*This article was edited with the assistance of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. Final review and editing were conducted by authorized DoW personnel to ensure accuracy, clarity, and compliance with DoW policies and guidance.
*The contents of this article do not represent the official views of, nor are they endorsed by, the U.S. Army, the Department of War, or the U.S. government.
Published 1/9/2026
By Captain Kassi Gulliford
The Task & Purpose article, “Here is the training that the Army says is no longer
mandatory,” immediately caught the attention of every overtasked and undermanned leader in the
Army.¹ The Department of War (DoW) has reduced the number of mandatory annual training
requirements from 27 to 16. As a result, several courses are now optional, including both individual
and unit-level chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) training.
Commanders can now assume risk on these optional training requirements, freeing up
valuable time for other priorities. But this raises an important question: do we truly need annual
CBRN training when those skills could be refreshed during pre-deployment or rotation train-ups
instead?
Emphatically, I say yes!
The title of this article is a nod to the mnemonic device (direct, indirect, non-hostile, obstacle, CBRN, aerial, visual, electromagnetic [and influence] [DINOCAVE]) used to memorize the forms of contact as listed in Army doctrine publication 3-90, Offense and Defense.² Do we choose how the enemy makes contact? When commanders elect not to conduct this training, are they fully informed of the risk to force and mission they are accepting? What does CBRN contact look like? What downstream effects does it have on Soldiers and the mission?
This article serves a dual purpose: to emphasize why every commander should prioritize CBRN training and to advocate for its thorough integration throughout the training cycle.
CBRN is an Enviroment
CBRN represents four distinct areas—chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear— each with unique threat profiles. While the hazard can often be traced back to a specific event, once released, it becomes a condition of the battlefield.
CBRN readiness is not simply about how fast Soldiers can don their masks—it is about their ability to continue the mission under CBRN conditions. Can Soldiers perform critical tasks such as loading and reloading a weapon, programming a radio, or operating a vehicle while wearing mission-oriented protective posture (MOPP) gloves? Can they move effectively in MOPP gear? Can they conduct foot marches in overboots?
CBRN training, when fully integrated, is not a singular annual training. It should recur throughout the training cycle in different ways, from sergeants’ time training to collective exercises.
CBRN Threats
When most people envision a CBRN strike, they picture the weaponized threats—perhaps imagining a World War I–era trench with white smoke billowing out of it. It could look like that.
Or it could look like an odorless, tasteless, colorless gas that releases concurrent to an artillery strike. Are your Soldiers prepared to simultaneously react to two forms of contact?
Industrial hazards are the type of threat that Soldiers are most likely to encounter. Whether the hazard was introduced by way of enemy fire, natural disaster, or routine accident, the presence of toxic industrial chemicals (TICs), toxic industrial biologicals (TIBs), toxic industrial radiologicals (TIRs), or toxic industrial materials (TIMs) creates a CBRN environment.
Ukraine Examples
Despite being a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), Russia deployed the choking agent chloropicrin on Ukrainian forces. This chemical weapon was widely used in World War I and is prohibited under the CWC. While not deadly, it can cause severe respiratory distress and irritation to the eyes, lungs, and skin. Russian forces have denied the use of chemical weapons.3
There are relevant recent examples of both weaponized and industrial CBRN incidents in Ukraine. Europe’s largest nuclear power plant, the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, located in Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia region, has been under Russian occupation since early 2022. The plant supports six reactors and ranks among the ten largest nuclear power stations in the world. Since the onset of occupation, operations have been partially suspended. While the plant no longer generates power for the region, the offline reactors still house radioactive materials and must remain partially online to prevent nuclear meltdown in the remaining active reactor.
Due to the plant’s proximity to the front lines, multiple drone and artillery attacks made direct contact with the outer and support structures of the reactors. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have confirmed and inspected the damage from these attacks, stating that while the damage was minimal, "this is a serious incident with potential to undermine [the] integrity of the reactor's containment system."4 The gentle language of the IAEA inspector could leave the impression that a failing containment system is akin to a fence missing a few pickets. To be clear—it is not.
The 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster serves as a modern example of a nuclear meltdown. The earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused chemical explosions and a nuclear meltdown in three of the plant’s reactors.5 As of today, approximately 880 tons of melted nuclear fuel and structural debris remain on site, along with over 1.4 million tons of irradiated wastewater. Fourteen years later, radiation levels inside the compromised reactors remain so high that electronic components in the robots being used to aid cleanup are failing. Experts estimate it will take a century to fully mitigate this nuclear disaster.6
Anyone in your targeting cell may be able to identify that a nuclear power plant is a bad target. But what other common industrial staples pose a nuclear risk?
For example, X-ray machines are not limited to medical facilities. They are also used in security environments where baggage screening is required and in hospital nuclear medicine departments, colleges, and research facilities with radiological labs. Equipment containing built-in radiation sources is safe when properly used, stored, and transported. However, these sources pose serious hazards if the equipment is damaged or destroyed by an explosion.
CBRN Training
Apply Training
Reviewing the procedures for donning and doffing masks and MOPP gear, as well as operating joint chemical agent detectors (JCADs) and radiation detection, indication, and computation (RADIAC) sets, is entirely achievable in the weeks leading up to a deployment or rotation. What cannot be achieved in that short time frame is getting Soldiers accustomed to operating in MOPP gear without experiencing degraded performance. MOPP gloves and overboots challenge Soldier dexterity and agility, making routine tasks difficult. The thermal burden of MOPP gear requires acclimatization. Soldiers must be trained on the proper carrying, storage, and accessibility of this personal protective equipment (PPE) to ensure that they know where it is and how to react to contact. Can you don your mask in nine seconds if it is in the bottom of your ruck, tied down to the outside of your truck? CBRN skills are like any other basic Soldier skills—they must be trained consistently to be executed under pressure.
For units that choose to forego CBRN training, deficiencies may not be immediately apparent. Initially, organizational memory will be strong enough to offset the lack of recent training. However, these deficits will become more apparent as time goes on. Deficiencies will surface during major collective training events where CBRN is already integrated, such as gunnery exercises and collective training center (CTC) rotations. Soldiers from units that deprioritize CBRN training will be underprepared.
Additionally, the CBRN shoots listed in the weapons tables—regardless of execution—are factored into the annual Standards in Training Commission (STRAC) allocations. If these shoots are no longer required, ammunition allocations may be adjusted accordingly.
Chemical Units
Chemical units are there to provide support in larger-scale incidents and for specialized CBRN tasks that nonchemical units are not equipped to conduct. However, not all chemical platoons have decontamination capabilities. The CBRN platoons within brigade combat teams (BCTs) serve primarily as CBRN reconnaissance elements. These platoons have no decontamination capabilities at all. Before delegating tasks, commanders must have a clear understanding of the capabilities of the supporting units.
Conclusion
The June 2025 update to Army regulation (AR) 350-1 identifies the first Lieutenant Colonel (or equivalent O5) in your chain as the waiver authority for CBRN training in units that are not deploying.7 Commanders who choose to waive these requirements must be fully informed of the risk they are accepting.
The world of CBRN and counter weapons of mass destruction is an entire field of academic study, an Army branch, and a functional area. If it is not your area of expertise, you can find yourself out of depth very quickly. Commanders have advisors for this reason. There are staff chemical officers at every echelon. Engage the senior chemical officers on your installation to discuss the risks and benefits of delaying, reducing, or waiving CBRN training before making a decision that will impact unit readiness in ways you cannot predict.
1Patty Nieberg, "Here is the training that the Army says is no longer mandatory," Task & Purpose, April 1, 2025.
2Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90: Offense and Defense (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019).
3Matt Murphy, “Russia using chemical choking agents in Ukraine, US says”, BBC, 2024
4John Aikman, "IAEA Report on Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant," International Atomic Energy Agency, 2024.
5" Fukushima 10 years on: How the 'triple disaster' unfolded," BBC, 2021.
6Mari Yamaguchi, " ‘Nervous and rushed': Massive Fukushima plant cleanup work involves high radiation and stress" Associated Press, 2025.
7Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 350-1: Army Training and Leader Development (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2025).
Captain Gulliford served as the Executive Aide to the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear School Commandant. She holds a bachelor’s degree in music education from Jacksonville State University, Jacksonville, Alabama, and a master’s degree in curriculum and instruction from Averett University, Danville, Virginia.