As part of the transition to the new force structure, many military police units are inactivating and reflagging under different organizations. While the Military Police Corps Regiment is restructuring, the branch will continue to conduct combat support and law enforcement operations. In certain cases, military police companies will be directly assigned to divisions. At the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California, while units are tested in large-scale combat operations, the utilization of military police in support of security and mobility operations can prove a vital asset. The purpose of this article is to discuss how brigade combat teams (BCTs) and divisions can best utilize military police based on observations from the perspective of an observer-coach/trainer (OC/T) at NTC.

Rear Area Security

Rear area security is not a new mission set for the military police. However, challenges persist due to inadequate early integration, incorrect task organization, and insufficient planning—issues that will remain until a solid integration plan is implemented. Military police often attempt to respond to enemy attacks on the main command post of the brigade, but due to its distant location, they are unable to provide timely support. Nevertheless, there are many tasks that military police can support while conducting rear area security. OC/Ts have observed several operations, including detect, delay, secure, and control.

Tasks: Prioritizing military police support based on the prioritized protection list is one approach to organizing forces for the rear area security mission; another is to assign areas of responsibility and task each military police element with support to mobility and/or security tasks revolving around secure, control, delay, or detect functions. In addition, deploying military police as a rapid response force enhances readiness, allowing for swift engagement, effective countermeasures, or strategic delays against the enemy.

Success: Regardless of whether or not military police support originates from within the division, integrating them into the planning process and the dissemination of the plan enhances coordination and effectiveness. Military police have been highly adept at providing early detection by utilizing observation posts and/or ground line of communication security within the rear area, as military police can defeat most combat reconnaissance/patrol vehicles or dismounted enemy forces. Planning and integration drive success; for example, if no one informs the military police of the location of the main command post of the brigade, their response time is significantly delayed. At NTC, if military police do not have antitank weapons, Javelins, Stingers, or counter-unmanned aircraft systems, security operations in the rear area are hindered. An M2 .50-caliber machine gun will not delay a T-90 Russian main battle tank, and an MK19 automatic grenade launcher can only delay a T-90 by making a precise shot to the tracks. Even then, the tank will remain fully capable of employing its weapons system. While the Military Police Corps Regiment is exploring future equipment upgrades, military police at NTC, without these advancements can only defeat combat reconnaissance/patrol vehicles and dismounted forces by using organic assets. This could enable a prolonged delay or even defeat of the enemy, particularly against a lighter adversary; however, if the unit tasks military police to secure a site on the prioritized protection list, military police should have some form of antiarmor to defeat or delay enemy forces. Ensuring equipment readiness is essential. Precombat checks, inspections, and load plans that are properly validated and executed enhance operational effectiveness across all missions. In the future, military police rear area security could evolve beyond securing lines operational concepts within specified and prioritized areas. The integration of counter-unmanned aircraft systems and antiarmor weapon systems will be vital to the success of the protection warfighting function in brigade combat team operations and higher-echelon engagements.

Sustainment

Throughout history, attacks on logistics and nodes have helped determine the success or failure of a unit. If sustainment cannot reach the forward line of troops, then the forward line of troops will not move forward.

Securing sustainment nodes is critical to operational effectiveness. So, how do commanders prioritize where to send military police? Do military police get tasked into the brigade support area (BSA), or is the priority to secure logistics release points? There is no correct answer, as it is ultimately dependent on the situation. Some questions to consider are: Does the BSA have its own security measures? Does the logistics release point have security? How far and where is the element going? Is this one of the commander’s priorities, or is it on the prioritized protection list? Have there been recent activities along the main supply routes or on transportation assets?

Movement and maneuver at NTC are not easy tasks. Night movements, including the loading and unloading of supplies, require several hours to complete. When examining logistics release points originating from a BSA and a brigade engineer battalion, it is rare to find security on these elements in the rear area. As the rear area expands during combat, military police must assess the security assets with greater scrutiny.

Military police should focus on controlling routes and securing sustainment assets while establishing a priority. For example, a military police company could employ two platoons and a headquarters to enforce route regulations, establishing static posts with mobile patrols along main and alternate supply routes for early detection and delay when necessary. Command and control or operations elements would be positioned at the point of greatest friction, based on the evolving fight. The remaining platoon would serve as a convoy security element, operating in squads to secure assets and remain ready to respond as needed. When they were not actively on mission, they could provide critical site or area security at the BSA.

Protected sustainment can be executed in many ways, and no single approach is always the solution. A military police platoon could achieve the same objective, but with squads rather than platoons.

Movement Control

Traffic jams along major ground lines of communication, movement corridors, or lanes are a frequent challenge during major training exercises. When units receive military police support, the military police are often directed to establish traffic control points (TCPs). However, this often results in static posts at random intersections with no tracking mechanisms, prioritizations, or clear operational boundaries for higher-level support.

Improvements

Military police senior leaders must be enabled to assist the BCT or division in planning movement control for large operations, and the provost marshal should be included in this process. The following are additional strategies for conducting effective movement control, regardless of whether military police support is available. A traffic control point is ineffective if it lacks a clear task and purpose.

Detention Operations

Detention operations are the primary consideration for BCTs and divisions when assessing military police utilization. During WWII, an average of 1,000 enemy prisoners of war surrendered daily. If this situation arises in the future, military police resources will be insufficient to cover all areas. Every Soldier must understand point-of-capture procedures, as rapid movement to the rear may no longer be as common as it has been. Historically, front-line Soldiers collected detainees, and military police took over detention operations at the division facility.

When military police resources are limited and prioritized for detention operations, they can be prepared to maintain and operate a detention control point (DCP) for the BCT. If considering a division-level asset, assigning a detainee holding area would make more sense. A DCP can be hasty (a circle of concertina wire with water and rations). Alternatively, the DCP could be developed into an enhanced DCP that possesses all the necessary resources to hold detainees for 24 hours or longer. Due to the significant increase in BCTs, OC/Ts do not recommend attempting to establish a DHA, as it requires a substantial amount of manpower and does not necessarily guarantee the ability to accommodate more detainees. Looking ahead, BCTs and divisions must plan for detainee transportation—whether military police support is organic or not—to ensure that detainee operations do not hinder the tempo of friendly forces. While this primarily applies to detainees, it is critical to recognize that large-scale combat operations also involve civilian internees, refugees, and other displaced individuals. Military police must be trained to understand and effectively manage these differences.

If there are other missions for which military police need to provide support, OC/Ts at NTC recommend maintaining an element on a “be prepared to” (BPT) status to ensure that the DCP remains operational. If detention operations are the sole mission of military police, where should they be positioned? Consider an approach similar to the one outlined in the following paragraph.

Military Working Dogs (MWDs)

At NTC, MWDs support BCTs during rotations. However, MWDs have been utilized to maximum efficiency only twice in the past three years. Generally, this is due to MWDs being task-organized to military police in the rear area and not having been trained with the BCT before rotation. Training the specific MWD team assigned to a BCT for a combat training center rotation presents significant challenges. Any prior training will greatly benefit the brigade. This is essential not only for proper utilization, but also for understanding the logistics and resource requirements of the MWD team. MWDs can support forward elements by conducting building searches for explosives and personnel, detecting explosives, searching vehicles at entry control points, and providing early warning detection for sentry guards. Successful rotations have demonstrated the value of MWD support. In one instance, an MWD assisted in a raid by locating a high-value target (HVT). In another, an MWD team served as sentry guards for the main command post of the brigade. When, intelligence indicated a possible minefield nearby, the MWD team successfully identified its location.

Conclusion

The tasks discussed in this article are only a portion of the responsibilities the military police are evaluating as the new force structure is implemented and additional military police are integrated into divisions. Military police can be a force multiplier when effectively integrated. These tasks should be considered during home station training. In addition, military police can support training on various stability tasks, including nonlethal operations, civil disturbance, and riot control. The role of military police in the protection warfighting function is critical to the success of the BCT or division, whether through action or advisement. If you, your BCT, or your division have questions about military police maneuver support, the NTC team is ready to assist.