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  5. The Lasting Effects and Dangers of Not Training on CBR Threats: The Impact of the 2025 U.S. Army Policy Change

The Lasting Effects and Dangers of Not Training on CBR Threats: The Impact of the 2025 U.S. Army Policy Change

The Lasting Effects and Dangers of Not Training on CBR Threats:

The Impact of the 2025 U.S. Army Policy Change

By Major Karl Jahrsdoerfer

Service members casualty extraction training
Service members from the New York and New Jersey National Guard Homeland Response Force conduct casualty extraction and hazardous environment response training under the instruction of the West Virginia National Guard during a regional CBRN response exercise. The training focused on lifesaving operations, interagency coordination and rapid response capabilities during large-scale domestic emergencies.

(U.S. Army National Guard photo by Sgt. Tristan Murry)

Chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) warfare has been a persistent concern throughout military history, particularly after the widespread use of chemical weapons in World War I and the subsequent development of biological and radiological threats for the U.S. Army. The importance of preparing Soldiers for these types of threats has been underscored by decades of training programs designed to ensure readiness in case of a CBR attack. However, in 2025, the U.S. Army introduced a policy change relieving commanders of the requirement to conduct annual chemical training for Soldiers.[1] This marks a significant shift in the military's approach to CBR readiness. While the Army’s move to alleviate the annual CBR training requirement is based on modern military needs, it raises important questions about the long-term effects of reducing or eliminating this critical training.

The Importance of CBR Training in Military Preparedness

EOD technicians capabilities exercise
Explosive ordnance disposal technicians with the 192nd Ordnance Battalion (EOD), 52nd Ordnance Group (EOD), ignite a piece of ordnance during an EOD capabilities exercise at Fort Bragg, N.C., May 6, 2026. The 52nd Ordnance Group (EOD) is one of two EOD groups that serve under the 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives (CBRNE) Command, which is home to 75% of the active-duty U.S. Army EOD technicians.

(U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Alexis Fischer)

To fully understand the implications of the 2025 policy change, it is necessary to first explore the historic and strategic significance of CBR training. The threat of CBR weapons has remained a central focus for military planners due to their potential to cause mass casualties, disrupt military operations, and induce long-term environmental and psychological damage. From the use of mustard gas in World War I to modern fears of biological agents and nuclear weapons, CBR warfare represents a unique and dangerous form of conflict.

During the Cold War, the U.S. military prioritized CBR training, knowing that potential enemies—both state and nonstate actors—could deploy these weapons against Soldiers and civilians. This led to the development of the U.S. Chemical Corps, a specialized branch of the Army responsible for CBR defense, which focused on research, training, and developing protective equipment and procedures for Soldiers. Protective gear, such as gas masks and protective suits, became standard issue, and Soldiers were regularly trained on how to use them in various scenarios, including the identification and decontamination of CBR agents.

The frequency and intensity of training ensured that Soldiers were not only familiar with their equipment but also conditioned to respond to a CBR attack under the stress of combat. These training programs were fundamental in developing a mindset of preparedness and ensuring that Soldiers could quickly and efficiently react in real-world scenarios.

The 2025 Policy Change: Rationale and Implications

Soldiers decontaminating a casualty
U.S. Soldiers assigned to the 172nd Chemical Company, 2nd Battalion, 48th Chemical Brigade, 20th Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Command from Fort Riley, Kansas, decontaminates a casualty at Fort Hood, Texas, on Feb. 22, 2026. The 172nd Chemical Company is an active-duty unit that provides CBRNE support, including both mounted and dismounted reconnaissance, surveillance and decontamination. The Reconnaissance and Surveillance Platoon was tasked with identifying hazards in a building as part of training for an upcoming exercise, Guardian Response. This exercise simulates the worst-case scenarios of a domestic CBRNE catastrophe. The training allowed Soldiers to practically set up and use their equipment to identify nuclear emissions and practice decontaminating a casualty. Additionally, it encouraged collaboration across the company’s platoons, enabling each section to work together toward a common goal.

(U.S. Army Reserve photo by Sgt. Alexandria Romanack)

In 2025, the U.S. Army made a pivotal decision to relieve commanders of the requirement to conduct annual chemical training for Soldiers. The policy change was largely motivated by the evolving nature of military threats and resource allocation considerations. Some Army officials argued that advances in protective technologies—such as improved gas masks, detection systems, and decontamination methods—reduced the need for frequent training. Additionally, the Army's shift toward modern warfare tactics, such as cyber defense and high-tech weaponry, meant that resources were increasingly allocated to other operational priorities. Some also pointed to the changing global security environment, where the threat of large-scale CBR attacks seemed less imminent compared to other challenges.

Despite the reasoning behind the policy change, critics raised concerns about the potential long-term consequences of neglecting CBR training. The following sections discuss the lasting effects and dangers associated with reduced or eliminated training on CBR threats.

Lasting Effects of Reduced CBR Training

Decreased Soldier Readiness

The most immediate and significant impact of the policy change is the potential decline in Soldier readiness. In any military conflict, the ability to respond to a CBR attack can be a matter of life and death. Soldiers who have not undergone regular training may find themselves unfamiliar with the procedures for donning protective equipment, responding to contamination, and executing decontamination procedures. As a result, they may struggle to react quickly and appropriately when a real CBR threat occurs.

Even if Soldiers are equipped with advanced protective gear, their effectiveness in using that gear depends on their training and familiarity with it. Without regular practice, Soldiers may be slow to put on their gas masks or fail to use their suits correctly, increasing the risk of exposure to toxic agents. In high-stress environments, this lack of muscle memory could lead to critical delays and result in unnecessary casualties.

Loss of Expertise and Institutional Knowledge

Engineer rappels down a tower
U.S. Army Engineer assigned to the 5th Engineer Battalion, 1st Infantry Division, rappels down a tower with a simulated casualty during an urban search and rescue exercise as part of a Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Force training evaluation at Fort Bragg, N.C., Feb. 11, 2026. The high-angle rescue demonstrated the unit’s ability to safely evacuate victims from elevated positions while operating under evaluation for regional disaster response readiness.

(U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Nolan Brewer)

Another significant consequence of reducing CBR training is the loss of institutional knowledge and expertise. For decades, the Army has invested in developing a corps of CBR specialists who are highly trained in the identification, response, and neutralization of CBR threats. These specialists have passed down their knowledge to other Soldiers through training, drills, and expert instruction.

By reducing the frequency of CBR training, the Army risks losing this expertise over time. Soldiers who do not regularly engage in CBR procedures may not fully understand the complexities of CBR threats, and the institutional knowledge developed over years of research and training may begin to fade. The loss of this expertise could have serious consequences if the Army is called upon to respond to a CBR attack in the future, as there may not be enough experienced personnel to effectively manage the crisis.

Moreover, the decline in regular training could lead to the erosion of the Chemical Corps itself, which is integral to the Army’s CBR defense capabilities. If the demand for CBR training decreases, fewer Soldiers may be trained in this area, diminishing the Army’s overall ability to respond to future CBR threats. This creates the potential for additional burdens to fall on the only 74-series chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) personnel in a maneuver unit—typically a second lieutenant and, in some cases, a staff sergeant.

Reduced Confidence in Protective Equipment

A key component of CBR training is ensuring that Soldiers are confident in their protective equipment and procedures. Gas masks, protective suits, and decontamination tools are only effective if Soldiers know how to use them. Regular training provides Soldiers the opportunity to become familiar with their equipment, build confidence in its capabilities, and practice using it under pressure.

Without regular exposure to this equipment, Soldiers may lose confidence in their ability to use it during a real emergency. They may second-guess themselves when putting on protective gear or fail to act quickly in response to a CBR attack. This lack of confidence could lead to delays in protecting themselves and their comrades, exacerbating any damage caused by the attack.

Increased Vulnerability to Emerging Threats

While the risk of large-scale CBR attacks may seem lower today, the threat is still very real—especially in a world where nonstate actors and rogue nations may use these weapons in unconventional warfare. Additionally, emerging biological threats, such as genetically engineered pathogens, could pose a new challenge to Soldiers who have not been trained to recognize and respond to these risks.

If Soldiers are not regularly trained in CBR defense, they may be less able to identify and respond to new and evolving threats. Biological agents, for example, may exhibit symptoms that differ from those of traditional pathogens, making them harder to detect and neutralize. Without up-to-date training, Soldiers could be caught off guard by these threats, resulting in unnecessary casualties and greater exposure.

The Dangers of Discontinuing CBR Training

Undermining National Security

National security depends on the ability of military forces to respond effectively to a wide range of threats. If the U.S. Army becomes less prepared to handle CBR attacks, the overall security of the nation may be jeopardized. In the event of a CBR attack, a lack of readiness could lead to confusion, higher casualties, and a slower response, ultimately undermining the Army's ability to protect both military personnel and civilians.

Moreover, the U.S. military is often called upon to assist in global CBR crises, whether through direct intervention or by aiding allied forces. If the Army's readiness is weakened by reduced training, it may be less capable of supporting international efforts to prevent or mitigate CBR threats, ultimately undermining the United States’ global standing and alliances.

Increased Psychological and Health Risks for Soldiers

CBR threats are not just physically dangerous; they also pose significant psychological risks. Soldiers who are unprepared for a CBR attack may experience heightened anxiety, stress, and fear during an actual attack. The inability to respond effectively to a CBR threat could have long-term psychological effects, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

In addition to psychological risks, there are significant health consequences for Soldiers exposed to CBR agents. Without proper training, Soldiers may fail to follow decontamination procedures, putting themselves at risk of long-term health issues such as cancer, respiratory problems, and neurological disorders. This could result in a greater burden on the military healthcare system and increased long-term costs for veterans.

Conclusion

The U.S. Army’s decision to relieve commanders of the obligation to conduct annual CBR training represents a significant shift in military priorities. While this policy change may be motivated by evolving threats and resource considerations, it carries significant risks. Reducing or eliminating CBR training could undermine Soldier readiness, erode institutional expertise, and increase vulnerability to emerging threats. The potential dangers of this policy change include weakened national security, reduced confidence in protective equipment, and long-term psychological and health risks for Soldiers. As such, it is crucial that the Army reassess its approach to CBR training and ensure that Soldiers remain fully prepared to handle these critical threats.Chemical Corps Watermark Crest

About the Author

Major Jahrsdoerfer is the brigade operations officer (S-3) for 1st Brigade, United States Army Cadet Command. He holds a master’s degree in defense and strategic studies and countering weapons of mass destruction from Missouri State University, Springfield, Missouri.

Endnote:

  1. U.S. Department of the Army. Army Regulation 350-1: Army Training and Leader Development. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 01, 2025, app. C, para. C-1.h., ↩

Disclaimer 1: The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of War, or the U.S. government.

Disclaimer 2: This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of War (DOW) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOW policies and guidance.

Download Original PDF Document
June 15, 2026
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