affiliated organizations, the imprisonment of the political police, and the breaking-up of the German general staff. To accomplish the long-range objectives of the occupation such as the punishment of war criminals, the destruction of Germany's war potential, and the reeducation of the German people in the ways of democracy, a long period of occupation had to be contemplated.

c. The original plans for the occupation called for the stationing in Germany of relatively large field forces, organized at first into two armies. This may be characterized as an army-type occupation, and it depended upon the conversion of ordinary combat units into occupation forces. The European Theater was, however, soon notified by Washington that large field forces of the army-type would not be available for the control of the German people. From this fact arose the concept of the police-type occupation. Its central idea—that an occupied nation may best be controlled by a relatively small but highly mobile and especially trained security force—cannot be attributed to any individual or any single agency. Part of the concept came from the War Department, while many aspects of the organization and functions of the security force, or constabulary,

were developed from practical experience in the occupation of Germany.

132. The Constabulary and the Tactical Reserve.

The knowledge that only a relatively small force would be available for the long-term occupation of Germany forced the command of the European Theater to consider the most efficient use of the manpower that would be available. In the fall of 1945 thought along this line began to crystallize, and certain ideas gained general acceptance. Granted that a large portion of the strength available would have to be used as headquarters and service troops, it was believed that most efficient use could be made of the troops available for security and the control of the German population by setting up a relatively small, but highly trained and mobile superpolice force, or constabulary, to be supported by the remainder of the troops, which would be held in a tactical reserve. It was calculated that the constabulary should have a strength of about 30,000 and that the tactical reserve should consist of three mobile combat divisions. The former, operating by a system of roving patrols, would provide for the general security of the area of Germany occupied by the U.S. Army and would enforce upon the civil population the edicts of the Military Government. The latter, held in strategic locations, would be available to back up the constabulary in any emergency. The only apparent disadvantage in this plan was that the number of mobile ground combat forces would be so limited as to prevent any action outside the United States-occupied areas, in case forces

were needed for strategic support of other Allied forces or for the implementation of national policy in other parts of Europe. The major underlying assumption in the adoption of the police-type occupation was that the other United Nations in Europe would cooperate in the maintenance of peace by upholding law and order in their areas of responsibility.(67)

133. The Proposal for a Superpolice Force.

General Eisenhower outlined the theory of the police-type occupation to General Marshall on 8 October 1945 and proposed a pyramided superpolice system with mobile tactical units in reserve, as follows:(68) a "city" and "country" police composed of Germans or Austrians, supervised by Military Government, for the enforcement of military government ordinances in addition to usual police duties; a "state" police composed of specially trained, highly mobile United States units of the mechanized-cavalry-squadron type, which would be given a security patrol mission; an organization of centrally controlled United States counterintelligence agents; and United States combat formations of regimental strength or larger, located in principal communications and administrative centers and capable of rapid movement to threatened places.

134. Communication of the Plan to Commanders.

Late in October, General Eisenhower communicated the plan to all headquarters in the European Theater. He described the pyramided

police system as a U.S. Constabulary working over the local city and country German police. It would eventually be responsible to the civil governor of the United States Zone, while the supporting troops would be organized under the United States military command. No strategic reserve was to be retained, but each district was to maintain certain troops on an alert basis as a local reserve prepared to furnish forces for emergency use. The various headquarters were requested to submit by 1 November proposals for the tactical disposition of troops based on these principles.(69)

135. The Problems of Activating a Constabulary.

During November the plan was put into operation on an experimental basis. A small-scale trial group began operations in the Eastern Military District about the middle of the month as a supplement to the normal combat units having occupation duties. The lessons learned were to be utilized in putting the plan into full operation by 1 July 1946. By that time the winter would be over, the new harvest would be reaching the people, and the basic assumption underlying the plan--that the German people were relatively quiescent--would be well tested. Furthermore, the shift at that time would coincide with what was then accepted as the target date for "civilianizing" the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), as it was then anticipated that the German and Austrian people would be governing themselves with only minimum control. It was assumed that the major functions of Theater troops pertaining to displaced persons,

prisoners of war, and surplus property would be substantially finished, as well as tasks in liberated countries.(70) The plan contemplated a constabulary unit that would patrol a fixed area and, through high mobility, be capable of supporting adjacent constabulary units. Activities were to be coordinated with German local and frontier police through military government officers at local levels and through normal staff coordination at Theater level. The proposed strength of the constabulary was based on the size of the area covered and its population. The estimate for the mobile combat force was three divisions, made up of two armored and one motorized infantry divisions concentrated in regimental or larger strengths near the centers of population and disposed so as to be able to reach all areas of their operational range.(71)

136. Opposition to the Plan.

Despite the opposition of the Provost Marshal to the proposed division in the security command,(72) recommendations were submitted to the War Department on 22 December for a separate constabulary unit.(73)

137. Planning for the Constabulary Program.

a. The Third Army was made responsible for the organization of the force and was provided with preliminary planning data. The Public Safety Branch, Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone), assisted in working out the program and in coordinating constabulary

functions with the Counter Intelligence Corps, the military police, the German civil police, and other agencies.

b. The constabulary was to be developed as an elite force of the highest caliber United States personnel available, and no over-age or limited-duty men were to be used. If practicable, the troops were all to be reenlisted veterans. Their period of training was set at ninety days. The use of foreign nationals was considered for some time, but it was finally decided that it would weaken such a centrally controlled system by creating language and training difficulties.(74)

c. A central Zone Constabulary Headquarters was to be established with three brigade headquarters at the German Land level. Each was to include an air reconnaissance squadron and a varying number of mechanized cavalry regiments, which were to be modified by elimination of the bulk of the tanks and artillery and substitution of carbines, tommy guns, jeeps, and motorcycles for the heavier weapons and transportation. Twelve group headquarters were to be coordinated with German civil authorities at points agreed on with Land Offices of Military Government. Finally, forty-eight squadrons were to be allotted to the groups, distributed according to the population of the area and its security needs, and the reserve was to be assigned at group and higher echelons.(85)

Chapter VI

THE MANPOWER PROBLEM

PROGRESS OF REDEPLOYMENT(1)

138. Before V-J Day.

For the last half of July and the first ten days of August 1945 the story of redeployment was the uneventful one of an operation at last fully organized, with the responsible agencies trying to cope with the backlog left from the first two chaotic months. This was reduced by 10 August to under 27,000 through shipment of an excess of nearly 70,000 men bound for the Pacific via the United States(2). Direct shipments to the Pacific were 96,000 short.

139. The Changes at V-J Day.

On 10 August 1945 the redeployment machinery was for the first time functioning fairly smoothly. Plans were laid for the redeployment to the Pacific, directly or indirectly, of 186,000 men in August. As many as 382,000 men with low priority for discharge were in course of preparation for redeployment. Procedures were thought out and published, or about to be published, which would cover the whole scheme of redeployment from the European Theater down to the achievement of the occupational troop basis by 1 July 1946. On V-J Day this whole prospect was swept away. Two cables were received from the War Department which announced the imminent defeat of Japan and the procedures to be adopted as soon as this was

accomplished.(3) These directions required the Allied commanders in China and the Pacific to report immediately upon their requirements for men and material for the next sixty days in the light of the surrender of Japan. Direct redeployment to the Pacific was to cease almost immediately. All enlisted men with adjusted service rating scores of 85 or above were to be returned immediately to the United States, under a priority second only to the urgent requirements of the Pacific Theater.(4) On 14 August, the news of the surrender of Japan was received and the War Department cabled orders to put the above instructions into immediate effect.(5)

140. Progress in Redeployment During August.

Some units were so close to their sailing date that it was not feasible to cancel their departure. Over 100,000 men in units of low priority for discharge were therefore shipped to the United States during August.(6) The air lift known as "Green Project"(7) was reduced slightly during the month. Where possible, units intended for the Pacific were sidetracked from the pipe-line while units containing mainly candidates for discharge passed through first. Some units intended for the Pacific were assigned temporarily to duties in the Theater that had been performed by units then being shipped home for discharge.(8) Subordinate commands were entrusted with the task of selecting units for redeployment, with a view to nominating units as far as possible in their correct priority for discharge. Major commands were informed that candidates for discharge should be assigned priority

as follows: first, those with adjusted service rating scores of 85 or more; secondly, those with scores of 75 to 84; and, thirdly, those with scores of 60 to 74.(9)

141. Estimates and Policies during August.

In the middle of August, it was hoped that 250,000 men could be moved each month—200,000 for discharge and 50,000 for duty in the United States. It was expected that by the end of the year Theater strength would be reduced to just over a million men.(10) The War Department was emphatic in urging the Theater to get the candidates for discharge out of Europe first. The Theater responded by raising the estimate for the shipment of men for discharge to 227,000 per month for August and September.(11) In order to fill the quota of 200,000 high score men for September, seven divisions and 81,000 men in smaller units were alerted for shipment. The divisions were authorized to proceed at an overstrength of 12 percent.(12) On 16 August the age limit for discharge was reduced to 38. Any enlisted man regardless of special skills or assignment, who was above that age was entitled to return to the United States within ninety days.(13) The "critical military occupational specialty numbers," possession of which might result in the retention of a man otherwise eligible for discharge, were reduced in August to three.(14) The ultimate critical score was tentatively fixed at 45. Men with scores below this were assigned to the occupation forces, and men with higher scores to units that might be shipped to the Pacific.(15) Later it was decided that

units for the strategic reserve, which were regarded as of the same category as units for the Pacific, should contain only men with scores below 45.(16)

142. Shipping Plans.

On 20 August 1945, the Theater announced to the War Department its proposals for revised shipping plans for the remainder of the month and for September. It was then estimated that eleven complete divisions would be shipped to make up in large part the quota of 200,000 high score men eligible for discharge. Theater Headquarters also reported that 70,000 low-score men would be included in the shipments of the near future.(17) After a few days the War Department announced a great increase in the rate at which the Theater must ship its strength back to the United States. It directed the Theater to ship over 400,000 in September and an average of 322,000 in each of the following four months.(18) The Theater requested that, in order to meet this requirement, it should be allowed to include more than the 20 percent of low-score men then authorized, and that a liquidation force of 300,000 be authorized in addition to the occupation force.(19) This second request was refused.(20) The War Department then announced that no more troops for the Pacific would be required of the European Theater. The emphasis was exclusively on men for discharge.(21) The Theater was especially requested not to return men with medium priority for discharge to the United States, as it was not practicable to reassign these men and there would be no alternative but to discharge them.

This would slow the discharge of men with higher priority and have a bad effect on morale.(22)

143. Achievement in August.

By the end of August the change from redeployment for the Pacific campaign to return of large numbers to the United States for discharge was complete. Arrangements had been made to reduce Theater strength to its occupational troop basis by the end of January 1946. Men with medium priority (between 45 and 70 points) were being held up until November. Fifteen divisions had been alerted for shipment. The total number of men redeployed during August was 278,270.(23)

144. Progress in Redeployment during September.

a. European Theater Headquarters did not abandon its recommendation for the authorization of a close-out force, and finally the War Department was persuaded to approve it.(24) The basis for this force was intended to be the medium priority men whom the War Department could not reassign. Meanwhile an adjustment was made in computing adjusted service rating scores to include points accumulated between V-E and V-J Days. This had the effect of adding at least eight points to the score of every man in the Theater.(25) Theater Headquarters was alarmed early in September by the discovery that the scheduled shipments to February would bring its strength below the occupational troop basis. This was partly due to a miscalculation by the Theater of over 200,000 in its strength, but shipping forecasts were altered to clear up what was real in the threat.(26) "Green

Project" was greatly reduced in September, and finally ended on the last day of the month.(27)

b. The plan for the occupational troop basis, worked out in the Theater before 6 September, was approved by the end of the month by the War Department. It called for a Theater strength of 707,000 at the end of 1945, including 363,000 occupation troops, The rest were the close-out force and some service units for the Mediterranean Theater. The 1st, 3d, 9th, 42d, and 78th Infantry Divisions and the 1st and 4th Armored Divisions were thereupon designated as the occupation forces. Six divisions were designated as the close-out force and two as the strategic reserve. The rest were declared eligible for discharge.(28)

c. On 6 September the War Department announced plans for the redeployment of officers. Except for field grade officers, for whom the critical score was 100, there was not much difference between the officer critical score and that for enlisted men.(29)

d. The shipping situation was responsible for a certain amount of delay in the September sailings. Dockyard strikes, the return of ships of other flags, miscalculation of loading and unloading time, and bad weather were various causes of this delay.(30) Nine divisions were shipped out of the Theater and three, with two corps headquarters, were inactivated in the Theater during September.(31) Assembly Area Command was also inactivated, its functions being taken over by Cise Intermediate Section on 22 September.(32) By the end

of September a total of 1,451,558 men had been shipped out of the Theater, and the Theater strength was reduced to 1,672,569.(33)

145. October to December.

a. At the beginning of October, efforts were made to clear up the backlog from the previous month and to arrange that all those eligible for redeployment in that month be shipped in their proper priority. It was hoped that all men with scores of 80 and above could be shipped home in October, and all those with 70 and above in November. As the month advanced, however, it was seen that the same causes which brought September shippings below their quota would prevent the lag being made up in October. When the Queen Elizabeth, the Aquitania, and the equivalent in troop space of the Queen Mary had to be returned to Great Britain early in the month, all hope of clearing the men with 80 points and over in that month was lost. The target had now to be moved up to the middle of November. Moreover, major commands continued to report discoveries of high point men or units previously not accounted for. Some relief was gained by the use of warships for returning men for discharge.(34) The methods of redeploying the air forces had long been causing dispute. In this month Theater Headquarters at last approved the plan submitted by Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, under which units which adjusted service rating scores in five-point brackets were prepared by the Air Forces and then called forward by Theater Headquarters in due course.(35) Seven divisions were redeployed complete in October.(36)

Altogether 366,903 persons were shipped home, of whom 313,404 had scores of 75 or above or were officers of above the then critical score.(37) Theater strength was then 1,317,328, of whom 163,282 were enlisted men with 80 or more points and officers with 75 or more. The scores of nearly 100,000 were still unknown.(38)

b. The main event of the month of November was the opening of the port of Bremen for replacements and the arrival of the first replacements there.(39) November was also the month in which the largest numbers were sent home, 420,795 being shipped, of whom 400,058 were for redeployment.(40) In December the War Department announced that for that month less shipping would be available to the European Theater. All the warships and twenty-one other vessels were taken from the Theater allotment.(41) During the month seven divisions left the Theater.(42) The rate was slower than in the previous month, partly because another month like November would have reduced Theater strength below what was required at the time, and partly because even the lowered quota was not met owing to stormy weather. The number shipped during December was 327,272, of whom 303,689 were for redeployment.(43) The critical score at this time was 60. Nearly 30,000 enlisted men of the total had scores of 73 or above.(44) By the end of 1945 over two and a half million men—81 percent of the Theater strength—had been redeployed to one or another destination.(45)

146. Redeployment Plans for 1946.

In November the War Department asked for the views of the European Theater on two plans for redeployment for the first half of 1946. One was to use all the shipping that could be allotted to bring the Theater's strength down to the occupational troop basis as soon as possible. The other was to be more gradual, but still to phase-out troops as quickly as was consistent with the other functions of the Theater.(46) Obviously, if there was to be any difference between these, the first one would result in functions other than redeployment being neglected. The Theater therefore supported the second, mentioning in particular that use of a large part of the occupation force in support of the close-out force while it was being redeployed would draw too heavily on the strength of the former. Furthermore, this would happen in February and March, when a large part of the occupation force would be withdrawn from operational duties to be trained as constabulary units. It was suggested, therefore, that as far as possible the close-out force should redeploy itself, one twelfth of it being moved in each of the first three months of 1946 and one fourth in each of the next three.(47) In December the strengths of the close-out force and the occupation force, which had before been fixed at 344,000 and 363,000, respectively, were reduced to 316,000 and 300,000. This reduced the authorized Theater strength at the end of 1945 from 707,000 to 616,000. The actual strength on 1 January 1946 was 622,789.(48) The final shipping

schedule published early in 1946 showed that the close-out force was to be shipped out in six approximately equal monthly loads. It also showed 15,000 miscellaneous shipments, and shipments of high point men for whom replacements had arrived from the United States to the number of 34,500 in January and approximately 20,000 a month thereafter.(49)

SUCCESSIVE CHANGES IN THE OCCUPATIONAL TROOP BASIS

147. The United States Occupied Areas.

The final withdrawal of United States forces from the other occupied zones and of all other Allied forces from the United States Zone was reported to be complete on 17 July 1945.(50) Plans had been made for the reduction by three-quarters of the United States troop strength in Czechoslovakia.(51) The main United States area of Germany was divided into two Military Districts, the Western consisting of Württemberg-Baden and Grosshessen, occupied by the Seventh U.S. Army, and the Eastern, Bavaria, by the Third U.S. Army.(52) The United States Zone of Austria was already established, and during this six-month period no alteration took place in its organization, except for the move of Zonal Headquarters to Vienna in October.(53)

148. Successive Reductions.

The alterations in the projected occupational troop basis that took place in the summer and fall of 1945 were completely unrelated to the organization in the Theater at the time. Some reductions in commitments and inactivations of major headquarters, however, were of significance in determining the future pattern. The first of these was the inactivation of 12th Army Group on 1 August.(54) In September the withdrawal from Czechoslovakia began. This was not completed until 10 December.(55) Early in October, United States troops began to withdraw from Norway.(56) On 1 November the first systematic action toward insuring that the forces remaining after the close of redeployment would be in the most advantageous employment possible was taken when the Theater G-1 Division set a ceiling strength on all staff divisions and major commands. One month later this ceiling was declared effective, and all commands were ordered to reduce their strength to the established ceiling or to furnish full justification for the excess.(57) On 9 December 1945 most of the territory in the Bremen Enclave was restored to the British Zone.(58) On 18 December the Theater Commander announced the basis of the occupation force for the second half of 1946, when for the first time the occupation would be the sole task of the forces in the Theater. The target of 300,000 was to be reached by 1 July 1946. One army, three divisions, and a constabulary force of 38,000 was to be the security force for the whole United States

occupied areas, including Austria. Theater Service Forces and the base sections under it were to be inactivated by 15 March 1946. Unnecessary activities were to be cut out, and necessary ones closely reviewed to insure that no personnel savings were neglected.(59)

149. Overstrength, Replacements, and Reinforcements.

a. Several reasons combined to cause the Theater to rely on overstrength, on units surplus to the table of organization, and on grades and ratings surplus to the table of organization of their units during the last half of 1945: no reinforcements on any scale could be expected at this time;(60) the point system of redeployment made the whole situation so fluid that it was not feasible at the time to build up new permanent units; and tasks had to be performed in the Theater for which there was no organization, and in many cases no precedent. Considerable latitude was allowed in the Theater in the use of overstrength and of grades surplus to tables of organization, but the policy that permitted this emphasized that the use of these must be neither permanent nor unlimited.(61) Even so, by July 1945 surplus grades had reached the number of 54,000. It was suggested by the War Department that a total of 38,000 of these might eventually be allowed in the occupation forces. In order to pare down requirements as far as possible, commands were instructed to make the minimum use of civilian help of all kinds.(62) It was a long time, however, before any reduction in overstrength could be made. On 8 October the Theater G-1 Division requested a total of over 70,000

grades.(63) The plan now submitted called for a steady monthly reduction in surplus grades in the Theater, and the target of 38,000 seemed not to be too difficult. After screening, the surplus grades were reduced to a total of 52,760, and this total was approved.(64) On 30 November 27,178 permanent surplus grades were approved.(65)

b. The most urgent demand for replacements in this period was that which occurred in August for Quartermaster Corps officers. Reassignments had been numerous, and tasks were heavy. The War Department was approached, but replied that any such replacements must be found within the Theater.(66) The first postwar replacements promised the Theater were 240,000 who were to arrive between 1 October 1945 and 1 July 1946.(67) As early as 3 October the Theater requisitioned 135,000 of these, asking for specialists, and making the special request that they should arrive before the end of January 1946.(68) The War Department promised the replacements, but could not guarantee their arrival by the date specified.(69) At the end of the year, though some replacements had arrived, the schedule had not nearly been met.(70)

150. Suitability of Arrivals.

a. Under these circumstances the correct placing of reinforcements, not only in the command where they were most wanted, but also in the job where they would do the most good, was an essential contribution to the efficiency of the Theater. But the size of the drafts and the inadequacy of their classification into military skills

before leaving the United States caused more and more withdrawal from this ideal, until finally, on 24 December, it was decided that allocations to major commands would be made by arm and service and not by military occupational specialty.(71)

b. The Theater was naturally anxious to know what standard of training could be expected of its replacements. In reply to a request for this information,(72) the War Department stated that the first replacements might be expected to have seventeen weeks' training, but that later ones were not likely to have more than basic training.(73) Theater Headquarters in reply recommended that the reinforcements should be trained in the United States at least until 1 July 1946, when some of the current Theater problems would have been solved.(74) No action, however, was taken on this recommendation. Some specialist schools were started in the Theater. These were for office staff and teletype operator categories, which were in shortest supply,(75) and they continued in operation until the end of the year, when they were closed down for lack of suitable students.(76) The permanent Adjutant General's School, however, with a much smaller monthly enrollment, assumed the task of training office personnel for the whole Theater early in the new year.(77)

c. The whole system was complicated by the fact that, with a rapid turn-over of personnel, a rather large proportion of Theater strength at any given time consisted of men who were ineffective, either because they were not yet assigned or because

they had been removed from assignment for shipment home. Commands were forced to withdraw a man from his assignment a fortnight before his replacement arrived in the Theater; when the replacement arrived, it was another fortnight before he could take up his duties; but all the time they were in the Theater both men were carried on the Theater strength.(78) At year's end it was reckoned that out of an official Theater strength of 616,000 no less than 163,000 were ineffectives. Of these 90,000 were normal ineffectives, such as men on leave, pass, and furlough, in confinement, or in the hospital. Of the rest, 25,000 were on reenlistment furlough or on rehabilitation, recuperation, and recovery detachment in the United States; 23,000 were shortages in replacements for high-point men who had already left; and 25,000 were in the redeployment pipeline.(79)

151. The Police-Type Occupation Force.

The original occupational troop basis of 363,000 was intended to be assigned as follows:

Headquarters and other military overhead	38,000
Ground Forces (seven divisions)	144,000
Service Forces	103,000
Air Forces	<u>78,000</u>
	363,000.

In the light of experience in the occupation, it was decided by November 1945 that these forces were not all necessary. There seemed to be no likelihood of a general armed uprising. What resistance there was consisted of individual acts of indiscipline, sabotage,

and crime. Under these circumstances, the plan was changed so that troops were assigned as follows:(80)

Headquarters and other military overhead	20,000
Mobile combat forces (three divisions)	65,000
Service Forces	80,000
Air Forces	78,000
State Constabulary	<u>38,000</u>
	281,000.

A single army headquarters was to be responsible for the combat forces in the main zones of Germany and Austria. In Frankfurt and in the separate areas of Berlin, Bremen, and Vienna, there were separate independent commands.(81)

CIVILIAN PERSONNEL(82)

152. Types of Civilians Employed in Europe in Late 1945.

a. Two methods of recruiting United States citizens for employment in the Theater were adopted. Men in the forces were allowed to obtain their discharge from military service in the Theater and retain their jobs or be assigned to similar jobs; others were recruited in the United States.(83) Women were not recruited at the beginning of this period except for specialists, but this policy was changed before the end of the year.(84)

b. Allied and neutral civilians were recruited in all cases through agreements with the governments concerned. Some of these governments allowed only small quotas of their civilians to go abroad.(85)

c. Displaced persons or Allied nationals recruited in Germany were expected to be a fruitful source of civilian labor. In the first months of the occupation the movement of displaced persons was too rapid for them to be of much use as labor. Later, many of those left in the Theater because they would not accept repatriation were employed.(86) As workers, however, they were often far from satisfactory.

d. When once German civilians were authorized as employees, they soon became the main source of labor.(87)

153. Procurement Policy.

In July 1945 a survey of all available civilian labor was made by Theater Headquarters as an aid in determining procurement policy. On the basis of this, it was decided that, although some units had violated current policy and even international agreements in hiring and moving their civilians, contracts should not be terminated for this reason, so that the first priority for employment was for civilians already employed on a contract basis.(88) Next in priority came soldiers discharged in the Theater, then specialists from the United States, displaced persons, and indigenous civilians. The term "specialists" was fairly rigidly interpreted, and comparatively few United States citizens were recruited in America at this time.(89) The hope that Headquarters could be manned entirely by United States and indigenous civilians had to be abandoned because of serious shortages in clerical staff. In September, therefore, some British

women clerks were moved to Frankfurt.(90) Citizens of other nations were also employed there soon after. At that time the priorities for employment were as follows: discharged United States military personnel; United States civilians recruited in the Theater; displaced persons; enemy and ex-enemy civilians; Allied and neutral civilians; and United States civilians recruited in the United States.(91) Little alteration in the character of the civilian labor force occurred after this time.

154. Administration of Civilian Personnel.

The administration of civilians in the Theater was the responsibility of the G-1, G-3, G-4, and G-5 Divisions and of the Adjutant General of Theater Headquarters; the general staff divisions, the Adjutant General, the Engineer Labor Procurement Office, the General Purchasing Agent, and the Military Labor Service of Theater Service Forces, and major commands. Functions were divided as follows in Theater Headquarters: the G-1 Division had general policy supervision over all civilians; G-3 had supervision over labor service units; G-4 was responsible for supplying the services of these units; and G-5 had special supervision over working conditions for ex-enemy civilians. In Theater Service Forces, G-1 and G-4 duplicated the functions of the same divisions in Theater Headquarters; the Adjutant General had the operative supervision over all the civilians in the command concerned; and the other staff divisions mentioned above had charge of certain special aspects of civilian labor. Major commands

had operative control over civilians employed locally; thus, Headquarters Command controlled civilians employed in Theater Headquarters.(92)

PRISONERS OF WAR

155. Conditions of Employment of Prisoners of War.

The conditions under which prisoners of war might be used as labor were clarified in July by a message from the Secretary of State. He wrote that with the unconditional surrender Germany had lost the rights of a belligerent power, and that consequently the provisions of the Geneva Convention no longer applied to German prisoners of war in Allied hands.(93) Most of the German prisoners of war who were working for the United States forces were organized in Labor Service Companies. These were bodies of not less than 250 men working under a Labor Supervision Company, each of which consisted of a fairly small nucleus of U.S. Army supervisory personnel.(94) In August 1945 there were a total of 2,430 Labor Service Companies in the Theater.(95) Another type of prisoner-of-war unit that was working for the United States forces was the disarmed enemy unit. This was a unit that had surrendered complete and was working under its old organization. Conditions for the disarmed enemy units were as follows: they were broken down into companysize units, except in

special cases; German field grade officers might not retain operational command except in special cases, though they might retain supply and administrative duties; unit designations and all insignia, except insignia of rank, were abolished; United States personnel were responsible for all supervision of the work; and, in spite of the policy described above, the members of the unit possessed the privileges of prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention.(96) One of these units, a Luftwaffe Signal Battalion, worked for the U.S. Air Forces, Europe, from June to November 1945, without armed guards, and showed outstanding discipline and cooperation.(97)

156. Statistics.

Most of the labor units working for the United States forces in the early postwar period were under the control of the Communications Zone, and later under Theater Service Forces. The Communications Zone and its successor kept complete statistics of numbers of prisoners held and numbers working. At V-E Day, in a total of 1,545,644 prisoners, 280,937 were at work.(98) The peak of prisoner-of-war labor was reached at the end of August, when 491,442 prisoners were working out of a total in the Communications Zone of 716,568. On 29 December 1945, of a total of 535,023, workers numbered 331,521.(99)

Chapter VII

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONING OF THE OCCUPATION

DEVELOPMENTS IN THEATER ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIP

157. General Developments during the First Half of 1946.

The first half of 1946 saw a steady continuation of the process of reduction in installations and personnel in the European Theater. In both the field forces and military government, efforts to attain the same objectives of simplification and economy resulted in increasing efficiency until, by 30 June 1946, a streamlined organization had been evolved from the more complicated and unwieldy one that had been in operation on V-E Day.(1)

158. Termination of the Military Districts.

On 2 January 1946 the Eastern and Western Military Districts ceased to function, and their territories were redesignated as Third and Seventh U.S. Army Areas.(2) As their respective headquarters continued to function, the elimination of the Districts brought few changes in operations, except as regards military government supervision.

159. Reorganization on the Command Level.

Considerable change occurred, however, on the major command level.

a. The Theater Motor Transport Service, Military Railway Service, and Theater Inland Waterways Transport Service were discontinued 1 January.(3)

b. Continental Base Section, which had been formed at Reims, France, on 10 December 1945, moved on 3 January to Bad Nauheim, Germany, where it was combined with Advanced Section,(4) and became operational on 15 January 1945.(5)

c. On 15 January 1946, Western Base Section was formed in Paris to take over the functions previously performed by Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater (Rear), Seine and Oise Sections, and the USFET Mission to France.(6)

d. Delta Base Section, the main function of which had been the redeployment of personnel, first to the Pacific and later to the United States, was inactivated on 22 January 1946,(7) since the peak of redeployment had been passed.

e. The Ground Forces Reinforcement Command was discontinued on 31 January 1946, and the Ground Forces Reinforcement Coordinating Group was established at Marburg, Germany.(8)

f. On 1 February 1946, Hungary and Roumania were incorporated in the European Theater,(9) and on 1 June West African District passed to European Theater control.

g. On 15 February Western Base Section was enlarged by the addition of two new subordinate commands, Chanor Base Section and London Area Office, both of which were relieved of assignment to Headquarters, Theater Service Forces.(10) A few days later, on 20 February 1946, Chanor Base Section was discontinued and its functions were transferred to Western Base Section.(11)

h. One of the two remaining armies, the Seventh, was inactivated on 31 March 1946, leaving the Third Army to serve as the occupation army.(12) Personnel of the Seventh Army was reassigned either to the Third Army or to the United States Constabulary.

i. Bremen Port Command, which had been assigned to Continental Base Section on 1 March 1946,(13) was discontinued on 15 April,(14) after which date the 17th Major Port was the main administrative headquarters for the Bremen-Bremerhaven area.

160. Inactivation of Theater Service Forces.

These and other measures were directed toward the final elimination of Theater Service Forces, European Theater. On 1 February 1946 the Theater Chiefs of Claims, Special Services, and Information and Education, and the Theater Chief Chaplain, Fiscal Director, and Provost Marshal were designated special staff officers on the special staff of the Theater Commander.(15) On 28 February 1946 the Theater Signal Communications Service was assigned to Theater Headquarters,(16) and the following special staff officers were assigned to the Theater Commander's special staff: the chiefs of Army Exchange Service and

Chemical Warfare Service, the Chief Surgeon, Chief Engineer, Chief Quartermaster, Chief Ordnance Officer, and Chief Signal Officer.(17) The final step came with the inactivation of Headquarters, Theater Service Forces, European Theater, on 28 February 1946.(18)

161. Naval Command in the European Theater.

a. On 1 May 1946, the headquarters of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, was shifted to Bremerhaven, a small liaison group being maintained at Theater Headquarters in Frankfurt. The naval command had also been giving through a process of consolidation. On V-E Day the U.S. Naval Forces, Europe, comprised U.S. Naval Forces, France; U.S. Group Control Council, Naval Division; and the U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, which in turn included U.S. Navy, Southwest Germany; U.S. Naval Ports and Bases, Germany; and U.S. Naval Advanced Bases, Bremerhaven and Bremen. On 31 May 1945 an agreement was signed between the Army and the Navy for the orderly operation of ports in Europe.(19) On 10 November the U.S. Ports and Bases, Germany and the U.S. Naval Advanced Bases, Bremerhaven and Bremen, were decommissioned and their activities consolidated in the U.S. Advanced Base, Weser River. In December, U.S. Naval Forces, France, was decommissioned and its responsibilities transferred to the Commander of Naval Forces, Germany, with a liaison group remaining in Paris. The Advanced Base at Le Havre continued to function as a subordinate activity of U.S. Naval Forces, Germany, until 10 July, 1946, when it was decommissioned. The U.S. Navy, Southwest Germany, was never commissioned. The naval elements

of the U.S. Group Control Council, consisting of the Disarmament and the Demobilization Units, were subsequently redesignated the Naval Adviser, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), and the U.S. Member, Tripartite Commission. This included the Naval Division of the Allied Commission for Austria; the U.S. Naval Member, Military Mission, Potsdam; and the Naval Technical Unit, Europe.(20)

DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS BETWEEN MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE UNITED STATES FORCES

162. Headquarters Level.

In the development of military government policies for the United States Zone, the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) had to coordinate with the staff of the Theater Commander and, for supervision of the United States element of the Berlin Kommandatura, with that of the Deputy Military Governor. It had also to maintain liaison with the U.S. Group Control Council for Austria. Prior to 1 April Military Government maintained personnel and agencies in both Berlin and Frankfurt. Early in 1946, however, it was decided to consolidate all military government functions in Berlin, leaving only a small G-5 Division in Theater Headquarters. On 1 April the G-5 Division of Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater was reestablished,(21) with the following functions: to inform and advise the Theater Commander on military government matters as they

affected the occupation forces; to coordinate responsibilities and activities of the field forces with military government agencies and activities; to maintain liaison with the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration; to supervise the control and care of displaced persons; and to conduct Civil Affairs matters outside the occupied countries.

The organization of the new G-5 Division comprised a Plans and Coordination Branch, Economic Affairs Branch, Government Affairs Branch, Supply Branch, and Displaced Persons Branch, with Information and Administration Branches functioning as part of the Executive's Office. A rear echelon of military government offices was also maintained at Frankfurt, attached to Theater Headquarters for administration and supply.(22)

163. Land Level.

a. Development of the Land Offices of Military Government.

With the official confirmation of the Eastern Military District on 12 August 1945, the official designation of the G-5 Section of Third Army became the Office of Military Government for Bavaria, and it was consolidated by the end of September with the Regional Detachment E-201.(23) The 3d Military Government Regiment was assigned to Headquarters, Eastern Military District, in September.(24) Personnel procedures were simplified as all military government personnel in Bavaria was now under the direct control of the District Headquarters. In Western Military District, the reorganization of

the G-5 Section of Seventh Army had continued from August to October 1945, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, was placed on Deputy Chief of Staff level and became responsible to the army commander for all military government within the Military District. The entire staff of the headquarters was to assist in the military government of the District.(25)

b. Increase of Responsibility.

From 1 January 1946, the three Offices of Military Government for Bavaria, Württemberg-Baden, and Grosshessen each became an independent command under its respective director, who was to report directly to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater. All command and supervisory powers passed from the commanding generals of Eastern and Western Military Districts. They retained general court-martial jurisdiction and responsibility for supply and administrative support,(26) and also their previous functions and responsibilities in connection with security, prisoners of war, disarmament, and displaced persons. On the redesignation of the Military Districts in January as the Third and Seventh U.S. Army Areas, the relationship previously maintained between military government and the Military Districts continued between military government and the army areas.(27)

c. Revision of Relationship.

In February 1946 the relationship was revised, and certain functions connected with redeployment and travel outside the occupied Zone, previously assigned to the Land directors, were reallocated to

the area commanders or to the Theater.(28) In June 1946, by which time Third Army had been assigned responsibility for the whole United States-occupied area of Germany except the Bremen, Berlin, and Frankfurt areas, the G-5 Section was reestablished, to exercise supervision and control over matters pertaining to displaced persons and Civil Affairs and to maintain liaison with military government officials.(29) The Section was organized in three branches: administration, military government, and displaced persons.

d. Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone).

On 1 April 1946 the Office of Military Government (U.S. Zone) was inactivated and its functions were redistributed between the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and the new G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters.(30)

164. Relations between the Field Forces and the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.).

a. Recommendations regarding details of staff coordination between the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.) and the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters were made by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, to the Chief of Staff in April 1946 and were approved in June.(31)

b. In the field, a similar tendency was seen toward definition of the relation between tactical troops and military government. In May 1946 provisions were made for the commanding officers of all tactical and service troops to report the location

and extent of their units to the military government detachments in the Landkreis. Particularly close coordination was to be maintained in the administration of displaced persons. Conferences were to be held between the various military government offices and other occupational units.(32)

THE REDUCTION TO THE OCCUPATIONAL TROOP BASIS(33)

165. The Outlook for 1946.

On 1 January 1946 the allotted strength of the Theater was 616,000 and the actual strength 622,789.(34) Shipping capacity sufficient to transport an extra 20,000 men to the United States had been allotted for January to take care of the backlog and expected losses. Exclusive of these 20,000 men, the average monthly lift for the first six months of 1946 was estimated at 90,150.(35) This meant that 238,000 men must enter the Theater by 1 July 1946 if the occupational troop basis of 300,000 was to be filled. Of these, 90,000 would be men returning from reenlistment furlough; rest, recuperation, and recovery; and other temporary absence in the United States.(36) A margin of about 14,000 men was allowed against unexpected shipping shortages or delays; so 135,000 replacements were expected.(37)

166. The January Disturbances.

This program, and especially the part of it which cut the monthly shipments from a peak of 400,000 to 90,000, did not appeal to the troops in the Theater. They felt that they were forgotten, an attitude which was not helped by the news on 6 January 1946 that there would be no more redeployment on a point basis and that men with 50 points would still have three months to serve in the Theater.(38) The explanation for this order was that there were no replacements.(39) Two other press releases served to intensify the feeling and to cause it to find voice. One told that war brides were being shipped to the United States, the other that open demonstrations in the Pacific Theater had been effective in getting men with 50 points sent home from that Theater.(40) The effect of these releases was that demonstrations began in the European Theater, too. In Paris, London, Frankfurt, and in other parts of Germany crowds of soldiers gathered and marched, or shouted slogans. On the direction of General McNarney, who felt that the meetings were the result of the failure of the Theater and the major commands to explain the true facts of the case, no action was taken to break up the meetings. At this moment the War Department announced that the demobilization program was to be revised.(41) For the time being this had no effect, but on January 13, when the meetings had been going on sporadically for five days, General McNarney in a press interview asked that the meetings be discontinued in view of the fact that they had served their purpose.(42)

The same day an intensive publicity program was launched to bring home to the minds of the occupation forces the fact that there was at least some reason for keeping them in Europe.(43)

167. The New Plan and Its Effects.

The new War Department demobilization plan kept the old point system, but speeded up the pace of releases under its provisions. It also introduced a scheme whereby men could be released on length of service alone.(44) On this basis it was estimated that men with 55 points would be on their way home by mid-February; with 53 points or three and a half years' service by the end of the month; and so on down to 40 points or two years' service by the end of June.(45) As a result of this, all unit shipping dates were advanced. A new shipping plan was devised which would concentrate about four-fifths of the six-month lift over the first four months.(46)

168. Out-Shipments in the First Six Months of 1946.

Shipping was not a scarce facility in this period. The War Department sent what it thought fit, and would not cut allocations even when requested to do so. The Theater authorities reported that overloading of vessels resulted in an excess left. To "alleviate" this situation, the War Department directed that ships might be underloaded.(47) In January shipments exceeded even the increased estimate, 161,310 troops being shipped out.(48) This included the accumulation from the previous year, over 10,000 men who were not

being redeployed, and about 40,000 who had been intended for later shipment.(49) In February it was hoped to better the target by 13,000, but owing to various causes about 10,000 of these were still in the Theater at the end of the month.(50) In March the estimate was again exceeded, and over 130,000 were shipped out. In these three months total shipping was almost 400,000, including 370,000 redeployment personnel, instead of an expected 327,000.(51) In the next three months shipments out of the Theater again dropped off, and only 169,345 men for redeployment sailed in the whole period. This did not prevent, however, targets for repatriating men due home on account of point score and length of service from being met.(52)

169. Close of Unnecessary Port Installations.

With the lessening of the homeward flow, it became possible in the early part of 1946 to close some of the staging and port installations that were serving troops on their way home. In January and February all the local commands in France were combined as Western Base Section, and at about the same time the importance of the intermediate staging areas was considerably reduced by the transfer of the processing of all but major units to the port staging areas.(53) In January the port of Marseille was closed.(54) Antwerp was closed at the end of March, and Le Havre at the end of June. Henceforth all shipments from the Continent were to be from Bremerhaven.(55)

170. General Survey of the Redeployment Scheme.

From the point of view of the mechanics of the redeployment scheme, the requirements of the Theater and the War Department, and the measures that were taken to meet them, the program was a complete success. The men were shipped out, slowly at first, then with more and more speed, until shortage of men checked the operation.

CONTINUING LANPOWER PROBLEMS

171. Theater Strength Targets.

On 18 January 1946 the Theater Commander suggested that by 1 July 1947 the Theater strength should be 200,000, including a permanent Air Forces component of 43,000. In reply the War Department set up the following series of targets, all of which included 43,000 in the Air Forces; 230,000 by 1 September 1946; 200,000 by 1 January 1947; and 160,000 by 1 July 1947.(56)

172. Strength Control.

a. On 8 January 1946, General McNarney directed that vigorous action should be taken to reduce overstrength and to bring Theater strength as soon as possible within unit tables of organization.(57) The authorized personnel had been 37,607 for 1 July 1946. Careful pruning reduced the requirements of major commands to 17,811. The staffs of the newly authorized military communities required

14,389. The new figure, therefore, stood at 32,200. This cut did not satisfy Theater Headquarters, and a further drastic screening brought the figure down to 24,005. An overstrength of 25,000 was allotted, to give a certain margin for unanticipated requirements.(58) On 25 May 1946 the War Department granted an indefinite extension of the time limit for meeting the occupational troop basis.(59) On 30 June actual Theater strength was 342,264.(60)

b. Replacements continued to be one of the problems of the Theater. It has already been mentioned that the shortage of reinforcements held up the homeward shipment of troops.(61) Despite cooperation of the War Department, shipments still fell. In February, however, the War Department announced that 64,000 replacements would be in the Theater by the end of the month, which would meet scheduled requirements. Replacements to the number of 26,000 were promised for March.(62) The War Department's commitment to supply 240,000 replacements by 30 June 1946 was practically met, and further arrivals were forecast at the rate of 10,000 a month.(63)

c. The shortage of officers in the first half of 1946 was particularly serious as respects its chaplains and those with legal experience.(64) In general, the Theater was suffering from a shortage of about 26 percent in officer strength. Steps were taken to spread this shortage as evenly as possible;(65) but it was not expected that the situation would be relieved for some time after the end of June.

d. In contrast to the many shortage problems, one problem was caused by a surplus. The total number of Negro enlisted men in the Theater grew far beyond the authorized proportion, 10 percent, of the occupational troop basis, and eventually beyond the capacity of the Theater to assign them.(66) The War Department appeared to ignore requests not to ship to the Theater men who had enlisted for three years for arms and services not authorized Negro troops in the Theater. A few such men were transferred to the United States, but later the policy of the War Department was to assign them, regardless of their choice, if they refused to make a second choice.(67) The War Department raised the authorized percentage of Negro troops in the Theater from 10 to 15,(68) and the Theater authorized first 10, then 20, and finally 50 percent overstrength in Negro units and directed all these units to carry at least 40 percent overstrength.(69) In addition, a Negro Provisional Infantry Regiment was activated,(70) although there was no permanent authorization for Negro infantry in the Theater. On 12 June 1946 it was estimated that at the end of the month there would be an overstrength of Negro troops of 75 percent. When this was represented to the War Department, the latter agreed to ship no more Negro troops to the Theater, while Theater Headquarters undertook to place those who were already there.(71) Soon after the end of June, methods were authorized for returning unnecessary Negro units and personnel to the United States, and at about the same time the War Department suspended Negro enlistment in the Regular Army and the problem was well on the way to solution.(72)

173. The Liquidation and Manpower Board.(73)

The Theater Liquidation and Manpower Board was established on 14 January 1946,(74) to consist of six or seven senior officers. Its mission was to report directly to the Chief of Staff on progress being made in strength reductions, to make recommendations as to how these could be speeded up, and to make special surveys as required by the Theater Commander and the Chief of Staff.(75) Successive chairmen were Maj. Gen. Leven A. Allen and Brig. Gen. Aubrey L. Moore. Activities of the Board during the first six months of 1946 included the following: a survey of the United States troop requirements in the United Kingdom, which resulted in the phasing-out of the London Area Office; a survey of the use made of manpower in Headquarters Command; a review of the value of the continuation of the G-5 Division of Theater Headquarters as a separate entity; recommendations for the assumption by the Adjutant General's Department of much of the routine work then done by each of the staff divisions; recommendations for closing the ports of Le Havre and Marseille, and the replacement depot at Namur; and a survey of the manpower requirements for the communities in the Zone.

174. Civilian Personnel.

Little change in priorities and procurement policies in the employment of civilians took place during the first six months of 1946. In March, the adoption of a standard employment contract and the Continental Wage Scale for Allied civilians put all European civilians

except displaced persons and ex-enemies on the same footing.(76) A slight difficulty in recruiting civilians for service in the Theater was removed in May, when the wearing of the civilian uniform which had been hard to get on the Continent, was made optional. Various attempts to build up a rather large cadre of United States civilians in the Zone had met with comparative failure. Up to April 1946 only 351 women of the Women's Army Corps, including five officers, had accepted civilian jobs. In the first six months of 1946, only 170 men were discharged to accept jobs in the Theater.(78) At the end of June 3,300 civilians were on requisition from the United States. Only 743 had arrived since 1 January.(79) An attempt was therefore made in June to induce dependents living in the Zone to accept clerical and administrative jobs.(80) In the same month, recruitment in the United States was widened to include types of jobs less responsible than those for which United States civilians had previously been considered.(81) By June, too, the correct civil service grades had been assigned to nearly all positions.(82) The numbers of Germans and displaced persons employed increased vastly during these six months. That of Germans rose from 169,000 to 262,730, and that of displaced persons from 28,000 to 60,460.(83)

175. Prisoner-of-War Labor.

a. Early in 1946 further steps were taken to reduce the numbers of prisoners of war at work, by discharging them and allowing

them to accept work as civilians. In January commanders were authorized to reduce the number and strength of labor service units to the minimum that might be sufficient for the job to which they were assigned, to replace by local civilians all units doing common labor, and to discharge all prisoners resident outside the United States Zone who were in a category for which discharge was authorized, provided that they were immediately reemployed as civilians. Commanders were further directed to hand over to the Provost Marshal all prisoners who became surplus owing to this action , and to report progress in discharging prisoners of war each month thereafter.(84) Later, however, it was made clear that, though this policy was to be met as far as possible, it was not to be followed to the point of depriving the Theater of necessary unskilled labor. Prisoners-of-war labor was used especially in liberated countries. Out of 143,000 prisoners expected to be necessary for labor after 30 June 1946, 106,000 were for work in the Western Base Section and its installations. It was still the policy to discharge all prisoners as soon as they were no longer required.(85) To facilitate the discharge of prisoners of war direct to the work they would take up as civilians, major commands were authorized to set up mobile discharge teams to visit installations from which it would be difficult to send prisoners to discharge centers and discharge them on the spot, so that they could pass directly into civilian employment.(86)

b. At the beginning of the year, the number of prisoners

of war working as labor units was 331,521.(87) This figure declined steadily throughout the first six months of 1946. On 31 May it was just over 200,000,(88), and on 30 June it had been reduced to 136,327.(89)

Chapter VIII

ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE OCCUPATION

POLICIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MILITARY GOVERNMENT

176. Denazification.

High on the list of military government accomplishments came denazification. In the first half of 1946, the process of denazifying the German government and civil administration in the area occupied by the United States was brought to completion. An official announcement to this effect was made on 20 June 1946. Toward the end of 1945, emphasis had already shifted to the denazification of economic life and institutions other than the government and civil administration. In 1946 a large share of the responsibility for denazification was shifted to the Germans. An important step in the assumption of this responsibility by the Germans was the enactment on 5 March 1946, by agreement among the three Länder in the United States Zone, of the German law on denazification---significantly

entitled: "The Law of National Liberation." Under this law, special German denazification courts known as Spruchkammern were set up for the trial of all members of the Nazi Party other than nominal participants. On 14 June 1946 the responsibility for administering denazification was turned over to these German courts, while Military Government retained the functions of observation, liaison, and reporting.]

177. Reforms in German Judicial and Penal Administration.

One of the principal tasks of military government was the reorganization of the German judicial system. After an initial period when all German courts were closed and justice was administered exclusively in military government courts, the first civil courts were reopened in August 1945. By 1 April 1946, 372 courts on all levels were functioning in the United States Zone. All these courts had been purged of their Nazi personnel and influences. As confidence in their efficiency and political reliability increased, more and more types of cases previously tried in military government courts were turned over to them. During the same period, progressive reforms were introduced in German prison administration and the penal systems. A program of segregation of prisoners by age, sex, type of offense, and length of sentence was carried out. Prison hospitals for the insane and diseased were set aside from the regular system.

178. Elections.

One of the most important military government achievements

in this period was the reinstitution of free elections in Germany. The first was held on 20 January 1946 in Grosshessen, when 83 percent of the eligible electors voted for members of the Gemeinderäte. The Social Democrats polled 33 percent of the votes, Christian Democrats 27 percent, Independents 24 percent, Communists 4 percent, and Liberals 2 percent.(1) This was followed a week later by a zone-wide election on the Gemeinde level,(2) while in April and May elections for Kreis councils and for Gemeinde councils for the larger Gemeinden were held throughout the zone,(3) with the Christian Democratic Union outstripping the other parties.(4) The culmination came on 30 June, with the zone-wide election for delegates to the constitutional assembly to draft charters for the three Lander states. Of the eligible electors 71 percent voted, and Christian Democrats again emerged as the strongest party.(5)

179. Labor Unions.

On 14 April 1946 authorization for the organization of German labor unions on a state-wide basis in the United States zone was announced at a conference of Military Government officials and German labor representatives in Frankfurt.(6)

180. Reparations.

a. At an international conference held in Paris from 9 November to 21 December 1945, the representatives of eighteen nations considered plans for the equitable distribution of German surplus assets.

An agreement was reached on the share in the reparations to be paid by Germany to the respective participating nations. At this conference an administrative agency, the Inter-Allied Reparations Conference, was established to make allocations of reparations to the member nations. This agency prepared "The Plan for Reparations and the Level of Postwar German Economy in Accordance with the Berlin Protocol," which was adopted by the Allied Control Council for Germany on 26 March 1946. The main object of this plan was to bring about the industrial disarmament of Germany and at the same time to guarantee to Germany the retention of sufficient industrial capacity for self-support.

b. In accordance with the international agreement on reparations, the United States Military Government began to survey German industry and to mark factories and establishments for destruction or for dismantling and delivery to other nations as reparations in kind. By 1 July 1946, sixty-nine war plants in the United States Zone were listed for destruction or demolition. Dismantling operations were started on the plants allocated as advance reparations, and some machinery was delivered to the Soviet Union. On 26 May General Clay, Deputy Military Governor, announced that the United States had stopped reparations deliveries from its zone in Germany, except for factories which had already been allocated, until all occupying powers had agreed to put into effect the Potsdam decision on administering Germany as an economic whole.

181. Restitutions.

The program for the restitution of art objects and other valuable property looted by the Nazis in the countries that they conquered was still delayed in the first half of 1946 by the failure of the different nations concerned to agree upon an interpretation of the broad definition of restitution contained in the London Declaration of 5 January 1943. In the early months of 1946, efforts to reach an agreement were continued. In the meantime, a program of returning stolen property found in the United States Zone was instituted. The Offenbach Archival Depot, which opened in March 1946, received more than two million pieces of library material written in 35 languages. At the end of June no decision had yet been reached on the disposal of some 400,000 pieces of this literature. By June 1946 Hungarian, Greek, and Soviet Restitution Missions were in the United States Zone. The property involved in 39 percent of the 1,823 claims filed by ten countries had been partially or entirely located, while Germans had filed 20,000 declarations of knowledge of the location of property, 17 percent of which had been processed. France received an oil-cracking plant, and the Netherlands received 297 streetcars out of a total of 301 taken from that country.

182. Importation of Foodstuffs for the German Population.

In January 1946 the importation of foodstuffs from the United States for the relief of the German population was begun. For the supplies to be imported into Germany to prevent disease and unrest,

furlough, or pass from 12 to 8 percent of actual strength. Tactical units were directed to devote a minimum of forty hours weekly to training, and nondivisional service units were to give each individual a minimum of three hours of basic and two hours of technical training weekly.(7) At the same time, a pamphlet supplementing earlier information and instructions,(8) designed to improve the standards of leadership and command, was distributed.

b. A more specific training problem centered on the constabulary, which required a special training program to fit the men for their duties. In January 1946 responsibility for the organization of the force was delegated to the commanding general of the Third Army, and on 18 January Maj. Gen. Ernest M. Harmon was announced as Commanding General of the U.S. Constabulary.(9) On 15 January 1946 Theater Headquarters published a thirteen weeks' training program for the Constabulary, and in February a troopers' handbook was issued. The Third Army drew up a training scheme comprising three stages: the training and indoctrination of personnel from 15 February to 31 May; on-the-job training from 1 to 30 June; and postoperational training after 1 July.(10) During the month of June, emphasis was laid on carrying out simulated and real operations. Each troop participated in at least one practice search-and-seizure operations, and, in addition, each brigade held a command post exercise.(11)

184. Movement toward a Civilian Occupation.

It had long been assumed by the military authorities that the line of development would be from a military occupation to a civilian supervisory occupation. At the time of the surrender, the number of United States citizens employed in the European Theater was small, and consisted largely of highly trained technical specialists. The Theater policy prohibiting recruitment of civilian personnel from the Zone of the Interior, except for persons possessing unusual qualifications, continued throughout the summer of 1945. The use of discharged military personnel as civilian employees was initiated in July 1945, and from September the recruitment of civilian employees in the United States was authorized. In addition, civilian employees were recruited from the Allied and neutral countries, and among displaced persons and enemy nationals. In the first half of 1946, the number of civilian employees of the United States forces for the first time surpassed the military strength of the Theater, as shown in the following table.(12)

MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FROM APRIL TO JULY 1946

Month	Civilian	Military
April	333,674	401,684
May	345,531	383,109
June	360,572	332,292
July	374,466	342,264

185. Agreement with United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

To take the place of the previous agreement between the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and Supreme Headquarters, an agreement was signed in Frankfurt on 19 February 1946 by Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull, Chief of Staff, on behalf of the United States forces, and Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan, Chief of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in Germany.(13) The Army continued to provide basic supplies for displaced persons in the Zone, but joint Army-Administration panels were established to coordinate supply operations. The Army gave supplemental medical and dental care, and agreed to consult camp directors first in instances of search, arrest, or detention of displaced persons. The Administration operated displaced persons' centers, arranged for the participation of voluntary agencies in the displaced persons programs, operated a central tracing bureau, maintained records, and assisted in planning for repatriation.

186. Aerial Mapping Project.

The project known as CASEY JONES for the aerial mapping of Europe and the northwest coast of Africa was nearing completion on 1 July 1946. This project was planned by the United States and Great Britain, and flights were started in June 1945. The Air Force was charged with the aerial photographic missions and the Theater Chief Engineer with inspection and acceptance of the finished film. Countries not covered, pending a more favorable international situation, were

the Soviet Union, Soviet-occupied Germany, Yugoslavia, Albania, Spain, and Portugal.(14)

187. Shipment of Alien Dependents.

a. In 1946 the Army started fulfilling a new responsibility that it had assumed: the shipment to the United States of the war brides and children of United States personnel. The policy in effect provided that free government transportation would be given to the dependents of military personnel of all grades, of honorably discharged veterans, and of civilian employees of the War Department and the American Red Cross. The commanding generals of Theater Service Forces and the United Kingdom Base were designated by the Theater Commander as his authorized representatives to conduct the program,(15) and extensive planning was carried out. Western Base Section arranged for shipment of dependents from the liberated countries, and Continental Base Section handled the project in other European countries, including occupied territory.

b. The first shipment of war brides, 626 in number, sailed from Southampton on the Argentina on 26 January 1946, while the first to leave the Continent sailed from Le Havre on the General Goethals on 8 March 1946. By the end of June 1946, 45,285 had sailed and applications had been received from an additional 15,678.(16) Figures for shipments from the three base sections through 30 June 1946 are shown in the following table.(17)

SHIPMENT OF ALIEN DEPENDENTS JANUARY TO JUNE 1946

Base Section	Adults	Children	Total
United Kingdom	28,299	10,424	38,723
Western Base	5,300	673	5,973
Continental Base	526	63	589
Totals	34,125	11,160	45,285

188. Occupational Planning and Accomplishments.

The most extensive achievements of the United States forces in the first half of 1946 were the successful transition to an established occupation forces, designed for a long occupation, and the building up of a system of military communities in the occupation areas.

a. Planning Responsibility. The responsibility for planning was in the hands of the Special Occupational Planning Board, which was organized on 19 September 1945 with General Bull as chairman.(18) The Board was to draw up plans for living quarters, recreational facilities, and services for occupation forces and their dependents in accordance with certain basic standards.

b. Progress of Planning. By 8 October certain basic assumptions had been arrived at: that the occupation would extend for at least five years; that most of the cost of construction and rehabilitation was to be borne by the Germans as reparations; that the troops were to be stationed in compact military installations of

not less than regimental size, similar to Army posts; that facilities were to be at least the equivalent of the best of the former German Army; and that maximum use was to be made of existing former German Army installations. It was estimated that some 90,000 dependents of officers and enlisted men would be brought to Europe during the following year, and transportation, housing, schools, and merchandising facilities were to be provided. Surplus vehicles were to be sold to military personnel for their personal use, and gasoline and oil made available. By December, tentative locations had been put forward for the communities, and the commanding general of Theater Service Forces had been made responsible for the preparation of further plans. Generals commanding geographical areas were to plan for the use of the facilities existing in communities of their areas, and to submit their reports and estimates by 20 January 1946. On submission of the Theater plan, however, the War Department stated that no construction, either temporary or permanent, was to be authorized.(19)

c. High priority was given, in this planning, to the shipment of dependents to the Theater. Originally, plans had excluded the dependents of enlisted men except those of the first three grades. By the time applications were accepted, however, in the middle of February, dependents of all enlisted grades had been declared eligible by the War Department.(20) The matter of relatives by marriage was later clarified in "in-laws in fact dependent and who are additionally bona fide members of the household" were declared eligible for

transportation on a spaceavailable basis.(21) As of 25 February, 138 applications for transportation of dependents to the Theater had been received, and it was requested that all personnel desiring transportation should submit applications by 29 March 1946. At that date, 415 officers, 26 enlisted men, and 8 civilians had filed applications. All dependents were processed through the port of Bremen. The first to arrive in Europe reached Frankfurt am Main on 29 April 1946, and by 28 June 2,467 dependents had arrived in the Theater from the United States, including 2,328 dependents of officers, 80 of enlisted men, and 59 of civilians.(22)

d. Educational Facilities for Dependent Children. With the presence of families in the Theater, a need arose for educational facilities for the children. Planning for this had started early, and in May 1946 publicity was given to the qualifications desired in teachers.(23) By the end of June, plans were well advanced for the opening of the schools in October.

e. Army Exchange Service Facilities. Certain general facilities and services were also expanded for the use of all members of United States communities. One of these was the Army Exchange Service. At the cessation of hostilities, little was available in post exchanges except tobacco, candy, and a few toilet articles. By September 1945, post exchange officers were being urged to extend their activities to provide more and better services.(24) Plans submitted on 26 December envisaged a greatly expanded service, to

include tailoring, and watch- and radio-repair. In the last quarter of 1945, the first merchandise began to arrive from other countries with which contracts had been made, namely, Spain, Sweden, France, Belgium, Switzerland.(25) In the first half of 1946, contracts amounting to nearly four million dollars were placed in Germany and Austria, while contracts amounting to nearly twenty million dollars were placed in other European countries.(26) The Army Exchange Service itself supervised the production of beer, soft drinks, and ice cream, using German facilities as far as possible.(27) Auto maintenance and repair, tailoring, laundry, dry cleaning, hairdressing, and watch- and radio-repair were also provided by the Army Exchange Service. The sale of jeeps began in June 1946, and it was planned to sell cars by lottery from July 1946.

f. Leave and Recreation. Leave and recreation facilities remained abundant, although the current policy was one of cutting down ineffectives and eliminating expense by instituting a pay-as-you-go policy. By June 1946, leave centers and tours were operated in Great Britain by the American Red Cross; in Paris, Rome, Brussels, and the Riviera by the Army; and in Switzerland, Denmark, and the French Alps by negotiation with the foreign government at a flat-rate cost to the individual. Rest areas within the occupied areas were also authorized from November 1945,(28) and were maintained at Königsee, Berchtesgaden, Garmisch, and Chiemsee in Germany, and at Bad Ischl, Gmunden, and Mondsee in Austria.(29)

189. War Crimes.

a. By the beginning of January 1946, Case No. 1, against the twenty-two principal defendants and seven German political and military organizations, was being prosecuted before the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, and by the end of June the case was nearing completion. Proceedings for violations of the laws of war to the prejudice of United States nationals, notably prisoners of war, and for atrocities committed in the concentration camps, were being conducted before military commissions or military government courts. These cases included the Borkum Island Case, opened on 6 February at Ludwigsburg; the Mauthausen Concentration Camp trial, opened on 11 May 1946 at Dachau; the Malmedy Massacre trial, opened on 16 May; and the Flossenbürg Concentration Camp trial, opened on 11 June.

b. The U.S. Army had in its custody a large number of civilian internees, amounting to 150,000 persons, who had been arrested during the first year of the occupation in implementation of the automatic-arrest policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.(30) These presented a problem of feeding and guarding, and the danger that new Nazi cliques might be formed in the camps. It had become clear that many people had been interned on purely technical grounds. The automatic arrest category policy was amended, therefore, from time to time during the first year of the occupation. Mandatory arrests were limited to active members of organizations under indictment and to war crimes suspects and dangerous security suspects.(31)


THE UNITED STATES FORCES ON 30 JUNE 1946

190. The United States Forces on 30 June 1946.

The constitution and the interrelation of units of the United States forces in the European Theater as of 30 June 1946 is shown in the chart on the following page.

EUROPEAN THEATER ORGANIZATION

30 JUNE 1946



NOTES:

- RESPONSIBLE TO OFFICE MILITARY GOVERNMENT (US), FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT MATTERS ONLY
- FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT MATTERS, THE COMMANDING GENERAL US FORCES AUSTRIA REPORTS DIRECT TO JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
- OPERATIONAL CONTROL ONLY
- UNDER TECHNICAL CONTROL OF THEATER QUARTERMASTER

Chapter IX

THREE EXAMPLES OF UNITED STATES OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND

191. Beginning of the Occupation.

The occupation of Germany began in September 1944, when the first troops operating under the Supreme Commander entered German territory and captured a few towns. The first German city to fall was Aachen, which surrendered on 21 October after a five-day bombardment by the First U.S. Army. Enemy defenses west of the Rhine River crumbled rapidly, and by 12 March the 12th and 21st Army Groups stood on the German Rhine throughout its entire length north of the Mosel. Practically all enemy forces had been cleared from the area. Much of the civil population had fled before the advancing Allied armies, but enough people were left to warrant their control for reasons of military security. During the fall and early winter of 1944-45, a few military government detachments operated in the region already conquered along the western frontier, and a few tactical units got

their first experience as security troops for the control of the German population. Military government detachments had been trained for duty in specific German localities and attached to the armies, which had been directed by the 12th Army Group to leave detachments behind all departmental and regional capitals as the army rear boundary moved forward. By 24 September 1945 there were twenty-six such detachments, with a total strength of 133 officers, 7 warrant officers, and 235 enlisted men, serving with the Third U.S. Army. Approximately nine detachments were made available to each corps.(1)

192. Collection of Intelligence for Military Government Operations.

Studies of specific cities ahead of the armies were made and issued to the detachments concerned, detailing as nearly as possible current conditions in the towns, including the extent of bomb damage, the number of industries still operating, the possibilities for billets, the condition of railheads, laundries, storage warehouses, refrigeration facilities, and dump parks. Detachments in forward zones relayed such information of value through daily and special reports and through interviews with intelligence couriers who visited them daily. Civil affairs, military government, and G-5 staffs of divisions and corps supplemented this and the information obtained through the constant cooperation of G-2 and the Counter Intelligence Corps. The information was widely disseminated along with other literature of all types and, in addition, meetings were arranged with specialists

in various fields. As a result, the plan for the occupation of Germany was not a bare framework when these first detachments went to work there.(2)

193. Change from Civil Affairs to Military Government.

a. During operations in France, Belgium, and Luxemburg, the mission of G-5 had been confined strictly to civil affairs, particularly the interpreting and adjusting of conflicts between civilian and military needs so that the vital requirements of each could be satisfied. It was difficult for tradesmen, producers, and local officials to understand why combat-zone restrictions should be continued so far behind the lines, where the guns could no longer be heard. In Germany it became necessary for the first time to establish a government over a defeated people.(3)

b. Civil Affairs was organized as the military agency charged with keeping the civilian population "off the back" of the fighting forces; so far as the army was concerned, its chief purpose was to further military objectives. Every assistance was given state authorities in France, Belgium, and Luxemburg in surveying their devastated countries and in establishing control. Officials of these countries resumed their posts quickly and took measures in support of military operations. In Germany it was not a matter of reinstating a former government, but of setting up a complete military authority. Such authority was to be exercised indirectly through local self-government, but only when such a government, purged of all Nazi personnel

and doctrines, could be established.(4)

194. Conditions Encountered in Germany.

Upon entering Germany the armies found it necessary to restore order in a desolated country that was still, in many regions, under enemy fire. Retreating enemy forces and civilians alike, ordered to evacuate, attempted to take with them everything of value except unthreashed grain and crops still in the ground, and they added to the extensive combat damage by destroying public utilities still usable. Military government officers found the people who stayed behind badly frightened, docile, and tired of war. At the end of his first week of military government, the commanding officer of Detachment 1562, Third Army, reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5, that the German villagers had begun to show an "attitude of friendliness and cooperation" to American troops. He added: "Some of the inhabitants have openly expressed their anti-Nazi feelings. Consensus of opinion is that Germany is doomed and that the quicker the Allies overthrow the Nazis the quicker Germany will be able to begin reconstruction."(5)

195. First Actions of Military Government.

a. Laws, ordinances, and notices were published immediately in all towns and were almost everywhere readily obeyed. Exceptions were noted at Koblenz and Cochem, where the people were described as "sullen and uncooperative," and detachments moving east of the

Rhine observed a similar attitude. Defiance of Allied rule was most frequently shown by the Nazi-indoctrinated youth. Immediate and wide circulation of laws and ordinances which the people were expected to obey was obtained by distribution of a special issue of Die Mitteilung, a newspaper published by agents of Publicity and Psychological Warfare. Subsequent copies with straight news reports were accorded respect by the Germans because of the official character of the first copy. As time went on the publication proved to be popular and print orders were increased from week to week. In the Third Army area alone, a circulation of 100,000 copies was attained by 31 March.(6)

b. After issuing directives, military government turned next to those things which would be of help to the Army. The people were instructed to clean up the streets and bury the dead. Highways and water, light, telephone, and gas systems were repaired with German labor as rapidly as possible. To carry out War Department instructions, units which uncovered evidence of atrocities required the populace living nearby to see and examine the evidences of the control exercised by the Nazi government. In some cases, Germans were forced to bury the bodies of the victims. On the whole the military security situation was better than had been anticipated and military government was able to effect reasonable organization and tight control over the people after only a brief period of anarchy. Every German over twelve years of age was registered by military government detachments and names were checked against lists provided

by the Counter Intelligence Corps. As soon as possible civil government and law enforcing bodies were set up.(7)

196. The Establishment of Civil Government.

The military government detachments moving into the Rhineland found no government in operation when they arrived. Civil authorities had for the most part been evacuated by the German Army and it was hard to find residents who know anything about government. A number of Bürgermeisters who remained behind had to be removed from office because screening showed them to have been ardent Nazis. The most cooperative officials were found by making use of old civil lists dating back to 1927-33. In many of the Kreise, non-Nazi who had been removed from office by the Nazi government in 1933 were reinstated. In some of the smaller Gemeinde non-Nazi officials were found who had not been removed because of their long service to the community and some of them were retained. At the level of government next higher than the Kreis, the Regierungsbezirk, and at the still high level of Provinz it was more difficult to secure satisfactory civil servants. At all levels where chief administrative officers were appointed, they were able to organize police and other essential services on a limited scale. All appointments were on a temporary basis, and some appointees were subsequently dismissed after investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps.(8)

197. The Machinery for Law Enforcement.

a. As the area occupied during the winter of 1944-45 was small, it was difficult to assay the quality and permanence of government organizations established locally. The chief interest at the time was the promulgation of military government law and the establishment of courts for its enforcement. Legal action began with the posting of proclamations and laws which established military government, abolished Nazi laws and organizations, suspended courts, imposed security restrictions upon the German population, and ordered penalties for violations. The machinery for enforcement was provided by the appointment of courts composed of military government personnel.(9)

b. The courts set up gave a quick and decisive answer to any questions that might have been entertained on the severity to be exercised by the United States forces. The first sentences handed down were sufficiently severe to convince the Germans that they were not dealing with the 1918 American. In Koblenz, for instance, where German had known the Americans in 1918, the citizens were certain that there would be no change since the last occupation. They read the proclamations skeptically, but soon discovered that the proclamations meant what they said. The courts tried and convicted civilians charged with such offenses as violations of curfew and circulation restrictions, crossing the Franco-German border, private slaughtering of cattle, larceny of property of the United States forces, failure to report the presence of German soldiers, and

transportation of mail over the frontier. Sentences were from seven days' to six months' imprisonment at hard labor.(10)

c. Since a study of case records revealed a lack of uniformity in sentences, an abstract of all cases tried in the 12th Army Group area was sent to corps, divisions, and detachments for information and guidance. In some cases, letters were written to courts pointing out the inadequacy of sentences in certain cases involving serious offenses. A board of review was appointed and charged with the review of all cases in which the punishment exceeded imprisonment for one year or a fine of one thousand dollars, and all other cases tried by courts appointed by the armies in which a petition for review was filed.(11)

198. The advance into Germany.

General Patton launched the first modern assault-crossing of the Rhine River on 22 March, at Oppenheim. This crossing progressed smoothly and three others were made north of the Ruhr by the 21st Army Group during the night of 23-24 March. Two days later the Third Army made two more crossings in the Oberwesel-Boppard area. The advance beyond the Rhine was ordered on 25 March, and at the same time the Fifteenth Army was ordered to assume responsibility for the occupation of the Rhineland, where the rapid advance had left a tremendous amount of territory without occupation forces and governing bodies.(12)

199. The Assignment of the Fifteenth Army.

a. As the armies proceeded eastward from the Rhine, the Fifteenth Army was to be prepared to occupy, organize, and govern the Rhineland, including the Rheinprovinz, the Saarland, the Pfalz, and the portion of Hessen west of the Rhine River. By 1 April it was to take over the defense of the west bank of the Rhine River from Bonn to Neuss. Operational control of all units then defending the sector was to pass temporarily to the Fifteenth Army until such time as those units might be relieved by units of the Fifteenth Army. The Fifteenth Army was to extend its defensive sector on the west bank to include Homberg by 5 April, and, at a time to be decided later, Lunchen Gladbach.(13)

b. Because it was most immediately available, the XXII Corps was designated by Fifteenth Army to assume responsibility for the defense, security, and military government of the Rhine sector. As conditions warranted, the Corps was to be prepared to occupy, organize, and govern additional areas in the rear of the First and Ninth Armies, namely, all of the Rheinprovinz west of the Rhine River in Regierungsbezirke Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Cologne, and eventually the parts of Düsseldorf and Cologne east of the River.(14)

c. The XXIII Corps had most of its forces in the United Kingdom but, as soon as possible, it was to take over Regierungsbezirke Trier and Koblenz in the Rheinprovinz, and the Saarland, the Pfalz, and the portion of Hessen west of the Rhine River. Later, as the First, Third, and Seventh Armies advanced into Germany, the XXIII Corps

was to be ready to take over additional areas across the Rhine.(15)

d. On 10 April responsibility for an area west of the Rhine and south of the German-Netherland frontier was assumed, the Ninth Army retaining responsibility for screening and patrolling the west bank of the river and for the maintenance and protection of the bridges. The following day, the Third Army area around Koblenz was added to the Fifteenth Army's responsibility. The city of Koblenz itself was taken over three days later. Except for certain supply installations within the city and traffic control at the east approaches of bridges, Bonn and the surrounding area passed to the control of the Fifteenth Army from the First Army on 15 April. During the next two days, the relief of Third Army units was completed and preparations were made for movement of the Fifteenth Army to the Seventh Army area west of the Rhine. On 20 April boundaries were extended to the Rhine River from Boppard to Oppenheim. The remaining portions of the Saarland were taken over on 24 April and the area within the Rheinprovinz lying east of the river and the last portions of Hessen were taken over the following day.(16)

200. The Last Resistance in the Rhineland.

a. When the Fifteenth Army assumed responsibility for the Rhineland, fighting continued in approximately one fifth of it. The combat area included about one half of each of the Regierungsbezirke of Düsseldorf and Cologne and a tip of the Regierungsbezirk of Koblenz, all lying east of the River. The tactical operations along the

Rhine River had become negligible, consisting of only occasional patrolling and light artillery fire. The mission specifically forbade any attack in force across the river and no single patrol larger than a company was authorized at any time. Combat and reconnaissance patrols were sent east of the river, and contacts with German forces were reported until 11 April. On 6 April, for example, a raiding party repulsed a counterattack by three enemy tanks near Hildorf. Sixty prisoners were taken. On the same day a patrol in the vicinity of Eilendorf returned with forty displaced persons. The following day one of the patrol groups encountered an antipersonnel mine on the east bank and suffered twelve casualties, while the other eleven patrols sent out that day reported no trouble. Of the six patrols sent out on 8 April only one met resistance. It was ambushed, and one man was killed and another wounded. On 10 April the 101st Airborne Division reported that three or four patrols were unable to cross the Rhine because of heavy enemy fire in the area of Düsseldorf.(17)

b. The principal combat mission of the Fifteenth Army was to hold the Rhine River line intact while First and Ninth Army forces were reducing the German forces trapped in the Ruhr pocket. Resistance here had been split into two pockets by the two Armies, and enemy tanks and troops were killing aimlessly in the center of the two shrinking circles. By 16 April only one rapidly disappearing pocket remained on the east bank of the Rhine, just north of Cologne, and resistance in the Fifteenth Army area had ended. The mission of the Army was immediately shifted in keeping with this development.(18)

201. Organizing for the Occupation.

a. There was a noticeable difference in the way in which tactical units and military government units tackled the problem of control of German territory. Tactical commanders deployed their troops for possible defensive or offensive use, with combat operations as their chief concern. Military government units, on the other hand, had been trained for occupation on the basis of existing political divisions and organizations of the German Reich. This was founded on a system of organization which had as its basic unit the Stadtbezirk, or Stadtkreis, (roughly a city and its surrounding area of influence) and the Landkreis (similar to a small county). (19)

b. The tactical disposition of troops seldom coincide with the administrative subdivisions of military government authority. The boundaries overlapped to such a great degree that confusion developed in both the military government and the tactical organization, and a great deal of confusion was created in the minds of the German people. Both the purely military and governmental commanders became uncertain of the bounds of their proper authority and frequently were obliged to make decisions by instinct rather than by regulation. The multiplicity of commands and the issuance of orders by almost all of these commands caused repeated duplications of effort. Many orders were issued by different units covering the same areas or populations, with varying specifications. The effect upon the Germans was plainly undesirable. (20)

c. Early in April the tactical set-up with a forward combat zone and a rear security sector was found to be unsatisfactory for the mission of military government. The disposition of troops was changed to coincide more with the political subdivisions and all authority was centered in the corps commander with the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, directly in charge. The corps were to organize their areas into districts and subdistricts, each district conforming to the boundaries of the Regierungsbezirk and subdistricts to those of one or more kreise, insofar as practicable. Consideration was to be given to the establishment of two districts in the Regierungsbezirke lying on both sides of the river, for instance Düsseldorf and Cologne. All existing tactical headquarters were to be subdistrict and sector headquarters. The corps commanders were to be responsible to the army commander for the maintenance of control, including security, traffic, and policing, and the administration of military government.(21)

202. Counterintelligence Activities.

The First, Third, and Ninth Armies in their advance past the Rhine had been unable to give complete counterintelligence coverage, but they had been successful in exploiting a large number of personality targets, including Gestapo and military intelligence personalities, and in first uncovering the Werewolf organization. In spite of this, when the Fifteenth Army took over the Rhineland, the counterintelligence coverage was, at best, superficial.(22)

a. All static Counter Intelligence Corps Detachments in the area remained in place and came under the control of the Fifteenth Army. Target information was obtained from the armies and the "T" Forces. The activities of "T" Forces west of the river had been completed before the Fifteenth Army assumed responsibility and all priority targets had been exploited. These forces continued to operate east of the river in the Ruhr after reduction of enemy forces until 1 May, when responsibility for their activities passed to the Fifteenth Army. The Counter Intelligence Corps was responsible for the screening of all appointees to local government positions and also assisted temporarily in the screening of thousands of refugees and displaced persons.(23)

b. Reconnaissance of the area for security and other purposes was an unending process. Numerous denunciations were received and valuable contacts and sources of information were established. There were no outward indications of organized hostility, but instances of subversive activity indicated that certain elements of the civil population were recovering from the first shock of the occupation and if they were organized, might constitute a real threat. Incidents included cases of wire stringing, isolated sniping, and violations of travel and curfew restrictions.(24) An investigation of incidents in coal mines and a glass factory produced evidence that certain industrialists were left behind at the time of retreat to protect their industries, at the same time denying the products of the industries to the Allies. This discovery was one of the first indications of the

problems to be encountered in the denazification of German industry.(25)

203. Mission of the Occupation Forces.

Civil government was established at all levels as quickly as possible, but there were five tasks for which only United States troops were to be used, namely:(26)

a. Troops were to administer and guard displaced persons camps until replaced by United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration teams, supplemented by selected displaced persons.

b. Troops were to serve as military government security guards. Foreign liaison officers and interpreters were to be used at all division and higher headquarters. German civilians could be used by military government detachments as interpreters and clerks.

c. Troops were to be used to police the larger German cities until the German civil police could be reorganized.

d. Troops were to supervise and control the prohibited five-kilometer frontier zone.

e. Finally, troops were to assist the Counter Intelligence Corps detachments and guard intelligence targets.

204. Security Guards.

During the advance across the Rhineland the armies considered assigning troops to military government, but no action was taken. Meanwhile a disordered Germany needed guarding. The German populace watched its chance to break into Wehrmacht food stores when guards

were withdrawn, and displaced persons frequently celebrated their liberation by looting. In April the corps began to assign field artillery, infantry, cavalry, and antiaircraft troops to G-5 to serve as security guards. They were called "converted battalions," but retained their unit designations and equipment. These troops posted proclamations and ordinances, interrogated suspicious individuals, and kept main supply routes clear of displaced persons and refugees. In many instances arms were taken from civilians by guards patrolling assigned areas. Battalions from liberated countries were also used, normally as guards on bridges, roads, railroads, depots, and utilities, and as convoy and train guards. This same security guard plan was followed by the Fifteenth Army when it took over west of the Rhine. In addition, the 15th Cavalry Reconnaissance Group and the 16th and 17th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadrons were employed as mobile combat reserves to handle situations beyond the capabilities of local security forces. They were reinforced by approximately one motorized infantry company.(27)

205. Police in the Cities.

The work of returning mayors and auxiliary police to towns was begun immediately; but it was not easy to find qualified men for the jobs, as the German police had collapsed completely under the pressure of combat conditions and had, for the most part, retreated with the German Army. It was necessary in the meantime to use tactical

units in all the larger centers of population and sometimes in every little community. Military police battalions, as available, were used for policing and traffic control and other troops were trained to supplement them. As civil police forces were organized, they helped to enforce military government regulations, thus relieving tactical units of the burden. In order to avoid confusion, permanent changes in the structure of the German police system were delayed until after the withdrawal of Allied troops into the established boundaries of their respective zones.(28)

206. Border Control.

a. As a constantly expanding area required more troops than were available, a secure border zone was a necessity. A system of border control was outlined on 15 April, establishing a frontier command to lay and patrol a prohibited zone along the German frontier for 138 miles, from Losheln in the south to Venlo in the north, and extending from one to five kilometers. This zone was to be evacuated, and authorized crossing points were to be established for German, Netherland, and Belgian nationals. Guards were placed at these places and mines were laid in the open areas. Liaison planes supplemented by motor and foot detachments patrolled the area. Battalions from liberated countries could be used as guards if augmented and controlled by United States troops. The Netherland troops assigned to the frontier command were composed mostly of men from the underground army, who had been taken into the regular army. They were not always entirely

satisfactory in carrying out the duties assigned to them and occasionally conducted private looting expeditions. There were no instances of friction, however, between United States troops and the Belgian and Netherland troops.(29)

b. For the first few days guards were ordered to shoot any trespasser on sight. This order was soon modified to authorize power of arrest only. Originally, it had been planned to evacuate all of the 30,000 nationals living in the zone, but actually only those considered a threat to security were evacuated. Any person who aided war criminals, disturbed the peace, or performed any hostile act was subject to evacuation.(30)

c. Military government authorities issued passes which were valid at the fifteen crossing points. Civilians of the western nations escorted by military government personnel and holding the proper papers could go through, but all Soviet citizens, Poles, Czechs, and other eastern nationals were turned back at the border and returned to the jurisdiction of the proper displaced persons authorities. Trains carrying displaced persons were stopped by Counter Intelligence Corps men, but no complete check was possible because of lack of personnel. No provision was made for people living along the border. Formerly these people had been issued frontier passes by each country concerned, permitting them to pass back and forth to carry on their business. Many people living in the Netherlands, for instance, had farms in Germany. The system worked a hardship on such people, but no solution was ever reached.(31)

207. Assistance Given to Counter Intelligence Corps.

The tactical forces assisted the Counter Intelligence Corps in situations requiring force beyond the latter's capabilities. In making arrests, for example, the agents of the Counter Intelligence Corps were often backed up by military police or details of regular troops. The Counter Intelligence Corps called upon the troops for assistance in making systematic searches of houses or outdoor areas, in posting special guards in unusual circumstances, and in guarding prisoners. In turn, the Counter Intelligence Corps served the troops in an advisory capacity respecting their security problems and went into action when summoned by the troops to undertake interrogations or to screen personnel.(32)

208. Progress of Military Government at the End of Resistance.

As of 1200 hours on 18 April, the remaining front along the west bank of the Rhine was officially deemed uncovered, and the tactical mission completed. The reshuffling of tactical troops to conform with political demarcations had simplified the G-5 problem, and the improvement was reflected in the reaction of the German population. A policy of military government had developed that seemed to be working, and an over-all administrative system had been set up.(33)

a. Qualified Germans were being appointed to civil offices as rapidly as possible. A high percentage of the adult population admitted Nazi membership, but most of the people questioned gave stories

of yielding to outside pressure in order to retain jobs. The problem of incomplete Nazi registration records confronted all military government teams in the area. A new directive was issued by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, permitting people who had joined the Nazi Party through necessity to hold office at least temporarily, without which the military government authorities would have been hard pressed to find governmental personnel of any caliber, because the prohibition on all Nazis had the effect of preventing practically all qualified persons from holding office. The military government detachments were not as successful in establishing the German courts as they were in establishing administrative agencies. There were only a few qualified judges who had not been tainted with the Nazi ideology.(34)

b. Politically the people were apathetic, as they were more concerned with personal problems. With the exception of the Communist Party, which was trying to regroup its membership, there were no noticeable attempts of any of the political parties to reestablish themselves.(35)

c. A War Crimes Division was set up on 14 April consisting of personnel suddenly converted from tactical to occupation duties. Numerous cases were filed, the majority of which were solved by the aid of volunteer German informers. Many persons wanted on charges of war crimes were known to be in the Ruhr area, including some of high rank such as Field Marshal Model, the commander of the German Army Group "B", which had been trapped in the Ruhr pocket. The outstanding

case during the period concerned the murder of seventy-one political prisoners of the Nazis, just prior to the arrival of the United States troops at Landswehr, near Solingen, and their hurried burial in a mass grave in a sand pit near the village.(36)

209. The Cordon Sanitaire.

Wartime living conditions, particularly in prisoners-of-war and displaced-persons camps, had created a high incidence of typhus and it was necessary to take steps to control it. On 23 April the Fifteenth Army, as directed by Theater Headquarters, established a cordon sanitaire along the Rhine River to protect the areas to the west from the louse-borne disease. Ports of entry or guard stations were established and all civilians and liberated prisoners of war traveling from east to west were deloused before crossing. Delousing stations were set up to carry out disinfection on an around-the-clock schedule. Reception centers provided temporary shelter and food, as well as medical inspection. Individuals suspected of having any communicable disease were isolated for observation.(37)

210. The Situation on and after V-E Day.

Before the end of hostilities, the XXII and XXIII Corps of the Fifteenth Army were engaged in the occupation, organization, and administration of an area of 14,000 square miles, about eight times the area of the United States occupation zone after World War I, but including the same area and its capital city, Koblenz. In spite of the difficulties resulting from continuous shifting and readjustment

of troops within the area due to redeployment, a great deal of progress had been made.(38)

a. The occupation mission of the XXII and XXIII Corps was not announced by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces, until 19 May. On that day the Rheinprovinz Military District Provincial Government was initiated. According to the plan, the area of responsibility of the Fifteenth Army was treated as one Military District. The three Regierungsbezirke of Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Cologne, constituting the area of responsibility of the XXII Corps, were placed under one Oberregierungs-Präsident, while each of the three had a Regierungsbezirk-Präsident and a completely constituted administrative staff. This unit was supervised by the military government personnel attached to the XXII Corps. The Regierungsbezirke of Trier and Koblenz and the Saarland, the Pfalz, and Hessen were similarly organized as a unit under the supervision of the XXIII Corps. By 20 July 1945, effective civil administration within the entire area of the Rheinprovinz Military District had been established at all levels of administration from the provinz level down to and including the Kreis level. The area was under control and had become serene enough to permit the beginning of political reorganization by the German population. The Social Democratic, Communist, and the Anti-Fako (Anti-Fascist) Parties were the first to organize, with their activities centering in Düsseldorf. The Anti-Fako Party seemed to have some Catholic clerical support.(39)

b. Within the first few days of June, the process of turning over the Regierungsbezirke of Düsseldorf, Aachen, and Cologne to British control was begun. This division of the Rheinprovinz Military District brought to an end the progress in the reconstitution of the civil government. The provincial government as it existed on 20 June, together with the Oberpräsident and his staff, passed to the control of the I British Corps. The south part of the Rheinprovinz was then attached to the administrative system which had been established at Neustadt.(40)

c. Under an agreement reached with the French, the XXIII Corps was directed on 5 July to turn over its territory of the Saarland, the Pfalz, Hessen west of the Rhine, and the Regierungsbezirke of Trier and Koblenz to the First French Army. The relief of United States units by the French was completed by 10 July.(41)

211. The Value of the Rhineland Occupation.

The Rhineland occupation served as a trial run in military government. For the first time, the tactical objective of an army was secondary and military government the primary concern. The statement from General Eisenhower's headquarters that the Germans were "going to get military government and are going to know it is military government," was borne out in the Rhineland. The XXII and XXIII Corps, with some of the veteran European Theater fighting units, were commanded by two of the Army's most experienced combat generals-- Maj. Gen. Ernest N. Harmon, commander of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions

in nearly every major campaign from the North African landing on, and Maj. Gen. Hugh J. Gaffey, commander of the 4th Armored (Spearhead) Division, which the German SS troops called "Roosevelt Butchers." Actual experience seemed to prove that cooperation was as important as force. In many ways the original plans for the occupation had to be changed when they were tested in practice. Much was accomplished and much was learned that was to prove helpful in the later more permanent job of occupation.(42)

OCCUPATION OF NORWAY

212. The First Stages.

a. The total German surrender included, of course, a surrender of their forces in Norway, although these had not been defeated in the field. In fact, during the period of hostilities there had been no invasion of Norway after 1940 by United Nations forces, except for a Soviet expedition into Finnmark, in the far North. Shortly after V-E Day, however, a small joint British-American force landed in Norway to control the 347,000 German troops located there and to help rehabilitate the Norwegian nation.(43)

b. In many ways, conditions in Norway were found to be better than expected. The Norwegians were hard working and well disciplined, and quickly restored their government to good working

order. The country was not devastated except Finnmark, where the Germans had laid waste the country in their retreat before the Soviet forces.

213. Attempts to Remove German Installations.

It was not possible to remove German installations immediately. It was not even possible to disarm the Germans immediately. Few untoward incidents occurred, however, and the German forces proved cooperative. Their units were gradually moved into restricted areas and thence slowly transported back to Germany. All types of ships were pressed into service to bring these surrendered troops back to their homeland, but German ships predominated. By 1 August 1945, 25,000 German prisoners had been moved from Norway to the United States Zone and 15,000 to the British Zone of Germany. An attempt was made immediately to bring all members of the German Navy, including German civilian employees, into these restricted areas or reservations. There were insufficient British and Norwegian naval personnel, however, to control completely the naval stations and shore batteries, so that a skeleton German naval organization was retained. By 10 July 1945, there were 70,052 German naval personnel on the reservations and 19,699 outside the reservations.(44)

214. Recovered Allied Military Personnel.

a. A total of 86,458 former Allied prisoners of war were discovered in Norway, distributed in 400 camps and work detachments.

On 14 May 1945 all German guards on camps containing ex-prisoners of war were ordered removed, and the Germans were directed to leave a thirty-day supply of food at each of the camps. Prisoner-of-war exchange teams were sent into all camp areas, each including a British officer, a representative of the Soviet Repatriation Commission, and, where necessary, Polish or Yugoslav prisoner-of-war exchange officers.(45)

b. On 18 May 1945 a Soviet delegation arrived in Oslo from Stockholm to supervise the repatriation of the recovered military personnel and displaced persons of Soviet nationality who were located in Norway. On 10 June an agreement was reached between the Soviet and the Norwegian Governments providing for the evacuation of Soviet nationals from southern Norway by rail and sea through Sweden and Finland, and for their evacuation from northern Norway by sea direct to Murmansk. The evacuation through Sweden and Finland commenced on 13 June 1945 and was completed by 13 July 1945; the evacuation by sea direct to Murmansk commenced on 23 June 1945 and was completed by 26 July 1945. Altogether, 18,852 people were evacuated.(46)

215. Continued Evacuation of German Personnel.

a. By 15 August 1945, 124,000 Germans had been evacuated from Norway. By that date the staff of the German Headquarters near Oslo had been greatly reduced, although many of its members were held in Norway for interrogation.(47)

b. On 20 September 1945 it was estimated that all disarmed Germans in the following categories who were slated for the United

States Zone of Germany would be evacuated by 15 October 1945: all whose residence was in the United States Zone of Germany, except 4,500 who were in arrest or essential labor categories; all whose residence was in Austria, except the Soviet Zone; and 50 percent of those whose residence was in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Responsibility for the disposition of the remaining 50 percent, or about 57,000 persons, was accepted by the British. It was estimated that about 70,700 disarmed Germans would remain in Norway after 15 October 1945, of whom 4,500 resided in the British Zone of Germany, 57,000 in the Soviet Zone of Germany, and 4,500 in the United States Zone of Germany and who were in arrest or in an essential labor categories. In addition, about 11,000 German civilians would be left in Norway.(48)

c. By 20 September 1945, all German forces in Norway had been disarmed except a small number used as guards. By 17 October 1945, 251,818 had been evacuated to Germany and Austria and a total of approximately 70,700 remained to be evacuated to those two countries.(49)

d. By 5 September 1945, the disarmament of the German Navy and of German naval fortifications had been completed. By 15 October, over 50,000 German naval personnel had been evacuated to Germany. By that date, 10,113 German naval personnel remained "frozen" and were employed in such capacities as dumping ammunition and minesweeping, and as crews of merchant ships or on dockyard duty.(50)

216. Return of King Haakon.

King Haakon returned to Norway on 7 June 1945. On that date,

the SHAEF Mission to Norway handed most governmental powers back to the Norwegian civil government. This was only a month after the original landing on Norway.(51)

217. Destruction of German War Materiel.

It had been Allied policy throughout Europe to destroy captured German war materiel. The carrying out of this policy created resentment among Norwegians, who felt that this materiel should have been turned over to the Norwegian Government, and much criticism was expressed in Norwegian newspapers. Eventually, the Allied Land Forces issued a news release to the Norwegian press explaining the necessity for such destruction, to prevent any future war potential. It mentioned that certain exceptions had been made in the cases of Norway and the Netherlands, as enough German war materiel had been left to supply the coast defenses.(52)

218. Inactivation of Supreme Headquarters.

The SHAEF Mission to Norway ceased to exist, as such, on 14 July 1945, when Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, was dissolved. On that date, the American elements of the SHAEF Mission to Norway became the USFET Mission to Norway. Effective 24 August 1945, the Headquarters Allied Land Forces, Norway, took over all troops in Norway. Two commands were formed under this headquarters. One, the Oslo Zone, comprising the Allied Zones of Oslo and Stavanger, was under American command; the other, comprising the Allied Zones of Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromso, was designated

219. Establishment of Norwegian Auxiliary Forces.

Much enthusiasm for the Allies was felt among the Norwegian populace. In fact, many Norwegians wished to join the U.S. Army for service against Japan. The Norwegian Government asked Allied Headquarters whether Norwegians could enlist in the U.S. or the British Armies, and were informed that they could not. It was finally agreed, however, that the Norwegian Government would raise an army composed of "liberated manpower units" which would aid the Allies within Norway. This was to be under the tactical command of the Allied Land Forces Norway, but the Norwegian Government was to retain full disciplinary powers over these units. The agreement with the Norwegian Government establishing this new army of "liberated manpower units" was signed on 28 June 1945.(54)

220. Evacuation of United States Troops.

A. It had originally been planned that United States troops would leave Norway by 1 August 1945. This proved impossible because of the comparatively low speed at which German disarmed personnel was moved out of Norway. United States forces in Germany were unwilling to accept a large-scale movement of Germans over a short period of time. Hence the repatriation of disarmed Germans was gradual and American occupation forces in Norway were unable to leave during the summer of 1945.(55)

b. The USFET Mission to Norway finally became inoperative 20 October 1945. American Task Force "A," which comprised all American forces in Norway except specialists and headquarters groups, became inoperative on 5 October and was completely phased out of Norway by 17 October 1945. A detachment of Theater Service Forces personnel, known as Theater Service Forces European Theater Liquidation Detachment, Norway, remained a short while to close out the remaining supply and administrative details. Likewise, a small group of officers and enlisted men remained to work with the American Embassy to clear up such matters as had to be handled at the ambassadorial level. With the exception of this latter group, the USFET Mission to Norway was phased out on 31 October 1945. Likewise, Headquarters Land Forces, Norway, became inoperative on 31 October 1945. This terminated the combined command in Norway and, after that date, the command of land forces in Norway became purely a British responsibility.(56)

OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

221. Beginnings of the Occupation.

a. On 4 May 1945 the Third U.S. Army was directed to advance into Czechoslovakia to an agreed point of contact with the Soviet forces. By 8 May this agreed point of contact had been reached by the United States forces, which occupied a line beyond the cities of Budejovice,

Pilsen, and Karlsbad.(57) Until 17 June 1945, the part of Czechoslovakia occupied by United States forces was under the tactical control of the V Corps of the Third Army, commanded by Maj. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner. On 17 June 1945 the command of all V Corps troops and units still occupying Czechoslovakia passed to the XXII Corps under Maj. Gen. Ernest W. Harmon.(58)

b. The mission assigned to Third Army was to put into immediate effect the terms of the surrender and such provisions of Operation ECLIPSE as were applicable to the situation. This involved holding all areas which Third Army troops occupied to prevent any movement of German troops into Germany until they could be disarmed and properly discharged; maintaining the boundary between United States and Soviet forces; and occupation of the part of Czechoslovakia allocated to the United States.

c. After V-E Day, there was little resistance to the enforcement of the surrender. A few incidents were reported of small bands of armed enemy troops operating in the rear lines of the Corps, but these were speedily brought under control. There were no major outbreaks of Werewolf activity, although a number of cases of cutting of telephone lines, occurred. German soldiers and Czech partisans exchanged a few shots, but no large skirmishes were reported. To avoid captivity or internment by the Soviet forces, many German soldiers continued to attempt to pass the United States lines, but these were returned to Soviet control in accordance with agreements.(59)

d. Contact with the Soviet Army in Czechoslovakia was established at three points on 10 May 1945. The 6th Armored Division met elements of the Soviet forces in the vicinity of Karlsbad; the 2d Division contacted an officer from the V Russian Tank Corps at Rokycany; and the 16th Armored Division met elements of the CII Russian Corps at Vesperbury. Further contact was made all along the control line within the next few days.(60)

e. Civil affairs activities were initiated in Czechoslovakia almost immediately upon cessation of hostilities. The liberated Czechs were both anxious and willing to take up the reins of government at the point where they had been snatched away by the Nazis. Military government proper was not established, since the country was liberated and therefore received the same treatment as the liberated territories of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg. Assistance rendered to the Czech Government, therefore, took the form of assistance in the rehabilitation of the country by its own government.

f. The occupation brought numerous problems, chief of which were: elimination of Nazis from the Sudetenland; disbandment of German forces; problems of refugees and displaced persons; evacuation of Sudeten Germans; location of war criminals and high-ranking Nazis; and maintaining the Pilsen Line with the Soviet forces.

222. Recovered Allied Prisoners of War.

On 9 May 1945 Third Army evacuated many Allied ex-prisoners of war, and by the evening of the following day all United States,

British, and French ex-prisoners of war had been moved from the Third Army area. Most United States, British, French, and Netherland prisoners of war had been located in Karlsbad, Brux, and Schuneau. V Corps used a hundred trucks and seventy-five ambulances to evacuate them to Pilsen. From there, United States and British personnel were evacuated by air, train, or truck.(61)

223. Recovered Soviet Nationals.

An exchange point was established at Pilsen, where Allied ex-prisoners of war and displaced persons who were western nationals were exchanged for Soviet citizens.(62) An agreement was reached with the Soviet forces whereby 5,000 of their ex-prisoners of war or displaced persons would be turned over to them daily. The Chief of Staff, with several staff members, attended a conference with the Chief of Staff of the Fourth Soviet Guards Army and arranged details of the mutual transfer of personnel, both military and civilian.(63) Soviet patients were returned to Soviet-controlled territory by United States ambulances, and during the period 2 to 28 June 1945 a total of 1,117 Soviet military personnel were evacuated in this manner. All relations with the Soviet forces on these arrangements were cordial.(64)

224. Displaced Persons.

The Third Army in Czechoslovakia was entrusted with the responsibility for displaced persons located within their sector and

those passing through it. Ordinarily, most trains carrying Polish displaced persons being repatriated to Poland were routed through Czechoslovakia. In August 1945 an investigation by the XXII Corps of the Third Army revealed that some displaced persons and prisoners of war were not receiving a sufficient amount of calories to meet the standards set by higher headquarters. Immediate action corrected this situation and large stores of captured enemy food stocks were built up, from which these individuals were fed. During the period 1 to 6 October 1945, the Czech Government assumed control of all displaced-persons camps except one, which the XXII Corps continued to maintain as a transient camp. XXII Corps continued to inspect all camps, however, to insure their proper maintenance. During October and November 1945, 201 Poles, 133 Yugoslavs, 158 Hungarians, 193 Rumanians, 5,892 Germans, 1,590 Austrians, and enough displaced persons of other nationalities to reach of total of 8,923 were processed. On 15 November 1945 the transient camp operated by XXII Corps was closed.(65)

225. War Criminals.

Both Theater Headquarters and Czech officials were eager to screen out from the 75,000 German prisoners of war held by the United States forces in Czechoslovakia all members of the Gestapo and other political offenders guilty of Nazi crimes. Counter Intelligence Corps agents carefully checked all German prisoners of war, in accordance with the directives, to determine whether they should be discharged

or held for further investigation. Among those detained were two notorious Nazis, who were captured on 9 May 1945: Hermann Frank, Reich Protector for Bohemia and Moravia, and Konrad Henlein, Nazi Party leader for the Sudetenland. Henlein later committed suicide to avoid trial.(66)

226. German Prisoners of War.

German prisoners of war in the established camps throughout the area, numbering about 70,000 men, were discharged so rapidly that by the end of July there remained but some 35,000. Under hospitalization in the area were some 16,000 German prisoners of war and 1,600 German civilians. The hospitals were staffed by German military personnel under the control of U.S. Medical Department supervisory teams.(67)

227. Expulsion of Germans from the Sudetenland.

a. By far the most serious problem faced by the occupying troops was that of the German-speaking population of the Sudetenland. This area, composing the northern, western, and southern borders of Czechoslovakia, had been included within the borders of the Republic since its formation in 1918. Since the people of this area had been used as a pawn by the Nazis in their systematic destruction of the Czech state in 1938 and 1939, it was not unnatural that the Czechs, on regaining their independence in 1945, should desire to expel these people from Czechoslovakia in order to safeguard themselves against any future repetition. While this was primarily a Czech problem rather than one affecting the United States troops, it nevertheless

presented a problem, since the troops, unacquainted with the background of the matter, tended to consider the manner of expulsion unduly harsh. There was also the additional problem of border control, since the Sudeten Germans were nearly always expelled into the United States Zone of Germany.(68) While the expulsion of Sudeten Germans was temporarily suspended in the summer of 1945, pending a study by the Allied Control Council to determine how many German expellees from liberated nations each national Zone could absorb, illegal crossings continued, and military units reported that only about one-tenth of the persons attempting to enter Germany illegally could be restrained.(69) The bulk of official expulsions occurred after United States troops had left Czechoslovakia at the end of November 1945; nevertheless, United States troops had made their sympathies sufficiently clear to cause the Sudetenlanders to believe that the former were in Czechoslovakia chiefly to shield the latter from the Czechs.(70)

228. Relations between Czechs and Americans.

a. With the exception noted above, an excellent understanding existed between Czechs and United States personnel, and continued efforts were made on both sides to maintain friendly relations. American trucks and gasoline were allocated to Czech agriculture in the summer of 1945; a heavy equipment school was established in Pilsen to teach United States forces and Czech civilian engineers the use and maintenance of heavy earth-working equipment, which had been supplies to the Czechs to assist in rehabilitation. The sending of United Nations

Relief and Rehabilitation Administration supplies to Czechoslovakia was largely an American responsibility.(71)

b. Close contact and friendly relations were maintained with the Czech press. A continuous flow of information as to the activities of the United States forces in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere was given to representatives of the Czech press, and full coverage of all news events was obtained by close cooperation. Press representatives were given identification badges to permit them ready access to all events.(72)

c. Counterintelligence personnel maintained close relations with the Czech police and cooperated with them in uncovering and apprehending Axis war criminals and other personalities of counter-intelligence interest. Many such persons were turned over to the Czech authorities for trial by them, including Monseigneur Tiso, the puppet president of Slovakia during the German occupation.(73)

d. The Czechs themselves did much to maintain the good relations between the two nations. An "American Institute" was established with a main office in Prague and branches in Marienbad and Pilsen. Its program, in addition to promoting better Czech-American understanding, was to bring together Czechs who had studies in the United States and to assist Americans interested in professional, social, and cultural activities.(74)

229. Relations with the Soviet Forces.

a. While the United States forces occupied the part of Czechoslovakia west of the Budejovice, Pilsen, and Karlsbad line, and including those three towns, the Soviet forces occupied the part of Czechoslovakia lying east of that line. Relations between the United States and Soviet forces were friendly. Russian-speaking personnel in the XXII Corps were insufficient, however, to maintain liaison with the Soviet forces and to serve as interpreters. Consequently, a request was made to the G-2 Section of the Third Army for two Russian Military Interpreter Teams. These were obtained, each consisting of two officers and four enlisted men. A liaison station was established at Rokycany, a border point between the United States and Soviet zones of occupation and on the main highway between Pilsen and Prague, and staffed with one officer and three men. Its mission was to facilitate crossings of the control line and to maintain liaison with Soviet forces at this point. The remaining members of the two teams were retained at the Headquarters of the XXII Corps, where they could act as Russian interpreters, translators, and couriers.(75)

b. For an effective control of the movement of personnel in the Corps area or crossing the Soviet-American control line, a visitors' bureau was set up in the headquarters of the XXII Corps, operated under the supervision of the G-2 Section. The bureau was staffed with United States personnel and with Czech civilian interpreters speaking Czech, Russian, German, and English. Among

its functions was the issue of XXII Corps circulation passes for travel within the corps area, and Russian-American control line permits for travel into the Russian zone of Czechoslovakia by U.S. Army personnel on official duty or compassionate leave.

c. The only point of disagreement between United States and Soviet authorities in Czechoslovakia arose in connection with the Soviet policy of "living off the country." The Czech Government had authorized the requisitioning by Soviet forces of local supplies and also supplies located within the United States zone of occupation. The U.S. Army, however, refused to permit requisitioning in their zone by members of the Soviet Army.(77)

230. Withdrawal of United States Troops from Czechoslovakia.

a. As early as June 1945 the question of withdrawal of United States troops was discussed. When the State Department raised the point, it was reported that President Benes, though desirous that both United States and Soviet forces leave the country, asked that United States forces remain for the present and that their eventual withdrawal be synchronized with that of the Soviet forces.(78) In the middle of July 1945, the Czech Government made a formal request that United States troops be withdrawn, simultaneously with Soviet troops.(79) Toward the middle of September, however, it was noted that Soviet withdrawal from Czechoslovakia proceeded slowly, if at all, and Czech officials began to express considerable concern.(80) At this time President Benes informally requested the United States

to draw up a withdrawal plan and request the Soviet Union to provide a similar plan. The President suggested that, if the Soviet authorities refused, the United States should give the widest publicity to the refusal.(81)

b. In early October 1945 plans for the withdrawal of troops were formulated. One corps with two divisions was to remain in Czechoslovakia until 15 November 1945. If complete withdrawal of United States troops by that date proved impossible, the occupational troop basis of the European Theater would have to be increased.(82) Later statements of Army officials suggested that the United States forces would leave as soon as the haphazard evacuation of Sudeten Germans could be changed into an orderly evacuation, regardless of Soviet plans for evacuation.(83) The State Department finally requested the War Department to postpone the date for the United States withdrawal to 1 December 1945, and the War Department agreed to this.(84)

c. Orders were issued for the initiation of the evacuation on 20 November 1945 and its completion by 1 December 1945. On 13 November all troops attached or assigned to the XIII Corps had been alerted to the fact that all United States troops would clear Czechoslovakia by midnight on 30 November 1945 and that all United States supplies and installations would be evacuated from Czechoslovakia. The move was carried out on schedule, and by 1 December 1945 all United States troops had left Czechoslovakia.(85)

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1. See pars 14-23.
2. Ibid.
3. Seventh Army, Report of Operations 1-31 May 1945, G-2 History.
4. Stars and Stripes, 9 May 45.
5. Ibid., 8 May 45.
6. Ibid., 10 May 45.
7. PM, 13 May 45.
8. SHAEF Press Releases Nos 1455, 1456, 1457, 10 May 45; and Nos 1458, 1459, 1460, 1461, 11 May 45.
9. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 9/10 May 45.
10. SHAEF, G-3 Monthly War Diary, May 45, file GCT 314.81-1 Exec.
11. Stars and Stripes, 14 May 45, Reuter from Allied Mediterranean Headquarters, 11 May 45.
12. Baltimore Sun, AP, Oslo, 20 May 45.
13. Newsweek, 25 Jun 45.
14. Stars and Stripes, 6 Jun 45.
15. Ibid., 5 Jun 45; Chicago Sun, 28 May 45; Letter of Instruction No 23, Hq, 12th Army Group to Armies.
16. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
17. Third Army, Report of Operations, 9 May-30 Sep 45.
18. Ninth Army, Report of Operations, 1 May-15 Jun 45.
19. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
20. SHAEF, G-3 Monthly War Diary, May 45, file GCT 314.81-1 Exec.

21. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 13/14 May 45; SHAEF Press Release No 1513, 17 May 45.
22. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
23. G-3 Battle Studies, Summary of Operations 12th Army Group; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
24. Stars and Stripes, 9 May 45, AP, London, 8 May; SHAEF Press Release, Naval Terms of Surrender, May 45.
25. SHAEF Press Release No 1496, 15 May 45.
26. SHAEF, G-2 Weekly Intelligence Summary, 6 May 45.
27. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 10/11 May 45.
28. Ibid, Op 11/12 May 45.
29. SHAEF Press Release No 1496, 15 May 45.
30. Stars and Stripes, 18 May 45.
31. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 18/19 May 45.
32. Stars and Stripes, 17 May 45.
33. Ibid, 7 Jun 45, UP, Lisbon, Portugal, 6 Jun.
34. SHAEF, G-3 War Room Daily Summary, Op 3/4 Jun 45.
35. Stars and Stripes, 27 May 45, Reuter, 26 May.
36. Ibid, 8 May 45.
37. Ibid, 10 May 45; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
38. Stars and Stripes, 9 May 45.
39. G-3 Battle Studies, Third Army Operations in Bavaria; Cable CX-31966, 6 May 45, 12th Army Group to Third and Ninth Armies, sgd Bradley; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45; SHAEF, G-3 Monthly War Diary, May 45, file GCT 314.81-1 Exec.
40. G-3 Battle Studies, Third Army Operations in Bavaria; Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.

41. Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
42. Stars and Stripes, 15 May 45.
43. Third Army, G-3 Historical Report, 9-31 May 45.
44. Third Army and Eastern Military District, Report of Operations, 9 May-30 Sep 45.
45. For more detailed information, see monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46, chap III.
46. Cable S-96715, 6 Jul 45, SHAEF Main sgd Tedder to 12th Army Group, AGWAR, AERHQ, 15th Army Group, COM Z.
47. Third Army, Information Bulletin, "Intelligence Review," 8 May 45 (21 Army Group); Ninth Army, G-2 Periodic Report, May 45, annex No 3, No 240 dated 2 May 45; Weekly Intelligence Report, Naval Intelligence Division, Naval Staff Admiralty, HM Navy, No 270 dated 11 May 45.
48. SHAEF Press Releases, 2 May 45.
49. SHAEF Press Releases, 1-10 May 45.
50. Cable FWD-20714, 6 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to 30 Military Mission, Moscow.
51. Cable FWD-20904, 7 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to EXFOR Main.
52. Cable FWD-21068, 9 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to EXFOR TAC.
53. Ltr.Orders, SHAEF, G-3 Div (Fwd), 13 May 45, file GCT 387-8 Ops (C).
54. Cable FWD-21085, 9 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to EXFOR.
55. Cable MX-24345, 17 May 45, Military Mission, Moscow, sgd Archer to SHAEF Fwd to Eisenhower, AGWAR for CCS and AMSSC for British Chiefs of Staff.
56. Ltr Orders, SHAEF, 11 May 45, file GCT-7 Ops (C), to General Rooks.
57. Cable FWD-21082, 9 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower, to 30. Military Mission, Moscow.
58. Cable 2, 10 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to OKW.

59. Ltr, SHAEF, G-3 Div (Fwd), 13 May 45, file GCT 387-8 Ops C, to General of Infantry Fangehr, OKW Liaison Detachment.
60. Cable FWD-21456, 14 May 45, SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Control Party (OKW) for Rooks.
61. Cable FWD-21475, 14 May 45, SHAEF Fwd, sgd SCAEF to SHAEF Control Party OKW for Rooks.
62. Cable FWD-21947, 20 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to 6th, 12th and 21st Army Groups; SHAEF Control Party OKW; and ANCXF Main.
63. Cable FWD-22091, 21 May 45, SHAEF sgd SCAEF to 12th and 6th Army Groups; Cable FWD-22222, 23 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to SHAEF Control Party OKW.
64. Ltr, SHAEF G-3 Div, 17 May 45, file GCT 388-3-1/GPS; Cable FWD-22322, 24 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd SCAEF to SHAEF Control Party OKW.
65. Admiral Dönitz and most members of his staff were members of several arrest categories determined upon prior to the occupation of Germany. For instance, Joint Chief of Staff Directive No 1023/6 provided that all members of the Reichskabinet, all members of the High Command, including Army, Navy, and Air Force, all members of the General Staff Corps, all high officers of the Nazi Party, all members of paramilitary organizations, and all members of the German Intelligence Service should be automatically arrested when apprehended. Most members of the Dönitz "government" fell into several of these categories.
66. Cable FWD-21846, 18 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR to CCS.
67. Cable FWD-21899, 19 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR to CCS.
68. Ltr, SHAEF, G-3 Div (Fwd), 22 May 45, file GCT 322.01-2/GPs.
69. Time, 4 Jun 45.
70. Cable S-91271, 17 Jun 45, SHAEF Main sgd Eisenhower to Ministerial Control Party OKW South for Watkins.
71. Plan GOLDCUP, 4 Feb 45.

72. Cable FWD-21531, 15 May 45, SHAEF Main to ANCXF.
73. Cable FWD-21531, 15 May 45, SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Main, ANCXF;
Cable FWD-21758, 17 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to major commands.
74. Cable 67, 26 May 45, SHAEF Control Party OKW for Rocks to SHAEF Fwd for Bull.
75. Cable FWD-22568, 28 May 45, SHAEF Fwd sgd Eisenhower to Ministerial Control Party OKW (Flensburg) for Watkins, Ministerial Control Party OKW (Munich) for Waring.
76. SHAEF, G-4 Div Report, 2 Jun 45.
77. Cable FWD-23664, 5 Jun 45, SHAEF sgd Eisenhower to 12th Army Group Main for G-1 for Robertson, US GCC, Höchst, SHAEF Main for British CC Component SHAEF Special Echelon.
78. Ltr, SHAEF Fwd, 13 Jun 45, file AG 370-7 GCT-AGM, subj: "Ministerial Collecting Center," to CG, 12th Army Group.
79. SGS Files No)91.1 Germany, 31 Jan 45-16 Nov 45, "Disposition of German Ministries and Agencies;" Ltr of Instructions Sent to Director of Intelligence, USGCC by Byran L. Milburn, Brig Gen, GSC.
80. "Minutes of Meeting Concerning Troop Requirements for Ministerial Collecting Center," G-3 Div, Hq USFET (Main), 15 Oct 45.
81. Ltr, USFET G-3 Div, 19 Oct 45, file GCT.350.05/OPS, subj: "Ministerial Collecting Center (Kassel)"; Cable S-28810, 22 Oct 45, USFET sgd Eisenhower to OMGUS; Cable S-33552, 2 Dec 45, USFET sgd McNarney to OMGUS, Hq Berlin District, CG 7th Army.
82. Ltr, OMGUS, 5 Jan 46, file AG 322-132 (DI), subj: "Movement of Ministerial Collecting Center to Berlin."
83. "Account of the Activities of the Ministerial Collecting Center," by Major John F. Reineck of the 7771st Document Center.
84. A list of enactments prior to 14 July 45 is to be found in USFET, OMGUS, MG Regulations, title 23, "MG Legislation," part II.
85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.
87. Stars and Stripes, 29 May 45.
88. Third Army, EMD, Report of Operations, 9-31 May 45.
89. USFET, OMGUS, History of OMGUS (USGPCC, May-Nov 45.
90. See par 101, below.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

1. Memo, SHAEF, 11 Jul 44, file SHAEF 21234/0 & E, or SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Reorganization in the ETO."
2. Memo, SHAEF, 21 Jul 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, to the C/S, sgd DDE.
3. GO 66, ETOUSA, 17 Apr 45.
4. Memo, SHAEF, 22 Jul 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Administration of American Theater."
5. Memo, SHAEF, 11 Jul 45, file SGS 322, subj: "Reorganization in the ETO."
6. Staff Study, G-4 SHAEF, 18 Sep 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Organization and Command of US Forces" to C/S, sgd R.W. Crawford, Maj Gen, USA, ACoS, G-4.
7. Ltr, ETOUSA, 5 May 45, file 322.011 OpCS, subj: "Duties and Responsibilities of the Deputy Theater Commander."
8. See par 3d, above.
9. Memo, SHAEF, 16 Jul 44, file SGS 322 ETOUSA, subj: "Draft General Order of the Organization of the ETO," sgd WBS.
10. Ltr, SHAEF, 11 Jul 44, file SGS 322, ETOUSA, subj: "Responsibilities and Functions of CG, COM Z."
11. GO 118, COM Z, 29 Jun 45, sec I.
12. The breakdown into corps and divisions as given in this section is taken from the Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff for period 1 Jul 43 to 30 Jun 45.
13. Cable 4168, 13 May 45, London sgd Winant to State Dep.
14. Cable W-23985, 28 Jun 45, AGWAR from WARCOS to ETOUSA Main.
15. Memo, US Pol Adv to Lt Gen W.B. Smith, C/S, SHAEF and Lt Gen Lucius D. Clay, Dep Mil Gov, Germany, 11 Jul 45.

16. EAC, 26 Jul 45, Minutes of Meeting held at Lancaster House, London, SW1, on 26 Jul 45 at 1900 h.
17. Cable WX-24456, 29 Jun 45, AGWAR from CCS to SHAEF Main to Eisenhower, AFHQ to Alexander, US Mil Mission to Deane and Gammell.
18. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 1-31 Jul 45.
19. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
20. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 401, 11 Jul 45.
21. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 399, 9 Jul 45.
22. See monograph on "Supply, Procurement, Storage, and Issue," Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46.
23. Cable FWD-2445, 10 Jun 45, SHAEF FWD sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for CCS.
24. Fifteenth Army, Report of Operations, 1-31 Jul 45.
25. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
26. USFA, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45.
27. Ibid.
28. See monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap III.
29. Cable WX-24456, 29 Jun 45, AGWAR from CCS to SHAEF Main to Eisenhower, AFHQ to Alexander.
30. Cable GO 159A, 30 Jun 45, EXFOR Main to VIII Corps Dist, XXX Corps Dist, TAC 7 Armd Div.
31. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
32. USFA, Report of Operations, II Corps, 8 May-30 Sep 45.

33. Cable S-12796, 17 Jul 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to AGWAR for JCS.
34. See monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap III.
35. Cable S-95715, 6 Jul 45, SHAEF Main sgd Tedder to 12th Army Gp, AGWAR, AFHQ, 15th Army Gp, COM Z.
36. See monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap III.
37. Cable WX-24456, 29 Jun 45, AGWAR from CCS to SHAEF Main for Eisenhower, AFHQ for Alexander.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter III

1. Crimea Conference Communique, 3-11 Feb 45, sgd Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, J.V. Stalin.
2. See par 155, below.
3. See pars 53-57, below.
4. WD, 30 Jun 44, Spec Planning Div, Report on the Status of Demobilization and Postwar Planning.
5. EAC Report, 14 Nov 44.
6. Ltr, SHAEF, 17 Apr 45, file GGT/388-3/US, subj: "US Theater Organization."
7. Memo, SHAEF, 8 Jun 45, subj: "US Theater Organization General Aspects of the Problem."
8. Cable FWD-22471, 28 May 45, SHAEF from Eisenhower to AGWAR for Marshall.
9. Cable E-58393, 17 Jun 45, ETOUSA Main sgd Devers to ETOUSA FWD.
10. GO 130, ETOUSA, 20 Jun 45, secs II, III, IV.
11. Cable FWD-22132, 22 May 45, SHAEF to ETOUSA.
12. JCS 1400, 28 Jun 45, subj: "Command Directive for Germany and Austria."
13. GO 154, USFET, 14 Jul 45, sec I.
14. Staff Study, 12th Army Gp, 4 Jan 45, file 323.33 (G-3), subj: "Territorial Organization of US Zone of Occupation, Germany."
15. Memo, SHAEF, G-3 Div, 26 Jan 45, file GGT-387.46/PHP, subj: "Territorial Organization of the United States Zone of Occupation, Germany," approved, 27 Jan 45, by W.B. Smith, CofS.
16. Cable EX-51512, 30 May 45, COM Z to SHAEF FWD.
17. Cable CA-11685, 25 May 45, CONAD to COM Z.

18. COM Z, 28 Mar 45, Planning Directive Series K, Operation ECLIPSE.
19. Cable E-11668, 22 Feb 45, ETOUSA from Lord to SHAEF for Crawford.
20. Staff Study, SHAEF, 23 Feb 45, file 231/GDP-1, subj: "Analysis of COM Z Nonconcurrency."
21. Ltr, COM Z, 14 Jul 45, file AG 322 OpGD, subj: "COM Z Service Commands."
22. GO 159, USFET, 17 Jul 45.
23. Cable S-13239, 20 Jul 45, USFET to COM Z.
24. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 345, 16 May 45.
25. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 405, 14 Jul 45.
26. GO 168, USFET, 21 Jun 45, sec I.
27. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 416, 26 Jul 45.
28. GO 306, USFET, 6 Nov 45, sec II.
29. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 344, 15 May 45.
30. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 352, 23 May 45.
31. USFET, AG Oprs Card Files, Frankfurt, Germany.
32. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 375, 15 Jun 45.
33. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 398, 7 Jul 45.
34. USFET, AG Oprs Card Files, Frankfurt, Germany.
35. Cable EX-52150, 1 Jun 45, COM Z to DBS.
36. Chanor Base Sec, Report of Operations, 8 May-20 Feb 46.
37. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
38. Ibid.
39. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."

40. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
41. Ibid. Throughout this section, figures for actual shipments are taken from the Theater Headquarters, G-3 Division, Redeployment Branch, "Monthly Redeployment Progress" for October 1945, while the forecasts for June shipments are taken from the report by G-3 Division for June. Actual figures for shipments for May and June are taken from the October report rather than the June report because of the fact that, during early redeployment, statistics were difficult to keep and thus subject to inaccuracies. In order to obtain an accurate set of figures, statistics were worked over in September of 1945. These were published in the October "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
42. USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
43. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
44. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
45. Ibid.
46. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Redeployment Progress."
47. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
48. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
49. USFET, Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr 45-28 Feb 46, annex "B".
50. USFET, G-3 Div, 30 Jun 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
51. USFET, MS, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
52. USFET, G-3 Div, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
53. USFET, G-3 Div, 31 Jul 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
54. USFET, G-3 Div, Redeployment Branch, 31 Oct 45, "Monthly Progress Report."
55. Ibid.

56. USFET, G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
57. See chap I, pars 14-23, above.
58. "12th Army Group Plan for Operation ECLIPSE," 4 May 45, annex 7.
59. Ltr, Hq, ETOUSA, 8 Apr 45, file AG 383.6 OpGA, subj: "Liberated Citizens of the Soviet Union."
60. COM Z, Progress Report, May 1945, sec I.
61. ECLIPSE Memo 17, 16 Apr 45, par 20, sec F.
62. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 15 May 45, Nos 1 & 2.
63. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 18 May 45, No 3.
64. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 5 Jun 45, No 4.
65. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 30 Jun 45, No 5.
66. SHAEF Disbandment Directive, 6 Jul 45, No 6.
67. Ltrs, ETOUSA, 25 Oct and 11 Nov 44, file AG 383.6 OpGA, subj: "Repatriation, Recovery, and Rehabilitation of American Prisoners of War in Europe."
68. SHAEF, 15 Mar 45, "Strength of POW Camps in Germany as known to PWX-G-1 Div."
69. SOP 58, ETOUSA, 3 Apr 45, subj: "Reception, Processing, Maintenance, and Disposition of Recovered Allied Military Personnel."
70. TSFET, Staff Conference Report, 7 Sep 45.
71. Cable WX-70557, 20 Apr 45, AGWAR to SHAEF et al.
72. SHAEF, 3 Jun 44, file AG 383.7-ICE-AGM, Outline Plan for Refugees and DP's.
73. SHAEF Administrative Memo 39, 25 Nov 44, appendix "C", subj: "Employment of UNRRA Personnel with Military Forces."
74. Handbook for Military Government in Germany Prior to Defeat or Surrender, Dec 44, part III.

75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Ltr, SHAEF, 8 Jul 45, file AG 383.7-1 GE-AGK, subj: "Combined DP Executive."
78. Ltr, SHAEF, 18 Dec 44, file AG 383.7-1 GEAGK, subj: "Responsibility for Assembly Centers for DP's and Refugees."
79. For further information, see monograph, "Displaced Persons, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-46," chap I.
80. USFET, General Board, Study No 35, undated, DP's, Refugees, and RAMP's; see also DP Rpt No 40, appendix "A".
81. Ibid.
82. The source for table I is OMGUS, DP Div, Status of DP's (US-British and French Zones), 31 Jul 45. The figures for DP's outside camps are estimates carried forward from 24 June, after which date no estimates are available for Eastern or Western Military Districts.
83. General Board Study No 86, p 9.
84. General Board Study No 86, p 9.
85. Cable WX-18961, 19 Jun 45, AGWAR to SHAEF.
86. Judge Advocate File: War Crimes Trials and Procedure after Trial, item 13.
87. Ltr, USFET, 1 Aug 45, file AG 250.4, subj: "Authority to Appoint Military Commissions."
88. Ltr, USFET, undated, file AG 000.5 WCB-AGO, subj: "Trial of War Crimes Cases."
89. USFET, Theater JA, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45, pp 1-2.
90. Crimea Conference Communique, 3-11 Feb 45, sg'd by Winston S. Churchill, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and J.V. Stalin.
91. New York Times, 13 May 45.
92. Executive Order No 9547, 22 May 45.

93. Cable WX-18961, AGWAR to SMAEF.
94. JCS 1023/10, 8 Jul 45.
95. GO 128, ETOUSA, 17 Jun 45; amended by GO 182, USFET, 7 Aug 45;
GO 312, USFET, 20 Nov 45.
96. GO 312, USFET, 20 Nov 45.
97. GO 128, ETOUSA, 17 Jun 45.
98. GO 144, USFET, 4 Jul 45.
99. GO 289, USFET, 14 Oct 45.
100. Ltr, USFET, 6 Aug 45, file AG 334 GDS-AGO, subj: "Establishment
of the Office of the Army-Navy Liquidation Commission."
101. Stars and Stripes, 13 Jun 45.
102. PRD Release No 15, USFET, 14 Jul 45.
103. Ltr, SHAEF, 22 May 45, to Brig Gen Marion Van Voorst, American
Embassy, sgd J.B. Moore III, Col, Secretary General Staff.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IV

1. For later developments, see also chap VI, pars 152-54, below.
2. Cable W-75375, 5 Aug 44, JCS to SHAEF.
3. GO 80, ETOUSA, 9 Aug 44.
4. Ltr, SHAEF, 17 Feb 45, file 322, subj: "Hqs Command for USGpCC(G)."
5. GO 28, ETOUSA, 5 Mar 45.
6. Cable CC-12381, 20 Mar 45, USGpCC(G) to SHAEF.
7. GO 22, USGpCC(G), 15 May 45.
8. USGpCC(G), Minutes of Meeting of 10 Mar 45.
9. Ltr, ETOUSA, 31 Mar 45, file 322, subj: "Mission of the USGpCC(G)."
10. Ltr, ETOUSA, 26 Apr 45, file GCT.322.01, subj: "The Relationship of the Deputy Military Governor and the US Group Control Council (Germany) to the Theater Staff."
11. See chap I, pars 1-5, above.
12. Berlin Declaration, 5 Jun 45.
13. BD, CG Diary, BD/FAA, 29 Jun 45.
14. TMO No 39, BD/FAA, 30 Jun 45.
15. BD/FAA, C/S Diary, 1 Jul 45.
16. BD/FAA, C/S Diary, 7 Jul 45.
17. Cable W-24669, 30 Jun 45, ACHEAR from WARCOS to COMGENETO; see also chap II, pars 45-51.
18. ACC (Germany), Minutes of Meeting, 30 Jul 45.
19. EAC, Minutes of Meeting, 14 Nov 44.

20. History of OMGUS (USGpCC(G)), chap III.
21. History OMGUS (USGpCC(G)), chap II.
22. Moscow Declaration on Austria, 1 Nov 43.
23. Cable F-46412, 16 May 44, AFHQ to AGWAR.
24. Cable WX-20896, 27 Jan 45, MTOUSA to SHAEF.
25. USFA, USACA Sec, Military Government, Austria, 30 Sep 46.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Cable FX-17725, 5 Jul 45, AFHQ to 15th Army Gp.
29. 12th Army Gp, G-3 Report No 400, 10 Jul 45.
30. GO 1, USFA, 5 Jul 45.
31. JCS, 28 Jun 45, Command Directive for Germany and Austria.
32. Cable FX-17725, 5 Jul 45, AFHQ to 15th Army Gp.
33. Cable O-727, 14 Jul 45, 85th GpAAF to subordinate units.
34. GO 154, USFET, 14 Jul 45.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter V

1. Ltr, Hq ETCUSA, 16 Jun 45, to US Rcn Party to Berlin.
2. Hq Berlin District (Masterwork), Strength Returns, 16 Jul 45.
3. USHq Berlin District & Hq First Airborne Army, History and Report of Operations, 8 May-31 Dec 45, pt I.
4. Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordinating Committee, Allied Control Authority, Germany, vol 1, 1945, p 23.
5. Ibid, p 26.
6. Ibid, p 20.
7. Ibid, p 20.
8. Ibid, p 75.
9. Ibid, p 75.
10. GO 168, USFET, 21 Jul 45, sec I.
11. GO 177, USFET, 1 Aug 45, sec I.
12. USFET, G-3 Rpt No 31, 25 Aug 45.
13. See also par 147.
14. GO 262, TSFET, 21 Sep 45.
15. GO 361, TSFET, 12 Dec 45, sec I, II, IV.
16. Bremen Port Command, Report of Operations, 9 Dec 45.
17. GO 380, TSFET, 29 Dec 45.
18. GO 317, USFET, 26 Nov 45.
19. GO 115, USSTAF, 16 Aug 45.
20. See also Chapter III, secs III, IV.

21. Ltr, USFET, 21 Jul 45, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "US Theater Organization."
22. GO 167, TSFET, 21 Jul 45.
23. GO 355, USFET, 29 Dec 45.
24. TSFET, 1 Aug 45, Planning Directive Series L, No 1.
25. TSFET, Progress Report, Aug 45.
26. See pars 29-40.
27. GO 179, USFET, 2 Aug 45; see also GO 199, TSFET, 16 Aug 45.
28. GO 244, USFET, 15 Sep 45.
29. GO 259, USFET, 22 Sep 45.
30. For specific examples see pars 97-100 and 102-104.
31. USFET, OMGUS, Proclamation No 2, 19 Sep 45.
32. Ltr, USFET, 5 Jul 45, file AG 014.1-1 (Germany), GE, subj: "Assumption of Certain Military Government Responsibilities."
33. GO 283, USFET, 8 Oct 45, sec II, III.
34. See also chap IV, pars 91-96.
35. GO 283, USFET, 8 Oct 45, sec I.
36. Staff memo, USFET, OMGUS, (USZ), 17 Oct 45, file GE Plans 322 (MG), subj: "Separation of Military Government Organization from Army Tactical Field Forces and Administrative and Supply Service."
37. GO 331, USFET, 11 Dec 45, sec II.
38. Third Army, G-5 Sec, Quarterly Report of Operations, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
39. For details on the early occupation of Austria, see pars 97-100.
40. USFA, USACA Sec, MG Austria, 30 Sep 46.
41. Map, Austria, 1:00,000, Bezirk Boundaries - Vienna.

42. USFA, MG AUSTRIA, Rpt of the US Commissioner No 1, Nov 45.
43. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Sep 45.
44. Ibid.
45. Stars and Stripes, 28 Jan 46.
46. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Oct 45.
47. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Nov 45.
48. Monthly Report of Military Government, US Zone, 20 Dec 45.
49. Monthly Report of the Military Governor, US Zone, 20 Aug 45.
50. Monthly Report of the Military Governor, US Zone, 20 Sep 45.
51. USFET, PRD Release No 352, 15 Sep 45.
52. For further particulars see monograph "Fraternization," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
53. See also monograph, "The Care and Repatriation of Displaced Persons," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
54. Hq, COM Z, ETOUSA, Progress Report, June 45.
55. Cable MG-1718, 20 Aug 45, EXFOR to I Corps et al.
56. Cable S-18908, 22 Aug 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to TSFET Rear for USFET Mission France.
57. War Crimes Committee, Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 9 Aug 45.
58. Memo, Chief International Law Section, TJA, for Theater JA, 16 Oct 45, subj: "Organization for Proceedings Against Axis Criminals and Certain Other Offenders," par 11.
59. Ltr, USFET, 20 Sep 45, subj: "Identification and Apprehension of Persons Suspected of War Crimes or Other Offenses, and Trial of Certain Offenders."
60. Memo, Chief International Law Section, TJA for Theater JA, 16 Oct 45, subj: "Organization for Proceedings Against Axis Criminals and Certain Other Offenders," par 10.

61. WD Cable WCL-38715, 18 Jan 46, AGWAR to USFET.
62. Control Council, Law No 10, 20 Dec 45, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes against Peace, and Crimes against Humanity.
63. Baltimore Sun, 30 Aug 45.
64. USFET, G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No 11, 27 Sep 45.
65. USFET, PRD Release No 438, 27 Sep 45.
66. USFET PRD Release No 707, 13 Nov 45.
67. Cable, COM Z, ETOUSA, Progress Report, June 45.
68. Ibid.
69. Cable, USFET, S-29064, Eisenhower to EMD, WAD, BD, USFA, USAFE, TSF (Rear), COMNAVFORGER, 24 Oct 45.
70. Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj: "Police-Type Method of Occupation;" and cable, USFET, S-30332, Eisenhower to AGWAR for WARCOS, 1 Nov 45.
71. Cable, USFET, S-30332, Eisenhower to AGWAR for WARCOS, 1 Nov 45.
72. Provost Marshal, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45.
73. Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj: "Police-Type Method of Occupation."
74. Cable Hq USFET, S-32630, Patton to AGWAR for WARCOS, 24 Nov 45; Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj: "Police-Type Method of Occupation."
75. Ltr, Hq USFET, 22 Dec 45, file AG 371.2-4 GCT-AGE, subj: "Police-Type Method of Occupation."

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VI

1. Unless other references are given, the source for any statement in this section is the monograph "Redeployment, Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46", chap III and IV. For further information see this monograph.
2. USFET G-3, Redeployment Branch, Monthly Progress Reports, 31 Jul and 31 Oct 45.
3. USFET G-3, Redeployment Branch, Monthly Progress Reports; USFET Redeployment Coordinating Group, Report of Operations, 17 Apr to 28 Feb 46.
4. Cable W-47214, 10 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET and Theater concerned; cable WX-47209, 10 Aug 45, AGWAR from Marshall to USFET Main personal for Eisenhower and LTCUSA personal for McNarney.
5. Cable 1410, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to Theaters concerned; cable WX-49784, 15 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
6. USFET G-3, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Cable EX-80003, 18 Aug 45, USFET to major commands. The point system was the result of investigation by the War Department into soldier opinion on the subject of priority for release. Four types of credit were recognized: service credit, based on the total months of Army service since 16 September 1940; overseas credit, based on the number of months of overseas service; combat credit, based on the first and each additional award of a decoration; and parenthood credit, which allowed for each dependent child under eighteen years up to the limit of three children. For each of these credits the soldier was awarded a certain number of points, the total of which made up his adjusted service rating score, which in turn decided his eligibility for release. The exceptions to this were certain types of irreplaceable specialists whom the Army was unable, on grounds of military need, to release.
10. Cable W-49576, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET Main, personal to Eisenhower.

11. Cable W-49544, 14 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET, personal to Eisenhower; cable S-17802, 15 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
12. Cable EX-81337, 23 Aug 45, TSFET to Base Sections and Bremen Port Command.
13. USFET, Interim Directive for Redeployment and Readjustment Following the Defeat of Japan, 22 Aug 45.
14. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
15. Cable EX-80003, 18 Aug 45, USFET to major commands.
16. Cable S-20076, 28 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
17. USFET G-3, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
18. Ibid.
19. Cable S-20075, 28 Aug 45, USFET to AGWAR.
20. Cable EX-57182, 30 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
21. USFET G-3, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
22. Cable WX-57162, 30 Aug 45, AGWAR to USFET.
23. USFET G-3 Div, Redeployment Br, Monthly Progress Report, 31 Oct 45.
24. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
25. Telephone Conference, Washington (Maj Gen Craig and Maj Gen Henry) with Frankfurt (Brig Gen Eyster), 2 Sep 45.
26. Special TWX Conference, AGWAR and USFET, TT-4059, 3 Sep 45, subj: "Redeployment."
27. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
28. Ibid.
29. Cable WX-60240, 6 Sep 45, AGWAR to Theaters, Commands, and WD Staff Divisions.
30. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.
33. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 30 Sep 45.
34. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Oct 45.
38. Ibid.
39. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
40. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 30 Nov 45.
41. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
42. Ibid.
43. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Dec 45.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Cable WAR-81908, 9 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET Main personal to Eisenhower.
47. Ibid.
48. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Dec 45.
49. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
50. USFET SGS, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.

53. G-3 Report No 89, USFET, 22 Oct 45, par 3a.
54. USFET SGS, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
55. G-3 Report No 130, USFET, 2 Dec 45, par 3a.
56. Cable, S-25879, USFET to AGWAR and major commands.
57. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET No 7, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
58. Bremen Port Command, Report of Operations, Oct to Dec 45.
59. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
60. Cable W-75415, 1 May 45, AGWAR from Hull to ETOUSA personal for Eisenhower.
61. USFET SGS, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
62. Cable S-14945, 1 Aug 45, USFET to major commands.
63. Memo, USFET, ACofS, G-3, 8 Oct 45 for CofS.
64. USFET G-1, Report of Operations, 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.
65. AG Non-T/O Allotment Letters, No 501 A, Jun 45 to Jul 46.
66. IRS USFET, OCQM to AG Mil Pers through G-1, 18 Aug 45; cable S-21115, 1 Sep 45, USFET to AGWAR; cable 74437, 29 Sep 45, ASF sgd Henry C. Wolfe, Brig Gen, USA, Dir Planning Div; Memo, Maj Gen Daniel Noce, Acting CofS, ASF, for Lt Gen John O. H. Lee, CG T-REX.
67. USFET G-1, Report of Operations 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.
68. Ibid.
69. Memo, ACofS, G-3, 6 Dec 45, for CofS.
70. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
71. USFET G-1 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.

72. Cable ETX-4015, 23 Oct 45, USFET to AGWAR.
73. Cable W-80642, 2 Nov 45, AGWAR to USFET.
74. Cable S-34223, 8 Dec 45, USFET to AGWAR.
75. Memo, USFET, 24 Nov 45, for major commands; USFET G-1 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Oct to 31 Dec 45.
76. Memo, USFET OTIG, 23 Jan 46, subj: "Method of Assigning Replacements," for CofS.
77. IRS, USFET, G-1, 13 Feb 46, subj: "IG Report on Assignment of Replacements," for SGS.
78. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report, USFET, No 1, 18 Dec 45, Rpt of the ACoS, G-1.
79. USFET, G-3, Report of Operations, Oct-Dec 45.
80. Ltr, USFET G-3 Div, 29 Nov 45, file GCT 370 JPS, subj: "Estimates on Future Troop Basis, ET," to WD, sgd A. S. Nevins, Brig Gen, GSC A/ACoS, G-3.
81. Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 1, 18 Dec 45, and No 2, 2 Jan 46.
82. Unless other references are given the material in this section is drawn from the monograph "Manpower, Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, pt II. For further information see this monograph.
83. Ltr, USFET, 21 Aug 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
84. Civ Pers Cir 15, USFET, 20 May 46, subj: "Civilian Employment Priority."
85. "G-1 and its Role in the Fight against Nazism in the ETO," USFET G-1 Div, 1945.
86. USFET G-4 Div, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
87. Third US Army, G-2 Sec, Historical Report, Jun 45.
88. Staff Study, USFET G-1 Div to CofS, 15 Sep 45, subj: "Employment of Civilians in the Occupied Zone."

89. Ltr, USFET, 21 Aug 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
90. Ltr, USFET, 22 Sep 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "British Civilian Volunteer Clericals."
91. Ltr, USFET, 15 Sep 45, file AG 230 GAP-AGO, subj: "Employment of Civilians."
92. SOP 29, ETOUSA, 26 May 44, subj: "Procurement, Utilization and Administration of Civilian Labor in Liberated or Occupied Territory"; Staff Memo No 45, USFET, 18 Sep 45, subj: "Staff Responsibilities for Civilian Personnel," appendix 1; ltr, USFET, 8 Sep 45, file AG 322.011 GAP-AGO, subj: "Delegation of Civilian Personnel Authority," appendix 2; ltr, USFET, 3 Oct 45, file AG 322.011 GAP-AGE, subj: "Responsibility for Civilian Personnel Administration."
93. Cable 125, 17 Jul 45, SECSTATE to USFET Main.
94. SOP 49, ETOUSA, 9 May 45, subj: "Employment of PW's."
95. USFET G-4, Notes of G-4 Daily Conference, 15 Mar 46.
96. Ltr, USFET, 23 Oct 45, file AG 322 GCT-AGO, subj: "Policy for Employment of Disarmed Enemy Units and Labor Service Units."
97. Ltr, Hq USAFE, 2 Nov 45, subj: "Luftwaffe Signal Battalion."
98. TSFET PM, Report of Operations, 8 May to 30 Sep 45.
99. TSFET Progress Report, for August and December 45.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VII

1. Cf charts in chaps IV and VIII.
2. GO 1, USFET, 2 Jan 46.
3. GO 26, USFET, 30 Jan 46, II.
4. Memo, TSFET, 19 Nov 45, subj: "Logistical Support of US Occupation of Germany."
5. CBS, Report of Operations, 15 Jan-31 Mar 46.
6. GO 374, TSFET, 26 Dec 45.
7. GO 16, TSFET, 22 Jan 46.
8. Ltr, USFET, 12 Jan 46, file AG 322 GAP-AGO, subj: "Inactivation of GFRG."
9. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference No 3, 8 Jan 46.
10. GO 18, 26 Jan 46, I, III.
11. GC 19, TSFET, 29 Jan 46.
12. GO 66, USFET, 13 Mar 46.
13. GO 24, TSFET, 5 Feb 46.
14. GO 103, USFET, 11 Apr 46.
15. GO 18, USFET, 18 Jan 46, I.
16. GO 63, USFET, 8 Mar 46, I.
17. GO 36, USFET, 11 Feb 46, II.
18. Ibid, I.
19. Stark-Lee Agreement, 31 May 45.
20. The material for this paragraph was furnished by the Naval Liaison Office, Hq EUCOM, June 1947.

21. GO 61, USFET, 7 Mar 46.
22. Ibid.
23. Third Army, G-5 Sec, Historical Report, Sep 45, pt VI.
24. USFET, Troop Assignment No 139, 5 Sep 45.
25. Staff Memo No 72, Seventh Army, 4 Sep 45; for further details see monograph, "Civil Affairs," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
26. GO 337, USFET, 14 Dec 45.
27. Ibid.
28. GO 43, USFET, 19 Feb 46.
29. GO 117, Third Army, 14 Jun 45.
30. GO 61, USFET, 7 Mar 46.
31. Staff Memo 57, USFET, 13 Jun 46.
32. Ltr, USFET, 7 May 46, file AG 371.2, GEC-AGO, subj: "Security Liaison between Army Units and Military Government."
33. Unless other references are given, the source of any information in this section is the monograph "Redeployment," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46. For further information see this monograph.
34. Redeployment Progress Report, USFET G-3 Div, 31 Dec 45.
35. Ibid.
36. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
37. Ibid.
38. Stars and Stripes, 6 Jan 46.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.; also edition of 9 Jan 46; TWX Conference, Washington-Frankfurt, 8 Jan 46.

41. Stars and Stripes, 11 Jan 46.
42. Ibid, 13 Jan 46.
43. USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
44. Cable WCL-3750, 15 Jan 46, AGWAR to USFET; press release No 1045, USFET PRD, 15 Jan 46.
45. Ibid.
46. USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
47. Ibid.
48. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Jan 46.
49. Ibid; also USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46.
50. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 28 Feb 46.
51. USFET G-3 Div, Trps and Redeployment Br, Redeployment Progress Report, 31 Mar 46; USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
52. USFET G-3 Div, Redeployment Progress Report, 30 Apr 46; 31 May 46; 30 Jun 46; USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, No 46.
53. TSFET G-3, Report of Operations, 1 Oct 45-28 Feb 46.
54. Ibid; USFET G-3, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46.
55. USFET G-3 Div, Report on Redeployment, Nov 46; USFET G-3 Div, Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
56. USFET SGS, Report of Operations 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
57. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 3, 8 Jan 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
58. Memo ACofS, G-3, 29 Jan 46, for CofS.
59. Cable W-89263, 25 May 46, AGWAR sgd WARCOS to USFET.

60. Ibid.
61. See par 166, above.
62. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 8, 12 Feb 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
63. Cable, W-90337, 5 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
64. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 14, 26 Mar 46, No 15, 2 Apr 46, and No 18, 26 Apr 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
65. Ibid, No 24, 4 Jun 46.
66. Interview with Col Leslie E. Jacoby, formerly Chief, SerSAC Br, G-1, TSFET; USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 14, 26 Mar 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
67. Ibid, No 20, 7 May 46; cable S-2935, 29 Apr 46, USFET to AGWAR; cable W-89263, 25 May 46, AGWAR to USFET; IRS USFET, G-1 to AG, 27 May 46.
68. Interview with Col. Jacoby, as cited n. 66.
69. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports No 20, 7 May 46 and No 26, 19 Jun 46, Rpts of ACofS, G-1; cable, 20 May 46, USFET to major commands.
70. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 26, 19 Jun 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1.
71. Ltr, USFET, 22 Jun 46, subj: "Negro Manpower" to major commands.
72. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 29, 9 Jul 46, Rpt of ACofS, G-1; cable W-93524, 4 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET; cable WCL-27934, 16 Jul 46, AGWAR to USFET.
73. All information in this paragraph, unless otherwise cited, is from USFET Report of Operations of the Theater Liquidation and Manpower Board, 1 Jan-31 Mar and 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
74. GO 10, USFET, 10 Jan 46, subj: "Establishment of the Liquidation and Manpower Board."
75. Cir 4, USFET, 4 Jan 46, subj: "Establishment of the Liquidation and Manpower Board."

76. Ltr, USFET, 11 Mar 46, file AG 230 GAP-AGPC, subj: "Continental Wage Scale; Civ Pers Cir No 16 (revised), USFET, 28 Jun 46, annex "A" "Continental Wage Scale."
77. Cir 60, USFET, 1 May 46.
78. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports Nos 3 to 30, Jan-Jul 46.
79. Ibid.
80. Memo, USFET AG, 27 May 46, subj: "Employment of Dependents of Military and Civilian Personnel," for Chiefs of Staff and Special Divisions.
81. Civ Pers Cir 15, USFET, 20 May 46, subj: "Civilian Employment Priority."
82. Ltr, USFET, 23 Jun 46, file AG 248 GAP-AGE, subj: "Federal Employee Pay Act of 1946."
83. USFET Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Reports Nos 13 and 35, 19 Mar and 20 Aug 46; USFET G-1 Div, Civ Pers Br, statistical bulletins, April, May and June 46.
84. Cable S-37399, 10 Jun 46, USFET to Seventh US Army.
85. Ltr, Hq USFET, 20 Mar 46, file AG 383.6 GAP-AGO, subj: "Discharge of Prisoners of War for Labor in US Zone."
86. CTPM, Report of Operations, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46, p 13.
87. TSFET, Progress Report, Dec 45, p 111.
88. CTPM, Report of Operations, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46, p 37.
89. USFET Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 26, 19 Jun 46.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter VIII

1. USFET G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summary No 28, for week ending 24 Jan 46.
2. Stars and Stripes, 29 Jan 46.
3. USFET G-2, Weekly Intelligence Summaries Nos 42, 43, for weeks ending 2 and 9 May 46.
4. Christian Science Monitor, 6 Jun 46.
5. Stars and Stripes, 2 Jul 46.
6. NY Herald Tribune, 15 Apr 46.
7. Ltr, USFET, 30 May 46, file AG 353 GCT-AGO, subj: "Initiation of Training Program and Reduction of Ineffectives."
8. Ltr, USFET, 20 May 46, file AG 461 GCT-AGO, subj: "Leadership and Command Pamphlet for Officers."
9. Stars and Stripes, 19 Jan 46.
10. TM #6, Third Army, 7 Mar 46, subj: "Training of US Constabulary."
11. For further particulars, see monograph "The US Constabulary," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap II.
12. For further details, see monograph "Manpower," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
13. Stars and Stripes, 21 Feb 46.
14. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 37, 2 Sep 46.
15. Ltr, USFET, 9 Oct 45, file AG 510 GAP-AGP, subj: "Transportation of Dependents from Overseas."
16. CBS, G-1 Sec, Rpt of Opns, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
17. For further details, see monograph "The Shipment of Alien Dependents to the US," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.

18. Ltr, USFET, 19 Sep 45, subj: "Special Occupational Planning Board."
19. For further details see monograph, "Shipment of Dependents to the ET and Establishment of Military Communities," Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
20. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 7, 5 Feb 46.
21. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 25, 11 Jun 46.
22. USFET, Theater Commander's Weekly Staff Conference Report No 28, 2 Jul 46.
23. Stars and Stripes, 26 May 45.
24. USFET, Rpt of AES, 8 May-30 Sep 45.
25. USFET, Rpt of AES, 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.
26. USFET, Rpt of AES, 1 Jan-31 Mar 46, 1 Apr-30 Jun 46.
27. USFET, Summary of Special Theater Activities for the Under Secretary of War, 25 May 46.
28. Ltr, USFET, 6 Nov 45, file AG 354.1 GAP-AGO, subj: "Instructions to Govern Operation of Theater Leave Centers."
29. For further details see monograph "The Recreational and Entertainment Program of the US Forces, ET," Occupational Forces in Europe Series 1945-46, chap IV.
30. JCS 1067/6, 26 Apr 45.
- 31. Cable, CC-20114, 8 Dec 45, OMCUS to AGWAR.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter IX

1. G-3 Battle Studies, Summary of Operations 12th Army Group; Third Army History, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45, vol II, G-5 sec.
2. Third Army After-Action Report, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; vol II, G-5 sec.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid; and Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 44-30 Apr 45.
8. Third Army After Action Report, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45, vol II, G-5 sec.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. G-3 Battle Studies, Summary of Operations 12th Army Group.
13. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Fifteenth Army, G-3 Bi-Daily Report, 2 Apr 45-14 Jul 45.
17. Ibid; and Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
18. Ibid.
19. Third Army After-Action Report 26 Jan 44-9 May 45, vol II, G-5 sec; and Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.

20. Ibid.
21. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.; and Third Army History, vol II, G-5 sec, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; and Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 44-30 Apr 45.
24. Ibid.
25. Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 44-30 Apr 45.
26. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
27. Ibid.; and Third Army History, vol II, G-5 sec, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; and Ninth Army Tactical History, 1 Sep 44-30 Apr 45.
28. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45; and Third Army History, vol II, G-5 sec, 26 Jan 44-9 May 45; see also Public Safety, chaps I and II.
29. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Public Safety, Occupation Forces in Europe Series 1945-46.
33. Fifteenth Army History, 21 Aug 44-8 May 45.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., 16 Apr-10 Jul 45.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.

42. Ibid, and New York Times, 20 May 45.
43. Ltrs, SHAEF /231/5 GDP, "Liberation of Norway"; cable M-N-74, 11 Sep 45, USFET Mission to USFET Main.
44. SHAEF Mission to Norway, Report for 13 July 45.
45. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Aug 45.
46. SHAEF Mission to Norway, Report for 13 July 45.
47. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Aug 45.
48. Cable S-24328, 20 Sep 45, USFET Main, sgd Eisenhower to major commands.
49. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 15 Oct 45; cable S-24328, 20 Sep 45, USFET Main to major commands.
50. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 15 Oct 45.
51. SHAEF Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Jul 45.
52. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Sep 45.
53. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 13 Aug 45.
54. SGS File, 091 Norway. Memorandum of Agreement between the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway, 28 June 45.
55. Cable, W-26600, 4 Jul 45, AGWAR from WARCOS to SHAEF Main to COMGENETO; cable S-95426, 5 Jul 45, SHAEF Main to AGWAR for Joint Chiefs of Staff, SCOFOR.
56. USFET Mission to Norway, Report for 15 Oct 45; cable S-25879, 30 Sep 45, USFET Main sgd Eisenhower to major commands; ltr, Hq Allied Land Forces, Norway, 22 Oct 45, file GON 301/1, subj: "Termination of Combined Command"; cable S-28794, 21 Oct 45, USFET Main, sgd Eisenhower to major commands.
57. 12th Army Gp, Final After-Action Report, G-3 sec, pp 50-53.
58. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations 8 May-30 Sep 45, p 3.
59. V Corps, Report of Operations, Jan 42-May 45, p 465.

60. Ibid.
61. Ibid, p 464; Hq TUSA, Report of Operations, May-Sep 45, p 22.
62. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Sep 45; and 1 Oct-30 Nov 45.
63. Hq TUSA, Report of Operations, May-Sep 45, p 22.
64. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Nov 45.
65. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, 1 Oct-30 Nov 45.
66. V Corps, Report of Operations, Jan 42-May 45, p 458.
67. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, 8 May-30 Nov 45.
68. Hq XXII Corps, Report of Operations, May-Sep 45.
69. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Periodic Report of Operations #51, 16 Oct 45.
70. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Periodic Report of Operations, #52, 23 Oct 45; ltr, Gen Harmon to CG 3d US Army, 2 Oct 45, subj: "Removal of US Troops from Czechoslovakia."
71. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Report of Operations, 30 Sep 45, p 4; Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Periodic Report of Operations, #35, 26 Jun 45.
72. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Report of Operations, 16 Jun-30 Sep 45.
73. Ibid.
74. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Periodic Report of Operations, #39, 24 Jul 45.
75. Hq XXII Corps, G-2, Report of Operations, 16 Jun-30 Sep 45.
76. Ibid.
77. Ltr, Gen Harmon to CG Third US Army, 2 Oct 45, subj: "Removal of US Troops from Czechoslovakia."
78. Cable W-16162, 13 Jun 45, AGWAR fr Marshall to SHAEF Fwd for Eisenhower.
79. Cable W-26489, 4 Jul 45, AGWAR fr Joint Chiefs of Staff to SHAEF Main to Eisenhower.

80. Cable unnumbered, 3 Sep 45, Mil Attache Prague, sgd Woldike to MILID Washington and USFET Main.
81. Memo, 22 Sep 45, for J. D. Beam, Office of U.S. Political Advisor for Germany, Maj Gen H. R. Bull, DCofS.
82. Cable S-27035, 6 Oct 45, USFET Main, sgd Eisenhower, to Hq Eastern Mil Dist.
83. Cable W-77097, 19 Oct 45, AGWAR from WARCOS to USFET Main for Eisenhower; ltr, 23 Oct 45, Gen Harmon to Gen Bull.
84. Cable W-80709, 3 Nov 45, AGWAR sgd WARCOS to USFET Main.
85. Hq 3d US Army, Report of Operations 1 Oct-31 Dec 45.