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COLLECTION AND DOCUMENTATION OF MATERIAL

RELATING TO THE PRISONER OF WAR INTERMENT

PROGRAM IN KOREA, 1950-1953 (U)

CHAPTERS 1 THROUGH 6

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COLLECTION AND DOCUMENTATION OF MATERIAL
RELATING TO THE PRISONER OF WAR INTERVIEW
PROGRAM IN KOREA, 1950-1953 (U)

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COLLECTION AND DOCUMENTATION OF MATERIAL RELATING TO
THE PRISONER OF WAR INTERVIEW PROGRAM IN KOREA,
1950 - 1953

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER 1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND		
Section I. Introduction - - - - -	1-2	1
II. Brief of events - - - - -	3-18	2
III. Retrospect - - - - -	19-21	15
CHAPTER 2. PERSONNEL, TRAINING, SUPPLY, AND SERVICE PROBLEMS RELATED TO UNITS OPERATING POW CAMPS		
Section I. Personnel problems - - - - -	22-26	17
II. Training problems - - - - -	27	36
III. Supply and service problems - - - - -	28-34	43
IV. Lessons learned - - - - -	35	47
CHAPTER 3. ORIENTAL COMMUNIST POW'S		
Section I. Background information - - - - -	36-40	49
II. Communist POW behavior - - - - -	41-42	58
III. Lessons learned - - - - -	43	59
CHAPTER 4. ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL MANAGE- MENT OF POW'S AND CI'S AT CAMP LEVEL		
Section I. Administration - - - - -	44-49	61

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER 4. ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT OF POW'S AND CI'S AT CAMP LEVEL (Cont.)		
Section II. Difficulties encountered in processing oriental POW's and CI's - - - - -	50-52	99
III. Requests, complaints, and petitions - - - - -	53-54	103
IV. Records and reports - - - - -	55-56	107
V. Transfers between camps - - - - -	57-58	110
VI. Religious, educational, recreational, and other activities - - - - -	59-63	114
VII. Lessons learned - - - - -	64	119
CHAPTER 5. COMMUNIST AND UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, PLANS, AND OPERATION		
Section I. Communist intelligence organization, training, and operation outside UNC POW camps - - - - -	65-68	122
II. Communist POW missions, organizations, and operations within UNC POW camps - - - - -	69-73	131
III. United States intelligence organization, plans, and operations - - - - -	74-83	151

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER 5. COMMUNIST AND UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION, PLANS, AND OPERATION (Cont.)		
Section IV. Lessons learned - - - - -	84	168
CHAPTER 6. OPERATION OF FACILITIES AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED		
Section I. Problems regarding control of POW's -	85-99	171
II. Operation of POW and CI enclosures, compounds, and service areas - - -	100-108	200
III. Security - - - - -	109-117	238
IV. Maximum security facilities - - - -	118-123	276
V. Inspections and staff visits - - - -	124-129	308
VI. Lessons learned - - - - -	130	322
CHAPTER 7. PRISONER OF WAR COMMAND - KOREA		
Section I. Establishment and operation - - - -	131-134	326
II. Lessons learned - - - - -	135	338
CHAPTER 8. CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM AND LOGISTICAL SUPPORT		
Section I. Construction program - - - - -	136-141	339
II. Logistical support - - - - -	142-152	357
III. Lessons learned - - - - -	153	400

	<u>Paragraphs</u>	<u>Page</u>
CHAPTER 9. MEDICAL CARE AND SANITARY MEASURES		
Section I. Introduction - - - - -	154-155	402
II. Evacuation - - - - -	156-159	406
III. Medical care at camps - - - - -	160-162	408
IV. Camp hospitals - - - - -	163-171	411
V. Prisoners injured while on work details - - - - -	172-173	417
VI. Sanitary measures - - - - -	174-179	418
VII. Lessons learned - - - - -	180	423
CHAPTER 10. POW EXCHANGES		
Section I. Operation "Little Switch" - - - - -	181-187	424
II. Operation "Big Switch" - - - - -	188-194	447
III. Task Force Olsen - - - - -	195-198	470
IV. Operation "Thanksgiving" - - - - -	199	474
V. Operation "Glory" - - - - -	200	475
VI. Lessons learned - - - - -	201	477
APPENDIX I. LOCATION AND TYPE OF POW CAMPS AS OF		
18 AUGUST 1952 - - - - -		480
II. RECORD OF NON-JUDICIAL PUNISHMENT OF		
PRISONERS OF WAR - - - - -		481
III. CHECKLIST AND REQUIRED INFORMATION FOR		
INCIDENT REPORTS - - - - -		482

	<u>Page</u>
APPENDIX IV. PRISONER OF WAR INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS - - - -	486
V. ENCOURAGEMENT MESSAGES TO ALL PARTY	
MEMBERS - - - - -	487
VI. OPERATION PLAN: SWAP (BIG SWITCH) - - - - -	497
VII. QUESTIONNAIRE - - - - -	543
VIII. PRISONER DETAIL RECEIPT - - - - -	544
IX. REQUEST FOR PRISONER-OF-WAR LABOR - - - - -	545
X. PRISONER-OF-WAR LABOR DETAIL INSPECTION	
SHEET - - - - -	546
XI. REPORT OF ESCAPED PRISONERS - - - - -	547
XII. PHYSICAL LAYOUT OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY	
FACILITY - - - - -	548
XIII. INTERROGATION FORM - - - - -	549
XIV. SOP INSPECTION ITINERARY - - - - -	550
XV. SAMPLE ICRC DELEGATE VISIT REPORT - - - - -	555
XVI. KOREAN CERTIFICATE OF LOSS - - - - -	557
XVII. OPERATION PLAN: LITTLE SWITCH - - - - -	558
XVIII. OPERATION PLAN: LITTLE SWAP - - - - -	592
XIX. PROVOST MARSHAL PLAN TO OPERATION PLAN 1-53 - - -	616
XX. TOTAL RECAPITULATION OF POW'S SHIPPED	
FROM CAMPS - - - - -	619

	<u>Page</u>
APPENDIX XXI. DELIVERY PLAN NON-REPATRIATE PW'S - - - - -	623
XXII. SECURITY FOR A HALTED TRAIN CARRYING	
POW'S - - - - -	625
XXIII. SHIPPING PLAN - NON-REPATRIATES -	
OPERATION "SWAP" - - - - -	627
XXIV. OPERATION PLAN: THANKSGIVING - - - - -	629
XXV. OPERATION PLAN: THANKSGIVING - - - - -	642

ABBREVIATIONS

CCF	Chinese Communist Forces
CFI	Custodial Forces India
CI	Civilian Internee(s)
CI&E	Civil Information and Education
CINCUNC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ISN	Internment Serial Number
JRCT	Joint Red Cross Team
KComZ	Korean Communications Zone
KMAG	Korean Military Advisory Group
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
NKPA	North Korea Peoples' Army
NNEC	Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission
POW	Prisoner(s) of War
PWC	Prisoner of War Command
PWIB	Prisoner of War Information Bureau
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROKA	Republic of Korea Army
UN	United Nations
UNC	United Nations Command
UNCACK	United Nations Civil Assistance Commission Korea
USAFFE	United States Army Forces, Far East

CHRONOLOGY OF THE KOREAN CONFLICT--1950-1953*

1950

- 25 June--Beginning of hostilities.
- 27 June--President Truman ordered United States air and naval forces to help repel North Korean invaders.
- 28 June--Seoul, Korean capital, abandoned to invaders.
- 30 June--President Truman authorized General Douglas MacArthur to send ground forces to Korea.
- 1 July--First combat unit, United States Army, landed in Korea.
- 5 July--U. S. Army troops fought first engagement in Korea.
- 7 July--United Nations Security Council authorized use of UN flag in Korea.
- 8 July--General MacArthur named Commander in Chief, United Nations Command.
- 10 July--U. S. tanks in first action; first Communist atrocities reported.
- 12 July--U. S. troops fell back across Kum River near Taejon; Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker took command of all U. S. forces in Korea.
- 18 July--U. S. reinforcements landed in Korea.
- 20 July--Taejon lost to enemy; Major General William F. Dean reported missing.

*Prepared by Captain R. J. Loesch, Artillery, assigned to Public Information Division, Department of the Army, at the time this chronology was written.

24 July--Communists in western Korea pushed to southern coast and attacked toward Pusan.

31 July--First reinforcements landed direct from United States.

3 August--U. S. troops fell back to Naktong River line; Communists thrust to within 40 miles of Pusan.

7 August--U. S. Forces launched strong counteroffensive toward Chinju, west of Pusan.

29 August--First British troops arrived from Hong Kong.

1 September--Communists established 17 bridgeheads across Naktong River and pushed to within 30 miles of Pusan.

7 September--Communists reported seven miles from Taegu.

14 September--Communist drive on Taegu stalled.

15 September--UN invasion fleet landed at Inchon.

16 September--After six weeks behind Pusan perimeter, Eighth U. S. Army jumped off in all-out offensive.

26 September--Seoul liberated by X Corps; Eighth Army Task Force linked up with Inchon invasion south of Suwon.

30 September--UN forces regained nearly all territory south of 37th Parallel.

1 October--ROK Third Division pushed across 38th Parallel and sped up east coast.

9 October--U. S. 1st Cavalry Division crossed 38th Parallel.

10 October--ROK Capitol and Third Divisions captured port of Wonsan.

19 October--Pyongyang, North Korean capital taken.

20 October--U. S. 187th Parachute Infantry Regimental Combat Team jumped at Sukchon and Sunchon, 25 miles north of Pyongyang.

26 October--ROK Sixth Division reached Yalu River at Chosan; UN forces captured first Chinese Communist soldiers.

1 November--UN pilots opposed for first time by speedy Russian-built MIG-15 jet fighters.

2 November--1st Cavalry Division (Infantry) suffered severe casualties when hit by Chinese Communists at Unsan.

21 November--U. S. 7th Infantry Division occupied Hyesanjin on banks of Yalu.

24 November--UN forces launched "end-of-war" offensive; ROK troops entered Chongjin, 60 miles from Siberian border.

25 November--Communists launched violent counteroffensive, forcing UN troops to begin withdrawal.

27 November--U. S. Army and Marine units attacked by six Chinese divisions in the Chosin Reservoir area.

5 December--UN forces abandoned North Korean capital.

9 December--Special relief force made contact with U. S. Marines cut off in Chosin Reservoir area.

11 December--UN forces began evacuation of Hungnam, Songjin, and Wonsan.

23 December--General Walker killed in jeep accident.

24 December--Last of 105,000 troops evacuated safely aboard ship from Hungnam beachhead.

26 December--Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway arrived to take command of all UN ground forces in Korea.

1951

1 January--Communists launched general offensive.

3 January--Seoul abandoned for second time by UN forces.

7 January--Communist forces attacked Wonju.

25 January--UN took offensive to wage war of maneuver.

5 February--"Operation Round-up" launched against North Korean Second and Fifth Corps.

13 February--U. S. 2d Division's 23d Infantry and attached French Battalion surrounded by three Chinese Communist Divisions at Chipyong-ni.

21 February--"Operation Killer" launched to annihilate enemy forces and re-establish UN line east of Wonju.

7 March--"Operation Ripper" launched to outflank Seoul and capture Chunchon.

15 March--Seoul re-taken by UN forces.

23 March--U. S. 187th Regimental Combat Team jumped at Munsan in attempt to cut off enemy forces south of Han River.

11 April--General MacArthur relieved of all his commands in Far East by President Truman.

12 April--General Ridgway became Supreme Commander of Allied Powers and General James A. Van Fleet assumed command of UN forces in Korea.

22 April--Communists launched spring counteroffensive with estimated 600,000 troops.

29 April--Communists counteroffensive came to abrupt halt after carrying to outskirts of Seoul in west, and 40 miles south of 38th Parallel in central Korea.

3 May--UN forces launched a limited objective attack to regain former positions and re-establish contact with enemy.

16 May--Communists launched second spring offensive with approximately 21 divisions across 75-mile front.

19 May--UN forces halted enemy drive on western front and launched savage counterattack.

21 May--UN forces halted enemy drive on eastern front and launched a counterattack.

24 June--Jacob Malik, Russia's UN representative, advocated cease-fire in radio speech.

30 June--General Ridgway proposed meeting to discuss armistice; suggested Danish hospital ship in Wonsan harbor as site.

1 July--Communist commanders proposed that meeting be held at Kaesong on 38th Parallel.

10 July--First meeting between UN and North Korean-Chinese delegations held at Kaesong.

26 July--After tenth meeting, the two delegations announced agreement on five-point order of business.

15 August--Far East Air Forces started "Operation Strangle."

23 August--Communists suspended armistice negotiations.

13 September--UN began attack on Heartbreak Ridge.

25 October--Armistice talks resumed as delegates met for 27th plenary session.

27 November--Plenary session agenda item number two--military demarcation line ratified by both sides.

2 December--Task Force Paik launched "Operation Rat-Killer" against guerillas in Chirisan Mountain area.

18 December--Both sides exchange prisoner lists. UN held 132,474 Communist prisoners. Communist list contained 11,559 names.

1952

24 January--Korean truce negotiations stalemated.

16 February--U. S. warships started second year of shelling and blockading Wonsan.

20 March--Agreement on "ports of entry" through which men and supplies would move to and from Korea during truce reached by UN and Communist delegates.

7 May--Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd, commander of UNC Prisoner of War Camp Number One on Koje-do, was seized and held for 78 hours by Communist prisoners.

12 May--General Mark W. Clark took over from General Ridgway as Supreme Commander.

19 June--"Operation Break-up"--resettlement of Kojie Island prisoners in 500-inmate compounds completed.

23 June--Large-scale UN air attack knocked out 90 percent of North Korea's power supply.

10 July--Korean truce talks entered second year.

14 August--Prisoner of War Command established.

4 September--Air Force reported record one-day bag of 13 Communist MIG's.

6 October--Estimated 10,000 to 15,000 enemy troops launched largest Communist attack of year.

8 October--Truce teams agreed to indefinite recess.

15 October--Large U. S. amphibious force faked an invasion and conducted "training exercise" off northeast Korea below Wonsan.

1953

25 January--"Operation Snack" started on west-central front.

11 February--General Van Fleet turned over command of Eighth U. S. Army to Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor.

6 April--UN and Communists opened talks on exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

11 April--Agreement reached on prisoner exchange--605 UN troops for 6,030 Communists.

26 April--Communists completed return of 684 sick and injured UN prisoners. The exchange consisted of 471 South Koreans, 149 Americans, 32 Britons, 15 Turks, 6 Colombians, 5 Australians, 2 Canadians, 1 Netherlander, 1 Filipino, 1 South African, and 1 Greek.

3 May--First round of sick and wounded exchange completed in Panmunjom when UN finished turning back 5,194 North Korean, 1,030 Chinese soldiers and 446 North Korean civilians.

7 May--Communist negotiators conceded that prisoners of war unwilling to return to Communist control may be placed in neutral custody.

14 May--Deadlock developed in truce negotiations over plans for handling prisoners who objected to returning to North Korea.

16 May--Truce talks recessed.

24 May--Allied warships entered Wonsan harbor, and bombarded port.

25 May--A new UN armistice plan on prisoners of war submitted to Communists.

27 May--U. S. 5th Air Force reported 51 Communist MIG-15 jets downed since 1 May at cost of only one U. S. Sabre jet.

30 May--Communist troops attacked in strongest action since October, 1952.

3 June--UN and Communist delegates signed an agreement on prisoners of war. Vigorous opposition voiced by President Syngman Rhee and South Korean Government.

- 11 June--Attacks by Chinese Communists renewed.
- 18 June--South Koreans released 25,000 North Korean anti-Communist prisoners of war rather than turn them over to a custodial commission as specified in the proposed truce agreement.
- 12 June--Heavy Communist attacks on central and eastern fronts.
- 20 June--Truce negotiations suspended.
- 25 June--Communist troops attacked ROK positions on east-central front. Antiarmistice demonstrations staged in Seoul by South Koreans.
- 30 June--Sabre jets scored biggest one-day kill of the war by shooting down 15 MIG-15's over North Korea.
- 13 July--Chinese Communists opened major attack, drove South Korean units from 60 square mile area to flatten out the UN's Kumsong River bulge.
- 16 July--UN troops counterattacked on east-central front in Kumhwa-Kumsong area. Communist truce delegates requested a recess after being warned either to sign an armistice soon or break off the talks.
- 27 July--Armistice agreement signed at Panmunjom.

CHAPTER 1

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Section I. INTRODUCTION

1. Purpose and Scope

a. The general purpose of this study is to collect and document material relating to the prisoner-of-war (POW) internment program in Korea. It is particularly designed to record in a permanent, accessible, and concise form the experiences gained and the many lessons learned in the operation of POW camps in Korea; to provide reference and background material for students and instructors; and, to the extent applicable, to provide a basis and guidance for the development and implementation of future internment programs.

b. This study covers the historical background and the POW internment program, including personnel, intelligence, operational, and logistical problems; civilian internees (CI); the Prisoner of War Command; and the POW exchanges.

2. Definitions

a. The term, "POW's," as used in this pamphlet, refers to Oriental Communist prisoners of war and retained personnel.

b. The term, Oriental, as used in this pamphlet, refers only to persons from North Korea and Communist China.

Section II. BRIEF OF EVENTS¹

3. Inception of POW Operation in Korea

The Korean conflict began at 0400 on Sunday morning 25 June 1950 when Communist-trained army of North Korea crossed the 38th Parallel and attacked the Republic of South Korea (ROK). Action was initiated promptly after this invasion when the United States Government brought the aggression to the attention of the United Nations Security Council. On the afternoon of 25 June, the Security Council called upon the North Korean authorities to withdraw their armed forces and asked all United Nations members to refrain from giving assistance to the North Koreans. Then, on 27 June, the Security Council recommended that United Nations members act to repel the armed attack and restore peace and security in Korea. The United States and twenty-one other nations joined under the United Nations flag to repel Communist aggression. For the first time in modern history, an assembly of nations marshalled a truly international fighting force to resist an aggressor nation. During the three years of fighting and intermittent peace negotiations, nearly half a million United States soldiers served in Korea. Upon entrance of the United Nations forces into the conflict, POW activities were based primarily on experiences of World War I and World War II.

1. McGarr, Lionel C., Major General, "A Study of the Administration and Security of the Oriental Communist POW during the Conflict in Korea," Prisoner of War Command, 1953. Tabs A-1 through B-7, pp. 12-76. (Except as otherwise indicated, the material in this section was taken from the above-cited reference.)

POW operations in the Korean conflict commenced with the capture during July 1950 of 224 enemy persons. As the campaign progressed, the total number of persons captured or taken into custody by the forces of the United Nations Command (UNC) rose to a total of 3,319 by the end of September 1950; 38,250 by the end of October; 81,765 by the end of November; and 113,873 by the close of December 1950. The maximum number of persons housed in POW camps by the UNC was 170,183.

4. Application of Principles of Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949

POW camp administrators carried out the principles of the Geneva Convention. Custodial personnel received instructions in these principles and accordingly the POW's were treated humanely. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inspected the compounds frequently.

5. Initial Facilities

a. The surprise element of the invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) by the Communist enemy in June 1950, combined with the speed and urgency of committing units of the UNC to the assistance of the ROK, precluded adequate planning for the reception or interment of captured enemy personnel.

b. Facilities were hastily constructed to meet the needs of the moment, and these installations were manned by insufficient numbers

of personnel for administration and security duties. At this time, an extreme scarcity of personnel existed in Korea, and the absence of native facilities and supplies aggravated the situation.

no hospital was already there
c. Shortly after the beginning of the Korean conflict, UNC POW Enclosure No. 1 (later redesignated UNC POW Camp No. 2) was constructed in the Pusan area. During the fall of 1950, six enclosures, including a hospital, were constructed in the Pusan area. With the invasion of Inchon and Wonsan and the drive northward toward the Yalu in September 1950 by United Nation forces, camps were ^{established} ~~constructed~~ at Inchon, Wonsan, and Pyongyang, Korea.

6. Movement of POW's to New Locations

a. The tactical situation which developed during December 1950, after the intervention of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF), resulted in the closing of the large camps established at Wonsan, Pyongyang, and Inchon and in the transfer of the POW's to installations in the Pusan area. As Pusan was the principal port of entry for all supplies and personnel committed to the Korean conflict, the presence in that area of large numbers of captured enemy personnel, together with thousands of Korean refugees, resulted in a condition of confusion that was dangerous to the security of the United Nations forces.

b. It was decided to remove the POW's from the Pusan area, and the island of Koje-do was selected as the site for the new installation. This installation was designated as the United Nations Command

Prisoner-of-War Camp No. 1, Koje-do, and the Headquarters, 60th General Depot, was assigned the mission of serving as the Headquarters of the installation and of constructing the camp. The hospital enclosure in Pusan was continued with medical personnel supplied by the 14th Field Hospital and the 3d Field Hospital.

c. Until September 1951, UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do, was under the 3d Logistical Command, a subordinate command of the 2d Logistical Command. At that time the 3d Logistical Command was eliminated from the chain of command and the camp was placed directly under the 2d Logistical Command.

d. In October 1951, the recently activated Headquarters, Military Police Group, 8137th Army Unit, was imposed on the Headquarters, 60th General Depot, in an effort to provide adequate personnel as camp overhead. The 60th General Depot was inactivated on 27 December 1951.

7. Facilities at Koje-do and Pusan

UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do, and UNC POW Enclosure No. 1, Pusan, were planned, established, constructed, operated, and supported on a strictly austere basis. Construction was delayed because of the shortage of materials. Despite the difficulties, minimum facilities which were sufficient to absorb all the POW's in the Pusan area, with the exception of those in the hospital installation, were completed in June 1951. At this time, UNC POW Camp No. 1 had 31 compounds

and Enclosure No. 1, Pusan, had ten compounds, many of which contained as many as 8,000 POW's.

8. Hospital Facilities

By the middle of June 1951, UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do, housed 150,000 captured enemy personnel. With the movement of all able-bodied POW's to Koje-do, Enclosure No. 1, Pusan, was reduced to 7,420 POW patients and 630 women POW's and civilian internees. Later in January 1952, Enclosure No. 1 was redesignated Enclosure No. 10 and was placed under the control of the 14th Field Hospital. Patient load reached its peak of 10,800 POW's in March 1952. Patient population fluctuated as the load had dropped to 7,574 patients by December 1952.

9. Beginning of "Incidents"

During the first few months of the operation of the camp at Koje-do, incidents occurred, but the first incident involving mass defiance by POW's occurred in June 1951. This incident took place among the POW's in Compound No. 72. In July 1951, the truce negotiations commenced at Panmunjom, and later it was realized that there was a definite relationship between the negotiations and POW uprisings. Moreover, the difficulty of securing logistical support and assignment of ample numbers of personnel increased with the general feeling that "peace" was just around the corner, and that all POW's would be released.

10. Increase of "Incidents"

In August 1951, a series of POW incidents began. From that time until May 1952, control by the camp authorities decreased steadily, and the number of incidents increased each month. A number of camp commanders were replaced. During this period the Communist and anti-Communist POW's waged a continuous struggle to gain control of the compounds. Vicious assaults and murders were frequent occurrences. The POW's were organized by their leaders into regiments, battalions, and companies and openly conducted military drills.

11. Screening Program²

a. Meanwhile, the camp authorities at UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do, had been conducting a screening program to separate the South Korean civilians from real POW's. These civilians had been forced to fight or to work as laborers in the North Korean Army when it overran most of the ROK during the first months of the conflict. As a result of the screening program, 38,000 POW's were reclassified as civilians during November and December 1951. Then in January 1952, the camp commander began a second screening program to correct mistakes made in the first one.

b. The Communist leaders within the compounds resisted this screening because it meant that they would lose control over the

2. Draft Manuscript, US Army in the Korean Conflict, Korea 1951 - 1953; Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, pp. VIII - 12 through VIII - 17.

anti-Communist POW's and because it would enable the guards to keep a closer watch over antagonistic groups. As a result, violent opposition to screening began in early 1952 when the POW's in Compound No. 62 attacked a battalion of troops from the 27th Infantry Regiment (US).

c. This battalion had entered the compound to keep order while the ROK screening committee performed its duties. The POW's attacked the United States troops with rocks, pick handles, homemade knives and axes, tent poles, and barbed-wire flails. The soldiers threw concussion grenades to stop the attack but the mob continued to move forward, and the battalion commander ordered his troops to fire. This forced the POW's back. When the melee ceased, 200 POW's were casualties, and one United States soldier had been killed and thirty-eight wounded.

d. As a result of the riot, steps were taken to prevent its repetition in Compound No. 62 and the other compounds. The guard strength was increased, and a third screening and segregation program was instituted. The new program called for separation of POW's and civilian internees desiring repatriation from those who did not want to go back to their homelands. It also called for construction of new POW camps on the mainland and on the island of Cheju-do.

e. In April 1952, the new screening program met with increased hostility from the Communist POW's. Mass meetings, flag raising, and other acts of defiance took place. The climax came in May 1952

when the POW's seized the Camp Commander, Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd. General James A. Van Fleet, Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, immediately moved reinforcements to the island, including flame-throwing tanks. Upon release of General Dodd, Brigadier General Hayden L. Boatner assumed command and proceeded to bring the situation under control. General Boatner had all civilian residents of the island moved off. He reorganized the staff and ordered his guards forcibly to enter any compound displaying slogans or flying North Korean flags. Meanwhile, engineers began rebuilding the compounds to reduce their capacity to 500 men, and General Van Fleet sent the 187th Airborne Regiment to reinforce the guard strength of the camp.

f. The Communist leaders saw that the new compounds would be a threat to their control and prepared to contest any removal of the POW's by force. Crude weapons were made secretly and the POW's in Compound No. 76 dug a waist-deep trench before the main gate on the assumption that the guards would enter there. Grenades were manufactured out of hoarded cooking gasoline.

g. On 10 June 1952, General Boatner proceeded to move the prisoners to the new compounds. The leader of Compound No. 76 was ordered to form his men into groups of 150 in preparation for the move. He failed to do so and General Boatner ordered two battalions of the 187th to move into the compound. The troops did not enter by the main gate. Instead engineers cut through the barbed wire in

rear of the compound while tanks patrolled outside the enclosure. Then the troops, wearing gas masks, advanced through the cut in the wire and threw tear gas grenades into the unruly mob. The grenades ignited gasoline hidden in the compound and the POW's broke before the American troops. Some locked themselves in the barracks while others jumped into the ditch (f, above). The troops began a methodical job of cleaning out the barracks and the ditch and of herding the POW's toward the center of the compound. In one and one-half hours it was all over. Nearly 6,000 North Koreans squatted in the center of the enclosure while the compound's buildings went up in flames. Over 150 POW's were killed and injured. One United States soldier was killed and thirteen wounded. Shortly afterwards, the POW's were moved to the new compound and their leaders were placed in solitary confinement.

h. With the collapse of the POW revolt in Compound No. 76, the remainder of the screening program was carried out with relatively little difficulty. The non-Communist prisoners were separated from the Communists and the latter were moved into the 500-man compounds. Incidents on the island continued, but guards used tear gas to stop demonstrations and riots and to maintain order and discipline among the unruly inmates.

12. Inadequate Security

In August 1951, the security force assigned to these camps was grossly inadequate. The force at UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-Do consisted of six military police escort guard companies and two Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) security guard platoons or a total of fewer than seven companies. The number of POW's at UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-Do, by the middle of June 1951 was 150,000. The mission of one military police escort guard company is to guard from 2000 to 3000 POW's or interned enemy aliens at POW's enclosures. This meant that approximately 50 companies would have been required if the POW's were to have been guarded adequately. Such an estimate does not take into account the character of the POW's who were riotous and exceedingly difficult to handle. To cope with this problem, a tactical infantry battalion was assigned to Koje-Do in October 1951 as an additional security force. In August 1951, the security force at enclosure No. 10, Pusan, consisted of one military police escort guard company and two ROKA military police companies. The ROKA security guard platoons were hastily organized and poorly equipped "rear area" units with little or no training. In some instances they received poorer rations, clothing, and shelter than the POW's. These factors in part accounted for their low morale.

13. Deterioration of Discipline

Discipline of POW's continued to deteriorate. Coincidental with the emergence of the POW question as the most controversial issue

among the negotiations at Panmunjom, aggressive action to regain and maintain control over the POW's was discouraged. This was because of the probability of attracting adverse publicity which might affect the truce negotiations.

14. Inadequate Records

In November 1951, the lack of adequate POW records created an acute problem. The scanty records available were of little value because of the difficulty in translating Korean and Chinese names into the English language. Fingerprints appearing on the personnel records were, for the most part, of mediocre quality, having been prepared by persons who had had little or no qualifications in fingerprinting. In view of the administrative burden imposed by the project of establishing adequate personnel records, the questionable practice of utilizing POW's to prepare the records was adopted.

15. Results of Tactical Operations

a. The period of July 1950 to June 1951 was one of continuous construction and establishment of facilities.

b. The active and fluid tactical situation throughout this period, combined with the necessity of building up the tactical forces in Korea, partly accounted for the limited logistical and personnel support given to POW activities.

c. The ability of trained Communists within the compounds to organize and to control POW's was demonstrated.

d. The acceptance by United Nations forces of a low standard of control in the POW camps on the basis of a desire to avoid any incident that might possibly affect the progress of armistice negotiations resulted in an almost intolerable state of discipline.

16. Reorganization of Command

a. The Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, was responsible for the operation of the United Nations POW camps from the beginning of the Korean conflict until 14 August 1952. He delegated this responsibility to the Commanding General, 2d Logistical Command, whose primary mission was the logistical support of combat troops. To both commands the operation of these POW camps was understandably of secondary importance in relation to their primary missions -- that of combat and of logistical support for combat troops. As a result, the POW program received inadequate support. This condition resulted in an increased number of incidents. The climax was reached in May 1952, and the need for a Prisoner of War Command was clearly indicated.

b. On 14 August 1952, the Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, was relieved of the responsibility for POW activities and that responsibility was given to the Commanding General, Prisoner of War Command, which was activated on that date as a major command under Headquarters, Korean Communications Zone (KComZ). Location and types of POW camps as of 18 August 1952 are indicated in appendix I.

17. Planning Harassment Efforts

With the resumption of truce talks in June 1953 and the possibility of repatriation, the POW leaders planned and executed their final drive for all-out harassment. They planned to strengthen Communist organizations in North Korean Communist POW camps. They accomplished their mission. While the detaining power was treating them in accordance with the humanitarian principles of the 1949 Geneva Convention, the POW's created embarrassing incidents of propaganda value by their fanatical acts.

18. Closing of POW Operation

a. On 27 July 1953, an armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom. This agreement provided for the mutual exchange of all POW's who desired to return to the control of their own country. All other POW's were to be remanded to the Custodial Forces India (CFI) in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) pending disposition by a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC).

b. A number of "Operations" were effected by the UNC to accomplish the repatriation program. The biggest of these was called Operation "Big Switch." It was characterized by repeated incidents and frantic demonstrations in a final Communist effort to harass and embarrass the UNC and to impress and incur favor from their Communist masters to whom they were returning.

c. On 6 September 1953, Operation "Big Switch" came to an end with a total of 75,800 captured enemy personnel (5,640 Chinese and 70,160 Koreans) being repatriated directly to Communist control at Panmunjom.

d. Other operations which provided for repatriation of POW's and civilian internees were "Little Switch," and "Thanksgiving." These exchanges are discussed in Chapter 10.

e. The transfer of 22,604 nonrepatriate POW's (14,704 Chinese and 7,900 Korean) to the custody of the CFI was completed on 24 September 1953. These nonrepatriate POW's were moved from the DMZ to Formosa and various points in South Korea. This operation, known as "Task Force Olsen," was completed 22 January 1954.

Section III. RETROSPECT³

19. Insufficient Preplanning

a. Past experience indicates that insufficient preplanning and study were given to policies and procedure that would be required to operate a Communist POW camp. It was evident that two major factors influenced the approach of commanders:

- (1) The conflict would be a short one.
- (2) The experiences in operating POW camps in World War II could be used as a basis.

3. McGarr, op. cit., Tab B-5, p. 72.

20. Different Type of POW

As the realization developed that a different type of POW from the POW of World War II was interned, it became necessary to revise policies and procedures to meet each new development. At the close of the POW operation, standing operating procedures and directives were based on actual operating experiences and considered judgment of the capabilities of Oriental Communist POW's.

21. Preclusion of Future Mistakes

a. Initial sound policies and procedures, based on a long range concept of the problems involved, would have done much to prevent the occurrence of the many unusual incidents with which the Prisoner of War Command was faced.

b. The history of the operation of POW camps in Korea must be studied thoroughly by qualified personnel in order to preclude future mistakes.

CHAPTER 2

PERSONNEL, TRAINING, SUPPLY, AND SERVICE PROBLEMS RELATED TO UNITS OPERATING POW CAMPS

Section I. PERSONNEL PROBLEMS

22. Trial and Error Procedures Used in Providing Operating Personnel for POW Camps

a. The United States troops used in the POW operation represented a cross section of the entire Army. The majority were from the Military Police Corps but every branch of the service was represented.¹ A composite of these troops would approximate these characteristics:

- (1) Age: 20-30.
- (2) Combat experience in World War II, Korea, or both.
- (3) No prior experience in POW or confinement work.
- (4) Little prior experience with the Oriental.
- (5) Little prior knowledge of Communist ideologies or Oriental fanaticism.

b. From about October 1950 to about July 1951, miscellaneous service type units in Korea and Japan were levied, irrespective of training or background experience, for initial personnel to form military police escort guard companies. The soldiers assigned

1. "The Story of the Prisoner of War Command," OPMG, Department of the Army.

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Cite
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to these military police escort guard companies were given approximately three weeks training in POW operations by a cadre of military police officers and enlisted men and then were assigned to duty as custodial personnel. Throughout the POW operation, officers and enlisted men were assigned custodial duties with little experience, training, or understanding of the responsibilities of their mission. Many custodial personnel could not be entrusted with weapons.

c. There were cases of master sergeants, sergeants first class, and sergeants who volunteered for Korea to serve as infantry being assigned to POW camps. This was contrary to their contracts with the Government. The procedure was rectified when the Commanding General, KComZ, directed that these men be replaced.²

d. About July 1951, a survey was made at Koje-do to determine the ratio of POW's to enclosure guards. There was an average of one guard for every 139 POW's.³ This ratio is in striking contrast to the current allocation of guard personnel. Under TOE 19-500R, the basis of allocation of the KA Team, consisting of 12 persons, is one team per 200 to 220 POW's (i.e., one guard to approximately 18 POW's). As late as September 1951, the ratio of United States guard personnel to POW's was 1 to 188. When ROKA guard personnel were counted, the ratio was 1 to 33, but this was still 65 percent above the recommended ratio of 1 to 20.⁴

2. Ltr, Hq KComZ, 26 Aug 52, sub: "Conditions at POW Camps."

3. Personal interview with Lt Col C. H. Sullivan, MPC, on 9 Oct 56.

4. Eighth U. S. Army Command Report, September 1951.

Regraded

2nd Ind & USA G-2 380.01 AG (19 Apr 58) dtd 10 Jul 58 - Hq 8th Army, APO 301
200.000.58-~~SECRET~~

e. During April 1953, approximately 80 medical personnel with an average AGCT score of 72 were assigned to the Prisoner of War Command. General Lionel C. McGarr, Commanding General, Prisoner of War Command, reported that it is quite evident that this type of personnel could not be entrusted with the mission of guarding Communist POW's, to say nothing of the command type necessary to act as compound commanders, assistant compound commanders, and assistant enclosure commanders. The sensitive and critical nature of this mission calls for personnel of the highest leader type.

f. On 21 April 1953, General McGarr stated, "I again invite attention to the serious personnel situation confronting this command. Only a very few of the field grade officers recently assigned have the military background and exhibit the characteristics and fortitude deemed necessary."⁵

g. On 11 May 1953, General McGarr reported, "AFFE [Armed Forces Far East] still continues to demand and only approve top military police officers for transfer. I am still being left with the lesser lights."⁶

h. On 12 May 1953, General McGarr reiterated the serious personnel situation confronting his command. In the past 30 days he had been assigned 65 master sergeants, sergeants first class, and

5. Ltr, Hq PWC, 21 Apr 53, sub: "Personnel and Troop Requirements for Prisoner of War Command."

6. Personal ltr from CG, PWC, to CG, KComZ, 11 May 53.

sergeants; 28 of these were medical specialists and had to be assigned to a field hospital.⁷

i. On 23 May 1953, in a letter to the Commanding General, AFTE, General McGarr stated, "The deteriorating personnel situation within the Prisoner of War Command again makes it desirable to bring to the attention of higher headquarters that measures taken have not alleviated the situation to any marked extent. During the month of April we received 152 replacement personnel who were basically trained medical enlisted men. Over 30 of these men had an AGCT score of under 70. On 19 May, we received an additional 37 basically trained medical personnel. Of this number, 13 were in the AGCT bracket of below 70. With the assignment of a large number of sub-standard personnel and a shortage of 1,349 enlisted men, it is no longer possible to assign such personnel to nonsensitive positions...the overall US personnel situation within the Prisoner of War Command is in a precarious position."⁸

j. On 25 May 1953, Major General Thomas W. Herren, Commanding General, KComZ, advised General McGarr as follows: "Your enlisted personnel shortages are recognized and, when viewed in the light of other commands and considering missions, you are in good condition. You must realize that personnel assigned to your command cannot be

7. Ltr, Hq PWC, 12 May 53, sub: "Enlisted Personnel Shortages."

8. Ltr, Hq PWC, 23 May 53, sub: "Personnel Requirements for the PWC."

restricted to those fully trained and qualified. It is recognized by this Headquarters and by AFPE that your mission is extremely sensitive in nature. However, even were your personnel authorization perfect, insofar as requirements are concerned, the possibility of getting personnel ideally trained and in proper number is extremely remote."⁹

k. On 1 June 1953, General Herren stated, "The caliber and degree of skill of enlisted replacements presently being received leaves much to be desired. This headquarters must assign to major subordinate commands proportionate shares of personnel being received whose scores are below some predetermined number. Accordingly, the Prisoner of War Command must accept a fair share of this low caliber of personnel. A recent directive from Headquarters, AFPE, reduces the overall allocation of KComZ spaces. Accordingly, it will be necessary to reduce the allocation of the Prisoner of War Command."¹⁰

l. On 3 November 1952, in accordance with the manpower austerity program, General Herren directed a reduction of from 20 to 25 percent in all personnel. He advised, "A ruthless determination to streamline operations and organizations in order to operate on a minimum of military manpower must be engendered in all commanders."¹¹ The keynote of his program was good management.

9. 1st Ind, Hq KComZ, 25 May 53, to ltr, Hq PWC, 12 May 53, sub: "Enlisted Personnel Shortages."

10. 1st Ind, Hq KComZ, 23 May 53, to ltr, Hq PWC, 23 May 53, sub: "Personnel Requirements for the PWC."

11. Personal ltr fr CG, KComZ to CG, PWC, 3 Nov 52.

m. General McGarr summed up the replacement picture as follows:
"The flow of replacements through the pipeline has been sporadic and contained relatively few military police trained enlisted men. Requisitions for personnel by needed MOS have not been filled. We have had to accept most anything that came through and are constantly engaged in a program of on-the-job training and reclassification."¹²

n. Sufficient personnel who were adequately trained and who possessed the necessary capabilities for the assignment were not available during the entire POW operation. Contributing factors were:

- (1) Impetus on assignment was to the front.
- (2) Determination of personnel requirements was beyond the scope of any previous POW operation.
- (3) Manpower austerity and cost consciousness program.
- (4) Belief that the conflict would soon be over.¹³

23. Personnel Requirements

a. Personnel. In the operation of an Oriental Communist POW camp, provisions for adequate security are imperative; therefore, the necessity for adequate, properly trained, security, and administrative personnel cannot be overstressed. Necessary control over this type of prisoner can be maintained only when there is sufficient security personnel to apply the degree of force necessary to

12. Personal ltr fr CG, PWC, to CG, KComZ, 31 May 53.

13. Personal interview with Major Robert T. Cumback, MPC, 14 May 56.

maintain uncontested control at all times. In the beginning of the POW operation in Korea, there were no valid bases of previous consideration for determining the requirements. About July 1950, G2, UNC, estimated that the total number of POW's would be 15,000 by the end of hostilities; however, by December 1950 at Enclosure No. 5, UNC POW Camp No. 1, Pusan, the 92d Military Police Battalion with approximately 180 United States Army personnel and about 400 ROK soldiers was responsible for guarding approximately 39,000 prisoners of war.¹⁴ The following personnel requirements are based on experience factors gained from trial and error methods of operation:

- (1) Security personnel. Requirements for security personnel will vary to a certain degree dependent upon the physical layout of the camp, terrain conditions, nature and location of work and work areas, caliber of security troops, and proximity to other installations and units. A yardstick for security troops requirements is approximately one battalion for two 4,000 population enclosures for the purpose of physical security of the enclosures and escort guards.
- (2) Administrative personnel. The requirements for administrative personnel will vary with the size of camp and the assigned mission. A yardstick for administrative

¹⁴. Sullivan, op. cit.

personnel requirements is 16 officers and 300 enlisted men for the operation of a camp consisting of three 4,000 population enclosures. These figures include administrative requirements of two officers and 49 enlisted men for each enclosure. (See Section II, Chapter 6.)

- (3) Medical personnel. The above personnel requirements do not include medical service or outpost facilities which had to be furnished. Normally, if a field hospital was available in the vicinity, the attachment of a platoon from a medical clearing company was sufficient to service a 12,000 population camp.¹⁵

b. Qualifications. It was found that only combat experienced and battle indoctrinated troops could be depended upon to cope successfully with serious incidents which called for calm, judicious but immediate, aggressive, and decisive action. Reliance on less qualified personnel established a calculated risk which could have resulted in the UNC being placed in an undesirable and embarrassing situation. On 21 April 1953, the Commanding General, Prisoner of War Command, reported that it was well recognized that a Communist POW camp required the highest qualities of leadership and judgment. He frequently stressed the need of combat-proved officers and often reiterated the necessity for this highly desirable and necessary qualification.

¹⁵ McGarr, op. cit., p. 131.

24. Assignment of Personnel

a. Units. Administrative and security units (UN and ROK) were assigned to the POW operation by GI, KComZ, according to requirements and availability. Combat units were reassigned from Eighth U. S. Army to KComZ by the Far East Command for custodial missions according to requirements and availability.¹⁶

b. Individuals. Filler personnel for the POW operation were obtained by requisition and "forced issue" from the replacement stream, hospital reassignments, and incidental personnel according to requirements and availability.¹⁷ The control of assignment of pipeline personnel to commands in Korea was retained by the Far East Command. Beginning about July 1950, personnel were assigned by the Pusan Replacement Depot through the 2d Logistical Command to the 8137th Military Police Group (60th General Depot) for further assignment to the operating units, i. e., 92d, 94th, and 96th Military Police Battalions.¹⁸ The replacement system for the Prisoner of War Command was operated by the Commanding General, KComZ, who made bulk allotments direct to the Prisoner of War Command for further breakdown and assignment within the Command according to individual abilities and needs of the Command.¹⁹

16. Cumback, op. cit.

17. Ibid.

18. Personal interview with Major Frank H. Akers, HPC, 17 May 56.

19. Letter of Instructions, Hq FEC, 4 Oct 52.

- (1) Staff assignments. In order to maintain a staff cognizant of current POW problems and to give the operation proper support, the Prisoner of War Command staff was kept at necessary strength by levying directly on the 12 POW camp staffs as to both officers and enlisted personnel. Replacements necessary as a result of the levies were furnished directly from incoming ZI pipeline. This system permitted rotation of personnel within the Command and a more equitable and diversified tour of duty.²⁰
- (2) Lateral transfers. On 19 September 1952, the Prisoner of War Command authorized lateral transfers of officers and enlisted men within the Command.
- (a) Superior personnel. Superior personnel could be laterally transferred after five consecutive months service in the same camp.
- (b) Malassigned personnel. Satisfactory but malassigned personnel usually were reassigned more fitting duties at the same camp, but they could be reassigned to another camp dependent on pertinent facts.
- (c) Unsatisfactory personnel. Such personnel could be reassigned to other camps based on written requests to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, with all factors

²⁰. Information Letter, Hq PWC, 23 Jul 52.

fully explained. A request was forwarded to the new assignment and, in the case of an officer, the contents of the request were briefed into his efficiency report by the losing commander. In the event of failures in new assignments, personnel were considered for recommendation for release from the service by the gaining commander. 21

25. Morale and Discipline

a. From about October 1950 through about March 1951, morale and discipline of troops involved in POW operations reached a low point. Several factors accounted for this condition. First, many enlisted men held positions which were normally filled by officers. These men would normally have been promoted, but there were no TD and not many TOE units which would make deserved promotions possible. Second, living conditions on Kojima-do were poor and men were often living under conditions not much better than those of the POW's. POW facilities on Kojima-do were seriously understrength so that it was necessary for men to work long hours under difficult conditions. Time off was infrequent. Another factor related to low morale was the difficulty of getting supplies. Military police provisional companies were organized and assigned to the 92d Military Police Battalion. These provisional companies had difficulty in obtaining

21. Ltr, Hq PWC, 19 Sep 52, sub: "Policy for Lateral Transfers of Officers and Enlisted Men."

supplies, particularly such critical items as vehicles. Supply personnel frequently refused to give these provisional companies supplies and equipment on the basis that there was no authorization for such issuance.²²

b. Upon activation of the Prisoner of War Command, the Commanding General observed, "The present status of training, wearing of the uniform, general appearance, haircuts, shoe shines, condition and care of clothing and equipment, military bearing, general physical condition of the individual soldier, both officer and enlisted, is entirely below the standard required in this command and must be improved."²³ The ensuing military training program stressed discipline.

c. On 26 August 1952, General Herren stated, "There is a lack of smartness in appearance and demeanor on the part of both officers and enlisted men. With some exceptions, no premium is placed on strict observance of military courtesy. Discipline appears to be lax, performance of duty perfunctory and slovenly in many cases. Few, if any, military formations are required; drills of precision are lacking; ceremonies and inspections are being neglected. Immediate action is required to bring standards of officers and men to an acceptable level."²⁴

22. Sullivan, op. cit.

23. Training Directive Nr. 1, Hq PWC, 26 Aug 52.

24. Ltr, Hq KComZ, 26 Aug 52, sub: "Conditions at POW Camps."

d. On 11 August 1952, General Boatner stated to all camp commanders, "Superior discipline is the keystone of all military organizations and is that characteristic which distinguishes an army from a mob. The essence and reason for discipline is reliability. Military courtesy, deportment, bearing, and conduct are symbols of military efficiency and discipline. The discipline of the prisoners of war cannot be disassociated from the discipline of the security troops, both ROK and US, who must, by their own actions, set the example for UN prisoners. Commanders of all grades and ranks will give maximum attention to maintaining the discipline of subordinates at the highest standards."²⁵

e. On 25 September 1952, Colonel C. V. Cadwell, Commanding Officer, Prisoner of War Command, citing noncompliance with command instructions, directed all camp commanders to take prompt action to improve courtesy and discipline within their commands.²⁶

f. The necessity for rigid self-discipline, smartness and maintenance of a soldierly, impersonal attitude toward POW's had to be emphasized. Informality and friendliness are characteristics of a United States soldier, but these qualifications were considered as weaknesses by the Communist POW's.²⁷

25. 1st Ind, Hq PWC, to ltr, Hq KComZ, 8 Aug 52, sub: "Discipline in POW Camps."

26. Ltr, Hq PWC, 25 Sep 52, sub: "Courtesy and Discipline."

27. Personal ltr fr CG, KComZ, to CG, PWC, 5 Oct 52.

26. Personnel Services²⁸

a. Leaves and Recreational Facilities.

- (1) By July 1951, there was a policy that anyone with 12 months rear area service in Korea would be authorized to go to Japan on "R & R" (Rest and Recreation) for five days. However, in many cases quotas were changed and some men did not go until they had been in Korea 14 months. After Colonel Harold L. Taylor assumed command on Koje-do (10 May 1952), more personnel were assigned to the POW operations which permitted more custodial personnel to go on "R & R." Occasionally, personnel were placed on TDY to Pusan and were able to enjoy the recreational facilities located there.
- (2) From July 1950 through about May 1951, United States Army facilities at POW camps were poor. By July 1951, conditions were much improved. Movies were being shown regularly at company level. Some baseball fields were constructed and used. Practically all areas including those occupied by ROK personnel had volley ball courts. Post exchange supplies were generally adequate. A service club was in operation and an officers club had been built.

²⁸. Except as otherwise indicated, the information contained in this paragraph was obtained on dates indicated through personal interviews with the following military police officers: Col G. R. Momeyer, 1 Jun 56; Lt Col C. H. Sullivan, 5 Oct 56; Lt Col L. L. Treadwell, 22 May 56; Maj F. H. Akers, 17 May 56; Maj Hugh Basse, 15 May 56; Maj R. E. Carroll, 25 May 56; and Maj R. T. Cumback, 14 May 56.

- (3) Partly as a result of the interest shown by Colonel Taylor, the recreational program was improved considerably. Movies were instituted; hobby shops were constructed; and competitive sports, such as baseball and volleyball, were started. Day rooms were established which provided writing materials, books and magazines, and games, such as ping pong, cards, and checkers. Additional service clubs were built to provide floor shows, slot machines, beer, mixed drinks, and dancing. Occasionally, USO shows from the States provided special entertainment to officers and men alike. The main source of entertainment was American movies. (See e, below.)

b. Troop Information and Education.²⁹

- (1) Assignment of personnel. Each camp commander was instructed to assign a commissioned TI&E officer as an additional duty at camp and company level and a noncommissioned officer as TI&E NCO, principal duty, at company and detachment level.
- (2) Command conference. A weekly command conference was conducted for all personnel. TI&E officers maintained attendance records.
- (3) Officers' information conference. An officers' information conference was held monthly at each installation

²⁹. Training Directive No. 3, Hq PWC, 25 May 53.

where there were six or more officers present for duty.

At installations where there were fewer than six officers, the reading of the current "Officers Call" pamphlet was acceptable.

- (4) Daily news bulletin. The publication of a daily news bulletin, while not mandatory, was encouraged when deemed practicable. The use of mimeograph paper from administrative stocks was authorized.
- (5) Army education center. Each installation established an army education center as the focal point of its educational activity. Day rooms were used for this purpose at small detachments, and separate buildings were utilized at larger garrisons.
- (6) USAFI courses. The USAFI catalog was displayed in each army education center. TI&E personnel were made available for all USAFI services including testing. Commanders were authorized to make direct arrangements for testing.
- (7) Off-duty group study classes. The value of off-duty group study classes was stressed. Funds were made available for the payment of instructors. Classes consisted of at least ten students and were organized in six weeks blocks of instruction. When it was impracticable to organize groups of ten or more, smaller numbers of

students sharing a common interest were encouraged to enroll in self-study or correspondence courses for joint study.

- (8) Basic education program. The USAFI Achievement Test II was administered to all personnel who were within the basic education area and were within 25 miles of a testing facility. Testing results were used to determine the need and frequency of basic education classes.
- (9) TI&E supplies. The requisitioning of such periodically published materials as "Armed Forces Talks," "Troop Topics," "Troop Information Bulletins," and "Officers' Call" was made through normal adjutant general channels and was the responsibility of the installation commander. All other TI&E supplies were requisitioned by the TI&E officer, Prisoner of War Command.
- (10) Training. The training of discussion leaders was accomplished through the medium of a series of "Army Forty Hour Discussion Leader Courses."
- (11) Reports. The following reports were submitted:
 - (a) TI&E Quarterly Report.
 - (b) Monthly TI&E Activities Report.
 - (c) Weekly Receipt Log of Troop Information Material.

c. Religious Activities.³⁰ From July to December 1950, religious activities were very limited. At no time during this period were religious services unavailable at either Pusan and/or Koje-do. In some of the camps, however, religious services were conducted by laymen, usually by the commanding officers. As more chaplains became available, religious activities at camp level increased. Beginning in December 1950, religious activities continued to increase. More chaplains were assigned and quonset huts were converted into chapels. Eventually, all three faiths (Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish) were represented at each camp. Services provided included character guidance, individual counseling, and spiritual direction. Chaplains were given freedom of movement except in cases where their personal safety was involved.

d. Decorations and Awards. Decorations and awards were controlled by the Commanding General, KComZ. Except for Colonel Taylor's Distinguished Service Medal, no outstanding decorations were awarded to personnel of the Prisoner of War Command. One officer received the Legion of Merit and a few of the officers and men received the Bronze Star Medal or the Army Commendation Ribbon. The outstanding services of many custodial personnel went unrecognized and unrewarded.

³⁰. Personal interview with Lt Col C. H. Sullivan, MPC, 5 Oct 56.

e. Special Services. Prior to about August 1950, special services activities were almost nonexistent. In August 1950, a theater and a service club were opened at Pusan. As special services facilities and activities progressed, so did the morale of custodial personnel. Items furnished included sporting equipment (baseball and volleyball) motion picture machines, radios, writing materials, books, and magazines. Special services sponsored USO shows from the States and service shows featuring service personnel. (See a, above.)

f. Post Exchanges. Post exchange facilities were usually adequate at all camps. However, on the islands, the usual shortages were increased by the delay of supply ships due to inclement weather. In addition to the usual items of tobacco, toilet articles, and periodicals, there were such items as cameras, radios, fans, hot plates, and souvenirs of all kinds. Luxury items, such as coca cola and canned milk, were eventually available at most camps. Post exchange services proved to be a positive morale factor.

g. Operation Santa Claus. CINCUNC continued to improve the situation of the individual soldier in the field and to provide as much in the way of relaxation and entertainment as was possible under wartime conditions. One of the largest single projects attempted was "Operation Santa Claus," whereby military personnel in Korea sent orders to the Army Central Exchange in Japan for purchase of Christmas gifts by volunteer workers. These gifts were shipped

to designated recipients. A total of more than 4,000 orders amounting to more than \$95,000 were processed by the end of November 1950.³¹

Section II. TRAINING PROBLEMS

27. Training of Troops

a. In the early phases of the POW operation, officers and enlisted men assigned to this operation had little background experience, training, or understanding of the responsibilities of their mission. Their knowledge had to be gained the hard way by on-the-job experience. This method was most difficult to the average United States soldier who, as a rule, was trusting and had had little experience with the Oriental. Although there were exceptional cases of commanders who quickly grasped the essentials that were required, previously trained officers and enlisted personnel would have relieved the delicate situation to a great extent and would have improved the POW operation.³²

Site
b. Activation of the Prisoner of War Command on 14 August 1952 enabled a major command to concentrate on prisoner-of-war activities as a primary mission for the first time. One immediate result was the reorganization of the training program.³³

31. Command Report, General Headquarters, UNC, FEC, Nov 1950.

32. McGarr, op. cit., p. 67.

33. Ibid., p. 76.

c. A training program was issued by the Prisoner of War Command.³⁴ Emphasis was placed on the proper utilization of noncommissioned officers, their acceptance of responsibility commensurate with their rank, and the efficient performance of assigned duties. Each camp commander was directed to participate personally in this program to insure that all phases were fully implemented and to adapt the training to the conditions which existed at his camp. The training program included the following subjects:

- (1) Discipline.
- (2) Leadership.
- (3) Initiative.
- (4) Teamwork.
- (5) Tactical proficiency.
- (6) Technical proficiency.
- (7) Supply economy and conservation.
- (8) Physical conditioning.
- (9) Dismounted drill.
- (10) Manual of arms.
- (11) Small-arms range practice.

d. Another training directive directed the integration into the regular training program of a course of instruction in the use of nonlethal chemical munitions in prisoner-of-war disorders.³⁵

³⁴. Training Directive No. 1, Hq PWC, 28 Aug 52.

³⁵. Training Directive No. 2, Hq PWC, 25 May 53.

The purpose of this instruction was to insure the prompt and efficient use of nonlethal chemical munitions in prisoner-of-war mass disorders.

- (1) Individual training included instruction in --
 - (a) Policy of the command on the employment of chemical munitions.
 - (b) Characteristics of nonlethal chemicals.
 - (c) Individual protection and first aid.
 - (d) Maintenance of chemical munitions and equipment.
- (2) Unit training included instruction in --
 - (a) Chemical alert squad organization.
 - (b) Tactical employment of nonlethal chemicals in riot control.
- (3) The objective of this instruction was to assure proper training of all personnel assigned to the Prisoner of War Command administrative and security mission.

e. On 7 October 1952, the United Nations Command issued instructions which prescribed additional training of security personnel.³⁶ It directed that all security guards would receive "on-the-job" and classroom training in methods, techniques, and rules and regulations involved in handling prisoners of war, covering the following subjects:

- (1) Leadership and proper supervision of prisoners.

36. UNC Pam No. 1, "Operations Instructions Reference Enemy Prisoners of War," 7 Oct 52.

- (2) Riots, disorders, and disturbances.
- (3) Development of powers of observation.
- (4) Interior guard.
- (5) Searching and spot check and shakedown inspections.
- (6) Familiarity with emergency, escape, and fire plans.
- (7) Proper use of weapons.
- (8) Provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
- (9) Regulations affecting prisoners.

f. On 23 June 1953, the Prisoner of War Command training program was implemented by a directive to camp commanders to insure the training of all troops in the following subjects in order to meet the high standards required on a continuing basis:³⁷

- (1) Riot training, including particularly bayonet and the use of butt strokes.
- (2) Training to overcome apparent reluctance to close with POW's.
- (3) Training to eliminate reluctance on the part of United States security personnel to use any and all methods and weapons at their command other than the use of firepower against mass breaks.

g. The need for orientation of custodial personnel in the handling of Oriental Communist POW's cannot be overestimated. It was the policy of General Boatner to welcome and brief personally

37. Letter Directive, Hq PWC, 23 Jun 53.

all newly assigned personnel, both officer and enlisted. This not only improved operations but was an important morale factor.³⁸

Prior to its arrival at a camp, each security unit was oriented in its duties and in what it could expect from the POW's. This was usually accomplished by one officer and one noncommissioned officer from the Prisoner of War Command who would proceed to the alerted unit several days prior to its movement and give the instruction.³⁹

The orientation of security personnel included the following topics:⁴⁰

- (1) History of Communist and non-Communist camps.
- (2) Discussion of incidents - errors noted.
- (3) The mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
- (4) Conduct of United States supervisory personnel.
- (5) Use of force.
- (6) Use of firearms.
- (7) Knowledge of guard orders.
- (8) Knowledge of 1949 Geneva Conventions.

h. The training program was inadequate. The military training program, designed to train both administrative and security personnel in the handling of Oriental Communist prisoners of war, consisted primarily of the usual military subjects. On 25 September

38. Cumback, op. cit.

39. Basse, op. cit.

40. Ltr, UNC POW Camp No. 4, 9 Jun 53, sub: "Outline Orientation for POW Supervisors."

1953, General McGarr stated, "An adequate training program for officers and enlisted personnel, based on the problems that were prevalent in handling this type prisoner of war, has not been established. The responsibility for staff supervision of prisoners of war is considered to be that of the Office of The Provost Marshal General. In the case of this type of prisoner, the magnitude of that responsibility has not yet been reflected in policy directives.... It appears that complacency has prevailed in necessary plans and training, probably due to the belief that the war would soon be over. At this time, there has been no higher level training program established for the purpose of instructing selected command personnel in the intricacies of the Communist ideologies and the reaction of the Oriental mind.... A Prisoner of War Command must have specially qualified and trained officers and enlisted personnel in order to perform the mission of the Command in an efficient manner."⁴¹ General Herren said, "Troops detailed to guard prisoners of war, and administrative personnel who are responsible for their welfare, must be especially trained for this type of work. Prisoner guards must be well disciplined, properly instructed concerning the details of their assigned tasks, and closely and continually supervised."⁴²

⁴¹. McGarr, op. cit. pp 6 and 67.

⁴². Ltr, Hq KComZ, 8 Aug 52, sub: "Discipline in POW Camps."

i. A group of military police officers who collectively had more than 86 months of experience in the POW operation during the Korean conflict agreed that the training program for custodial personnel was inadequate and should have been more comprehensive.⁴³ The following topics represent a consensus of recommended additional training:

- (1) Practical aspects of fanatical Communist ideologies and doctrine.
- (2) Practical aspects of Oriental psychology and reaction of the Oriental mind.
- (3) Recognition and identification of Oriental persons by sight and sound.
- (4) Observation and interpretation of the manners and actions of prisoners of war.
- (5) Defensive judo with emphasis on killing or stunning blows.
- (6) More rigid physical conditioning, especially for unarmed personnel.

j. These officers also recommended the weekly rotation of security personnel by company on tower guard, work and alert

^{43.} See Note No. 28.

details, and training. The training element would also act as reserve. It was felt that this procedure would --

- (1) Contribute greatly to both morale and discipline by diversifying duties and alleviating the monotonous nature of guard duty.
- (2) Develop teamwork in both guard duty and training, and promote a more harmonious operation.
- (3) Increase efficiency.

Section III. SUPPLY AND SERVICE PROBLEMS⁴⁴

28. Supplies Arrive by Landing Ships Tank (LST's)

Although the removal of POW's from the mainland was advantageous from the viewpoint of security, their relocation on adjacent islands created many logistical problems. The paramount problem was that of transportation. In the absence of a main supply road, all supplies and equipment had to be moved by LST's and similar craft which, because of inadequate dock and other facilities, soon became a major operation encompassing the many problems peculiar to island operations. Security was inadequate. There were many instances of inexcusable pilferage of supplies and damage to motor and other equipment between the mainland and the island destination. Another problematical factor was that of weather. Inclement weather often halted shipping for periods of several days.

⁴⁴. Except as otherwise indicated, information contained in this section was obtained from the officers listed in Note No. 27.

29. Inadequate Weapons

In many instances, weapons were in very poor condition. Many were defective or inoperative. From about July 1950 through about November 1951, as many as 50 percent of ROK guards had unserviceable M1 rifles. This was due to inadequate ordnance service, weather conditions, unavailability of replacement parts, and negligence. Many of the shoulder weapons had been worn out by combat troops in action prior to assignment to custodial duties. In the beginning of the POW operation, there was a shortage of crew-served weapons; shotguns, riot type; and BAR's. The following weapons were recommended for custodial duties by a number of military police officers who had experience in the POW operation during the Korean conflict:

- (1) Machine gun, cal. .30.
- (2) Submachine gun, cal. .45.
- (3) BAR, cal. .30.
- (4) Rifle, M1, cal. .30.
- (5) Shotgun, riot type, 12 gauge.

30. Lack of Training Ammunition

From July 1950 through about November 1951, there was a lack of training ammunition except for military police personnel at Pusan. During this period about 90 percent of the ROK guards did not fire more than 10 rounds of ammunition with the M1 rifle because there were few training opportunities. One reason for the ammunition shortage was caused by deterioration (rust and corrosion) due to the

climatic conditions. This condition was alleviated by daily inspection and cleaning of ammunition. Another reason for the shortage was that combat troops had priority for training ammunition. After the assumption of command by General Boatner in May 1952, the supply of ammunition increased. This increased supply permitted the monthly range firing of all weapons.

31. Shortages of Engineer Supplies

From July through December 1950, there were critical shortages of construction and materials especially of such items as shovels, picks, hammers, saws, screwdrivers, barbed wire, nails, fence posts, lumber, and roofing. It was during this period that the Pusan Perimeter was being established, and critical engineer supplies were needed in the construction of defenses. In January 1951, this situation was improved by the assignment of a United States engineer construction battalion at Kojedo and by the availability of critical engineer supplies for POW operations. Many of the needed tools (approximately 80 percent) were manufactured by the POW's. Saws were sometimes purchased on the open market, and nails were reclaimed from shipping crates. Nonessential buildings and other structures were salvaged for lumber and other materials. There were cases of roofs being made of flattened beer cans and other bits of metal. On Kojedo, paint brushes were fashioned from pieces of rope.

32. Clothing

Initially, there was a shortage of clothing for custodial personnel. Some men had long coats; others had short ones; some had no coats. Uniforms did not match and many men had to wear fatigue clothes that were beyond repair. There were cases of men wearing shoepacks because they had no shoes. The supply of clothing, like other items, went to the front. Gradually, however, the clothing situation improved until about the middle of 1952 when the supply became adequate.

33. Water Problem

The large number of persons concentrated in small areas and the inadequate water facilities created a serious water problem. Water had to be rationed at all camps. In the absence of approved streams, wells had to be dug with inadequate equipment and often were operated with inadequate "booster" pumps designed for pipeline operation. Initially, canvas water tanks were used for the storage of potable water. These canvas tanks were later replaced by wooden or metal storage tanks. Earthen reservoirs were constructed for bulk storage, often by the custodial personnel.

34. Other Problems

Food was distributed improperly. During an inspection tour by General Herren in August 1952, it was observed that grain stocks were improperly distributed. One camp had 228 days supply of rice, while others had less than ten days supply. Because of inadequate

storage facilities, grain was stored in the open and was damaged by moisture.⁴⁵ Redistribution and control of grain stocks were ordered to enable the proper distribution of wheat, barley, and rice to all POW's.

Section IV. LESSONS LEARNED

35. Lessons Learned

- ✕ a. The training program for both officers and enlisted personnel was inadequate and should have been based on problems that were prevalent in handling Communist POW's.
- ✕ b. A Prisoner of War Command must have specially qualified and trained officers and enlisted personnel in order to perform the mission of the Command in an efficient manner.
- ✕ c. Selected Command personnel should have been instructed in the intricacies of Communist ideologies and the reaction of the Oriental mind.
- ✕ d. It was extremely unwise to undertake to operate an Oriental Communist POW camp with inadequate and unqualified security and administrative personnel.
- ✕ e. The degree of control over prisoners of war was an important factor related to morale and discipline of custodial personnel.

⁴⁵. Ltr, Hq KComZ, 26 Aug 52, sub: "Conditions at POW Camps."

f. Provisional security battalions should have been composed of a headquarters detachment and four companies. Only military police should have been used as security troops.

g. One additional administrative officer as "Relief officer" for enclosure commanders, and one officer, DC, for the medical platoon were needed.

h. Additional enlisted personnel for isolated areas to perform routine military police functions were needed.

i. Determination of future custodial personnel requirements should be based on a serious consideration of the religious and political convictions, and racial and national characteristics of the POW's.

j. The rotation of both officers and enlisted custodial personnel between Communist and non-Communist camps with initial assignment in a Communist camp aided in alleviating tension and improving morale and efficiency.

CHAPTER 3

ORIENTAL COMMUNIST POW'S

Section I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION

36. Development of the Chinese Communist Party

The first stage in the history of the Chinese Communist Party was marked by its essential dependence upon the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) for its political existence and operational or organizational opportunities and achievements and by its complete dependence upon distant Moscow for its leadership, policies, and programs. Lacking an administrative apparatus, armed forces, substantial and independent economic resources, and control of effective political, labor, or mass organizations, the Party was unable to seize power from the Kuomintang leadership when it was instructed to do so from Moscow in 1927. The Party was outlawed and could not exist as a purely political organization. Through anti-Communist purges and defections the membership declined from about 58,000 in 1927 to perhaps as low as 10,000 in 1930. The leading Communist organizer of peasants, Mao Tse-tung, through a period of struggle for power achieved complete control of the Party after 1935. His success was achieved when he finally centralized Party authority and discipline in his own hands and those of his associates, brought all the Chinese Communist Army units under the control of the Revolutionary Military Council of

which he was chairman, and consolidated the scattered units of the Party and Army in Northwest China.

The importance of Mao's achievement of complete control of the Party cannot be overemphasized. This Bolshevization of the Party centralized rather than democratized the Party organization, a virtual necessity in a Party whose membership was made up so largely of peasants, partial illiterates, and those who were ideologically and politically naive. With the rank and file under control, the Party itself became a flexible instrument of its leadership and was expanded after 1936 into a mass Party, the chief vehicle for mobilizing and directing the extensive political, military, social, and economic organizations developed by the Chinese Communists. By 1950, over a million Party members were brought within the so-called "military supply system," in which they served as political professionals, a new kind of bureaucracy, without pay and accepting Party assignments under the military-type discipline.¹ The development of the Communist Party in North Korea was similar to the development in China.

1. McGarr op.cit., Tab C, pp. 104-106, and Lindbeck, J.M.H., "Chinese Communism," in Air University Quarterly Review (winter 1951-52) pp. 109-11.

37. Chinese Communist Soldiers²

a. General. The Chinese Communist soldier has developed over a long period of time and on a solid regional basis. The length of the struggle has eliminated the weak and the dissident and bound the survivors together. The army is a mixture of men who are politically reliable and those who are not, but the mixture is well governed and controlled. The composition of the Chinese Communist Army in 1951 was as follows:

15% veterans of WW II.

25% veterans of entire Civil War.

30% ex-Nationalist troops.

30% inducted since about 1948.

The ex-Nationalists group contain essential technicians, but are also the least reliable politically, except for the ex-wounded who were healed and converted, and are grateful to the Communists. About 80-90 percent come from farms. The Communists have divided them into 12 social classes, but the average is a peasant accustomed to little comfort; plain, meager food; and a lot of hard work. They were recruited mostly under social pressure in public meetings; but some were physically rounded up for the army.

2. Rigg, Robert B., Lt Col, Red China's Fighting Hordes. The Military Service Publishing Company, Harrisburg (Pa.), C1951.

Present military leaders are not healthy and are irritable and impatient. A common saying in Peking after the liberation was: "Out of every five old Communists, two are crazy and two others have tuberculosis."

b. Control. Control made it difficult to escape from the army, and heavy punishment was inflicted on those who escaped and were captured. Death was the penalty for desertion, disobedience, and for many lesser infractions.

c. Obedience to Authority. The outstanding characteristic of Chinese Communist soldiers is their enduring obedience to orders. Their vigor and drive leads them to attack with less hesitation than other soldiers. They have an appalling ability to take losses and to rush forward over piles of their own dead. Some have had so much campaigning and combat that they consider it a normal existence. But they are not the die-hard escapists from prison camps that some other nationalities breed. They can probably outmarch any other nation, and they can get along on less food than United States soldiers. They will obey orders that other troops would challenge. They are products of a stiffer and more brutal system of discipline than our own. Noncommissioned officers are almost all Communist Party members. They are tough and have an exaggerated sense of their importance. Almost all have participated in combat. They are close to their men; many have been elected by their soldiers. They are excellent leaders, pack a lot of authority, and are well backed up.

d. Education. The Chinese Communist Army is more poorly educated than that of any other great power. Most of the soldiers cannot read or write. The spoken language is not the same, and those from the South of China cannot understand those from the North. Great efforts are being made to teach the soldiers the elementals of reading and writing and to educate the masses. In 1951, the educational project called for 31 hours of general education a week, or 70.2 percent of the weekly study period. The aim was to facilitate the daily indoctrination program so that the soldiers could read the propaganda themselves, and to train noncommissioned officers and officers to read orders intelligently. With this program the troops feel they are learning something which will benefit them if and when they ever get out of service. Health and personal hygiene are also being stressed now.

e. Indoctrination and Training. Indoctrination and political training were daily measures during early morning and late evening. The bugle blew at 0500. In most units there was a two and one-half hour study period the first thing in the morning. It consisted of lectures and readings by one member, since most could not read. Slogan songs were used effectively. Slogans played a major role in indoctrination and training. Breakfast was at 0730; the work day was from 0800-1700; during which the soldiers did agricultural, construction, or factory work. Many evenings were filled with meetings. Indoctrination was continuous with "political education stations" established even along a training march. The training was both formal and informal, and was

conducted along simple lines, sugar-coated with such devices as group singing and plays. The material played on the emotions. Each soldier was made to feel that he was a part of something bigger than himself. He belonged to something that was significant. The soldier was protecting himself and his family from many threats. Although he might like to know the answers to many questions, it was dangerous to seek the truth. It was easier and safer to accept and obey. Party men continually watched the troops for what might be "incompatible" thoughts. Self-criticism meetings and public confessions were common. The men gained "face" by admitting minor faults. In each squad, there was at least one Party man whose duty it was to watch the others. Fear was an important factor. They have had several years of violent anti-American indoctrination, and the hate campaign has taken effect among many. They have had little education and believed most of what they were told.

f. Morale. The Chinese in the past have not had an interest in fighting, but the Chinese Communist have succeeded in instilling in them a feeling of a personal need to fight. Teaching them to hate has been the first step in their political education. Propaganda has paid off in making the soldiers believe that they were superior to all other generations of Chinese soldiers. As a result, the Chinese Communist soldier took pride in self-restraint and in himself. Generally, he treated the civilian populace well, except when he was under orders to raid or shoot. In turn, the civilian populace treated the soldier well.

He was respected by the civilian populace, and this increased his morale. Such factors have contributed to developing esprit de corps.

Their pay was small, but they were taught that they served for a cause, not for money. They were inherently obedient to power and were responsive to discipline, and asked for little. The main cause of desertion was to get home. Several hundred thousand were unhappy because they could not get married. Sometimes they were required to skip a meal to save food for the nation. Medical service was bad. Death and wounds were the only certain discharges from military service. Chinese Communist soldiers were at their best when they were winning; their morale sank severely when they believed that they were losing.

g. Personal Characteristics. There was a sadism and brutality in many Orientals which was not common in men of better educated areas of the world. Chinese Communist soldiers had seen bloodshed on a large scale and were hardened to bloodshed and even to death. But they also had their more humane side. They were unhappy and worried over personal problems, but this was largely hidden. They tended to be exceedingly brutal and arrogant when given some power, such as that of policeman, prisoner guard, or commander. Their own lives were held so cheaply that they regard others' the same way. The men were trained like dogs, and they attacked viciously or were friendly, as ordered. They were superior in stealth and were adept at improvisation. They delighted in killing by treachery. As a result of their guerilla background, they

knew many combat tricks and one could not be too suspicious. They used techniques which were both daring and dangerous, as for example putting entire companies in enemy uniforms and marching them through enemy territory. Such a disguised body of soldiers may have been supported by guerillas posing as refugees. Sometimes they put on women's clothing and even resorted to flirtation to entice enemy troops. They frequently ambushed the enemy who returned to pick up their dead. An illustration of some of their characteristics is found in the way they used refugees. Refugees are exploited in three ways: infiltration of gunmen and guerillas; using refugees as a shield for regular units; and imposing on the enemy the burden of caring for these transient masses. In many ways the North Korean soldier was similar to the Chinese Communist soldier.

38. Nationalism

The Chinese and Koreans have not heretofore had very strong nationalistic feelings. This lack of nationalistic feeling was due in part to the fact that China and Korea had been ruled for many centuries by an imperial system and in more recent years by independent war lords whose power rested primarily on the sword. The Orientals were often forced to give allegiance to provincial officials and war lords and not to a sovereign nation, consequently, a nationalistic feeling was overshadowed by loyalty to an individual. In recent years, a growing nationalistic feeling has been developing in the minds of the

Orientalism. The Oriental Communists have been using this growing nationalism to further their ideas. They succeeded to the extent that some Orientals believed that Communism was a means for their nations to achieve freedom and independence. The behavior of some Oriental Communist POW's can be understood in the light of patriotism combined with Communistic fanaticism.

39. Treatment of Prisoners

The Orientals during their wars have treated their POW's brutally. The war lords, for example, did not place much value on human life; consequently, they employed extreme measures to obtain useful information and services from POW's. The Orientals have considered inhuman acts as part of war and even as part of life, and have become traditionally accustomed to what Occidentals would call brutality; consequently, they did not have the same attitude toward inhuman acts as Occidentals had. Orientals often considered sadistic acts as an indication of authority. On the other hand, they often considered acts of consideration for them as a lack of authority. United Nations custodial personnel had to govern their actions, therefore, so as not to appear weak to the POW's. The POW's idea of strength or weakness on the part of custodial personnel was a deciding factor in their behavior.

40. Face-Saving

The traditional idea of "face-saving" or "losing face" was strong among Orientals. As POW's in Korea, they attempted to avoid incidents

that, in their way of thinking, made them "lose face." On the other hand, they resorted to extreme measures to "save face." Oriental Communist POW's believed that when they were captured they incurred dishonor - they "lost face." They believed that if repatriated they would not be welcomed as heroes but would be subjected to thorough interrogation and possible imprisonment or execution. They believed that by creating disturbances or causing embarrassment to the United Nations they could "save face." These acts of "face-saving" caused Oriental Communist POW's to commit acts that sometimes resulted in their death.

Section II. COMMUNIST POW BEHAVIOR³

41. General

The factors in the background of Oriental Communist POW's were different from those in the background of Occidental POW's; consequently, these Orientals were expected to act differently. They did act differently in that they were not content with merely planning and attempting to escape; but they also attempted in every way to further the interests of their party and nation.

42. Purposes of Behavior

The purposes of POW's behavior are listed in the order of importance that they were to them.

3. McGarr, op.cit., Tab C, pp. 104-106.

a. Create Incidents. These incidents entailed bloodshed and casualties among the POW's, and world-wide attention was centered on them. Communist diplomats, radio commentators, and newsmen twisted the facts and broadcasted them to the world in such a manner as to make the United Nations appear ruthless and brutal in its treatment of its POW's.

b. Harass the detaining Power. Some incidents were intended to harass the detaining power and cause confusion which the POW's could use to their advantage.

c. Divert Combat Units. Incidents were intended to divert combat units to guard the POW's and thus aid the Communist war effort by diverting these combat units from frontline duty.

d. Destroy Equipment. The POW's destroyed equipment in order to place additional problems on logistical personnel in replacing the equipment or, if not replaced, to attempt to show to the ICRC delegates who inspected the camps that the United Nations were not adhering to the 1949 Geneva Conventions by failing to issue the necessary equipment.

Section III. LESSONS LEARNED⁴

43. Lessons Learned

The following lessons were learned in regard to Oriental Communist POW's:

4. Ibid. pp. 2-5.

a. The behavior of the POW's often resulted from their mores, traditions, and customs.

b. Some Communists were Communist because they believed that they could further their nationalistic interests by means of the Communist Party.

Cite c. An act of brutality was sometimes regarded by the POW's as an act of authority. On the other hand, an act of consideration, was regarded as a sign of weakness.

Cite d. The psychology of the Oriental Communist POW must be understood and utilized to the utmost as an important means of maintaining control and minimizing the use of force.

Cite e. Never bargain with POW's. Avoid being placed in an embarrassing position in the presence of POW's.

Cite f. The Oriental Communist POW continued to think in terms of being a combatant; he had to be handled as such.

CHAPTER 4
ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT OF POW'S AND CI'S
AT CAMP LEVEL

Section I. ADMINISTRATION

44. Responsibilities¹

a. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, Headquarters, United Nations Command, was the general staff officer primarily responsible for the supervision of plans for POW's and CI's, and for the coordination of such plans with the interested general and special staff officers.

b. The Provost Marshal, United Nations Command, was the special staff officer responsible for --

- (1) Advising the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, on matters pertaining to POW's and CI's.
- (2) Staff supervision of the establishment of facilities and the evacuation, guarding, processing, and administration of POW's and CI's.
- (3) Establishment and operation of the United Nations Command Prisoner of War Information Bureau (PWIB) to perform the following services:
 - (a) To maintain a file consisting of a completed basic personnel record (DA Form 19-2, old DA AGO Form 19-2) for

1. McGarr op. cit, Inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 3-9; UNC Pam No. 1, pp. 3-4; and personal interview with Lt Col C. H. Sullivan, MPC, 5 Oct 56.

each POW and CI interned by the United Nations Command and of the necessary information regarding transfers, releases, repatriation, escapes, admissions to hospitals, and deaths.

- (b) To answer inquiries from both official and nonofficial sources concerning POW's and CI's.
- (c) To receive and hold secure the wills of POW's and CI's and the personal effects of those that were deceased.
- (d) To transmit to the protecting power, if and when one was selected, and to the ICRC such information as was required.

c. The Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, was charged with --

- (1) Expeditiously screening all enemy persons taken into custody by United Nations Forces, including ROK Forces commanded by the Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, for the purpose of determining whether or not such persons were bona fide POW's or CI's.
- (2) Care, control, custody, and evacuation of those captives determined to be POW's or CI's to camps designated by the Commanding General, KComZ.

d. The Commanding General, KComZ, was charged with the processing, care, control, custody, location, release, repatriation, security, treatment, and utilization in accordance with the humanitarian principles of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and current United Nations

Command directives and policies of all enemy persons, delivered or transferred into his custody.

e. Each camp commander had the responsibility to --

- (1) Maintain POW and CI records at enclosure level at camps with more than one enclosure.
- (2) Maintain for each POW and CI a field copy of DA Form 19-2, which had been verified for accuracy by the Prisoner of War Central Records Section, and to file it by compound in numerical sequence by internment serial number (ISN).
- (3) Maintain UNC Form 17, "Weight and Immunization Record," for each POW and CI, and file separately from DA Form 19-2 by compound in numerical sequence by ISN.
- (4) Maintain UNC Form 14, "Locator Card," showing current location of each POW and CI. File by camp or enclosure, as appropriate, in numerical sequence by ISN. Maintain separate file of locator cards on POW's and CI's hospitalized, escaped, or deceased.
- (5) Conduct one rollcall by name and make one head count of POW's and CI's daily.
- (6) Submit daily POW and CI morning report for each enclosure on PWC Form 100. (Instructions for the preparation of this report were printed on the reverse side of the form.)
- (7) Telephone the morning report to Central Records Section not later than 1200 hours daily.

- (8) Insert FWC Form 108, "Replacement Card," for DA Form 19-2 when temporarily withdrawn.
- (9) Submit other reports as required by higher headquarters.
- (10) Insure compliance with administrative procedures handed down by higher headquarters.

45. Routine Administration²

a. Receiving POW's and CI's. For newly captured POW's, UNC POW Camp No. 2 was designated as the processing camp to receive and provide for all phases of reception to include transportation, security, political screening, medical quarantine and examination, clothing, housing, feeding, and preliminary interrogation by personnel of Military Intelligence Service Group, Far East (MISG/FE). Only those persons specified in Article 4, Geneva (POW) Convention, were administratively processed as POW's. Segregation compounds were established at UNC POW Camp No. 2 for the temporary confinement and quarantine of newly arrived and unprocessed prisoners (par. 78). A telephone report of the actual time of arrival and number of POW's received in each shipment was made to G3, Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command.

- (1) Search. Each POW and CI was searched for concealed weapons and other unauthorized articles before being admitted to the segregation compound.

2. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 12-15, 53-54, and 85-86; UNC Pam No. 1, pp. 5, 11-12, 13, and 20; and MF 19-8699, Prisoners of War.

- (2) Assignment of ISN. An ISN was assigned to each POW and CI. The block of numbers 63 NK 1 through 63 NK 400,000 was assigned to North Koreans. The block 63 NK 700,000 through 63 NK 1,000,000 was assigned to Chinese. CI's had the prefix CI before the number. ISN's other than those enumerated above were not used unless authorized by higher headquarters. The ISN was recorded on DA Form 19-2, UNC Form 20, and UNC Form 3 for each POW and CI. Each POW was permitted to retain his UNC Form 3.
- (3) Segregation. In the early stages of the POW program, segregation was not accomplished fully because of lack of sufficient guards. The segregation program was complicated by many officer POW's who pretended to be enlisted personnel. Many officers were evacuated as privates. Later many of these officers discovered the advantages of being treated as an officer POW and revealed their correct grades. It was not uncommon for enlisted men after being processed to claim officer status in the hope of gaining preferential treatment particularly in not being required to go on heavy work details. New POW's and CI's were segregated from old POW's and CI's, and were further segregated by officers, noncommissioned officers, privates, and civilians, and by those who desired repatriation, until medical, intelligence, and administrative processing had been completed.

A report was made to G2, Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, of the results by category, number, and condition of POW's and CI's as the information was available.

b. Processing.

- (1) Medical. Medical processing was accomplished by roster and consisted of the following procedures which were accomplished within 48 hours after admission to the reception camp.
 - (a) Haircut.
 - (b) Smallpox vaccination, and typhus and typhoid immunization.
 - (c) Preparation of prisoner or internee weight and immunization record.
 - (d) Physical inspection and shower including delousing.
 - (e) Issuance of clean clothes and toilet articles. (Old clothes were destroyed.)
 - (f) Issuance of mess equipment and blankets.
 - (g) A quarantine period of not less than 14 days was required.
 - (h) Preliminary intelligence interrogation was conducted to the extent practicable without interfering with the medical processing or the quarantine period.
- (2) Administrative. After each POW and CI reached the camp, he was processed administratively as soon as practicable except that seriously sick or wounded personnel were not processed until their physical condition was such that the processing could be done accurately and completely. This

referred specifically to fingerprinting and photographing POW's or CI's who were bandaged. The Central Records Section, Prisoner of War Command, had the responsibility for the administrative processing of personnel. The administrative processing team consisted of interviewers, fingerprint specialists, and photographers and were furnished by the Central Records Section upon request.

- (a) Fingerprints. Rolled fingerprints of each POW and CI were impressed on an original and five copies of DA Form 19-2 and on the internee fingerprint card (UNC Form 20), and a flat impression on the UNC Form 3; UNC Form 20 was initialed by the fingerprint man who rolled the prints.
- (b) Interviews. Information required on the reverse side of DA Form 19-2 was obtained by interview with the POW or CI. The necessary information was entered on UNC Form 20 and the prisoner identification card (UNC Form 3).
- (c) Photographs. A front and profile picture of each POW and CI with the ISN and date shown was made. A copy of the picture was attached to each copy of DA Form 19-2.
- (d) Identification card. UNC Form 3 was completed for each POW and each POW retained a copy for identification purposes.

(3) Completion and distribution of records.

- (a) One temporary pencil copy of DA Form 19-2 was retained at the reception camp until receipt of a verified copy from Central Records Section with pictures and fingerprint classification.
- (b) The Central Records Section, Prisoner of War Command, was responsible for the completion and distribution of records and forms. The distribution was as follows:
 - 1. The original and two copies of DA Form 19-2 with pictures attached and fingerprint classification were forwarded to Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE), Attention: PWIB.
 - 2. One copy of DA Form 19-2 with pictures attached and fingerprint classification was filed in the Central Records Section, Prisoner of War Command.
 - 3. One copy of DA Form 19-2 with pictures and fingerprint classification was forwarded to the camp where the POW or CI was held and served as a camp personnel record and as a means of identification. This copy replaced the temporary pencil copy that was retained by the reception camp at the time the prisoner was administratively processed. The temporary copy was destroyed.

4. Capture cards, UNC Form 5 for Koreans and UNC Form 11 for Chinese, were prepared for each POW and CI and were mailed direct to the ICRC, Geneva, Switzerland.
5. UNC Form 20 was classified and filed in the Fingerprint Branch, Central Records Section, by classification. (Classification was entered on all copies of the form prior to dispatch for ready reference and assistance in the future identification of prisoners.)

- (4) Disposition of POW's and CI's. When POW's and CI's had completed the quarantine period or were released from hospital, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Prisoner of War Command, issued orders governing their disposition.

c. Messing. In general, rations were issued to, and prepared in, each compound. The camp commander, however, made exceptions to this rule when, in his opinion, conditions warranted a deviation from this policy.

- (1) The compound commanders examined all food rations delivered to the compounds. They checked the quantities and made sure that the rations were correct as prescribed for the POW's and CI's. Any deficiencies were noted and were reported to the enclosure supply officer.
- (2) Compound representatives received the food rations in the presence of the compound commander and signed a receipt which listed the type and amount of rations received.

(3) Compound commanders supervised the preparation and distribution of the food. They made sure that each person received his share of the daily ration.

(4) The hoarding of food by POW's and CI's was not permitted.

d. Quarters. The following minimum standards were observed:

(1) Enlisted personnel: 20 square feet per person or 25 persons per 16' x 32' squad tent.

(2) Officer personnel: 30 square feet per person or 14 persons per 16' x 32' squad tent.

(3) Insofar as practicable, POW's and CI's of more than one nationality were not interned in the same camp.

(4) Insofar as practicable, POW's and CI's of violently opposed political ideologies, i.e., Communist and non-Communists, were not interned in the same compound.

(5) Insofar as practicable, officer personnel were not interned in the same enclosure with enlisted personnel.

(6) Officer POW's were not interned in the same compound with enlisted POW's with the exception of such orderlies as were authorized by the camp commander in accordance with Article 44, Geneva (POW) Convention.

e. Clothing and Equipment. Each compound bulletin board displayed at all times a list, in the POW's or CI's language, of clothing and equipment authorized each person. Showdown inspections were held periodically to determine the condition of clothing and equipment.

Wornout items were replaced with the least practicable delay. Appropriate action was taken against persons who willfully destroyed or disposed of clothing or equipment issued for their use, or failed to display the required number of items authorized and issued.

- (1) The authorized list of clothing and equipment per POW or CI was as follows:

- 1 cap, cotton or wool.
- 1 blanket or cotton comforter (3 in winter).
- 1 belt, web, waist.
- 1 suit, HBT or equivalent (summer only).
- 1 coat, cotton, padded, or wool overcoat, or suitable substitute.
- 1 pair gloves, working (winter only).
- 1 raincoat, or poncho (issued as needed).
- 2 shirts, wool, (winter only).
- 1 pair shoes, rubber or leather, class O footwear.
- 2 pair socks, wool (cotton for summer authorized).
- 2 pair trousers, wool (winter months).
- 2 pair drawers, wool (winter months).
- 2 undershirts, wool (winter months).
- 2 undershirts, cotton (summer months).

- (2) These items were issued from class X clothing generated locally or shipped from other sources for this purpose.

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Class A or combat serviceable stocks were not issued to POW's or CI's without the approval from Headquarters, United Nations Command.

→ f. Mail and Censorship. The Prisoner of War Command established the policy that all correspondence addressed to or dispatched by POW's or CI's would be censored. This was done because it was necessary that all communications to and from POW's and CI's be examined to obtain and disseminate information which might be of value or assistance to the United Nations' war effort in Korea and to prevent the passage of information which might be prejudicial to the interests of the United Nations or be of aid or assistance to the North Korean or Chinese Communist Forces.

(1) Responsibility.

(a) The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Prisoner of War Command, was responsible for staff supervision and formulation of policies as pertained to censorship of POW and CI communications.

The Chief, Prisoner of War Central Records Section, Prisoner of War Command, was responsible for implementing procedures and policies for the censorship of POW and CI communications and for operational control of the Prisoner of War Censorship Branch, to include the maintenance of records as was prescribed by TM 30-236.

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(c) Subordinate commanders were responsible for adhering to the appropriate sections of the 1949 Geneva Conventions as pertained to POW and CI mail censorship, and for the following:

1. Proper and equitable distribution of mail forms, the collection, safeguarding, and forwarding of outgoing mail to Prisoner of War Central Records Section, Prisoner of War Command, and the distribution of censored incoming communications.
2. Issuance by compound commanders of not more than two letters and four cards per month. The issue was made weekly.
3. Posting of instructions on compound bulletin boards covering: Mail privileges for POW's and CI's in appropriate languages; instructions concerning objectionable information; sample cards and letters (UNC Forms 4 and 6) with addressing instructions for mail to North or South Korea; sample cards and letters (UNC Forms 8 and 12) with addressing instructions for mail to Communist China.
4. Establishing procedures to verify names and ISN's on all outgoing mail and against official files to insure that mail carried the correct names and ISN's.

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5. Installation of a locked mail box in each compound.
6. Forwarding outgoing mail, unsealed, unfolded, and securely bundled, to Prisoner of War Command, ATTN: Prisoner of War Censorship Branch.

(2) Procedures. The Prisoner of War Censorship Branch used the following procedures:

(a) Incoming communications.

1. Recorded in the daily log the number of pieces of communications by type received.
2. Checked for proper location of addressee. Returned communications to sender in case of no record of addressee.
3. Censored each communication and marked objectionable material.
4. Passed censored communications to Chief Censor for determination of acceptability of the objectionable material.
5. Forwarded acceptable communication to camp concerned.
6. Translated and forwarded rejected communications to G2, Prisoner of War Command, for disposition.
7. Listed objectionable material: quotations from books or other writings; code; music symbols; shorthand markings; military information; numbering of pieces of mail; all references to political matters; and propaganda.

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8. Recorded in daily log number of communications by type forwarded to each camp.

(b) Outgoing mail.

1. Recorded in daily log number of pieces of mail received from each camp.
2. Censored each piece of mail and marked objectionable material.
3. Passed censored mail to chief censor for determination of acceptability of the objectionable material.
4. Translated and forwarded rejected communications to G2, Prisoner of War Command, for disposition.
5. Listed objectionable material: reference to the construction of the enclosures or compounds; reference to the number or equipment of the guards; security matters; reference to incidents in the compound or to work details; complaints about confinement conditions; reference to government officials or agencies; and those items listed in (a) 7, above.
6. Maintained records of the number of letters or cards containing objectionable information.
7. Separated cleared mail into categories for dispatch to addressees in the following areas: Korea, occupied by

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Communist forces; Korea, occupied by UN and ROK forces; China; Formosa; and other countries.

- g. Placed each category of mail as indicated above in separate sacks or packages, securely sealed and clearly labeled as indicated below:

PW MAIL - FREE

FOR ADDRESSEES IN _____
(Country)

9. Maintained records and reported to G2, Prisoner of War Command, any prisoner, by name and camp location, who received or dispatched an unusual amount of mail.
10. Submitted weekly comprehensive reports of all censorship activities to G2, Prisoner of War Command, by 1200 hours each Saturday.

g. Safekeeping Valuables, Currencies, and Documents. From

September 1950 until about November 1951, the safekeeping of POW and CI valuables, currencies, and documents was no problem because not many POW's or CI's had such items. Later they acquired money, cigarettes, tobacco, and other items by trading clothing and equipment issued to them. The commander of each camp was responsible for safekeeping money, valuables, and personal effects of POW's and CI's. Property found in the possession of POW's or CI's was classified into the following categories:

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- (1) Personal effects which he was allowed to retain. Money found on a POW or CI was not taken except on order of a commissioned officer.
- (2) Personal effects which may be taken from him temporarily but returned as soon as practicable.
- (3) Personal effects which he was not permitted to retain while interned, including money and any contraband, especially those articles which could be used to facilitate escape.
- (4) Articles which he was not permitted to retain at any time and which were confiscated.

h. Gratuitous Issue of Tobacco and Toilet Articles. POW's and CI's were issued the following items as indicated:

- 1 soap, 4 ounces, toilet, per person per month.
- 1 toothbrush, per person (resupply on replacement basis when determined unserviceable).
- 1 toothpaste, tube, per person per month. (Toothpowder in non-metallic container could be substituted.)
- 1 kit, sewing (needles and thread) per 10 persons.
- 1 towel, bath, per person (resupply on replacement basis, when determined unserviceable).
- 1 razor, safety, per 50 persons.
- 1 blade, razor, safety, per person per month.
- 1 kit, barber, per 500 persons.
- 1 belt, sanitary, per woman POW or CI.

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5 napkins, sanitary, regular, per woman POW or CI per month.

10 cigarettes, per person per month.

i. Transfers. See section V of this chapter.

i. Escapes and Apprehensions.

- (1) Each camp commander had an escape plan drawn up. When an escape was reported, the plan was implemented. For more details, see chapter 6.
- (2) POW's and CI's who had escaped and who had not been recaptured within thirty days were reported as escapees by the Commanding General, KComZ, direct to the PWIB, United Nations Command, giving name, ISN, and date of escape. Similarly, POW's and CI's who had been dropped as escapees and later recaptured were reported direct to the PWIB, including the following procedures:
 - (a) Entered appropriate remark on morning report.
 - (b) Confined apprehended POW's and CI's in holding compound.
 - (c) Identified each POW and CI by fingerprint comparison with his field copy of DA Form 19-2 and quarantined him for 14 days.
 - (d) Transferred POW's and CI's to another enclosure at end of quarantine period.
 - (e) Immediately notified the local Korean National Police and G2, Prisoner of War Command.

- (3) Any voluntary assistance, such as food, clothing, money, shelter, or otherwise helping to escape, given by any person to a POW constituted a crime in violation of ROK Presidential Decree (Emergency Decree No. 1, 25 June 1950) and was punishable by death or penal servitude of not less than ten years. The Korean National Police disseminated this information to the ROK civilian population.

k. Medical Attention and Hospitalization.

- (1) POW's and CI's were given the necessary medical attention including hospitalization when required. Commanding General, KComZ, submitted direct to the PWIB, United Nations Command, a monthly report of seriously ill or seriously wounded POW's and CI's. These reports gave the following information in the case of each POW and CI:
- (a) Name.
 - (b) ISN.
 - (c) Whether seriously sick or seriously wounded.
- (2) Each report was prepared in the following four sections:
- (a) Section I: list of POW's and CI's added to the seriously sick and wounded category during the month.
 - (b) Section II: list of POW's and CI's dropped from the seriously sick or wounded category during the month because of death.

(c) Section III: list of POW's and CI's dropped from the seriously sick or wounded category during the month because of recovery.

(d) Section IV: list of POW's and CI's remaining in the seriously sick or wounded category on the last day of the month.

(3) For more details see chapter 9.

1. Release or Repatriation.

(1) G1, Prisoner of War Command, coordinated all phases of release or repatriation of POW's and CI's including obtaining the necessary authority and/or clearance.

(2) G2, Prisoner of War Command, took the necessary action to obtain clearances by appropriate intelligence agencies when clearances were required and requested by G1.

(3) G3, Prisoner of War Command, coordinated with United Nations Civil Assistance Commission, Korea (UNCACK) and camp commanders concerned, or other agencies when appropriate, in performing physical release or repatriation of POW's and CI's, insuring compliance with command policy with respect to issues of food and clothing.

(4) Immediately prior to release or repatriation, the commanding officer of each camp --

(a) Issued clothing and food in quantities specified by G3.

- (b) Furnished transportation for individuals to place of receipt or custody by UNCACK or other agency when appropriate.
 - (c) Prepared six copies of the certificate of release and repatriation (UNC Form 8 for Koreans, and UNC Form 15 for Chinese). The specific authorization for the release was entered on the form. The fingerprints of the first two fingers of the right hand (left hand in the event the POW or CI had no right hand) were placed in the lower left hand corner of the certificate. Fingerprints were used to establish positive identification by comparing fingerprint impressions on DA Form 19-2 with those on UNC Form 8 or 15. The original and three copies of the certificate were forwarded to the Prisoner of War Records Section, Prisoner of War Command; one copy was retained with the camp records; and one copy was given to each POW or CI released.
- (5) The Prisoner of War Records Section --
- (a) Forwarded original and two copies of the certificate to the Commanding General, USAFFE, ATTENTION: Provost Marshal.
 - (b) Withdrew released or repatriated POW or CI 201 file from the active files, attached a copy of the certificate and filed the 201 file in the inactive files of the Prisoner

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of War Records Section, and made the necessary notations on locator cards and in appropriate rosters.

m. Death, Burial, and Casualty Reporting System.

- (1) A notification of death, UNC Form 7 (Korean) or UNC Form 13 (Chinese), was prepared and forwarded in three copies by the camp commander through Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, to PWIB, Headquarters, United Nations Command, in the case of death of a POW or CI. The camp commander identified each deceased person.
- (2) The camp commander posted UNC Form 14 to indicate time, date, cause of death, and filed the card in the deceased section of the locator card file.
- (3) The proper remark was entered in the morning report.
- (4) The camp commander insured that one copy of the report of internment (DD Form 551 or QMC Form 1042), complete with fingerprints, was forwarded with the notification of death to the PWIB. Care was taken that the name and ISN agreed with those shown on the basic personnel record.

46. Discipline and Treatment³

a. Discipline of POW's.

- (1) About June 1951, discipline among POW's was becoming a problem, and it grew worse until June 1952. Discipline in

3. UNC Pam No. 1, Appendix B, pp. 1-4; and letter, AG 383.7 (3 Nov 51) JA, General Headquarters, United Nations Command, date unknown, subject, "Disciplinary Control of Civilian Internees."

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a POW camp was just and strict, and was rigidly enforced in accordance with the provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. POW's were properly instructed so that all orders were completely understood. Tests and spot checks were made to determine if orders which were issued to POW's were completely disseminated and thoroughly understood by them. An order, having been given, was enforced to the letter. Any disobedience was met with prompt action. No single instance of disobedience was overlooked. Adequate discipline and satisfactory control of prisoners were achieved when all prisoners took their places promptly in a formation, at attention upon order or signal. Prisoners were gainfully employed as a means of preventing trouble and maintaining discipline. It was recommended that a system of awards for meritorious, outstanding discipline and for the upkeep and maintenance of compounds should be instituted. Competition between compounds and enclosures could be encouraged. The discipline established and maintained at a camp reflected on the efficiency of the responsible officer personnel.

- (2) Prisoners were subject to the same rules and regulations as members of the Armed Forces of the United States. The same standards of discipline for prisoners were required as for members of the Armed Forces of the United States.

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In addition, to the courtesies toward their officers required by regulations in force in their own armies, enlisted prisoners saluted all commissioned officers of the UN forces and armed forces of the ROK. Officer prisoners were required to salute only officers of a higher or equal grade but were required to return all salutes. They were required, however, to salute the camp commander regardless of his grade.

Discipline of CI's.

- (1) With respect to disciplinary matters, civilians interned by the UNC were subject to the same standards as were applicable to POW's detained by the UNC.
- (2) Trials of CI's were conducted by United Nations Military Commissions. Authority to convene such commissions was delegated to the Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, who could further delegate such authority as he deemed appropriate. Trials were governed by the applicable provisions of the "Supplemental Rules of Criminal Procedures for Military Commissions of the United Nations Command," 6 October 1951, insofar as appropriate and relevant, they applied to trials of CI's.
- (3) CI's could be tried for all offenses against discipline, including but not limited to all violations of the laws and customs of war; all violations of the rules, regulations,

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and laws of the ROK; all violations of rules, regulations, or orders applicable to CI's promulgated by the Commander in Chief, UNC, or his authorized representatives; all violations of rules, regulations, or orders of camp commanders or their authorized representatives; all violations of "Articles Governing United Nations Prisoners of War," 23 October 1951; and all other acts to the prejudice of good order and discipline among CI's.

- (4) Penal confinement of CI's was prescribed in "Regulations Governing the Penal Confinement of Prisoners of War," 19 October 1951.

c. Avoidance of Harsh, Restrictive Measures against POW's and CI's. POW's and CI's were at all times treated humanely as far as circumstances permitted. They were protected, insofar as possible, from acts of violence, insults, threats, ridicule, and public curiosity. They were permitted to present themselves to the medical authorities for an examination and were never deprived of this right. They were not given dangerous or unhealthy work or work that could be considered humiliating or degrading. When on work details, they were allowed a rest in the middle of the workday for at least one hour. No physical force or mental torture was used to secure from a POW or CI information of any kind. POW's who refused to answer questions were not threatened, insulted, mistreated, or penalized in any way. POW's and CI's were permitted the use of tobacco.

47. Punishment⁴

a. Nonjudicial. The following punishments applied to prisoners and internees:

- (1) In cases of individual prisoners violating any directive, regulation, or order issued by competent authority, the enclosure commander separated them from the other prisoners for discipline punishment, which could include restriction of diet. As a disciplinary measure, however, enclosure commanders were not authorized to withhold food from prisoners or internees as a group. In cases where punishment was deemed necessary, officers exercising disciplinary power resorted to nonjudicial punishment, unless it was clear that nonjudicial punishment would not adequately meet the ends of justice or discipline among prisoners and internees.
- (2) Nonjudicial punishment was imposed only by a commissioned officer who had this authority as a camp commander. A camp commander could delegate this authority to enclosure and compound commanders.
- (3) The following punishments were authorized:
 - (a) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by the Geneva (POW) Conventions.

4. UNC Pam No. 1, Appendix B, pp. 1-4 and Appendix C, pp. 1-21.

(b) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.

(c) Confinement.

b. Limitations on Punishment. The following restrictions upon nonjudicial punishment applied:

- (1) Fatigue duty was not imposed upon officer prisoners. The duration of any single punishment did not exceed thirty days.
- (2) The maximum of thirty days provided in (1), above, did not exceed thirty days even when the prisoner was answerable for several acts at the same time when punishment was imposed, whether such acts were related.
- (3) Any period of confinement awaiting a hearing was deducted from the confinement imposed.
- (4) After the imposition of nonjudicial punishment upon a prisoner, further nonjudicial punishments were not imposed upon the same prisoner until a period of at least three days had elapsed if the duration of one of the two punishments exceeded ten days.

c. Procedure.

- (1) Each prisoner, prior to the imposition of nonjudicial punishment, was given a hearing, and in each case was --
 - (a) Provided, prior to the hearing, precise information regarding the offense or offenses of which he was accused.

- (b) Given an opportunity, at the hearing of explaining his conduct and defending himself. This included the right to call witnesses on his own behalf.
- (2) The prisoner or internee had recourse to the services of a qualified interpreter.
- (3) The punishment imposed was announced to the prisoner or internee and also to the prisoner's representative.
- (4) A record of all imposed nonjudicial punishment was maintained in the office of each commissioned officer authorized to impose nonjudicial punishment and such record was open to inspection by representative of the protecting power or a delegate of the ICRC. The form illustrated in appendix II was used to maintain this record.

d. Execution of Punishment.

- (1) The period between the announcement of punishment and the commencement of its execution did not exceed one month.
- (2) Under no circumstances was a prisoner undergoing confinement as nonjudicial punishment deprived of --
 - (a) The opportunity to exercise and to stay in the open air at least two hours daily.
 - (b) Permission to read and write.
 - (c) Permission to send and receive letters.

e. Confinement prior to Hearing.

- (1) No prisoner or internee was placed in confinement prior to a hearing unless the conduct of the prisoner or internee rendered it essential to the maintenance of camp order and discipline.
- (2) Prehearing confinement was kept to the absolute minimum and did in no event exceed fourteen days. During confinement prisoners and internees had permission --
 - (a) To read and write.
 - (b) To send and receive letters.

f. Clemency. Abatement of nonjudicial punishment in view of good conduct was a matter of clemency and rested in the discretion of the officer imposing the punishment.

g. Judicial. There were two types of commissions for the trial of prisoners and internees for postcapture offenses: Special Military Commission and General Military Commission.

- (1) Jurisdiction of persons. These commissions had jurisdiction over all prisoners and internees who were in the custody of the convening authority.
- (2) Jurisdiction of offenses. These commissions had jurisdiction over all postcapture offenses, including but not limited to, all violations of the laws and customs of war, all violations of the laws of the ROK, all violations of rules, regulations, or orders, applicable to prisoners and

internees, promulgated by the CINCUNC or his authorized representatives, all violations of rules, regulations, or orders of camp commanders or their authorized representatives, and all other acts to the prejudice of good order and discipline among prisoners and internees.

h. Membership of Commissions.

(1) Appointment. The members of each commission were appointed by the Commanding General, Eighth United States Army, or under authority delegated by him.

(2) Number.

(a) Each General Military Commission consisted of not less than five members.

(b) Each Special Military Commission consisted of one or more members but not more than three.

(c) Where an offense involved victims of more than one nation, each such nation, in the discretion of the convening authority, could be represented on the commissions.

i. Eligibility.

(1) Any commissioned officer of the armed forces of the UNC including any commissioned officer of the armed forces of the ROK, was eligible for membership on a commission.

(2) The convening authority, in his discretion, could appoint as a member of a commission any citizen who was a citizen of any nation of the UN, including any citizen of the ROK.

j. New Members. The convening authority filled any vacancy occurring in a commission and made any additions to a commission. The substance of all proceedings had and of evidence taken in the case on trial, however, was made known to each new member. The fact that the substance of all proceedings had and evidence taken in the case had been made known to each new member was announced by the President of a commission in open court.

k. Qualification of Members of the Commissions.

- (1) General. The convening authority appointed to a commission only persons who were competent to perform the duties involved and who were not disqualified by personal interest or prejudice. No person, however, sat as a member of a commission in any case in which he was the accuser or investigator or in which he was required as a witness for the prosecution.
- (2) President. The President was especially selected by reason of his experience, maturity, and judicial temperament.
- (3) Law member. The law member of a General Military Commission was a member of the Judge Advocate General's Corps, or its equivalent; or an individual certified by The Judge Advocate General, or his equivalent; or a member of any of the UN armed forces qualified under applicable law to sit as law member or law officer on a general court-martial, or its equivalent; or a commissioned officer, or civilian, of

the UNC who had been certified by the convening authority to be a member of the bar in good standing of any nation, or territory or division thereof, of the UN.

l. Duties of Members of Commissions. The members of a commission heard the evidence; without partiality, favor, or affection, determined the guilt or innocence of the accused; and if the accused was found guilty, adjudged a proper sentence.

m. Defense Counsel. In each trial, the accused had a defense counsel either chosen by himself, the protecting power, or the ICRC, or appointed by the detaining power. The defense counsel explained his duties to the accused and prepared the defense. The defense counsel or a duly appointed successor represented the accused until the term of appeal expired. He guarded the interests of the accused by all honorable and legitimate means.

n. Powers of the Commissions.

- (1) General. The commissions had power to impound money and property, to compel the attendance and detention of witnesses, to require witnesses to produce documents and property, to punish for contempt, to administer oaths and affirmations, and to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. Subject to review by the convening authority, a commission could debar for cause a counsel from practicing before it.

(2) Contempts.

- (a) A General Military Commission had the power to punish for contempt by imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding \$500, or by both fine and imprisonment, any disobedience of its mandates or any contempt.
- (b) A Special Military Commission had the power to punish for contempt by imprisonment for one month or by fine not exceeding \$50.00, or by both fine and imprisonment, any disobedience of mandates or any contempt.

o. Rules and Forms. A commission had the power to adopt supplementary rules and forms to govern its procedure, not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.

p. Authorized Punishment.

- (1) General. The table of maximum punishment or its equivalent, in effect in the armed forces of the nation of the convening authority, was used as a guide in determining the proper punishment.
- (2) General Military Commission. A General Military Commission could sentence an accused, upon conviction, to death, confinement to hard labor for life, or for any lesser term, or such other punishment as the commission determined to be proper, consistent with the customs of war in like cases in the armed forces of the nations of the convening authority.

- (3) Special Military Commission. A Special Military Commission could sentence an accused, upon conviction, to confinement at hard labor for six months or for any lesser term, as the commission determined to be proper, consistent with the customs of war in like cases in the armed forces of the nation of the convening authority.

g. Trial. The trials were conducted in a fair, impartial manner in accordance with the procedures prescribed in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1951.

r. Interpreters. If necessary, the accused was provided an interpreter, who before entering upon his duties took an oath or affirmation in a form recognized as binding by him, to perform his duties faithfully and truly.

s. Sentence.

- (1) Reference of record. Before acting on a record of trial, the convening authority referred it to his staff judge advocate for review and advice.
- (2) Approval of sentence. No sentence was approved by the convening authority unless upon conviction established beyond reasonable doubt of an offense within the jurisdiction of the commission, and unless the record of the trial had been found legally sufficient to support the findings.

t. Powers of Convening Authority upon Review. The convening authority had the authority to approve, disapprove, mitigate, remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend, reduce, or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or, without prejudice to the accused, remand the case for a rehearing before a new commission. However, the convening authority did not have the authority to increase the severity of the sentence, nor to order the rehearing on a charge or specification as to which the commission had found the accused not guilty. Upon approval of a sentence to imprisonment for a term of years, the convening authority allowed the accused credit for all time theretofore served in confinement as a suspect.

u. Finality of Judgment. Except as otherwise provided in t, above, the judgment and sentence of a commission were final.

v. Execution of Sentence.

- (1) General. No sentence was carried into execution until it had been approved by the convening authority.
- (2) Death sentences. No sentence of death was carried into execution until it had been approved by the convening authority and confirmed by the CINCUNC. No death sentence was carried into execution until the expiration of a period of at least six months from the date of the receipt by the accredited Delegate of the ICRC of the notification of findings and sentence.

w. Appeals.

- (1) Right of petition. At any time within one year after the convening authority approved the sentence, the accused could petition the convening authority for a new trial or other appropriate relief. The petition could be submitted by the accused or by his counsel or representative; however, a petition could not be submitted after the death of an accused. This right of petition did not require that the execution of sentence be delayed to permit a petition for a new trial or related remedy, nor did the presentation of a petition operate to stay the execution of a sentence.
- (2) Action on petition. The convening authority was authorized to dismiss the petition, to grant a new trial, to vacate the sentence or any part thereof, to mitigate, remit, or suspend the sentence or any part thereof, and to restore the rights, privileges, and property affected by such sentence. In the event a petition was filed in a case involving the death penalty and the convening authority had already taken his action approving the sentence to death and forwarded the case to the confirming authority, the petition was forwarded promptly to the confirming authority for action by him.

x. Participation of International Committee of the Red Cross.

Where an accredited Delegate of the ICRC had been accepted by the UNC, such delegate was entitled to attend all trials unless the proceedings were held in secret for security purposes. No secret proceedings were held, however, without the concurrence of the CINCUNC. If a delegate requested permission to attend proceedings to be held in secret, this request was communicated immediately to Headquarters, United Nations Command, Attention: Command Judge Advocate.

y. Difference in the Treatment of Males and Females. No differences in the treatment of males and females existed because of sex. Females were treated with all the regard due their sex.

48. Visitors, International Committee of the Red Cross⁵

a. Purpose and Procedures. (See paragraph 125.)

b. Authority To Enter Enclosures and Compounds.

- (1) Entrance into an occupied enclosure or compound by any person, military or civilian, was prohibited unless his official duties in connection with the administration, custody, control, welfare, and security of prisoners and internees required his presence inside the enclosure or compound.

5. Letter, AG 383.7 (3 Nov 51) PM, General Headquarters, United Nations Command, 3 Nov 51, subject: "Administrative Instructions Reference Handling Civilian Internees," and McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 66-67.

- (2) Requests or demands by visiting VIP's, military or civilian, for entry into an occupied enclosure or compound were denied pending authorization by CINCUNC. Such requests or demands were forwarded through Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, for necessary action.

49. Public Information⁶

a. Representatives of the press were afforded full cooperation. There were no restrictions on their taking pictures; however, pictures which tended to ridicule the prisoners were not permitted and all pictures were forwarded to the Press Advisory Division, Prisoner of War Command, for general censorship. From September 1950 until many months later, there were several instances where reporters attempted to take pictures of unwilling prisoners and to obtain interviews with prisoners by subterfuge, such as contacting them while on work details. There were instances of reporters going to Kojedo by commercial means when that project was still classified. Limitations imposed on members of the press were --

- (1) They were not permitted to talk with interned personnel.
- (2) They were not permitted to talk with any guard while on duty.
- (3) They were not permitted to enter any occupied enclosure or compound without authority of the camp commander.

6. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 2, to Tab 3, pp. 2-3, and Sullivan, op. cit.

b. Official photographers were permitted to take any pictures as directed by the Prisoner of War Command or higher headquarters. Prior to taking any pictures, however, permission was cleared through G2, Prisoner of War Command.

c. The taking of pictures by private individuals was permitted subject to the following restrictions:

- (1) Cameras were not permitted inside any enclosure or compound.
- (2) No pictures were permitted of any prisoner or group of prisoners who in any manner objected to being photographed.
- (3) Female prisoners were not photographed.
- (4) The use of telephoto lens was prohibited.

Section II. DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN PROCESSING ORIENTAL POW'S AND CI'S⁷

50. Lack of Records prior to 1951

Records for prisoners and internees were maintained primarily for identification purposes. Due to the tactical situations and other conditions, records of prisoners and internees in the early phases of the conflict were not complete for identification purposes.

51. Results of the Lack of Records

a. The lack of records for identification purposes resulted in POW's being able to conceal their identities. This caused duplication in

7. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 1 to Tab B-8, pp. 84-89 and Appendix "C" to Inclosure 2, Tab B-8, p. 98.

the rosters presented to the enemy power and resulted in the UN having to explain why some POW's who were processed under different names as different POW's were not repatriated or otherwise accounted for.

b. The incident occurring on 18 February 1952, together with the brutalities in the compounds populated with Communist and non-Communist prisoners, necessitated Operation "Scatter" in order to move the minority groups to compounds of like political beliefs. Operations of this type must take into consideration the time element required for properly processing the records, and the records should be completed prior to the transfer of the prisoners. When the records are completed, the prisoners have less chances for concealing their identities.

c. Operation "Scatter" resulted in moving the non-Communist Chinese POW's to Cheju-do and the non-Communist Korean prisoners to the mainland of Korea in order to separate them from the Communist threat. The many problems of processing and lifting 82,000 prisoners by water and rail to new camps were complex. Daily shipments involved from 6,000 to 9,000 POW's. No incidents of importance occurred during this operation; however, the records of the prisoners were confused in many instances and it was impossible to establish positive identification. The required haste in shipping POW's precluded accuracy and completeness in processing the records.

52. Difficulties in Processing POW's

a. Language Barrier. Many difficulties arose in translating the Korean and Chinese names into English equivalents. Qualified interpreters often gave different English translations for the same name. This resulted in the same POW having two or more English names and caused errors in the records. To some extent it increased, on paper, the number of POW's and CI's in the custody of the UN. Standard transliteration guides were developed; however, they were not always available for processing prisoners and the confusion still remained.

b. Uncooperativeness of Prisoners. The POW's soon realized that the identification system depended on self-identification requirements set forth by the Geneva (POW) Convention and they often refused to identify themselves correctly.

c. Difficulties in Identification.

- (1) Photographs. Each POW and CI was photographed as soon as possible after capture or after taken into custody; the picture, however, was not sufficient to identify positively the individual.
- (2) Fingerprints. The only sure means of identification was through fingerprints. In order to identify a POW or CI, each individual's fingerprints were taken and placed on the appropriate records.

d. Final Action. An identification and fingerprint classification team was initiated by the Prisoner of War Command and formed by the Prisoner of War Command Central Records Section. It was placed on temporary duty at UNC POW Camp No. 8 on Cheju-do on 2 November 1952. Fingerprint cards with classifications (UNC Form 20) were completed, and true copies of basic personnel records were prepared to replace inadequate field copies. The fingerprint cards became part of a file of fingerprint classifications on all POW's in the custody of the UN. The identification of POW's and CI's, the making of a new copy of the basic personnel record, and the preparation of the fingerprint cards for 5,800 POW's at UNC POW Camp No. 8, required more than one month to complete. Based on the experience gained in this operation, a standing operating procedure was published as a guide for further operations, including the taking of photographs. On 2 December 1952, the team proceeded to UNC POW Camp No. 1c on Pongam-do to continue the program. Three identification and fingerprint teams were formed after the return of five officers and forty enlisted men from the fingerprint school in Japan. These teams were sent to UNC POW Camp No. 1a at Chogu-ri on 15 January 1953. The completion of the fingerprint classification program resulted in the following:

- (1) All POW's and CI's were identified by classified fingerprints on forms printed for that purpose. This permitted ready identification of POW's and CI's at any time.

- (2) The Prisoner of War Central Records Section had the following files:
 - (a) Basic personnel record with fingerprint classification entered on the form and filed by internment serial number.
 - (b) Fingerprint cards with rolled and flat impression fingerprints, classified and filed by the "Henry" system of fingerprint classification, the same as that employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
 - (c) Film library with photographs of all POW's and CI's in the custody of the UN.
- (3) The camp records sections had new copies of the basic personnel record with rolled and flat impression fingerprints classified and up-to-date photographs.
- (4) The final results were that, for the first time during the Korean conflict, each POW and CI in the custody of the UN could be positively identified and an accurate roster could be produced.

Section III. REQUESTS, COMPLAINTS, AND PETITIONS

53. Rights of POW's

Article 78, Geneva (POW's) Convention, states that POW's have the right to make known to the military authorities in whose power they are, their requests regarding the conditions of captivity to which they are subjected. POW's have the unrestricted right to apply to the

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representatives of the protecting powers either through their prisoners' representative or, if they consider it necessary, direct, in order to draw their attention to any points on which they may have complaints to make regarding their conditions of captivity. These requests and complaints shall not be limited nor considered to be a part of the correspondence quota established for POW's. Even if they are recognized to be unfounded, they may not give rise to any punishment. Prisoners' representatives may send periodic reports on the situation in the camps and the needs of the POW's to the representatives of the protecting powers.

54. Procedures for Handling Requests, Complaints, and Petitions⁸

a. POW's and CI's were authorized to submit requests or grievances in writing through their compound representatives.

b. All such documents were delivered to the compound commander for transmittal through the enclosure commander to the camp commander. In no case were these documents forwarded direct to the camp commander. The reply of the camp commander was returned, through channels, to the compound representative who in turn promptly delivered it to the POW concerned.

c. POW's and CI's also had the right to apply to the representatives of the ICRC, either through their compound representative,

8. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 37-38, 52-53; inclosure 2 to Tab 3, pp. 5-6; and Memorandum Number 30, Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, 26 September 1952, subject: "Disposition of Petitions Initiated by Prisoners of War."

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or, if they deemed necessary, direct, in order to draw attention to any points on which they had complaints regarding their conditions of captivity.

d. When a POW or CI submitted a complaint, he included his signature, grade, ISN, and the number of the enclosure in which he was interned. The enclosure commander insured that this information appeared on the complaint before he forwarded it. If the complaint did not include this information, it was returned to the POW or CI for including the desired information. The forwarding of unsigned complaints created congestion in the prisoners' and internees' mail and served to delay other mail. Each complaint addressed to the camp commander was written in the language of the POW or CI.

e. All complaints initiated by POW's or CI's addressed to higher commanders, persons, and organizations (military or civilian) which contained allegations of mistreatment or mismanagement of prisoners or internees were accompanied by a statement verifying the veracity of the allegations.

f. A request for an interview with the camp commander or the representative of the ICRC was submitted through channels. Upon approval of the camp commander authorizing an interview, the enclosure commander had the concerned POW escorted under guard to the camp commander's office.

g. Complaints were brief and clearly stated.

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h. At one time, petitions addressed to the following were forwarded to the Prisoner of War Command for action as indicated:

<u>Petitions Addressed To</u>	<u>Action</u>
Members, Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command	Commanding General, Prisoner of War Command
Members of Headquarters, KComZ	Forwarded Commanding General, KComZ
Members of Eighth United States Army	Commanding General, Prisoner of War Command. Informal report of action taken to CG, KComZ, ATTN: CZPM
Official of the ROK Government	Forwarded to Commanding General, KComZ, ATTN: G5
International Committee of Red Cross representative; Government officials (other than ROK); and others not indicated herein	Forwarded to Commanding General, KComZ, ATTN: G5

i. Prior to forwarding the petition, the validity of the claim was determined and appropriate recommendations were included in the letter of transmittal.

j. The provisions contained in i, above, were changed to the following procedures:

- (1) Petitions addressed to camps or subordinate commanders were handled by the respective camp commanders.
- (2) Petitions addressed to the Commanding General, Prisoner of War Command, higher commanders, persons and organizations (military and civilian) in a higher echelon than the prisoner-of-war camp, were forwarded to Commanding General, Prisoner of War Command, ATTN: PWGI, for disposition.

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- (3) Petitions forwarded to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, for disposition were accompanied by translations, and included a statement verifying the petitioner's identity and other pertinent remarks, including recommendations.

Section IV. RECORDS AND REPORTS

55. Theater Prisoner of War Information Bureau

This bureau, maintained at theater headquarters, provided technical supervision and coordination of prisoner accounting for the theater commander, as well as administrative processing in establishing identities and issuing internment serial numbers.

56. Preparation and Distribution of Records and Reports⁹

a. DA Form 19-2, "Basic Personnel Record." This form carried all of the identifying information required by the Geneva (POW) Convention as well as spaces for fingerprint impressions and photographs of the prisoner. It was made out in five copies by the prisoner-of-war processing teams at the time of initial processing. One copy was forwarded to the Prisoner of War Central Records Section; three copies were sent to the theater FWIB, where one copy was withdrawn and two copies were forwarded to the EPWIB, Fort Holabird, Maryland; and one copy accompanied the prisoner to his place of confinement.

9. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 8-9.

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b. UNC Form 17, "Weight and Immunization Record." Because of international interest in how closely the UNC conformed to the provisions of the Geneva (POW) Convention in regard to the health and welfare of POW's, a form was devised and approved on 4 March 1952 to keep periodic weight records of each POW, as well as a record of the date and type of immunization administered. This form was maintained at enclosure level and was also used for CI's.

c. UNC Form 14, "Locator Card." This form was devised for use in POW and CI camps and was approved 26 April 1951. It was filed in numerical sequence by ISN, showing current location of the POW or CI by compound and enclosure. It was used only at camp level.

d. POW Form 100, "Internee Strength Report." This report was submitted daily by each camp to the Prisoner of War Central Records Section, Prisoner of War Command. In addition the strength by camps was telephoned daily prior to 1200 hours to the Prisoner of War Records Section, Prisoner of War Command.

e. UNC Form 20, "Internee Fingerprint Card." This form was devised to facilitate identification of the classification of fingerprints and was filed at the Prisoner of War Central Records Section. It was approved for use in October 1952.

f. UN AGO Form 7, "Notification of Death" (Korean POW and CI);
UNC AGO Form 13 (Chinese POW). See paragraph 45m, above.

g. Reports of Escapes and Apprehension. See paragraph 45j, above.

h. Others. Other reports included the following:

- (1) DA AGO Form 8-166, "Roster of Seriously Ill." Submitted daily by the commanding officer of prisoner-of-war field hospitals.
- (2) Form MD-76, "Hospital Daily Admission and Disposition." Prepared daily by the commanding officers of the hospitals concerned.
- (3) MFGP Form 199, "Record of Nonjudicial Punishment." Prepared at enclosure level.
- (4) MFGP Form 23, "Individual Clothing and Equipment Record." Prepared at enclosure level.
- (5) Roster of transfer. Prepared by the losing installation.
- (6) Report of new prisoners. Prepared by the gaining installation.
- (7) Reports of incidents. See appendix III.
- (8) Grenade and ammunition. A monthly report of CN and CN/DM grenades, by type, and ammunition by type and calibre was submitted by each camp commander to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, so as to reach that office not later than the 5th of the month following the month covered by the report.
- (9) Standard Form 91A or 92, as applicable. This report was prepared by the agency having custody of POW's who were

working and who became sick or were injured while working.

- (10) Fire instructions. Each camp commander submitted a monthly report in writing stating that all personnel in his command had had their attention called to the current fire instructions.

Section V. TRANSFERS BETWEEN CAMPS¹⁰

57. Administrative Procedures

a. Authority To Transfer. The authority to transfer POW's and CI's between camps came from Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command.

(1) The losing agency used the following procedures:

- (a) Submitted to Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Prisoner of War Command, requests for transfers with the reasons therefor in three copies.
- (b) Prepared sufficient copies of the roster of transfer to give all interested agencies at least three copies.
- (c) Identified each POW or CI transferred by fingerprint comparison with his field DA Form 19-2. POW's and CI's who could not be identified were not transferred.
- (d) Entered the necessary changes to cover the transfer on the morning report. POW's and CI's from different

10. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 6-7, 76, Inclosure 2 to Tab 3, pp. 47-49; Inclosure 3 to Tab E, pp. 166-169.

enclosures were listed on separate rosters. In case of the transfer of five or more persons, a copy of the roster of transfer was attached to each copy of the morning report.

- (e) When the receipt, b(5), below, was received by the enclosure records clerk, he called the gaining agency and verified the receipt.
- (2) The gaining agency used the following procedures:
 - (a) Made a headcount of POW's or CI's received and identified them by fingerprint comparison.
 - (b) Filed field DA Form 19-2's and UNC Form 17's. Posted new locations on UNC Form 14's and filed the forms.
 - (c) Entered the necessary changes on the morning report.
- (3) A POW or CI who could not be identified because his field DA Form 19-2 did not accompany him was segregated until the form arrived.

b. Preparing the Records. The following records were prepared by the enclosure records sections that transferred the POW's or CI's and the records accompanied them:

- (1) DA Form 19-2, "Basic Personnel Record."
- (2) UNC Form 17, "Weight and Immunization Record."
- (3) UNC Form 14, "Locator Card."
- (4) Clothing form.

- (5) Two receipts were prepared. One was signed by the individual in charge of escorting the POW's or CI's. The other was signed by the individual receiving the POW's or CI's. The second receipt was returned to the enclosure records section immediately after the transfer had been completed.

These receipts contained the following information:

- (a) Name and ISN of each POW or CI.
- (b) Place from where the POW or CI was transferred and his destination.
- (c) The type of records sent with the POW or CI.

c. Preparing the POW's and CI's.

- (1) The POW or CI to be transferred was brought to the enclosure record section.
- (2) The records clerk and fingerprint specialist positively identified the person by means of comparing his fingerprints with those on his DA Form 19-2.
- (3) After the POW or CI had been identified, he was taken to the enclosure supply where he was given a thorough search and his clothing form was checked. If the POW or CI was short any clothing and equipment, he was sent back to his compound to obtain the shortage. When he returned, he was searched again. If the missing items were not found, the necessary corrections were made by the supply sergeant to complete his issue of clothing and equipment and a note

was attached to the clothing form stating the number and type of items missing. When the POW or CI reached his destination, the necessary disciplinary action was taken.

58. Security En Route

a. The minimum number of security (escort) guards for moving POW's and CI's were --

- (1) One to ten prisoners or internees - two guards.
- (2) Ten to 18 prisoners or internees - three guards.
- (3) Nineteen to 25 prisoners or internees - four guards.
- (4) More than 25 prisoners or internees - one additional guard for each additional five prisoners or internees.

b. Each security (escort) detail included at least one United States soldier in charge and one KATUSA or ROK soldier.

c. Medical attendants were furnished when deemed necessary by the medical officer at the losing installation. Medical attendants were not considered as security guards, nor were guards substituted for medical attendants.

Section VI. RELIGIOUS, EDUCATIONAL, RECREATIONAL
AND OTHER ACTIVITIES¹¹

59. Religious Services

a. Definition. The prisoner of war command defined a religious service as a gathering of worshippers at a service conducted or attended by a minister of religion from outside the compound.

b. Conduct. In September 1950, an early stage in the POW program, each camp had assigned to it a missionary who conducted the religious services for Christian POW's. A special tent was furnished in each compound for religious services. Professing Christian POW's were excused from work details on Sunday. This practice resulted in some rather questionable conversions to Christianity. Later, religious services were not held inside a compound but in an area or building within the enclosure designated by the camp commander as a place of worship. The Civil Information and Education (CI&E) Instructional Center was used when it was not otherwise utilized. Camp commanders insured that all POW's were notified of the scheduled periods of worship. POW's attending a particular service were segregated and accounted for by compounds. The camp commander insured that the necessary security measures were taken. The ministers of religion who conducted the services were cleared by the Assistant

11. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 16, and 195-198; and Sullivan, op. cit.

Chief of Staff, G2, Prisoner of War Command, prior to conducting the initial service in the enclosure.

c. Churches as Protection for Non-Communist Prisoners. In compounds where the POW's were predominately Communist, the non-Communist prisoners often sought safety in the temporary churches erected in the compounds. Since United States missionaries were continually visiting the churches, Communists were not bold enough in the early phase of the conflict to invade the churches. The churches, therefore, played just as important a role in protecting non-Communist POW's as the prisoners' dispensaries did for Communists in the early phase of the conflict.¹²

60. Health Education, Literacy, and Agricultural and Vocational Training

a. Health. Health education was attempted through organized classes in defector compounds and through use of posters placed on bulletin boards in other compounds.

b. Literacy. Literacy training through the primer stage was started among illiterate defectors but was discontinued when S2 objected to certain words in the books that were being used. Literacy training was never attempted among Chinese repatriates because of the

12. Kim Sun Ho, Captain, "Kojé-do in Complication:" (HUMRO Control No. A-3583-A) Human Resources Research Office, George Washington University, Washington, D. C. 1954.

hostile attitude of POW's toward Formosan Chinese who had to be used as teachers.

c. Agricultural and Vocational Training.

- (1) Agricultural and vocational training projects were the most valuable of all projects attempted in the Communist camps; both of which were resisted by the majority of the inmates.
- (2) A large number of POW's farmed the tillable land in and surrounding the camp areas. The agitating POW's were quite adept at destroying the agricultural tools, wasting seeds and fertilizer, and, in general, hampering and delaying the work. A large group of security guards and supervisors were required for this work. The results obtained at harvest time, however, were very gratifying and a substantial dollar saving was realized, even dwarfing the estimates reasonably hoped for.
- (3) The same delaying tactics were employed in the vocational training. However, as time progressed certain POW's who developed skills were utilized on the job exclusively until there was a substantial dollar reduction realized from the fruits of their labor, especially in construction of office and living quarters, furniture and implements, and necessities required by the POW's themselves. The rice bowl project developed by the camp commander at Koje-do was

very effective in furnishing replacement bowls constructed from scrap aluminum.

- (4) In Communist camps, agricultural and vocational work were the only profitable subjects that were introduced and which did not create excessive incidents and cause camp commanders serious problems in control. This was done only on a strict security basis, however, the ends justified the means and the overall result was the definite reduction of dollar expenditures.

61. CI&E Program

After the implementation of the CI&E program in July 1951, it became apparent that the Communists were utilizing this program to meet their own needs. They used the CI&E classrooms at night for clandestine meetings and "kangaroo courts." Mimeographed machines were improvised from materials furnished for the CI&E program. Shops were used to make wirecutters, knives, and spears. In August 1951 during one of the uprisings in Compound No. 76, the POW's seized a portable generator and a public address system used in the CI&E program and utilized it to broadcast propanganda that could be heard by POW's in enclosures as far as three miles away. This campaign continued for several hours until a reinforced company entered the compound and removed the equipment by force and liberated 12 POW's who had been tried and sentenced to death by the Communists.

62. Athletic Games

In August 1950, a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross donated volley balls to the POW's. As early as May 1951, athletic contests were organized. Prizes in the form of cigarettes, soap, and comfort items were awarded winners. The supervision of athletic games had to be very strict among Communist POW's because they converted athletic equipment into weapons to be used in defying their guards and enforcing discipline among non-Communist POW's. Much of the equipment issued was converted into military training aids for use in teaching principles of warfare and defiance.

63. Radio Broadcasts

From July 1950 until about June 1951, every effort was made to keep radios away from prisoners, especially those working in the troop housing area. The only POW's who would accept radio-type broadcasts were those who had defected and had chosen to resist Communism. All broadcasts had to be strictly censored. The Communist rebuttal to any program - even the simplest news type - was one of retaliatory demonstrations and counterpropaganda periods of their own.

Section VII. LESSONS LEARNED

64. Lessons Learned

The following lessons were learned in regard to the administration and personnel management in camps:

Cite a. All new POW's should be sent to a central camp for processing before being assigned to individual camps.

Cite b. POW's should be segregated by nationality and by political ideologies, as well as by officer and enlisted personnel, and by sex.

Cite c. POW's should be processed by trained personnel and a number of adequately trained personnel should be provided for the processing.

d. Incoming and outgoing mail of POW's and CI's must be strictly censored.

e. Adequate weight and immunization records for POW's and CI's should be maintained.

f. Prompt reporting of escapees will aid in their apprehension.

g. If a POW or CI is moved from an enclosure for medical reasons, he should be identified before he leaves the enclosure and before he returns. The use of fingerprints was found to be the best means of identification.

Cite h. Captured personnel should be closely screened to determine if they are POW's.

i. Before burial, the deceased should be positively identified, and a record should be maintained so that the grave could be located.

Cite j. POW's and CI's should be observed closely by security personnel to detect any minor violations of discipline and to correct such violations before they become major problems.

Cite k. Only orders that can be enforced should be given to POW's and CI's.

Cite l. Harsh treatment of POW's and CI's should be avoided.

m. Complete records should be maintained for POW's and CI's from the time of the capture of the first POW or internment of the first CI's.

n. A transliteration guide for translating foreign names into English should be provided processing teams.

Cite o. Demands from POW's or CI's should not be tolerated.

p. Before a POW or CI is transferred, his records should be prepared and they should accompany him.

q. Sufficient security guards should be detailed to accompany the movement of POW's or CI's to prevent any escapes or disorders.

Cite r. Agricultural and vocational projects were found to be better for POW's and CI's than any other types of projects.

Cite s. Radio broadcasts to POW's and CI's had to be strictly censored.

t. Athletic equipment had to be closely guarded to prevent POW's and CI's from converting the items into weapons to be used against the guards.

CWE u. In the future educational programs should be strictly controlled. The facilities for a CI&E program, such as shops, schools, stages for entertainment, books, and public address systems, should be placed outside the compounds or enclosures.

CHAPTER 5
COMMUNIST AND UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
ORGANIZATION, PLANS, AND OPERATIONS

Section I. COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION,
TRAINING, AND OPERATIONS OUTSIDE UNC POW CAMPS¹

65. Organization

Two Communist agencies were responsible for communications between the POW's on Kojæ-do and Communists in North Korea, namely: the Guerilla Guidance Bureau and the Military Intelligence Section of the North Korean Army (chart 1, appendix IV).

a. Guerilla Guidance Bureau. The Guerilla Guidance Bureau was responsible for the infiltration of agents into South Korea and the control of guerilla operations. Thousands of bandits, agents, and guerillas surrendered or were captured by UNC counter-intelligence units. These captured personnel revealed the functions, duties, and missions assigned to them by the Guerilla Guidance Bureau under the leadership of General Pae Chol, who was also a Soviet Army officer.

b. Military Intelligence Section of North Korean Army. The Military Intelligence Section of the North Korean Army consisted of the elite of the North Korean military intelligence system.

1. The Communist War in POW Camps, Headquarters, United Nations and Far East Command. 28 January 1953.

To its Espionage Department was entrusted much of the transmission of the records and messages from POW's to North Korea. Intelligence teams consisting of 10 to 12 officers and noncommissioned officers with the grade of the team commanders varying from senior lieutenant to colonel were equipped with portable radios of USSR manufacture and were dispatched with instructions to form covert intelligence nets throughout South Korea. Some of these intelligence personnel operating in South Korea were captured and stated that they were part of, and trained by, the Espionage Department of the North Korean Military Intelligence Section. Generally, they were officers with cryptographic and signal training.

66. Training and Duties of Communist Agents

a. All agents were hard-core Communists. After selection, they were thoroughly schooled for two months in the following subjects: history of the USSR Communist Party and Korean Labor Party; Communist theory; methods of organizing party groups, either civilian or military; Korean revolution and world situation; and the situation in South Korea. The agents were directed specifically to spread propaganda among the POW's to the effect that unification of Korea under the North Korean Government was a certainty and that withdrawal of the United Nations forces from Korea was imminent. Also they were directed to emphasize that modern equipment was being given to the North Korean Army by the

USSR and China, that the life of the North Korean soldier had vastly improved, that high North Korean Government officials were concerned about the welfare of the POW's, and that high respect and consideration would be shown POW's upon their return.

b. To stimulate maximum loyalty and zeal in their mission, the agents were told that an armistice definitely would be signed and that they soon would return to North Korea. To dispel fears previously engendered by the Communist propaganda that the United States forces killed all POW's, the Communist leaders now stated that because of the armistice negotiations the enemy had stopped murdering POW's. As final encouragement and inducement, the agents were promised that they would be publicly praised and decorated upon their return. They would be treated as heroes of the North Korean people.

c. The agents organized cells. Specific instructions stipulated the establishment of cell organization committees in each POW camp and the close supervision within the cells including their smallest units. The agents assigned North Korean officers to responsible positions within the cells in order to foster stringent military discipline. When the cells grew strong enough, they instigated and carried out strikes, protests, and demonstrations.

d. In addition to organizing cells, the agents were further instructed to investigate the attitude and conduct of each POW.

They were to obtain the names of those who had surrendered voluntarily, those who were unsympathetic to the North Korean Government, and those whom the camp authorities had called in several times for interrogation. Names of ROK guards and all informers posing as POW's were also to be obtained for future reference.

67. Key Figures

a. The key figures in the Communist intelligence system as related to POW behavior and the Panmunjom armistice negotiations were ---

- (1) Nam Il. Nam Il, Cultural Chief of Staff and Chief of the Security Agency of the North Korean Army, together with Lee Sang Jo and General Kim Pa met with the UNC representatives for the Panmunjom armistice negotiations. He was responsible for ensuring the loyalty of the army to the state by controlling all personnel through political officers or commissars. His rise as a Russian protege has been traced from a Russian Army career to a Russian-sponsored North Korean Army General.
- (2) Lee Sang Jo. Lee Sang Jo was Nam's Deputy at Panmunjom and was Chief of Collection of Military Intelligence in the North Korean Army. He was brought from Russia and placed in this position in July 1950.
- (3) Kim Pa. General Kim Pa has been identified as a former USSR MVD agent and was one of the high ranking officers

of the North Korean Political Security Department. Eye witnesses saw him at Panmunjom disguised variously as a lieutenant or sergeant where he served as a liaison officer between Panmunjom and Nam's Command in the North Korean Army Headquarters.

b. These three figures and the high command in North Korea issued instructions to the POW's in UN camps directing the POW's to disobey, challenge, and attack their guards. The POW's were to cause trouble so as to weaken the position of the UN in the Panmunjom armistice negotiations. If they succeeded in breaking out, they were to link up with the Communist bandits operating in South Korea, to terrorize the local populace, and to force the UNC to divert troops and equipment from the combat area. It was anticipated that the rioting POW's would meet with resistance and that they might be killed, but the POW's were expendable. The Communist leaders were ordered explicitly to disregard any possible consequences to the prisoners. The more casualties there were, the better the propaganda value. Moral condemnation of the UNC in the eyes of the world, it was reasoned, would help to weaken its firmness in the armistice negotiations.

c. These three men were doubly involved with carrying on the negotiations in furtherance of the objectives of the Communist hierarchy and devising and putting into effect measures, primarily

military, which would help to swing the negotiations to their advantage. Their assignment as delegates was only incidental to their continued performance of their military duties.

68. Communication

a. Methods of Communication. There was communication between the Communist high command and Communist leaders in the camps. Various ways were used to effect communication within the camp and from the camp to the outside.

- (1) Hospital. The Communists used the 64th Field Hospital as a clearing station for communication among compounds. The headquarters for the Communist organization at the hospital was Ward A-6. This communication organization was a major factor in organizing and controlling the POW's. Intercompound communication was accomplished by POW's who feigned illness to get into the hospital. Oral communication was then established between wards or contact was achieved by tying notes to rocks which were either thrown or lowered into the desired wards. Discharged POW patients carried the information back to their respective compounds. In this Communist organization, each ward was designated as a "yuk" or company and a group of wards as a "ku" or battalion. In addition to the patients, most of the POW workers in the hospital joined the Communist organization. Each was

interrogated by his ward leader to ascertain whether he was a good Communist; and, if he were, he was made a member of the Korean Labor Party and functioned as part of the communication system.

- (2) Other means of communication among POW's. Besides the hospital communication system, the prisoners used semaphore flags, hand signals, whistling and chanting, and threw rocks with messages wrapped around them for intercompound communications. Messages were placed in rations, clothing, and supplies delivered to various compounds.
- (3) Agents allowing themselves to be captured. Communication between prisoners and points outside the camps was accomplished chiefly by agents from North Korea who allowed themselves to be captured. Many agents were dispersed in frontline Communist units and, during small combat engagements, either surrendered or were "captured." This method enabled many agents to find their way through the normal prisoner-of-war channels into the compounds without detection. After capture and internment, they delivered the instructions inside the enclosures. Many prisoners captured by UN forces admitted that they were given the specific mission of being captured in order to penetrate the POW camps

on Koje-do. This system was augmented by covert agents on the outside who received and passed on messages from Communist prisoners for delivery in North Korea. Such messages even addressed to Kim Il Sung, (Supreme Military Commander of North Korea) and Mao Tse-tung were confiscated from POW's within the compounds.

- (4) Female agents disguised as refugees. Female agents were disguised as refugees. They were instructed to obtain employment at or live near POW hospitals or camps in order to aid Communist agents within the hospitals or camps.
- (5) Use of non-Communist press. The Communists utilized the non-Communist press for communication and planning. They anticipated that direct contact would not always be possible because of increased UN security measures. Thus, instruction was given in how to use the non-Communist press as a secondary and interim medium of contact. POW's said that copies of current newspapers were smuggled daily into compounds. Material for indoctrination lectures was prepared from the newspapers by distorting the published news items. The main advantage, however, was that these newspapers enabled the Communist leaders in the camps to keep current on developments in the armistice negotiations and thus to

time their activities, such as riots, disorders, and other acts of violence, to be most advantageous to the Communist negotiations.

b. Evaluation of the Communication System. Toward the end of 1951, the UNC became aware of increasing efforts by the Communists to keep in contact with POW's. The success of these efforts could not be measured. That the Communists would like to instigate trouble was taken for granted, but the POW's remained quiet and gave no evidence that anything was developing. Surprise was an essential ingredient in the Communist plot, and special care was taken to ensure it. Not until after the outbreak was it possible to fit the pieces together and reconstruct what had happened. In the armistice negotiations, only one major issue remained -- repatriation of POW's. Nam Il's delegation began to stall, and Communist propaganda became more vehement. That was the moment chosen for the POW's on Kojedo to riot. They carried out their instructions to the letter, and it must be admitted that initially the advantage of surprise enabled them to achieve a measure of success. Only stern counteraction by the UNC saved the situation and brought the camp under control. Even so, Nam Il gained an opportunity to attract worldwide attention with propaganda allegations of "illegal and barbaric persecution of Communist prisoners of war" by the UNC.

Section II. COMMUNIST POW MISSIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND OPERATIONS
WITHIN UNC POW CAMPS²

69. Problems Encountered in Early Stages of POW Program

Between September and December 1950, UN forces diverted thousands of persons into POW channels without proper screening. Later, these persons were screened and interned or released according to their status. During this period intelligence efforts were not sufficiently coordinated among the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force intelligence personnel. As a result of this ineffective coordination, at least 50 indigenous personnel who had been recruited and trained by United States Army and ROKA for operations behind enemy lines were captured by other than their parent units and were processed as POW's. Between September 1950 and February 1951, United States Army personnel developed information nets among the POW's; however, due to the necessity of furnishing able-bodied POW's for construction work, many of the key POW's who were providing information and were in the intelligence net were shifted to other compounds and enclosures. In addition as construction proceeded on Koje-do, it was necessary to transfer POW's to new enclosures and compounds from enclosures and compounds already established there. As a result, established information nets were

2. Ibid. McGarr, op. cit.; and Sullivan, op. cit.

repeatedly disrupted. After the construction program was completed more attention was given to the screening of POW's.

70. Communists POW Efforts in Early Stages of Internment

From September 1950 to April 1951 there were no overt indications of any intelligence or other organizational activity among the POW's. Shortly thereafter, however, information was received through G2, Eighth U. S. Army, that at least one and possibly several, USSR trained, political and military leaders had deliberately infiltrated into POW camps as ordinary POW's. Despite intensive attempts to locate and identify them, they were not found until October 1951. After April 1951, a Communist intelligence organization was detected in POW camps. In addition, a campaign of harrassment began including singing at night, sit-down strikes, complaints about food, occasional beatings of POW's at night, and the making of demands rather than requests.

71. Missions of Communist POW's in UNC POW Camps

From the beginning of the war, it was recognized that it would be in keeping with their character for the Communists to take the fullest advantage of the scrupulous adherence by the UNC to the 1949 Geneva Conventions without themselves being restrained by it in any way in their own actions. The exact nature of what they might attempt, however, was not apparent, nor was there evidence of anything unusual for more than a year. During this period,

Communist POW's in UNC camps were easily handled and followed orders and were relatively quiet. Such incidents as occurred were very similar to those known wherever there had been POW's in modern times. After this period of relative inactivity, the Communist POW's developed several objectives. Among them were the following:

a. They planned to organize completely and regiment POW's under hard-core Communist leaders so completely that all POW's would blindly follow the dictates of such leaders regardless of consequences.

b. They aimed to teach Communist ideology and political beliefs to other POW's not only to reduce defectors to a minimum but also to further the Communist education of those POW's who had not previously been indoctrinated in Communism.

c. They were to continue to contribute to the prosecution of the war; they kept fighting even after being captured. This belief of the Communists in themselves as "fighters" continuing the war within the POW camps, revealed in detail in countless interviews and seized documents, is shown with exceptional clarity and fullness in a hand-written exhortative party summary of the results of the Pongam-do riot of 14 December 1952. In this attempted mass breakout, 85 CI's were killed and 113 were wounded. According to the document, heavy casualties had been expected, and "our fighting comrades... were determined to die a glorious death." Though the

"task imposed on us by the party and fatherland" - which was to break out - could not be fulfilled, the "main purpose is to develop a class fight and to give the enemy a crushing defeat." The party leadership was satisfied that this had been done. In the "magnificent effort," the prisoners "lost nothing but their shameful lives in the fight, and these were for liberation and glorious victory." The uprising was a "legal fight... connected with the fatherland war." What made it successful from the Communist viewpoint was that by sacrificing themselves "the sons of Korea, the fatherland, and honorable fighters of the Great Stalin" had "exposed nakedly the inhumanitarian, brutal, cannibalistic, slaughtering violence of the American imperialists, causing the peaceable peoples of the whole world, the fatherland, the party, and all democratic nations to shout for revenge." They had "won a great victory by estranging the Americans from the peaceable peoples of the world." The UNC had been compelled to disclose the Pongam-do incident by radio, "without concealment, to the world," and "the press of the whole world devoted its attention to Compound F and the investigation of the incident." As a result, "the offensive by the democratic nations of the world against the crimes and slaughtering policy toward prisoners of war committed by the enemy is now developing briskly." This will, according to the document, "hasten the time of our rejoining the fatherland." Because of what it revealed

regarding the thinking of the Communist POW's, a translation of this document is included as appendix V. At a later stage, the expanding Communist organization clarified its objective as follows: "We must consider the possible rupture of the cease-fire negotiations which are now underway and be ready to liberate ourselves in accordance with orders from Kim Il Sung. The prisoners of war should educate themselves and surround themselves with Party members. All types of units must be organized to rise in revolt simultaneously in order to liberate all the prisoners of war and attack the ROK and American forces that now occupy Koje-do. After we win autonomous rights we will keep in touch with the commanding officer of the North Korean People's Army [NKPA] by wireless and will land in Korea proper. After that we will join the NKPA together with the Chiri-san guerrilla units."

d. In their attitude toward the North Korean and Chinese POW's in UNC camps, the Communists were faithful to their well-known axioms that the individual is of no importance except as he can contribute to Communist ends and that such ends justify the means. He has no rights of his own as a human being, least of all the right to consider himself freed by capture from the obligation to obey orders of his Communist military and political masters. The implication in the 1949 Geneva Conventions that his status as a POW entitled him to humane treatment is posed on his willingness

to cease resistance, but the Communists do not recognize any such obligation on his part. Though separated geographically from his army, he still is part of that army, and his sole obligation is to carry out such orders as it may have given him before his capture or gets to him after his capture. To the Communist, therefore, the 1949 Geneva Conventions have value not in safeguarding the welfare of their captured personnel but in assuring for the Communists circumstances in which they can do maximum harm to the detaining power and in providing a useful tool for propaganda exploitation of any countermeasures taken against the POW's.

e. The Communist POW's continued to follow and support the same political system which had dominated them while fighting.

f. Another objective was to create incidents resulting in casualties among POW's so as to give the impression to the world that the detaining power was killing helpless and peace-loving POW's. By this objective, the Communists hoped to embarrass the UNC in the eyes of the world and strengthen their position in the Panmunjom armistice negotiations. The plans for POW mutinies and other incidents were formulated by the very same Communists who were negotiating with the UNC representatives at Panmunjom.

g. Some missions of a secondary nature included general harrassment of the UNC and by various means causing the UNC to expend as much money and supplies as possible in keeping the POW's.

72. Clandestine Communist Political Organizations within UNC POW Camps and Compounds

a. Overall Organizational Structure. The overall organizational structure which the North Korean Communist developed to exploit the POW's on Kojé-do is shown in chart 2, appendix IV.

b. Mission and Organization of the Political Committee.

(1) Mission. Each compound had subordinate Political, Agitation, and Youth Association (military) sections, and members were divided into cells as in all Communist organizations. Some aims and principles of these political groups were:

- (a) "We are reborn members of the Party and will sacrifice our lives and display all our ability for the Party so that the North Korean People's Republic may win the final victory."
- (b) "We are reborn members of the Party and will be faithful to the Party and carry out the Party's proclamation to educate all prisoners of war."
- (c) "Our Party will implement the platform of the People's Republic to have all prisoners of war, indigenous refugees, or officers and soldiers of the Republic of Korea recognize the platform."

- (d) "Our Party will foster internationalism, try to be friendly with the Chinese Communist forces, and infuse class consciousness into United Nations soldiers."

(2) Organization.

- (a) A political committee was established to control POW's in the various compounds through four sections, Political Security, Organization and Planning, Military, and Agitation and Propaganda (chart 3, appendix IV). "Peoples Courts" were established to punish offenders who deviated from the party's policies or refused to join its militant organizations. Informants or loyal party members penetrated or were placed in every military echelon down to squad level.
- (b) The leader of the Political Committee or "General Leading Headquarters" was Jeon Moon Il listed as a private in the North Korean Army. Jeon has been identified by his fellow POW's as Pak Sang Hyon, one of the original members of 36 USSR-Korean group brought into North Korea by the USSR in 1945 to organize the North Korean Satellite State. Other members of this same USSR-Korean group were Kim Il Sung, Ho Kai, and Nam Il. Within the compounds, Pak went by the code name of Ro Sun Saeng. POW's have stated that he controlled all the compounds and personally ordered the

capture of General Dodd. He also was allegedly responsible for instigating the riots in Compound No. 77 against the UNC screening program for voluntary repatriation. He issued instructions, directives, disseminated propaganda. It was he who sentenced to death many of the POW's who dared to defy the Party directives.

(c) The four sections of the "General Leading Headquarters" had the following functions:

1. The Political Security or First Section was to investigate all Party members for any deviation from the Party line, recruit members, and take precautionary measures against outside infiltration. It was divided into two subsections as follows:

(a) The Organizational Security or First Sub-Section was -- "To conduct an investigation in secret of Party members involved in acts of petty individual heroism (as opposed to "heroic" group activity), factionalism, opportunism, and cowardice; and of degenerative, destructive elements who have been smuggled into the organization under the mask of democracy. All of these people will be blacklisted.

Only superior experienced members will be selected, and they will be dispatched to each company, platoon, and squad. Their status and functions will be kept secret, and they will perform their duties at the risk of their lives. They will investigate and report on all personnel within the assigned units and must be ready to report whenever the higher organization directs. A daily activity report will be submitted. In case a secret task is compromised, the respective members will be responsible for the indiscretion." Captured documents revealed how this section implemented its duties. Its plans included detailed instructions as to substance of tasks, dates, executors, responsible persons and supervisors.

- (b) Internal Security or Second Sub-Section was --
- "To strengthen the party by leading the prisoners of war to affiliate with the organization. Investigate the independent mob (those not under or amenable to Communist control) and all members under the Prisoner of War administration. Take precautionary measures against spies and agents to include agents of the Republic of Korea Army, civil interpreters, Christian ministers, Party

members with bad qualities, religionists, former security chiefs, draft evaders, reactionary groups, and those who associate with reactionary elements. The above people will be blacklisted. An outstanding experienced member will be subsection chief. One leader will be dispatched to each battalion -- a first grade member to each company and a second grade member to each platoon. Their status and mission will be secret; they will perform their duties at the risk of their lives and, if a task is compromised, the member will be held responsible." Captured documents revealed the task plans for this subsection; i. e., detailed instructions as to the substance of tasks, dates, executors, responsible officers and supervisors.

2. The Organization and Planning or Second Section was to maintain external liaison and contact with guerrillas, render intelligence reports on camp guards, and cover news and world events. It had two subsections with the following missions:
 - (a) External Liaison and Reconnaissance or Third Sub-Section was to make -- "Reconnaissance of the United Nations military establishment, channels of

communication, and supply lines. Connect with the guerrillas on the mainland and cooperate with the North Korean Army in accordance with instructions issued by the party in order to destroy the enemy's military establishment. Whenever the time is appropriate for an uprising or break, the members dispatched to the outside will assist the basic fighting units to get out of the compound by occupying stationary firing posts and guard posts by surprise attack, light signal fires on the hills, capture weapons, and destroy United Nations ammunition and armory storehouses. This subsection will be organized from Party members experienced in guerrilla fighting in China and South Korea, those who have a thorough knowledge of enemy weapons, and those who served in the North Korean Army in engineering and reconnaissance units. Members will be dispatched outside after strict investigation and examination of their ability." Specific instructions were given to the members of this group and, once outside of the compounds, they had the following orders: "After extrication, construct a partisan base and set fire to the camp's headquarters petroleum

dump, food storage and other supply areas, and destroy the transportation route. After completion of this duty, they will get to the mainland and report to an officer higher than major and join the partisans. Extrication or escape will be accomplished before dawn, while on work details, or during foggy weather."

- (b) External Intelligence or Fourth Sub-Section was --
- "To find out the type of enemy units by squad, platoon, company, etc., classified by military service through command post signs, marks on vehicles, signs, shoulder patches, and all other signs and appropriate weapons. Compile the full name, age, birthplace, address, and political ideas of all ROK soldiers, police, civilians, and government officials. All members must have a knowledge of affairs in South Korea and be able to speak English. The subsection will have ten plain members. They will be placed on outside work details in order to collect newspapers, military documents, and other papers in order to gain knowledge of international and internal affairs for our information in order to assist in attaining our final purpose." This subsection

had four units: USA, ROK, Civil, and Reconnaissance. The USA subunit was to make a chart with location of troops, names, formation and number, kinds of weapons, location of weapons, number of officers and noncommissioned officers, location of command posts and billets, condition of communications, and guard dispositions. The ROK subunit was to make a sketch chart with location of troops, names of troops, formation and number, kinds of weapons and location, number of officers and noncommissioned officers, location of command posts and billets, and conditions of communication. Furthermore, it was to make a record of any discord between officers and noncommissioned officers and the current ideas and thinking of the soldiers. The Civil subunit was to make a sketch chart with disposition of the National Police, their location, number of officers and their political thinking, and the location of the ROK CIC. The Reconnaissance subunit was to watch from inside the compounds and formulate reconnaissance reports and charts. The following table is an example of this type of reporting:

Movement of Enemy Military Power

TIME	ARMS	NO	NUMBER OF PEOPLE	MOVING DIRECTION	RESULT
0700	Carbine	50	Yankee (US) 54	Northeast	Unknown
	M-1	4			
0710	Carbine	4	Puppet Soldier (ROK) 25	Northeast	Unknown
	M-1	21			

3. The Military Section or Third Section was to safeguard staff members, documents, and communications and to punish all violators and reactionaries. Its two subsections had the following missions:

- (a) Guard Unit or Fifth Sub-Section was to accomplish the following: "One leader will be dispatched to each staff member as a bodyguard. Outstanding members will be chosen who have more than five years of party experience and more than three years in the NKPA. Each leader will control three plain members who must have served in the NKPA for more than three years. The members are required to keep the secrets of the staff members and if there is any compromise, the members will be punished for the indiscretion. They will be responsible for the staff members' safety under all circumstances and will submit activity reports every ten days. The members will sleep within staff rooms. Constant care should be exercised regarding the staff's health conditions (securing their health, food, and clothes); strict observation of internal opportunists, cowards, and reactionaries should be maintained to prevent the kidnapping of the staff members."

(b) Special Activity or Sixth Sub-Section was --

"To punish by physical or other means all reactionary, destructive elements and spies who act in defiance of the advice of party members and who violate the party regulations and rebel against the Fatherland and people. The subsection chief will have five or more plain members. They will be selected from those who have more than three years of experience in the Party. They must perform their duties at the risk of their lives and, in case secrets are compromised, they will be responsible for the indiscretion. The members of this group are the executioners or the strong-arm squads who punish, beat, and execute violators condemned by the 'Peoples Courts.'" In addition to the above enumerated "duties," the special activity units organized perimeter guards to prevent anti-Communist prisoners from escaping from their control. Forty-five men from each battalion usually were chosen for this duty.

4. The Agitation and Propaganda or Fourth Section was charged with the responsibilities of keeping statistics and documents and planning and preparing teaching material and propaganda. Its two subsections had the following missions:

(a) Statistics, Documents, and Publications or Seventh Sub-Section was -- "Responsible for safe-keeping documents, statistics, plans of other sections, and copying and reproduction of documents and directives for distribution." On the basis of intelligence received, this subsection established plans for new intelligence activities.

(b) Education and Culture or Eighth Sub-Section prepared propaganda, lectures, indoctrination, and agitation data.

c. Complexity of the Committee. The same clandestine committee existed in all compounds. These committees were centrally directed and basically the same. All were operated covertly and the high ranking staff officers and the basic organization were known by very few ordinary prisoners. These organizations were complex for three reasons:

- (1) To assure that the methods of operation remained secret and the leaders could not be identified. There was a staff section for directing the committee, and, at the lower levels, the typical Communist cell organization called the 3.3 system existed. The 3.3 system was based on a cell of three persons, one being the leader who contacted the next highest cell. Each plain member

controlled two other persons each of whom in turn controlled two other persons. This system operated from the top cell all the way down to the lowest cell. In this manner, the cell members knew only three other persons: the contact man and the two members they controlled.

- (2) To assure that the military leaders carried out the instructions of the political leaders. At all levels of command, the military leaders could not take any action without the approval of the political leaders at the same command level.
- (3) To establish a cross check on the loyalty of all POW's at all levels regardless of their position in the organizations.

d. The "Peoples Courts."

- (1) "Peoples Courts" were organized at various levels. For minor violations, the platoon leaders acted as judges while the company and battalion leaders were judges for more serious offenses. The Political Committee Courts -- the highest -- punished all serious offenses which could result in the death sentence.
- (2) A few of the many examples of "People's Court" actions and other activities of special activity subsections known to the UNC follow:

- (a) On 5 June 1952, a "Peoples Court" accused a POW of planning to overthrow the Communist regime in the compound. He denied the charge, but after having been beaten with fists, kicked, and struck across the shoulders with clubs made from tent poles, he made a "self-criticism," admitted lack of zeal for the Communist cause, but promised future loyalty.
- (b) A POW in Compound No. 10 was interrogated by the Communists and found not to belong to any North Korean Communist organization. He was alleged to be a traitor, sentenced to death, and murdered.
- (c) A prisoner accused of being an anti-Communist refused to speak before the Chief of the Political Committee in Compound No. 66 on 11 November 1951. All platoon members kicked or struck the prisoner. Two of them then took a section of a tent pole and beat him to death.

73. Clandestine Communist Military Organizations within UNC POW Camps and Compounds

a. The Organizational Structure. Once the political organization was established, Military Administrative Committees were set up in each compound. These committees established brigade or regimental headquarters to which the compound spokesman, interpreter,

monitor, and security chief were attached (chart 3, appendix IV). These were all under the command of the assistant brigade or regimental commander. The next echelon was the battalion, the basic "fighting" unit. The battalions had three or four companies, broken down into platoons and squads (chart 4, appendix IV). In lower units, the political organization was represented by the assistant commander of the battalion, company, platoon, or squad, who usually was the commissar or political officer. Other political agents, keeping their identities secret, infiltrated the lower echelons.

b. Organization of Compounds. Each compound was organized along military lines, and the barracks and other facilities were allotted as shown in chart 5, appendix IV.

c. Examples of Plans and Activities of the Military Administrative Committees. The following are examples of plans and activities of the Military Administrative Committees:

- (1) "In April of 1952, the leaders instructed the men to seize any USA or ROKA guards who entered Compound No. 77."
- (2) "The Communists had detailed maps of Kojedo showing locations of UNC troops and weapons and were constructing tunnels for the purpose of escape from the compounds."
- (3) "On 30 May 1952, the strategy of the Communists in compound No. 62 was to entice or decoy UNC troops between the 1st and 2nd Battalions and then surround them."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TIAL

Section III. UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION,
PLANS, AND OPERATIONS³

74. General

Before the establishment of the Prisoner of War Command on 14 August 1952, the S2 organization responsible for the intelligence activities in the Korean POW program was inadequate. The staff consisted of one lieutenant colonel who was also the S3, one captain as assistant S2, one operations sergeant, and one indigenous interpreter. In addition, for a short time a Korean speaking U. S. Army lieutenant was assigned to the section. At Koje-do from March through July 1951 four United States missionaries who had spent from 10 to 25 years in Korea were assigned as chaplains to carry on religious activities among the Christian POW's. They were a fruitful source of information about plots and plans, and they proved of value in screening Communist and non-Communist prisoners.

75. Basic Principles of Organization

When the nature of the Communist POW's was realized, it became obvious that a commander of a POW camp must have a good intelligence section. The intelligence system began at the Prisoner of War Command and extended down through each camp and enclosure. Where there were several large POW camps, the G2 network in its magnitude

3. McGarr, op. cit., Inclosure 4 to Tab C, pp. 119-124; The Communist War in the POW Camps, op. cit.

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could be roughly compared to the G2 organization in an army corps. While the mechanics of collecting information and processing it into useful intelligence are unusual, the basic principles of military intelligence remain the same as for a combat organization. The size and composition of the G2 section of the Prisoner of War Command and of the S2 sections of the various camps were influenced by many factors including the number of camps, the number of POW's in each camp, the location of the camps, the accessibility of the camps to enemy agents, the nationality of the POW's, the length of time the POW's were in captivity, and the magnitude of the war.

76. Organization Plan for G2 Section of Prisoner of War Command Having Several Camps Each Containing Several Thousand POW's

a. The G2 section of the Prisoner of War Command consisted of the following:

- 1 - G2, Colonel.
- 1 - Assistant G2, Lt Col.
- 1 - Intelligence Officer, Major.
- 1 - Administrative Assistant, WO.
- 1 - Chief Clerk, M/Sgt.
- 2 - Intelligence Analyst, 1 M/Sgt and 1 SFC.
- 1 - Intelligence Editor, M/Sgt.
- 1 - Order of Battle Specialist, SFC.
- 2 - Intelligence Specialists, Sgt.
- 1 - Stenographer, Sgt.

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5 - Translators (Korean), SFC.

1 - Translator (Chinese), SFC.

b. In considering the personnel required for the S2 section of a POW camp, a typical example may be a camp containing several enclosures which were serviced by two or more POW service units. Such an S2 section required the following personnel to perform duties as indicated:

- 1 - S2, Lt Col or Major.
- 1 - Assistant S2, Major or Capt.
- 1 - Operations Officer, Capt.
- 1 - Chief Clerk, M/Sgt.
- 1 - Intelligence Analyst, SFC.
- 1 - Editorial NCO, Sgt.
- 2 - File Clerks, Cpl.
- 3 - Clerk Typists, Cpl or Pfc.
- 2 - Interpreters.
- 10 - CIC Agents.⁴
- 6 - Interrogators.⁴
- 6 - Translators.

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4. These individuals were completely fluent in both the written and the spoken language of the POW's. Military personnel were preferred but that was of secondary importance to their command of the POW languages and their reliability.

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c. A typical S2 section of a POW service unit consisted of the following:

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- 1 - S2, Capt or 1st Lt.
- 2 - Intelligence NCO's, M/Sgt and SFC.
- 1 - Intelligence NCO for each enclosure, Sgt.
- 2 - Clerk typists, Cpl or Pfc.
- 1 - Translator.
- 2 - Interpreters.

d. An examination of the above intelligence sections shows that they were heavily staffed with translators and investigators. This was necessary because it had been learned from experience with the North Korean Communist POW's that most of the intelligence produced was the result of information obtained from documents and interrogations. [Special emphasis should have been placed on documents. It was found that Communist POW's could not operate their organizations and disseminate their information and directions without considerable documentation.]

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77. Intelligence Collection in POW Camps

a. Essential Elements of Information (EEI). The production of intelligence in a POW camp, as in any other operation, was based on essential elements of information. [The following list includes many of the EEI that were used.]

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- (1) What is the strength, composition, and identity of Communist and rightist elements in the camp, including the leaders?

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- (2) What is the strength, composition, and disposition of bandit groups in adjacent areas?
- (3) Will Communist groups and rightist groups within the installation continue to reinforce themselves and rule by force and if so, what is the probability of their success in these efforts?
- (4) Will Communist elements within the camp or in adjacent areas attempt to interfere with the operation of the installation and if so, when, where, in what manner, and in what strength?
- (5) Will Communists or non-Communists attempt to escape and if so, when, where, in what number, and for what reason?
- (6) Are POW's communicating with or attempting to communicate with elements outside the camp and, if so, by what means and to what extent?
- (7) Are elements outside the camp attempting to communicate with the POW's and, if so, by what means and to what extent?
- (8) Are POW's within compounds attempting to communicate with POW's in other compounds; if so, by what means and to what extent?
- (9) Have there been or are there any indications of uprisings, disorders, or sabotage against the UNC?

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- (10) What is the strength of Communist organizations and their degree of control over civilian communications, transportation, and law enforcing agencies in or adjacent to camp?
- (11) Is there any suspicious activity such as photographing, sketching, or the taking of soundings on beaches, in harbors, or dock areas adjacent to the camp?
- (12) Have any enemy or unidentified aircraft been sighted?
- (13) Have any enemy or unidentified surface or submarine craft been sighted?
- (14) On special holidays, are POW's planning any demonstrations and, if so, when, where, in what manner, in what strength, and for what purpose?
- (15) Are any elements of the indigenous population in or adjacent to the camp planning any demonstrations?

V b. Indications Which Provide Answers to EEI. The following is a list of indications which may be incorporated into a collection plan to provide the answers to the above listed EEI. Many of these indications will apply to two or more of the EEI.

- (1) The establishment by POW's of rosters, organization charts, manning tables, or other organizational literature or documents.
- (2) The conduct of military training, organized demonstrations, disturbances, riots, political indoctrination

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classes, and organized resistance or passive resistance to camp authorities.

- (3) Submission of petitions, passing of subversive literature and propaganda, initiation of stereotyped unjustified protests.
- (4) Attempts to gain recognition and official sanction of rightist organizations or POW's.
- (5) Attempts to gain information relative to strength, disposition, duties, and type of personnel performing security functions.
- (6) Distribution of propaganda among forces of the UNC to foster disaffection or dissension.
- (7) An increase in strength, equipment, and activity of militant groups adjacent to the camp which might be used to execute sabotage missions, form guerrilla organizations, or assist in hostile action on troops or installations.
- (8) The construction and fabrication of crude weapons, such as knives, hammers, barbed-wire flails, spears, hatchets, clubs and wire cutters.
- (9) Preparation of subversive literature, charts and propaganda, and the development of military and political organizations.

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- (10) Increase in harassment activities by POW's or increase in their refusing to comply with orders or tardiness or reluctance in complying with orders of camp authorities.
- (11) POW's found beaten or killed or an increase in the number of POW's fleeing compounds stating that they were anti-Communists or that they feared they would be killed. Unusual tension, uneasiness, or apprehensiveness on the part of POW's.
- (12) Attempts to bribe, indoctrinate, propagandize or influence guard personnel.
- (13) POW's storing food reserves, clothing, or equipment; finding of currency in the compounds or in possession of POW's.
- (14) Removal of markings on clothing or equipment by POW's.
- (15) POW's talking to civilians and soldiers, or attempting to communicate with indigenous employees.
- (16) Contraband, such as newspapers, documents, unauthorized letters or messages, found in enclosures or on POW's.
- (17) The finding of Government clothing and equipment for POW issue in shops and markets in surrounding areas.
- (18) Suspicious civilians located in camp areas.
- (19) Signals, visual and auditory, from surrounding areas intended for POW's.
- (20) Finding of radio or telegraphic transmission equipment.

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- (21) POW's switching from one compound to another within an enclosure.
- (22) Lack of cooperation by civilian contractors or indigenous employees.
- (23) The construction of banners and flags by POW's.
- (24) POW's constructing stages, writing plays and dramas, and constructing musical instruments.
- (25) POW's conducting mass meetings, singing, and demonstrating.

c. A sample of an intelligence annex to an operation order is contained in appendix VI.

76. Procedure for Screening Newly Interned POW's

a. All newly arrived POW's at the reception camps (par. 45) were quartered in a separate compound. The Prisoner of War Central Records Section prepared the personnel records. The CIC, in accordance with instructions from G2 of Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, conducted an interrogation and made an initial segregation. When subsequent investigations were completed, a roster showing name, grade, ISN, nationality, date of birth, political adherence, and desire to be repatriated or not was furnished to the G2, Prisoner of War Command. Any intelligence files, including copies of interrogation reports, were forwarded by the losing camp S2 to the gaining camp S2, utilizing the senior escort guard as

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the courier. The losing camp S2 prepared a 5" x 8" card in duplicate on each POW considered of intelligence interest. One card was forwarded to the gaining camp S2 and one card was forwarded with the roster prepared by the CIC to the G2, Prisoner of War Command. The latter card contained information of interest to G2, Prisoner of War Command including pertinent background on the POW, e. g., suspected of being a war criminal or Communist agent, and listed any available reports on the POW in question.

b. Following this reception procedure, G3, Prisoner of War Command directed shipment of POW's to designated camps. When new POW's arrived at permanent camps, they were segregated from old POW's for a period of observation until such time as the camp commander was satisfied with their status. Successive new groups of POW's were placed in the same compound and processed in a like manner. After the camp commander was satisfied with the status of a POW, that POW would then be absorbed in other compounds or enclosures.

79. Interrogation of POW's

One of the most important means of obtaining intelligence was through the interrogation of POW's. Interrogation of POW's was conducted at any time that was practicable. During the confinement period, the interrogation did not interfere with medical processing or quarantine periods.

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80. Censorship and Control of Mail

a. Correspondence and postal consignments addressed to or dispatched by CI's were censored and examined by internee camp commanders to the extent deemed necessary to ensure security and to safeguard the essential interests of the UNC. The Commanding General, Eighth U. S. Army, made arrangements for the delivery of mail to CI's from persons within the ROK; from CI's to addressees in the ROK; and for the exchange of mail between CI's and persons in other countries.

b. See paragraph 45f for additional information regarding censorship and control of mail.

81. POW Intelligence Files and Personality Cards

a. A POW intelligence file and a personality card were initiated and maintained for each of the following categories of POW's at each camp:

- (1) Top leaders and staff members of any leftist or rightist organization that existed in camp.
- (2) Former leaders and staff members described in (1) above.
- (3) Consistent trouble-makers.
- (4) Agitators.
- (5) Regimental level or higher rank officers, military and political.
- (6) Known or suspected agents or "plants."

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- (7) Former intelligence personnel.
- (8) Former members of the North Korean Security Police.
- (9) Known or suspected war criminals.
- (10) Escapees (including those who attempted to escape).
- (11) POW's who attacked UNC personnel.
- (12) Informants.
- (13) New POW's on whom an intelligence file and/or personality cards had been opened.

b. An intelligence file contained the following information:

- (1) Personal history (copy of completed DA Form 19-2).
- (2) Interrogation reports.
- (3) Copy of any investigation conducted relative to the POW.
- (4) Record of punishment, included offense committed.
- (5) Any additional information of an intelligence nature.

c. A personality card (5" x 8" card or paper of same size, if the cards were not available) was made in duplicate. One copy remained in the camp and the other was forwarded immediately to G2 Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command. The personality card contained the name, grade, ISN, nationality, date of birth, political adherence, category of POW's shown above, reference to any documents on him in his intelligence file, his desire regarding repatriation, and, if possible, a short resume of his potentialities. Personality cards were kept up to date. Whenever changes, deletions, or amendments were made, information to that effect was

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furnished to G2, Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, by letter.

d. Upon transfer of a POW to another camp, his intelligence file and personality card were forwarded to the S2 of the gaining camp. Upon death, discharge, or escape of over 30 days duration, these records were forwarded to Prisoner of War Central Records Section, Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command. Reason for forwarding was indicated on the individual cards.

62. Counterintelligence Activities

Cy a. Mission. The counterintelligence mission in the KComZ area of responsibility was to contribute to the successful operation of the command through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and disaffection, and the detection and prevention of enemy espionage and sabotage. To assist in accomplishing the counterintelligence mission, the 704th and 801st CIC Detachments were assigned to KComZ. In the POW installations, the CIC personnel assigned coverage of POW installations had the mission of protecting those installations by counterintelligence measures. They were further charged with the responsibility of detecting subversive elements, riots, possible escape attempts, sabotage, and incidents of an intelligence nature within the installation. It was also the responsibility of CIC to keep the POW installation commander informed as to the morale of POW's, guards, and United States Army personnel assigned to the installation. CIC personnel

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notified the installation commander of any incident which tended to disrupt or otherwise hinder the UNC war effort.

(u) b. Responsibilities. The Commanding Officer, 704th CIC Detachment, was charged with the technical supervision and administrative control of CIC detachments in the KComZ. In addition, he was responsible for the detailed planning for, and actual employment of, the CIC detachments. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, KComZ, was responsible for general supervision and advice pertaining to the employment of CIC detachments.

(u) c. Operations. CIC personnel were encouraged to exercise initiative within the policies and directives issued by higher headquarters. In the performance of their duties they were permitted to operate with minimum restrictions of movement. When consistent with the policies of the appropriate command, CIC personnel were instructed not to be delayed in the execution of their assigned duties by the observance of standard military customs or prohibitions, nor by military police or other military agencies. CIC credentials were honored at all times after verification of authenticity. Counterintelligence investigations were conducted as follows:

- (1) Assignment of investigative personnel for a specific mission was made by a CIC detachment commander.
- (2) CIC investigative personnel reported to the unit commander or his representative, and to the unit intelligence officer,

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identified themselves and stated the nature of their business. Upon completion of the investigation, CIC personnel reported to the unit intelligence officer and the unit commander.

- (3) Copies of all investigative reports were forwarded to Commanding Officer, 704th CIC Detachment, in the prescribed number of copies. If tactical commanders requested that investigations be made by CIC personnel, they were furnished copies of the reports showing results of investigation.

83. Reporting Incidents Involving POW's and CI's

a. Incidents were of two types, major and routine. A major incident was one involving a riot, murder, assault on other prisoners and/or UNC personnel, mass demonstration, mass attempt to escape, and similar incidents involving POW's and on which it might be expected that Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, would be requested to furnish information to higher headquarters and agencies. An incident in which it became necessary to shoot any sizable number of POW's was always considered a major incident and was extremely sensitive. A routine incident was one resulting in injury or requiring disciplinary action, whether or not UNC personnel were involved, and which did not fall into any of the categories of a major incident.

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4/ b. Reporting Procedure. An initial report of the incident was made immediately. It indicated the general nature and the more important available facts and circumstances surrounding the incident including the number of personnel involved and suppressive measures employed or measures taken to prevent recurrence. Interim reports were submitted as additional pertinent information was uncovered and new developments took place. The report continued to be developed and submitted until a complete and final picture of the incident was presented. When the narrative of the incident was completed, including the last applicable item listed on the check sheet, a final interim report, so designated, was submitted to reach headquarters in any case not later than 36 hours subsequent to the initial report. The maximum possible number of items at time of submission was answered. A final report covering all phases, pertinent facts and circumstances surrounding the incident (including, if possible, determination of causes and/or persons responsible) and corrective action taken, was forwarded to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, within five days following the incident. Inquiry by a board of officers in the case of death or serious injury of a prisoner as prescribed in pertinent directives continued. In appendix III is a format including information to be included in incident reports which was used as a guide for the submission of such reports.

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c. Incident Reporting Check List. In appendix III is an incident report check list which was utilized as a guide in checking submission of the required information.

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Section IV. LESSONS LEARNED

34. Lessons Learned

a. The mere fact that a Communist was a POW did not necessarily mean that he no longer was a combatant. A Communist POW, therefore, had to be regarded not as a passive human being in need of care and protection until he could be returned to his home but still as an active enemy determined to fight on in whatever way his leaders dictated.

b. For propaganda value, the Communists exploited their soldiers confined as POW's even to the point of direct actions which resulted in the death of POW's. This warfare through POW's did not require that they possess arms in enough strength to overwhelm their guards and enter into large scale military operations. The POW's were to break out if they could and join the nearest irregulars. They were told to do this more with the intent of arousing them to action rather than with any expectation that they could succeed in doing it. Military objectives would be served no less, the Communist high command thought, if the POW's created incidents which would make it necessary for their guards to use force against them, resulting in deaths and injuries which could be represented to peoples in both Communist and non-Communist countries as convincing evidence of the "brutality" and "inhumanity" of the UNC and especially of the United States. The loss of Communist lives was a small price to pay for gaining propaganda

material to accomplish two purposes: first, to turn public opinion in non-Communist countries against the United States and thereby to weaken its leadership in the resistance to Communism in Korea and elsewhere; and, second, to unify public opinion in Communist lands against the UN cause.

c. The Communists had no respect for the sanctity of human life, but recognized that others did, and so they capitalized on the mistreatment of human beings. Over the years, the Communists had become very familiar with the effect on public opinion of reports, whether true or false, of inhumane treatment of human beings. Though by no means moved, except to be even more secretive about it, by the disclosure of their own widespread and flagrant disregard for the dignity of the human individual and the sanctity of his life, they had seen time and again the horrified reaction to them of even many of their own friends in non-Communist countries. Because of their effectiveness, the leveling of similar charges against opponents became a standard practice in their own propaganda. When they had nothing concrete on which to base such propaganda, they manufactured something as they did in the germ warfare hoax against the UNC. Such was the mission required of the Communist POW's on Kojedo, and so much importance was attached to it that no efforts were spared to build up a fantastically elaborate organization in the POW compounds.

d. The procedure for handling Communist POW's had to be modified to take account of the fact that POW's were still combatants. Enlightened by this knowledge, the UNC moved swiftly to block Communist warfare through the Kojé-do POW's. POW's who were confirmed Communists, as indicated by their readiness to return to Communist territory, had to be dispersed into smaller and more easily handled groups of about 500 POW's per compound. As a result of this dispersion, a much stricter control of the POW's could be accomplished.

e. It was found that the intelligence systems needed to be expanded to give fuller information on the activities of the POW's in the compounds and especially to identify and segregate subversive leaders.

f. Civilian natives had to be removed from the proximity of a POW camp to prevent the civilian natives from bearing messages to and from POW's.

g. The Communists ordered some of their soldiers to surrender and to act as Communist agents in the POW camps.

h. Despite all measures to prevent any deaths among POW's, the Communist fanaticism is so great that it is probable that some POW lives will be sacrificed.

CHAPTER 6

OPERATION OF FACILITIES AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

Section I. PROBLEMS REGARDING CONTROL OF POW'S¹

85. Control Problems at Pusan

During the period September 1950 to the time the prisoners were transferred to Kojé-do, there were practically no significant incidents in Pusan. Approximately 30 POW's escaped during this period, and of this number about one-half of them returned of their own free will. Only one minor incident happened in November 1950. At that time it was rumored that United States troops, before leaving the mainland, would kill all officer POW's. This rumor caused some anxiety on the part of some POW's, and a minor incident developed, but it was quickly controlled.

86. Escapes, Disorders, Riots, and Mob Demonstrations on Kojé-do

As the prisoner population on Kojé-do grew daily, facilities and personnel to guard them became inadequate. Escapes, disorders, riots, and mob demonstrations occurred frequently at this crowded POW camp. In July 1951, the Provost Marshal, FEC, reported to the Chief of Staff, FEC, that during the first half of 1951 a number of serious incidents including riots and escapes occurred at UNC POW Camp No. 1 which resulted in many POW's being killed or wounded by guards

1. McGarr, op. cit., Tabs A-1 through A-16 pp. 12-60; Dickinson, op. cit.; Merrill, op. cit.; Pavlick, op. cit.; and McDowell, op. cit.

attempting to quell the disorders. The provost marshal advised the chief of staff that the situation at the camp was potentially very dangerous, particularly during the period while armistice negotiations were in progress, as the prisoners were sharply divided along ideological lines and very apprehensive as to their future. CINCPAC directed that Eighth U. S. Army take necessary corrective actions immediately. Eighth U. S. Army reported that the supervision and administration of approximately 165,000 prisoners were too heavy a burden for a field army engaged in extensive combat operations. Requests from Eighth U. S. Army for reinforcements of United States guard personnel, however, were not approved by General Headquarters, FEC, because of an anticipation that the armistice negotiations would terminate in an agreement in the near future.

87. Communists Gain Control of Compound No. 62, Kojedo

a. Brief of the Incident.

- (1) From the commencement of the construction of UNC POW Camp No. 1 at Kojedo in January 1951 through June 1951, the POW's were as tractable as the first POW's in July 1950, and they cooperated in the construction of the camp to such an extent that the camp developed into what was then considered a typical POW installation. The POW's erected their own kitchens, mess facilities, and buildings within the compounds designed to house around 9000 POW's.

Other buildings, such as barracks, dispensaries, recreation facilities, CI and E classrooms, and administration buildings, were in some instances planned as well as constructed by the POW's. The entire road, power, and water systems within the installation were constructed by the POW's.

- (2) On the surface, it appeared that the POW's were receptive to the camp program and to the administrative and security procedures then in effect. During this early period, however, underneath the outward appearance, a struggle was going on between the Communist and non-Communist POW leaders to gain control of each compound. The Communist POW leaders used every opportunity to strengthen their organization, and to develop a Communist pattern or plan of action for their members in each compound, and to extend their power into each compound where the Communists were in a minority.
- (3) During the night 21-22 December 1951, Compound No. 62 (containing around 9,000 CI's) of UNC POW Camp No. 1, which had been controlled by the non-Communist element of the population, suddenly came under the control of a small but determined, die-hard, Communist group. Despite the small number of this group, the Communist control was complete. The immediate result of this conflict

was the killing and beating by the Communists of many non-Communist leaders and other CI's. After the Communists gained control of the compound, they refused to admit administrative or guard personnel into the compound. The camp commander lost control of the compound, and the new Communist leaders controlled its entrance, administrative building, and dispensary. They refused entrance into the compound, and they prohibited CI's from going on work details.

- (4) Consideration was then given to the necessity for taking out one of the political groups from Compound No. 62 for segregation in another area in order to eliminate further brutality. The camp commander was directed to interview each CI in Compound No. 62 to determine his political belief. The use of a security force was authorized to enforce this directive, however, the command was warned not to permit an incident that would embarrass the UNC and the Peace Conference delegates at Panmunjom.
- (5) Careful plans were made, and under cover of darkness before dawn on 18 February 1952, the administrative personnel required for the interviews and one infantry battalion as a security force approached Compound No. 62. At dawn, the battalion entered the compound with the intention of immediately quartering the compound thereby

to establish control. However, they were met by fanatical groups of CI's who stormed the bayonets of the security force and were only halted by the use of firepower. At approximately 0730 hours, the infantry was ordered to withdraw after one United States enlisted man and 55 CI's had been killed and 159 CI's had been wounded with 22 of them later dying in the hospital.

b. Results of the Incident.

- (1) The mission was not accomplished.
- (2) Not only the camp commander but also the UNC lost face in the eyes of the POW's and CI's. The Communist leaders maintained their control over the CI's in this compound. Control of other compounds deteriorated to such an extent that by April 1952, the only control exercised by the camp commanders was the posting of perimeter guards. The Communist leaders controlled the interior of eight compounds as well as the administration and discipline of the CI's.

88. Operation "Scatter"

a. Brief of the Operation.

- (1) The incident occurring on 16 February 1952, together with the brutalities continuing in the compounds holding Communist and non-Communist POW's and CI's, established the necessity for Operation "Scatter" in order to remove the

minority groups to compounds of like political beliefs.

- (2) On 8 April 1952, Operation "Scatter" was implemented, and minority groups were moved to newly constructed compounds in Central Valley, Koje-do. No incidents of importance occurred until an attempt was made to enter the eight compounds controlled by the Communists. The leaders of those compounds refused to cooperate, and the operation was stalemated. The Communists thereby gained their objective.
- (3) Prisoner unrest at Enclosure No. 10, Pusan, began on 15 April 1952. Recalcitrant prisoner patients and laborers seriously tested the 14th Field Hospital's ability to function and provide medical treatment and made hospital compounds so unsafe that the camp commander ordered most of the compounds closed to all UN personnel. In early May 1952 and coincidental to the capture of General Dodd, the unrest culminated in open rioting. UN troops were required to enter forcibly the hospital compounds to quell disturbances. During this rioting, the POW's destroyed the orthopedic brace shop, clinical records, X-ray films, laboratory reports, and equipment and caused serious property damage in three compounds.

b. Results of the Operation.

- (1) The POW's in compounds controlled by non-Communists were scattered with the result that approximately 82,000 POW's declared that they opposed repatriation to North Korea; approximately 36,000 POW's indicated a desire to be repatriated, and approximately 50,000 POW's refused to indicate their choice. The above figures include 14,000 Chinese non-Communists and 6,000 Chinese Communists.
- (2) The intelligence estimate on the eight Communist compounds not polled was that approximately 75 percent would desire repatriation. However, approximately 95 percent later chose repatriation during the June 1952 screening.

c. Questionnaire. For a sample questionnaire used in the interviewing of prisoners, see appendix VII.

89. Operation "Spreadout"

a. Brief of the Operation.

- (1) The results of Operation "Scatter" necessitated moving the non-Communist Chinese POW's to Cheju-do and non-Communist Korean POW's to the mainland of Korea in order to separate them completely from the Communist threat. Operation "Scatter" also necessitated the segregation of Communist and non-Communist POW's at Enclosure No. 10, Pusan. The Communist women POW's were shipped to UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do. A hospital annex was hastily

constructed near Tong-nae approximately seven miles distant.

This annex was a tent city of 3,000 bed capacity. The non-Communist women and men POW's were moved from Enclosure No. 10 to this annex. On 19 April 1952, Operation "Spreadout" commenced, and was planned to be completed in 30 days.

- (2) The many problems of processing and moving 82,000 POW's by water and rail to new camps were complex. Daily shipments involved from 6,000 to 9,000 POW's. No incidents of importance occurred during this operation; however, the records of the POW's were confused in many instances, and it was impossible to establish positive identification.

b. Results of the Operation.

- (1) The two political groups were moved from close proximity of each other.
- (2) The POW's in camps on the mainland and on Cheju-do were removed from the command control of the Commanding Officer, UNC POW Camp No. 1, leaving approximately 83,000 Communist POW's at UNC POW Camp No. 1.
- (3) Most of the mainland camps were isolated from the main source of supply in Pusan, and logistical support was often a critical matter.

90. Capture of General Dodd

a. Brief of the Incident.

- (1) At approximately 1500 hours 7 May 1952, General Dodd, while conferring with the leaders of Compound No. 76, Kojé-do, was suddenly surrounded and forced into the compound by a group of Communist prisoners. Subsequent intelligence reports disclosed that this act had long been premeditated and that the suddenness of the act precluded immediate counteraction by the available guard personnel.
- (2) The incident is a matter of record; however, this one factor is emphasized. General Dodd's deputy commander on being informed of the incident, acting on his authority then as camp commander, issued instructions to the compound leaders to release General Dodd without harm by 1700 hours. Regimental troops were then deployed for the purpose of forcing an entry into Compound No. 76 at 1700 hours if General Dodd was not released. Prior to 1700 hours, however, instructions were received not to force an entry into Compound No. 76 at that time. The result is a matter of recorded history.

b. Results of the Incident.

- (1) The UNC was embarrassed in the eyes of the world by the incident and subsequent failure to take initial forceful action.

- (2) It was realized that Oriental Communist POW's could not be administered and secured in the same manner as other types of POW's.

- (3) Operation "Breakup" was planned.

91. Operation "Breakup"

a. Brief of the Operation.

- Cite* (1) The Dodd incident resulted in new policies and techniques for administering and securing prisoners.
- Cite* (2) New compounds and enclosures were constructed under approved plans. Action was taken on 10 June 1952 under Operation "Breakup," to implement the transfer of prisoners from the large compounds to the small 500-POW compounds. This operation continued for several weeks. Under a continuation of Operation "Spreadout" the 6,000 Chinese Communist POW's were shipped to a new camp on Cheju-do, the CI's to UNC Camp No. 1c, the North Korean officers - with a number of enlisted POW's - to UNC POW Camp No. 1b, and approximately 12,000 enlisted North Korean POW's to UNC POW Camp No. 1a.
- (3) The above movements were completed without a major incident except at compounds No. 76 and No. 77. On 10 June 1952 at Compound No. 76, the first compound under Operation "Breakup," the POW's defiantly refused to move after having been ordered by the Commanding General. Tanks and infantry

moved into the compound to force compliance with the order. One United States infantryman and 40 POW's were killed, and 151 POW's were wounded. POW's of Compound 77 were transferred the next day without the use of force. However, after the transfer, 16 bodies, presumably non-Communist, were found in shallow graves. Evidence indicated that death had been inflicted during the night of 10-11 June 1952.

- (4) Upon the completion of the 64th Field Hospital at UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do, in the latter part of July 1952, approximately 3,000 North Korean Communist POW's were shipped to this camp from Enclosure No. 10, Pusan. The non-Communist POW patients located at the hospital annex were moved to Enclosure No. 10 of the main hospital, and the hospital annex was discontinued. At the time, Enclosure No. 10 contained 2,621 POW's of which 478 were Communist Chinese POW patients. Enclosure No. 10, Pusan, was redesignated UNC POW Camp No. 2, Pusan (Hospital) by General Orders No. 5, Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, 17 August 1952. At this time full control of all enclosures and compounds in the camp was vested in the camp commander and the 14th Field Hospital was relieved of all duties and camp activities except that of the treatment of POW patients.

b. Results of the Operation.

- (1) For the first time in the operation of UNC POW Camp No. 1, steps were initiated to insure greater effectiveness in the method of administration and operation of the camp. Several additional months were required to develop proper procedures and techniques. The above operations were the first steps toward establishing tried and tested methods.
- (2) On or about 15 July 1952, more aggressive and positive measures were introduced to inform individually the Communist POW's what they could or could not do. At no time did the command permit POW's or their leaders to make any type of demand upon camp authorities. Each incident was dealt with separately, immediately, and with the degree of force required to implement and enforce policies, and at the same time apply the humanitarian provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
- (3) UNC POW Camps No. 1a, b, and c posed many complex problems of construction and supply. After many months of reconstruction and new construction and the establishment of an automatic supply procedure, the conditions at those camps were greatly improved.

92. Operation "Removal"

a. Brief of the Operation.

- (1) A known fact had been established that many natives of Kojedo carried instructions to the POW's. Native villages were in close proximity to the POW enclosures - many next to the wire fences. Intelligence revealed that many native villagers were sympathetic to the POW's.
- (2) After the 7 May 1952 incident, it was determined to remove this hazard. With the cooperation and assistance of the island Korean officials and the local representatives of UNCACK, villagers with their household belongings were moved during the period 23-28 May 1952 by Army trucks to new locations outside the camp area. However, the farmers were permitted to return to harvest their crops which had been planted.

b. Results of the Operation.

- (1) A POW "message center" source was removed.
- (2) A physical handicap to the control of POW's was eliminated.

93. Riot of 14 December 1952

a. Brief of the Incident. On the afternoon of 14 December 1952, the CI's of Enclosure No. 2, UNC CI Camp No. 1c, Pongam-do, started mass demonstrations in their respective compounds, the demonstrations were manifested for the most part by mass singing of forbidden,

military, Communist songs, in defiance of published and oral orders. A company of ROKA infantry was ordered to the scene, and the internees were ordered to stop the demonstrations. These orders were ignored. Repeated orders to cease the demonstrations resulted in the POW's strengthening their formations and singing more defiantly and fanatically. When mass action by the CI's against UN troops was imminent, limited fire power was employed against them. This seemed only to aggravate the situation. More fire power was then employed and troops entered the compounds, forced the demonstrators between the compound fences, and restored order.

b. Results of the Incident.

- (1) Order was restored, but there was a large number of casualties among the CI's.
- (2) The use of nontoxic irritants had been directed by KComZ on 20 October 1952, such use to be at the discretion of the Commanding Officer, Prisoner of War Command. At the same time, the Chemical Section of the Korean Base Section was ordered to ship CI-DM grenades to the POW camps. Because of the high number of casualties resulting from this incident, the use of nontoxic chemicals was now made mandatory. On 15 December 1952, a directive was received from CINCUNC which stated that CN and/or CI-DM would be used to the maximum extent possible to control disorders,

and that lethal weapons would not be employed until all possible efforts had been made to regain control by use of nontoxic agents.

94. Riot of 9 February 1953

a. Brief of the Incident. On the afternoon of 9 February 1953, the POW's of Compound E, Enclosure No. 3, UNC POW Camp No. 1a, Chogu-ri, Koje-do, were singing forbidden, militant, Communist songs. This was an apparent attempt to influence and encourage the POW's in the other compounds in the enclosure to join in a demonstration. The POW's were ordered to stop singing, and a short time later they entered their barracks. It was observed that there was an unusual amount of activity taking place within the barracks. The POW's were ordered, through the compound representative, to assemble in the assembly area. These orders were ignored. It was observed that the doors to the barracks were barricaded with wooden sleeping pallets and blankets were hung over the windows. The POW's chanted slogans from within the barracks, and stoned the chemical squads and troops each time they attempted to enter the compound to force them out of the barracks. Selected small-arms fire was employed to stop the stone throwing. Concussion grenades were used to break the barricades at the doors of the barracks, and a nontoxic irritant was thrown into the barracks. Troops surrounded each building and as the gas took effect, the POW's were forced to leave the barracks and they were assembled in the assembly area.

b. Result of the Incident. Order was restored with a small number of casualties among the POW's.

95. Riot of 7 March 1953

a. Brief of the Incident. On the early morning of 7 March 1953, the POW's of the four compounds of Enclosure No. 1, UNC POW Camp No. 1b, Yoncho-do, held mass demonstrations and stoned UN troops. Three officer compounds and one enlisted compound were involved. This was a planned disorder as was manifested by intelligence evidence and prior preparations, such as the large number of rocks piled at strategic places; the presence of water-soaked blankets, towels, ricemats, first aid materials in the form of bandages made from strips of cloth, splints; and buckets of water which were placed at strategic locations. The POW's had organized themselves; some were to throw rocks at UN troops while others were to cover or throw back any grenades which fell inside the compounds. Due to the rough terrain and wind conditions, it was necessary to supplement the grenade line by throwing grenades into the compound. Because of attacks by POW's it was also necessary to use selected small-arms fire to protect UN troops from being stoned.

b. Results of the Incident.

- (1) Order was restored with a number of casualties among the POW's.

- (2) It was necessary to segregate the POW officers into smaller groups, not to exceed 350 in number. Enlisted POW's were removed as far away from the POW officers as possible.

96. Disorder of 23 March 1953

a. Brief of the Incident.

- (1) On 23 March 1953 at 1700 hours, the POW's in Compound D, Enclosure No. 1, at UNC POW Camp No. 1b, Yoncho-do, refused to stand routine headcount. They withdrew into their huts and barricaded themselves by placing wooden sleeping pallets against doors and windows. Other preparations by POW's included the wetting of blankets and strips of material to cover their faces and bodies as protection against nontoxic irritants. The POW's were given 20 minutes in which to comply with orders, but they refused to do so. POW's in Compound C refused to withdraw into their quarters while POW's in Compound D were ordered to fall out for headcount. Instead, they remained outside yelling and chanting in order to give encouragement to POW's in Compound D.
- (2) A grenade line was laid down on the upwind side of Compound D. Against the barricaded huts, however, the chemicals attained little results. Therefore, troops armed with concussion grenades were sent into the compound to force

hut doors open and to place chemical grenades inside.

At the same time a grenade line was set up around Compound C to restore order and force the POW's to discontinue their shouting and chanting which was reaching hysterical proportions. By 1755 hours, the POW's of Compound D had formed for headcount.

b. Results of the Incident.

(1) Order was restored by use of chemicals, supported by adequate security troops, without gunfire and without casualties among the POW's.

(2) Over 60 percent of the prisoners became sick; however, the majority had recovered within two hours.

97. Disorder of 24 March 1953

a. Brief of the Incident. On 24 March 1953 at 1045 hours, CI's in Compound H, Enclosure No. 1, UNC POW Branch Camp No. 1c, Pongam-do, massed and started chanting in protest against removal of their subversive leaders by UN troops. The CI's were ordered to break up formation and move out of the compound, but they refused to do so. Four platoons of UN troops and one chemical squad were sent to the compound. When the CI's persisted, CN-DM grenade lines were set up around the compound, and M-25 bursting type tear gas grenades were employed over the heads of the formation. The tear gas caused the formation to break into smaller groups. These groups stood in

formation withstanding the chemical cloud for about twelve minutes, before the concentration overcame their resistance. As a result of their stubbornness, approximately 90 percent suffered irritation of eyes and nose, coughing, sneezing, nausea, and retching. About 40 percent remained sick for longer than 12 hours. Recovery time for the remainder was about an hour. The medical officer reported no serious illness, and recovery was complete in all cases. Weather conditions during the period were favorable with a temperature of 65 degrees, clear and dry, with winds of two to five miles per hour.

b. Result of the Incident. Four hundred and thirteen POW's were exposed to the nontoxic irritants. Order was restored with no casualties or serious injury to UN personnel or to the POW's.

98. Riot of 17 April 1953

a. Brief of the Incident. On 17 April 1953 at 1530 hours, the POW's in Compound D, Enclosure No. 3, UNC POW Camp No. 1b, Yoncho-do, refused to permit the enclosure administrative personnel to conduct the daily inspection of their quarters. In all other compounds of the enclosure, the POW's were ordered to go to their quarters and remain there. One ROKA company plus one ROKA platoon and a United States chemical squad entered the enclosure. The POW's in Compound D then barricaded themselves inside their quarters. Troops were deployed around the compound, while the chemical squad moved into the compound and employed concussion grenades to force openings in

the barricaded buildings. Nontoxic chemical grenades were thrown into the buildings, driving out the POW's, who then charged the UN troops, throwing stones as they advanced. While this was going on, the POW's in other compounds within the enclosure were outside the huts encouraging the barricaded POW's in violation of orders. Some also assaulted UN troops with stones, necessitating the use of riot guns to subdue them. A nontoxic irritant was employed against all compounds who violated orders. During this time, the wind was blowing from 20 to 30 miles per hour, definitely reducing the overall effectiveness of the chemical. However, most of the 480 POW's in Compound D were affected by the irritant; 75 percent recovered from the effects within one to three hours, 25 percent remained sick for a longer period. By the following morning, all POW's were completely over the effects. In the other compounds, approximately 10 percent remained sick longer than three hours.

b. Result of the Incident. Order was restored and uncontested control was regained.

99. All out Harassment Efforts by Communist POW's Immediately Prior to and during Repatriation

a. Overall Plan of Harassment.

- (1) With the resumption of truce talks in June 1953, the Communist POW leaders suddenly realized that an armistice was a possibility, and that it could easily materialize

in the near future. They had long realized that in order to be welcomed back into the Communist fold, they had to return as conquering soldiers and not as beaten, dejected and subservient captives. With the repatriation near at hand, they evidently believed it imperative to reassert this spirit. Consequently, the POW leaders launched their final effort for all out harassment. This harassment had been planned many months in advance. In the early part of 1952 the Communists "planted" in the front lines a North Korean battalion headed by Colonel Lee Hak Ku. The mission of this battalion was to be captured or to surrender and to create disturbances at times to be specified according to the progress of the truce negotiations. The aim was to cause embarrassment to the United Nations. Most of the battalion surrendered intact to the 25th U.S. Infantry Division, and during a period of time were distributed to various prisoner-of-war camps. Their mission was not discovered until after they had been successful in creating disturbances. It is to be noted that for several weeks prior to this period, a stabilized condition of a low incident rate had prevailed. At UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do, no major incident involving mass

disobedience to orders had occurred between the latter part of April and the first part of June 1953.

- (2) In early June, POW leaders immediately laid plans for strengthening Communist organizations in North Korean Communist prisoner-of-war camps to insure a united effort and blind obedience by all POW's to their orders. This strengthening was accomplished by a rigid and intensified training program which included instruction in all phases of Communist doctrines; infantry, riot, and combat tactics; field fortifications, weapons, first aid, and general infantry subjects. POW's were taught and encouraged to attack as individuals or as groups, the guards, work supervisors, and other UN personnel. As a result of forced discipline that had been imposed on the POW's by their leaders, and the failure of many to conform, an increasing number of POW's either voluntarily came out, "bugged out", or were driven out of Communist compounds. In some cases, injured POW's were removed from headcount and other formations. These POW's usually stated that they had been beaten, or that their lives were in danger, indicating that the Communist leaders were attempting to obtain blind obedience to their directives to the extent of beating or murdering reluctant POW's. Some of these

"bug-outs", when interrogated, stated that they still desired repatriation, but they wanted to go to another Communist compound because of the threat against their lives.

- (3) In order to develop a unified and coordinated course of action for the all out harassment of UN troops, the controlling Communist organization at UNC POW Camp No. 1, Kojedo, initiated the "Three Step Fight" plan. Through confiscated documents, informers, and other intelligence sources, considerable evidence of this plan was brought to light.
 - (a) The "first step fight" was staged from approximately 1 July to 20 July 1953 and included general harassment of the detaining power by singing Communist songs, shouting and chanting. It also included a stepped up program of individual petition writing, criticizing the camp authorities for treatment afforded the POW's.
 - (b) The "second step fight" commenced on approximately 20 July 1953 and continued through 4 August 1953. The tactics employed in the first phase of the "fight" were continued. The second phase was characterized by stereotyped and preposterous petitions containing alleged brutalities by the detaining power, and making demands for concessions. These written protests were addressed

to all levels of the UNC, including the President of the United States of America. By 1 August 1953, more than 3,000 petitions had been presented by the POW's at UNC POW Camp No. 1, Koje-do. Demands by the prisoners included the removal of KATUSA personnel from their assigned mission as component parts of the detaining power, accentuated with threats upon the lives of such personnel if they remained as guards. Other POW demands included the closing of the maximum security compound which was used for the detention of top Communist agitators, murderers, and the like. The POW's further demanded the removal of all guards surrounding the prisoner-of-war enclosures. Accusations by the POW's falsely charged the UN with employing gas in the compound where female POW's were interned, and injuring the children located therein. Other accusations consistently contained absurd allegations of the use of poison gas, continual slaughtering of POW's with both rifle and bayonet without the slightest provocation, torture of POW's and kidnapping.

- (4) The "third step fight" was scheduled to be placed in effect during the first week of August 1953 and continued until final repatriation. In addition to the tactics used in the first two steps, this phase was manifested by open defiance in groups of compound size or more. The "third

step" also included plans and tactics for propaganda dissemination and demonstrations both en route to and while at the repatriation point. Preparations included intensification of military discipline and memorization, or written accounts, of the achievements of the Communist POW leaders. During the first week in August, the number of mass demonstrations reached an all-time high. These incidents followed the usual mass pattern of defiant chanting, singing, and shouting insults but involved larger groups and were harder to quell. Several incidents developed on shipboard, and wild, frantic demonstrations occurred frequently on trains between Inchon, Yong Dong Po, Munsan-ni, and the repatriation point. Propaganda notes were strewn all along the repatriation route. Generally, these improvised notes and leaflets contained statements denouncing Syngman Rhee and/or the UN and exhorting the South Koreans to rebel. Clothing was frequently discarded en route. After exchange, the POW's planned to apologize for being captured, and at the same time to tell of the brutalities inflicted on them while they were POW's, extolling the fierceness of their fighting during the time of internment.

b. Summary of the Incidents.

- (1) During the period characterized by the "Three Step Fight," the incident rate increased tenfold over a similar period just prior to the initiating of this plan. At UNC POW Camp No. 1, Kojedo, and at Branch Camps No. 1a, 1b, and 1c, 45 major incidents were reported during the period 1 July through 14 August 1953. Of this number, 37 were of the mass defiance type; violation of camp directives by singing and chanting unauthorized songs in a frenzied manner; seven were assaults on UN personnel. Nonlethal chemicals were employed to restore order during 40 of these major incidents. The defiance was of a frenzied nature, with obviously calculated attempts being made to withstand stubbornly the effects of the chemicals used. Consequently, a greater quantity of chemicals were required to break down resistance and quell the disorders with the results that a greater percentage of the exposed POW's became ill from the effects of the irritant.
- (2) During repatriation, both at Communist camps and en route to the release point, POW conduct was characterized by action as outlined in the "Three Step Fight Plan." Whenever feasible, nonlethal chemical agents were used to restore order and insure compliance with instructions.

(3) The frenzied behavior which was a part of the "Third Step Fight" and the difficulties encountered in maintaining uncontested control are well illustrated in the following narrative report on the movement of 473 female Communist POW's and 23 children from Pusan to TASP (train ambulance switch point at Munsan-ni) on 8-9 August 1953:

(a) The LST containing the POW's arrived in Pusan harbor at 1050 hours 8 August 1953, and unloading began at 1115 hours. As the women stepped off the LST, they reached in their blouses and pulled out flags which they waved as they started singing and shouting. Each group was in the complete control of their leader or "honcho." They were loaded in buses and taken to the train, but the POW's in the second bus refused to debark, and it was necessary to remove them from the bus by force and put them on the train. In their frenzy, the POW's damaged some of the buses by tearing up the seats and breaking the luggage racks. The entraining was completed at 1220 hours, yet the POW's continued to sing Communist songs and to wave flags defiantly. The ROK policewomen assigned to assist in the movement were ineffective, apparently having been intimidated earlier in the trip. After the feeding of the POW's was completed at 1330 hours, Communist representatives of the Joint Red Cross Team (JRCT)

went through the train and distributed Chinese cigarettes and canned rations. The cigarettes were subsequently thrown from the car windows to natives along the route, and the canned rations were used as hammers to break out car windows, as well as weapons against the guards. The leader of the ROK policewomen announced at 1330 hours that the police would not go on the trip if the POW's were allowed to continue their demonstrations, particularly the flag waving. Consequently, an order to remove the flags was given, but the POW's either sat on them or stuffed them inside their clothing and refused to give them up. At 1410 hours it was decided to use nontoxic irritant gas in one car to enforce compliance with the orders. Three CN grenades were used in the vestibule of the car but the defiant POW's refused to comply with the orders. United States troops entered the car and removed the leaders by force and the rest of them came out. The train departed at 1500 hours, one hour behind schedule. During the train trip, the POW's demonstrated at Taegu and Taejon, and continued their frantic destruction of car equipment. Practically every window in the hospital cars was either completely broken out and holes knocked in it, or cracked. All grenade

screens were torn and rolled up, the valve handles in the latrine were removed and thrown away. Upon detrain-
ing at Munsan-ni at 0715 hours, 9 August 1953, the POW's started another demonstration, and their stubborn defi-
ance was continued during the ride in ambulances from Munsan-ni to the exchange point. Windows were broken out of the ambulance, and one United States driver was attacked when the door between the front seat and the ambulance was forced open.

- (b) It is self-evident from the reading of the above sub-
paragraph that the mission of planned harassment to pro-
vide incidents of propaganda value was well carried out. The POW's were accorded every consideration by the de-
taining power under the humanitarian principles of the Geneva (Prisoners of War) Conventions, including the
providing of hospital cars for comfort, yet the POW's created embarrassing incidents by their fanatical
behavior.

Section II. OPERATION OF POW AND CI ENCLOSURES,
COMPOUNDS, AND SERVICE AREAS

100. Operating Personnel Requirements²

In Pusan in about September 1950 there were only five officers, an escort guard company, and a complement of ROK soldiers responsible for the operation of the prisoner of war program. At that time the POW population was about 100,000. One of the platoons of the escort guard company was used to process POW's, since there were no processing troops available. Under the supervision of the escort guard personnel POW's were trained to process other POW's. After the trial and error method of determining operating personnel requirements, 2 officers and 49 enlisted men were found to be the minimum for the operation of an eight compound enclosure. They were broken down as follows:

- a. Enclosure commander - 1 officer.
- b. Assistant enclosure commander - 1 officer.
- c. Noncommissioned officer in charge - 1 master sergeant.
- d. Compound commanders - 8 enlisted (noncommissioned officers).
- e. Assistant compound commanders - 8 enlisted men.
- f. Compound gate guards - 8 enlisted men (United States or KATUSA personnel).
- g. Supply sergeant - 1 enlisted man (noncommissioned officer).

2. McGarr, op.cit; inclosure 3 to Tab E pp. 142-149; and Sullivan, op.cit.

- h. Ration breakdown man - 1 enlisted man.
- i. Assistant supply and ration breakdown - 1 enlisted man.
- j. Records clerk - 1 enlisted man (noncommissioned officer).
- k. Assistant records clerk and fingerprint man - 1 enlisted man.
- l. Dispensary technician - 2 enlisted men (1 noncommissioned officer).
- m. Service area supervisor - 1 enlisted man (noncommissioned officer).
- n. Detail dispatcher - 1 enlisted man (noncommissioned officer).
- o. Main gate guard - 1 enlisted man per guard relief.
- p. Inter sally port gate guard - 1 enlisted man during duty hours only.
- q. Center tower lookout guard - 1 enlisted man during duty hours.
- r. Charge of quarters - 4 enlisted men.
- s. Detail supervisor - 4 enlisted men.
- t. Shakedown personnel - 6 MATUSA. (Not counted in total.)
- u. Guard supervisor - 1 enlisted man per guard relief. (4)

101. Planning for Operations³

a. Oriental Communist POW's behaved differently from other POW's who had been in the custody of United States personnel in the past. The planning factors derived from experiences during World War II were not adaptable to the problems confronting planning for personnel for the internment of these POW's.

3. Ibid.

b. In the early phases of the conflict, an adequate number of enclosure and security personnel was not assigned to the prisoner-of-war camps. Based on experience factors gained in the internment of Oriental Communist POW's, the number of custodial personnel was increased. The minimum number of enclosure personnel for the operation of an eight compound enclosure was determined and is indicated in paragraph 100. The number of security personnel required for a like operation is set forth in paragraph 102.

c. Depending on the availability of personnel, the types of personnel by service varied. For planning purposes, all of the positions listed in paragraph 100 were to be filled by personnel from the Military Police Corps except the following with the branch indicated:

- (1) Ration breakdownman - Quartermaster Corps.
- (2) Dispensary technician - Army Medical Service.
- (3) Assistant supply and ration breakdownman - Quartermaster Corps.

d. The personnel of the security force, for planning purposes, were composed of combat type units. Initially, two companies plus one platoon were planned for this force; after several disturbances, it was found that a battalion size security force was needed.

102. Operating Personnel Duties⁴

Between about September 1950 and February 1951 the duties for the various operating personnel were not prepared in writing. There were

4. Ibid

various reasons for this. One was that only about two typewriters were available for prisoner-of-war operations and these were in constant repair. DA Forms 19-2, "Basic Personnel Record" were sent to Tokyo for typing because of lack of both personnel and equipment to do the job by personnel working with the POW's. When the Prisoner of War Command was established in 14 August 1952 this problem was corrected and operating personnel duties were prepared and issued. Enclosure operating personnel and their duties were --

a. Enclosure Commander. The enclosure commander was responsible for the administration, operation, and security of the enclosure.

b. Assistant Enclosure Commander. This officer assisted the enclosure commander and was responsible for maintenance, work details, projects and POW records.

c. NCO in Charge. This noncommissioned officer acted as the sergeant major of the enclosure.

d. Compound Commander. There was a noncommissioned officer for each compound. Since an enclosure usually had eight compounds, there were eight compound commanders. His duties included:

- (1) Daily headcounts and roll calls.
- (2) Daily inspection of compound and surrounding deadspace.
- (3) Police of compound and surrounding deadspace.
- (4) Drawing and issuing of rations and necessary tools.
- (5) Supervision of POW's in recreational area.

(6) General welfare and sanitation.

(7) Other duties assigned by the enclosure commander.

e. Assistant Compound Commander. There was an assistant compound commander for each compound, and he was not always a noncommissioned officer. He assisted the compound commander.

f. Compound Gate Guard. There was a compound gate guard for each compound. He was usually a United States enlisted man or a KATUSA enlisted man. His duties included:

- (1) To know, understand, and obey the eleven general orders.
- (2) To keep the inner and outer gates locked at all times except when enclosure personnel were in the compound.
- (3) When enclosure personnel were in the compound, to lock the inner gate and under no circumstances to leave the gate until the personnel had departed the compound.
- (4) To allow no POW to enter or leave the compound unless authorized by the compound commander.
- (5) To allow no UN individual to enter the compound by himself unless other personnel were already in the compound.
- (6) To keep in sight at least one UN individual when any were in the compound.
- (7) To spread the alarm immediately in case of any attack upon any UN personnel.

g. Supply Sergeant. The supply sergeant was responsible for:

- (1) Drawing all necessary supplies, with the exception of rations.
- (2) Keeping account of all supplies and equipment by means of a property book or issue slips.
- (3) Keeping the enclosure commander informed on the whereabouts and condition of all supplies and equipment.
- (4) Verifying that individual POW or the compound representative signed for all supplies and equipment which entered the compound.
- (5) Verifying that all supplies and equipment which entered the compound were used for the purpose for which they were issued.
- (6) Insuring that all POW clothing was stenciled in the prescribed manner and entered on the clothing form and obtaining the POW's signature.
- (7) Other additional duties assigned by the enclosure commander.

h. Ration Breakdownman. He was responsible for:

- (1) Drawing the correct amount of rations, including fuel for the enclosure as authorized by the S4.
- (2) Breaking down rations and fuel according to the headcount of each compound.
- (3) Inspecting periodically each compound to determine if POW's had a surplus of rations or coal on hand.

i. Assistant Supply and Ration Breakdownman. He assisted the supply sergeant and the ration breakdownman. In addition, he was prepared to ~~assume~~ the duties of either of these persons in case either was absent.

j. Records Clerk. He was responsible for:

- (1) Keeping all POW and CI internee records.
- (2) Preparing the enclosure morning report.
- (3) Verifying that all records were kept complete and up to date.
- (4) Checking records and receipting for or obtaining receipts for all incoming or outgoing records.
- (5) Supervising the monthly weighing of all POW's and CI's.

k. Assistant Records Clerk and Fingerprintman. He was responsible for:

- (1) Assisting the records clerk and also determining the true identity of all incoming, outgoing, POW's or CI's whose identification was in question.
- (2) Fingerprinting and identifying each POW or CI at time of weighing.
- (3) Maintaining current locator files by ISN and by fingerprint classification (Henry system).

l. Dispensary Technician. He was responsible for:

- (1) Administrative, supply, and operational procedures and records.

- (2) The holding of daily sick call according to the instructions of the surgeon.
- (3) Periodic inspections and recommendations concerning the sanitary conditions of the enclosure.

m. Service Area Supervisor. He was responsible for:

- (1) Coordination and control of the service area, i.e., segregation of POW's while picking up rations or going on sick call, dispatching the number of POW's for outside details when called for by the detail dispatcher.
- (2) The police of the service and administrative area.
- (3) Other duties assigned by the enclosure commander.

n. Detail Dispatcher. His duties included:

- (1) Notifying the compound commanders the number of POW's to dispatch to the service area for outside details.
- (2) Preparing work detail receipts including the number of tools, rations to be taken out, and the number and kind of mess equipment.
- (3) Verifying that the correct number of POW's and equipment leave and return to the enclosure.
- (4) Supervising the shaking down of all POW's entering or leaving the enclosure.
- (5) Insuring that all POW's leaving the enclosure were signed out and signed in when they returned.

- (6) Determining that personnel taking POW's from the enclosure had proper authority and that the number of guards and method of transport were in accordance with current directives.
- (7) Verifying that all POW's leaving the enclosure were in proper uniform.

o. Main Gate Guard. There was one main gate guard per relief.

His duties included:

- (1) To know, understand, and obey the eleven general orders.
- (2) To allow no unauthorized person to loiter in the vicinity of the gate at any time or to enter the enclosure.
- (3) To allow no vehicle to enter the enclosure unless authorized by the enclosure commander or his representative.
- (4) To allow no unauthorized person to operate the gate.
- (5) To secure the gate with lock and chain, and to keep the key in his possession at all times.
- (6) To unlock the gate only if the inner sally port gate was closed.
- (7) To sound off "Gate Open" when opening the gate.
- (8) To sound off "Gate Closed" when closing the gate.
- (9) To insure that POW work details entering or leaving the enclosure were in groups of 25 or less.

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- (10) To allow no individual or individuals to enter the enclosure with weapons unless authorized by the enclosure commander.
- (11) To guard all weapons and grenades located in the gate shack.
- (12) During an alert, to perform the duties prescribed in the enclosure alert plan.
- (13) To request all personnel except enclosure personnel to report to the command post before entering the enclosure proper.

p. Inter Sally-Port Gate Guard. There was usually one inter sally-port guard on duty during duty hours. His duties included:

- (1) To know, understand, and obey the eleven general orders.
- (2) To allow no unauthorized person to operate the gate.
- (3) To secure the gate with lock and chain, and to keep the key in his possession at all times.
- (4) To unlock the gate only when the main gate was closed.
- (5) To sound off "Gate Open" when opening the gate...
- (6) To sound off "Gate Closed" when closing the gate.
- (7) To insure that POW's on work details entering or leaving the sally port were in groups of 25 or less.
- (8) To allow no unauthorized individual, with the exception of enclosure personnel, to pass through the gate. All personnel, with the exception of enclosure personnel, obtained permission to enter the enclosure at the enclosure command post.

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g. Center Tower Lookout Guard. A lookout guard was needed only during normal duty hours or at any time when UN personnel were entering or leaving the compounds. The main purpose of such a guard was to observe the movements of unarmed UN personnel moving about the enclosure. This was done by using the binoculars located in the tower. Immediately upon noticing an assault of UN personnel or any unusual happenings, the guard notified the enclosure command post by means of direct telephone line from the tower to the command post. (The center tower lookout guard did not replace the two armed guards located in the tower. He was an additional guard.) In addition, he --

- (1) Secured list of details by compounds from the labor supervisor.
- (2) After the headcount was completed, commenced dispatching the details.
- (3) Called one compound at a time to have details released. Obtained number of POW's in each detail.
- (4) Allowed only details from one compound to be in the catwalk of central service area, at one time.
- (5) When all details from one compound had passed the tower, called the next compound.
- (6) Insured that each detail was searched in the sally port by shake down personnel before being released from the enclosure.

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- (7) Insured that a sufficient number of guards per detail assumed the security of the detail when it was released from the enclosure.

r. Charge of Quarters. He was responsible for the operation of the enclosure during normal off duty hours. The charge of quarters was a noncommissioned officer who was familiar with all the operations of the enclosure.

s. Detail supervisor. The detail supervisor was responsible for assigning details to compounds checking details out and in (See Appendix VIII for receipt format), inspecting details which are out at work and for the police and maintenance of the sally port and the area surrounding the enclosure. In addition, he --

- (1) Secured detail sheet from enclosure command post each morning and checked with the enclosure commander for any additions details.
- (2) Assigned details to compounds and notified compound commanders of the requirements.
- (3) Notified supply sergeant of tools needed for each detail.
- (4) Notified central tower operator of details coming from each compound.
- (5) When escort guards arrived at the enclosure, requested the central tower operator to start dispatching details.

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- (6) Dispatched details out main gate:
- (a) Assigned proper number of guards, one guard to each six POW's to each detail.
 - (b) Recorded number of POW's their compound, using agency, time of departure, the number and kind of tools, the name of the work supervisor, and required the work supervisor to sign for the number of POW's and tools.
 - (c) Turned detail over to detail supervisor (KATUSA or US personnel).
- (7) Required KATUSA to shake down details leaving and entering enclosure.
- (8) Assured that sally-port gates were properly manned.
- (9) Inspected details which were out at work and required detail supervisor to correct deficiencies.
- (10) Checked details into enclosure when they returned from work.
- (a) Supervised shake down.
 - (b) Counted tools and required detail supervisor to produce all tools checked out. In the event tools were not produced, reported the fact to the enclosure commander.
- (11) Inspected area of sally port and around enclosure and assigned necessary details to remedy defects. In the event fences showed signs of tampering, such as wires being cut, reported to the enclosure commander before effecting repairs.

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t. Shakedown Personnel. Usually 6 KATUSA personnel made up the detail. They were responsible for:

- (1) The shakedown of POW's or CI's entering or leaving the enclosure.
- (2) Assisting in administrative searches.
- (3) Such duties as dispensary, command post, service area gate guards, and conducting sick call groups to and from the dispensary.

u. Guard Supervisor. A guard supervisor was needed only at enclosures which were guarded by ROKA personnel. The main purpose of a guard supervisor was to repair immediately to the location of any disturbance or incident. The value of having an English-speaking person available many times assisted in the timely and proper notification of individuals concerned. This also left the enclosure charge of quarters free to perform his necessary functions. There was normally one guard supervisor per guard relief. His duties were --

- (1) To investigate all incidents or disturbances and immediately notify the charge of quarters of the enclosure.
- (2) To make a tour of all guard posts at least once an hour, to determine if anything unusual had been noticed by the guards.
- (3) To assist the charge of quarters in the performance of his duties.

- (4) To regulate the taking of rest breaks by members of the guard detail, insuring that not more than one guard was away from the POW detail at the same time.
- (5) To prohibit bartering between the POW and other persons.
- (6) To prevent the POW's from obtaining any contraband.
- (7) To prevent Korean civilians from talking or coming too close to the POW's.
- (8) To insure that guards did not talk to POW's except to issue orders.
- (9) To prevent POW's in one detail from mingling with POW's in another detail.
- (10) Each security guard detail for POW labor detail consisted of four guards per groups of 25 POW's. The senior ranking guard was in command of the detail and was responsible for the conduct of the guard. Each escort guard was armed with an M1 rifle or carbine with fixed bayonet.

103. Labor⁵

a. Type of POW Labor.

- (1) In Pusan from September 1950 through about February 1951 POW's were used in the construction of five enclosures. The hospital area was expanded by adding squad tents surrounded by barbed wire. Another work project during this period was the hauling of gravel in rice sacks from a gravel

5. UNC Pam No. 1, App. D, p.6; McGarr, op.cit, p.p. 135-136, inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 87-92, inclosure 3 to Tab E, PP. 171-176.

pit in the vicinity of the camp to the enclosures. Insufficient supervisory personnel limited the gravel hauling operation. The supervisory personnel was so limited that only one supervisor was assigned to approximately 200 POW's.

- (2) Unsented POW's were not assigned any work other than necessary policing of their quarters and premises.
- (3) Nonjudicial sentenced POW's were not assigned any work other than necessary police of their quarters and premises, unless fatigue duties, not exceeding two hours daily, had been imposed upon them as disciplinary punishment.
- (4) Judicial sentenced POW's were not assigned any work other than necessary police of their quarters and premises unless their sentences included confinement at hard labor.

b. Responsibility of the Commanding Officer of the Using Agency.

- (1) The commanding officer of the using agency requested POW work details on the prescribed form (See Appendix IX). The request was submitted to the commanding officer, UNC Prisoner-of-War Camp, nearest the work site at least twenty-four hours prior to the time that work was to be accomplished.
- (2) The using agency provided adequate drinking water and sufficient latrines for the POW's. Food for POW's on work details was prepared by the POW camp concerned and was transported to the work site by the using agency.

(3) Supervisory personnel was assigned by the using agency as follows:

- (a) Not less than one United States officer per 500 POW's.
- (b) In addition to ROKA guards, at least one United States enlisted man per 50 POW's was used as supervisor. A minimum of one United States enlisted supervisor was used with each separate detail of fifty prisoners. Exceptions to the provisions of this paragraph were made only when authorized by Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command.
- (c) United Nations escort guards for POW work details were not used as work supervisors; their sole mission was to guard the work detail. Supervisors were unarmed and did not carry clubs, rocks, or swagger sticks in the vicinity of work details and did not push, pull, or man-handle POW's in any way.
- (4) The using agency conducted adequate instruction in the treatment for supervisory and guard personnel furnished for the work details and management of POW's. Pertinent provisions of the Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention and applicable Prisoner of War Command directives pertaining to treatment of POW's were used as references. Each supervisor was informed as to sanitary facilities available to POW's, also the nearest United Nations or Korean medical installations.

- (5) Except as specifically authorized by this headquarters, POW details were not used on tasks in which the POW's were intermingled with local laborers or civilians.

c. Planning Work Projects.

- (1) Branch camp and prisoner-of-war service unit commanders were responsible for planning work projects to be accomplished by POW's and prescribing the specific time within which such projects were to be completed. These projects were on a task basis, and at the discretion of the commanders concerned the details could be returned to the enclosure, as a reward when they completed assigned tasks in less than the specified time. Work projects and the time allowed for their completion, were carefully planned, so that a given work project would be commensurate with the physical capabilities of the POW's, the number of POW's assigned to a given work project, and the time allotted. The time allotted must be such that the POW's would not complete the assigned project in an unusually shorter time than was allotted, and not inadequate for the completion of the assigned task.
- (2) Branch camp and prisoner-of-war service unit commanders instructed enclosure commanders, compound commanders, and work supervisors in projects, in order that the desired

results could be obtained. Certain types of work projects were assigned to skilled labor groups on a voluntary basis when such action was warranted. Commanders exercised close supervision in such instances to insure that no individual POW was placed in a position where he might become a leader of a group which would carry out his instructions other than those pertaining to the work project, which might result in the embarrassment of the UNC.

- (3) Branch camp and prisoner-of-war service unit commanders implemented the above instructions, and conducted their prisoner-of-war work programs in such manner as to insure the greatest possible efficiency in the utilization of prisoners, guard personnel, and supervisory personnel on work projects. They took prompt, appropriate action in those instances where POW's failed to accomplish assigned work projects within the time allotted.

d. Processing of POW Work Details.

- (1) Requests for POW work details were screened by the camp commander concerned. The camp commander was empowered to refuse a request for a POW work detail if at any time, in his opinion, the using agency did not comply with published directives, or if, in his opinion, the detail was an unreasonable security risk. All such refusals

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were referred to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command,
Attention: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

- (2) A representative of the using agency called with guards and the necessary transport vehicles, to receive the POW work detail at the camp concerned at the appointed time, and receipted for the detail by signing two copies of the receipt. The original copy remained at the camp; the duplicate accompanied the detail.
- (3) The using agency returned the detail to the camp at the designated time. Camp personnel checked the detail back in. When the detail count had been verified, the checker signed both copies of the receipt. The using agency was given the original and the camp representative kept the duplicate.

e. Security of POW Work Details.

- (1) It was the responsibility of the using agency to insure that the POW's were gainfully employed, properly guarded, and that provisions of pertinent directives were complied with. Immediate reports of any irregularities were made by the using agency to the camp commander concerned. The using agency did not take any disciplinary action against the POW's.

Revised UNCLASSIFIED
per Plans Br OPMG 16 Oct 74

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- (2) Camp security inspection personnel inspected daily as many POW work details as were possible. These inspections were conducted while the POW's were on the job, en route to and from work areas.
- (3) Camp security inspection personnel could order POW work details to return to the camp in the event that the inspection revealed noncompliance with the provisions of directives covering work details. When a work detail was returned to the camp, security inspection personnel notified Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, and the commanding officer of the using agency. Telephone communications were authorized for the initial report. Twenty-four hours from the time of the initial report, a written report containing full details was forwarded by the concerned camp commander to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, Attention: G3, and one copy to the commanding officer of the using agency (appendix X).
- (4) The commanding officer of the using agency or the camp commander concerned, whichever one was responsible at the time, insured that details were at all times under the supervision of military personnel and secured by United States or ROKA guards, who had been issued specific instruction relative to their duties and responsibilities

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and knew the exact number of POW's in the detail.

Exceptions to this were made only as specifically authorized by the FIC.

- (5) POW's remained in the custody of assigned guards while on labor details.
- (6) Guard orders were amended or changed only by order of camp commanders or their authorized representatives.

f. Use of Interpreters.

- (1) An interpreter was furnished for each POW work detail.
- (2) Whenever it was necessary to transmit any orders or instructions to POW's from operating personnel through an interpreter, care was exercised that the message was transmitted briefly and explicitly.
- (3) Long discussions or arguments between the interpreter and the POW representative tended to weaken overall discipline and to encourage noncompliance with such orders and instructions.
- (4) Interpreters were instructed to limit the transmission of the message from operating personnel to the POW's by interpreting from English to the particular foreign language into as nearly the exact meaning as was possible. They refrained from discussing, commenting, or enlarging upon the message given to them for transmission.

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- g. Duties of US and POW Supervisors. See paragraph 102s above.
- h. Duties of Guard Supervisors. See paragraph 102u above.
- i. Method of Dispatching POW's on Outside Details.

- (1) The basic POW detail unit was composed of 25 POW's, however, S3, PWC, could authorize a smaller detail on an individual request basis and could determine the number of guards required for such a detail of less than 25 POW's.
- (2) The supervisor in charge of the detail made sure that the POW detail had food and mess gear with them when the detail messed at the work site. The POW's ate at the work site when it was located a distance greater than thirty minutes by foot from the enclosure from which the work detail was dispatched. POW's were given one hour to eat and rest when messing at work sites.
- (3) Work details were formed at the enclosures ready to depart for the work site no later than 0730 and 1300 hours.
- (4) Work details did not depart from the work site prior to 1145 hours or 1700 hours unless the location of the work project was changed or the job was completed.
- (5) Work details were given a reasonable amount of work to accomplish and were required to work diligently at all times. Sufficient force was used to require POW's to comply.

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(6) Instructions to a work detail were issued in a firm and positive manner and were passed to the POW's through a POW interpreter. No promises, agreements, threats, or coercion were used when issuing instructions concerning the work detail.

(7) POW's were not required to work in the rain except on necessary and priority details.

j. Transporting POW's to Work.

(1) POW's were prepared to leave the compound not later than 0730 hours each day and normally returned by 1730 hours.

(2) The work details were formed inside the enclosure in groups of 25 POW's or less.

(3) Under the supervision of the compound commander, each group was given a thorough search upon entering and leaving the enclosure.

(4) Agencies requesting POW work details provided United States Army personnel as work supervisors who signed for the details and supervised them throughout the day.

(5) Work details marched to the place of work (including "honey-bucket" carrying details) and moved out in groups not to exceed 25 POW's per group. Each group was secured by not less than four UN guards.

- (6) A distance of not less than fifty yards was maintained between marching groups and working groups from different compounds. The details marched with traffic. Work supervisors led the POW's, escort guards marched on either side; the guard supervisor brought up the rear.
- (7) POW's when moved by trucks were under the supervision of a United States Army noncommissioned officer.
- (8) POW's were marched at a cadence of 120 steps per minute. Dragged out marching was not tolerated. The work supervisor and security guards used necessary force for compliance.
- (9) UN escort guards did not ride in vehicles loaded with ten or more POW's but rode in a separate vehicle in rear of such POW loaded vehicle. No vehicle was permitted between the guard vehicle and the vehicle carrying the POW's. Tops of vehicles carrying guards were removed. Lights on POW vehicles and guard vehicles were turned on and the vehicles were given traffic priority.
- (10) When transportation was not capable of transporting all POW's to be moved in one load, movement was accomplished by the shuttle method.
- (11) No movement of POW's was made outside the enclosure between 1730 and 0730 hours unless directed by the camp commander.

k. Hours of Labor.

- (1) Work hours normally were from 0730 to 1730 hours, Monday through Saturday, for POW details, except for special details such as stevedores, Quartermaster supply labor, and repair and utility shops.
- (2) Each Sunday, POW details were limited to normal compound details and other necessary details as determined by the camp commander or prisoner-of-war service unit commander. These duties consisted of "money-bucket" details, garbage disposal, ration breakdown, and such other duties as deemed necessary. All POW's who were not on duty were permitted to rest and recreation was stressed.

l. POW's Injured on Work Details.

- (1) The using agency reported all accidents or injuries involving POW's that occurred while POW's were under their supervision. This report was prepared in accordance with the provisions of ST 305-10-41.
- (2) When a POW was injured on a work detail, he was given all possible first aid treatment and if necessary the nearest ROKA or UN medical personnel was contacted for assistance.
- (3) Standard Form 91A or 92, as applicable, was prepared by the using agency having custody of the injured prisoner(s) at the time of the accident and it was distributed as follows:

- (a) One copy to the camp commander concerned.
- (b) One copy to the using agency.
- (c) Six copies to the appropriate Safety Officer, United Nations Prisoner of War Camp.

m. Escapes.

- (1) Escapes of POW's on work details were investigated by the camp commander to which the POW belonged.
- (2) The using agency was responsible for reporting immediately by telephone to the camp commander concerned the escape of POW's while under their supervision. See appendix XI for information that was furnished.
- (3) When the escape of a POW became known, the camp commander concerned rendered the report to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, Attention: G2 (par 45).

104. Marking and Displaying Clothing and Equipment⁶

a. Marking Clothing.

- (1) All POW clothing which may be worn as an outer garment, except for headgear, other accessories, and national uniforms, were marked in the following manner:
 - (a) All shirts, undershirts, blouses, jackets, coats, including overcoats and raincoats, and similar articles were marked across the back with the letters, "PW", 6

⁶ McGarr, op.cit., inclosure 2 to Tab 3, pp. 13-14 and annex 1 to inclosure 2 to Tab 3, p.1; and UNC Pam No. 1, p.29.

inches high, and in the same manner on the front of each sleeve between the elbow and shoulder with the letters, "PW," 4 inches high.

- (b) Trousers, shorts, and similar articles were marked in the same manner with letters 4 inches high across the back immediately below the belt and on the front of each leg immediately above the knee.
 - (c) Clothing of retained personnel and civilian internees were marked in the same manner as clothing for prisoners, using the letters, "PP" or "CI" instead of the letters "PW."
- (2) Stenciling of POW clothing was accomplished before issue to the POW and only clothing required for immediate issue was so marked.
 - (3) Paint, stencil, gloss, black, was used on all garments other than those dyed black, blue, or other dark colors which prevented the black from plainly showing.
 - (4) Garments dyed black, blue, or other dark colors were stenciled with enamel, stencil, gloss, white.

b. Dyeing of Clothing. At Koje-do April 1951, fatigue clothes were dyed red and distributed to prisoners. This was done to make prisoners, particularly escapees, easily distinguishable. Following this change in the color of their clothing POW's were placed on a work detail to dig a large hole, but they refused to work. An

investigation was made to determine the cause of this refusal, and it was learned that the POW's were under the misapprehension that the hole they were digging was to be a grave for themselves. It was learned that it was the oriental custom to dress persons in red prior to their execution. Because of the meaning which POW's attached to the red clothing its use was immediately discontinued.⁷

c. Display of Clothing and Equipment.

- (1) Each POW had an assigned space within his billets. This space was his sleeping area and a place to display his clothing and equipment. He had a bunk tag with his name in English and internment serial number thereon securely fastened to the aisle end of the pallet, centered on his area and at all times visible and free from mutilation or alteration.
- (2) Prior to 0730 hours daily, each POW arranged his clothing and equipment in a uniform manner and such clothing and equipment remained in this order for inspection between 0730-1130 hours daily unless otherwise specified by the camp commander.
 - (a) Rice mats remained flat on the ground, or pallet, covered by one blanket.
 - (b) Other blankets were folded in eighths, long folded edge to the right, open ends next to the wall and laid flat

7. Personal interview with Lt Col Harrell Reagan, MPC, 9 Sep 55; Sullivan, op. cit.; and Kim Sun Ho, op. cit.

on the ground. Blanket(s) were aired outdoors each afternoon, weather permitting, between 1300-1700 hours.

- (c) Overcoat (or substitute) when not in use was folded neatly in half, buttoned up, neck next to wall, and laid on top of blankets(s).
- (d) Extra trousers were folded in quarters and placed on the blanket(s) in front of overcoat.
- (e) Extra shirt was buttoned up neatly, folded four times, and laid on top of trousers, neck next to overcoat.
- (f) Raincoat or poncho was folded into a square, laid on the mat, top edge touching blanket(s), right and left edges lined up with right and left edges of blanket(s) so that underwear and mess gear could be displayed thereon.
- (g) Extra drawers were folded neatly in eighths and placed on the raincoat, top edge next to the trousers, next to the undershirt.
- (h) Gloves, when not in use, were placed, one on top of the other, lengthwise on the lower edge of the undershirt.
- (i) Socks were rolled individually and placed, one above the other, on the lower half of the folded drawers.
- (j) Mess gear (rice bowl, canteen, and spoon) were displayed on the raincoat in front of undershirt and drawers.

- (k) If a POW did not have any of the above-mentioned items, the space for each missing item was left vacant.

105. Military Courtesy⁸

a. Saluting by Prisoners.

- (1) In the early days of the prisoner-of-war internment program (about October 1950) military courtesy, particularly saluting, was poor. Part of this low standard was attributed to the fact that many of the North and South Korean POW's had been in the military service only about 10 days to two weeks. However, military courtesy standards improved after the POW's were interned for several weeks.
- (2) In addition to the courtesies toward their officers required by regulations in force in their own armies, enlisted prisoners saluted all commissioned officers of the UN armed forces and armed forces of the Republic of Korea. Officer POW's were required to salute only officers of a higher or equal grade but always returned all salutes. They were required to salute the camp commander regardless of his grade.
- (3) UN military personnel and ROKA personnel were not required to salute POW's nor to assume the position of attention when addressing them.

8. UNC Pam No.1, p.29.

(4) UNC and ROKA officers returned the salutes of POW's.

b. Display of Flags. Flags, emblems, and placards were not to be displayed within enclosures or compounds, or to be carried by POW's while in formation or on details outside of compounds.

c. Possession of Flags and Emblems. Except for emblems and insignia worn as a part of the uniform, POW's were prohibited from having in their possession or displaying any emblems, insignia, or flags, or pictures of military or political leaders.

106. Restrictions and Prohibitions⁹

a. Singing of Insolent, Offensive, or Political Songs. From the time of the initial internment of the POW's in September 1950 to at least about February 1951 there were no problems regarding singing of insolent, offensive, or political songs. This problem began after the POW's were transferred to Koje-do. It became so acute that directives were issued prohibiting the singing of insolent, offensive, or political songs. POW's and CI's were prohibited from singing while engaged in any work detail outside the compound. Singing by POW's and CI's inside the compound was permitted at the discretion of the camp commander. Usually, POW's and CI's were permitted to sing inside the compound between the hours of 0600 and 2000 hours daily. The following songs, however, were prohibited at all times:

9. McGarr, op.cit., inclosure 2 to Tab 3, pp. 2-5, 50-51; and Sullivan, op.cit.

- (1) The Red Flag.
- (2) Song of General Kim Il Sung.
- (3) People Fight Against Capitalism.
- (4) The Partisan Song.
- (5) North Korean Peoples' Army March.
- (6) Song of Partisan.
- (7) Song of Stalin.
- (8) Breakdown of Syngman Rhee and ROK.

b. Unauthorized Training. POW's and CI's were not permitted to conduct any military training at any time. However, as early as October 1950 prisoners were given physical training at infrequent intervals.

c. Quarters. POW's and CI's were restricted to their quarters from 2100 to 0400 hours daily or as prescribed by the camp commander or his authorized representative. Necessary visits to the latrine and authorized movements by mess personnel were excluded from this restriction. The enclosure charge of quarters informed all POW's and CI's when the quarters restrictions was in effect by means of a series of short blasts of a whistle at 2000 hours. At 0100 hours, the charge of quarters informed all mess personnel to enter the kitchen in a group by one long blast of a whistle. At 0400 hours, the charge of quarters informed the POW's that the quarters restrictions had been lifted by another series of short blasts of a whistle.

d. Use of Electric Lights. POW's and CI's at no time were permitted to change, remodel, or repair any electrical lighting equipment placed in a compound.

e. Others.

- (1) Monitors. POW's were forbidden to set up police organizations within the compound in order to control and direct activities.
- (2) Fences. POW's were not permitted to congregate or approach within five feet of the inner fence of the compounds and enclosures. At no time were clothing, blankets, or other articles permitted to be hung on the fences.
- (3) Kangaroo courts. POW's were forbidden to hold "Kangaroo Courts," "Peoples' Courts," or any other similar type meetings for the purpose of punishing other POW's. Disciplinary action was the responsibility of the camp commander.
- (4) Flags. At camp headquarters, the flag of the UN and the national flag of the country or countries supplying administrative and/or security personnel for the operation of the camp could be displayed. All other flags were not authorized for display by POW's.
- (5) Acts of defiance. POW's were instructed not to make any acts of defiance, disobedience, disrespect, hostile gesture (throwing stones) toward UN personnel.

- (6) Organizations. POW's and CI's were prohibited from forming organizations or operating groups within the compounds other than those directed by the compound commander. Any attempt to violate this prohibition was cause for disciplinary punishment.
- (7) Unnecessary noises. POW's and CI's were not to make any unnecessary noises at any time.
- (8) Alcoholic beverages. POW's and CI's were not permitted the use of alcoholic beverages or any intoxicating drinks.

107. POW's Representatives¹⁰

a. How Elected.

- (1) When the POW's were initially interned in Pusan in about September 1950, the senior officer of each compound was designated as the POW's representative by the enclosure commander. Later enlisted POW's also were designated as compound representatives. The enclosure commander met with the representatives at stated intervals, approximately once or twice weekly. Upon the establishment of the PWC the procedure was modified. Each POW compound was authorized one POW representative who was known as the compound representative and who, except as provided in (3) below, was selected by secret ballot by the POW's in each compound.

10. McGarr, op.cit., inclosure 2 to Tab 3, p.p. 5-6; UNC Pam No. 1, pp. 12-13; and Sullivan, op.cit.

The compound representative served a term of six months and he was the only POW representative with whom the camp commander and others concerned dealt with in the operation of the compound.

- (2) The compound representative, after being duly elected, was approved by the enclosure commander before assuming any duties.
- (3) In compounds of officer POW's, the senior officer POW, in the highest grade, unless incapacitated physically or otherwise incompetent, was recognized as the compound representative.
- (4) The compound representative was authorized four assistants whose duties did not involve direct dealings with the camp commander or his representatives. They performed such duties as were necessary to assist the compound representative in connection with his authorized functions.

b. Duties. The compound representative performed such administrative duties as were prescribed by the compound commander. Usually these duties included such functions as:

- (1) Providing work details as directed.
- (2) Conducting daily sick call formations.
- (3) Assisting in conducting daily headcounts.
- (4) Assisting the compound commander in insuring proper police sanitation within the compound.

- (5) Insuring that all POW's understood the "specific instructions for prisoners-of-war," that all POW's understood that UN guards were instructed to enforce the provisions of the instructions.
- (6) Representing the POW's before military authorities and Red Cross.
- (7) Performing other duties as directed by the compound commander.

c. Prohibited Practices.

- (1) From the initial internment of the POW's in Pusan to the transfer of POW's to Kojedo there were no serious incidents of "kangaroo courts," "peoples' courts" or similar forms of punishment by other POW's. One POW was found dead in one of the compounds in Pusan during this period, but an investigation revealed that he hung himself. The compound representative was not under any circumstances authorized to take any disciplinary action, conduct "kangaroo Courts," "peoples' Courts," or other punishment against any POW. Disciplinary action was a responsibility of the camp commander only.
- (2) POW's were not authorized to form or operate groups within the compound except as was authorized or directed by the compound commander. Any attempt to form an unauthorized organization or groups was a cause for disciplinary action.

against those POW's found responsible. In case the compound representative was involved, he was relieved and the POW's were required to elect a new representative.

(3) POW representatives other than at compound level were not authorized.

(4) Retained personnel were not authorized to act as POW representatives.

108. Confinement of Women POW's¹¹

a. Women POW's were segregated from men in the same camp since the internment program began in September 1950 in Pusan. It was found that it was better to segregate them further so that they were not in the proximity of men POW's.

b. They were treated with all the regard due their sex and in all cases benefitted by treatment as favorable as that granted to men.

11. McGarr, op.cit., inclosure 1 to Tab E, p.68.

Section III. SECURITY

109. General¹²

a. POW's and CI's from early 1951 until the Dodd incident on 7 May 1952 were treated as noncombatants and in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Prisoners of War Conventions of 12 August 1949 for the Protection of War Victims. Although the POW's were behind barbwire fences and were guarded by ROK and United States troops, full consideration was given to their well-being and comfort.

b. Huts that were comfortable from the standpoint of the POW's standards were built within the compounds. Each hut was heated by stoves and had electric lights and showers. Rations, based on the native ingredients and in accordance with caloric requirements, were issued for three meals each day. Religious services of most faiths were available as desired. The CIEE Program was stressed.

c. The activities in b above, were accomplished in accordance with the standards of fair play as practiced by United States personnel. In those early days, however, the meager intelligence reports indicated trouble was fomenting between the Communist and non-Communist groups. One of the groups gained control in a compound and inflicted brutal treatment or even death on many members of the opposing group until they joined the group in control.

d. Gradually came the realization, climaxed with the capture of General Dodd, that an Oriental Communist POW or CI could no

¹². McGarr, op. cit., p.p.62, 63; and Sullivan, op. cit.

longer be treated as a noncombatant. Necessary action had to be taken in the form of security procedures to treat them as an active enemy and to maintain uncontested control regardless of all other considerations. They were treated firmly, and concessions to their unreasonable demands were not made. Orders had to be given so that the POW's could understand them. Careful consideration had to be given to the type of orders to give the POW's. Once an order was given, it had to be enforced. If the POW's failed to obey one order, and were not forced to comply, they would test the authority of the camp commander in other areas of security and discipline.

e. An enclosure or compound commander, or other unarmed person did not issue orders to POW's or undertake to compel POW's to obey any verbal or written order while the unarmed person was inside a compound, athletic area, administrative area, dispensary, hospital or hospital annex, or any other area within an enclosure, unless adequate armed security personnel were immediately available to insure the safety of the personnel issuing the order and to enforce compliance with it.

f. All orders issued to POW's by any enclosure administrative personnel were issued through the POW representative, or over the public address system, or through the medium of posting written orders on compound bulletin boards.

g. All orders involving any type of disciplinary action imposed on POW's were issued by an officer through the POW compound representative.

110. Objectives

a. Gaining and Maintaining Uncontested Control. From the time that the POW's were interned in Pusan in September 1950 until after they were moved to Koje-do there were no disciplinary problems. The problem of uncontested control did not arise until about December 1951 when some POW trouble makers resisted the authorities. One objective of the camp commander was to gain and to maintain uncontested control of the POW's and CI's.

b. Others. Other objectives were --

- (1) To prevent the escape of POW's and CI's.
- (2) To prevent disorders, disturbances, and riots.
- (3) To quell disorders, disturbances, and riots, without losing face with the POW's or CI's and without embarrassing the UNC.

111. Methods of Maintaining Security¹³

a. Organization of Guard Force. The guard force for an enclosure consisted of the following guards:

- (1) Perimeter.
- (2) Perimeter tower.
- (3) Escort.
- (4) Tower.

13. McGarr, op. cit. inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp 78-79; inclosure 2 to Tab 3, pp. 23-41; and Memorandum No. 27, UNC POW Command Camp 1A (Chogee-Ri), 13 Dec 52, subject: "SOP for Administrative Search of Compounds" (S); and Sullivan, op. cit.

- (5) Dead space.
- (6) Corridor.
- (7) Center tower.
- (8) Roving patrol.

b. Supervision. Supervision of the guards was accomplished by the officer of the guard and sergeant and corporal of the guard.

c. Alertness and Surveillance. The guards were instructed to be alert at all times and to note any indications of any trouble. The slightest breach of obedience of orders by POW's often indicated the attitudes of the POW's and to a certain extent some of their plans for testing the control of the camp commander.

d. Segregation.

- (1) POW's in one enclosure were prohibited from mingling with POW's in another.
- (2) Within an enclosure, sick calls and work details were handled so that POW's in one compound did not have the chance to mingle with POW's from another compound.
- (3) For security reasons, POW's of different political beliefs were separated from each other.
- (4) Officers were separated from enlisted men.
- (5) Women POW's were segregated from men.

e. Checking Weapons at Enclosure Entrances. Personnel entering an enclosure were required to check their weapons at the command post before entering the enclosure. Exceptions to this were made

for armed guards on duty inside the enclosure and for other personnel so authorized by the camp or enclosure commander.

f. Spot Check Inspections. Spot check inspections were made in the same manner as daily inspections (par. 124c). These inspections were made unannounced and at times when the element of surprise would favor inspecting personnel.

g. Shakedown for Contraband. The shakedown for contraband was performed in the following manner:

- (1) The POW's or CI's were moved to the service area or if leaving or entering the enclosure, the shakedown was performed in or adjacent to the sally port. Armed guards were placed around the POW's or CI's for security.
- (2) Personnel conducting the search were unarmed and were provided by each enclosure.
- (3) The POW's removed their hats and held them in one hand and held their personal items in the other hand.
- (4) Any excess of clothing, supplies, equipment, or any other unauthorized items were considered as contraband.
- (5) Each POW or CI moved up to and halted in front of the searcher, arms out-stretched at shoulder height and feet spread about eighteen inches apart.
- (6) The searcher inspected the contents of each hand, and then, beginning at the collar, searched the POW or CI down to his feet, carefully feeling for hidden items of

contraband. If deemed necessary the POW or CI was required to remove all of his clothing and the clothing as well as the person was searched.

- (7) Personal belongings, such as rings, watches, and pens, were not considered as contraband and were not taken from the POW's or CI's.

h. Administrative Searches.

- (1) In Pusan from September 1950 until several months later there were no planned administrative searches. The only time during this period that such a search was held was once when a rumor arose that several POW's planned to escape. It was directed that an administrative search of each compound be conducted at least each month to remove all unauthorized articles and subversive documents. This search included not only an exhaustive search of the compound but also a thorough strip search of each POW. POW's were not disrobed when the temperature was below 60 degrees Fahrenheit.
- (2) These searches were planned and conducted in such a manner as to fully exploit the element of surprise. Any advance warning, even one minute, substantially reduced the effectiveness. Precautions were taken to prevent individuals from destroying documents that they had in their possession.

- (3) A schedule of proposed searches was submitted to the camp headquarters, Attention: S2, before 1700 hours each Saturday, setting out the searches that were to be conducted the following week.
- (4) It was not intended that searches be limited to those listed in the schedule. Other searches could and were made as the need for them arose, and after the S2 had been notified. Commanders of branch camps could make additional searches without prior notification to the S2.
- (5) All confiscated documents together with a list of confiscated materials and clothing were transmitted to camp headquarters, Attention S2, within two hours after the search was completed. Branch camp commanders transmitted the materials and list as soon as possible. Documents were not translated or evaluated by lower units.
- (6) POW's on whose person a subversive document was found were identified, segregated, and placed in maximum security confinement. The name and ISN of the POW was placed on a note which was stapled to the document. Any other document had stapled thereto a note showing the place it was found, such as a coal pile, tent number, hut number, or location of bed.
- (7) Administrative searches of compound regularly scheduled by the enclosure commander were conducted by the off

duty guard relief of the enclosure concerned. If additional security forces were needed, they were provided by the unit furnishing security forces for that enclosure.

i. Head Count of Prisoners. When the POW's were interned at Pusan in September 1950, only one headcount daily was held. At Koje-do the compound commander made a head count of all POW's or CI's under his control twice daily. It was the first duty to be performed in the morning and the last duty in the evening. Head count was taken in the following manner:

- (1) The cover guards were posted by the compound commander.
- (2) The compound commander and his assistant entered the compound and stood directly inside the compound gate.
- (3) The compound commander sounded his whistle.
- (4) Upon hearing the whistle, the POW representative formed the POW's in columns of fives in groups in the area previously designated by the compound commander. The POW's fell in at attention and assumed the squat position.
- (5) After forming the POW's, the POW representative reported to the compound commander.
- (6) The compound commander and assistant both made the count. If a POW was found to be missing, another count was taken. If the POW was not found, a hurried search of the compound was made. If the POW still was not found, the enclosure commander was notified immediately.

d. Escort Guards (Dismounted).

- (1) I will take charge of POW's in my detail.
- (2) March on the sides (guard supervisor in rear) of the POW work detail. Weapon with bayonet fixed will be carried with the butt on hip or at high port.
- (3) Not allow anyone to come between myself and the POW's in my charge and will keep myself at least ten and not more than fifteen yards from the prisoners at all times, area permitting.
- (4) I will see that the POW's stay in formation and march at a cadence of 120 per minute, and that they stay in the prescribed area when working.
- (5) Take a break only when authorized by the guard supervisor and smoke only during this break. (This break will not coincide with that of the POW work detail.)
- (6) Not allow POW's to commit acts of pilferage or willful destruction of Government property; use necessary force to prevent such acts.
- (7) Observe and cover work supervisor and in case of attack by POW's; support UN personnel with such action and/or force as may be necessary.
- (8) Prevent any bartering with POW's.

e. Escort Guards (Mounted).

- (1) I will take charge of POW's in my detail.
- (2) Guard POW's, riding with the POW's on the same vehicle only if less than ten POW's are in the vehicle.
- (3) If the POW work detail consists of ten or more POW's, I will guard the POW vehicle from a trail vehicle and I will allow no vehicle or person to come between the POW loaded vehicle and escort vehicle.
- (4) Not allow the POW's to commit any unsafe acts, especially while riding vehicle, such as horseplay, singing, or shouting.
- (5) Not allow the POW's to dismount from their vehicle until the escort guard has dismounted and taken up position.
- (6) Observe and cover work supervisor, and in case of attack by prisoners support UN personnel with such action and/or force as may be necessary.
- (7) Prevent any bartering with POW's.

f. Dead Space and Corridor Guards.

- (1) My post is number ____, enclosure number ____.
- (2) Prevent POW's from escaping from compound, to assist in maintaining order and discipline within compound and to prevent POW's from violating orders.

- (3) If POW's are outside of hut in violation of orders (going between huts, rather than going to latrine), I will halt him by using the phrase "Chung-Gee," twice and after he has halted, cause him to "Anjo," to be removed from the compound and turned over to the personnel on duty at the enclosure command post.
- (4) Enforce my order to the POW's to halt by employing fire-power, if necessary. I will endeavor to fire at the lower extremities of the POW's if he fails to obey my order.
- (5) Prevent any bartering with POW's.
- (6) Report to the corporal of the guard unusual clicking noises, flashing lights, or intermittent dimming of lights within buildings.

g. Center Tower Guards.

- (1) My post is center tower, enclosure number ____.
- (2) Maintain close observation on activities within the enclosure and give timely warning of any suspicious actions.
- (3) Prevent POW's from escaping from compound, to assist in maintaining order and discipline within the compounds.
- (4) Prevent any bartering with POW's.
- (5) Observe and cover the movements of any person armed or unarmed on duty within the enclosure.

- (6) To pay particular attention to and report to the corporal of the guard any unusual clicking noises, flashing lights, or intermittent dimming of lights within buildings.

h. Roving Patrol Guards.

- (1) I will patrol, as scheduled, around assigned area observing for unusual incidents.
- (2) I will report any suspicious activity immediately to the duty officer.
- (3) I will service machine gun and ammunition prior to going on patrol.
- (4) I will cover compounds during head count, roll calls, and other massed formations of POW's or CI's.

i. Cover Guards.

- (1) I will station myself in the most advantageous position so as to cover the movement of unarmed UN personnel within the compound or other enclosure areas.
- (2) In the event of attack by prisoner(s), to support such personnel with action and/or force as may be necessary.

113. Alert Forces for Control of POW's¹⁵

a. Mission. To regain control of a compound, and to cause obedience to properly constituted authority. In about December

¹⁵. McGarr, op. cit., pp. 33-35; and Sullivan, op. cit.

1950 a British tank battalion located in the vicinity of Pusan had as one of its missions the quelling of disturbances among POW's.

b. Organization.

- (1) Three platoons of four nine-man squads for a 500 POW compound.
- (2) Four platoons of four nine-man squads for a 1,000 POW compound.
- (3) All platoons were organized with a rope cutting detail of two men (carrying machetes) and a wire breaching team of two men (carrying wire cutters).
- (4) Support platoon carried one riot gun per squad.
- (5) Support platoon had attached four jeeps with machine guns mounted thereon.
- (6) Support platoon had one jeep ambulance with complement of medical personnel.

c. Ammunition.

- (1) Platoons which entered compounds carried ammunition as directed by alert unit commander.
- (2) Members of the support platoon carried individual ammunition for the weapons with which they were armed, additional ammunition for the assault platoons, and CN and CN-DM grenades.

d. Principles of Employment.

- (1) The alert force commander determined the requirements for the operation from the enclosure commander or the prisoner-of-war service unit commander prior to committing the alert force.
- (2) The alert force commander, after formulating his plan, briefed his troops on his plan, and checked to see that his plan was understood.
- (3) The alert force moved into the sally port and formed into a column of two's, bayonets fixed. The support platoon was the leading element.
- (4) Once the support platoon had moved into position outside the compound, the assault platoons moved directly into the compound to accomplish their mission. All units moved to their assigned positions on the double.
- (5) The assault platoon moved into the compound in such a manner as not to mask the fire of the support platoon.
- (6) If the POW's were to be assembled at a designated area, the alert force commander made sure that there were no obstructions in the way of the movement.
- (7) Once the alert force had been committed inside the compound, the alert force commander used a whistle to cause troop action to cease, so that necessary verbal orders could

be issued. The alert force commander maintained control of his troops at all times.

- (8) Once the POW's were assembled, and under control, the alert force commander, through a qualified interpreter, took the following action:
 - (a) Ordered the POW's to sit flatly on the ground.
 - (b) Ordered the POW's to remove their hats.
 - (c) Ordered the POW's to keep their heads up.
 - (d) Gave the reason the alert force was present.
 - (e) Told what the alert force intended to do, and requirement from the POW's.
 - (f) Made sure that POW's understood their instructions.
- (9) Once the alert force commander had instructed the POW's as to his requirements, he used the necessary force to cause compliance with his orders.
- (10) Concurrent with instructing the POW's, selected men searched the compound, including the quarters. Other selected men enforced the preliminary instructions of the alert force commander.
- (11) Disabled POW's were segregated so they could be protected. Casualties were moved to the enclosure dispensary as soon as possible.

(12) Employment of the support platoon was accomplished on order of the alert force commander.

(13) Upon departing a compound, the alert force commander established a small covering force, and moved his troops out smartly at quick time and at high port. Upon reassembling the alert force, the men cleared their weapons, removed bayonets, and an officer inspected their weapons.

(14) Under no circumstances did the alert force leave the compound until it had accomplished its mission.

114. Emergency Plans, Procedures, and Training¹⁶

a. Procedures in case of Riot, Escape, Fire, and Storm.

(1) Riots.

(a) All camp commanders were instructed to prepare and maintain up-to-date detailed plans for the suppression of mass disturbances or riots, to include plans for:

1. Disturbances within compounds and enclosures.
2. Disturbances by work details outside of enclosure.
3. Concerted mass disturbances from within compounds or enclosure and by outside work details.

(b) Such plans covered both daytime and nighttime disturbances and stressed the following:

16. McGarr, op. cit., inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 61-63, 100-103; inclosure 2 to Tab 3, p. 44; and Sullivan, op. cit.

1. Adequate alert force available at all times at each enclosure.
2. Assembly of all troops at emergency duty stations within.
3. Adequate and readily available general reserve at each camp.
4. Detailed instructions covering action to be taken by all administrative and security personnel, to include stations and routes thereto, formation, armament, communications, officer or noncommissioned officer in charge, and transportation.
5. Utilization of maximum number of jeeps equipped with mounted machine guns as roving patrols.
6. Establishment of adequate general alarm system.
7. Positive auxiliary illumination.
8. Protection of sensitive installations, such as POL and supply dumps, motor parks, and generators.
9. All personnel assigned to and on duty at prisoner-of-war camps carried or had in their immediate vicinity their assigned individual weapons and ammunition at all times. Arms racks were authorized in places, such as offices and motor pools, for temporary storage during duty periods. Weapons, however, were carried by men when moving between various locations or duties.

Each barracks had a locked arms rack available during periods of occupancy. Exceptions to this procedure were made in the case of medical and religious personnel whose duties were inside the enclosure.

10. Weapons, in excess or for personnel absent for any reason, were immobilized by removal of bolts or other parts of the firing mechanisms. The weapons were secured by a minimum of two locks with the removed parts stored in a separate location.
11. Local reserves of small-arms ammunition were secured under at least two locks and were kept readily available at platoon level.
12. Employment of nontoxic gases. CN and CN-DH to break up mass demonstrations and to disperse defiant or disobedient groups of POW's, prior to firing individual or crew-served weapons.
13. All personnel carried or had immediately available individual gas masks.
14. Weekly orientation of all administrative and security personnel.
15. Rehearsal of each plan at least once a month.
16. Copies of each plan and changes thereto were furnished

Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command.

- (2) Escapes. See subparagraph 45j.

- (3) Fire. Each enclosure commander published a fire plan which included --
- (a) Concise and adequate alarm measures.
 - (b) Action to be taken in case of fire, giving alarm, arousing personnel, evacuation plans, assembly, fire fighting, utilizing both military and POW salvage teams to evacuate property.
 - (c) The enclosure fire plan was printed and posted on bulletin boards in the command post and at guard posts. Extracts of fire plans were printed in the appropriate language and were posted on POW bulletin boards and all quarters within each compound.
- (4) Storm. Between September 1950 and February 1951 no instructions were issued regarding action to take in the event of storms. Later, however, each camp commander was directed to prepare a storm damage control plan. The plan took into consideration the following factors:
- (a) Additional guards to prevent looting in the event of a widespread disruption of facilities.
 - (b) When a storm appeared imminent or a warning was received, fires in tent stoves were extinguished to prevent possible loss by fire. Tents were struck in place and secured with weights or lashings. All individual

equipment and military impedimenta were stacked, secured, and protected with tarpaulins securely fastened.

- (c) Standby crews were to resecure any tarpaulins or lashings that came loose during the storm.
- (d) Large nearby trees were guy-wired in such a manner that the strain would prevent the trees from toppling on adjacent buildings.
- (e) During most storms, high tides occurred. Small boats were beached and lashed down. It was planned that larger craft would be moved to the best available bay and anchored fore and aft. In some cases the boats were tied to the lee side of a pier. Standby crews were instructed to shift the boat if the wind shifted.
- (f) Aircraft were grounded at camps during a storm. Commanders were directed to lend every possible assistance, labor, and materials to air crews in their efforts to protect the aircraft.
- (g) It was planned for standby crews to be organized and to be instructed as to their responsibilities to meet any contingencies that might arise during storms. Specific crews to maintain the electrical and communication systems were to be ready to take preventive damage measures as well as to be prepared to repair damage

immediately after the storm subsided. Medical aid men had specified stations and provisions available to render adequate medical service.

- (h) Every possible fire prevention measure was planned.
- (i) Means for evacuating personnel and equipment to places of safety were planned.

b. Training. Rehearsals and drills were held to insure the smooth operation of the plans. In the training for the quelling of disturbances, the following was stressed:

- (1) Familiarization firing of weapons utilized.
- (2) Physical conditioning.
- (3) Riot control formations.
- (4) A thorough understanding on the part of commanders at all levels of:
 - (a) The provisions of the Geneva (Prisoners of War) Conventions of 12 August 1949.
 - (b) The provisions of paragraph 23, UNC Pamphlet No. 1, 7 October 1952.

115. Arms and Ammunition for Security Personnel¹⁷

a. Perimeter Guards.

- (1) Weapons. Each perimeter guard was individually armed with a rifle, M1; carbine, M1; or carbine M2, with bayonet fixed.

17. McGarr, op. cit., inclosure 2 to Tab 3, pp. 29-31.

(2) Ammunition.

- (a) Rifle, M1. Each perimeter guard was armed with a rifle, M1, and carried eight rounds of ammunition in the weapon, including one round in the chamber. The weapon was carried on safe. He carried an additional sixteen rounds in clips.
- (b) Carbine, M1. Each perimeter guard armed with a carbine, M1, carried a magazine of 15 rounds of ammunition in the weapon, including one round in the chamber. The weapon was carried on safe. He carried an additional thirty rounds in two magazines of fifteen rounds each.
- (c) Carbine, M2. Each perimeter guard armed with a carbine, M2, carried a magazine of thirty rounds in the weapon including one round in the chamber. An additional thirty rounds in two magazines of fifteen rounds each were carried.

b. Escort Guards. Each guard performing dismounted or mounted escort guard duty on POW's or CI's carried a weapon and ammunition as prescribed for perimeter guards.

c. Tower Guards.

- (1) Each guard on duty in a perimeter guard tower was armed with a weapon and ammunition as prescribed for perimeter guards.

- (2) One of the two guards on duty in the perimeter guard tower during the hours of darkness was armed with an automatic rifle. He carried a magazine of twenty rounds in the weapon. He carried an additional one hundred and eighty rounds in twenty round clips. Ammunition was not inserted into the chamber of the rifle unless the situation demanded and such precaution indicated that immediate discharge of the weapon was necessary.

d. Perimeter Tower.

- (1) Weapon. Each perimeter guard tower was equipped with one or more light or heavy machine guns, properly laid, checked and secured. Muzzle pointed away from the tower and over, not into the compound. Machine guns were half loaded with ammunition on the receiver block and with cover raised unless it was necessary to bring the weapon to bear on a target. The guard manning each machine gun, in addition to manning the machine gun, was individually armed and carried ammunition for that weapon.
- (2) Ammunition. 2,500 rounds, in boxes, were available for each machine gun at all times. The ammunition was stored so as not to be exposed to the sun and belts were stretched at least twice a week to permit free feeding of the weapon and to avoid malfunction and stoppages.

- (3) Grenades. Each perimeter guard tower was supplied with ten grenades, offensive, which were stored in a container for security reasons.

e. Dead Space Guards.

- (1) Weapons. Guards performing dead space guard duty inside the enclosure were armed with the shotgun, riot type.
- (2) Ammunition. Each shotgun carried by a guard was loaded with five rounds of ammunition, the size of the shot prescribed was No. 4, 6, or 8. Ammunition was not inserted into the chamber of the shotgun unless the situation demanded such action.

f. Corridor Guards. See e above.

g. Center Tower Guards. All guards in the center tower were armed with a rifle, M1, or carbine, during the time they were on duty in the center tower. Ammunition was as prescribed for perimeter guards, (see a above).

h. Roving Patrol Guards.

- (1) Weapons. Each roving patrol guard was armed with his individual weapon in addition to the machine gun mounted in the jeep. Bayonets were not fixed on the individual weapons.
- (2) Ammunition. Ammunition for the individual weapons was as prescribed for perimeter guards. Ammunition for each

machine gun was 1,000 rounds and it remained in boxes until necessary to load the weapon for action or inspection.

i. Cover Guards. Cover guards were armed and carried ammunition as prescribed for perimeter guards. Bayonets were fixed.

j. Enclosure Guard House or Command Post.

(1) All weapons and ammunition in the possession of the guard reliefs not on guard were immediately available to each individual member of the guard. Plans for committing the guard reserve included plans for the resupply of ammunition.

(2) The following amount of grenades was on hand in the enclosure guard house or command post at all times. Containers were provided for the storage of these grenades for security reasons.

Grenade, Offensive	25
Grenade, Tear Gas, CN, M-25	50
Grenade, Tear Gas, CN, M-7	50
Grenade, Adamsite, CN-DM, M-6	<u>25</u>
Total	150

k. Supervisory Personnel.

(1) Officer of the guard. The officer of the guard for each guard was armed with his TOE weapon or a pistol, cal. .45, loaded with seven rounds of ball ammunition. Ammunition was not inserted into the chamber of the pistol unless the

gravity of the situation demanded such action. He carried an additional fourteen rounds consisting of two magazines of seven rounds each.

- (2) Sergeant and corporal of the guard. The sergeant and corporal of the guard and other supervisory personnel of the guard were armed and carried ammunition as prescribed for perimeter guards.

1. Automatic Weapons Inspections.

- (1) Each automatic weapon located in a guard tower was inspected by a qualified officer at least twice each week and any deficiencies found in the weapon or ammunition were corrected immediately.
- (2) Each automatic weapon was removed from the guard tower and test fired at least once each month. The test firing was accomplished on ranges approved by the camp headquarters and so coordinated that no tower was ever without the required automatic weapon in operating condition.

116. Security Measures at Hospitals¹⁸

- a. Identification of Incoming and Outgoing POW's. Enclosure personnel had the responsibility of identifying all POW's sent to a hospital and received from a hospital. Fingerprint comparison was the best means for positive identification.

18. McGarr, op. cit. p. 136, inclosure 2 to Tab 3, pp. 9-10; and Sullivan, op. cit.

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b. Searches. Between September 1950 and January 1951 security of POW's at hospitals was not a major problem. During this period strip searching was not performed. After January 1951, however, incidents arose of POW's using the hospital as a communication center. Since hospitals often served as a clearing house for communications to and from POW's, enclosure personnel strip-searched all POW's going to or coming from a hospital. A close search of the person, including bandages, was also made to insure that no written messages were sent to or from the hospital.

c. Guards. Security at hospitals was equally as stringent as under other circumstances. The perimeter security of the hospital area was comparable to that for an enclosure. While weapons were not normally carried by personnel on duty inside the hospital and such personnel, by virtue of their duties inside the wards, were apt to get beyond the observation of security personnel, every possible measure had to be taken to insure their safety and freedom from attack by POW's.

117. Criminal Investigation Activities

a. A case involving the death or serious injury of a POW or CI was not referred to military police criminal investigators with the

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exception of a case which, upon preliminary investigation, indicated that the death or serious injury was the proximate result of --

- (1) Violation of a governing law, rule, or regulation by a member of the UNC.
- (2) Violation of one of the articles governing UN POW's by a person therein construed to be a POW.

b. Authority to refer the above described cases to criminal investigators was delegated to --

- (1) Camp commander, including a branch camp commander.
- (2) Deputy commanding officer.
- (3) S2.

c. In every instance where an individual POW received bodily injury which required medical attention or where a POW appeared to have been abused, the camp commander concerned required an investigation to determine whether excessive force was used, and in cases where excessive force was used, prompt disciplinary action was taken.

d. Reports of investigation were filed by the commanders concerned until called for by higher headquarters, except in those cases where disciplinary action was warranted. In those cases, reports of investigating officer, together with a report of disciplinary action taken, were immediately forwarded to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command.

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Section IV. MAXIMUM SECURITY FACILITIES¹⁹

118. General

a. A prisoner-of-war stockade, separate from the main body of POW's, was established in each camp as a facility in which POW's were confined for punitive or disciplinary reasons. This stockade, however, was not established until after February 1951. Prior to this date there was no separate enclosure primarily because personnel were not available to man it. There were isolated cases of confining POW's for punitive or disciplinary reasons. When they arose the POW's involved were placed in an isolated area where there were two or more tents.

b. The following minimum standards were found to be adequate: one 20' x 54' building per 4,000 prisoners at a camp.

119. Personnel Requirement for Typical Maximum Security Facility

a. Personnel requirements for a typical maximum security facility were tailored from TOE 19-500, 12 May 1950.

b. Personnel were as follows:

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Teams</u>					
	<u>NA</u>	<u>NC</u>	<u>NE</u>	<u>NF</u>	<u>NG</u>	<u>NI</u>
Prison officer	1					
Provost sergeant		1				
Assistant provost sergeant			1			

19. SOP for Maximum Security Section, UNC POW Camp No. 1 (Kojedo), Hq MP Group, 8137th AU, 19 Jan 53; and Sullivan, op. cit.

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>NA</u>	<u>NC</u>	<u>NE</u>	<u>Teams</u>		
	<u>1</u>			<u>NF</u>	<u>NG</u>	<u>NI</u>
Mess supply sergeant	1					
Prisoner guard supervisor						3
Turnkey					3	
Clerk/typist	1					
Cell block guard (3 cells)					12	
Driver, truck, light	1					
Prison guard		3	3			
	6	3	3	12	3	3

120. Duties of Personnel

a. Confinement Officer. The confinement officer had the following duties:

- (1) Was responsible for the operation of the maximum security facility in accordance with established practices of security, discipline, and sanitation.
- (2) Commanded all personnel assigned or detailed to the facility during their duty hours.
- (3) Was responsible for government property and equipment required in the operation of the facility.
- (4) Was responsible for the POW's personal property and its disposition.
- (5) Was responsible for maintaining all records required by applicable regulations.
- (6) Supervised the employment of POW's in confinement.

- (7) Assigned duties to administrative and security personnel as required.

b. Provost Sergeant. The provost sergeant was the senior non-commissioned officer assigned to the facility and had the following duties:

- (1) Was responsible for the administration and enforcement of pertinent regulations.
- (2) Supervised POW work assignments.
- (3) Reported to the confinement officer any unusual incidents that affected the security of the POW's.
- (4) Supervised disciplinary guards on work projects.
- (5) Exercised supervision relative to the security and treatment of POW's in close confinement.
- (6) Inspected POW's periodically to determine need for haircuts and to see if the desired standards of personal hygiene were being maintained.
- (7) Supervised work projects of POW's to insure the maintenance of good discipline.
- (8) Inspected weapons, uniforms, and equipment of guards prior to their assignment of duty.
- (9) Instructed guards in their duties prior to their assignment.

c. Other Personnel. The confinement officer assigned duties to other administrative and disciplinary guard personnel assigned to the facility.

121. Administration

a. Confinement Provisions.

(1) Who were confined.

- (a) Any POW or internee who was accused of an offense under "The Articles Governing United Nations Prisoners of War."
- (b) Women POW's were not confined in the facility.
- (c) Women POW's were reported to the camp commander for confinement.

(2) Reports. The confinement officer made a daily report on the status of each POW and internee within 24 hours after commitment.

(3) Procedure. The following action was taken when a POW was confined:

- (a) A written statement or confinement order, signed by an officer, was presented to the confinement officer or his representative at the time of confinement, showing the POW's name, grade, ISN, compound and enclosure to which he was assigned, and the offense of which he was accused. His verified DA Form 19-2 and allied records accompanied the POW at the time of confinement.

- (b) POW was required to bathe, have his hair cut (head was not shaved) and was thoroughly searched.
 - (c) All items of personal property taken from the POW were recorded on a receipt for POW's personal property and were held in safe keeping until the POW was released from confinement. The POW was permitted to retain only the necessary clothing and other authorized articles.
 - (d) POW was provided with toilet articles and adequate facilities for washing and bathing.
 - (e) Each POW was required to read the rules and regulations of the facility.
 - (f) Each POW was examined by a medical officer within 24 hours after confinement or as soon as practicable.
 - (g) POW was weighed when committed to confinement and weekly thereafter. The results of each weighing were recorded on an appropriate record of the individual POW.
- (4) Release from confinement.
- (a) POW's were released from confinement upon normal expiration of the sentence, or upon specific instructions from the installation commander.
 - (b) Under normal circumstances five days were deducted from a 30-day sentence provided the POW's conduct warranted such action.

(5) Custodial guards.

- (a) Custodial guards were assigned on the following ratio:
one guard to six POW's where work projects and POW
classification were considered favorable. Where sus-
pected escape risks existed, the guard to POW ratio
was commensurate with the risk involved. In some cases
there was one guard for each POW.
- (b) Where it became necessary to hospitalize a POW who had
to be under guard surveillance during such hospitaliza-
tion, guard personnel as deemed necessary were provided.
- (c) When it was necessary to place a POW in protective
custody, such precautions as were deemed necessary to
protect the POW were taken.

b. Status of POW's. POW's were classified as sentenced or
unsentenced.

- (1) Sentenced POW. A POW who was undergoing confinement as
the result of the imposition of a nonjudicial punishment
or serving an approved sentence.
- (2) Unsentenced POW. A POW who was awaiting the imposition
of nonjudicial punishment or was undergoing confinement
pending trial for an offense under the "Articles Govern-
ing United Nations Prisoners of War."

- (3) Change of status. A POW's status changed from unsentenced to sentenced when his nonjudicial punishment was announced to him or when his sentence to confinement by a United Nations Military Commission was ordered into execution. The sentence of a POW by a United Nations Military Commission was read to him in a language that he understood when the orders promulgating the same were received at the confinement facility.

c. Administrative Disciplinary Measures.

- (1) Commanding officers were authorized to impose one or more of the following administrative disciplinary measures upon POW's for misconduct or action prejudicial to good order and discipline or violation of prison rules and regulations:
- (a) Reprimand or warning.
 - (b) The withholding of the privilege of smoking.
- (2) A record of punishment was maintained for each POW confined to the facility.

d. Clothing. Confined POW's had the same clothing as other POW's.

e. Specific Regulations.

- (1) Unauthorized personnel were not permitted inside the facility.
- (2) No weapon was allowed inside the facility.

- (3) Lights were kept burning above occupied cells during hours of darkness.
- (4) Cells were kept clean at all times.
- (5) POW's were provided shower, barber, and latrine facilities.
- (6) No unauthorized disciplinary action was permitted against any POW either by operating personnel or inmates.
- (7) Sick call was held daily.

122. Physical Layout of a Maximum Security Facility

a. The facility consisted of two confinement buildings, one guardhouse, one latrine, one shower room, and two quonset buildings. The latrine, shower room, and two quonset buildings were for the use of enlisted personnel assigned to duty with the facility. (See Appendix XII.)

b. The exercise area was a double, barb wire enclosed area with single fenced lanes connecting it with the rear of the two confinement buildings. These lanes also served as a means of evacuating the POW's in case of a fire.

c. Building number 1 was constructed of cement, stone, and wood. The roof was wood. The structure was typical Korean in design in that there was no foundation and the walls were made of large stones with cement used as plaster. This building contained four large confinement cells with sufficient space for 20 to 25 prisoners. There were, in addition to the group confinement cells, four cell

blocks with five solitary confinement cells in each cell block. A shower room with two shower heads was located within the building. The cooking facilities for all POW's confined were located within the building. The mess area consisted of a clay brick oven with three Korean cooking pots. The stove was supplied with fuel oil. A center corridor ran the length of the building with cells and cell blocks on each side. The partitions between the cells were made of wood. The cell doors were made of wood with a window in each door. The cell doors were operated manually and were secured by the use of a sliding bolt and slide bar. The cell doors within the cell blocks for the solitary cells could be opened simultaneously by the use of a central control bar. The lights were placed overhead so that sufficient lighting was available within each cell 24 hours a day. The cells were covered overhead by interlaced barbed wire. A catwalk ran the length of the building on each side over the cells affording the catwalk guards a view into each cell. A door was located at each end of the building and was secured from the inside. Windows ran the length of the building at the roof level. Water was supplied by pipes and a fire hydrant was available for use in case of fire or to quell a riot or other disturbances. Heat, during winter months, was furnished by space heaters. The floors of the group and solitary cells were covered by removable wooden pallets. A field telephone connected building number 1 with building number 2.

d. Building number 2 was constructed of reinforced concrete and a wooden roof with wooden partitions between the cells. This building housed seven cell blocks consisting of two cells in each block. The cells were eight feet by six feet. This building housed the administrative office as well as the supply room for the entire facility. A shower was located in the building with two shower heads. A holding cell was designated to segregate incoming and outgoing prisoners. Electric lights were provided as for building number 1. Cell doors including cell block doors were operated manually by a double metal bar hinged to slide into the foundation of the walls. A fire hose and fire hydrant were located within the building for use in case of fire or to quell disturbances. The fire door was located at the rear of the building and was secured by a slide bolt locked from inside. The main door was secured from the outside and under guard by the sentry on duty at the guardhouse which was located directly across from this building. A field telephone connected this building with building number 1 and with the guardhouse. Telephone communications were also maintained with camp headquarters. Space heaters were used to heat this building. Daylight was obtained by windows located near the roof of the building. Wooden, removable pallets were located within each cell.

e. The guardhouse was located directly across from building number 2 and was a stone and cement building with a wooden roof. Located within this building was an arms room which was closed in.

A field telephone connected this building with buildings number 1 and 2.

123. Operations

a. Admissions. The POW was admitted to a maximum security facility in the following manner:

- (1) He was brought to the facility under guard by personnel from the agency requesting confinement.
- (2) He was accompanied by a confinement letter and the POW's verified DA Form 19-2 and other allied papers. (In case of nonjudicial punishment the completed papers accompanied the POW's.)
- (3) He was stripped searched before being admitted to the facility.
- (4) His clothing record was completed.
- (5) He was issued three blankets in winter and one in summer. He was also issued a blue-dyed oversea type cap for head-gear.
- (6) He was placed in the holding cell and picked up on the holding cell headcount.
- (7) He was picked up on the headcount for the facility.
- (8) He was entered on the log and given a log number.
- (9) A locator card was made out.
- (10) His record was checked and filed.

- (11) If he was received in a sentenced status, his time for confinement was computed and he was told his release date.
- (12) He was assigned a cell depending upon his classification.
 - (a) An officer was held in a separate cell.
 - (b) A POW held for S2 or S3 was confined in a separate cell.
 - (c) A serious offender was held in solitary confinement.
 - (d) A lesser offender was held in group confinement.
- (13) POW was taken from his holding cell and placed in his assigned cell.

b. Rations.

- (1) Rations for POW's, as well as other supplies pertaining to POW's, were obtained from the supply officer of the camp.
- (2) Based upon an average strength of the facility, edible rations were issued for five days at a time. Rations left over were accounted for by reducing the requirement for a new issue.

c. Inspections.

- (1) From September 1950 through February 1951 medical inspections were infrequent because of the scarcity of medical officers. Later this situation improved, and the confinement officer, accompanied by a medical officer, inspected all quarters daily to determine the adequacy of

sanitation, ventilation, heat, and other conditions which adversely affected the health of the POW's. The medical officer kept the commanding officer informed of the state of health and conditions of all POW's.

- (2) The noncommissioned officer in charge of each relief made an inspection of each cell at least once during his tour of duty.
- (3) The provost sergeant made at least one check of the entire facility area during his tour of duty.
- (4) The above personnel made additional inspections as deemed necessary during their tour of duty.

d. Medical Care.

- (1) Sick call was held daily for all POW's requiring medical attention. Sick call was held by United States personnel. Medical personnel holding sick call were required to sign the visitor's log each time they held sick call.
- (2) Emergency cases were handled by contacting a designated office.
- (3) Medical personnel placed the POW's requiring special attention or medical isolation in a designated cell. This cell was for medical cases only.
- (4) On the admission of a POW to a hospital from the maximum security facility, his records were forwarded and he was dropped from the records of the facility. His locator

card was marked "hospital" and retained in the rear of the locator card file. The POW was discontinued from a sentenced status and was picked up again when he was returned from the hospital and served out the balance of his sentence.

- (5) S2, CIC, and Criminal Investigation cases were sent to the hospital under 24-hour guard which was obtained from S3. The agency confining those POW's was notified of their transfer.
- (6) Each POW was showered daily depending on the weather conditions. In all cases where a POW was on a work detail, he was showered upon his return to the building.
- (7) The showering of a POW was not his choice. The POW's were showered on order of the confinement officer or in his absence by order of the noncommissioned officer in charge of the relief.
- (8) Each POW was clean shaven and kept his hair cut to a length of not more than two inches.
- (9) Under the supervision of a UN guard, haircuts and shaves were accomplished during the evening hours and on Sundays.

e. Mail.

- (1) POW's were permitted to send and receive mail.
- (2) The mail schedule for sending mail was as follows:
 - (a) First and third Saturdays of each month - one letter.

- (b) First, second, third, and fourth Saturdays of each month -- one postcard.
- (3) The distribution of correspondence forms was handled as follows:
 - (a) A roster of all POW's confined as of 1700 hours each Saturday was prepared.
 - (b) This roster was by cells and showed the POW's names and ISN's.
 - (c) Each POW was informed of the type of mail which he was permitted to send that day and was asked if he wanted to send any.
 - (d) If he did, a "yes" was marked by his ISN: if he did not, a "no" was marked by his name.
 - (e) Each POW wishing to write was given a form applicable to that Saturday and a pencil.
 - (f) After he had finished writing, the pencil and form were taken and the form was sent to the camp S2 for censoring.
 - (g) The roster, (b) above, was filed in a permanent file for future records.

f. Reports.

- (1) Morning report. A morning report was submitted daily.
It was made out in triplicate. Two copies went forward and the triplicate was filed at the facility.

(2) Losses and gains.

- (a) The loss and gain report had two purposes: one, to log in and out all losses and gains during a 24-hour period; and the other, to form an attachment to the morning report to show the POW's who had either been admitted or discharged from the facility during a 24-hour period.
- (b) This report was made out in three copies for the three copies of the morning report.
- (c) A copy was filed with the retained copy of the morning report.

g. Interrogation Form.

- (1) When a prisoner was transferred to a maximum security facility without a verified copy of his DA Form 19-2, the form, Appendix XIII, was used to obtain the necessary information.
- (2) This record was made out in five copies. Four copies went forward and one remained with his records until the verified DA Form 19-2 was received.
- (3) A fingerprint man was obtained from one of the enclosures to accomplish the fingerprinting.

h. Special Orders for Guards. Special orders for guards were --

- (1) Noncommissioned officer in charge of each relief.
 - (a) I will obey my general orders while posted.

- (b) I will supervise, assign duties to, and control the activities of UN personnel who are members of my relief.
- (c) I will supervise and control the activities of the POW's in confinement during my tour of duty.
- (d) I will maintain a blotter of the activities which take place during my tour of duty. The requirements, as applicable, which appear on the blotter will constitute a part of my relief duties.
- (e) I will report to and salute all officers entering the facility by giving the following information, "Sir, (grade and name) reporting as NCO in charge of the ____ relief."
- (f) Except when overhead personnel are present, I will admit and process into confinement and discharge from confinement POW's as prescribed in the standing operating procedure.
- (g) I will keep the facilities both within and outside in a proper state of police at all times during my tour of duty.
- (h) I will contact the provost sergeant or the confinement officer in all cases not covered by these instructions or in the standing operating procedure.

(2) Entrance guards.

- (a) I will obey my general orders while posted.
- (b) I will take my post and assume the position of parade rest.
- (c) I will be armed with a rifle, M1, with bayonet fixed.
- (d) I will not read, smoke, or sit down while on my post.
- (e) I will not allow personnel to loiter in or around my post.
- (f) I will relay all messages into the facility by use of the field telephone located inside the guardhouse.
- (g) I will require all personnel entering buildings number 1 and 2 to clear their weapons and turn same together with all ammunition over to me.
- (h) I will secure all weapons and ammunition within building number 3.
- (i) I will secure the door to building number 2 from the outside and open it only on permission of the officer or NCO in charge from within that building.
- (j) I will check to see that the door to building number 1 is secured from the inside at all times.
- (k) I will not allow female personnel to enter without prior approval of the island commander.

- (1) I will allow only personnel authorized by the SOP to enter buildings number 1 and 2 without prior approval of the officer or NCO in charge.
- (3) Main floor guard.
 - (a) I will obey my general orders while posted.
 - (b) I will walk my post which is located on the main floor of the building to which I am assigned.
 - (c) I will not read, smoke, or sit down while on my post.
 - (d) I will answer the telephone by giving my name and building number.
 - (e) I will only open cell blocks and/or cell doors while under the observation of another guard either on the catwalk or on the main floor with me.
 - (f) I will issue toilet paper to the POW's as required. I will not leave excess toilet paper in the cells.
 - (g) I will be responsible for the proper state of police of the building to which I am assigned.
 - (h) I will perform additional duties as required by the NCO in charge of my relief. While posted in building number 1, I will take charge of that building unless otherwise directed.
 - (i) I will become familiar with the regulations governing the conduct of POW's while in confinement so that I

may observe and report any violations of those regulations to the NCO in charge of my relief.

(4) Catwalk guards.

- (a) I will obey my general orders while posted.
- (b) I will walk my post on the catwalk assigned to me looking into each cell and cell block.
- (c) I will not read, smoke, or sit down while on post.
- (d) I will not throw anything into a cell or cell block from the catwalk.
- (e) I will call the main floor guard or NCO in charge of my relief when a POW requires attention.
- (f) I will be watchful for any attempt on the part of a POW or POW's to break out of their cells.
- (g) I will be watchful for any attempt on the part of a POW to commit suicide.
- (h) I will require POW's to remain quiet while within their cells.
- (i) I will not allow POW's to hang anything from the barb wire which covers their cells.
- (j) I will become familiar with the regulations governing the conduct of POW's while confined so that I may observe and report any violation of those regulations to the NCO in charge of my relief.

(5) Exercise area guards.

- (a) I will obey my general orders while on duty.
- (b) I will take my post at the entrance to the exercise area and assume the position of parade rest.
- (c) I will not read, smoke, or sit down while on my post.
- (d) I will be armed with a rifle, M1 with bayonet fixed.
- (e) I will not allow a POW to approach closer than 15 feet to my post.
- (f) I will require the POW's to maintain a distance of at least five feet from the inside perimeter fence of the exercise area.
- (g) I will not allow any one to loiter at or around my post.
- (h) I will not allow POW's in the exercise area to engage in mass or group exercise, drills, singing, demonstrations, signalling, or any other unusual activities.
- (i) I will become familiar with the regulations governing the conduct of POW's while confined so that I may observe and report any violations of those regulations to the NCO in charge of my relief.

(6) Area guards.

- (a) I will obey my general orders while posted.
- (b) I will be armed with a rifle, M1, (or carbine) with bayonet fixed.

- (c) I will walk my post around the quonset buildings which house the enlisted personnel of this facility. Hours for this post are 2200-0600.
 - (d) I will be watchful for unauthorized personnel walking through the area.
 - (e) I will not read, smoke, or sit down while on my post.
 - (f) I will not permit United States personnel to leave the area between the hours of 2245 to 0530, except to report for duty at the facility.
 - (g) I will check to see that all lighting, except that which is necessary, is turned off.
 - (h) I will hold all personnel attempting to enter or leave the area and will turn them over to the provost sergeant.
 - (i) I will be especially watchful for fire in the area. I will be governed by the fire plan in such cases.
- (7) Work detail guards.
- (a) I will obey my general orders while posted.
 - (b) I will march on the side of the work detail.
 - (c) I will guard POW's on work details only when the ratio is one guard for each group of five POW's or less.
 - (d) I will be armed with a rifle, M1, (or carbine) with bayonet fixed.

- (e) I will carry my weapon at high port or with the butt of the weapon on my hip.
- (f) I will not allow the POW's to take a break.
- (g) I will not allow the POW's to commit acts of pilferage or willful destruction of government property.
- (h) I will not allow anyone to come between me and my POW's.
- (i) I will keep a distance of at least 25 feet between my POW's and myself at all times.
- (j) I will call Chung-Gee (halt) twice to any POW attempting to escape, and if the POW fails to halt, I will fire upon that POW.
- (k) I will make a head count of the POW's on my work detail at least once every 15 minutes.
- (l) I will not work POW's on my work detail. A work supervisor will be responsible for that function.

i. Holding Cell.

- (1) The holding cell was for the reception and disposition of POW's who were to be confined in the maximum security facility.
- (2) All newly arrived POW's were committed to this cell for the purpose of permitting them to read the rules and regulations governing the POW's in confinement.

- (3) This cell was kept free of POW's over prolonged periods of time. It was not the purpose of this cell to be used as a place of overnight confinement.
- (4) This cell maintained a separate count of POW's confined and the POW's were not included in the count of the building in which the cell was located.
- (5) POW's did not enter this cell until they had been shaken down.
- (6) POW's were not permitted to talk while in the cell.

j. POW Regulations. POW regulations were posted in each cell in a language that the POW understood. One copy was also posted inside the holding cell on the bulletin board. Sufficient copies were available for the members of each guard relief so that they could become familiar with the regulations concerning the conduct of the POW's. These regulations were --

- (1) Sick call. Sick call will be held daily for those requiring medical attention.
- (2) Showers, haircuts, and shaves. Between September 1950 through at least February 1951 there were no shower facilities for either POW's or United States military personnel responsible for this internment. Later, however, facilities were constructed, and showers were held daily for all POW's, except in extreme cold weather. Haircuts and

shaves were given weekly, on Sundays, for those POW's requiring same.

- (3) Smoking. Between September 1950 and about February 1951 the amount of tobacco available for POW's was limited. In some instances when tobacco was on hand cigaret paper was not available. Later this situation was corrected. Smoking is a privilege. POW's confined in this facility have lost this privilege.
- (4) Petitions. Petitions may be written by individual POW's upon request to the confinement officer. Petitions will be written in respectful language, will pertain to specific matters, and will be written by the POW concerned.
- (5) Clothing. POW's will be permitted to retain such clothing as is deemed necessary depending upon weather conditions. The only headgear authorized for wear, within this facility and area, will be that which is issued to each POW upon his entry into this facility. The headgear is a blue-dyed cap.
- (6) Mail privileges. POW's will be permitted to send and receive mail. Four postcard forms and two letter forms are authorized monthly. These forms will be issued weekly (Saturday evening) over the period of one month.
- (7) Weight records. POW's will be weighed weekly on Sunday.

- (8) Exercise. In the early days of internment between September 1950 and February 1951 some exercise was given the POW's at irregular intervals. Depending upon weather conditions, POW's will be permitted two hours of exercise daily. This exercise will take place in the open air.
- (9) Mess hours. POW's will be fed a nonworking ration. Mess hours will be held twice daily - from 0500 to 0600 hours and from 1700 to 1800 hours.
- (10) Care of clothing and equipment. POW's will not destroy, tear, or otherwise mutilate their clothing and/or equipment.
- (11) Fire. In the event of a fire, all POW's will immediately be evacuated from this facility and will be placed in the exercise area.
- (12) Library. In the early days of internment, between September 1950 and about February 1951, there were very few library books for the POW's. These books were given to them by the International Red Cross. POW's will be permitted to read. A library is available for this purpose. Library books may be borrowed for a period of two hours at one time. These books will not be marked in any manner by the POW's.

(13) Religious activities. POW's will be permitted to engage in religious activities according to their individual beliefs.

(14) General conduct. POW's are informed that their conduct will be above reproach and any violation, however slight, will be reason for disciplinary action.

k. Cell Regulations. The following regulations applied to the POW's in the cells:

- (1) POW's will keep their cells clean at all times.
- (2) POW's, in group confinement, will keep their shoes lined against the wall opposite their sleeping pallets.
- (3) POW's in solitary confinement will keep their shoes outside their individual cells and opposite the doors of their cells.
- (4) POW's while in their cells will not talk except to call for the guard personnel.
- (5) POW's in the grade equal to or below that of the officer in charge of the facility will be required to salute that officer either when reporting to him or when that officer enters their cells.
- (6) When their cell doors are opened, POW's will retreat to the rear of their cells and stand at attention. POW's will

remain standing at attention during the time that their cell doors are open.

- (7) POW's will roll their blankets in an individual roll for each blanket between the hours of 0500 to 1900 hours. Blankets will not be used as pillows during daylight hours.
- (8) Canteens will be left hanging from the nails provided for that purpose except when POW's are drinking from them.
- (9) POW's will not sing, whistle, or make unnecessary noises.
- (10) POW's will obey all orders of the guard personnel.
- (11) POW's will not mark or otherwise deface their cells or any items within their cells.
- (12) Blankets will not be torn or otherwise mutilated.
- (13) POW's will be fed within their cells. All food must be consumed during the period allotted for eating. All food not consumed at the time the rice bowls are removed from the cells will be removed also.
- (14) Toilet paper will be issued in sufficient quantity for one usage. All excess toilet paper will be removed from the cells.
- (15) The only articles other than clothing allowed inside a cell are: DDT powder, canteens, "honey-bucket," individual toothbrush and tooth powder, wooden pallet, blankets, and these regulations.

- (16) POW's are not permitted to smoke within their cells.
- (17) POW's will wear a cap at all times when outside their cells.
- (18) POW's will use the "honey-bucket" properly so as to insure that proper sanitation standards are maintained.
- (19) When a whistle is blown ONCE, POW's will stand at attention at the rear of their cells unless otherwise directed.
When a whistle is blown TWICE, POW's will lie face down within their cells with arms extended in front of them.
- (20) POW's who fail to obey these and other instructions, regulations, or orders, written or oral, will be subject to disciplinary action.

l. Personal Effects. When a POW was admitted, all personal property except that which was deemed necessary was taken from him. A receipt listing the items was made out in triplicate. One copy was given to the POW, one copy remained with his property, and the third copy was retained in his 201 file. When the items were returned to the POW, he surrendered his copy of the receipt.

m. Emergency Plans.

- (1) In the event of a mass outbreak or for practice alerts, the following positions were taken by personnel of the facility:

(a) POW's outside their cells were brought into their cells and all POW's were notified by two blasts on a whistle to lie face down with their arms extended over their heads. The guard personnel on duty immediately stopped all activities and all POW's were locked in their cells.

(b) All guards took posts assigned to them. The relief that came off duty augmented the guard on duty. The relief next to come on duty augmented guard personnel at the guardhouse by three personnel, and four personnel formed a perimeter guard around the facility areas. The remainder of the personnel reinforced the main floor guards inside both buildings.

(2) If the POW's did breach a fence and appeared to be heading towards the maximum security facility, the weapons and ammunition, including grenades, were evacuated from the guard shelter and all personnel withdrew into the two maximum security buildings. If infantry troops were in support, the personnel of this section assisted ONLY as requested by the infantry commander in charge.

n. Fire Plan. A fire plan was posted where all personnel, including guards and POW's, could read it. POW's were not used in the active fighting of a fire unless so directed by a United States commissioned officer.

o. Library.

- (1) A library was provided for use by the POW's. These books were available to the POW's upon their request. A POW could borrow any one of the books within the library for a period of two hours. At the end of that time, the book was taken away from the POW and examined page by page for any markings or other means of communicating with other POW.
- (2) A count of the books was posted with the library. The NCO or his representative of each relief counted the books to make certain that the correct amount were present.

p. Visitor's Log.

- (1) All visitors signed the visitor's log.
- (2) The field officer of the day signed it nightly at the time of his inspection of the facility.
- (3) The log was maintained in a permanent folder or file.

q. Discharge of POW.

- (1) A POW was discharged from the facility, other than for medical reasons, when either S2, CIC, or Criminal investigation personnel were finished with him, or the POW had completed his sentence.
- (2) The POW was removed from his cell and placed in the holding cell to await transfer.

- (3) The unit or organization responsible for receiving the POW was called and notified that the POW was ready for release.
- (4) The records of the POW were checked and all papers pertaining to him were checked and completed.
- (5) A receipt in duplicate was accomplished for the POW and his records.
- (6) The receipt was signed by the receiving agency.
- (7) The POW was given back his personal property, if any, and also any excess property which had been taken from him at the time of admission.
- (8) After he left the facility, the head count was changed. The POW was dropped on the losses and gains report.
- (9) The POW was dropped on the log book and his locator card was retired to the "dead" file.
- (10) The POW was dropped on the morning report for the date that he was released.
- (11) The blue-dyed cap and blankets were taken from the POW.
- (12) The POW was returned to his original compound unless GI directed otherwise.

Section V. INSPECTIONS AND STAFF VISITS

124. Inspection of Enclosures and Compounds²⁰

a. Objectives. Enclosures and compounds were inspected to determine that --

- (1) POW billets were protected against dampness.
- (2) Fire-fighting equipment was serviceable, strategically located, and sufficient in amount.
- (3) Latrines, kitchens, and work areas were clean and in sanitary condition. Any unsanitary conditions were corrected immediately.
- (4) Breeding places for flies, mosquitoes, or other insects were eliminated.
- (5) The overall security program was effective.

b. By VIP's.

(1) Authority to enter.

(a) Entrance into an occupied enclosure or compound by any person, military or civilian, was prohibited, unless his official duties in connection with the administration, custody, control, welfare, and security of POW's or CI's required his entrance.

(b) Requests or demands by visiting VIP's, military or civilian, for entry into an occupied enclosure or compound was denied, pending authorization from CINCOMC.

20. McGarr, op. cit., inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 55-56, 58, 70-72; and Sullivan, op.cit.

Such requests or demands were forwarded through Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, for necessary action.

(2) Security measures.

- (a) Enclosure tower and perimeter guards were especially watchful and reported immediately to the enclosure command post any act of unusual nature by POW's or CI's during the inspection.
- (b) Prior to arrival of an inspection party, an alert security platoon or larger force, if considered necessary, was assembled in the vicinity of the enclosure sally port.
- (c) The security force remained in readiness during the inspection and was prepared to enter the enclosure in order to quell any disorder.
- (d) The officer in charge of the security force reported to the enclosure commander and remained in the vicinity of the enclosure command post for further orders.
- (e) Security forces were posted at strategic points along the route of an inspecting party within the camp boundaries.
- (f) Body guards with concealed weapons were assigned to the VIP's to accompany the party within the enclosure. Two

bodyguards were assigned to the senior VIP, and one for each additional VIP.

(3) Inspection procedure.

- (a) The inspecting party inspected the command post, dispensary, work shop, and supply area. Only a minimum number of POW's were allowed in these areas during the inspection.
- (b) Prior to the arrival of the inspecting party at the compound to be inspected, all POW's except a minimum number of cooks required, were moved to the recreation area or similar location.
- (c) The inspecting party inspected the kitchen, wash house, and one or more unoccupied POW quarters.

c. Daily Inspection by Compound Commander.

- (1) General. At least two inspections were made daily by the compound commander accompanied by his assistant, the POW representative, and the interpreter. During all inspections, the POW's were formed in the head count formation. The compound commander was ever mindful of the fact that unarmed personnel never entered an occupied compound unless cover guards were present.
- (2) Procedures. The inspection was conducted in the following manner:

- (a) The compound commander and his assistant entered the compound. The POW representative and interpreter reported to the compound commander. The compound commander informed the POW representative that he had come to make an inspection and that the POW representative was to form the POW's immediately.
- (b) The compound commander made a personal inspection paying especial attention to haircuts, cleanliness of the POW's and their clothing, and to see if the POW's were wearing any unauthorized decorations.
- (c) After the personnel inspection, the compound commander inspected the kitchen, latrine, and living quarters.
- (d) When inspecting the kitchen, the compound commander paid particular attention to the cleanliness of the building and cooking utensils, condition of the floor, walls, and stove, ventilation, and window screens. The compound commander periodically checked to see if the number of cooking utensils as issued were present and checked their condition.
- (e) When inspecting the living quarters, particular attention was paid to the cleanliness and condition of the buildings, clothing layout, and bunk tags.

- (f) When inspecting the latrine, particular attention was paid to the overall cleanliness and construction of the building, the placing of lime around areas containing "honey-buckets," and the condition of the faucets.
- (g) Next the compound commander inspected the compound area, paying attention to the police of the area, the drainage, the clothes lines, the condition of the compound fences and concertina wire, the storage of "honey-buckets," burying of trash, and the tools relative to their use.
- (h) After the compound had been inspected, the compound commander, still accompanied by his assistant, the POW representative, and interpreter, inspected the area surrounding the compound to include the "chickenrun," (space between the fences). Particular attention was paid to the compound and enclosure fences, police of the area, and the garden.
- (i) During the inspection, the compound commander continually gave instructions to the POW representative as to what to repair, and what to remove from the compound. Before starting the inspection, the compound commander obtained a supply of lime from the enclosure supply and supervised the placing of the

lime in the kitchen, in and around the latrine, in drainage ditches, or wherever it was needed. Lime was never given directly to the POW's because it could be used as weapons against UN personnel.

d. Medical Inspection. Between September 1950 and February 1951 it was not possible to hold medical inspections of POW's at least once per month because of the limited number of medical officers available. Later, the personnel problem improved, and a medical inspection of all POW's was made at least once a month by a medical officer. This inspection included the recording of the POW's weights, the general state of health, the presence of any contagious diseases, especially malaria or tuberculosis. When possible, miniature radiography was taken of POW's to detect any tuberculosis.

e. Itinerary and Report.

- (1) Each camp commander prepared an itinerary SOP to include briefing material and a schedule for inspecting officers or visiting dignitaries. The itinerary followed a logical sequence beginning with a meeting of the party concerned, movement to the headquarters, followed by a briefing and later a tour of the installation. After the tour of the installation was completed, time was allowed for a discussion period where questions could be answered.
- (2) For purpose of uniformity, the SOP was developed as follows:

- (a) The first paragraph consisted of a concise general history of the camp.
 - (b) This was followed by the itinerary proper, giving the place and number of minutes devoted to the briefing and for each stop thereafter.
 - (c) The briefing included a map of the camp showing enclosures, compounds, administrative and supply areas, and other pertinent information. The briefing also included charts giving construction progress, amounts of subsistence on hand expressed in days of supply, per capita status of water supply both potable and nonpotable and amounts furnished daily, a strength chart showing the nationality, category, number of POW's and CI's camp capacity, and current plans for camp improvements.
 - (d) The discussion included the welfare of UN troops, recreational facilities, training plans and schedules, and other pertinent activities. Also discussed were the welfare of POW's and CI's recreational facilities, the part played by the CI&E, work projects, and other items of interest.
- (3) For sample itinerary and report see Appendices XIV and XV.

125. Staff Visits by ICRC Delegates²¹

a. Purpose. Members of the ICRC were representative of a neutral country. They were authorized by the United States Government to make neutral inspections of prisoner-of-war and civilian internee installations and to make reports to their committee in Geneva, Switzerland on the conditions found at the installations.

b. Procedures.

- (1) Delegates were received and treated with the courtesies due their position and mission.
- (2) Military personnel, including ROKA, were instructed in the mission of the ICRC delegates and the manner in which they were to be received.
- (3) A senior officer of the camp, insofar as local conditions permitted, accompanied the delegate in his tour of inspection in order that a factual and true concept of conditions could be imparted. Delegates, however, were permitted to interview POW's, particularly the POW representatives, without witnesses, either personally or through an interpreter.
- (4) The entire area of the camp, including outside working areas, were made available for their inspection without restrictions.

²¹. McGarr, op.cit., inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 66-67.

- (5) In case of an incident occurring when a delegate was in the vicinity of a camp, an invitation was immediately extended to him to view the situation.

c. Comments and Recommendations made by the Delegates. Camp commanders submitted a written report (see Appendix XV) to Headquarters, Prisoner of War Command, immediately following the inspection to include the following:

- (1) Specific requests and recommendations made by the delegate.
- (2) A statement of the comments or action taken by the camp commander in regard to each request and recommendation made by the delegate.
- (3) Statements of generalities made by the delegate or the camp commander to the delegate.

126. Posting of Instructions²²

Bulletin boards for POW's and internees were installed and posted clearly in all compounds. The POW representative was responsible for posting and maintaining the bulletin in his compound. He was also responsible for informing those POW's who were unable to read of the contents of the papers posted on the bulletin board. All directives posted were numbered serially by the compound commander who made periodical inspections to see that all directives were posted. When possible, covers for the bulletin boards were made to protect the papers against inclement weather.

²². McGarr, op. cit., inclosure 2 to Tab 3, p. 7.

a. Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention. Portions of the Geneva (Prisoners of War) Convention pertaining to the rights and duties of POW's were posted in a language which the POW's understood. Extreme difficulty was encountered in obtaining accurate translations.

b. Others. Current directives and instructions pertaining to POW's and internees were posted in a language which the POW's or CI's understood.

127. Accident and Fire Prevention Program²³ (See paragraph 150)

a. Plan. Between September 1950 and February 1951 there was no fire prevention program as such in the prisoner-of-war program in Pusan. Attention of commanders was concentrated on feeding, clothing, and sanitary measures. Later, each camp had a fire prevention plan which varied according to the location, but, as applicable, it contained the following:

- (1) General.
- (2) Fire fighting plan.
- (3) Duties and responsibilities.
- (4) Fire alarm and methods of reporting fires.
- (5) Responsibilities during and after a fire.
- (6) Training of personnel.
- (7) Care and maintenance of equipment.

23. McGarr, op. cit., inclosure 1 to Tab E, pp. 114-116, 132-152; and Sullivan, op. cit.

(8) Administrative records and reports.

(9) Fire precautions and hazards.

b. Supervision.

(1) The camp fire marshal had the overall responsibility for fire prevention and protection and the necessary training incident thereto. He exercised staff supervision and conducted inspections in the area for which he was responsible.

(2) Each company size unit commander personally made a daily fire prevention inspection of his area of responsibility.

(3) Each battalion commander made a weekly fire prevention inspection of his area of responsibility.

(4) Camp commanders exercised personal supervision over subordinate units for the fire prevention program.

(5) Commanders of all echelons determined the fire prevention deficiencies that existed within their areas of responsibilities and instituted vigorous remedial action at once. These deficiencies included, but were not limited to the following:

(a) Command inspections which failed to detect and correct hazards.

(b) Open fires in or near buildings or tents.

(c) Lack of adequate fire plans.

(d) Failure to conduct regular fire drills.

- (e) Field ranges, space heaters, and tent stoves improperly installed and operated.
- (f) Fueling field ranges inside a building or tent.
- (g) Lack of positive steps to prevent smoking in a restricted area.
- (h) Fires too close to fuel or ammunition storage.
- (i) Lack of adequate fire breaks.
- (j) Use of gasoline-diesel mixture in space heaters.
- (k) Improper storage of inflammable products and waste.
- (l) Accumulation of inflammable trash.
- (m) Existence of oil soaked area.
- (n) Existence of leaks in stove units, fuel lines, POL cans, and drums.
- (o) Lack of instruction, supervision, and proper fire prevention signs for indigenous labor.
- (p) Failure to use field expedients to supplement available fire fighting equipment.
- (q) Improper use or lack of maintenance of issued fire fighting equipment.

128. Coordination with Other Army Agencies

a. In the early phase of the prisoner-of-war program, the tactical situation required most of the available material and personnel. The prisoner-of-war program had a low priority. With the realization that the POW's were behaving as combatants and that, especially

after May 1952, more support was required for the program, it received more support.

b. Prior to February 1951 the Inspector General, Eighth U. S. Army, inspected the POW camps. After February 1951, staff visits and inspections of POW camps were made by officers from higher headquarters. Technical service and other personnel from the higher headquarters participated in these staff visits and inspections. The coordination which was established with these representatives from higher headquarters was invaluable in improving conditions and eliminating deficiencies in the camps. Specifically, the coordination resulted in the camps obtaining more and better personnel, more supplies, and prompt action on requests for material and personnel. Generally, it resulted in better understanding of the camp problems on the part of personnel at higher echelons.

129. Security Training of Personnel²⁴

Between September 1950 and February 1951 very little attention was paid to training of United States Army personnel in security

²⁴ Pam No. 1, p. 26.

which was the responsibility given to ROKA. The number of United States Army personnel to handle the prisoner-of-war program was extremely limited. Therefore, it was not possible to take them off their jobs for class room training, without jeopardizing the program. Later, the personnel situation was corrected. Security personnel received "on the job" training and classroom training relative to methods, techniques, rules, and regulations involved in handling POW's. The training covered the following subjects:

- a. Leadership and proper supervision of POW's.
- b. Riots, disorders, and disturbances.
- c. Development of powers of observation.
- d. Interior guard duty.
- e. Searching, spot check, and shakedown inspections.
- f. Familiarity with emergency, escape, and fire plans.
- g. Proper use of weapons.
- h. Provisions of the Geneva (Prisoners of War) Conventions.
- i. Regulations affecting POW's.

Section VI. LESSONS LEARNED

130. Lessons Learned

The following lessons were learned in the operation of prisoner-of-war internment facilities:

a. An adequate number of personnel trained in the handling of POW's and CI's were needed to operate a prisoner-of-war or civilian-internee internment facility. This need was found to be so urgent that it was almost impossible to operate a camp without qualified personnel.

b. Before establishing a camp, careful plans should be made to provide for necessary qualified operating and security personnel, supplies, and equipment.

c. Operating personnel must be thoroughly oriented and trained in regard to their responsibilities and duties.

d. Labor projects should be planned and programmed, so that, as many POW's as possible may be utilized. Less trouble with POW's was encountered when POW's were kept busy.

e. Labor details should consist of 25 POW's or less per group with a minimum of four guards per group of 25 POW's.

f. Labor details should be dispatched in such a manner as to prevent the mingling of POW's from different compounds.

g. Labor details should be thoroughly searched in the sally-port area before leaving for the working areas and before returning to their compounds.

h. If four or more POW's were transported in a vehicle, guards should follow in a trail vehicle.

i. POW clothing should be marked and displayed in the prescribed manner so that any overages or shortages could be readily detected by inspecting personnel.

j. Certain practices, such as unauthorized training and "Kangaroo Courts," must be forbidden to POW's. The POW's must be informed of these restrictions which must be enforced.

k. Women POW's should be interned in areas geographically removed from men POW's.

l. Uncontested control over POW's must be maintained at all times, and, if necessary, the amount of force required to maintain uncontested control must be available and must be used.

m. Periodic searches of compounds must be made to discover any items of contraband or intelligence.

n. Each camp must have emergency plans to cover the techniques to be used in case of riots, escapes, fires, and storms. Operating and security personnel must be trained in these techniques.

o. Guards must be armed with appropriate weapons for their particular type of guard duty and they must have an adequate supply of ammunition.

p. POW hospitals were often the message center for POW's. Special security measures had to be taken to eliminate this means of communication.

g. When an ICRC delegate inspected a camp, a senior officer accompanied the delegate in order to give the delegate a true concept of conditions at the camp.

r. The camp commander submitted a report on each visit by an ICRC delegate. This report included the specific and general comments by the delegate as well as the statements by the camp commander.

s. A bulletin board should be maintained in each compound.

t. Close coordination with higher headquarters and technical service personnel resulted in better support for the prisoner-of-war program.

u. On-the-job and classroom training for security personnel increased the overall security of a camp.

y. In the movement of Communist women POW's by rail in the future, it is recommended that --

- (1) Female POW's be thoroughly searched in small groups before loading for shipment. The experience in handling female POW's showed that the ROK policewomen assigned this job were quite evidently intimidated by the female POW's.
- (2) Only the sick and mothers with children be transported in hospital cars.
- (3) The female POW's be shipped in smaller lots not more than two cars to the train, to facilitate control and movement.

- (4) Policewomen be carefully selected and thoroughly briefed before accompanying female POW's on trips of this nature.

w. The UNC did not intend to control Communists properly or to prevent the spread of Communist organization within the camps. Other deficiencies, stated or implied, leading up to the situation in which the UNC found itself negotiating with Communist POW's as equals, were:

- (1) Failure to counter previous Communist indoctrination of the POW's during the first few months when they were very susceptible to re-indoctrination.
- (2) Failure to segregate and give differential treatment to hard-core Communist POW's.
- (3) Failure to provide adequate guidance or backing for anti-Communist leaders.
- (4) Overconcern about disturbances of law and order per se, inadequate concern about causes of these events, and consequently inadequate understanding to pick compound leaders who would and could enforce order and justice.
- (5) Lack of effective punishment for murderers and instigators of riots.²⁵

²⁵. Kim Sun Ho, op. cit.