Smoking Guns: Lessons Learned from M75 SOM Squad Live Fire Integration

Paratroopers of Charlie Company, 3-509th Parachute Infantry Regiment maneuver under concealment of the M75 SOM (U.S. Army Photo by CPT Mitchell Klema)

A key challenge for many chemical units across the Army is achieving effective training integration with maneuver forces to produce mutually beneficial results. In March 2026, the 95th Chemical Company ‘Arctic Dragons’ integrated newly fielded M75 smoke obscuration modules (SOMs) into the live‑fire progression of Charlie Company, 3d Battalion, 509th Parachute Infantry Regiment at Joint Base Elmendorf‑Richardson, Alaska. This inaugural case study in SOM integration highlights the challenges encountered, the successes achieved, and the observed relevance of the system in supporting maneuver tasks within a training environment.

Perspectives from Maneuver

The M75 SOMs provided a unique opportunity to train suppress, obscure, secure, reduce, assault (SOSRA) at the squad level. The unit employed SOMs for local obscuration as fire teams maneuvered from intermediate support‑by‑fire positions to execute Battle Drill 5—the ‘knock out a bunker’ drill. For scenario purposes, the SOMs augmented hand‑thrown smoke normally employed by the team or squad leader. Standard training smoke grenades, such as M18 colored smoke, do not adequately replicate high‑concealment (HC) smoke used for obscuration in real operations. The SOMs enabled the unit to simulate realistic obscuration conditions and provided squad leaders an operationally relevant pyrotechnic load.

Challenges

A Soldier assigned to the 95th Chemical Company, 17th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, U.S. Army Alaska, operates a M1135 Stryker Nuclear Biological Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle while performing vehicle maintenance at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, Jan. 22, 2019. The Stryker NBCRV increases unit combat power by utilizing an integrated nuclear, biological and chemical sensor suite/meteorological system for improved threat detection and battlefield surveillance. An onboard NBC positive overpressure system minimizes cross-contamination of sensitive detection instruments, further protects the crew inside, and allows for extended operation in a contaminated environment. (U.S. Air Force photo by Alejandro Peña)

In any live fire, iteration tempo is the difference between success and failure. Training schedules and range requirements demand that every hour be used to maximize training value, or subordinate echelons risk remaining unqualified with limited calendar space for alibis. This same balancing act applies within each iteration, where targetry, maneuver, and injects must be synchronized to create realistic training. Within this context, aligning SOM employment to tempo proved to be the most challenging aspect of the event. The scenario required timing SOM activation to coincide with the squad leader’s hand‑thrown smoke. Because SOMs take roughly 30 seconds to begin producing smoke, activation had to be precisely timed by the lane walker controlling battlefield effects to ensure realistic obscuration once the squad leader employed their smoke grenade.

Arctic weather conditions added further complexity. Environmental factors such as wind, temperature, and snowfall had measurable impacts on achieving an effective smoke screen capable of obscuring maneuver. Smoke often began to billow and then rise above the Soldiers, preventing adequate concealment. The team mitigated this by digging holes in the 2.5 feet of snow to lower the nozzle, allowing smoke to build before being carried off by the wind. Once implemented, subsequent iterations produced significantly improved results. However, changes in wind speed and direction across iterations sometimes rendered the smoke ineffective with no ability to correct in real time—highlighting a particular challenge for sustained obscuration over extended operations rather than isolated events.

Successes

Spc. Francis Lucredo, a native of Los Angeles, second from left, and Army Staff Sgt. Norbert Iriarte, center, a native of Mangilao, Guam, both assigned to the 95th Chemical Company, “Arctic Dragons”, 17th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion, U.S. Army Alaska, execute a Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology stress fire at McGee range on Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, April 13, 2017. The JSLIST is the product of a four-Service effort to field a common chemical protective clothing ensemble including a lightweight protective garment, multi-purpose overboots and gloves. (U.S. Air Force photo/Justin Connaher)

Ammunition constraints remain a constant challenge for rifle companies, especially in Alaska. Nonrotational units rarely have sufficient ammunition or pyrotechnics at the battalion, company, or platoon level to consistently produce realistic training that mirrors combat conditions. Light infantry battalions typically receive fewer than 100 smoke grenades in their annual Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) allocation, leaving companies with only a fraction of that for squad‑ and team‑level training. The result—and the opening for the M75 SOM in a training environment—is that organic smoke obscuration is extremely limited during collective training events. Employing M75s created realistic conditions that enabled squads to train SOSRA with battlefield effects that would otherwise be difficult to replicate.

The iterations also demonstrated that, under favorable conditions, the M75 is a significant asset for enabling maneuver under concealment. Understanding the system’s limitations when tested in realistic scenarios allows leaders to adjust tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and refine before‑action reviews to better present capabilities to maneuver commanders requiring obscuration. Building on insights from this initial exercise, the 95th Chemical Company intends to expand fielding into applications such as bridge crossings, concertina wire breaches, and feinting footprints in extreme cold weather.

Takeaways

The foremost takeaway from this training event was the necessity of deliberate planning to enable effective obscuration integration outside traditional use cases. Maneuver commanders may prefer administrative employment of the M75 rather than attaching a team in the task organization during live‑fire training, driven by factors such as scenario complexity and range safety. Chemical units fielding this equipment must maintain maximum flexibility and remain mindful of qualification risks within scenario design that may lead maneuver commanders to favor battlefield effects over direct attachment.

Equally important as planning is redundancy during execution. High‑tempo events require the ability to rapidly swap SOMs rather than pausing for maintenance tasks such as refueling or replacing turbine oil. Changing weather conditions also necessitate multiple pre‑established SOM locations that can be adjusted during check fires. Without proactive management, the M75 can quickly become a liability to maneuver training.

This case study in M75 SOM integration represents an initial step toward revitalizing a previously ‘lost art’ of obscuration within the Chemical Corps. Only through aggregation of training data can units fully understand the system’s advantages and limitations. Overall, employing the M75 in a squad live fire proved both challenging and rewarding, demonstrating obscuration integration at echelon that provided mutual value to infantry and CBRN personnel. The 95th Chemical Company and Charlie Company look forward to further opportunities to train and refine this novel capability.