U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters with the B. Co., 1/111th Aviation Regiment, transport Military Police Soldiers from the 290th Military Police Brigade during a prisoner transport training exercise Titan Warrior 2025, Camp Shelby, Miss., July 25, 2025. Titan Warrior is an annual training exercise that prepares Military Police units from within the 290th Military Police Brigade for missions in force protection, mobility support, and detention operations.

(U.S. Army Photo by Master Sgt. Justin P. Morelli)

The strategic environment of the twenty-first century has shifted from the geographically confined counterinsurgency campaigns of the Global War on Terror to an era of high-intensity, multidomain competition. The U.S. Army and the joint force now prepare for the demanding reality of large-scale combat operations (LSCO), where air superiority, uncontested logistics, and secure rear areas can no longer be assumed.[1] Future battlefields will feature persistent long-range precision fires, unmanned aerial system (UAS) surveillance, electronic warfare disruption, and contested land and maritime lines of communication.[2] In this environment, functions once treated as rear-area administrative tasks, particularly detention operations (DETOPs), become operationally decisive.

Soldiers in the inaugural class of the U.S. Army Military Police School’s new Advanced Small Unmanned Aircraft System Operator Course take turns getting familiar with the controller and maneuvering a small UAS, March 18, 2026, at Fort Leonard Wood.

(U.S. Army photo courtesy of Maj. Charles Follin, USAMPS deputy assistant commandant)

Current LSCO projections generate detainee flows at a speed and scale the Army has not faced since the Korean War. Despite this, the Army’s current detention construct remains rooted in counterinsurgency models built on time, consolidation, and the survivability of mass via centralized collection points, semipermanent holding areas, and large theater detention facilities (TDFs).[3] This model presumes protected transfer routes and stable rear areas—assumptions fundamentally invalidated in LSCO projections where persistent sensors and long-range fires transform fixed sites and massed detainee populations into high-payoff targets. When detainee systems collapse under tempo or become immobile under threat, commanders must divert combat power, compete with sustainment priorities, and improvise under pressure. This translates to maneuver companies pulling personnel and assets from the line to guard detainees or lift assets, and sustainment convoys being reprioritized away from the main effort, creating a combat power dilemma.

History demonstrates that such improvisation, particularly when systems are overwhelmed by scale, produces not only operational friction but ethical failures that carry enduring strategic consequences.[4] To prevent operational paralysis and preserve both combat power and compliance with the law of armed conflict (LOAC), the U.S. Army must adopt a dispersed, tempo-driven detainee collection-and-transfer framework designed for survivability, scalability, and coalition interoperability in contested joint and maritime-constrained theaters.

Detention’s Legacy: Issues that Plague Operational and Strategic Success

The Army’s current detention framework is predicated on the "Survivability of Mass," an institutional assumption that large, centralized facilities are the most secure way to manage captured personnel. Field Manual (FM) 3-39, Military Police Operations and associated army detainee operation doctrine envision a linear flow of detainees from the point of capture to a TDF, capable of housing up to 4,000 people.[5] This model assumes that rear areas are generally stable and lines of communication are sufficiently protected to allow for predictable movement. However, wargames indicate that safe rear areas no longer exist, and any large concentration of Soldiers or detainees represents a predictable signature that adversary reconnaissance-strike complexes can target.[6] The Ukraine-Russia conflict also highlights the lack of safe rear areas. The airstrike on the Zaporizhzhia prison and hospital and the Olenivka prison massacre, which killed an estimated fifty-two Ukrainian prisoners of war, demonstrate that static detention facilities are highly vulnerable, acceptable targets that can be exploited for misinformation and strategic manipulation by adversaries.[7] Failure to adapt current strategy risks not only the lives of the force but also the strategic legitimacy of the mission.

Five U.S. Army and Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army soldiers pose for a group photo at a forward military encampment. Four soldiers stand while one crouches in front. Military pup tents and a unit guidon flag are visible in the background along with additional personnel. The terrain appears barren and war-torn. The soldiers wear standard U.S. Army field uniforms and garrison caps. Estimated Korean War era, circa 1950-1953.

Historical precedent confirms that when detention frameworks are not designed for the specific tempo of the conflict, they become strategic liabilities that consume combat power. During the Korean War, the United Nations Command consolidated over 130,000 prisoners on the island of Koje-do, erroneously assuming it was an isolated sanctuary. This centralization allowed North Korean agents to engineer their own capture, infiltrate the camps, and conduct mass-scale violence that culminated in the kidnapping of the camp commander.[8] To restore order, infantry and armor units were retasked from the front line at a critical point in the war. Koje-do validates the notion that massed detention populations often hide subversion behind a wall of logistical collapse, creating targets for infiltration that fix friendly forces in place.

Training at then-Camp McCoy, Wis., is shown in July 1951 for troops training to deploy for the Korean War. Thousands of troops trained and deployed from McCoy for the conflict.

(U.S. Army Historical Photo)

A second problem is the risk of systemic ethical and legal collapse when detention systems are overwhelmed by the scale of LSCO. Historic detention failures, such as Abu Ghraib, demonstrate that ethical breakdowns are rarely the result of intentional misconduct by individuals but instead are a predictable outcome of untrained systems failing under operational pressure.[9] In the modern battlefield, immoral behavior by even a single strategic private can be captured by ubiquitous sensors and disseminated globally, destroying public support and delegitimizing the entire U.S. mission. Furthermore, units currently lack standardized battle drills for mass capture in nonpermissive environments, forcing discretionary decision making that historically increases LOAC violations.[10] If the Army does not reform its detention framework, commanders will be forced into improvised practices that risk LOAC violations, resulting in strategic condemnation, loss of legitimacy, and moral injury to Soldiers before operational objectives are secured.

Looking Ahead: Remodeling Detention for LSCO

Without a fundamental shift in doctrine, the Army’s detention system will collapse under the weight of high-intensity combat. The Army must mitigate this vulnerability by implementing a dispersed, tempo-driven collection-and-transfer process that treats detention as a dynamic maneuver function. This approach includes shifting from site-based to time-based metrics, utilizing networked mobile nodes and integrating detention requirements into the earliest echelons of the military decision-making process (MDMP).[11] Staffs and maneuver commanders who implement these strategies enable agile detention systems that support fighting forces, preserving combat power and institutional legitimacy.

The primary mechanism for this reform is the establishment of strict time thresholds for forward detention to prevent the accumulation of personnel. Instead of asking how many people a facility can hold, commanders must measure success by the speed of throughput. Explicit thresholds, such as 24 hours at a brigade collection point and 72 hours at a division holding area, must be treated as critical operational risks. Exceeding these thresholds should trigger mandatory branch plans within MDMP. Units prioritizing transfer speed over consolidation prevents the formation of high-signature targets and forces the logistics system to prioritize the movement of detainees as an essential flow.

Soldiers in the inaugural class of the U.S. Army Military Police School’s new Advanced Small Unmanned Aircraft System Operator Course take turns getting familiar with the controller and maneuvering a small UAS, March 18, 2026, at Fort Leonard Wood.

(U.S. Army photo courtesy of Maj. Charles Follin, USAMPS deputy assistant commandant)

In addition to time-based metrics, the Army must replace large, singular collection points with multiple, small, and camouflaged detention nodes. Each node should be squad size, highly mobile, and configured to utilize signature management and deception tactics to survive in a drone-saturated environment. Without dispersion, a single strike on a centralized TDF risks mass casualties, immediate global media exposure, and operational stagnation while commanders divert resources to restore order.[12] Lessons from Ukraine indicate that vehicle movement within 15 kilometers of the front line is increasingly impossible due to drone saturation, requiring nodes that can blend into urban or woodland terrain rather than relying on barbed wire and towers.[13] By splitting the detainee flow across dispersed locations, the Army introduces uncertainty into the adversary's targeting cycle and ensures that the loss of a single node does not result in a mission-ending catastrophe.

Soldiers with the Ohio Army National Guard’s 323rd Military Police Military Police Company and multinational forces conduct peacetime riot-control operations during multinational exercise Platinum Wolf 2023 at South Base, Serbia, June 23, 2023. During Platinum Wolf, U.S. and multinational forces honed their peacekeeping skills in areas including detention operations, crime scene investigations, military operations on urban terrain, patrolling and traffic control.

(U.S. Army National Guard photo by Spc. Michael Baumberger, 196th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

The Military Police Corps is already working toward this by revamping curricula and training, but the Army, as a maneuver force, must prioritize this shift. The Army is encouraging force-wide modernization testing through Transformation in Contact (TiC) initiatives, but there is a lack of emphasis on collective DETOPs revision. While individual units such as the 194th Military Police Company are experimenting with mobile collection points that move locations at regular intervals during training exercises, the Army must leverage experimentation and prioritize procedural refinement.[14]

U.S. Army Military Police train with the Javelin Mobile Biometric Collection system, Camp Shelby, Miss., July 21, 2025. The Javelin series of Mobile Biometric Collection Kits are a lightweight modular system for collecting fingerprint, face, iris, and voice, providing an important tool within detention operations.

(U.S. Army Photo by Master Sgt. Justin P. Morelli)

Finally, detention must be integrated into the MDMP and supported by advanced mobile technologies to maintain accountability in a dispersed environment. Handheld modular systems currently support rapid biometric enrollment and identification in under 60 seconds, even under pressure.[15] Recent testing during Ivy Sting 4 in February 2026 proved that wearable sensors can provide real-time patient tracking and physiological data, enabling data-driven patient regulation across multiple brigades. Integrating this real-time data into Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) architectures provides commanders a common operating picture of the detention population without the risks of physical massing.[16] Mastering the digital oversight of DETOPs allows the Army to uphold its LOAC obligations while operating at the speed and scale required by modern combat.

Counterargument: Increased Risk of Violating LOAC in a Dispersed Model

These soldiers shown are from the 367th Military Police Company. They are a Army Reserve Unit from Horsham, PA. The simulation focused on one essential mission interaction, transferring captured detainees to the custodial authority. This mission, possibly during wartime, would occur at a combined detention facility known as an international transfer point. The transfer of detainees, including enemy prisoners of war, or EPWs, and civilian internees, or CIs, requires meticulous attention to detail and close coordination between the U.S. detention operations units and their ROK counterparts.

(Images captured by the Training Support Center / Kevin McDevitt)

Critics may argue that a dispersed, mobile detention framework increases the risk of LOAC violations by fragmenting oversight and reducing centralized accountability. Large TDFs allow for dedicated legal advisors, medical assets, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access, and standardized administrative processes. Smaller, mobile detention nodes may struggle to provide consistent segregation, documentation, and humanitarian oversight, particularly under degraded communications or contested lift. Furthermore, coalition partners often interpret Geneva Convention obligations differently, creating additional friction in decentralized environments.[17] From this perspective, centralization enhances compliance by consolidating expertise, resources, and supervision.

Despite this, history demonstrates that ethical breakdown most often emerges not from dispersion, but from system overload. At Koje-do and later at Abu Ghraib, overcrowding, resource saturation, and improvisation under pressure—not decentralization—generated instability and abuse.[17] A tempo-driven, time-threshold-based framework prevents accumulation and reduces guard force saturation, directly mitigating the conditions that historically produce misconduct.

Ultimately, dispersion does not require diminished accountability. Digital biometric enrollment, standardized battle drills, and preplanned transfer decision points can preserve documentation and oversight even under degraded communications.[18] Smaller nodes enable rapid displacement, controlled redistribution, and mutual support with maneuver elements. A rehearsed dispersed model reduces ethical risk by aligning detention operations with battlefield realities instead of relying on assumptions that no longer hold. In LSCO, mass equals vulnerability, managed dispersion equals survivability, and survivability enables lawful treatment.

Conclusion

The transition to LSCO demands the Army treat detention as an operational function, not a rear-area administrative task. The current facility-centric construct, built on centralized mass and protected lines of communication, cannot survive the tempo, dispersion, or contested logistics of modern war. When detention systems collapse, commanders lose tempo, divert combat power, and assume strategic legal risk. A dispersed, tempo-driven framework—anchored in time-based thresholds, networked detention nodes, integrated MDMP planning, and codified battle drills— restores detention to its proper place within maneuver warfare. The Army must institutionalize this model through doctrine revision, command education, and Combat Training Center integration to ensure that detainee operations preserve combat power rather than consume it. Although baseline doctrine is still in revision, current experimentation in TiC and Ivy Sting 4 proves that the technological and tactical components can be rapidly directed to support dispersed model experimentation.[19] The Army must reform detention doctrine and force structure to transform detention into a survivable, integrated maneuver function that preserves tempo, protects legitimacy, and prevents institutional failure from undermining victory in LSCO.