Hard to Find, Hard to Kill: Foundational Protection in a Transparent Battlefield
Foundational Protection in a Transparent Battlefield
(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Michael Martin)
The modern battlefield is transparent. The rapid introduction of small unmanned aerial systems (sUAS) has altered the operational environment and makes widespread sensing a combat reality.[1] A recent course provided firsthand experience and revelations that highlight necessary evolutions within the Protection Warfighting Function to support movement and maneuver. While high tech solutions are critical, my experience evading sUAS in the woods of North Carolina proved that low-tech fieldcraft remains effective against high-tech platforms. To ensure future force readiness, the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence (MSCoE) and U.S. Army Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School (USACBRNS) must continue to improve and formalize unique sUAS tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) while reinforcing the foundational principles of protection found in ADP 3-37.[6]
Protection in the Transparent Age
(U.S. Air National Guard photo by Staff Sgt. Jacob Hancock)
Persistent surveillance by stabilized platforms means that being hard to find is a prerequisite to being hard to kill. This aligns with the discussion in the Breaking Doctrine podcast, "Episode 66 Protection in Operations," which emphasizes that protection is not just a staff function but a foundational task for every Soldier.[1] Success in a sUAS saturated environment relies on a cultural mindset where minimizing signatures is a deliberate and constant discipline.[10] In modern peer and adversary tactics, stabilized sUAS generally act as the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) hunters. These platforms prioritize sensor stability over speed, utilizing high-fidelity thermal cameras and laser range finders to fix positions for indirect fire or to employ in first person view (FPV) killers. These FPV sUAS are purpose-built lethal effects platforms, often carrying specialized munitions or improvised payloads. Purpose-built FPV racing sUAS are capable of speeds exceeding 90 mph. When carrying lethal armament payloads, they function as high-speed, low-cost precision munitions in the hands of skilled pilots. With sUAS missions being highly tailorable and ranging from non-lethal electronic warfare to kinetic suicide strikes, Soldiers must be able to categorize the threat instantly to determine the correct survival response. Precise recognition is crucial because stabilized platforms possess the payload capacity to carry heavy armament which blurs the line between hunter and killer. This wide range of capabilities reinforces the urgent need for visual and acoustic identification as a foundational survival skill.
Firsthand experience in the field demonstrated that detecting the threat often begins with the basics, such as acoustic recognition. Unlike electronic detection systems that might miss smaller platforms, the distinct audible signature of a quadcopter can provide immediate warning. We currently test Soldiers on their ability to visually identify enemy vehicles, so we must now apply that same rigor and accuracy to the acoustic and visual recognition of different types of sUAS and their capabilities. Training Soldiers to recognize these signatures must become as fundamental as gunnery skills tests (GST). This will enable them to rapidly identify the platform, assess its payload, and execute Battle Drill 10 (React to Aircraft while dismounted) immediately.[3]
Standardizing Reporting Procedures
Detection is useless without dissemination. Once a threat is identified, the reporting format must be standardized across the force to ensure rapid engagement or avoidance. Current doctrine, specifically ATP 3-01.81 Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Techniques,[7] recommends the use of a modified SALUTE report tailored for the sUAS fight. It requires specific details that change the commander's response. Formalizing and tailoring this reporting standard in the USACBRNS ensure that future leaders can feed the common operational picture (COP) accurately and transform individual Soldier observations into actionable intelligence.
Fieldcraft
(U.S. Army photo by Pfc. Marques Martinez, Operations Group, National Training Center)
Once detected, surviving relies on signature management. During daylight, stillness discipline and the use of thick, layered canopy were effective means of confusing thermal sensors by breaking up the human silhouette against the ambient heat of foliage. Movement was consistently the most reliable signature for detection. Successful countermeasures required absolute stillness and matching camouflage to the specific background environment. At night, however, thermal detection proved significantly easier for the sUAS operators. It is important to use 360-degree camouflage, masking presence, use deception, and unground fighting positions. This reinforces that basic Soldier discipline, which is the deliberate reduction of one’s own thermal and visual signature, remains the baseline layer of protection.[3]
Discipline and TTPs
(Images captured by the U.S. ASA Fort Dix (TSC) Training Support Center / Daniel Amburg)
Operating in this environment requires disciplined emission control and deceptive flight maneuvers. We found that the common practice of relying on a sUAS’s default return to home (RTH) setting, which would automatically engage when signal is lost, compromised the operator's location by tracing a predictable path back to the launch point. To mitigate this, we employed deception tactics like dogleg maneuvers, which is the technique of using not direct launch and recovery paths that deliberately masked the true location of the control base.[2] Furthermore, recovery teams had to treat retrieval operations as tactical patrols by utilizing bounding overwatch and SLLS (stop, look, listen, smell) to detect adversary reconnaissance platforms attempting to backtrack our position.[8] This same technique proved useful in any movement, keeping Soldiers alert and aware of possible threats around, above, and below.
The CBRN Paradox and sUAS Integration
(U.S. Army photo by Capt. Luke Jean)
A critical foundational paradox emerged during training where the terrain features that offer the best concealment from sUAS often present the highest contamination risks. Low draws, dense vegetation, and thick brush are excellent for masking thermal signatures from aerial observation, but they are naturally areas where chemical agents settle and accumulate.
This forces leaders to face a complex dilemma. They must choose sUAS concealment and risk chemical exposure, or they must avoid contamination and risk aerial detection. This requires a deeper level of planning to predict how an enemy might synchronize these threats. CBRN planners must aid commanders in determining if the enemy is using CBRN to dislodge our forces out of cover for sUAS annihilation or using sUAS to fix our forces in place for a CBRN attrition strike. To resolve this, the USACBRNS must develop specific planning for hazard understanding and awareness that prioritizes remote sensing with sUAS assist units with risk management in these paradox zones.
Airspace Deconfliction and Planning
Integrating friendly sUAS to solve this paradox introduces a risk of accidental collisions or engagement by friendly forces. In an sUAS-saturated airspace, deciphering friendly from enemy platforms proved exceptionally difficult. When multiple friendly sUAS were employed for reconnaissance, airspace deconfliction became critical to prevent mid-air collisions and friendly fire incidents.[4] This requires strict adherence to airspace control measures and a heavy reliance on the COP and grid reference graphics (GRGs) to track friendly sUAS positions in real-time.[4],[9] These coordinating measures added unforeseen complexities that the USACBRNS must address in detailed planning curriculums to ensure mission success.
Recommendations for Implementation
(U.S. Army photo by Neil Mclean)
In summary, the way ahead is to transform these lessons into institutional readiness, and the USACBRNS should implement the following across all Programs of Instruction (POIs):
- Institutionalize GST Identification: Integrate visual and acoustic sUAS recognition into Gunnery Skills Tests to ensure Soldiers can distinguish sUAS across their varied capabilities.
- Reinforce the Foundational Basics: Adopt training standards for the deception maneuvers, mandate the use of 360-degree camouflage and defilade fighting positions to emission signatures, and aid in the defeat of thermal and visual sensors.
- Standardize Reporting: Mandate the use of the ATP 3-01.81 modified SALUTE report for all sUAS sightings to ensure accurate data flows to the COP.
- Plan for the Paradox: Train leaders to plan and employ remote sensing via sUAS for reconnaissance to assist in risk-based decision making in support of operations.
- Visual Feedback Training: Utilize aerial thermal imagery captured during field exercises to provide students with immediate, undeniable evidence of their signature management successes and failures.
While these are not new recommendations, there is a difference between reading observations from sources such as the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and experiencing those lessons firsthand. These simple and effective observations will propel the USACBRNS and MSCoE forward and produce a significantly more prepared and lethal fighting force ready for the successful implementation and employment of robotics and unmanned systems by our future students.
Chief LaPlant currently serves as the CBRN Warrant Officer Instructor at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in computer animation from the International Academy of Design and Technology in Tampa, FL.
Endnotes:
- Combined Arms Center. (2023). Breaking Doctrine Episode 66: Protection in Operations (Audio podcast). ↩
- Department of the Army. (2022). Aviation Urban Operations (ATP 3-06.1), https://www.alssa.mil/Portals/9/Documents/mttps/auo_2022.pdf. ↩
- Department of the Army. (2023). Battle Drill 10: React to Aircraft While Dismounted – Platoon (07-PLT-D8015), https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/C17A21F3-CAFB-4591-BCC6-E2543F2CFE59-1688735194590/report.pdf. ↩
- Department of the Army. (2024). Fire Support and Field Artillery Operations (FM 3-09), https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/9B9879F3-F213-4CD7-9D20-8D4520E8D38E-1397219978180/fm3_09.pdf. ↩
- Department of the Army. (2024). Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad (ATP 3-21.8), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN44065-ATP_3-21.8-001-WEB-3.pdf ↩
- Department of the Army. (2024). Protection (ADP 3-37), https://rdl.train.army.mil/catalog-ws/view/100.ATSC/AEB2A8F7-017C-44B0-864C-0E7C2D039A6B-1346422199893/adp3_37.pdf ↩
- Department of the Army. (2025). Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems Techniques (ATP 3-01.81), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN43877-ATP_3-01.81-000-WEB-1.pdf. ↩
- Department of the Army. (2025). Ranger Handbook (TC 3-21.76), https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN45113-TC_3-21.76-000-WEB-2.pdf. ↩
- Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2021). Close Air Support (JP 3-09.3), https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/new_pubs/jp3_09_3.pdf. ↩
- National Training Center. (2025). Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) Training and Implementation at the National Training Center (25-1093), https://armyeitaas-my.sharepoint-mil.us/personal/joshua_e_laplant_mil_army_mil/Documents/Documents/390a/DOCTRINE and PRODUCT/25-1093, Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) Training and Implementation at the National Training Center (Aug 25). ↩
Disclaimer 1: The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of War, or the U.S. government.
Disclaimer 2: This article was edited with the assistance of AI tools, and subsequently reviewed and edited by relevant Department of War (DOW) personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DOW policies and guidance.
