MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

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USAMPS
573-XXX-XXXX/DSN 676-XXXX (563 prefix)
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COMMANDANT
COL Niave F. Knell.....563-8019
<niave.f.knell.mil@mail.mil>

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
COL Steven G. Yamashita.....563-8019
<steven.g.yamashita.mil@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM Michael P. Bennett.....563-8018
<michael.p.bennett.mil@mail.mil>

REGIMENTAL CHIEF WARRANT OFFICER
CW5 Mark W. Arnold.....563-8035
<mark.w.arnold.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY COMMANDANT
Mr. Mark L. Farley.....563-6221
<mark.l.farley.civ@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–USAR
COL Mark A. Waters.....563-6223
<mark.a.waters.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT SGM–USAR
MSG Ryan McCaffrey.....563-6198
<ryan.j.mccaffrey.mil@mail.mil>

DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT–ARNG
MAJ John P. Weaver.....563-4570
<john.p.weaver.mil@mail.mil>

14TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
COL Robert R. Arnold Jr. 596-0968
<robert.r.arnold3.mil@mail.mil>

CSM Gregory M. Kleinholz.....596-1194
<gregory.m.kleinholz.mil@mail.mil>

1/58 INFANTRY REGIMENT
LTC Rodney D. Johnson Sr. 596-2377
<rodney.d.johnson56.mil@mail.mil>

CSM Anthony A. Rodrigues.....596-3509
<anthony.a.rodrigues.mil@mail.mil>

701ST MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Patricia N. Kast.....596-2377
<patricia.n.kast.mil@mail.mil>

CSM Nathan B. Marriam.....596-2284
<nathan.b.marriam.mil@mail.mil>

787TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Wendy R. Tokach.....596-2910
<wendy.r.tokach.mil@mail.mil>

CSM Cari A. Rajewski.....596-4748
<cari.a.rajewski.mil@mail.mil>

795TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
LTC Jonathan T. Yasuda.....596-2384
<jonathan.t.yasuda.mil@mail.mil>

CSM Michael A. Odle.....596-2387
<michael.a.odle2.mil@mail.mil>

USAMPS Directors

DIRECTOR OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION
COL Matthew R. Gragg.....563-8098
<matthew.r.gragg.mil@mail.mil>

CHIEF OF STAFF/DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS
LTC William F Jennings Jr. 563-8027
<william.f.jennings4.mil@mail.mil>

G-37 Publications

Managing Editor, Diana K. Dean.....**563-4137**
<diana.k.dean.civ@mail.mil>
Editors, Kyle A. Lockwood.....**563-5004**
<kyle.a.lockwood.civ@mail.mil>
Cheryl A. Nygaard.....**563-5226**
<cheryl.a.nygaard.civ@mail.mil>
Graphic Designer, Dennis L. Schellingberger.....**563-5267**
<dennis.l.schellingberger.civ@mail.mil>

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By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

JAMES C. MCCONVILLE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:

KATHLEEN S. MILLER
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
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Military Police

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***The brigade level and above and battalion level command list is now available separately at the following website address:**

<https://home.army.mil/wood/index.php/contact/publications/mp_mag>

Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre

Dear Team—As I write my final message to the U.S. Army Military Police Corps as the 50th Commandant of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and Chief of the Military Police Regiment, the Army is celebrating its 245th birthday. For almost 250 years, the Army's Soldiers have faithfully served the Nation in times of peace and war. Men and women from all backgrounds protect the Nation from its enemies to ensure that our democracy thrives under the principles in our founding documents—principles that espouse liberty, equality, justice, and freedom. As Soldiers, we take an oath to protect the U.S. Constitution; we swear to support and defend its ideals and, if necessary, make the ultimate sacrifice in doing so. As I leave the commandant position, I truly believe that we are the greatest Army in history and I am proud of the Military Police Corps contributions throughout those 245 years.

One such contribution is our support in the Nation's fight against the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) global pandemic. COVID-19 threatens our Soldiers, Families, and communities; the Military Police Corps has and will continue to answer the call to assist, protect, and defend. From our Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve units mobilizing across the country and serving their local communities to our Regular Army military police units and civilian partners, we are all taking immense steps to continue the mission. The response of our Regiment to our Nation's call in a time of need is truly humbling. The presence of our military police Soldiers on the frontlines of the COVID-19 fight demonstrates the indelible meaning of our motto "Of the Troops, For the Troops."

As my wife and I depart Fort Leonard Wood for the second time and head back to Fort Bragg, North Carolina, for the third time, I want to thank my many great teammates at USAMPS. Over the past 2 years, I focused on establishing clear priorities and consistent communication that permeate the depth of the organization, empowering the total team to maximize the potential of the workforce and extending the commandant's influence beyond USAMPS and the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood. But it was the great leaders and teammates who overwhelmingly accomplished our two primary missions: train the force and build the future force. The organization's successes are too many to mention, and the inspiring leaders responsible for them too many to thank individually; so I will simply say, "Thank you to all my great teammates." Thank you for addressing the priorities and taking care of each other—and for your selfless commitment and dedication to the men and women of the Military Police Regiment. Lastly, thank you for allowing my wife and me to leave knowing that the Military Police Regiment will continue to achieve great success. It is clear that the relationships we built will last forever and that the Military Police Corps will support the Army far into the future.

Finally—and most importantly—on behalf of the entire USAMPS and Fort Leonard Wood team, I want to welcome Colonel Niave F. Knell, her husband, and her Family back to Fort Leonard Wood. There is no finer officer than Colonel Knell to serve as the 51st Commandant of USAMPS and 51st Chief of the Military Police Regiment. Niave is no stranger to Fort Leonard Wood; she served as the 14th Military Police Brigade Commander. She is visionary, very passionate, and professional. She also speaks "New England/Bostonian," so no change there for the team! There is no better leader to take the Regiment to the next level. Congratulations, Niave and a big congratulations to the Regiment—the Army got this right!

In closing, I would like to leave you with these thoughts:

- "Run, Forrest run."[1]
- Good leaders follow rules; great leaders know when to break them.
- "No one cares how much you know until they know how much you care."[2]
- Saying "thank you" is incredibly powerful.
- Engage, listen, learn . . . act.

And, of course: Giddy up!

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Endnotes:

[1]Winston Groom, *Forrest Gump*, Doubleday, 1986.

[2]Theodore Roosevelt, Brainy Quote website, <https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/theodore_roosevelt_140484>, accessed on 25 June 2020.

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major Michael P. Bennett



In August 2019, Sergeant Major of the Army Michael A. Grinston officially assumed the role and responsibility of senior enlisted leader of the U.S. Army. Not long after taking the position, Sergeant Major of the Army Grinston rolled out the "This is My Squad" campaign. The fundamental foundation of the campaign is ownership of surrounding Soldiers at all times. With the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) still a threat to our formations, there has never been a better time for you to reflect on your squad and all the things that you can do to improve readiness.

Who is in your squad? Personally, I have a few squads. The first is comprised of U.S Army Military Police School (USAMPS) Commandant, Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre; Assistant Commandant, Colonel Curt M. Schroeder; Regimental Chief Warrant Officer Mark W. Arnold; Deputy Commandant, Mr. Mark L. Farley; and me. The five of us spend considerable time around each other and have built a culture that allows for—and supports—candid conversation. The subjects of these conversations range from work to personal life. It is easy to identify when one member of the team is not having a good day; when that happens, the rest of the team members independently engage that person to ensure that he knows that he matters and that he has the tools to work through whatever might be throwing him off azimuth. Due to military regulation, there are some additional structures that go along with this easily recognizable squad.

My Family makes up the next squad. This squad is also easily recognizable but, at times, is a little more difficult to manage than the group of senior leaders in the first squad. Regulatory guidance does not help; and oftentimes, the ins and outs are primarily navigated through trial and error. Sometimes we talk and laugh all day; and other times, we spend the day staring at each other like we are calculus problems that have more symbols than numbers. However, at the end of the day, we are able to communicate with one another and work through our toughest challenges to resolve whatever issues we may have. The recent transition of education to distance learning has taught us all to be a little more patient and to have a little more respect for the professional educators who care for our children.

The last squad I want to discuss is made up of any Soldiers, past or present, with whom I have had the honor of serving over the years. We may have come from different backgrounds and cultures, but we are all Family. Regardless of time and distance, we do what we can to take care of one another. This could range from serving as mentors to providing a place to stay during travel to a new duty location.

I mention all of this to explain that I am a member of all of these squads. Regardless of the time or place, I will not allow anyone or anything to deter our ability to carry out our mission! This approach begins the day that a new Soldier's name hits our gains roster and continues long after he or she has transitioned to the Soldier for Life Program. The process starts with understanding how to use the Army Career Tracker to bring new Soldiers onboard to sponsor them. This represents the first interaction that Soldiers have with their new commands, and it is critical that it be done correctly so that they transition smoothly. Three websites that you should spend some time reviewing this quarter are the—

- Army Career Tracker website at <https://actnow.army.mil/>.
- Soldier for Life website at <https://soldierforlife.army.mil/>.
- Sergeant Major of the Army Grinston squad panel discussion at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j-F1J20SgHU>.

Know that all of you matter and that all of you make a difference. Just how productive you are to the overall climate of your organization depends on your effort to take care of your squad!

Assist, Protect, Defend!

Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Mark W. Arnold

Greetings to all from the Home of the Regiment.

It is hard to believe that it has been a year since I assumed duties as your 6th Regimental Chief Warrant Officer. As noted before, I am truly honored and humbled to serve you as we continue to support the Army's modernization effort.

The Army's mission is "to deploy, fight, and win our Nation's wars by providing ready, prompt, and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force."[1] Readiness is one of the Army's top priorities, and it is a result of the effective application of the Chief of Staff of the Army's focus—taking care of Soldiers.

Taking care of Soldiers means ensuring that they are trained and ready; that they have met, and continue to meet, the standards and expectations for the grades and duties they are assigned; and that they have the resources necessary to complete their assigned missions. Army leaders at all levels play a key role in ensuring the readiness of our organizations. It is our responsibility to develop military police leaders—and we owe it to the Army. Rest assured, here at the Home of the Regiment and U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), we are committed to leader development. This is a multistep effort that includes—

- Developing knowledge, skills, and behaviors as well as career-long assessments.
- Validating professional military education systems to ensure the development of leaders who possess the character, competence, and commitment necessary to serve in the Army profession.
- Winning in large-scale combat operations/multidomain operations.
- Possessing the knowledge, skills, and behaviors necessary to provide Soldiers with war-winning leadership.
- Meeting the requirements of the operational force.

We are currently finalizing the required knowledge, skills, and behaviors (by grade) and are in the process of developing the career-long assessments. Once this step is complete, we will validate the professional military education systems to ensure that they provide the appropriate training and education to develop future military police leaders required by the Army.

Team—around the world, military police leaders and Soldiers are doing great things. This exceptional performance has resulted in the great reputation of the Military Police Regiment, and senior leaders continue to commend the military police Soldiers who provide them with support. I am extremely proud of what you do every day, and I thank you for supporting our Regiment, our Army, and our great Nation.

Of the Troops, For the Troops.

Assist, Protect, Defend—Preserve the Force!

Endnote:

[1]U.S. Army mission statement, U.S. Army website, <https://www.army.mil/about/>, accessed on 1 July 2020.



Living the Army Profession

By Brigadier General James E. Bonner

As our Nation recently celebrated its 244th birthday and our Army—which is older than our Nation—turned 245 years of age, we reflect on our history. We are proud to be a part of the best-trained, most lethal, and most respected institution in the world.

Our Soldiers make us great. From enlistment to separation, the U.S. Army develops Soldiers and instills values, successfully transforming citizens into leaders of character and Soldiers for life. Leadership goes on 24/7 and requires engagement in order for leaders to know people, equipment, and operations. As leaders, we must visit our areas of responsibility to ensure good order and discipline—all while treating everyone with dignity and respect. To accomplish our mission, we must live by the five characteristics of the Army profession:

- **Trust.** Trust is the foundation of our profession. The American public believes that its Army will act ethically, effectively, and efficiently in order to protect the Nation and its interests. Soldiers and Army civilians trust their superiors, subordinates, and peers to be competent and reliable. To build trust and ensure mission success, we must embrace the diversity within our units and be inclusive of every person.
- **Honorable service.** Honorable service refers to the oaths of enlistment or office that all Soldiers and civilians take. Army professionals protect and defend the people of the United States—an exclusive responsibility. To gain perspective and to generate trust, we must tell our story and we must listen to those in our formations and learn why they serve. We must share their stories with the American public to inspire the next generation of Soldiers to join our ranks.
- **Military expertise.** Military expertise encompasses the expectation that all Soldiers and Army civilians become masters of their craft. Competence—in leader develoment, ethics, culture, and technical areas—is our watchword. Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; engineer; and military police Soldiers are essential in granting our maneuver units freedom of movement on the battlefield. The Army cannot succeed without the critical maneuver support skills and capabilities developed at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.
- **Stewardship.** The ideal of stewardship is a reminder to respect the trust and develop the next generation of leaders. We meet this responsibility by holding each other accountable. If we notice a violation of our professional standards, we must take the opportunity to respectfully correct it. If we are on the receiving end of a correction, we must respond with "thank you" and we must fix the issue.
- **Esprit de corps.** Esprit de corps encapsulates the winning mentality of our Army. This spirit helps unify us into a cohesive group. Our units display esprit de corps by respecting traditions, maintaining discipline, and fostering a team-centric environment. Winning matters, and units that foster esprit de corps understand that. They never quit in the face of adversity, and they stand by each other during the toughest missions.

Achieving these five characteristics as individuals and teams will ensure that we are able to fight and win on any battlefield. To learn more about the Army profession, visit the website <https://capl.army.mil/>.

Brigadier General Bonner is the Commanding General of the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence and Fort Leonard Wood. Brigadier General Bonner is a distinguished military graduate of Southern Illinois University. He holds master's degrees in administration from Central Michigan University and national security and strategic studies from the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.

Making Tax Dollars Count Twice: The Massachusetts Police Mission Partnership Initiative

By Lieutenant Colonel Bryan K. Pillai

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regiment exists to unencumber maneuver commanders and facilitate Army mission accomplishment at home and abroad. Military police personnel accomplish this task by employing the three military police disciplines (police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support) with the understanding that all activities are "policing in nature."[1] This key task is what makes the Military Police Corps Regiment unique within—and vital to—the Army. No other formation provides the Army with professional law enforcement capabilities to "protect the force and preserve readiness," allowing commanders unhindered focus on mission command to decisively employ combat power.[2]

The majority of Army military police units are included in the Reserve Component, with most assigned to the Army National Guard. While Regular Army and U.S. Army Reserve forces operate in a Title 10 status,[3] with restrictions on their ability to conduct police operations supporting civilian law enforcement, National Guard military police generally operate pursuant to either Title 32[4] or applicable state law and are often called upon to assist civil authorities.[5, 6] This is an essential aspect of the Military Police Corps Regiment requirement for "overmatching an adversary at home."[7] Laws addressing National Guard military police vary by state, with perhaps the best example of these laws found in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, where military police, together with Air National Guard security forces, are provided law enforcement authority consistent with that of a Massachusetts state trooper and are thus required to appear for duty armed and equipped.[8]

This forward-thinking approach toward military police employment, which was adopted in 2014, was born out of the chaos that followed the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, when military police personnel were rapidly emplaced throughout the Boston metropolitan area, unarmed and with limited authorities. The bombers' shootout with police days later and the massive manhunt thereafter necessitated the immediate arming of military police, who cordoned a section of Watertown, Massachusetts, while civilian police tactical teams searched the neighborhood—a plan that ultimately proved successful. Months later, the only major "improve" comment directed at the Massachusetts National Guard (MANG) in the state level after action report was that military police should have been armed from the onset, supporting changes ultimately adopted by the legislature.[9]

Cognizant of the responsibility accompanying this newly granted law enforcement authority, MANG leadership placed renewed emphasis on the Army guidance that all military police personnel conduct periodic law enforcement recertification.[10] This standard, which mirrors locally developed in-service training conducted by civilian police, is rooted in improving military police capabilities in incidents such as the 2009 Fort Hood, Texas, shooting.[11] It also facilitates the contemporary need of the Military Police Corps Regiment to preserve combat power in support of large-scale combat operations. An important element of this training standard, however, is that dual-career police professionals (Reserve Component military police personnel employed as civilian police officers) satisfy it by maintaining their civilian policing credentials.

POST Collaboration

States generally have a commission, council, or similar agency charged with developing training standards—often containing police (or peace) officer standards and training (POST) in its name—that all police officers must meet. The Municipal Police Training Committee, an organization with which MANG leadership worked to cultivate a collaborative relationship, is the Massachusetts POST agency.

Members of MANG-WPD Class 02-19 take the oath of enlistment to extend their service obligations as a requirement for Worcester Police Academy participation.

Even before the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, MANG and Municipal Police Training Committee leaders were working together to develop a new, reduced-hour police curriculum, such as that of the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), that credited military law enforcement training toward civilian police credentialing in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.[12] Lessons learned from the 2013 Boston Marathon terrorism attack not only pushed changes to the law regarding arming law enforcement authorities to the forefront, but also placed tremendous emphasis on this training program. The result was a progressive enterprise recognized for excellence by the International Association of Chiefs of Police with a 2014 Leadership in Civilian Law Enforcement/Military Cooperation Award.

The MANG Police Mission Partnership Initiative serves three distinct and complementary purposes:

- It benefits the Army by increasing individual readiness and overall retention.
- It rapidly places high-quality police officers on U.S. streets, while saving state and local governments time and money.
- It allows citizen-Soldiers to provide for their Families through meaningful employment that is synergistic with continued National Guard service.

The reference to "continued National Guard service" is key. This is not a program intended to transition military police Soldiers and Airmen from the military; instead, it is intended to keep them in.

Major General Gary W. Keefe, The Adjutant General of Massachusetts, addresses Class 02-19 on Day 1 of academy training as Brigadier Generals Frank Magurn and Brian Bisacre look on.

Military police Soldiers and security forces in Class 02-19 receive instruction from WPD Academy staff.

Once the USAMPS and Municipal Police Training Committee programs of instruction were carefully compared, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts agreed to certify a police academy for military police personnel with the standard 826-hour course reduced by 17 percent to 686 hours, representing a 1-month time savings.[13] The intent then—and now—was/is to realize additional reductions once the Department of Defense POST program is fully adopted.[14] The Worcester (Massachusetts) Police Department (WPD) enthusiastically agreed to host the first class in 2015 as a proof of concept, with MANG-WPD Class 01-15 graduating 34 Army National Guard military police and Air National Guard security forces personnel. The partnership between WPD and MANG continued to grow with the strong support of WPD Chief of Police Steven W. Sargent, himself a former Army military police Soldier, and MANG-WPD Class 02-19 graduated 24 personnel in January 2020.

Civilian Police Hiring and Retention Crisis

Around the same time that new initiative was developed, the civilian police community began suffering from a substantial downturn in initial-employment applications. According to the Police Executive Research Forum, 63 percent of police departments nationwide reported reduced applications from 2014 to 2019, with the Nashville, Tennessee, police department experiencing a stunning 60 percent decline.[15] Corroborating these findings, the *State and Local Government Workforce: 2019 Survey* revealed that policing was the most difficult government occupation to fill.[16]

Perhaps even more alarming is the fact that those who do apply and make it through the hiring process and the police academy are unlikely to stay on the job. Indeed, 29 percent of those who resign from policing have spent less than 1 year in uniform and 40 percent depart between their second and fifth years of service, meaning that nearly 70 percent of newly hired police officers nationwide quit within 5 years.[17] This unfortunate situation only serves to strengthen the need for innovative staffing solutions.

The Data

Now, 5 years since the first MANG-WPD training class concluded, an impressive 86 percent of the class has been retained in civilian law enforcement—nearly triple the national average. Additionally, 70 percent have maintained membership in the Army or Air Force Reserve Components. The

MANG-WPD Class 02-19 conducts applied patrol procedures as instructors discuss the students' performance.

second class—whose participants committed to continuing in the military for at least 4 years following graduation—is achieving similarly successful results but at a far more rapid pace, with 75 percent (18 of 24) securing civilian law enforcement employment just 4 months after course completion and 25 percent actively participating in the hiring process with at least one department.

This initiative provides civilian police departments with quality candidates who have law enforcement training and experience and who maintain a high level of physical fitness, professional appearance in uniform, cultural acuity to disciplined employment, and a strong background with a minimum of a secret security clearance. Moreover, from the civilian police employer's perspective, it costs less to train these candidates and they are nearly three times more likely than their peers to remain in law enforcement. Informal surveys conducted by MANG indicate that more than 50 percent of National Guard military police and security forces personnel are currently serving as dual-career police professionals or aspiring toward it, ensuring continued future interest from—and participation by—Service members.[18]

MANG-WPD Class 01-15 on graduation day in May 2015 with Major General L. Scott Rice, the Adjutant General of Massachusetts, and Command Sergeant Major Richard A. Woodring, Regimental Command Sergeant Major.

Viewed from the perspective of the Army National Guard and Air National Guard, this initiative improves individual readiness by developing highly skilled law enforcement professionals who are capable of conducting quality military police operations at home and abroad. It also supports recruitment and retention by providing unparalleled opportunities for Soldiers and Airmen to obtain civilian employment that is complementary to continued military service. This type of continued success requires ongoing engagement with civilian police executives, whose support of dual-career employees is essential for military retention.

Police chiefs who benefit from this initiative understand not only that the National Guard will provide them with high-quality military police in times of need, but also that National Guard leaders will reasonably balance the military and civilian responsibilities of the dual-career police professionals. It is essential that police chiefs know who they should contact within the military police leadership to rapidly resolve minor issues; the MANG solution to this question was to secure full membership for a senior military police officer in the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association. MANG also secured membership eligibility for all military police personnel in the statewide law enforcement association, the Massachusetts Police Association.

Next Steps

Building upon the successes of this initiative, MANG leaders next intend to develop a process whereby professional military education is appropriately credited toward civilian career advancement. Meaningfully translating the superior leadership training that officers and noncommissioned officers receive in the military to promotion in the civilian sector not only assists Soldiers and Airmen, but also allows civilian employers to benefit from the military service of their employees. Consistent with the previously mentioned crediting of occupational training toward credentialing requirements, government-funded leadership training would be paid for with taxpayer dollars once, yet efficiently counted twice. Not only would this approach incentivize continued military service for Service members, and employers, but it would also assist the law enforcement community, which is presently suffering from outmoded promotion and leadership training systems.[19]

Through the support of the WPD Academy, the Municipal Police Training Committee, and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Military Division, the costs of conducting the initial phases of this training program were exceptionally minimal—approximately $2,500 per attendee. Although MANG secured approval for Soldiers and Airmen to apply Veterans Administration education benefits toward this figure, those who did not qualify were required to pay the balance. Moving forward, MANG intends to expand this partnership to include a state college or university in

order to obtain appropriate college credit for the program of instruction. This will allow participants to earn credits toward a college degree—likely in criminal justice—and also permit the application of the 100 percent state tuition and fee waiver benefit provided to all MANG personnel, thereby eliminating the training cost. The recently announced Army Credentialing Assistance Program will also be carefully explored as a possible additional funding source.

Conclusion

The MANG Police Mission Partnership Initiative is an innovative solution to Army National Guard recruiting and retention challenges. It builds readiness and, ultimately, in a very direct manner, supports the government's "fundamental responsibility . . . to protect the American people, the homeland, and the American way of life."[20] The initiative not only serves the interests of the military, Soldiers, and Airmen, but it also provides tangible benefits to the civilian employers of National Guard personnel, a long-overlooked constituency that is essential to our national security.

Specific thought was given to programmatically broadening participation eligibility to include veterans and Reserve Component Soldiers and Airmen who are not presently in the National Guard; however, the essential need of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to maintain a highly trained and accessible National Guard makes it necessary to limit eligibility to current National Guard members. This policy is consistent with state university tuition and fee benefits offered only to National Guard members by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and many other states as an incentive for state service. Those veterans and Reserve Component Soldiers and Airmen who are interested in participating are welcome to visit <www.massnationalguard.org>.

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

[2]Michael D. Lundy, *United States Army Military Police Force Modernization Strategy*, 1 November 2019.

[3]Title 10, U.S. Code, *General Military Law*, Part I, Chapter 15, "Military Support for Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies."

[4]Title 32, U.S Code, *National Guard*, Chapter 1, "Organization".

[5]National Guard Regulation (NGR) 500-5, *National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support and Mission Assurance Operations*, 18 August 2010, paras. 3-2 and 3-3.

[6]U.S. Code, Title 18, Section 1385, *Use of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus*.

[7]Brian R. Bisacre, *U.S. Army Military Police Force Modernization Strategy*, 1 November 2019.

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Lieutenant Colonel Pillai commands the 211th Military Police Battalion (First Corps of Cadets) in Lexington, Massachusetts, and is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Massachusetts Chiefs of Police Association. He holds a bachelor's degree in international relations and political science from Boston University, Massachusetts, and a master's degree in government from Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The Army R2 Program Makes BCT Trainees Stronger

By Captain Kevin C. Marks

The U.S. Army has taken a closer look at personal health, nutrition, and mental wellness over the past decade, with the goal of increasing the overall mission readiness of our No. 1 asset, the Soldier. Through this effort, the Army has implemented holistic training for fitness, embodied a new physical fitness test, and increased access to medical providers across installations. Personal readiness—including the physical, psychological, social, spiritual, and Family preparedness needed to optimize performance and be fit for duty at home and at work—is now at the forefront of the minds of every Soldier and leader.

In May 2019, Captain Kevin C. Marks, the commander of Company A, 1st Battalion, 58th Infantry Regiment (1-58) (Basic Combat Training), 14th Military Police Brigade, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, began embedding the Ready and Resilient (R2) Program into unit basic combat training (BCT) cycles. The focus was on increasing Soldier readiness and enhancing trainees' ability to overcome mental obstacles faced during the increasing stressors of BCT. For the leaders of the 1-58, this started with resiliency and a focus on an individual's ability to face and cope with adversity, adapt to change, recover, and learn and grow from setbacks. BCT acts as a great equalizer in the quest to prove who is mentally and physically ready for the rigors and stressors of combat and the daily stressors of being a U.S. Army Soldier.

The preparation of the next generation is the responsibility of every leader in the BCT environment. That preparation should always include physical readiness; however, the importance of mental resiliency and health is as crucial to the success of each Soldier and trainee. There is no stronger individual than one who has the ability to harness his or her emotions and use them as tools and motivators to continue to overcome adversity.

R2 professionals enable trainees to push limits in ways that they may never have before. Company A, 1-58, has implemented R2 professionals in recent training cycles and, in doing so, has greatly enhanced the caliber and individual readiness of Soldiers. Over the past four cycles, Company A, 1-58, has maintained class statistics, using the first cycle (when R2 professionals were not present) as a baseline. Through constant data collection, the 1-58 demonstrated an increase in passing rates and numbers of graduations. Specifically, the data showed increases of—

- 39 percent in basic rifle marksman first-time go (FTG) rates.
- 10 percent in Army Physical Fitness Test FTG rates.
- 8 percent in land navigation FTG rates.
- 11 percent in 10-mile foot march completion FTG rates.

A Soldier conducts back-up iron sight qualification.

Based on the statistical data, the company concluded that the R2 Program had positively influenced BCT trainees. With the help of R2 professionals, BCT Soldiers became emotionally stronger, enhancing their ability to stay calm during stressful events. In addition, the R2 Program resulted in an increase in overall company achievement scores. However, there are a variety of external variables (such as the teaching ability of the instructors and the internal discipline/drive of the trainee) that must be considered when analyzing the data. The strengths of the R2 Program are individually based, and the benefits of the program are only achieved if the individual buys into the teaching.

Though the external variables may have impacted the results, the statistical data reveals a steady increase in the ability of trainees to overcome obstacles, increasing their overall personal readiness. No individual task in BCT is difficult; instead, it is the continuous tasks and stressors that make BCT taxing. It is important for leaders to find outside enablers to strengthen the trainees and teach them positive ways to overcome barriers. We must always make every effort to take care of our Service members and set up our trainees for success. Incorporating the R2 Program is one effective way of achieving this desired end state. It proved to be beneficial for the leaders of the 1-58 to show their continual support through the use of the R2 Program.

Captain Marks is the commander of the 252d Military Police Detachment, 180th Military Police Detachment, Fort Leonard Wood. He holds a bachelor's degree in law enforcement administration from Western Illinois University, Macomb, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

The Enforcer Crucible:

The Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant Development Program for the 503d Military Police Battalion

By Captain Sutton L. Ward

During a battalion planning conference in July 2019, company and battalion level leaders of the 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne) worked diligently in the Training and Education Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. With a new battalion commander, executive officer, operations officer, and command sergeant major came a desire to assess the current state of the Enforcer Battalion, visualize the desired end state, and develop a long-term plan. One of the first areas addressed was the demand for a leader development and validation program for platoon level leaders.

In the past, there had been no deliberate talent management, which had created an imbalance of strengths and weaknesses across platoons and companies. Leader development classes had consisted of quarterly classroom instruction on conducting officer and noncommissioned officer evaluations and promotion boards, presentations from outside agencies on programs available to command teams, and discussions on assigned reading. The new battalion command team envisioned a way to simultaneously welcome incoming leaders to the battalion; assess their strengths, weaknesses, and personalities; and, ultimately, build a cohesive team through a challenging, yet educational, experience. The Enforcer Crucible was born.

As the commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, I was tasked to develop a concept for assessing leaders on all desired areas within a feasible timeline—with the population for the first iteration consisting of all current platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. Based on a deliberate discussion with company command teams and senior leaders, the following critical aspects of the Enforcer Crucible event were developed:

- Execution on a quarterly basis.
- Length of 3–4 days.
- 8–14 participants.
- Instruction, assessment, and evaluation conducted by commanders and first sergeants.
- Presence of the command team maiximized throughout the event.
- Training dates set for 9–12 weeks before execution.
- Prioritization in quarterly training guidance.
- Scalable time and scope.
- Tailorable levels of leadership.

With buy-in from fellow command teams and approval from battalion leaders, the first iteration of Enforcer Crucible was planned for the first quarter, fiscal year 2020.

Enforcer Crucible 20-1: The Pilot

On 22 October 2019, 13 platoon leaders, platoon sergeants, and operations sergeants assembled at the airfield heavy drop rigging site, ready to begin the first Enforcer Crucible event—an Army Physical Fitness Test. Upon completion of the Army Physical Fitness Test, company first sergeants taught classes on weapons operation and capabilities. In the afternoon, company commanders taught classes on land navigation, operation orders, troop-leading procedures, tactical combat casualty care, and voice communications. Day 1 ended with a packing list layout for field activities scheduled for the next day.

Participants are evaluated on the M249 squad automatic weapon.

Early on Day 2, participants were transported to the start point for the second physical event—the 10-kilometer foot march. After completion of that event, the participants moved into the wood line to establish an assembly area for a dismounted land navigation course. Equipped with a map, compass, and protractor, participants navigated to assigned points, where—instead of finding the typical placard—they found a company commander or first sergeant waiting with training aids, a prewritten scenario, and a training and evaluation outline to assess performance of an Army

Participants receive a class on communication equipment.

warrior task. Tasks included application of a combat tourniquet, self-location using resection, and placement of a Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System into operation.

On Day 3, participants further tested their navigation skills on a mounted land navigation course. Without the aid of the Global Positioning System or Joint Battle Command Platform, leaders navigated to their point using a map, compass, and protractor. Once at the point, participants were required to report their status using the vehicle's Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System. Tasks required for the mounted land navigation event included completing a spot report and a call for fire.



A Soldier programs points for the night land navigation course.

A terrain model for a detainee collection point.

Throughout Days 2 and 3, participants conducted multiple iterations of tactical exercises without troops. Between events, two participants (one as platoon leader and one platoon sergeant) were identified as a team and issued a company level fragmentary order to a base operation order (OPORD) that was issued on Day 1. After receipt, the team selected squad leaders among the remaining participants. The purpose of the squad leaders was to assist with planning the operation and preparing a terrain model. With the time remaining (which ranged from 45 minutes to 3 hours), the team was required to plan its operation, construct a terrain model, and brief a five-paragraph platoon level OPORD for a mission under one of the following military police disciplines:

- Security and mobility support.
- Detention operations.
- Police operations with police intelligence operations.

After the OPORD briefing, the evaluators provided critiques to the teams of platoon leaders and platoon sergeants and to the rest of the participants in the group. The platoon leader evaluator focused on the format and content of the order and facilitated a group discussion on the strengths, weaknesses, and risks associated with the operation as planned. The platoon sergeant evaluator focused on the paragraph about sustainment in Appendix C, Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*.[1] Lastly, battalion leaders and participant squad leaders provided feedback to the teams on how the operation should have been planned differently. This all-encompassing approach allowed for improvement in the quality of the OPORD briefing and terrain models over the duration of 2 days.

Day 4 began with an espirit de corps run and graduation breakfast, where participants received leader books—complete with reference materials essential for the platoon leader/platoon sergeant team—for completing Enforcer Crucible. The Enforcer Crucible pilot concluded with an after action review to capture comments to be used to improve the next iteration of Enforcer Crucible.

(Continued on page 14)

Biometrics Technology: The Future of Military Policing

By First Lieutenant Jennifer K. Sanchez

Ever since the days of General George Washington, when the Marechaussee used physical features to identify people, the Military Police Corps has been actively serving the military community and upholding the law through the integration of emerging technologies. And ever since the development of fingerprint system biometrics technology in the early 1900s, the Military Police Corps has been a leader in using that technology to better support maneuver elements and mobility operations with threat identification in both peacetime and wartime.

The field of biometrics has been around for many years, but the military has recently experienced a significant increase in its utilization.[1] Biometrics analysis is used to verify the identity, or claimed identity, of individuals. The quality of images, fingerprints, and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) data affect whether biometrics databases can return a match. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces first began employing biometrics collection during operations in Afghanistan, and the International Security Assistance Force, Kabul, Afghanistan, used biometrics collection tools across Afghanistan from 2010 to 2014.[2]

"The collection of biometric data and cooperation from all military agencies, civilian entities, and NATO are significant. Allies gather threat data from around the world and aggressively fight against threats."

The biometrics collection system currently used by military police worldwide is known as the Biometric Automated Toolset. The system, which was first introduced in Kosovo in 2001, provides a means of concrete identification. In a 2018 interview, Mr. William Graves, the chief of engineering for the Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors; Biometric System Integration Laboratory; Fort Belvoir, Virginia, explained that the Biometric Automated Toolset is capable of collecting and saving the iris characteristics and fingerprints of individuals and can identify unique features. Although the Biometric Automated Toolset is not yet capable of native facial-recognition, several facial-recognition databases are. Therefore, the data collected is entered into one of those databases. Facial recognition is critical because the quicker a face is matched, the quicker the individual can be captured. Program Executive Office for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors development has led to further research in the field of biometrics to develop better equipment and upgrade technology to enhance biometrics collection.

The accuracy offered by biometrics platforms allows Soldiers to collect more detailed, advanced, and unique features—which, in turn, results in more accurate matches with information contained in databases. Fingerprints, iris photographs, facial images, and DNA for 7.4 million identities where the military is active around the world are stored in the Automated Biometric Information System.[3] The collection of biometric data and cooperation from all military agencies, civilian entities, and NATO are significant. Allies gather threat data from around the world and aggressively fight against threats.

Military police Soldiers stationed in Europe have the unique opportunity to train and operate with allied NATO military police units by engaging in multinational training events that provide U.S. Soldiers with the opportunity to prepare for the utilization of biometrics systems in austere environments throughout their careers.

In the fall of 2019, the 527th Military Police Company, Vilseck, Germany, was invited to participate in Clockwork Orange, a joint NATO military police exercise. This unique exercise, hosted by the Netherlands in October 2019, provided Soldiers with the opportunity to practice site exploitation, biometrics collection, and field laboratory operations with Swedish and Dutch military police soldiers.

The 527th provided its experience and support to the Royal Dutch Forces throughout the multinational training event. The aim was to create a learning environment that provided for cross-national training opportunities. The mission was to increase proficiency in police intelligence operations and enhance interoperability between NATO partners and allies. U.S. Army and Dutch soldiers tested the concept

of Soldier-manned Level 2 (field laboratory) exploitation facilities. Forces from all organizations were presented various objectives that tested their ability to adapt to situations and threats.

During the exercise, a squad from the 2d platoon, 527th Military Police Company, integrated, operated, and completed tasks in teams to differentiate and cross-train the various ways that countries utilize biometrics. Combined teams allowed participants the opportunity to learn tactics, techniques, and procedures from each country and encounter scenarios to develop joint best practices. This enabled military police Soldiers to enhance their training, experience, and knowledge and to build lasting relationships with their NATO counterparts.

With the complex and interchanging operational environment of today, it is important to provide support to our NATO counterparts, learn from their best practices, and implement lessons learned. The relationships built while conducting training with NATO allies and partners allow us to uniquely identify and correct issues with interoperability while enhancing our knowledge, experiences, and relationships. The Military Police Corps continues to evolve through the adoption of emerging technologies such as biometrics—especially into joint and multinational training with NATO allies. The Soldiers who participated in this exercise will carry their experiences with them for the rest of their careers.

Endnotes:

[1]David Vergun, "Army Researchers Improving Biometrics Speed, Accuracy for Military Intelligence, Security," *Army News Service*, 6 March 6 2018, <https://www.army.mil/article/201384/army_researchers_improving_biometrics_speed_accuracy_for_military_intelligence_security>, accessed on 5 June 2020.

[2]Mark Lunan, "New Doctrinal Concepts: Biometrics," *The Three Swords Magazine*, 2018, <http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/Biometrics_2018.pdf>, accessed on 5 June 2020.

[3]Matthew Monroy, "NATO Establishes Biometric Database, U.S. Military Has It Already," *Security Architectures and Police Collaboration in the E.U.*, 11 August 2019, <https://digit.site36.net/2019/11/08/nato-establishes-biometric-database-us-military-has-it-already/>, accessed on 5 June 2020.

First Lieutenant Sanchez is a platoon leader for the 527th Military Police Company. She holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Bethune-Cookman University, Daytona Beach, Florida.

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Enforcer Crucible 20-2 and the Way Ahead

After action review comments from Enforcer Crucible 20-1 were immediately implemented in Enforcer Crucible 20-2, which was executed 24–27 February 2020. To replace the Army Physical Fitness Test, participants completed their first Army Combat Fitness Test, which exposed Soldiers to the higher physical demands of the U.S. Army's future standard. Upon successful completion of the weapons evaluation, participants completed a live-fire familiarization with all weapons, incorporating night vision devices and thermal optics, which improved the participants' understanding of the platoon weapon capabilities. In addition to a dismounted day land navigation course, participants completed a night land navigation course while equipped with night vision devices and Defense Advanced Global Positioning System Receivers.

Enforcer Crucible 20-3 took place 18–21 May 2020. Based on comments received from previous iterations of Enforcer Crucible, participants received administrative classes in the following areas from primary battalion staff members:

- Law enforcement cell duties and responsibilities of the military police duty officer.
- Personnel office actions, awards, and evaluations.
- Intelligence office preparation of the battlefield and planning for opposing forces.
- Operations office training management, the battalion green cycle, and range briefing standards.
- Property book office leader roles and responsibilities in property accountability.
- Maintenance office leader roles in maintenance and common faults with the Humvee™.

During the live-fire exercise, participants became familiar with the M136 AT-4 light tank weapon, the M18A1 Claymore mine, and the M153 Common Remotely Operated Weapons Station. For the mounted land navigation course, participants used an M1151 Expanded Capacity Armament Carrier equipped with vehicle radio communications, a Joint Battle Command Platform, and a high-frequency/tactical satellite AN/PRC-150 multiband communication system to navigate the course and send reports.

The most significant take-away from the Enforcer Crucible after action reviews to date is that the participants and command teams across the battalion truly believe that development of leaders is imperative. As stewards of the profession of arms, the time and effort that we put into the development of our leaders is an investment in the quality of our Soldiers and organizations.

Endnote:

[1]FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014.

Captain Ward is the commander of Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg. He holds a bachelor's degree in business administration from The Citadel, Charleston, North Carolina.



Effectively Executing Internment: Planning and Preparing for Detainee Operations

By Major Megan R. Williams

Detainee operations (DO) represents a significant challenge on any battlefield. While commanders understand the application of Geneva Convention laws,[1] which stipulate that a detaining force has a legal and moral responsibility to ensure the humane treatment of enemy combatants, the technical administration of these responsibilities on a large scale is daunting. The United States has historically struggled with DO, but DO remains a high-consequence mission with international strategic implications. Commanders and staffs frequently view DO as a secondary mission rather than a requirement of the main operation. The challenge, in essence, is to sustain an unknown enemy population with a significant security requirement without knowledge of the exact size, timing, or location of that population. Military police leaders must be able to advise commanders and lead planning efforts for this mission. A designated analysis framework from which to better understand the enemy population can accelerate mission analysis, facilitate planning efforts, and better enable operational success.

Risks

DO presents risks to commanders at all echelons, and these risks are more difficult to mitigate if they are not anticipated. Commanders who fail to consider the enemy population as part of the operational environment (OE) do not have the full common operating picture of the battlefield and may miss key information that influences the decision-making cycle. When a captured enemy population and the burden of requirements inevitably associated with it are not considered, the mission becomes reactionary and the commander is compelled to reallocate combat power and resources to support it. Poor or insufficient planning prior to conflict prevents the United States from effectively setting the theater. Prisoner intake on the battlefield is heavy during Phase III operations, when maneuver commanders are concerned with dominating the enemy but resources are allocated to the fight.[2] There are heavy security and sustainment requirements for DO, and failing to plan for these conditions increases response time; the diversion of forces to support detainees may jeopardize the primary mission.

Additionally, specific considerations of the enemy combatant population may put friendly forces at risk. For example, exposing U.S. personnel to disease is risky—especially if a contagion has not been anticipated. Moreover, the sensitive nature and high degree of visibility under which DO missions function lend to the potential perpetuation of damaging or false information by media sources. Erroneous reports could impede U.S. efforts, as harmful narratives may impact domestic political support or international coalition partnerships. The future OE, which will present more challenges at a faster pace, will only exacerbate the demands on commanders and staffs, and adversaries will exploit any weaknesses exhibited by the United States on a global stage.

Historical Challenges

A comprehensive review of DO over the past century reveals that there was a common DO flaw in each war and conflict—the failure to appropriately plan. There was a lack of understanding about the detainee population and the logistics required to support the mission. In each conflict, the United States was assigned situational tasks unique to that conflict that demonstrated different complicating factors, such as logistical challenges or emerging legal classifications. A comprehensive study by the RAND Corporation indicates that U.S. military conflicts reveal a "typical pattern, including: belated recognition that prisoners will be taken in significant numbers and will need to be managed; hasty scrambling for resources needed for prisoner or detainee operations; a period of crisis management often accompanied by negative incidents; a concerted but difficult effort to improve operations; incipient understanding of the opportunities for influence through reintegration of prisoners into their society; and belated education and integration programs, with outcomes that could have been optimized by better and earlier implementation of a comprehensive plan."[3]

This pattern stems from poor mission analysis, an inadequate projection of the capture rate, and the subsequent failure to plan for the requirements for supporting that population. Failure to understand the OE creates cascading implications across the battlefield, and the effects of the

shortcomings are two-fold: First, it places the Army in a predominantly reactionary posture in which it responds to the security and sustainment needs to provide for the prisoner population; and second, it generates unnecessary risk for the mission and the troops.

Current Doctrine

Official Army doctrine directs that all persons will comply with the law of war with respect to the treatment of all detainees.[4] Violations of the Geneva Convention through improper interrogation techniques or DO planning and execution constitute a strategic failure for our Armed forces, lengthening the intensity of future conflicts and negatively impacting the reputation of the U.S. government.

DO encompasses the "capture, initial detention and screening, transportation, treatment and protection, housing, transfer, and release of the wide range of persons who could be categorized as detainees."[5] The military must be able to plan, execute, and support DO from the point of capture through the transfer, release, repatriation, death, or escape of a detainee. Within the U.S. Army, military police advise commanders and staffs on planning DO and military police units maintain the technical capability to execute DO in facilities but overall mission accomplishment demands a cooperative approach.

Throughout this process—even under the most favorable of circumstances—DO is a labor- and resource-intensive process. Beginning at the initial point of capture, detainees require constant security and a level of resourcing for life support equivalent to that of U.S. military personnel. DO is a high-visibility mission with international agencies; it requires transparency and access for oversight. The need for multiple categories of segregation creates a higher demand for space and security resources, as each disparate population must be separated for living, hygiene, and medical activities, which may be limited by manpower and resources, producing unanticipated operational strain.[6]

Requirement

Deficient mission analysis through a failure to understand and anticipate the DO mission leads to inadequate or incomplete planning, which creates a plan based more on assumptions and anecdotes than on analysis. The significant military and political consequences of poor mission planning demand a rigorous and robust effort that emphasizes a direct relationship with major combat operations planning. Because DO planning is not the main effort, it may be delegated to a staff protection section or provost marshal as an economy-of-force effort, but there is a risk of producing a less-informed and less-integrated effort.

Neither of the dual imperatives of DO—security and sustainment—can be allowed to fail. Detention is a military police discipline, so it is important for military police leaders to understand this mission as a professional competency. It is incumbent upon leaders to be able to perform their missions, as executed by military police units, but also to advise and plan in a staff capacity, understanding the mission requirements that may be outside the scope of military police units. This is an additional challenge in our contemporary environment because DO training objectives for maneuver units are not fully implemented in large training venues like combat training centers.

An operational framework designed specifically for DO can be used to expedite planning, recognize consistent requirements, and identify potential impacts to the mission in advance. The framework presented accomplishes all of these tasks by considering the direct effects of an enemy combatant population on U.S. requirements for their custody and control. Accordingly, if consistently implemented, the framework is designed to mature as more data is acquired, thus turning "unknown unknowns" into "known unknowns" to identify information and intelligence requirements that may later assist in operation refinement, ultimately striving to produce "known knowns." This framework elicits key stakeholder input to the DO mission analysis by identifying follow-on requirements, thereby supporting greater staff awareness and collaboration for mission analysis and course-of-action development.

DO Planning Framework

The DO planning framework proposes four population variables, each with subvariables, that have a significant impact on the DO mission (Figure 1). This framework reflects the variables describing the OE (the elements of social, health, communication, and capture) and also incorporates the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain, time available, troops, and civilians. The framework provides a brief description of each variable, with sample questions to guide planning efforts. The sample questions may serve as a guideline for staffs to identify considerations relevant to their specific OEs and enemy populations, planning considerations, and mission impacts.

As with other operational frameworks, the consideration of time available is important; it shapes how many of the components of the framework are known and when. Some, but not all, variables and subvariables can be anticipated or projected. Most subvariables are not confirmed until the point of capture, although the information carries implications for multiple units and multiple requirements throughout DO processing. Identifying information requirements in advance helps with information sharing in that units can keep in mind "who else needs to know."

Because the framework helps with the identification of mission impacts, the variables and subvariables contribute to an understanding of the greater common operating picture and can be used to shape reporting requirements. For example, injuries are unknown until the point of capture, but the transmission of an injury report helps receiving units become better prepared later. Also for example, information about any extenuating circumstances of capture (such as when a group of detainees surrendered or nearly fought to the death) may have future relevance regarding security measures.

Variables	*Subvariables*	*Mission Impacts*
Social Identifies nationality and cultural (or religious) composition of the enemy population.	**Nationality** What country is the enemy from?	**Space / security requirement**
	Demographics What is gender and age of the anticipated enemy population?	**Space / security requirement**
	Ideology What extreme ideologies may be represented within the population that should be segregated from others?	**Space / security requirement**
	Ethnicity / Religion What cultural or religious groups does the population represent?	**Space / security requirement**
		Dietary requirement
		Religious support
Health Identifies health considerations concerning the possibility and probability of both disease and injuries to the population.	**Disease** What diseases are expected within the population? Are there considerations for communicable diseases?	**Medical assets**
		Transportation assets
		Mortuary affairs
	Injury What injuries (cold weather or overexposure, malnutrition, CBRN contamination, specific combat injuries) can be anticipated?	**Medical assets**
		Transportation assets
		Mortuary affairs
Communication Anticipates ability of U.S. forces to communicate with, or convey messages to, the enemy population.	**Oral** What language does the population speak?	**Interpreter support**
	Written What is the anticipated literacy rate of the population?	**Detention communication**
Capture Considers the circumstances of capture, identifying an information requirement for the equipment on the detainee's person and the legal category of detention.	**Equipment on person** What equipment is issued to the enemy population? What personal effects does the detainee have?	**Intelligence collection**
		Personal protective gear
		Supply assets
	Legal category How many detainees are anticipated by type? Are they classified as uniformed combatants?	**Space / security requirement**
		Intelligence collection
	Circumstances of capture Are there any notable conditions (mass capitulation) regarding capture?	**Security considerations**

Figure 1, DO planning framework

Application

For the DO mission, staffs must be flexible—adapting as the OE and the situation change, developing branch and sequel plans supporting primary missions, and developing decision points for the commander. As a staff planning tool, the framework may be implemented by incorporating it into existing efforts at no additional cost. Application of the framework increases planning efficiencies by enabling staffs to identify variables, anticipate requirements and, ultimately, reduce risk to the senior mission commander. The identified mission impacts of the framework include facilitation of staff collaboration; for example, medical estimates can influence mortuary affairs planning.

As the OE evolves during conflict, the manner in which enemy populations adapt and fight may change too—and that, subsequently, impacts the Army's response to the enemy.[7] While not all-inclusive, the framework may help staffs recognize other population characteristics that influence how friendly forces respond. As the environment or the maneuver mission changes, the requirements for detainee operations may change as well; for example—

- Knowledge that North Koreans suffer from malnutrition, with a higher likelihood of carrying parasites,[8] should trigger adaptations in preparatory planning, including the addition of a potential requirement for specific medical treatment and supplies.
- The onset of cold weather, particularly on a poorly resourced enemy population, may impact the enemy's willingness to fight and, subsequently, the likelihood of surrender, which would impact the operational capacity to absorb the population. If the prisoner population has been exposed to cold weather and has limited warm clothing, medical treatment and logistics support are required in response.

The primary limitation of the framework is that it cannot be used to project population sizes. Instead, information about the posture of an enemy population is considered and deductive reasoning is used. The impact that the population could have on friendly forces is denied by identifying considerations that could assist staffs in contingency planning. There will be different considerations for population sizes and projected rates of capture in future conflicts, but the variables and mission impacts are scalable.

Conclusion

In preparation for a conflict of any size, the U.S. military must plan and prepare for DO. The ramifications of failing to do so are grave. The United States has consistently underestimated detainee populations, impacting the ability of the military to support the populations accordingly. Current and future adversaries will attempt to exploit U.S. DO in an effort to damage the domestic and international reputation of the military.

The proposed framework highlights specific variables for staff consideration; these variables can be used to facilitate planning and identify mission impacts. The simplicity of the DO planning framework, which supports current OE frameworks, allows it to be easily incorporated into existing staff planning efforts. It can be utilized as a checklist to identify key information requirements and shared among key stakeholders. Consistent utilization of the planning framework will increase awareness for DO requirements and assist commanders and staffs in visualizing and describing the application of resources. With proper organization and preparation, planning for DO will incorporate anticipated population risks and the mitigation of operational impacts, enabling the full projection of combat power for mission accomplishment.

Endnotes:

[1]International Committee of the Red Cross, Article III, *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War*, 12 August 1949.

[2]John F. Hussey, "Detention Operations as a Strategic Consideration," *Joint Force Quarterly,* NDU Press, 31 March 2020.

[3]Cheryl Bernard et al., *The Battle Behind the Wire: U.S. Prisoner and Detainee Operations for World War to Iraq*, RAND Corporation, 2011.

[4]Field Manual (FM) 6-27, *The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Land Warfare*, 7 August 2019.

[5]Joint Publication (JP) 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 13 November 2014.

[6]JP 4-02, *Joint Health Services*, 28 September 2018.

[7]Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 1-0, *The Army*, 31 July 2019.

[8]"Giant Worms are a Window Into the Hell of Life in North Korea," *New York Post*, 17 November 2017, <https://nypost.com/2017/11/17/injured-defectors-parasites-and-diet-hint-at-hard-life-in-north-korea/>, accessed on 14 July 2020.

Major Williams is currently a student at the School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. She previously served as the S-3, 42d Military Police Brigade, Joint Base Lewis–McChord, Washington. She holds a bachelor's degree in political science from the U.S. Military Academy–West Point, New York, and a master's degree in policy management from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.



The Distinguished Marksmanship Badge

By Captain Heather R. Bilicki

Marksmanship fundamentals are the key to success for every Soldier. Proper technique must be taught at the beginning of every basic-entry school and reinforced throughout a Soldier's career. Competition encourages the growth and development of individuals' skills; therefore, maintaining a competitive spirit throughout an organization only enables success on the battlefield.

Distinguished Marksmanship Badge History

The Distinguished Marksmanship Badge was instituted by General Phillip H. Sheridan in 1884 under General Order No. 12. In 1903, the honor was divided into two categories—the Distinguished Pistol Shot Badge and the Distinguished Rifleman's Badge.[1] These badges, along with the Distinguished International Shooter Badge, are the most prestigious marksmanship badges that Soldiers can earn in their military careers. To date, the highest-ranking Soldier to wear the distinguished marksmanship badge was General John J. Pershing, who earned the Distinguished Marksmanship Badge with the pistol and rifle before the Distinguished Pistol Shot Badge and Distinguished Rifleman's Badge were created.

The Distinguished Pistol Shot Badge and Distinguished Rifleman's Badge are earned by competing in the Excellence in Competition (EIC) Marksmanship Program, which is part of the Army's Small-Arms Competitive Marksmanship Program. The EIC was created to accomplish the following objectives:

- Improve marksmanship training techniques.
- Improve weapons and ammunition capabilities.
- Raise proficiency standards.
- Recognize marksmanship skills through competition.
- Establish a broad base of qualified instructors.

Small-Arms Championship

Commonly referred to as "All Army," the annual Small-Arms Championship is sponsored by the Army Marksmanship Unit, Fort Benning, Georgia. The primary objectives of the Small-Arms Competitive Marksmanship Program and the Army Marksmanship Unit are to develop marksmanship skills at the entry and intermediate levels, recognize superior skill at the highest levels, raise the standards of marksmanship, and increase lethality across the entire force.[2] The competition is open to all U.S. Army Soldiers, regardless of component or grade. The competition, which takes place over the course of 1 week, consists of multiple individual and team events, including several EIC matches. The competition is a comprehensive, live-fire training event that tests Soldiers' ability to employ primary and secondary weapon systems, solve problems, and think critically under the stresses created by competition in order to improve lethality and combat readiness.

A Soldier from the 549th Military Police Company competes in the EIC Marksmanship Program.

Army Marksmanship Unit

In 1956, President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the formation of the Army Marksmanship Unit, almost exclusively to win shooting competitions, intending to raise the standards of marksmanship throughout the Army. Today, the mission of the Army Marksmanship Unit includes winning competitions, supporting Army recruiting efforts, and advancing small-arms lethality. The unit is composed of five competitive shooting teams, each with world-class training facilities and competition grounds. The teams (Service Rifle, Action Shooting, International Rifle, Service Pistol, and Shotgun) have represented the United States in the Summer Olympic Games since 1960 and have earned 24 Olympic medals.

In October 2019, the 549th Military Police Company (Tropic Enforcers), 385th Military Police Battalion, Fort Stewart, Georgia, incorporated advanced marksmanship training, qualifications, and competitions into its predeployment training plan. One of the top priorities for the company commander, Captain Heather R. Bilicki, and company first sergeant, First Sergeant Nicholas A. Barker, is weapon readiness and proficiency. The company hosted a combat style M4 and M9 EIC Level 1 match, in which approximately 100 Soldiers in each category competed for a spot in the top 10 percent to earn the coveted Bronze EIC Marksmanship Badge.

President's Hundred Tab

The courses of fire for the EIC are as follows:

- **Combat Pistol Championship.** Competitors fire 40 rounds from distances of 30 to 15 yards during four separate stages of fire. Each stage requires two magazines loaded with five rounds each. The combat EIC target, an E-type silhouette with a modified police pistol combat target, is used during all stages of fire.
- **Combat Rifle Championship.** Competitors fire 50 rounds from distances of 400 to 25 yards during four separate stages of fire. The combat EIC target is used during all stages of fire.

Tropic Enforcers who earned the bronze EIC Marksmanship Badge in October 2019 included—

- M4 rifle.
  - Staff Sergeant Amanda F. Hurley.
  - Staff Sergeant William B. Spicer.
  - Staff Sergeant Dustin A. Thomas.
  - Sergeant Jacob C. Urea.
  - Specialist Ian D. Kite.
  - Private First Class Korwin D. Ewell.
  - Private First Class Michael J. Martinez.
  - Private First Class Bradley T. Muse.
  - Private First Class Neal S. Pancholi.
- M9 pistol.
  - Captain Heather Bilicki.
  - Sergeant First Class Justin M. Thomas.
  - Staff Sergeant Evert A. Heilbronreyes.
  - Staff Sergeant Joshua B. Scoggins.
  - Staff Sergeant William B. Spicer.
  - Staff Sergeant Dustin A. Thomas.
  - Sergeant Damon M. Mayes.
  - Specialist Ian D. Kite.
  - Specialist Dennis L. Palmer.
  - Private First Class Dylan F. Tamondong.

Soldiers continue to accumulate credit points for placements in subsequent EIC matches and, upon accumulating 20 total points, are awarded a Silver EIC Marksmanship Badge for the discipline in which points were earned. Soldiers receive the Distinguished Pistol Shot or Distinguished Rifleman's Badge once 30 credit points have been accumulated for the respective discipline.[3]

To maintain marksmanship proficiency, Soldiers may participate in military and civilian-sponsored small-arms marksmanship competitions and continue to earn credit toward a distinguished marksmanship badge. Soldiers competing in civilian EIC matches are allowed to earn up to a maximum of 14 points. Soldiers may participate in national Civilian Marksmanship Program matches, held annually at Camp Perry, Ohio, to earn additional points and to compete for the coveted President's Hundred Tab, authorized for official military wear in accordance with Army Regulation (AR) 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*.[4]

While the elements and spirit of competition are important, Soldiers are reminded that the Army's critical intent of marksmanship competitions is to develop skills at the entry and intermediate levels and to recognize superior skill at the highest levels—all while raising the standards of marksmanship and increasing lethality across the entire force.

The EIC custodian can be reached by telephone at (706)-545-4276 or by e-mail at <usarmy.benning.usarec.mbx.meb-amu-pao@mail.mil>.

Endnotes:

[1]William K. Emerson, *Marksmanship in the U.S. Army: A History of Medals, Shooting Programs, and Training*, University of Oklahoma Press, 2004.

[2]Army Regulation (AR) 350-66, *Small Arms Competitive Marksmanship Program*, 23 September 2019.

[3]Ibid.

[4]AR 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*, 25 May 2017.

Captain Bilicki is the commander of the 549th Military Police Company. She holds a bachelor's degree in architecture from Clemson University, South Carolina, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Pups in Prisons:
Logistical Considerations of Canine Rehabilitation Programs

By First Lieutenant Sidney L. Davis

In March 2020, an 11-year-old boy began experiencing health complications from Type I diabetes. Two days before that, he had received an assistance dog—Vizr. Trained to monitor human breath for a specific scent that is related to low or rapidly dropping blood sugar levels, Vizr took action when the boy's blood sugar began to drop to dangerous levels. Vizr found and alerted the boy's family, and family members were able to properly dispense the medication needed to return his blood sugar to safe levels.

Vizr is a 1-year-old Labrador retriever. The family acquired him from CARES Inc.®, where he was specifically trained to alert diabetic patients and their caretakers of any issues. Before attending the specialized alert training, Vizr received basic obedience training from the inmates of the Canine Care and Training Program at the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility (MWJRCF), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Inspiration for the MWJRCF program originated with a tour of the Minnesota Correctional Facility of Lino Lakes, Minnesota, during an American Correctional Associations conference. The facility had implemented a canine care and training program that modeled most others, including those of the U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas; the U.S. Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri; and the Lansing Correctional Facility, Lansing, Kansas. All of these prisons have a wing dedicated to housing dogs and trainers and cordoned outdoor space with regular access. As new trainers are added, they are moved into the trainer population and taught the necessary skills by veteran trainers. These accessibilities allow all of the programs to be self-sustaining, with minimal assistance from staff or external sources. Based on the tour of the Minnesota Correctional Facility, it was clear that canine programs should be integrated and self-sustaining and that they should result in minimal disruption to daily operations, while also providing as much community assistance as resources allow.

Research has shown that 70–86 percent of inmates who have partnered with organizations that raise dogs remain out of prison, compared to only 50 percent of those who have not been involved in a dog-related program.[1] Furthermore, about 80 percent of offender respondents noted an increase in their willingness and ability to take responsibility for their actions and 37 percent noted an increase in their level of patience.[2] Finally, the dogs' ability to provide a bridge between the inmates and guards has proven to reduce inmate-staff conflicts.[3]

Planning for the new Canine Care and Training Program at MWJRCF was conducted in two stages—development and implementation. There were two major considerations for both stages—space and funding. As with any mission, it was necessary to analyze how to best capitalize on the operational environment with limited space and how to extend the available logistical resources. As a volunteer community assistance program, it would not be possible to generate funds; therefore, any funds that might be received would be minimal.

STAGE I: Development

Based on initial program reconnaissance and fact finding, three possible courses of action (COAs) were developed. Two of those COAs relied on a partnership with a local shelter. Foster-to-rescue (COA 1) and foster-to-adopt (COA 2) were considered. COA 1 relied on the shelter to advertise and coordinate all prospective rescue possibilities for the dogs. COA 2 relied on the MWJRCF to develop an individual tax-exempt nonprofit organization to adopt the dogs itself and then to conduct all advertisement for outside adoption. Both of these COAs were dependent on inmates to train and maintain the dogs, making them attractive to potential rescuers/adopters.

COAs 1 and 2 also required advance funding from the facility to pay for all food, equipment, and upkeep. While COA 1 allowed the facility to generate revenue, it also required an immense amount of work from the staff and program administration to advertise the dogs and arrange meetings. The unit was simultaneously prioritizing Soldier development with additional schooling and training opportunities. This resulted in minimal manning for the facility, which could not absorb such a heavy workload.

COA 3—which was ultimately pursued—involved the training of service/therapy dogs. The Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Lewis Washington—the sister facility to MWJRCF—went through the existing Canine Companions for Independence® organization to obtain dogs for training. MWJRCF considered that source and two other competitors—Pooches and Pals® and CARES Inc.— analyzing what each potential partner could provide, how accessible the materials would be, how much the partnership would require from the facility, and whether the

partnership would constrain daily operations. The primary mission of the MWJRCF is the care, custody, and control of inmates; rehabilitation is a secondary mission that cannot inhibit custodial security, which requires a Soldier's full attention.

In the end, the MWJRCF decided to partner with the Concordia, Kansas-based CARES Inc.—an organization that has been providing service dogs to locations around the globe, including seven prisons across the Nation, for more than 20 years. The organization is well established, is geographically close, and possesses a wealth of knowledge to provide MWJRCF with all necessities with minimal startup costs.

STAGE II: Implementation

There are six housing units dedicated to medium- and minimum-level inmates at MWJRCF, but no inmates have been elevated to a status honorable enough to allow free outdoor access. Five of the six housing units are filled, and the sixth is being dedicated to an agricultural detail. There was no spare space available for dog kennels without encroaching on detail space or the inmate cell space required by American Correctional Association standards. In addition, the space required for the dog kennels needed to have regular access (for bathroom breaks) without a security threat or a requirement for a constant staff escort that would need to leave another post.

An analysis was conducted to compare the options of—

- Utilizing the housing unit containing the agricultural detail for the dog kennels.
- Consolidating the kennels into one housing unit when space became available.
- Integrating the dogs into normal operations.

As a result of the analysis, it was determined that the dogs would be housed overnight (separate from their handlers) in the housing unit specified for the agricultural detail and retrieved in the morning. This gave way to the idea of a hybrid program for the pilot, which began on 21 June 2019.

The pilot began as a 90-day proof-of-concept trial. The MWJRCF needed to ensure that operations could proceed as normal and that the creative solutions could evolve into a sustainable program. With the dogs in the agricultural housing units, their integration into the agricultural detail made sense. Because they had already proven themselves as reliable inmates, members of the agricultural detail became the first pool of potential dog handlers. This detail was also already the group most likely to be outdoors (to tend to crops). Measures were taken to ensure that the members of the detail had no prior animal offenses, no violent offenses, and no recent disciplinary actions. Each dog was assigned a primary and an alternate handler from the agricultural detail; the handlers could switch off in the event that one was otherwise occupied or did not momentarily have outdoor access.

After the 90-day trial period, the program became cemented. Not only were operations uninterrupted, they were integrated into daily operations. The program initially received pushback from staff and inmates, but they eventually came to know and love the dogs and to take pride in seeing them successfully graduate. The MWJRCF staff took phenomenal notes on subordinate Soldier and inmate comments and concerns and used the notes to refine the program to its current state of success.

CARES Inc. staff with one of their service dogs at MWJRCF

While there were difficulties within the pilot, anecdotes like Vizr's are reminders that hard work pays off. The MWJRCF has contributed 12 dogs that were trained to standard to those in need of assistance and will continue to train at highest capacity while integrating dogs into all details within the facility.

Inmate rehabilitation has been both quantifiable and quantitative. The program incentivizes inmate participants and hopeful applicants. "It gives the inmates a purpose, and they will tell you, by far, it is one of the best jobs in the facility," Ms. Sarah Holbert of CARES Inc. said, "I have several guys that have been in it for years that have told me that it has affected the way that they parent, the way that they interact with their wives or significant others because they learn correction and praise, they learn communication skills and nurturing that maybe they didn't have before." In addition to a change of heart, inmates are also receiving hours toward a U.S. Department of Labor apprenticeship in animal handling. Dog handlers who participated in the MWJRCF pilot report that, upon release, they were able to secure employment in animal handling and training due to their experience in the program.

MWJRCF is immensely grateful to CARES Inc. for providing the means necessary for, and entrusting the facility with, the training and care of these dogs.

Endnotes:

[1]Todd Harkrader et. al., "Pound Puppies: The Rehabilitative Uses of Dogs in Correctional Facilities," *Corrections Today*, Vol. 66, No. 2, April 2004, pp. 74–79.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

First Lieutenant Davis is the executive officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 705th Military Police Battalion (Detention), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. She holds a bachelor's degree in international studies from Arcadia University, Glenside, Pennsylvania.

How ABCTs Prepare Military Police Commanders for Warfare in 2028

By Captain Tyler J. Shimandle

In the fall of 2018, U.S. Army Secretary Mark T. Esper and Chief of Staff General Mark A. Milley published an 11-page document titled *The Army Strategy*.[1] The paper outlines the strategic plan for the Army to achieve multidomain dominance by 2028. It discusses everything from building readiness and force modernization to strengthening partnerships and developing leadership. Ultimately, the Army needs to "be ready to deploy, fight, and win decisively against any near-peer adversary in a joint, multidomain, high-intensity conflict, while simultaneously deterring others and maintaining our ability to conduct irregular warfare indefinitely."[2]

The Army and even the world may look very different in 2028; and to maintain dominance, the force—including the Military Police Corps—must remain dynamic and lethal in all aspects of warfare. Almost 2 years into *The Army Strategy*, the Military Police Corps has already taken significant steps toward meeting the goals that Secretary Esper and General Milley outlined. Regionally aligned forces include military police companies that are under administrative control in Europe to support Operation Atlantic Resolve, and formations are fielding the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected, All-Terrain Vehicle as an upgrade to the previous platform, the contentious M1117 Armored Security Vehicle. The Military Police Corps is moving forward on integration and force modernization—two key aspects of preparing for 2028. However, with 8 years remaining, what else can the Military Police Corps do to ensure that its leaders are fully equipped and trained?

Year group 2012–2014 officers are currently in their company command window. Based on the average career timeline, those officers will be preparing their board files for below zone–primary zone reviews for lieutenant colonel by 2028. They need to be ready to lead military police battalions on the battlefield in support of joint and multinational large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The best way to ensure that these leaders are ready to meet these challenges is to direct company commanders to armored brigade combat teams (ABCTs) to serve as brigade provost marshals. ABCTs provide military police officers with first-hand experience with rigorous logistical operations, multinational and joint service interoperability, and LSCO, which are all necessary to win the Nation's future wars.

When junior officers and their mentors discuss professional development, brigade provost marshal assignments are often overlooked or undervalued. Department of the Army (DA) Pamplet (Pam) 600-3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, states that the brigade provost marshal is a post-key developmental broadening assignment,[3] however, captains rarely fill these post-key developmental positions, which is not only an injustice to brigade combat teams but also (even more so) to future battalion and brigade commanders. Lieutenants, who typically fill these positions, do not have the knowledge or experience necessary to provide the level of analysis and expertise required to advise brigade commanders. As a result, they are underutilized and they often leave the unit with a negative experience. However, there is plenty of knowledge to be gained from this experience—especially in the case of post-key developmental captains. For example, junior officers serving as brigade provost marshals gain invaluable knowledge, especially in an ABCT, through involvement in one of the most rigorous logistical operations that the Army regularly conducts—rotating ABCTs to the eastern reaches of the U.S. European Command theater.

U.S. Soldiers participate with Polish soldiers in Operation Combined Resolve XIII in Hohenfels, Germany.

Deployment on a rotation to Europe in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve involves moving an entire ABCT across thousands of miles of air, sea, and land. Mobilizing

an ABCT is no small task. An operation of that magnitude takes a tremendous amount of planning, coordination, and battle tracking. Stryker brigade combat teams and infantry brigade combat teams currently do not deploy on similar rotations, nor are they as logistically complex as an ABCT. As the Army continues to train for encounters with near-peer adversaries—and with the next major conflict likely to involve multiple divisions fighting on foreign soil—future leaders of every branch benefit from taking part in the mobilization of an ABCT for a 9-month rotation.

An M1 Abrams tank during Operation Combined Resolve XIII in Hohenfels.

Brigade provost marshals play a relatively small but important role in the logistical planning, coordination, and battle tracking for the movement of an ABCT. Commanders look to provost marshals as the subject matter experts on physical security, expecting them to advise all echelons on securing arms, ammunition, and other sensitive items. Provost marshals plan and advise units on port security and customs operations—both essential operations during Operation Atlantic Resolve rotations. While currently the responsibility of 21st Theater Sustainment Command, in an actual conflict, the provost marshal would be responsible for coordinating convoy security, traffic control, and other host nation support as units road marched across country borders. The experience gained by provost marshals when supporting the logistics of an Operation Atlantic Resolve rotation will prove valuable if and when the time comes to rapidly mobilize large numbers of maneuver formations.

Another benefit for military police leaders serving in an ABCT relates to 9-month rotational deployments to Europe, Korea, and Kuwait. Unless previously stationed overseas, these rotations typically represent the first time that junior officers experience interoperability with allied partners. According to Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01, *Allied Joint Doctrine*, interoperability or "the effectiveness of forces . . . to operate together coherently, effectively, and efficiently" is broken down into three distinct categories: First, technical interoperability focuses on mission command and logistics management (Can my American radio talk to your Polish radio?); next, procedural interoperability focuses on doctrine and procedures from the national to tactical level (Does the Italian battery attached to my unit understand our ground and air clearance procedures?); lastly, human interoperability focuses on human behaviors including relationships, liaisons, and language skills (How effectively can an American Soldier brief a Korean soldier?).[4] Understanding and experience in each category will be essential when fighting alongside multinational partners in the future.

The Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) Program, which began during the Korean War, is a perfect example of how interoperability set United Nations forces up for success. This means of integration, which remains in place today, was essential to military police operations during the war. A common North Korean tactic involved pushing thousands of South Korean refugees toward United Nations defenses prior to an attack. While trying to filter the wave of refugees, military police were so overworked that it was " . . . not uncommon for a team of four [military police Soldiers] to have to deal with hundreds of refugees at a time."[5] KATUSA personnel arrived in military police units and immediately bridged the language barrier and were " . . . extremely adept at differentiating between North and South Koreans."[6] This prevented North Korean guerrillas and spies from sneaking through United Nation lines and, ultimately, proved instrumental in pushing North Korean soldiers back across the 38th Parallel. Today, ABCTs offer provost marshals similar opportunities to work with multinational partners from around the world in exercises like Combined Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian.

Another reason that military police captains should strive to go to an ABCT is to gain first-hand experience at fighting in LSCO. The Military Police Regiment Commandant, Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre, highlighted this necessity last spring when he wrote, "The mission of the Military Police Corps Regiment is now—and will be in the future—to enable movement and maneuver through the continuum of [multidomain operations], specifically in the execution of LSCO in a complex and challenging environment."[7] Provost marshals work in the tactical operations center during field training exercises and combat training center rotations and provide protection expertise to planners, subordinate battalions, and the brigade commander. Military police battalion/brigade commanders of 2028 will rely heavily on these experiences when the time comes to enable freedom of movement for combat arms units in LSCO. ABCTs provide the unique opportunity and challenge to gain those experiences early in an officer's career.

(Continued on page 26)

Imaging and Virtual Realization Technology: The Future of Military Police Intelligence and Training

By Staff Sergeant Shaelyn N. Turk

The U.S. Army Military Police Corps has traditionally measured the scenes of serious and fatal traffic accidents through a long and arduous manual process. Traffic investigators are trained to methodically measure a traffic collision scene, but they require assistance from other traffic investigators and time on-scene to complete a thorough investigation. Issues with manually measuring a traffic collision include manpower, time, and potential follow-on accidents or pedestrian strikes. The FARO® system, currently used by the Traffic Section, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is a 3D imaging and virtual realization technology that allows the user to scan a scene within minutes—and the images produced are more accurate than manual sketches or photographs. The technology not only mitigates the identified concerns, but also increases the quality, accuracy, and professionalism of the scene recreation and the associated report.

The Fort Bragg Traffic Section implemented imaging technology of accident scenes in 2018. In the past year, it has scanned more than 10 fatal traffic accidents. Prior to the implementation of the new technology, the Traffic Section recalled investigators for fatal accidents. A minimum of three to four investigators (not including the required traffic supervisor) was required to take measurements and scribe. On-scene investigators walked through the accident scene to take measurements, sometimes unintentionally disturbing roadway evidence. Investigators typically spent more than 8 hours on-scene, working in the dangerous roadways surrounding Fort Bragg to collect the necessary measurements. There are likely hundreds of measureable factors at a traffic collision scene. Traffic investigators are human and, unfortunately, can potentially miss—or inaccurately record—a measurement; and once they leave the scene, they cannot return to measure what they missed. They are trained to take measurements within a 3-inch range of error.

The imaging technology vastly improves traffic accident investigations by saving time and allowing for more measurements than would be possible for any individual, regardless of training or credentials. The technology can be operated by one trained traffic investigator, and millions of measureable factors can be scanned within an hour, thus reducing manpower and time on-scene while mitigating potential follow-on accidents and improving investigator safety. This technology can be used to scan a large, fatal traffic collision scene in less than half the time required for personnel to complete manual measurements. The imaging technology also allows for more accuracy than a trained traffic accident investigator can provide, with an error range of only 0.004 inch, which renders potential human error a problem of the past. The primary goal of traffic investigators is to provide a quality, detailed investigation and ensure safety on the roadways. Keeping a highly trafficked roadway closed for more than 8 hours would likely cause follow-on accidents, potential strikes to on-scene investigators, and road rage incidents.

Other specialized policing sections within the Military Police Corps could also benefit from the imaging technology. Special response teams could use the technology to scan multiple high-risk buildings and use the virtual realization technology to conduct room-clearing training. This would assist special response teams in preparing for potential threats (active shooters, hostage situations, barricaded subjects) on installations and allow them to plan and train on routes and entrances and exits to all installation buildings. Room-clearing training that is available in the field is incomparable to the training that can be provided by this technology. Virtual-realization technology allows special response teams to feel as though they are actually in a building without disturbing normal activity. It also allows the identification of potential blind and hazardous spots so that special response teams can be better prepared for threats, greatly improving the overall safety of the installation.

The possibilities for imaging technology are nearly limitless. Military police investigators could use this technology for cases such as domestic disturbances, assaults, attempted suicides, and child abuse or neglect. The technology allows investigators to simultaneously scan a scene and talk to witnesses, reducing the time on-scene. This also allows them to acquire a strong visual record of such things as the conditions of a house, the pattern of a blood splatter, or a bullet trajectory, improving the quality of evidence. The technology software allows for a digital copy of the records to be saved on disk and for the records to be opened with any Microsoft™ program, allowing other agencies such as Family advocacy or social services agencies to view the condition of a home involving a child neglect case. The imaging technology can also be used as evidence in court.

The FARO system

FARO technology training for the standard operator is a 40-hour course that is held over a period of 3 days and is taught by a trained FARO employee. Operators learn about the handling, set-up, and operation of the FARO system. The training includes implementation in buildings and outdoors, the proper use of angles and positions necessary for scanning, and the quality settings. It also covers how to operate the FARO software to recreate a scene, measure within a scene, label and/or mark evidence, operate the virtual reality technology in conjuction with a scene, and save a scene for evidentiary value. Additional training that covers the use of FARO technology for forensics is available over a span of 5 days; once the training is completed, Soldiers receive certification that can be applicable in the civilian sector.

The imaging software provides an accurate representation of the scanned scene, offering the opportunity to view the scene days, months, or even years later—just as if it were being viewed at the exact moment of the incident. The virtual realization software allows individuals to "walk-through" the scene and see every fine detail as if they are actually at the scene. This type of technology will improve all aspects of training and police work within the Military Police Corps.

Staff Sergeant Turk is the noncommissioned officer in charge of the Traffic Section, 42d Military Police Detachment, 503d Military Police Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

("How ABCTs Prepare . . . ," continued from page 24)

Additionally, military police officers experience working with joint forces and in multidomain operations while serving as provost marshals. The U.S. Air Force supports ABCTs through the augmentation of tactical air control parties, which provide fixed-wing close air support. Organic brigade aviation officers and attached combat aviation brigade units work together with provost marshals in the brigade tactical operations center, providing support to movement and maneuver. Working alongside both entities exposes provost marshals to combat and support operations in the air domain, which will be essential in future conflicts. ABCTs also have organic cyber and electromagnetic assets. While now relatively adolescent, by 2028, the cyber domain will be an integral aspect of LSCO and leaders across all branches will need to be well-versed in its capabilities and limitations. Serving and training with these joint and multidomain partners will give military police leaders a more comprehensive understanding of future battlefields.

ABCTs are the only formations that offer military police officers the chance to participate in extremely rigorous deployment and logistical operations, work alongside multinational and joint partners, and train for future LSCO. As the Military Police Corps continues to train and equip Soldiers with enhanced capabilities, it is important to remember that the commanders of tomorrow must be prepared to meet the challenges of 2028. *The Army Strategy* outlines a requirement for the entire Army to progress in order to maintain dominance, and the Military Police Corps will play an essential role in that dominance. However, only through a career of training and operating within maneuver formations can military police leaders be ready to effectively support LSCO in the next war.

Endnotes:

[1]Mark A. Milley and Mark T. Esper, *The Army Strategy*, 2018, <https://www.army.mil/e2/downlaods/rv7/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf>, accessed on 9 July 2020.

[2]Ibid.

[3]DA Pam 600–3, *Commissioned Officer Professional Development and Career Management*, 3 December 2014.

[4]AJP-01, *Allied Joint Doctine*, Edition E, Version 1, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 2017.

[5]Ronney Z. Miller, "Enhancing Operational Mobility: Refugee Control and Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Operations During the Korean War," *Historical Case Studies of Mobility Operations in LSCO—Into the Breach*, p. 155.

[6]Ibid., p. 156.

[7]Brian R Bisacre, "Building the Military Police Regiment of 2028 and Beyond," *Military Police,* Spring 2020, p.2.

Captain Shimandle is the brigade provost marshal, 2d ABCT, 1st Cavalry Division. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania, and a master's degree in business and organization security management from Webster University.

Testing the Combat Military Police Battalion Concept in Simulated LSCO

By Major Russell (Russ) B. Smith, Captain Kayla G. Hodges, and First Lieutenant Mark W. D'Angelo

Exercise Bayonet Focus was the culminating training event for the 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2d Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord (JBLM), Washington, prior to deployment to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California. The exercise replicated large-scale combat operations (LSCO), challenging the SBCT with a near-peer adversary in a complex hybrid threat environment. The exercise provided a great scenario for the U.S. Army Military Police Regiment to test its conceptual combat military police battalion. To do this, military police organizations across JBLM provided a battalion command cell, a combat support military police company with integrated internment/resettlement specialists, a military working dog (MWD) team, and a criminal investigation division (CID) team. Bayonet Focus created the opportunity to identify key lessons and recognize knowledge, training, and resourcing gaps in the brigade.

Prior to deploying forces for the exercise, military police senior leaders across JBLM undertook a strategic communications campaign. The target of this campaign was the leadership across the 23d Brigade Engineer Battalion, the 1st SBCT, and the 7th Infantry Division. The purpose of the campaign was to inform leaders of these organizations about what capabilities were resident in the new combat military police battalion and what they could expect during the exercise. In addition to these external strategic communications, there was also an internal campaign targeting military police leaders. This campaign was designed to inform military police leaders about what the other elements (CID, MWD) could contribute.

The battalion command cell consisted of a major with combat support military police experience and a CID special agent with investigative experience, who embedded with the 7th Infantry Division staff early in the planning process, participating on all operational planning teams and in all conferences. During this phase, the command cell made decisions on using CID—with input from the chief warrant officer four—and MWD teams, as well as using the military police company. Additionally—and most importantly—the cell acted as a division staff advocate for military police equities. Given that 1st SBCT was the focus of the exercise, finding opportunities to test the military police concept required a



A CID team conducts an investigation into a suspected war crime.

member of the cell to attend all master scenario event list working groups and exercise inject meetings and participate in other ad hoc meetings.

Early in the planning process, it became apparent that planners at both the division and SBCT levels were unfamiliar with military police capabilities. The cell spent significant time identifying the contributions provided by each of the various military police assets participating in the exercise. Despite the presence of military police-specific training objectives/scenarios on the master scenario event list, it became clear from the beginning that observer/controller/trainers were removing non-brigade combat team-centric scenarios to meet SBCT requirements. When this occurred, the battalion command cell worked within the master scenario event list working group or participated in other meetings to ensure the achievement of military police-specific training objectives. On multiple occasions, the major and chief warrant officer four were required to construct scenarios on the periphery of the main SBCT actions. On these occasions, the cell coordinated directly with the brigade provost marshal (PM) to relay what was to occur.

Prior to moving into the "Box" at the National Training Center, the SBCT placed its assigned PM, a first lieutenant, into the division headquarters as the liaison officer. This move created a problem for exercising the new combat military police battalion concept, given the key role that the brigade PM would play in ensuring that military police injects were executed. Fortunately, the military police battalion sent an additional captain to participate in the exercise and to mentor the brigade PM. Rather than serving as a mentor, the captain replaced the PM. This was beneficial for the battalion command cell, as it helped to ensure that military police injects were properly timed and executed. Unfortunately, the position was underutilized on the SBCT staff, despite the officer's best efforts. As the new military police concept matures, leaders must focus on reemphasizing the importance of the brigade PM.

The 571st Military Police Company plans for a route security mission.

An MWD team conducts training during Exercise Bayonet Focus.

From the outset of the exercise, the combat support military police company received a myriad of unplanned tasks. One of the first tasks was to provide route signing for the SBCT as it moved from its initial staging bases on JBLM to the Yakima Training Center, Washington. This task posed a problem since the company modified table of organization and equipment no longer contains route-signing kits. The unit improvised, creating hasty route-signing kits using a combination of spray paint and VS17 panels. As the Army continues to shift to LSCO, route signing is something that a new military police battalion can expect to support.

In addition to route signing, the company was also tasked with providing multiple checkpoints along the SBCT routes. Given the large area of operations for the SBCT, the main supply routes, and the alternate supply routes, the company quickly faced a personnel shortage. The observer/controller/trainers noted that the company had dedicated multiple military police teams per checkpoint, as would be done in contemporary operations. This provided a key lesson learned for the company—future checkpoints may need to be operated by one military police team.

While conducting checkpoint operations, the embedded MWD team provided the military police company with a detection capability that is not normally present. Neither the division nor the SBCT were familiar with how to properly employ or resource the MWD team. Because these echelons

were unfamiliar with how to employ the team, the company conducted multiple internal explosive detection lanes to ensure that training requirements were met. While meeting the resource requirements for the MWD team was not a challenge during Bayonet Focus, it could be in other exercises. In the future, consideration must be paid to the weather. Bayonet Focus took place in temperatures ranging from 32 to 50°F. Keeping the canines warm was not an issue because the sleeping tents contain heaters; however, if the exercise were to be conducted in warmer temperatures, the issue of keeping the canines cool would need to be addressed since the company does not have dedicated air conditioners. In addition to weather considerations, veterinary support must be considered. During Bayonet Focus, veterinarian support was provided by an existing contract with the Yakima Training Center. This was the most cost-effective and timely means of obtaining veterinary support for the particular situation. If multiple MWD teams are involved in an exercise, it may be possible to obtain Army veterinarian support.

The training exercise for the internment/resettlement specialists was a challenge. The military police company had one internment/resettlement specialist per platoon and one representative in the operations cell. There were multiple injects in which the SBCT acquired detainees; however, the detainees never made it back to the detention control points or detainee holding areas. There were a myriad of reasons for this—the first of which was a minimal number of role players and opposing forces in conjunction with the need to conduct other operations. The second was the logistical and transportation burdens placed on the SBCT to secure the detainees that ultimately would have taken resources away from other key training objectives that were required.

Two months prior to the beginning of the exercise, a great deal of effort and many assets were dedicated to providing logistical security to all elements deploying for the exercise. Special agents from the JBLM CID battalion coordinated with, and conducted assessments of, the Port of Tacoma and assessed all primary and alternate routes to the Yakima Training Center. The results of the assessments were provided to the G-4 movement working group, and they helped to build a common operating picture for the division.

Before the SBCT moved into the Box, one CID team embedded with the combat military police company. To ensure that the team did not pose undue stress for the company, the team was augmented with a mechanic and 2 days of field craft instruction prior to deployment. The mechanic drove and maintained the team Humvee® and trailer and provided general maintenance support. The block of field craft instruction covered how to load, fill, and communicate with a tactical radio; erect a tent; and maintain the Humvee and trailer.

The CID team training exercise was challenging. At the tactical level, the team was often left out of military police company planning, such as planning for detainee operations—finding out about operations only after they had occurred. For future exercises, it is paramount that these elements be included in daily battle rhythm events. When there were CID-specific training exercises, such as a "suspected war crimes" lane, movement and execution by the military police company and CID team went extremely well. While conducting CID lanes, the team reassessed the field investigative equipment, realizing the need to add items such as those offering mobile forensic exploitation capabilities. Such capabilities, including the capability to rapidly exploit cell phones, help feed the tactical and operational intelligence pictures.

At the operational level, the battalion command cell struggled with how to provide police intelligence to the division intelligence/targeting cycle(s). While working through this issue, the battalion command cell discovered that CID struggled with differentiating between law of armed conflict and rule of law requirements. It is critically important to distinguish the role of CID from that of counterintelligence, working to make these two niche capabilities complement, rather than compete. It was absolutely clear from the exercise that providing the intelligence cycle with police intelligence is a key niche of CID agents. As the Military Police Regiment continues to develop the combat military police battalion, it must clearly define how police intelligence is provided to the division intelligence cycles.

Exercise Bayonet Focus provided a unique opportunity to test the new combat military police battalion concept and identify key lessons learned; however, more experimentation must be conducted to fully develop the concept. Despite the struggles faced during the exercise, the unity of military police capabilities at echelon was well received by 1st SBCT and 7th Infantry Division senior leaders.

Major Smith is the battalion operations officer for the 22d Military Police Battalion (CID), Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He holds a bachelor's degree in geography from Georgia Southern University and multiple master's degrees. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps University and the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Captain Hodges is the commander of the 571st Military Police Company, Joint Base Lewis-McChord. She holds a bachelor's degree in international relations from the U.S. Military Academy—West Point, New York.

First Lieutenant D'Angelo is the former executive officer of the 571st Military Police Company, Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He is currently the executive officer of the 44th Military Police Detachment (CID), Joint Base Lewis-McChord. He holds a bachelor's degree in political science from Auburn University, Alabama.

Excellence Always: Using Twitter to Dominate the Information Domain

By Sergeant Major Michael A Vaughn

The 787th Military Police Battalion, 14th Military Police Brigade, is leading the charge in dominating the information domain at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, and within the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. This came about shortly after Major General Donna W. Martin, then Commanding General, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence; Brigadier General Brian R. Bisacre, then 50th Commandant, U.S Army Military Police School (USAMPS) and Chief of the Military Police Corps; and Colonel Robert R. Arnold, Commander, 14th Military Police Brigade, challenged their subordinate units on Fort Leonard Wood to dominate the information domain.

"Social media helps us capture moments in time through pictures and video to showcase our trainees' transformation from civilian to warrior as they overcome emotional and physical challenges and build their resiliency."

As part of the information campaign, the 787th Military Police Battalion focused on making Twitter® the primary social media outlet for command information to Soldiers, Army civilians, and Family members. Initially, there was reluctance toward expanding social media outreach due to potentially negative perceptions that could result from the required modifications to training and the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) control measures that have been implemented. However, given battalion level information training, coupled with command support, the tremendous benefits of dominating social media were quickly recognized.

Time spent in initial-entry training is challenging for trainees and commanders alike. It is a time when trainees' connections to the outside world are limited and a time for commanders to reassure concerned Families that their trainees are doing well. In a generation of technological advances and communication conveniences, basic training generally presents the first test of social media disconnection between trainee and Family. The 787th Military Police Battalion actively balances generating the Army force with using social media platforms to positively communicate Soldiers' messages.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank W. Jennings, commander of the 787th Military Police Battalion, set the pace by saying, "Last night, I set up a Twitter account, and I want subordinate leaders to do the same; we need to tell our story."[1] Sergeant Major Michael A. Vaughn, 787th Military Police Battalion sergeant major, joined the campaign, stating, "My goal was to post two pictures a day that showcase our cadre and trainees who were staying on top of social distancing challenges."[2] What started with a photograph and post of a Company A drill sergeant wearing a facemask, was taken to the next level when Captain Gregory A. Miller, the Company A commander, jumped on board.

Captain Miller said, "Our aspiring military police professionals come to us for a variety of reasons. Whatever the case, their force of choice was the Military Police Corps. Some seek [Regular Army] service as a full-time occupation, and others affirm devotion to the U.S. Army Reserve or National Guard. Some are drawn to travel the world and answer our Nation's calling wherever they may be sent. They come to us ready to take advantage of all the great educational benefits the Army has to offer. Many, if not all, come to us seeking career skills they can receive to set themselves up for future successes in the civilian workforce. Every Soldier is unique, and we are privileged to share their story."[3]

Company A quickly caught the Twitter "bug," and multiple posts updating fellow Soldiers, trainees, and Family members about unit training events were made per day. Before the end of the first week, Captain Miller had caught the attention of some notable Tweeters such as Major General Martin; Brigadier General Bisacre; Command Sergeant Major James W. Breckenridge, Maneuver Support Center of Excellence; and Mr. Dave Overson, Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. Mr. Overson provided Captain Miller, as the newest member of the "Twitter sphere," with some encouragement, advice, and information about Twitter etiquette. He said, "Share your knowledge. It doesn't matter who it is; if you can help a team member out, you do it. I just love what I see you guys doing! It is rare! You have grasped the exact tone we are looking

(Continued on page 33)

Pest Problems: Treatment and Prevention of Heartworm Infections in MWD at Fort Polk

By Captain Gina Cipolla-Canella and Captain Perianne Duffy

Heartworm disease is caused by the filarial organism, *Dirofilaria immitis*. Heartworms are very serious and contagious pathogens that infect the heart, lungs, and bloodstreams of many types of domestic mammals (with dogs being the most prevalent) and wild animals such as foxes, wolves, and coyotes. The infection can be transmitted to humans, but there are no reports of such infections becoming patent. Heartworm disease is transmitted from animal to animal by mosquitoes, with at least 70 species of mosquitoes capable of serving as potential intermediate hosts. Heartworms implant, mature, and multiply within their host, often resulting in hundreds of worms in the heart, lungs, and bloodstream of the infected animal. Heartworm larvae, called microfilaria, live throughout an infected animal's circulatory system and are passed to other animals when a mosquito bites the infected animal and transmits the larvae into a healthy animal. Once in the new host, heartworms can live up to 7 years; from there, they can infect countless other pets and wild animals if left untreated.[1]

Although diagnoses vary from year to year, an estimated 1 million dogs are, on average, annually diagnosed with heartworm disease in the United States alone. Heartworms have been found in all 50 states, however; they are most prevalent in Texas and the Mississippi Delta Region—the area between the Mississippi and Yazoo Rivers.[3]



Areas in the United States where heartworms have been most prevalent[2]

Fort Polk Diagnosis

The first diagnosis of heartworm disease for the 50th Military Working Dog (MWD) Detachment, 519th Military Police Battalion, Fort Polk, Louisiana, occurred in February 2019, when MWD Rony 7 tested positive for heartworm disease while being treated for unrelated intestinal issues while at the Holland MWD Hospital at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. All other MWDs housed in the kennels at the 50th were then tested on 28 February 2019, and all deployed MWDs were tested shortly thereafter. Of the 14 MWDs assigned to the kennels at the 50th at that time, two other MWDs—Devo and Igor—also tested positive for heartworm disease. However, the heartworm test detects only the antigen of adult female worms and it takes heartworm larvae 4–6 months to reach that life cycle stage. Therefore, heartworm infections can go undetected until the next annual examination or until a dog demonstrates symptoms.

Three MWDs—Bronco, Frenky, and Igor—were deployed when the initial heartworm testing was conducted in February 2019. Bronco and Frenky were tested during their respective redeployment physicals in March 2019 and were not infected. Igor, who had been deployed overseas for less than 2 months, received positive results. Upon receipt of the diagnosis, Igor was immediately sent back to Fort Polk for treatment.

Upon further examination of Devo's medical records, a peculiarity was discovered. Veterinarians determined that although the results of a previous, 10 December 2018 in-house heartworm antigen test performed upon his redeployment from a 9-month tour to U.S. Southern Command in November 2018 were negative, the results of the 13 December 2018 test that were sent to the laboratory were positive. The positive laboratory test results had somehow been missed in advance of Devo's subsequent 28 February 2019 test. Additionally, false negative results from in-house testing of Igor and Rony 7 in October and November 2018 were overlooked.

Current Prevention Practices

Heartworm prevention practices in the 50th MWD Detachment involve a monthly "spot day" for each MWD. One day each month, the veterinarian or the designated Military Occupation Specialty (MOS) 68T–Animal Care Specialist weighs each MWD, administers a monthly Heartgard® chewable pill preventative, and applies Advantix® topical flea and tick medication. Unfortunately, with the limited availability of veterinarians, it is the responsibility of the handler to administer the monthly preventative medication in deployed regions. During the round of infections associated with Fort Polk in 2019, all four deployed MWD handlers confirmed that they had administered the medication to their MWDs each month. In addition to the monthly preventative treatments, all MWDs are tested annually for heartworm disease.

Due to the three previous false negative heartworm tests, the Fort Polk Veterinary Treatment Facility made a change and now utilizes the SNAP 4DX Test©, which checks for heartworm antigen, Ehrlichia antibody, Lyme antibody, and anaplasma antibody. In addition, veterinarians also examine blood smears under a microscope to identify any microfilaria. Devo's blood sample was the only one that contained microfilaria detectable under a microscope.

To help prevent the presence of mosquitoes at Fort Polk, a paved parking lot was constructed. This has prevented the formation of puddles of standing water right next to the MWD kennels, which in turn, has prevented large numbers of mosquito eggs from hatching directly adjacent to the kennels.

Current Treatment

Since the diagnoses of heartworm disease in MWDs associated with the 50th MWD Detachment, personnel in MOS 64A–Veterinarian, MOS 64F–Clinical Specialist, and the Department of Public Works (DPW) have made an effort to curb the infection from spreading. DPW and local entomologists conducted aggressive fogging in the wooded area lining the eastern and southern edges of the kennels. In addition, DPW has emplaced heavy doses of an insecticide called a mosquito torpedo in rain puddles around the kennels and in other nearby standing water to kill any mosquito eggs.

All three heartworm-positive MWDs—Rony 7, Devo, and Igor—completed treatment with doxycycline, an oral antibiotic that is administered twice daily for 4 weeks. They each also received an oral steroid, prednisone, tapered over 3 weeks. They then received three injections of melarsomine, with the first injection given 28 days after the last dose of doxycycline and the second and third injections administered on consecutive days, beginning 28 days after the first injections. Devo and Rony 7 received their first injection of melarsomine in May 2019 and their second and third injections in June 2019.

Once diagnosed with heartworm disease, MWDs are placed on exercise restriction. They are retested 4 months after the last melarsomine injection, and they continue the rest period until they receive a negative heartworm test result. During the rest period, the MWDs are placed on Category III status, meaning that they are nondeployable.

As the MWDs were undergoing treatment, the 50th increased the frequency of blood testing for heartworms in all MWDs from once a year to once every 6 months.

Long-Term Prevention and Treatment

The first step in better protecting MWDs from the deadly heartworm disease is to change preventative measures. The Fort Polk MWDs started receiving ProHeart® injections along with the monthly Heartgard® chewable pills administered during the monthly "spot day" treatments. ProHeart is an injectable heartworm preventative that provides greater coverage to the MWDs and works longer than Heartgard so that it only needs to be administered twice a year—not once every month. By adding ProHeart to the preventative measures, MWDs are more securely protected than with Heartgard alone and are at less risk for lapses in treatment. In addition, the MWDs at Fort Polk (as well as at Barksdale Air Force Base and in New Orleans) no longer receive the K9 Advantix® topical flea and tick preventative; instead they receive Vectra 3D®, a topical medication that also repels mosquitoes.

The severity of heartworm infections at the 50th MWD Detachment could be linked to the unique design of the kennels, which include a training area, a paved parking lot, an office building, and the dog runs, where each MWD sleeps, eats, and rests when not in training. The peculiarity of the Fort Polk kennel is that the runs are completely outdoors. They are constructed of cement floors and cement inner walls; however, the outer wall and ceiling of each run consist of chain-link fencing. There is an all-encompassing roof that links all of the runs and the office building.

Aside from a screen attached to the outer wall, the MWDs are completely exposed to the elements year-round and to mosquitoes for almost 6 months of the year. A quick and inexpensive option that could be considered for enclosing the kennels is to completely cover each run with netting. The disadvantages of this option are that gaps would need to be left around each door and along the outer wall to accommodate cleaning and that the netting would not protect the MWDs from the seasonal elements. The best long-term option would be to partially enclose the kennels by dividing the runs into indoor and outdoor spaces. With the help of DPW and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a total of $250,000 has been committed to structural upgrades of the kennel, with the intent that the study, initial design build, and proposal be submitted by 3d quarter, fiscal year 2020, and that the final concept be approved by 4th quarter, fiscal year 2020.

Army Complications

While in treatment and under exercise restriction, the certification and deployability rate of the 50th MWDs dramatically decreased. The Army spends approximately $280,000 on each MWD, which includes the cost of training

Inside a kennel run

the handler. For each MWD that becomes infected with heartworms, the Army loses training time, certifications, deployments, and the overall lethality of its MWD Program.[4]

Commanders, kennel masters, and handlers of the Military Police Corps need to pay close attention to heartworm prevention practices. Not only do heartworm infections result in significant medical expenses and lost training hours, but they also deplete the Army's ability to employ much-needed explosive and narcotic MWDs to deployed units, ultimately denying an additional layer of protection to deployed Soldiers around the world.

Since beginning the heartworm study in February 2019, MWD Rony 7 passed away due to complications of cancerous tumors and Devo and Igor have both been adopted. MWD Igor was adopted by his handler at Fort Polk. Thanks to the nonprofit organization, Mission K9 Rescue©, Devo was transported to Missouri to his new forever home with his previous handler.

Endnotes:

[1]"Heartworm Prevention for Dogs," *American Heartworm Society*, 2018, <https://www.heartwormsociety.org/pet-owner-resources/heartworm-prevention-for-dogs>, accessed on 13 May 2020.

[2]"Assessment of Factors Contributing to Health Outcomes in the Eight States of the Mississippi Delta Region," *Centers for Disease Control*, 3 March 2016, <https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2016/15_0440.htm>, accessed on 22 June 2020.

[3]"Heartworm Basics," *American Heartworm Society*, 2018, <https://www.heartwormsociety.org/pet-owner-resources/heartworm-basics>, accessed on 13 May 2020.

[4]Kyle Stock, "The Dogs of War are in High Demand," *Bloomberg*, 28 August 2017, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-08-28/military-dogs-are-becoming-an-increasingly-precious-weapon>, accessed on 13 May 2020.

Captain Cipolla-Canella is the officer in charge at the Fort Polk Veterinary Treatment Facility. She holds a bachelor's degree in fine arts from Bowling Green State University, Ohio, and a doctor of veterinary medicine degree from Western University of Health Sciences, Pomona, California.

Captain Duffy is the commander of the 91st Military Police Detachment. She holds a bachelor's degree in German from the University of Missouri, Kansas City, and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

("Excellence Always: . . . ," continued from page 30)

for, and your messaging is on point! It's all about highlighting the trainees!"[4]

Lieutenant Colonel Jennings reflected on the strategic importance that social media has in bolstering information operations, stating, "This is our battalion's opportunity to operate in the cognitive dimension and transmit a positive message to a receptive audience—fellow brothers and sisters in arms and their Families. Our goal is to positively shape our audience's perception of the environment the trainee lives in, eliminate any false perceptions of mission execution, and help our leaders make informed decisions. It is important to tell the transformative story our Soldiers are making as they embrace the U.S. Army's values. Social media helps us capture moments in time through pictures and video to showcase our trainees' transformation from civilian to warrior as they overcome emotional and physical challenges and build their resiliency. Further, this platform enables our senior leaders to see firsthand the creative thinking, innovativeness, and great initiatives our cadre are executing on the ground."[5]

Sergeant Major Vaughn added, "Twitter is a means to tell our Soldiers' story and do so through a series of hashtags and @ symbols. We have a supplemental mission to champion our successes to the Nation and provide confidence to the Families that trust us with their sons and daughters."[6]

The original Company A photograph and post, along with a passion to tell the Soldiers' stories, quickly turned into positive, rapid involvement across the 14th Military Police Brigade. The outstanding feedback received from Family members has created a positive climate that fosters success. It is a great honor for us to train the next generation of Soldiers and military police and an even greater honor for us to showcase the sons and daughters of America to their loved ones via social media. In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is now more important to develop ways to connect with Families to enhance the spiritual, mental, and emotional well-being of all those who serve and support selfless service. The battalion line of effort with Twitter and its domination of the information domain have been an enjoyable, and the 787th Military Police Battalion looks forward to future daily engagements. Praetorians, Elite Professionals, Excellence Always!

Endnotes:

[1]Frank W. Jennings, personal interview, 1 June 2020.

[2]Michael A. Vaughn, personal interview, 1 June 2020.

[3]Gregory A. Miller, personal interview, 1 May 2020.

[4]Dave Overson, personal interview, 1 May 2020.

[5]Jennings.

[6]Vaughn.

Sergeant Major Vaughn is the sergeant major of the 787th Military Police Battalion. He holds an associate's degree in criminal justice from Troy University, Alabama, and a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Purdue-Global University.

A Consequentialist Approach to Combating Terrorism

By Staff Sergeant Cory M. Brooks

"War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things. The decay and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling, which thinks that nothing is worth war, is much worse."[1]

—John Stuart Mills

It is human nature to thirst for the inalienable right to be free and equal, but the goal of the warped ideology of terrorism is to eliminate those who do not adhere to the terrorists' single and strict political or religious belief system. Terrorists generally form small political/paramilitary organizations, but they can have an outsized global reach that enables them to affect the world—especially those who enjoy the benefits of democracy and religious liberty that can paradoxically enable terrorist activity. The world must fight terrorism through the use of unconventional warfare, making guided decisions founded on the ethical reasoning models of consequentialism. Combating terrorism through the use of unconventional warfare prevents the advancement of terrorism and gives those who are oppressed a chance to regain their freedom. According to Post University's "Lessons on Consequentialism," the main point of consequential ethics is that "An action is right if it promotes the best consequences. The best consequences are those in which happiness is maximized. What is essential to note is that it forges a link between consequence and happiness."[2]

The use of consequentialist ethics works to combat the dangerous minority because eliminating the terroristic minority would benefit the will of the majority and allow adherence to the core principle of consequentialism. The methods that society must use to eliminate this threat are complex and must be handled with caution to ensure that the code of ethics contained in consequentialism is not compromised. World leaders and citizens of the free world must consider the use of money, social media, and proportional military responses to diminish the terrorists' means of driving their ideology.

Terrorism is well-funded through various mediums. One of the most prevalent ways that terrorist groups collect money is through donations. According to Eben Kaplan's 2006 investigative report, "Monetary practices embedded in Muslim culture, such as donating to charities and informal money transfer centers, have compounded the difficulty in tracking down terrorist financial links."[3] Terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria build financial resources that enable them to carry out global campaigns of violence and influence. It is imperative that a global initiative establish strict, international charity and money-laundering laws that would hold those involved responsible for contributing to terrorist activity. This proposal aligns with consequentialism because it would produce more good than harm and those who would be harmed—terrorist organizations—are part of the moral and ethical minority.

Social media is another method that terrorists use to spread their cause. Joseph Kunkle writes, "Today, terrorist groups are recruiting, inspiring, and guiding global strategies not just by Internet operations but through an organized, steady infusion of propaganda videos and call-to-action messages circulated via social media platforms such as blogs, Facebook®, YouTube®, and Twitter®."[4] Social media is available worldwide through a variety of websites and mobile platforms. Dan Rivers further explains, "Behind the shop window of Twitter and Facebook accounts are more-limited, private chat rooms, where terrorist leaders from around the world exchange information and tactics."[5] This means that the terrorists have somewhat of a "home field advantage" when it comes to recruitment because it is difficult for authorities to find those chat rooms and websites. However, if state and international law enforcement agencies (such as Interpol) were afforded a wider range of privileges through legislation and other judicial means, they could mitigate and track the source of terrorist accounts. The assumption of risk involved with this reduction in civil liberties is necessary in order to enjoy the wider freedoms afforded in a world without terrorist influence.

In addition to cutting funding for terrorism and clamping down on terrorists' social media outreach, low-intensity, proportional military actions—such as air strikes—can physically annihilate terrorists and their assets. Air strikes also take a psychological toll on terrorists because the terrorists never know what area will be targeted—or when. Even accounting for potential civilian casualties, consequentialists would consider physically keeping Soldiers off the battlefield the best outcome because it would decrease the overall loss of life by shortening enduring conflicts. Although

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

Adapting Detainee Operations to the Korean Peninsula

By First Lieutenant Daniel C. M. Kurtzahn

Throughout the Korean Peninsula, military police Soldiers of the 94th Military Police Battalion train and prepare for the possibility of renewed hostilities with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. A crucial aspect of the 94th Military Police Battalion mission is the conduct of detention operations in support of U.S. forces. The Soldiers of the U.S. Army Correctional Activity–Korea—a subordinate unit to the 94th Military Police Battalion—conduct corrections operations for all U.S. forces on the peninsula. These Soldiers are the subject matter experts on detention operations, but they represent a small minority of military police Soldiers in Korea. Of those Soldiers currently stationed in Korea, many leverage previous combat and detention experience from Iraq and Afghanistan. However, detention operations on the Korean Peninsula include an entirely new set of challenges that differ from those of previous conflicts. The 94th Military Police Battalion continues to adapt its detention operations plan, capturing lessons learned to best prepare in the event of renewed hostilities.

Military police Soldiers are more versatile today than ever before. Throughout one-station unit training, trainees are instructed on the three military police disciplines: police operations, detention operations, and security and mobility support with the integrated task of police intelligence operations.[1] By the time military police Soldiers arrive in South Korea, they already have baseline knowledge of, and experience with, each of the military police disciplines. In the event of renewed hostilities, the detention and correction specialists from the U.S. Army Correctional Activity–Korea stand ready to supplement the combat support companies in executing detention operations, providing additional subject matter experts for the rest of the peninsula. The 94th Military Police Battalion is prepared to perform chain-of-custody operations for all detainees captured by U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula.

The mission-specific requirements for the Korean Peninsula vary considerably from existing combat operations and previous detention operations recently conducted by the U.S. Army. It has been 67 years since the Army last conducted detention operations against a near-peer threat in Korea. War on the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century is expected to include large combat engagements—something that the modern Army has been pivoting toward for several years now. The Military Police Regiment must adapt existing doctrine to succeed in performing detention operations in an entirely new and austere environment. Adaptability and communication will be essential for U.S. forces to succeed on the frontlines and to practically and effectively perform detention operations.

Incorporating mobility into detention operations planning is essential in ensuring the safety of both Soldiers and detainees. According to General Mark A. Milley, the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "It will be hard for formations to hide on battlefields flooded with sensors. . . . If you stay in one place for longer than 2 or 3 hours, you will be dead."[2]

The 94th Military Police Battalion is taking deliberate steps to adapt detention operations not only to the Korean Peninsula, but also to the fundamental and significant shift in the character of war in the 21st century.[3] Continued integration with sustainment echelons will increase the efficiency and improve the sustainment of the chain of custody during contingency. The development of a detainee collection point (DCP) standard operating procedure (SOP) will result in standardized operations and provide a practical approach to conducting detainee operations in a near-peer environment. In addition to the DCP SOP, the 94th Military Police Battalion is also developing a modular DCP package that will be prepositioned at units and locations throughout the peninsula. The modular DCP package will be specifically designed for rapid employment and dismantlement. The main challenge of both endeavors is the adaptation of Field Manual (FM) 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, to the realities of contingency operations on the Korean Peninsula.[4] With each iteration of training and simulation, the DCP SOP and modular DCP package evolve into more refined products. By continuously identifying and reducing friction points, the 94th Military Police Battalion is en route to creating a comprehensive solution for detention operations on the peninsula.

Current Army doctrine and existing knowledge on detention operations are heavily biased toward the conflicts in

Iraq and Afghanistan. Field Manual (FM) 3-63 is founded on several unrealistic precepts—most notably that the U.S. military will continue to dominate the enemy in the sky and face limited enemy resistance on the ground. A conflict on the Korean Peninsula would be the first near-peer threat that the U.S. has faced in decades. While Iraq and Afghanistan continue to constitute a large percentage of military police deployments, specific efforts to adapt existing detention operations tactics, techniques, and procedures to the Korean Peninsula must be taken. The 94th Military Police Battalion continues to adapt its detention operations plan, capturing lessons learned to best prepare in the event of renewed hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.

Endnotes:

[1]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 9 April 2019.

[2]Rick Maze, "Radical Change is Coming: Gen. Mark A. Milley Not Talking About Just Tinkering Around the Edges," *AUSA*, 13 December 2016, <https://www.ausa.org/articles/radical-change-coming-gen-mark-milley>, accessed on 15 July 2020.

[3]Ibid.

[4]FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 2 January 2020.

First Lieutenant Kurtzahn is a one-station unit training platoon leader in Company A, 795th Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy—West Point, New York.

("A Consequentialist Approach . . . ," continued from page 34)

the founding principles of consequentialism are beneficial to combating terrorism, consequentialism does not entirely rule out conflict and unpredictability.

According to Post University's consequentialism PowerPoint® presentation, "Consequentialists believe that consequences are the only things that matter."[6] This presents a terrible dilemma because it leaves the results of actions taken against the terrorists open to moral relativism. To effectively and ethically combat terrorism, careful consideration must be given to bridging the moral gap between eliminating terrorism and committing the same crimes against humanity as the terrorist groups do. Consequentialism might also be counterintuitive for fighting terrorism because the results of the actions—violent or nonviolent—taken against terrorists may not be fully understood for years or even decades. Consequences resulting from even the most well-intentioned actions cannot always be anticipated.

To successfully employ consequentialism as an ethical guidepost to combating terrorism, society must work hard not to jeopardize its collective moral compass. To accomplish this, consequentialism can—and should—be blended with other ethical theories and the American values of liberty and self-determination to develop a strict code of ethics that will help assist with reinforcing our Soldiers' own personal set of values. Ultimately, society must carefully calculate the overall end result of its decisions by adhering to actions that truly impact the greater good.

Endnotes:

[1]John Stuart Mills, "The Contest in America," *Fraser's Magazine*, February 1862.

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[6]"Unit 2 Consequentialism PowerPoint."

Staff Sergeant Brooks is an operations noncommissioned officer with the 554th Military Police Company, U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart, Germany. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Post University, Waterbury, Connecticut.

"I Support Movement":

PLATOON LEADERS IN MILITARY POLICE OSUT

By First Lieutenant Alan M. Martinez

"Drill sergeants should soon have less administrative work on their hands, with 216 lieutenants to take on some of their duties as basic combat training platoon leaders."[1]

—Meghann Meyers

Introduction

The U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), announced that in the spring of 2019, platoon leaders would be integrated into basic combat training units to address the cadre-to-trainee ratio problem. Major General Malcolm B. Frost, then the Commanding General, Center for Initial Military Training, stated that the intent of the integration was to free up drill sergeants' time, allowing them to train Soldiers.[2] I was one of more than 700 lieutenants placed as platoon leaders for one-station unit training (OSUT).

This article explores the role of lieutenants in TRADOC by summarizing the job description of the military police OSUT platoon leader, describing the officer/noncommissioned officer (NCO) relationship, and providing leadership tools to develop and prepare future military police OSUT platoon leaders.

Job Description

There is no standard description of roles and responsibilities that can be applied to the unique assignment of platoon leaders to military police OSUT. Therefore, serving as a military police OSUT platoon leader provides a unique opportunity to shape roles and responsibilities around the initial TRADOC guidance to assist in maximizing drill sergeants' time with trainees. Initiative, an understanding of the TRADOC guidance, and flexibility provide an opportunity for each lieutenant to shape the organization in a different way. Since there is no "one size fits all" approach, platoon leaders may find themselves conducting more tasks for the benefit of a limited number of Soldiers (cadre members) than they would in a U.S. Army Forces Command unit.

Everything that is done within TRADOC is influenced by the basic combat training and advanced individual training programs of instruction (POI) and the phase of training. Although the POIs are prescriptive, each training cycle brings different challenges that leaders must plan for, analyze, and adjust to in order to continually improve the quality of training. An important part of being a successful leader is knowing when and where you are needed. Your ability to manage time in the office versus time out training will be put to the test.

Military police OSUT consists of five phases:[3]

- **Red phase.** The red phase is the first portion of basic combat training, and it requires the drill sergeants' undivided attention. Platoon leaders execute, track, and enforce all administrative and logistical platoon tasks during this phase. This includes counselings, NCO evaluation reports, awards, score cards, memorandums, Soldier data sheets, Power Point© presentations, and operation orders. Platoon leaders also ensure that systems and processes are established and enforced to support the command supply and discipline programs and that they are prepared to execute their additional duties throughout the training cycle. Prior to the integration of platoon leaders, all additional duties were carried out by drill sergeants, which took time away from training Soldiers.
- **White phase.** The white phase is the second portion of basic combat training, which is also known as range density training. Rifle marksmanship training is time-intensive, as it requires extensive coaching and mentoring to ensure that trainees successfully master rifle marksmanship fundamentals and learn to identify and engage targets. Platoon leaders serve as officers in charge and range safety officers, assist in processing score cards and statistics, and—alongside drill sergeants—serve as coaches. However, the primary role of the platoon leader during the white phase is to assist in alleviating drill sergeants of all additional tasks, allowing them more time to focus on safety and to teach marksmanship fundamentals. This is a great opportunity for platoon leaders to observe the effectiveness of the training program and determine areas in which the company can improve in order to better streamline efforts and achieve a 100 percent qualification rate at the completion of rifle marksmanship instruction.
- **Blue phase.** The blue phase is the last portion of basic combat training. It involves operating in a field environment. Platoon leaders plan a culminating training exercise known as the Forge, with an emphasis on control measures to ensure tactical discipline and safety. Having platoon leaders plan training events alleviates that responsibility from the drill sergeants, enabling them to focus more time on the trainees. During the Forge, all platoon leaders from across the battalion surge on one company's field training exercise, serving as squad tactical exercise lane observer/controller/trainers. This not

only allows platoon leaders to gain additional tactical proficiency and confidence in conducting field training exercises but also allows each platoon to improve its cadre-to-trainee ratio to ensure maximum learning opportunities during mission briefings, precombat checks, actions on the objective, and after action reviews. Before the implementation of the TRADOC platoon leader initiative, all of these responsibilities were placed on the shoulders of 12 drill sergeants for an average-sized company of 200-plus trainees.

- **Black phase.** The black phase is the first portion of advanced individual training. It consists of law enforcement training that is heavily influenced by the basic military police training division POI. Platoon leaders serve as officers in charge for the 9-millimeter pistol range density week and conduct after action reviews on past training events in an effort to identify lessons learned and best practices. Platoon leaders continue to conduct administrative tasks involving counselings, evaluations, awards, trainee chapter packets, commander's investigations, and medical rehabilitation for trainees, as applicable.
- **Gold phase.** The gold phase is the last portion of advanced individual training. This phase covers maneuver support operations and mounted operations. Platoon leaders plan, coordinate, and lead the execution of the culminating field training exercise, which teaches trainees about combat military police missions. Platoon leaders ensure that all planning efforts focus on how military police operate in and support large-scale combat operations.[4] They plan missions involving convoy security, route signing, route security, detainee collection points, detainee segregation and processing, and cordon and searches. During this phase, platoon leaders use their tactical and technical knowledge to serve as observer/controller/trainers to reduce the cadre-to-trainee ratio and improve the quality of training.

Officer and NCO Relationships

There were a few emergent and transitional challenges to face when I arrived at my position in TRADOC, as the concept of platoon leaders in the OSUT environment was new. Drill sergeants had been accustomed to operating independently and managing the diverse array of tasks and the high operational tempo associated with 12 cadre members transforming 200-plus civilians into Soldiers and military police within a 19-week period. Although I did not have the benefit of a predecessor forging a path in this effort, I knew that the fundamentals of leadership do not change. Junior officers are expected to review systems and practices, identify problems, and create solutions.

Prior to the TRADOC platoon leader initiative, OSUT companies were NCO-centric, with only one captain as the commander and one lieutenant as the executive officer. Many of the operational tasks were planned and executed by the drill sergeants and overseen by the company commander and first sergeant. The addition of platoon leaders in OSUT created a paradigm shift from an NCO-centric organization to an organization similar to those of the U.S. Army Forces Command. And then, as a platoon leader, it was my turn to assist in the development of 12 staff sergeants and influence their ability to more effectively transform civilians into Soldiers. As Elyssa Vandra put it in her *U.S. Army* article, "It's not about likership; it's about leadership. . . . It is the lieutenants' job to stem any inappropriate behaviors they witness."[5]

A different drill sergeant oversees movement each week. As a platoon leader, I sat down with the drill sergeant from the prior week's movement to validate the plan and confirm allocated resources for the subsequent week's movement. This process allowed for fewer single points of possible failure and strengthened the officer/NCO relationship. Most NCOs do not work directly with officers until they serve as squad leaders within U.S. Army Forces Command. Now, with platoon leaders serving in the initial-entry training environment, younger drill sergeants have the opportunity to experience the officer/NCO relationship much sooner. This better prepares them to serve as future squad leaders and platoon sergeants in the operational force.[6]

Tools and Development

Traditional U.S. Army Forces Command platoon leaders require a particular set of technical tools; TRADOC assignments encompass different challenges and require additional tools. I would have liked to have these following tools prior to my assignment as a military police OSUT platoon leader:

- **TRADOC Regulation 350-6.** TRADOC Regulation 350-6, *Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration,* governs the treatment of trainees and covers all matters encountered by platoon leaders, including the "dos and don'ts" for those in positions of trust and graduation requirements for becoming a Soldier in the U.S. Army.[7] Platoon leaders must be familiar with TRADOC Regulation 350-6, as they are ultimately responsible for ensuring that training is conducted within established guidelines. They cannot afford to be misinformed about any of the topics since part of being a leader is understanding responsibilities to trainees and cadre.[8] Platoon leaders who do not believe that the company is following TRADOC Regulation 350-6 should go to the first sergeant for guidance.
- **The POI.** The POI is important because it provides guidance for planning events and ensuring that training is conducted to standard.[9] There are extensive POI requirements for the Forge culminating field training exercise for basic combat training, and it is a great event for platoon leaders to plan since they must ensure that those requirements are met during the planning process.
- **The training management plan (TMP).** The TMP is a schedule that provides a daily outline of the training cycle. Platoon leaders should use the TMP as a time/training management tool.[10] They must use it to verify the coordination of land, ammunition, and other outside resources and then follow up at least 72 hours prior to the conduct of training since the TMP is a master document that allocates resources for all initial-entry training companies across the installation. Failure to maintain and coordinate the TMP can have significant second- and third-order effects, not only for the OSUT company but

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PLATOON LEADER INTEGRATION IN MILITARY POLICE OSUT

By First Lieutenant Bradley K. Watrous

The core mission of the Military Police one-station unit training (OSUT) company is to transform volunteer civilians into disciplined, motivated, and combat-ready military police Soldiers. These Soldiers must wholeheartedly commit to live by the Soldier's Creed, the Warrior Ethos, and the Army Values. They become crucial members of a vital team, which continuously works under stressful conditions and remains 100 percent capable of immediately contributing to successful Army operations. In order to provide trainees with real-world knowledge of warrior tasks and drills, OSUT companies must continuously adapt to changes in programs of instruction and other key guidelines. The addition of effective platoon leaders is foundational to the success of this effort within Company A, 701st Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Platoon leaders were first assigned to OSUT companies during fiscal year 2019. Platoon leaders for Company A arrived between March and August, significantly benefiting the trainees, drill sergeants, and the company as a whole. Company A platoon leaders contribute to company training events and administrative operations.

Each platoon leader must plan and create an operation order for each assigned field training exercise. Field training exercises, which follow the program of instruction guidelines, are based on realistic scenarios. They include opposing forces to test trainee knowledge on warrior tasks and drills. The intentionally diverse nature of platoon leaders, who come from various branches and commissioning sources and have differing times in Service, is beneficial due to the unique viewpoints derived from their varied backgrounds. Platoon leaders also fill crucial roles in training exercises and increase the ratio of cadre to trainees, allowing drill sergeants to concentrate more on training. Additionally, they serve both as range safety officers and as officers in charge of live-fire exercises and field training exercises, allowing drill sergeants to remain on the firing lines to focus on training and safety.

A platoon leader briefs personnel about a cordon-and-search mission.

Platoon leaders have relieved drill sergeants of signing for equipment and tracking administrative and training data (including tracking separations, transfers, and Digital Training Management System input) for their platoons. Platoon leaders also work with company operations sergeants to prepare transfer documents, enabling trainees to move to the fitness training unit, the Warrior Training and Rehabilitation Program, or another OSUT company.

The insertion of platoon leaders into the battalion provides for another level of the chain of command, allowing many issues to be resolved at the platoon level rather than the company level. This has created a noticeable decrease in the number of trainees who feel the need to take advantage of the company commander's open-door policy. Additionally, handling issues for trainees allows platoon leaders to further educate themselves on possible situations that could

A platoon leader confirms a Soldier's zero during rifle marksmanship.

arise when they become company commanders. The presence of lieutenants at the platoon level also reinforces the customs, courtesies, and general knowledge of Army rank structure. Trainees become more adept in their use of customs and courtesies when speaking to a commissioned officer. Prior to platoon leader implementation, trainees were aware of the customs and courtesies of talking with a commissioned officer, but were only provided the opportunity to practice these customs and courtesies when addressed by the company commander or executive officer. Trainees are also better able to become familiar with rank structure by realizing that platoons have both a platoon leader and a platoon sergeant.

Drill sergeants can now focus more on training. The trainees get to see the chain of command in action. Lieutenants gain first-hand experience with facets of the Army that they normally would not encounter at the entry level rank. While the integration of platoon leaders into the OSUT environment has not been without challenges, the overall impact has been positive. It has improved battalion capabilities and readiness in the areas of training and operations.

First Lieutenant Watrous is the executive officer for Company A, 701st Military Police Battalion. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Campbell University, Buies Creek, North Carolina.

(" 'I Support Movement': . . . ," continued from page 38)

The Army develops Soldiers through three training domains—institutional, operational and self-developmental.[11] An assignment as a platoon leader in TRADOC assists with the refining of institutional and operational experiences and provides lieutenants with the opportunity to understand how the training domains intertwine with and complement each other. Further, it allows platoon leaders the opportunity to begin working on their master's degrees and preparing for their attendance at the Captain's Career Course on their way to becoming company commanders and staff officers.

Conclusion

At the initial onset of the TRADOC platoon leader initiative, there was some reluctance and skepticism about the role and effectiveness of platoon leaders serving in the initial-entry training environment. However, the initiative has proven worthwhile, with many benefits to officers and NCOs. Platoon leaders have assisted in alleviating administrative burdens on drill sergeants, greatly improved the cadre-to-trainee ratio, and enabled greater-quality training.

Endnotes:

[1]Meghann Meyers, "Lieutenants, Appearing Soon at an Army Basic Training Platoon Near You," *Army Times*, 8 March 2009, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/03/08/lieutenants-appearing-soon-at-an-army-basic-training-platoon-near-you/>, accessed on 14 July 2020.

[2]Ibid.

[3]TRADOC Regulation 350-6, *Enlisted Initial Entry Training Policies and Administration*, 9 August 2019.

[4]Harrison Morgan, "How Small Units Can Prepare for Large-Scale Combat Operations," *Army Times*, 13 February 2020, <https://www.armytimes.com/2020/02/13/how-small-units-can-prepare-for-large-scale-combat-operations/>, accessed on 14 July 2020.

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[6]Michael F. Pappal, *The First 100 Days of Platoon Leadership Handbook: Lessons and Best Practices*, U.S. Army Center for Lessons Learned, May 2018.

[7]TRADOC Regulation 350-6.

[8]Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, 31 July 2019.

[9]TRADOC Regulation 350-6.

[10]ADP 7-0.

[11]Ibid.

First Lieutenant Martinez is the executive officer for Company B, 787th Military Police Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice with a minor in Spanish from Texas A&M University–Corpus Christi, and is currently pursuing a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Griffin Watch 2.0:
Planning a Brigade CTE for LSCO

By Major Jessica N. Marks and Colonel Richard J. Ball

Training for large-scale combat operations (LSCO) is an evolving challenge for the U.S. Army. Due to a hybrid threat environment, the intensity and lethality of LSCO are unforgiving for military units. As commanders identify the movement, timing, and sequencing of deploying forces to a theater, units rapidly deploy in support of combat operations. The units initially on the ground buy maneuver space and time for follow-on forces during entry operations. As the support area is established, protection is critical because the assets within the support area sustain and enable combat operations by extending operational reach for the commander. Criminal organizations with advanced technology can globally project their influence, and military units will continue to face increased levels of insider threats, acts of terrorism, cyberattacks, trafficking, and protests. Military police units must be prepared to counter these evolving threats with local authorities while enabling commanders in military operations.

Combat training center rotations test brigade combat teams, and warfighter exercises test the staffs at each echelon. The purpose of Griffin Watch 2.0 was to validate the planning priorities within a corps support area—specifically, it was to test the ability of the 89th Military Police Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, to support operations against a hybrid threat within a corps support area (CSA).

The original Griffin Watch brigade training exercise was conducted in January 2018 at Fort Bliss, Texas. Based on lessons learned from the first iteration, the brigade commander, Colonel Richard J. Ball, met with the brigade operations officer and provided initial guidance, the commander's intent, and a schematic representation of Griffin Watch 2.0. The exercise was designed to challenge subordinate units to operate in a degraded logistical environment within the CSA. The mission was to conduct expeditionary deployment, provide area security, support mobility operations, and perform detention operations to enable freedom of III Corps maneuver forces and reestablish the border of an invaded nation. Additional guidance involved live and constructive force requirements, tactical operations center displacements, wet gap-crossing activities (later modified to support the breach), fusion of role players and nongovernmental organizations (such as the International Committee of the Red Cross), platoon level live-fire exercises (LFXs), and incorporation of enablers for base defense (military working dogs, unmanned aircraft systems, logistical security) across a dispersed footprint. Planning for an early Spring 2019 exercise began in earnest; however, activation of the brigade as the homeland defense task force in support of border operations resulted in a shifting of the exercise to Spring 2020 to allow for better refinement of the training event.

Brigade staff rehearsal

Several planning factors and challenges needed to be addressed in order for the brigade culminating training event (CTE) to succeed. There is limited capability of current military police brigade modified tables of organization and equipment to provide the sustainment, communication architecture, and enabler assets necessary to execute assigned missions in and around a CSA. In order to provide units with Class I sustainment support, each battalion would need field-feeding teams with either a mobile kitchen trailer or a combat kitchen trailer. This capability would sustain the force with Class 1 resupply operations from the brigade logistics release point. Upper tactical Internet for voice and data services would be sourced using a joint network node team at the brigade tactical operations center and command post nodes embedded with the battalions provided by the 11th Theater Tactical Signal Brigade, Fort Hood. Detention operations would require military intelligence brigade and criminal investigation division (CID) group support, breach operations and holding-area construction would require

engineer brigade support, and bulk fuel requirements would require assistance from the 13th Sustainment Support Command (Expeditionary), Fort Hood. Multiple iterations of working groups, operational planning teams, and formal tasking and orders processes with various stakeholders from brigades to divisions to III Corps—along with coordination and buy-in from the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command, Quantico, Virginia, and area Army Corrections Command units—would be required.

As the task organization was established, it was designed to provide the brigade with the ability to maintain LSCO in a contested environment and even to test some of the concepts under consideration in the *United States Army Military Police Force Modernization Strategy*.[1] Various military police capabilities were structured within the task organization at different locations to provide mission command of those capabilities and the supporting enablers. According to the plan, more than 1,500 Soldiers would participate in the training event.

The subordinate military police battalions within the brigade would prepare to deploy from their home stations with one combat support company, while three additional companies per battalion would be virtually replicated for the scenario using the Fort Hood Mission Command Training Center. One battalion would serve as the opposing force, with mission direction from the white cell, which was to be comprised of brigade staff personnel. The white cell would operate independently from brigade operations, using an extensive master scenario event list with in-depth role player instructions and backgrounds. The 303d Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, would support the development and scenario refinement in addition to exercise participation for key personnel.

Task Force Justice would be comprised of detention units, including the 40th Military Police Battalion (Detention) and the 705th Military Police Battalion (Detention), both of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Task Force Justice would be tasked with operating the corps holding area (CHA). The CHA was intended to represent a facility that was capable of processing a high number of personnel from various detainee categories but was focused on testing the transfer and care of enemy prisoners of war, at rates expected for LSCO. The facility was conceptually designed with input from CID and military intelligence exercise participants, with physical construction conducted by the 36th Engineer Brigade, Fort Hood, prior to the planned exercise. Task Force Justice was to consist of assets across several warfighting functions to replicate conditions at a CHA. The 40th Military Police Battalion was to provide command and control, mission command capacity, and special-purpose detention operations personnel. The 705th Military Police Battalion was to provide the remainder of the special-purpose detention operations personnel and also assist the white cell.

The 11th Military Police Battalion (CID), Fort Hood, was to execute criminal investigation support, crime pattern analysis, and the coordination of logistics security support operations. The 303d Military Intelligence Battalion was to provide human intelligence collection and analysis capabilities. CHA was to provide the forum and opportunities required for CID and military intelligence assets not only to test their mission-essential tasks, but also to use the generated analysis in support of the corps commander's situational awareness of his area of responsibility and possible enemy intentions and to better mitigate the threats to, and requirements for, protecting the CSA.

Griffin Watch 2.0 was to be a five-phase operation that spanned a 28-day training window. The operation was to consist of—

- **Phase 1.** Deployment, reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.
- **Phase 2.** Breach operations.
- **Phase 3.** Force-on-force operations.
- **Phase 4.** LFXs.
- **Phase 5.** Redeployment, reverse reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

Each vigorous phase was to be multifaceted, requiring the thorough, deliberate orchestration of activities, training objectives, resources, and manpower for seamless execution. Command and control and mission command systems and processes were to be taxed at every echelon through simultaneous operations and geographic dispersion. Logistical coordination and support assets were critical in receiving and redeploying assets from multiple command chains and in sustainment in an austere field environment that replicated LSCO. Finally, for breach operations and LFXs, an increased amount of risk to the force was assumed, necessitating that stringent oversight and safety procedures be maintained. A collaboration of commands and staffs was required to effectively execute this symphony of fused operations.

Phase 1 was to encompass the initial deployment of all units to Fort Hood. The scenario that drove reception, staging, onward movement, and integration reflected deployment to a semimature theater 60 days after the opening of hostilities. Enemy conventional forces were to have been mostly cleared from the CSA, with some enemy special-purpose forces opposition still expected. During this phase, the battalions were to arrive in staggered intervals, while the brigade communication exercise, observer/coach/trainer (OC/T) academy, and opposition force/role player academies were to be ongoing. This critical phase would be highly rehearsed because delays in execution would have a compounding negative effect for the duration of the exercise.

Phase 2 of the operation was to direct the 93d, 97th, and 759th Military Police Battalion Task Forces to conduct breach operations and occupy their respective tactical assembly areas while Task Force Justice initiated detention operations. The battalions were to colocate with their signal, field-feeding, and engineer assets to begin the development of tactical assembly area defense using the brigade operation order as framework, but incorporating appropriate standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures for further refinement. This process was to begin

with an obstacle breach conducted by the 62d Engineer Battalion, Fort Hood, and was to be supported by identified military police forces. Each supported battalion was to conduct a breach of a wire obstacle belt covered by special-purpose forces employing direct-fire weapons systems. Following the breach, the military police battalions were to initiate area security actions within their area of responsibility, facilitating detention operations through engagements with civilians, enemy prisoners of war, and detainees, while the white cell was to start master scenario events that would move the exercise forward using bypassed enemy elements. Upon completion of Phase 2, engineers were to be remissioned to a new area of operations and military police battalions were to be tasked to Phase 3 of the exercise through the orders process.

During Phase 3 of the operation, military police battalions were to continue to respond to scenarios, but would receive a task organization change order requiring a full military police company to support a division. This scenario would drive each company to execute Phase 4, a platoon LFX.

In Phase 4, each unit LFX was to be resourced by the brigade and each military police company was to have a full day to rotate platoons through day and night fire exercises before returning to ongoing operations. Platoons were to be evaluated and certified in a complex, dynamic, mounted LFX that was built into the overall scenario and was not simply an administrative operation. The platoon would designate two defensive squads and an assault squad. The range would begin with a defensive engagement battle position and a platoon engagement of long-distance targets. Following the defensive engagement, the offensive squad would assault through the terrain occupied by the enemy and fire on the move, through the first offensive engagement area. The defensive squads were to follow and provide support. There would be a total of four defensive platoon engagements and two offensive platoon engagements for the entire range. Additional engagement tasks—such as call for fire, request medical evacuation, and initiate situation reports via joint capabilities release—were designed to focus on leaders and platoon elements working together. Each platoon was to rehearse through dry (crawl) and blank (walk) phases, demonstrating full proficiency before proceeding to the live-fire (run) phase. A safety representative was to be in each vehicle, and the OC/T was to provide mentorship for squad leaders and platoon leaders. Upon completion of the LFXs, mission change was to occur, directing redeployment operations to a staging area, transitioning units into the final phase of the operation.

Phase 5 was to encompass the redeployment of all units from Fort Hood to their home station installations. Building from the mid-exercise after action review, a full after action review was to be executed with all units and leadership in the staging area, while redeployment operations continued. Battalions were to be redeployed on predetermined staggered intervals to avoid overlap. The brigade staff was to place additional emphasis and effort on redeployment in order move units back to their home stations in an orderly and efficient manner. Major friction points were to be initially identified in the time available for redeployment operations. This would have required a deliberate and streamlined execution process that prioritized effective command and control and simultaneous operations. In particular, balancing the movement of unit equipment prior to the movement of personnel was deemed essential. Throughout the exercise, it would be important that the brigade remain cognizant that some units participating in Griffin Watch would also be on prepare-to-deploy orders for Homeland Defense Task Force and Joint Task Force Consequence Management missions. In the event of activation, units on prepare-to-deploy orders would be nested with III Corps movement teams and the brigade would be prepared to deploy units directly from the exercise if alerted.

Unfortunately, the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic struck the United States just as the exercise was about to begin. Less than 36 hours before the scheduled arrival of the advance party, the brigade commander made a conscious decision to cancel the exercise and he directed the subordinate military police battalions to shift toward COVID-19 support of installations within the III Corps footprint. Although disappointing, the 15 months of planning for the operation resulted in a wealth of lessons learned for future events. And one immediate and continuing reward was the exponential professional growth of brigade and battalion staffs leading the planning efforts.

Griffin Watch 2.0 was set to test new boundaries and force units to build relationships among enablers; CID personnel; and military working dog, engineer, military intelligence, and signal units in a logistically degraded environment. The brigade did not anticipate the level of coordination that would be required for this operation during initial conceptual development. However, as the complexity of the operation became apparent, coordination with III Corps resulted in a plan for medical support, field-feeding teams, joint network node/command post node teams, and construction and heavy-equipment movement support to bridge identified capability gaps.

The 89th Military Police Brigade looks forward to the opportunity for a future iteration of Griffin Watch to prepare our units to fight and win in an LSCO environment. Until then, we remain "Phantom Lethal!" and "Proven in Battle!"

Endnote:

[1] *United States Army Military Police Force Modernization Strategy,* U.S. Army Military Police Regiment, 1 November 2019.

Major Marks is the brigade operations officer for Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 89th Military Police Brigade. She holds a bachelor's degree in biology from the University of Texas at Arlington and a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University.

Colonel Ball is the chief of staff for the Maneuver Support Center of Excellence, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. He holds a bachelor's degree in communications from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville; a master's degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University; and a master's degree in strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 94th Military Police Battalion

Lineage and Honors

Constituted 8 June 1945 in the Army of the United States as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 94th Military Police Battalion.

Activated 13 June 1945 in France.

Inactivated 25 February 1946 in France.

Allotted 24 October 1950 to the Regular Army.

Activated 30 October 1950 in Korea.

Inactivated 20 March 1953 in Korea.

Activated 24 June 1959 in Germany.

Companies A, B, and C constituted 30 March 1971 in the Regular Army and activated in Germany.

Battalion inactivated 21 June 1976 in Germany.

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 94th Military Police Battalion, activated 16 April 1996 in Korea.

Campaign Participation Credit

Korean War

United Nations (UN) Offensive

Communist Chines Forces (CCF) Intervention

First UN Offensive

CCF Spring Offensive

UN Summer–Fall Offensive

Second Korean Winter

Korea, Summer–Fall 1952

Third Korean Winter

Decorations

Army Superior Unit Award, Streamer embroidered 1996–1997

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1950–1952

Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation, Streamer embroidered KOREA 1952–1953

Support to Mobility Operations in Action:
709th Military Police Battalion's Assurance of Freedom of Movement

By Major J. Michael Miles
with contributions from Captain Joseph A. Brown,
Captain Jordan I. Bush, and First Lieutenant David Wang

Summer is known colloquially as "the fighting season," and it is a busy time for military exercises in Europe. Optimal weather results in ideal road conditions for large movements and exercises and allows for the participations of units from all components of the Army. The year 2019 was no exception, with multiple exercises occurring in the Balkan and Black Sea regions as part of the Combined Southern Exercise Campaign (CSEC). U.S. forces, allies, and partners demonstrated their ability to conduct warfare in a complex and challenging setting spanning the continent, and the exercises focused on the ability of U.S. Army Europe to mobilize forces and project combat power. The exercises highlighted capabilities and shortfalls that would occur in a real-world conflict. As this series of exercises included nearly 30,000 Soldiers, allies, and partners, it required nearly 200 military convoy movements as well as line haul and rail movements through 10 countries from Belgium to Bulgaria—and the assured mobility of all U.S. forces was quintessential to mission success.

The 21st Theater Sustainment Command, Kaiserslautern, Germany, established the Regional Movement Coordination Center (RMCC) to provide a centralized organization for synchronizing and regulating movements during CSEC. Movement control teams at each country's national movement coordination center were responsible for coordinating and assisting with national movement requirements.

The 21st Theater Sustainment Command tasked the 18th Military Police Brigade, Vilseck, Germany, to conduct route regulation (the scheduling of movements to prevent terminal and route congestion) to ensure freedom of movement along ground lines of communication, including the main and alternate supply routes used during the exercises.[1] Route regulation for military police normally includes tasks such as route signing, manning of traffic control posts, or route patrolling; however, during CSEC, regulation was largely the responsibility of the host nations.[2] Military police supported theater movements during CSEC by conducting route reconnaissance to validate main and alternate supply routes and providing police information, including the route status and traffic updates, to the RMCC during execution. This information helped in the development of a common operating picture for movement control and facilitated the 21st Theater Sustainment Command and host nation planning of military movements and traffic control.

Route Reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance is a deliberate task conducted to determine if a route can support military traffic.[3] Military police and engineers from the 18th Military Police Brigade conducted route reconnaissance prior to the excercise to assist in determining the best routes to support military movements. Complete route analysis included quantitative measurements to determine maneuverability by vehicle type, spatial analysis to annotate the efficient placement of support assets, trafficability, and civil considerations assessments to determine potential impediments or threats to movements.

While engineer units conducted route classification to determine if a route was usable[4] and movement controllers conducted spatial analyses that included a determination of convoy speed and refuel and rest requirements, military police partnered with host nation police to determine civil traffic and criminal considerations along routes. Military police gathered civil and criminal information from civil affairs and host nation police during the route reconnaissance and ensured that the information was uploaded into the U.S. Army Europe geospatial route database. The reconnaissance provided essential information for higher headquarters planning and the rehearsal-of-concept drill.

Military Police Liaisons

It was imperative that military police maintain an ongoing link with host nation police and an agreement for information sharing to create an accurate common operating picture in real time. In some cases, information sharing was difficult because each nation had different regulations on the sharing of police-sensitive information. In peacetime, most foreign countries have no obligation to share police information with U.S. military police.

Liaison is defined as "that contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action."[5] A military police liaison is an officer or noncommissioned officer who performs these functions for the commander. Liaison operations are complex affairs that require clear lines of communication between all parties, particularly when other countries are involved. Consistent communication and familiarization with roles and responsibilities at each host nation organization are key to achieving smooth information flow and the synchronization of police information between the movement coordination centers and the field. As such, the ability to perform independently while fully understanding the command intent is a crucial characteristic of a liaison.

The highway traffic section of the movement control team is doctrinally assigned the tasks to thoroughly analyze

routes, regulate resources, and schedule the most efficient flow of traffic; the Soldier performing this function is typically a military policeman.[6] During CSEC, the regulation on a route was handled through a combined effort between movement controllers and military police liaisons from the 18th Military Police Brigade working at the national movement coordination centers or police headquarters. Movement controllers focused on diplomatic clearances, customs clearances, and the approval of a unit travel plan to ensure that they had enough fuel, food, and rest to finish the movement,[7] and military police focused on collecting information to inform movement controllers and commanders of threats or potentially violent activities such as protests, roadblocks, or excessive traffic.

Military police liaisons at national movement coordination centers or host nation police headquarters facilitated the free sharing of information. To establish relationships and the necessary infrastructure, military police liaisons conducted predeployment site surveys of their areas of operation and identified host nation infrastructure, key personnel, and resources. Liaisons established relationships and mutual expectations and set conditions for joint operations with their counterparts.

Common Operating Picture

Military police liaisons operating on the ground used resources from their host nation partners, local news, and social media to collect information for a report. It was critical that military police had access to real-time traffic or contact information for all city and highway police stations on the routes. This allowed patrols to provide concrete—rather than estimated—traffic data. All police information was compiled daily into the report and sent to the RMCC, who ensured dissemination of the information to all national movement coordination centers and unit commanders preparing for movements. Military police and movement controllers used the daily police information to recommend delaying or adjusting movement plans and timelines. The host nation agencies always made the final decisions, while military police liaisons ensured that the host nation agencies had the most up-to-date information to facilitate those decisions.

The RMCC compiled the data into a common operating picture that was distributed daily to the movement control teams in each country and the unit commanders as they planned their movements. The movement common operating picture included route statuses depicted by color coding that was designed to be intuitive and easily understood. If there was no congestion and the traffic moved at a normal rate, the route was classified as green; depending on the condition of the traffic, routes could be degraded to amber or red—but in either of those cases, the route was still a viable option (not closed). Routes that suffered from stalled traffic and were no longer viable options due to closure for military movements were classified as black. The most common reasons for the closure of a route to military traffic were significant damage to roads and bridges, civil considerations, and municipal decisions. While most routes were never degraded to a classification below amber, several routes were classified as black due to civil considerations.

The 18th Military Police Brigade plan for information flow originally dictated that every 3 hours, the military police liaisons in each country would send an update to the 709th Military Police Battalion tactical operations center for consolidation. The information would consist of both an updated picture via overlays on Command Post of the Future and a joint capabilities release. Using these systems would allow the RMCC and military police to share the route information with U.S. commanders while on the move. Military police ultimately used a combination of unclassified narratives, Power Point® presentations, and brevity codes to relay route status directly to the RMCC.

Military police are capable of providing commanders with a variety of options for supporting large-scale mobility operations and exercises. The physical presence of military police controlling traffic or patrolling routes can increase security and aid in sustaining movement; however, military police can also effectively support freedom of movement by providing information to support the commander's movement control. Military police must still conduct route reconnaissance to determine the trafficability of the route and gather any information on local crime or criminal organizations prior to and during the execution of the operation. Military police can effectively influence and assist commanders in regulating the flow of forces moving into theater by providing real-time information on traffic and significant activity along the main and alternate supply routes. In a multinational environment, good relationships with allied and partner nation police are required in order to receive frequent and current information on activity that could impede the flow of military movements. The information must be easily understood and distributable on multiple mediums that are releasable to allies and partners.

The regulation and control of military traffic across multiple countries is a substantial task; but with sufficient planning and development of relationships with host nation partners, U.S. forces can efficiently flow into theater, supporting the commander's maneuver operations in the forward areas of operation.

Endnotes:

[1]Field Manual (FM) 4-01, *Army Transportation Operations*, 3 April 2014.

[2]FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 19 April 2019.

[3]Ibid.

[4]FM 3-34, *Engineer Operations*, 2 April 2014.

[5]FM 6-0, *Command and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014.

[6]Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 4-16, *Movement Control*, 5 April 2013.

[7]FM 4-01.

Major Miles is the executive officer of the 709th Military Police Battalion, Vilseck, Germany. He holds a bachelor's degree in psychology from Jacksonville State University, Jacksonville, Alabama, and a master's degree in administration from Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, Michigan.



Logistics Security in Large-Scale Combat Operations: A Way That Military Police Supported Operation Overlord

By Major Christopher A. Evans

In the early morning hours of 6 June 1944, 16,000 American and 8,000 British/Commonwealth paratroopers jumped into northern France under heavy German antiaircraft fire.[1] Concurrently, 125,000 Allied soldiers boarded 4,000 landing vessels in preparation for the largest amphibious landing in history.[2] Operation Overlord had commenced.

Operation Overlord illustrates the role that military police played in extending the operational reach of divisions and armies in large-scale combat operations. This article focuses on how combat support and criminal investigation division (CID) military police supported Operation Overload through logistics security (LOGSEC) by identifying vulnerabilities, securing docks and railheads, and investigating pilferage/black market activities.

Operational reach refers to the distance and duration that a unit can maneuver away from its base of operations.[3] Military police aid the commander in balancing the tension between endurance (the ability to employ combat power for a protracted period), momentum, and protection. LOGSEC increases endurance through the dependable arrival of supplies.

The United States shipped almost 2 million tons of supplies to the United Kingdom in preparation for Operation Overlord.[4] During the build-up of supplies in the United Kingdom prior to the D-Day invasion, First Lieutenant Leonard J. Pietkowski served as the ship transportation officer aboard the Liberty Class cargo vessel *John H. B. Latrobe*.[5] First Lieutenant Pietkowski watched incredulously as dock workers loaded cases and crates of supplies in cargo nets and then dropped them on the Liverpool dock. When the supplies hit the dock, a few of the cases and crates broke. Workers placed the broken cases and crates out of sight and continued to unload the ship. When First Lieutenant Pietkowski inspected the broken cases and crates, he realized that the civilian laborers had slowly pilfered the contents.

The large number of goods stolen from the Liverpool docks prompted the assignment of the 295th Military Police Company to the dockyard. Private First Class Howard R. Cook served in the 295th Military Police Company from October 1942 to February 1945.[6] Private First Class Cook believed that if a guard was not within sight of the supplies, then workers would steal them. The 295th Military Police Company assigned two guards to each ship and each pile of broken crates. The need for a large number of guards for the Liverpool docks resulted in the addition of 175 Soldiers to the company. British civilian police officers paired with the American military police at the dock and arrested day workers who were caught stealing. Guards also prevented workers from using cargo nets to unload supplies. These two measures reduced pilferage and shortened the time necessary to prepare for the Allied invasion.

According to the U.S. Army Transportation School, a single infantry division required 300,000 gallons of gasoline a day during World War II, while an armored division needed 700,000 gallons.[7] Unfortunately, some dishonorable Soldiers sold supplies on the French black market.[8] Technical Sergeant Five Joseph G. Salm, a CID agent attached to the 802d Military Police Battalion, was born in Egypt to American parents and spoke fluent English, Arabic, and French.[9] He observed that U.S. Army weapons and ammunition accounted for more than 25 percent of the black market sales. The remaining 75 percent of the black market item transactions consisted of luxury goods such as cigarettes and coffee.

U.S. Army equipment sold at a high profit on the black market. Technical Sergeant James H. Hutchinson, who served as the provost sergeant of the 3263 Ordnance Base Depot Company in Fontainebleau, France, was a World War I veteran and had seen a radical shift in the French economy between World War I and World War II.[10] He was aware of the belief of French citizens that the franc would lose all of its value in inflation and that, as a result, French citizens were buying or trading for American or British currency. The official currency exchange rate was 50 francs to one U.S. dollar, while the exchange rate on the black market was 250 francs to one U.S. dollar. Black market sales were five times more profitable for U.S. Soldiers. One case of cigarettes (50 packages) sold for $1,000, and 20 pounds of coffee sold for $12.[11] The high profit margin on pilfered goods was

a temptation that was difficult for Soldiers and civilian day workers to resist.

Dockyards were not the only areas vulnerable to theft. The supply dumps at railroad marshaling yards were mostly unguarded. Plainclothes military police and CID agents investigated thefts at the largest railyards to deter further theft. LOGSEC became a priority due to the large amount of equipment loss. Between 6 June and 31 December 1944, the U.S. Army recovered supplies worth $15,243.43 from civilians and $102,735.66 from U.S. Soldiers.[12] Adjusted for inflation, the value of those supplies was $1,709,841.79 as of January 2020.[13] Given the black market exchange rate, the recovered supplies were worth 29,494,772.50 francs in 1944.

The historical role of military police was to extend the operational reach of divisions and armies. The case study of Operation Overlord during World War II illustrates the importance of LOGSEC in large-scale combat operations. LOGSEC, though a CID mission-essential task, requires a team effort. CID agents conduct vulnerability assessments of supply yards, railheads, or ports to reduce the threat of theft, and they investigate all major fraud cases. During World War II, CID agents investigated black markets to deter the stealing of equipment and to recover stolen equipment. Combat support military police guarded ports and railheads to prevent pilferage. The extended lines of communication for the First and Third Armies led to multiple supply dumps and railheads that required the services of military police to prevent, deter, and investigate thefts in order to extend the endurance of divisions and armies during Operation Overload and the later Allied breakout from Normandy.

Endnotes:

[1]Max Hastings, *Overlord: D-Day and the Battle for Normandy*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1984, pp. 73–74.

[2]Eisenhower Foundation, *D-Day*, The University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, 1971, pp. 82–83.

[3]Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations*, 2017, p. 1-22.

[4]Michael Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Encyclopedia of Casualty and Other Figures, 1492–2015*, McFarland and Company, Jefferson, North Carolina, 1992, p. 487.

[5]U.S. Army Services Forces Technical Intelligence Report, Number 642, "Military Police Activities in England and France, 26 June 1945, Interview With Private First Class Howard R. Cook, 295th Military Police Company, on Preventing Pilferage of Supplies in Docks from October 1945–February 1945," Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Document Number NX-9321, p. 1.

[6]U.S. Army Services Forces Technical Intelligence Report, Number 642, "Military Police Activities in England and France, 26 June 1945, Interview With Private First Class Howard R. Cook, 295th Military Police Company, on Preventing Pilferage of Supplies in Docks from October 1945-February 1945," Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Document Number NX-9321, p. 1.

[7]"The Red Ball Express, 1944," U.S. Army Transportation Museum, <http://www.transchool.lee.army.mil/museum/transportation%20museum/redballintro.htm>, accessed on 13 July 2020.

[8]Roland G. Ruppenthal, *Logistical Support of the Armies: Volume I: May 1941–September 1944*, Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 571.

[9]U.S. Army Services Forces Technical Intelligence Report, Number T/PFI-2232, "Military Police Activities in European Theater, 14 June 1945, Interview With Technical Sergeant Joseph G. Salm, CID Investigation, 802d Military Police Battalion, Middle East Command on Black Market Operations," Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Document Number NX-9321, p. 1.

[10]U.S. Army Services Forces Technical Intelligence Report, Report Number 796, European Theater, 15 June 1945, "Interview With Technical Sergeant James M. Hutchinson, Provost Sergeant, 3263 Ordnance Base Depot Company, Fontainebleau, France on Black Market Sales in France," Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Document Number NX-9321, p. 1.

[11]U.S. Army Service Forces Office, *Semi Annual Report: 6 June–31 December 1944, Criminal Investigations Branch, European Theater of Operations*, 1945, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Document Number N9993.

[12]U.S. Army Service Forces, *Military Police Activities in the Communication Zone, Section F Black Market Operations*, p. 64.

[13]"Consumer Price Index Inflation Calculator," U.S. Department of Labor, <https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm>, accessed on 13 July 2020.

Major Evans is the executive officer for the CID, 502d Military Police Battalion, Fort Campbell, Kentucky. He recently returned from a deployment in which he served as a J-5 planner and as the deputy J-3 for U.S. Forces–Afghanistan.

The 728th Military Police Battalion in Korea

By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired) and Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

Editor's note: The individuals mentioned in this aritcle were interviewed at the 728th Military Police Battalion Reunion in Branson, Missouri, from 2 to 6 October 2019.

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Premier Joseph V. Stalin of the Soviet Union agreed to establish an international trusteeship for Korea. On 15 August 1945—after the two sides had originally failed to formulate a plan for Korea—President Harry S. Truman proposed to Premier Stalin to divide the Korean Peninsula at the 38th Parallel. With Stalin's approval, the countries agreed to remove Japanese forces from Korea and repatriate Koreans who were being held in Japan and Japanese-held territories.

In January 1950, the 728th Military Police Battalion was notified for movement to the Republic of Korea (ROK). Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, the 728th Military Police Battalion was transferred and reassembled in Pusan, South Korea. The mission of the 728th was the operation and control of traffic on the main supply route. For 8 months, members of the battalion took an active part in combat, suppressing guerrilla activities and responding to the changing tactical situation.

After the United Nations landed at Inchon, South Korea, in September 1950, the 728th moved to that region. As the area around Seoul, South Korea, began to stabilize, the battalion assisted in traffic control and other law enforcement duties there. Finally, in 1953, the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed, bringing about a long-lasting ceasefire to the Korean War.[1]

After the signing of the armistice, the 728th Military Police Battalion was made up of five companies. Headquarters Company and Company C were located in Seoul. Company B was located in Yong Dong Po, South Korea; the military police of Company B rode the trains, providing security from the Port of Inchon to Pusan and from Seoul to the demilitarized zone at the border. Company B also maintained detachments at Camp Howard and Camp Ames, South Korea. Company A was located in Pusan. Company D was located in the village of Bupyong, South Korea; the provost marshal's office was next to that company. There were also military police detachments of the 728th in Taejon and Taegu, South Korea.

Eventually, the 728th Military Police Battalion provided almost all of the law enforcement duties south of the Han River near Seoul. The major areas of South Korea in which the battalion military police companies or detachments were assigned were Pusan, Taejon, Taegu, and Pyeongtaek.

The 728th participated in three major historic events while stationed in South Korea:

- Security for the return of captured crewmen from the USS Pueblo in 1968.
- Security in support of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul.
- Truck convoy security for the fielding of Patriot missiles during the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Crisis in North Korea.[2]

Mr. Mark Lindsay, coauthor of this article, attended the 728th Military Police Battalion Reunion in Branson, Missouri, 2–6 October 2019. During that week, Mr. Lindsay met and interviewed various military police veterans who had served in the 728th in Korea. He interviewed them about their time there, asking them where they had been stationed, what duties they had performed, what uniforms they had worn, what equipment they had used, and more.

Each of the interviewees stated that they wore a pistol belt with an M1911 .45-caliber semiautomatic handgun as their sidearm. Most wore a helmet liner while on duty. The wintertime duty uniform included the M1951 pile cap. Summer uniforms consisted of fatigues. Between 1983 and 1984, the Army transitioned to battle dress uniforms. In 1991, the Army replaced the M1911 sidearm with the M9 9-millimeter sidearm. Duties were fairly consistent; Soldiers conducted post law enforcement, gate duty, town foot patrol, main supply route patrol, and convoy escort. While in Pusan, Company C also had the additional duty of providing security for the port and the property disposal office storage site.

Private First Class James E. Carden arrived in Korea 9 months after the armistice had been signed. On his first night there, an alert was called. Carden thought that the North Koreans were attacking. Everyone grabbed their weapons and equipment and ran out of the barracks. But Carden had no weapon or equipment—and no duty position to go to. Fortunately, one of the "old guys" told him to not worry—that it was just an alert. While assigned to Company A, Carden used an M38A1 jeep to patrol from

Yong Dong Po to the Han River and pulled gate duty at the Kimpo K-14 compound.[4]

Private First Class Genaro (Gerry) C. Salazar was assigned to law enforcement duty with Company D. The military police of Company D—along with their ROK partners—patrolled Inchon, either in jeeps or on foot. They also patrolled Kimpo Highway, along with U.S. Air Force security police and ROK military police. Prisoners were processed at the Kimpo K-14 compound. Company D also served as the tactical response force.

As a sergeant, Salazar was assigned to Company B and rode the supply trains at Yong Dong Po. From the moment the trains were loaded at the Port of Inchon until they were unloaded, they were under the guard of military police, who were armed with an M1911A1 sidearm and a 12-gauge shotgun. The trip could be local (lasting 1 day), or it could be a 3-day journey to Pusan.

The trains consisted of 100 cars of various types, including boxcars; refrigerated cars; gondolas; flat cars for vehicles and armor; and tanker cars for petroleum, oil, and lubricants. They carried all classes of supplies to Army and Air Force installations along their routes. On the return trip to Yong Dong Po and Inchon, the trains carried fresh supplies that were loaded at the Port of Pusan.

The duties of the guards included checking all the cars before leaving a depot or freight yard to ensure that the numbers and types of cars coupled to the train were the same as those listed on the consignor manifest and that all car numbers and the numbers of the U.S. Army Transportation Corps seals placed on the doors were correct. They also patrolled the area around the train from the time the noncommissioned officer in charge accepted responsibility for its security until it left the station. At points along the route where the train was forced to travel slowly—such as steep grades and sharp curves—the guards positioned themselves in the observation cupola and in the bay windows of the guard car. At all stops, they dismounted and patrolled their portion of the train until it got underway again. If a breakdown occurred along the route and it became necessary to cut out a car that was carrying U.S./United Nations supplies, a military police guard was detailed to stay with the car until it could be repaired and continue to its destination.[5]

In 1956, Specialist Four Robert C. Oman attended basic training at Fort Hood, Texas. He then reported to Camp Gordon, Georgia, for Military Police Advanced Individual Training. In January 1957, Specialist Four Oman—who had just been married—was notified that he would be sent to Korea. He spent 21 days on a ship headed overseas. Soldiers who did not have an assigned duty onboard were assigned to kitchen duty, so Specialist Four Oman created a job for himself. When asked, he reported that he was assigned to straighten the lifejackets each morning. He never did pull kitchen duty during the entire trip.

Specialist Four Oman spent the first half of his tour in Korea assigned as an operations clerk in a battalion S-3 office, where he handled various secret documents. In August or September 1957, he was transferred to Company C. Still stationed in Seoul, Specialist Four Oman spent the remainder of his tour performing law enforcement duty.[6]

Private First Class Robert V. Doepke spent most of his deployed time working the Main Gate No. 5 at Camp Humphreys, South Korea. He enjoyed gate duty because it kept him busy. Private First Class Doepke spent so much time on Gate No. 5 that he had a "Doepke's Gate" sign made. He replaced the original sign for Main Gate No. 5 with the new one; surprisingly, no one questioned the change the entire time that Private First Class Doepke was there. Doepke, who was only 5 feet, 4 inches tall, was known as the "Little MP." One day, while working the gate, two Korean children approached Doepke and began speaking to him in Korean. His Korean counterpart explained that the children thought he was Korean because of his height.[7]

Specialist Four Robert Ryder performed law enforcement duties in Seoul. When on town patrol, the military policeman and his ROK or Korean national police partner used M38A1 jeeps as their patrol vehicles. While on patrol, they often stopped at the United Service Organization site by the Han River. The site was operated by the wives of Eighth Army officers. Specialist Four Ryder indicated that this was one of the off-post sites where they could get coffee or water. He recalled that it was so cold one winter that the military police wore parkas and field pants over their olive drab wool uniforms. Due to the substantial winter clothing he was wearing, Specialist Four Ryder kept his M1911 sidearm in his coat pocket so that he could reach it if needed.

At times, the patrol was required to escort units moving to Seoul from the south. While traveling north to the I Corps, 1st Cavalry, or 2d Division area, the patrol often stopped by the embassy. On one occasion, the patrol found itself in the middle of an anti-U.S. protest. One call that still sticks with Specialist Four Ryder came in the night they were dispatched to one of the bridges over the Han River. A Soldier had received a "Dear John" letter, and had gone to the bridge, and jumped. The Soldier landed on the bank of the river, and his body was recovered and taken to the 121st Hospital on Yongsan Compound.

Specialist Four Ryder also recalled being sent on temporary duty travel on numerous occasions; he spent a month on temporary duty with Company B, serving as a train guard.[8]

Private First Class Robert T. Cengr performed law enforcement duties at Camp Humphreys, working with ROK military police or Air Force security police at the main gate. Town patrol in Pyeongtaek was conducted on foot with two military police. When an arrest was made, the military police walked the prisoner to the main gate, where an M38A1 jeep was parked. They then used the jeep to transport the prisoner to the military police station for processing. In 1966, a new post commander ordered that the military police working the main gate to Camp Humphreys wear a white helmet liner because he wanted to be able to distinguish the American military police from other gate guards.[9]

The duty of the Taejon Detachment, which consisted of seven American military policemen and their

ROK counterparts, was to patrol the main supply route in an M151A1 utility vehicle. They handled all traffic accidents. Specialist Four Ronald A. Bandza interviewed Americans, and ROK personnel interviewed Koreans. They submitted their reports to Camp Humphreys, where the two sets of interviews were combined for a final report to Eighth Army. Specialist Four Bandza handled just one crime—when an Airman firebombed his Korean girlfriend's house.

On 1 October 1976, Companies A, B, and C were inactivated in Korea. The units were replaced with numbered military police companies. The 728th Military Police Battalion, then headquartered at Camp Walker, Taegu, consisted of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, three line companies, and five military working dog (MWD) detachments. The 57th Military Police Company was headquartered at Camp Carroll, Waegwan; it was responsible for law enforcement and area security in the northern sector of the battalion area of operations. The 3d MWD Detachment (Narcotics) and the 904th MWD Detachment (Explosives) were aligned under the 57th and maintained kennels on Camp Carroll.[3] The 188th Military Police Company was headquartered at Camp Walker; it was responsible for law enforcement and area security in the southwest sector of the battalion area of operations. The 903d MWD Detachment (Explosives) was aligned under the 188th and shared kennel facilities with the 904th MWD Detachment at Camp Carroll.[4] The 552d Military Police Company was headquartered at Camp Hialeah, Pusan; it was responsible for law enforcement and area security in the southeast sector of the battalion area of operations. The 2d MWD Detachment (Narcotics) and the 905th MWD Detachment (Explosives) were aligned under the company and maintained kennels at the Pusan Storage Facility.[5]

In September 2006, the 728th Military Police Battalion relocated from Korea to Hawaii and reestablished its headquarters at Schofield Barracks. The battalion provided command and control of the 57th Military Police Company, the 58th Military Police Company, the 552d Military Police Company, the 13th Military Police Detachment, and the 39th Military Police Detachment. Later, the 558th Military Police Company was added to the battalion. On 14 November 2007, the battalion deployed to Tikrit, Iraq, in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; it redeployed to Schofield Barracks on 26 January 2009.[6]

Author's Note: Numerous members of the 728th Military Police Battalion who are also members of the battalion Facebook® page responded to numerous questions from the authors to complete the information about the various companies during the time the battalion was stationed in Korea.

Private First Class Cengr (white helmet) on gate duty

Endnotes:

[1]"728th Military Police Battalion," <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/728mp.htm>, accessed on 9 July 2020.

[2]Ibid.

[3]"728th Military Police Battalion."

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Ibid.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, he was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Mr. Lindsay began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID), and finished his career working cold cases.



Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility—Goodbye to an Old Friend

By Mr. Ennice Hobbs Jr.

It stood steadfast for more than 62 years, despite its original charter to stand for just 50. It was a visual representation of historical times in the world of military confinement—when open-bay domiciles housed double-bunked prisoners sleeping head to toe and prisoners moved throughout the facility following a color-coded route that signaled authorized and unauthorized areas. Through many changes and updates, the Northwestern Joint Regional Correctional Facility (NWJRCF) symbolized the transformation of military corrections.

Construction began on the precursor of the NWJRCF in 1934. A small building surrounded by a security fence and containing six cells and a single toilet and shower became known as "J Block." It was the original confinement facility on Camp Lewis, Washington, as it transitioned to Fort Lewis.

In 1955, 20 years after the construction of J Block, the Fort Lewis Installation Detention Facility opened. Despite rumors that the facility had begun as a warehouse before transitioning to a detention facility, the facility was actually based on the design of the Fort Knox, Kentucky, Installation Detention Facility. The new facility at Fort Lewis, now known as the NWJRCF, was built with a 50-year lifespan. At that time, most installations had an installation detention facility designed to hold short-term prisoners. Prisoners with longer sentences were sent to the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. However, this practice changed a decade after the Fort Lewis Installation Detention Facility opened, when American society shifted from a punitive penal system to one focused on rehabilitation.

In 1968, early U.S. Army correctional activities responded to this shift with the establishment of the U.S. Army Correctional Training Facility, Fort Riley, Kansas, which emphasized rehabilitation and retraining for return to duty. In 1973, the U.S. Army Correctional Training Facility was renamed the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade. The brigade espoused a program intended to motivate and retrain military prisoners with sentences that included less than 6 months of confinement and either no punitive discharge or suspended punitive discharge from the Army. The 7–8-week retraining program was designed to retrain and prepare former enlisted prisoners for return to duty with improved military performance and personal conduct.

In 1982, the U.S. Army Retraining Brigade became the U.S. Army Correctional Activity. The rehabilitation program continued until the late 1980s to early 1990s, when Army force reductions resulted in its demise. As the Army drew down in the 1990s, installations closed their individual detention facilities. Up to that point, a prisoner's sentence and type of discharge determined his or her place of confinement; however, the Army began transitioning to a regional correctional system. The few remaining installation detention facilities at Fort Lewis; Fort Knox; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Carson, Colorado; and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, became regional correctional facilities. The Fort Lewis Regional Correctional Facility housed prisoners who had been sentenced at installations west of the Mississippi River. Although aging, the facility was well-maintained and continued to serve the corrections community well.

When the NWJRCF first sought accreditation under the American Corrections Association in 1996, it decommissioned J Block due to its simple, and now-antiquated, construction. Although it currently sits mainly empty and alone, J Block once housed chickens, ducks, and goats under the facility's horticulture program.

The Army continued to consolidate its corrections activities with the closure of facilities at Fort Carson and Fort Hood in 1996. Nine years later, under the Congressional Base Realignment and Closure commission, Fort Knox and Fort Sill were ordered to be closed and a new facility—the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility—was built at Fort Leavenworth. The Base Realignment and Closure Initiative directed that the Army facility at Fort Lewis and the Navy facility at Bangor Submarine Base, Washington, merge to form the NWJRCF. In May 2012, the Navy closed the Bangor facility, leaving Fort Lewis—now known as Joint Base Lewis-McChord—as the sole proprietor of NWJRCF. To be identified by Congress as a successful joint facility is a testament to the resolve of NWJRCF and its many Soldiers, Sailors, and civilian supporters.

Just as the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks has a rich history as a Level III maximum-security facility, so too does

the NWJRCF have a rich history as a Level II medium-security facility. At 62 years in service, NWJRCF outperformed all other Level II facilities and the storied history of NWJRCF rivals that of the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks. In 1991, during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the garrison troop support battalion manned NWJRCF. The installation assigned all noncombatants (totaling more than 500 Soldiers) to the garrison troop support battalion. This unusual arrangement, which extended from May 1991 to October 1992, was unprecedented and has not been repeated either during war or peace.

Another element of the storied past of NWJRCF is superior performance. The annual Army-wide corrections competition is a rigorous competition for correctional specialists, with teams comprised of various skill levels and evaluated on their technical and tactical prowess. The event, which was held at Fort Leavenworth, was routinely won by teams from the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks. In 1994, a Fort Lewis team broke the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks winning streak and proudly displayed the trophy. In May 1996, NWJRCF became the first regional correctional facility accredited by the American Correctional Association. Years later, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 508th Military Police Battalion deployed as the first Regular Army military police internment/resettlement battalion. The battalion was critical in shaping detention operations as we know them today.

Over many decades, NWJRCF underwent several modifications and additions, including the addition of the supply building in 2005 and a complete life, safety, and security renovation in 2008. When it reopened following the 16-month renovation, NWJRCF encompassed 10 buildings and spanned more than 16 acres. As with all Level II facilities, NWJRCF provided vocational programs to rehabilitate prisoners and provide them with viable skills upon their release. Vocational programs that were contracted with Clover Park Technical College, Tacoma, Washington, included horticulture/landscaping, barbering, and carpentry. Each program directly supported the prisoner population or the surrounding community. Additionally, participation in the programs allowed prisoners to earn 80 or more Clover Park Technical College credit hours toward certifications in the vocations, improving their job opportunities upon release.

The horticulture/landscaping program involved the delivery of thousands of pounds of vegetables to local food banks every year. Greenhouses and aquaponics growing techniques were used in teaching advanced growing skills to provide greens and leafy vegetables such as chard and kale year-round. The horticulture program was strictly organic; neither hazardous materials nor pesticides were used to grow items. Natural composting and production methods were encouraged. Participants competed at the highest levels of local giant-pumpkin contests. One of the most famous aspects of the horticulture program was the bee hives. Each year, the hives produced up to a dozen gallons of honey that was spun, bottled, and sold to support improvements to other rehabilitative programs. Also under the program, damage to installation training areas was repaired by growing endangered species of prairie grass, creating a seed bank that could be used to replace grass damaged during maneuvers. Finally, prisoners learned how to diagnose problems and maintain the horticulture equipment as a cost-saving service for the organization.

The barbering program provided students with barbering experience on a variety of hair types and styles and allowed for the accumulation of critical hours needed toward licensing. Under the barbering program, every prisoner and paying staff member could receive a haircut in accordance with regulatory grooming requirements.

Carpentry program participants not only created thousands of custom awards, gifts, and furniture for purchase through the NWJRCF sales store, but also produced memorial boxes for every Soldier who was assigned to Joint Base Lewis-McChord and had fallen in combat. Carpentry program participants also repaired bee hives built bat boxes (for vector control) and horticulture boxes/flower containers and continuously produced items for the beautification of, and improved landscaping throughout, the facility grounds.

Another notable NWJRCF program was the Canine Companion Program, which was established in partnership with the Canine Companions for Independence organization. Under that program, prisoners raised puppies until they reached the age of 18 months and trained them on 30 basic commands. The puppies were then evaluated for suitability as service dogs for people in need. Many of the recipients of these puppies stay in contact with the facility to report how their animals continue to enhance and enrich their lives.

The rich and storied past of NWJRCF is a part of every Soldier and civilian who served there. From the first female corrections command sergeant major—who, incidentally, was the "first" in several categories during her remarkable military career—to the Regimental Command Sergeant Major, some of the best leaders in the Army walked the blocks and honed their skills at NWJRCF. Many other great professionals and leaders also did not waver in their support to NWRJCF mission accomplishment.

In 2019, the Army announced that it would be demolishing the NWJRCF facility and replacing it with a modern complex built on the same site. The old facility will undoubtedly be missed. While new a new chapter and new opportunities await those serving in a new NWJRCF facility, the future remains unknown—except for one thing: I know that as I watch the demolition of the NWJRCF, I will feel sadness sprinkled with a little anticipation and a lot of excitement. Like a phoenix, NWJRCF will rise again.

Mr. Hobbs has served for 43 years as a corrections professional with the Army—first as a correctional specialist, retiring as a first sergeant after 24 years; and then as a civilian supervisor correctional program specialist at the regional correctional facility on Joint Base Lewis-McChord for the past 19 years.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence G-3/Directorate of Training and Doctrine			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	9 Apr 19	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	2 Jan 20	A manual that addresses detainee operations across the range of military operations and provides detainee operations guidance for commanders and staffs. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 2d quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2021.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 4th quarter of FY 21.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	13 May 19	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations that support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. **Status:** Current.

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence G-3/Directorate of Training and Doctrine			
Publication Number	**Title**	**Date**	**Description**
ATP 3-39.30	Security and Mobility Support	21 May 20	A manual that provides Army military police commanders, staffs, and Soldiers at all echelons a foundation for the conduct of security and mobility support in support of decisive action. The tasks in this manual are primarily focused on applying military police combat power in support of the movement and maneuver and protection warfighting functions. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil-disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. **Status:** Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective-service missions and the management of protective-service details. **Status:** Current.
TC 3-39.30	Military Police Leader's Handbook	11 Aug 15	A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. It provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. **Status:** Under revision. Projected publication in 2d quarter of FY 21.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. **Status:** Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School website at <http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/>. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to <usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.mpdoc@mail.mil>.			

"Doctrine is indispensable to an Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort."

—General George H. Decker,

U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1960–1962


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