



MILITARY POLICE

THE PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN OF THE MILITARY POLICE CORPS

Spring 2016



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
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MILITARY POLICE

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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, U.S. Army Military Police School



Brigadier General Kevin Vereen

It has been a busy time for the Regiment over the past few months. Our Soldiers and Department of the Army civilians all across the Military Police Corps Regiment continue to perform at the highest levels in policing, investigations, and corrections. Most notably, our formations (Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve) have participated in regionally aligned/regionally engaged missions in support of partnership exercises that span from Africa to Asia. These exercises allow our units to better integrate with our allied counterparts in various regions of the world, building strong relationships and gaining a better understanding of the capabilities that we offer one another. I applaud commanders and praise their aggressive efforts in seeking training opportunities for their units while balancing daily law enforcement requirements that support garrison and senior mission commanders on Army installations inside and outside the continental United States.

Military police Soldiers continue to be integral enablers of the Army's emerging requirements, placing demands on the force to advise and assist allied nations and build capacity in countries that strive to protect themselves. The professionalism that our Soldiers and leaders display while conducting these very important missions will have a lasting impact. Every interaction military police have with other nations not only exposes those nations to our tremendous Army, but also provides opportunities for our Soldiers and leaders to be great ambassadors for our Nation.

As the Army continues to adjust manning levels, every opportunity to showcase the value of the unique skills of the Regiment becomes even more important. Our Soldiers must be ready, trained, and equipped for success. Our policing skills must be a commodity that only we (the Military Police Corps) can deliver for the Army. As I travel around visiting units and engaging senior Army leaders, they all express their need and the value that our formations provide to mission success, whether protecting installations, conducting thorough investigations, or performing missions abroad . . . protecting and preserving the force.

Lastly, I ask that our Regiment continue to remain vigilant as our law enforcement force remains on point to *assist*, *protect*, and *defend* through our proactive policing skills. Our installations and our Army must rest comfortably at night, knowing that we are living up to our motto as military police and that we are demonstrating it through actions every single day.



Assist, Protect, and Defend!



Regimental Command Sergeant Major



Command Sergeant Major Richard A. Woodring

Greetings again from the U.S. Army Military Police School!

I am often reminded of the sacrifices and hardships we—as Soldiers, Families, and the civilian workforce—bear being away from home while serving our great Nation. Fortunately for us, our operations tempo has slightly decreased, allowing more Families to be together rather than deployed.

One constant within our Regiment is the desire to serve. Whether it's at home or abroad, military police Soldiers have always been willing to step forward and help others in need. No one supports our communities and installations better than military police Soldiers and their Families. Our support to events (such as National Night Out, the Special Olympics, and special events such as Halloween) are always highly recognized.

I recently attended a U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command workshop, where a focus was placed on creating a common career development model for all career management fields. One area of the proposed model was the stewardship of the profession, with specific emphasis on promoting the profession through community involvement, speaking engagements, professional writing, and volunteerism. I am convinced that it is a great addition to the career map. We, as Soldiers, are America—and selfless service is in our blood. Most of us have spent our share of holidays deployed; but now, with more of us home, we have the ability to serve our communities—where our service is sometimes needed the most.

Our Nation is well aware of our service when we are deployed, but doesn't often see what we can do when we are home. The holidays provide ample opportunity for us to extend our service and support to assist our communities and to give back to those who supported us and our Families while we were deployed.

I ask that Soldiers and units seek out opportunities to support our communities—not just during the holidays, but year round. This not only benefits the communities, but also our profession in many ways. It builds *esprit de corps* within units, solidifies our bonds (and creates new ones) within our communities, motivates others to volunteer, fosters selfless service, develops leaders, and enhances character development. Sergeant Major of the Army Daniel A. Dailey recently directed a group of senior noncommissioned officers to build the Army billboard through our interactions with our civilian communities.¹ Our volunteerism allows us to tell the Army story through positive interaction.

America needs leadership, and no one is better prepared than our outstanding military police Soldiers to provide that leadership on our installations and in our surrounding communities. One of the tenants of the Military Police Code of Ethics is, "I will promote by personal example the highest standards of Soldiering, stressing performance and professionalism."² While it may be hard to gauge how well one provides stewardship of the profession portion of the career development model, that is something that we should all consider in our pursuit of professional Soldiering.

Thank you for your continued service. I am very proud of everything you do! Please take time to remember those who continue to *Assist, Protect, and Defend* around the world each and every day!

Assist, Protect, and Defend!

Endnotes:

¹Chris McCullough, "SMA Dailey Tells USARPAC Town Hall Audience 'Every Soldier is a Billboard,'" *Hawaii Army Weekly*, p. 1, <<http://www.hawaiiarmyweekly.com/storage/2015/01/20150515.pdf>>, accessed on 22 January 2016.

²Field Manual (FM) 1905, *The Military Police Handbook*, 28 November 1975 (rescinded 15 September 1979).

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Army Doctrine Reference Publication 1, *The Army Profession*, 14 June 2015.

FM 6-22, *Leader Development*, 30 June 2015.

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World—2020–2040*, 31 October 2014.





Regimental Chief Warrant Officer

Chief Warrant Officer Five Leroy Shamburger

Job Opportunities Within the Military Police Family

It is no secret that the Army is downsizing to a total Army force of 950,000 or less. Over my 30 years in the Army, I have never seen this type of number. This means that thousands of positions will be eliminated from the Army in order to achieve congressional mandates. A large number of those positions will belong to maneuver support Soldiers. More specifically, these positions have been, and will continue to be, military police Soldiers. We have been forced to inactivate military police companies, battalions, and brigades to eliminate approximately 3,200 positions by fiscal year 2018. When these units are inactivated, junior noncommissioned officers and other junior Soldiers (who account for approximately 85 percent of company level positions) will be impacted the most.

As these positions (Soldiers) are targeted for elimination, it is our responsibility to ensure that transitioning Soldiers are set up for success. We must make every effort to retain quality Soldiers in the Regiment. It may be necessary to offer quality Soldiers jobs outside of their current military occupational specialty (MOS). I have talked to senior leaders who admitted that as junior commanders they were not focused on the bigger picture. They never thought to offer a Soldier a job outside of his or her current MOS as a means to retain the Soldier in the Army. We cannot afford to be that narrowly focused. In this shrinking Army, we must (now more than ever) impress upon junior commanders and noncommissioned officers the need to broaden their focus concerning opportunities within the Regiment. To retain as many quality Soldiers as possible, leaders must be aware of the opportunities available within the military police MOSs. We hear the term *broadening* used quite often pertaining to leader development. I believe that a basic knowledge of the military police core competencies of policing, investigations, corrections, and Soldiering constitutes broadening. Commanders and senior noncommissioned officers should be able to counsel Soldiers on career opportunities available to them so that quality Soldiers can continue their service to the Military Police Regiment, the Army, and the Nation.

As we move forward with a smaller Army, it is imperative that we have the right conversations so that, as spaces are eliminated, good Soldiers are retained. This will ensure that our Military Police Regiment and our Army remain strong and fully capable of defending freedom.



Assist, Protect, and Defend—Preserve the Force

Center for Army Lessons Learned Seeks Volunteers

The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is offering the opportunity to serve as an embedded liaison officer (ELNO) in contingency locations in Kuwait, Iraq, Africa, and Italy.

CALL is looking for quality officer and noncommissioned officer volunteers (colonels by exception, captains to lieutenant colonels, warrant officers two through five, and master sergeants to sergeants major) to fill ELNO positions. Tours, which are generally 365 days in duration, are open to Soldiers in the following categories: Regular Army, Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentation, and Individual Ready Reserve.

CALL ELNO duties include the following:

- Collect and disseminate lessons learned and best practices between lessons learned organizations.
 - Conduct focused collections for CALL and the supported command.
 - Serve as a subject matter expert to teach, coach, and mentor units in their collections of lessons learned.
- If you are interested in applying for a position, contact CALL at <<https://call2.army.mil/forms/embed.aspx>>. Someone will contact you with further instructions. You can also call (913) 684-9515 (DSN: 552-9516) with questions or a request for additional information.
- Serve as the face of CALL to the supported command.
 - Integrate into the supported command staff functions to collaborate and integrate the CALL support capability.



Leadership Philosophy

*By Captain Megan E. Evans, Second Lieutenant Sherman B. Pruitt,
and Sergeant First Class Richard L. Saucier*

A leadership philosophy can be defined simply as whatever a person believes with regard to leadership. On further examination, it relates to a mission statement and clearly outlines leadership values. When combined, the leadership philosophy and the mission statement provide subordinates with a path to follow and a goal to which to aspire. It is helpful for leaders to write down their philosophies to ensure a clear understanding not only for themselves, but also for their subordinates and peers. Reaching a shared understanding of the mission and the desired end state is the first step in accomplishing the task at hand.

Everyone has his or her own philosophy; however, some philosophies are more effective than others. The simple act of writing a statement does not make an effective leader. Ensuring a clear understanding of the philosophy and its purpose, gaining a buy-in from all, and adhering to the philosophy are critical. A clearly defined leadership philosophy serves as a concrete roadmap to success for Soldiers. All leaders cement their philosophy around a few tenets that are deemed most important to them. The areas of leadership philosophy emphasized here are responsibility, respect, and teamwork.

Responsibility

Responsibility is critical; everyone in the unit should possess some level of responsibility. Responsibility (like respect) is noticed, no matter the rank. Soldiers who notice someone failing or struggling to meet standards have a responsibility to ensure that he or she is properly trained. The individual is also responsible for identifying areas of weakness and seeking help. Training is only one of many avenues for becoming more responsible. As a self-policing organization, all Soldiers are responsible for identifying issues, weaknesses, and failures within the ranks and making corrections, re-training, and following up.

Emotional intelligence is a critical component of responsibility. Self-awareness, self-regulation, motivation, empathy, and social skills are characteristics of emotional intelligence. These characteristics are directly linked to the ability to communicate, interact with, and understand others. Possessing these characteristics allows leaders and Soldiers to better self-analyze and understand their strengths and weaknesses, which creates leaders with higher emotional intelligence who are capable of accurately assessing the strengths and weaknesses of their Soldiers and others.

Respect

Respect is another critical tenet within the leadership philosophy. Respect is the ability to communicate with others without conveying intent or purpose in a demeaning or unprofessional manner. Respect must be paid to subordinates and peers, and the same should be expected in return. This tenet is important to embrace because self-respect, which is just as critical, leads to respect for others. Thoughts become words, words become actions, and actions represent the person. Respect is also gained over time. Always make decisions that won't compromise your self-respect.

Respect is an integral piece of the culture of an organization. If the value of respect is not instilled, the unit will fail to function properly and a positive command climate cannot be sustained. It is widely understood that respect for leadership and authority is important in a unit; however, mutual respect for subordinates is just as critical. Respect does not depend on rank or position. The sheer human decency of paying respect at all levels must remain a mainstay of interactions between leaders and subordinates. A climate of respect for all ranks and positions is paramount to a successful unit that is capable of functioning as a team.

Teamwork

No leadership philosophy is complete without a discussion of teamwork—the unifying factor that distinguishes

(Continued on page 8)

PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF MISSION COMMAND: OPERATION AIR MAX

By Captain Danelle R. Gamble

Not every young officer has the opportunity to work with senior leaders at the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Fortunately, as a first lieutenant on brigade staff, I became intimately familiar with mission command and the operations process. The brigade staff worked closely with the MCTP to develop an MCTP culminating exercise for the brigade.

As a company commander 18 months later, I had the opportunity to use the principles learned during the MCTP while exercising mission command at a training event involving multiple units. Operation Air Max began as a small-scale training exercise to prepare unit military working dog (MWD) teams for deployment, but grew into a large-scale event that involved three units from two different battalions, each with unique training objectives to improve overall readiness.

In the planning phase, my focus as the commander was on the first three principles of mission command:

- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust.
- Create a shared understanding.
- Provide a clear statement of the commander's intent.



Build Cohesive Teams Through Mutual Trust

The first challenge was to build trust within the organization. As a new commander with a big vision, I had to get my Soldiers to buy into that vision. I was presented with an opportunity to train with the resident assault helicopter battalion (AHB), and I knew that getting the MWD teams familiar with aircraft was a top priority. In an effort to design the best training possible, I enlisted the help of the MWD handlers. Through impromptu conversations, I learned that the Soldiers wanted to train with other military police units and with units outside the Military Police Corps and that they wanted to add variety to the strict training regimen. Additionally, the MWD handlers who had recently returned from deployment provided many ideas for training scenarios—all contemporary, relevant, and outside of their current training scenarios. Loaded with new ideas and an opportunity to train with a unit possessing a unique skill set, a plan was drafted. After input was again requested from the Soldiers, the Soldiers bought into the plan and a cohesive team was built on mutual trust.

The second challenge was to develop another cohesive team through mutual trust with our unified action partner, the AHB—a military partner external to the battalion. Helping to facilitate relationship building was a cost that was gladly incurred in exchange for the training opportunity provided by the AHB commander. The officer professional development event focused on MWDs and their capabilities. In order to gain mutual trust, it was important to execute the officer professional development well—not just by providing the standard capabilities brief, but by providing a capabilities brief tailored toward the audience. We maintained interest, displayed professionalism, and conveyed our respect for the aviation Soldiers and their craft by

including information pertaining directly to MWDs and aviation. Extending beyond the officer professional development, the detachment understood the human aspect of relationships; maintained communication with the AHB; attended joint planning sessions; and gained a shared understanding of their unit, skill set, and mission.

Create a Shared Understanding

Without realizing it, the detachment executed a cognitive hierarchy that takes data and morphs it into understanding, as outlined in Figure 2-1

of Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command*.¹ The data provided from Soldiers' recent deployment missions, continental United States missions in support of the President of the United States and the Secret Service, combined training center experiences, and daily training scenarios was processed into information. Given their experiences, I determined that our Soldiers would likely best benefit from more realistic training with other units in preparation for real-life missions. The kennel master analyzed the information to gain knowledge. Now armed



with knowledge and a plan, the first meeting with the AHB was held. I was immediately reminded of the importance of applying judgment to knowledge to obtain an understanding and to ensure that each unified action partner reached the same shared understanding.

The relationship building continued as we traded data, information, and knowledge with the AHB. It was vital to remember that with multiple units come multiple training objectives, and multiple training objectives require flexibility. With little to no knowledge of the composition of an AHB before the meeting, I was unaware that the AHB would need to fly in

formation to maximize its training benefit. Its execution would vary from the original concept of the training event based on the operational environment. The small exercise would need to triple in size and would involve the two battalion intelligence teams, an entire combat support military police company, and multiple days of train-up. The information provided by the experienced pilots and instructor pilots and the training objectives of the combat support military police commander enabled all three units to reach a shared understanding of individual unit training objectives and desired end states to accomplish the mission.



Provide a Clear Statement of the Commander's Intent

I was somewhat deflated when leaving the first meeting with the AHB, as there was much more to be done. However, commanders must remember that they are not in it alone and that they must exercise mission command. I met with the detachment and operations sergeant and explained the purpose of the operation, the new key tasks, and the desired end state that would mutually support each unit involved. From there, the detachment sergeant focused efforts on the individual Soldier tasks required to execute the training. Additionally, the operations sergeant adjusted the concept of the operation, further coordinated with the intrabattalion combat support company, and prepared for the next meeting with the AHB.

The initial intent of Operation Air Max was to train on the mission-essential task list of the 523d MWD Detachment, focusing efforts on deploying MWD assets. However, as ADRP 6-0 states, "Military operations are complex, human endeavors characterized by the continuous, mutual adaptation of give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants."² Leaders must adapt in seconds; the mission is already changing before execution. The complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environment allowed the Soldiers of the 73d Military Police Detachment and 523d MWD Detachment to partake in a training event that spanned across two battalions, prepared each MWD team for deployment, captured lessons learned from those recently deployed, and improved the intra-Army understanding of force capabilities. The detachment is exercising mission command. Through collaboration and dialogue, internal and external to the unit, it is evident that the mission command philosophy of command is relevant.

On 28 September 2015, the three commanders of very distinct units trained 152 Soldiers and met a total of 12 unit-specific training objectives. These three units were the unified action partners responsible for Operation Air Max. Applying the mission command warfighting function—specifically, the principles of building cohesive teams, creating a shared understanding, and providing a clear statement of the commander's intent—provided the members of these units with the distinct flexibility and confidence to operate within the air and ground commanders' intents, achieving mission success and fulfilling training objectives. 

Endnotes:

¹ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 17 May 2012.

²Ibid.

Captain Gamble is the commander of the 73d Military Police Detachment and the 523d MWD Detachment, Fort Riley, Kansas. She holds a bachelor's degree in business economics from the University of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky.

("Leadership Philosophy," continued from page 5)

mediocre units from superior units. All teams have strengths and weaknesses. To be effective, teams must understand their own strengths and weaknesses. A weakness can be a mental or physical limitation. A mental weakness can vary from a lack of knowledge to a lack of mental tenacity. A physical weakness can vary from not possessing a certain physical skill set (such as being unable to swim) to being unable to meet a desired goal (such as a specific run time on the Army physical fitness test). But teamwork involves not letting teammates fail. If a Soldier is mentally or physically deficient, the entire team must work together to help him or her excel. Struggling to push past mental and physical limitations serves as a beneficial learning experience for teams and units. It creates a shared understanding of capabilities and limitations. Understanding a Soldier's capabilities within a team is important in learning to work as an effective team and building cohesion.

Cohesion, an essential element of a successful team, allows an organization to work through any task, regardless of difficulty. Group cohesion, which is reflected in the tendency for a group to stick together and remain united in the pursuit of goals and objectives, is instrumental in meeting set standards and attaining success. Cohesion is what brings units together to complete a task. It may allow lives to be saved on the battlefield. The Army is a team in itself, and it has the ability to maintain cohesion despite any personal differences among Soldiers. An atmosphere that strives for success for all, through cohesion, should be the goal.

Conclusion

A leader's philosophy can be composed of tenets that are important to him or her and that help bring out the best in every Soldier. Creating the philosophy and making it known to others is the first step. Possibly more important, believing in it and incorporating it in your values are next. There are many ways to lead a unit, but instilling a team's pride in its craft and competence will help make it successful. Fully embracing responsibility, respect, and teamwork sets a unit apart from its peers. 

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The 89th Military Police Brigade Establishes Habitual Relationships

By Major Early Howard, Jr.

During the past decade of conflict, the main warfighting focus of the Army became the brigade combat team (BCT). The BCT was supported with one organic military police platoon to conduct military police missions that were assigned. After the Army's realignment of force structure and the removal of the military police platoon, divisions and BCTs had no organic military police capabilities beyond a small staff element. Habitual relationships were developed to show maneuver commanders the capabilities that military police can provide and to create a desire for these capabilities in garrison and on deployments. Habitual training and operational relationships between military police forces and BCTs were established to ensure that III Corps provided its subordinate BCTs with the capabilities required for assigned missions and future operations.¹ The formalization of these relationships was imperative for optimizing the use of III Corps military police forces and for ensuring that BCT commanders have the capabilities needed to succeed. The 89th Military Police Brigade established habitual relationships with BCTs to support the current fight, protect the force through combat readiness, and help forge the future of military police forces within III Corps.

The III Corps commander, Lieutenant General Sean McFarland, concurred with the concept and feasibility of a habitual relationship and codified it with an official order for all III Corps units. Military police habitual relationships are nondoctrinal command relationships that require close coordination between the parent military police battalion headquarters, the gaining BCT headquarters, and the division provost marshal's office.² Habitual relationships are defined and implemented by the following:

- Military police companies are in direct support (DS) to BCTs for BCT collective training, combat training center (CTC) rotations, and operational requirements on order.
- During collective training in garrison and CTC rotations, military police companies are tactical control in DS to their aligned BCTs.
- Concurrent deployments with their aligned BCTs may not occur, and the relationship may be determined by the combatant command.
- Military police companies will only be in a DS role while participating in collective training events or deployments. While in garrison, military police companies are unavailable to their aligned BCTs for garrison mission tasking.

Normal command and support relationships are clarified when the augmented BCT conducts detailed mission analysis for augmentation with military police forces.

Supporting the Current Fight

BCT commanders have expressed concerns about military police being "on time" units, not receiving training with the BCT before a CTC rotation or deployment. Military police units arrive at CTC rotations and deployments unfamiliar with the standard operating procedures and tactics, techniques, and procedures of supported commands. Under the guidance of Colonel Ross T. Guieb, 89th Military Police Brigade commander, a functional alignment concept was developed to provide needed military police capabilities due to the removal of military police platoons from BCTs.

The alignment of military police forces to maneuver units is based according to the assigned installation. Military police battalions assigned to the 89th Military Police Brigade provided one military police company in DS to each III Corps BCT for training and possible deployment.

Home station training opportunities integrated military police companies with their BCT counterparts and helped establish relationships, unity of effort, and a common operating picture before CTC rotations. While in a DS role to each BCT for collective training, military police gained valuable warfighting experience, confidence in their abilities, and an understanding of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

Colonel David Hodne, Commander, 1st Stryker BCT, 4th Infantry Division stated: "I think much of our success in the wide area security effort resulted directly from the habitual relationship with the 984th Military Police Company [759th Military Police Battalion, 89th Military Police Brigade]. We would have been hard-pressed to establish the roles and responsibilities at the National Training Center [Fort Irwin, California] without conducting our previous training with the same unit at Pinon Canyon [Colorado]. The commander of Operations Group observed that the BCT force protection (clearly enabled by the 984th) was a significant factor in defeating the irregular force threat in the BCT security area. Many threat forces were defeated through the use of traffic control points, aggressive security patrols, and command posts and support areas well covered and concealed by terrain."

Military police companies supported BCTs for CTC rotations to gain operational experience and demonstrate military police capabilities in decisive-action environments. Training management cycles were synchronized between military police companies and their BCT counterparts to support their home station training needs and Army force generation requirements.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Short, Commander, 91st Engineer Battalion, 1st Armor BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, "Having a military police company [64th Military Police Company, 720th Military Police Battalion, 89th Military Police Brigade] provides the BCT the capabilities needed to perform a full mission set. With no organic military police, the BCT would struggle to execute detainee operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, and weapons of mass destruction elimination operations."

Protecting the Force Through Combat Readiness

Focusing on habitual relationships enhanced the combat readiness level of military police companies within the III Corps footprint. Units within the brigade took a back-to-basics approach and focused on shoot, move, communicate, and protect fundamentals. Military police companies fostered a high state of readiness coupled with an expeditionary mindset through aggressive emergency deployment readiness exercise programs, organizational inspection programs, and external evaluations.

The 89th, in coordination with U.S. Army Forces Command, plans to send military police companies in a DS role to each III Corps BCT for operational deployments.³ This will provide military police units the opportunity to conduct traditional military police disciplines (security and mobility support operations, detention operations, police operations) outside the continental United States.

Forging the Future

Establishing habitual relations within III Corps has helped forge the future by defining the military police role in support of maneuver commanders. The 89th, in coordination with U.S. Army Central Command planners, is developing a request for the forces process to trigger the deployment of a military police company in support of its habitual aligned BCT.⁴ Military police and other enabler augmentations are needed if the BCT is to provide full warfighting function capability while conducting operations. The habitual relationship concept will increase the demand for military police conducting protection warfighting function tasks during a steady state and shaping operations in support of BCTs. Military police companies supporting BCTs will potentially partner with host nation police forces to support security co-operation activities, build capabilities, and help professionalize their forces.

The III Corps deputy commanding general, Major General John Uberti, received a semiannual training briefing from the 89th Military Police Brigade leaders. The briefing highlighted the concept of habitual relationships and

military police support to III Corps. Major General Uberti validated the concept, and he believes that the initiative will eventually spread throughout the Army as a proven concept and best practice for military police support to maneuver commanders.

"I will gladly take a military police company with me. I have missions where I can absolutely use their skill sets, but it has to be the unit we trained with at Fort Carson [Colorado] and took to the National Training Center," said Colonel Gregory Sierra, Commander, 3d Armor BCT, 4th Infantry Division.

Conclusion

The 89th Military Police Brigade established habitual relationships with BCTs to support the current fight, protect the force through combat readiness, and help forge the future of military police forces within III Corps. Establishing habitual relationships is strategically important to the Military Police Corps to maintain relevance and force structure within a resource-constrained Army.



Endnotes:

¹Operation Order PW 15-03-0280, *89th Military Police Brigade Habitual Relationships*, 27 March 2015.

²Ibid.

³Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 26 August 2013.

⁴Gregory L. Cantwell, et al., *Regionally Aligned Forces: Concept Viability and Implementation*, U.S. Army War College Press, March 2015, p. 39, <<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/carlislecompendia/Issues/mar2015/full.pdf>>, accessed on 26 January 2016.

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Training in Today's Environment: A Pacific Perception

By Captain Danielle A. Champagne

In our development experience, military police were the “do it all” Soldiers of the Global War on Terrorism—often at the expense of our policing skills and functions, which make us unique and ever important. We understood our roles in the main effort on the battlefield and fought as infantry. But the future success of our companies relies on returning to our doctrine foundation. For example, as military police, we can operate as teams; we are not always part of the typical squads of Afghanistan and Iraq. Ensuring that we know and understand our doctrine is the first step in training Soldiers to standard. Wars are won at the team level if we can doctrinally operate as a team. We can accomplish any mission as a squad or higher. The following quote from Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, conveys the message that we are trying to teach: “The police skills and mind-set of the military police Soldier form the basic building block for the Military Police Corps Regiment. Forming three of these uniquely trained Soldiers into a team forms the basic military police team that is the foundation and centerpiece of tactical military police organizations.”¹

After taking command of the 58th Military Police Company, the first sergeant and I knew that the challenges we would face in training Soldiers to standard would be based on two major factors: high operational tempo and limited resources. Four months into command, we company leaders got our first opportunity to execute training. The challenges that we thought were going to be major problems (including developing junior leaders, returning to doctrinal concepts, and understanding how to train in a resource-constrained environment while simultaneously conducting sustainment operations) turned out to be part of an issue that was developed through the ever-evolving transition of the company. Understanding these topics provided focus on the company deployment and redeployment to the Pohakuloa Training Area (PTA), located on the Island of Hawaii.

Training With Limited Resources During a High Operational Tempo

Soldiers who have trained at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, are aware of the limited training resources that come with being confined to an island with sensitive cultural and environmental concerns. This issue affects all units regardless of the location, but we accomplished training objectives by deploying to the PTA. While this was our company's first green cycle in almost a year, we all knew the importance of quality training time for Soldiers and their junior leaders. Before the event, staff sergeants and sergeants had limited opportunities to train their Soldiers. Additionally, platoon leaders and platoon sergeants (most of whom were new to the company) had never experienced such dedicated training opportunities. High operational tempos had always ensured that Soldiers were tasked with many missions, from law enforcement to general installation support, and were not often available for dedicated training outside of a green cycle.

We developed the unit training plan by placing the priorities on squad certification; mounted, live-fire exercises; and advanced range density. The advantage of training at PTA versus a



Soldiers react to direct fire as part of a squad certification lane.



A Soldier provides security as part of the route regulation enforcement squad certification lane.

combat training center is that we had free range to develop training objectives and the lanes, scenarios, training scripts, and synchronization matrix. We originally planned for three squad lanes for training and certification; however, once on the ground, we decided to condense the lanes from three to two to maximize training time and enhance training effects. This was the best decision that we made while at PTA. Putting more emphasis on two lanes allowed us to perform route regulation enforcement and convoy security to standard. The lessons our Soldiers learned by focusing on a particular high-payoff subtask far surpassed our expectations.

The training at PTA was the easiest mission we had during the off-island training cycle even though we were required to operate on a limited budget. The coordination that the executive officer performed before the event, on the ground, and while at home station was critical. We coordinated personnel movement through rotary wing aircraft from the Combat Aviation Brigade, while simultaneously coordinating for equipment transportation through the Army's logistics support vessels—truly the greatest asset in the deployment and redeployment to PTA. To enhance the training effect of the deploy/redeploy mission-essential task list, we coordinated and processed all pieces of rolling stock and containers through the Multifunctional Deployment Facility. We decided to take only a light package of vehicles to PTA and ensure that we could use additional troop carriers (light medium tactical vehicles) in lieu of our standard vehicle packages. This minimized space on the logistics support vessel, ensuring that we would have the needed transport and lift capability. By using rotary wing aircraft and logistics support vessels, we trimmed our operating budget by \$110,000, allowing us to use limited and competitive resources.

Promoting Leader Development

The concept of professional development, as outlined in Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, sets standards and gates for us to strive to meet. We must develop our Soldiers across the three domains of the leader development model: self-development, institutional, and operational domains. However, we must also arm Soldiers, especially junior leaders, with a doctrinal knowledge base, professionalism, and a moral compass. If we can train, teach, and develop basics at the beginning of their careers, they will share this knowledge with their Soldiers and peers and grow into stronger future leaders.

After observing our first day of squad lane training—exercising the military police capabilities of route reconnaissance, route signing, checkpoints, and roadblocks—we realized that our junior leaders lacked training to the standard that we were expecting. Through no fault of theirs, they did not understand basic military police disciplines. We decided to slow the high operational tempo and take the time to direct these classes, ensuring that our young officers and non-commissioned officers clearly understood each task.

With a plan in place, we recognized the need for the first sergeant to lead Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System training with our staff sergeants and sergeants. We had five 2-hour sessions built into our PTA training rotation. We started the training sessions the first night. The professional development sessions were extremely simple, and the junior leaders thrived on this opportunity—blowing past our expectations and raising the bar for our company standard. These professional development



A Soldier executes the M69 Hand Grenade Assault Course wheeled-vehicle obstacle.

(Continued on page 16)

Multinational Coalition Task Force Detention Operations

By Captain Osvaldo R. Santiago

Commanders at all levels are responsible for captured persons (CPERs) operations. Commanders drive operations, and they have an overall responsibility for the action and inaction of subordinate units and an obligation to ensure the safe and humane treatment of CPERs. The consequences of failing to conduct these operations correctly can impact national strategic objectives and negatively influence the overall North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Alliance goals in allied operations.

During rotation 15-03, Saber Junction 15, the commander of the 2d Cavalry Regiment emphasized the importance of CPERs operations across the Regiment and held squadron commanders responsible for the treatment of CPERs and collecting-point operations. The high accountability standard required of subordinate commanders by the 2d Cavalry Regiment Commander set the conditions for a successful and positive outcome throughout the operation. This article highlights the procedures that contributed to successful CPERs operations in a decisive-action training environment.

The increased need to enhance interoperability with other government components, military branches, and NATO allies in all facets of warfighting has required the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for detention operations. Detention operations may seem complicated to forces not familiar with the mission; however, they are quite simple if incorporated during the early stages of the planning process. During Saber Junction 15, Army and NATO allies established a combined collecting point designed to receive, process, and transfer CPERs during combat operations, which is unique in the current operational environment. How are the challenges of running a combined collecting point in an expeditionary decisive-action training environment exercise with NATO or multinational allies accomplished?

In answer to that question, the training event highlighted the principles and guidelines of establishing a collecting point and identified some of the challenges faced in a decisive-action training environment exercise.

The three primary variables to a successful combined collecting point incorporate—

- Commander's responsibility and planning.
- Construction of a collecting point.
- CPERs in-processing.

Rotational Background

Generally, the detaining or capturing unit (the unit that has apprehended CPERs for further investigation) is responsible for the proper care, custody, and control of CPERs. Once in custody, CPERs processing is conducted by the detaining country. The detaining unit establishes a collecting point within its area of operations to facilitate the expedient evacuation of the CPERs. In this scenario, countries that operate in overlapping operational environments may find that their standard operating procedures differ, although the objective is the same. These varying approaches and standard operating procedures of individual countries can create gaps



U.S. and Bulgarian military police soldiers discuss the collecting-point security gaps.

in a systematic approach. These gaps can then impact the success of the mission. NATO doctrine pertaining to CPERs operations authorizes individual nations an exemption from performing certain aspects of CPERs operations based on national caveats. Countries that have developed and implement a strict guidance (such as the United States) will bridge the gaps in other countries' standard operating procedures. It is essential for commanders to identify the CPERs-related national caveats of allied nations before any deployment or execution of operations.



Bulgarian military police soldiers maintain control of CPERs while a U.S. military police noncommissioned officer conducts in-processing procedures.

Commander Responsibility and Planning

The commander at each location and echelon maintains the overall responsibility for the execution of detention operations and provides safe and humane treatment for CPERs, as required by international laws (the Geneva Conventions and the Law of Armed Conflict). The commander must anticipate problems and establish planning mechanisms that identify potential detainee-related issues as early in the planning phase as possible. Plans should adequately account for a potentially large influx of detainees during the first days of combat operations.¹ The negative and visible impact that detention operations could have on the overall mission requires that several staff considerations be identified during the planning of detention operations:

- **Assets.** Military police units understand equipment requirements and are trained and prepared to conduct detention operations. Generally, these assets are tasked to provide their knowledge and expertise during combat operations. A plan must be established to identify organizations to be responsible for the transportation, processing, and operation of the collecting point when military police units are not available.
- **National caveats of multinational allies.** The staff must understand national caveats and capabilities of subordinate units. Some countries have the assets and training necessary to conduct full-scale detention operations independently, while others will provide technical guidance and assume advisory roles only. The intent of interoperability is to identify the strengths and weaknesses of all available units and capitalize on what each organization offers to achieve mission success.
- **Training.** Because conducting detainee operations is a Military Police Corps core competency, training immediately before an operation may not be necessary when a military police unit is available to conduct detainee operations. When other forces conduct specific and key functions, training should be emphasized and ensured before conducting an operation. The primary principles and concepts that a unit must understand include the Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, the development and implementation of one standard to conduct searches and escort CPERs, and familiarity with necessary documents (capture tags, sworn statements, evidence/property inventory, transfer). Training should incorporate legal personnel and other subject matter experts, when appropriate.
- **Logistics.** The success or failure of the detention operation mission in any given scenario is largely impacted by logistical planning. The primary objective of safely and humanely handling CPERs is effected through the segregation and processing of CPERs in appropriate housing or shelter, as the operational situation allows. Appropriate shelter or confinement may consist of a simple configuration of concertina wire and stakes or be as elaborate as tents or buildings. Additional considerations must include the storage of food, water, fuel, and generators depending on the length of the stay and the number of anticipated CPERs. Given that the general-purpose, medium tent can physically contain approximately 20 CPERs, a large number of CPERs could create a difficult situation to logistically control and maintain.
- **Location.** While the location of the collecting point can be dictated by a variety of factors, it should be located away from combat operations to prevent CPERs from observing what is occurring in the area of operations. In situations in which it is essential to maximize time and resources (such as during cordon-and-search operations), the operation of a collecting point in the area of

operations may be advisable. Additionally, in ideal scenarios, the collecting point will be within a support area in proximity to the main supply route. Operating a collecting point with access to the main supply route increases the ability to evacuate and transfer CPERs quickly and efficiently. Finally, resource and logistical support can be acquired if large numbers of CPERs must be processed.

Construction of a Collecting Point

In the course of decisive-action training environment rotations at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, a collecting point is established during force-on-force operations at the brigade level and below. The collecting point is designed to account for groups or populations and to secure those groups until they can be transferred or evacuated to the next higher echelon holding area.² In spite of the fact that there are no established standards governing how to create a collecting point, some of the guidelines from U.S. and NATO doctrine are very similar. The collecting point should, where possible, be based on an existing building to reduce the need for engineer support to erect perimeter wire and overhead shelter. There is no formal design for a collecting point, but it must be built to suit the climate, the weather, and the operational situation.³ During Saber Junction 15, there was no permanent structure available; therefore, U.S. and Bulgarian military police requested engineer assets from the brigade engineer battalion to assist in the construction of the collecting point. The combined effort of the U.S. military police, Bulgarian military police, and brigade engineer battalion overcame the logistical challenges of constructing the collecting point. The collecting point provided the space needed for in-processing, medical screening, interrogations, and sanitation requirements and offered the capability to process large numbers of CPERs. Additionally, the engineer battalion used heavy equipment to form berms for direct and indirect fire protection—key and necessary elements for a successful operation. In an effort to recognize the future plan, the headquarters and headquarters troop, brigade engineer battalion, and 2d Cavalry Regiment assigned the following roles and responsibilities for the operation of the collecting point:

- **Facility officer in charge.** A company commander (captain) oversees the facility operation and provides technical guidance to the guard force.
- **Facility assistant officer in charge.** A military police first lieutenant represents the officer in charge in his or her absence and supervises the day-to-day facility operations.
- **Facility noncommissioned officer in charge/liason from the brigade provost marshal's office.** A military police sergeant first class enforces facility standards and supervises guard force operations and the in-processing of CPERs.



Soldiers from the Bulgarian military police platoon improve the collecting-point structure.

- **Facility security and guard force.** A Bulgarian military police platoon conducts security, searches, and custody and control of CPERs.
- **Medical screening.** A physician assistant and a health care specialist provide medical care and conduct medical screening.
- **Interrogations.** Three human intelligence collection teams conduct interrogations.

Process From Point of Capture

Detention operations are initiated at the point of capture. This is generally the most vulnerable step of the operation, as Soldiers must disarm, restrain, search, and guard CPERs in a hostile environment. The detaining or capturing unit has the overall responsibility of securing, controlling, and coordinating transportation for the CPERs until their evacuation to the collecting point. Upon arrival at the collecting point, the CPERs are generally received by a military police unit. The complete in-processing of CPERs through the collecting point involves a variety of tasks and key personnel. Tasks performed by military police during in-processing include guard, search, provide a capture tag, segregate, and generate a group capture report.

Next, medical personnel perform a medical screening; they examine CPERs and treat any injuries that require immediate medical attention. Once the CPER is cleared by medical personnel, human intelligence personnel interview the CPER to determine if further interrogation is necessary. When further interrogation is required, trained and certified personnel conduct the interrogations. Following the interrogation phase, a recommendation for release or transfer is submitted to higher echelons for approval.

During Saber Junction 15, the proper delineation of roles, responsibilities, and rehearsals between the training units proved to be an asset to the overall success of the detention operation mission. Each military component understood and was able to execute its assigned roles, which mitigated

any confusion within the units. Each CPER was treated humanely and processed correctly throughout each step of the operation.

Conclusion

As we continue to build and develop an interoperable capacity with our NATO and multinational allies, detention operations will continue to be a critical mission during combined operations. The Joint Multinational Readiness Center provides leaders with the unique opportunity to train, identify issues, and find creative solutions to solve tactical challenges with NATO and multinational allies. In Saber Junction 15, military police, military intelligence, engineers, maneuver elements, and NATO allies came together to overcome some of the challenges of conducting detention operations in an expeditionary environment. The successful outcome of detention operations is achieved through competent and engaged leadership willing to train and enforce discipline at the unit level. We must continue to develop training exercises with our allies and enable our leaders to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures to maintain the edge over our enemies, achieve excellence, and increase the capabilities of our alliance.



Endnotes:

¹Joint Publication 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 13 November 2014.

²Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 26 August 2013.

³Allied Joint Publication 2.5(A), *Captured Persons Materiel and Documents*, 8 August 2007.

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(*“Training in Today’s Environment . . . ,” continued from page 12*)

sessions continued, focusing on many topics, including military police disciplines, roles and responsibilities, counseling, the difference between corrective training and punishment, and anything else these young leaders wanted to discuss and learn. The platoon leaders also attended the first sergeant’s Noncommissioned Officer Professional Development System discussions as part of their professional development, and they gained valuable knowledge from the noncommissioned officers. We routinely met once or twice a month and conducted a formal officer professional development session, discussing topics ranging from the command supply discipline program to operations orders and FM 6-0. But nothing could replace the abilities to deploy, train, and lead Soldiers through the off-island training rotation or the professional development lessons learned by our company leaders.

Returning to Doctrine

Leaders should not rely too heavily on past deployment experience. The explanation that “we did it this way in (insert country)” is no longer acceptable. With fewer deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism, the terms *expeditionary* and *linear* have now become relevant, realistic, and plausible. Doctrinal training must occur.

Closing

Understanding that every leader in today’s Army is operating in the challenging environment of high operational tempo and limited resources, we have managed to accomplish our missions in different but acceptable ways. We cannot capture all the lessons learned by deploying/redeploying, training, and leading at PTA. But this article relays the overall themes of our PTA training cycle. In conclusion, our leaders and Soldiers worked to accomplish the mission of a PTA rotation and the high-payoff returns gained with an expeditionary mind-set by understanding the importance of sustained readiness, even for a training event.



Endnote:

¹FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, 5 May 2014.

References:

ADRP 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*, 23 August 2012.

FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 26 August 2013.

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Phoenix Battalion Revolutionizes Training by Integrating the Entire Team

By Captain Michael C. Howard

The 92d Military Police (Phoenix) Battalion has long taken great pride in providing a highly trained, professional military police force capable of deploying worldwide to conduct military police combat support to full spectrum operations and providing garrison support with chemical assurance and qualified law enforcement to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. However, military police units include a wide range of military occupational specialties (MOSs)—not just military police Soldiers. In an effort to integrate the entire team, the 92d Military Police Battalion enhanced the professional proficiency of its support MOSs by creating the Phoenix Professionalizing the Professionals Program (P4) and sending those support Soldiers to career-enhancing schools and training. The goal was simple: achieve a highly professional, well-rounded military police unit by developing all battalion Soldiers—not just the military police Soldiers.

The early stages of the P4 training cycle focus on ensuring that military police meet the myriad of qualifications required to conduct garrison policing operations. All military police Soldiers attend the Phoenix Academy (the battalion military police training program) to become certified for law enforcement duties. The P4 also incorporates driver's training to ensure that a maximum number of military police Soldiers are certified and licensed to provide interchangeability between access control and law enforcement personnel. Another area of emphasis is on weapons qualification and proficiency. Soldiers perform a variety of weapons qualifications, with a primary focus on the M9 pistol, M4 rifle, and M500 shotgun to maintain proficiency on their duty weapons and maintain law enforcement certifications. Soldiers also qualify on crew-served weapons to maintain combat readiness. The use of the Engagement Skills Trainer to reinforce preliminary marksmanship instruction and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; night fire; and shoot/no shoot scenarios has proven to be beneficial in retaining these critical skills. Additionally, Phoenix Soldiers participate in reflexive fire drills and complete the Military Police Firearms Qualification Course to develop and maintain advanced proficiency with their duty weapons. The highlight of the

weapons training is a unique live-fire shoothouse in which Soldiers conduct shoot/no shoot scenarios while performing room-clearing techniques using their law enforcement gear.

One of the primary goals of the Phoenix Battalion is educating the future leaders of the Army. To further the professionalism of our Soldiers, select individuals attend advanced law enforcement schools in an effort to develop organic subject matter experts. These individuals serve as battalion assets that can share the knowledge gained, increasing the expertise and capacity of the parent company and the battalion as a whole. Some of the targeted training courses for these individuals include—

- Domestic violence intervention training.
- Special reaction team training.
- Military police investigation training.
- Child abuse prevention and investigation techniques.
- Antiterrorism evasive driving training.
- Critical incident peer support training.
- Inter-Service Nonlethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course.
- Personal security training.
- Department of the Army civilian police use-of-force training.
- Defensive tactics training.
- Missouri Uniform Law Enforcement System training.
- Army law enforcement and tracking system training.

One of the key components of P4 is the use of organizations that are not normally associated with Army law enforcement training. These training opportunities allow the battalion to broaden Soldier expertise and strengthen community relationships. In support of this endeavor, the 92d Military Police Battalion hosted a law enforcement seminar for senior leaders in which outside agencies (the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Kansas City Police Department, the county judiciary, the sheriff's department, and the state attorney general counsel) briefed our leaders to expand policing awareness and develop new skills. A large part of the

discussion focused on educating law enforcement professionals on recent events involving the escalation of force. Other topics included crime scene- and evidence-related subjects. An emphasis on attention to detail and professionalism standards proved to be extremely important; these can have a significant influence on the outcome of an investigation or trial.

To broaden the Phoenix Soldiers' knowledge base, the 463d Military Police Company brought the Law Enforcement Training Institute from the University of Missouri-Columbia to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. The topics of discussion emphasized the concepts of ethics, professionalism, terrorism, extremism and weapons of mass destruction awareness, fair and impartial policing, field interviews, and constitutional law. Given the current operating environment, these topics are of the utmost importance to civilian and military police operations.

The culminating event for the P4 training cycle is a situation-based law enforcement exercise. The exercise combines training and evaluation, replicating an actual duty shift from beginning to end. Soldiers attend guard mount; receive instructions, assignments, and a threat brief; and perform preventive maintenance checks on weapons, radios, and patrol vehicles. The military police Soldiers begin their patrols in and around Stem Village, (a life-like mock town) and respond to calls issued by the military police desk. In

the scenarios, Soldiers respond to a variety of situations commonly encountered by our daily patrols, including traffic stops, larcenies, assaults, domestic disputes, and worst-case emergency scenarios (active-shooter, disaster, and suspicious-package responses). To increase training realism, we use enablers such as narcotics and bomb dogs and explosive ordnance disposal assets to familiarize Soldiers with these additional tools. During and following a call, Soldiers train on the tactics and paperwork associated with each situation. Within the scope of each vignette, Soldiers are required to complete documentation of the case files. This greatly enhances the Soldiers' capability and confidence levels when completing required forms, which is a frequently overlooked but critical aspect of the criminal justice process.

In addition to the police operations focus of the P4 training cycle, the battalion stresses support for MOS-focused training to enhance other MOSs within the Army. Initially, the battalion focuses on Soldier Training Publication Skill Level 1-4 tasks to prepare Soldiers for individual and leader tasks in support of garrison police operations and unified land operations. To develop more resourceful and expansive

training, the 92d Military Police Battalion began reaching out to civilian counterparts on behalf of support MOSs.

There are numerous opportunities for communications specialists, health care specialists, food service specialists, and maintenance specialists to receive career-enhancing training that benefits the individual, the battalion, and the Army. For example, maintenance Soldiers attend the Master Driver Trainer Course and the Wheeled-Vehicle Recovery Course to enrich their knowledge base and implement best practices obtained from their counterparts into daily operations. Select wheeled-vehicle mechanics (MOS 91B) travel to Springfield, Missouri, to receive training at the Prime, Incorporated facilities. Prime, Incorporated provides the Soldiers with insight into their procedures on dispatching and truck operations, trailer repairs, mechanical troubleshooting and diagnostics, preventive maintenance tracking, and logistics for repair parts. Health care specialists (MOS 68W) participate in cadaver training

at Logan University in St. Louis, Missouri. The cadaver training includes hands-on experience accompanied by practical instruction in human anatomy and physiology. This valuable training further empowers junior leaders by developing their skills and confidence to train and lead Soldiers.

The P4 concept provides Soldiers from a wide range of MOSs with the ability to enhance their level of experience and professionalism through a combination of MOS-specific training

and external agency support. The P4 model is an invaluable training strategy that strengthens mission readiness through advanced professional development for our most valuable asset—our Soldiers. Our intent is to continue this unique endeavor to mentor Soldiers and leaders to the higher level of experience and professionalism that U.S. citizens have come to expect from our Profession of Arms.



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91st

Military Police Battalion

Supports Joint Exercise Sentinel Warrior

By Lieutenant Colonel Aaron M. Poulin

A small, heavily armed adversary force is hidden along a ridgeline overlooking a secluded dirt road. Its target, an Air Force convoy, approaches from the east. The signal is given, and the adversary initiates an attack with multiple improvised explosive devices disabling the primary target. Rocket-propelled grenades, heavy machine-gun fire, and smoke fill the air as the adversary rushes the Air Force convoy.

This could be the start of many after action reports from combat action encountered in the mountains of Afghanistan or the desert of Iraq, but it's not. This describes Joint Exercise Sentinel Warrior, conducted at Camp Guernsey, Wyoming, from May to June 2015. The exercise, which was hosted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) on behalf of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, involved more than 250 personnel from all Army components (Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve) and other Services.

DTRA is headquartered at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, and is the agency responsible for conducting the joint force-on-force exercise to test policy in terms of manning, equipping, training, and tactics


for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. The DTRA Force-on-Force Branch plans and coordinates these exercises over a 12-month period to enhance the ability of the military to perform against a real threat.

For this exercise, Air Force security forces from the 90th Missile Wing, 20th Air Force, Francis E. Warren Air Force Base, Wyoming, were the blue force (friendly force). The 90th Missile Wing conducted its standard mission set of convoy operations under extreme hostility by an adversary force represented by U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) planners and augments from the 91st Military Police Battalion, 511th Military Police Company, Fort Drum, New York. Military police forces were specifically requested from the joint staff due to their knowledge and skill set. The 1st Platoon met and surpassed every expectation set for it, and it received several exceptional compliments from the SOCOM team on its motivation, resourcefulness, and unmatched determination.

SOCOM special operators carefully planned and coordinated various attack scenarios that challenged the blue force ability to maintain positive control of the convoy. The experience of the special operators was key to successful daily operations. However, the tactical foundation each 91st Military Police Battalion Soldier brought to the fight was absolutely invaluable. When asked what expectations he had coming into this exercise, one of the participants stated: "I expected it to be physically demanding, but fun; and it was!"

Each iteration effectively prepared the blue force for a variety of worst-case scenarios that could occur with little to no notice.

The exercise planners did their best to ensure that every aspect of the exercise was as realistic as





Adversary forces initiate an attack.

possible. “Classroom training and theory only get people so far; and the sounds of gunfire, although only blank rounds, are a powerful motivator,” stated Air Force Senior Master Sergeant Garrett Langston, the exercise senior controller and force-on-force noncommissioned officer in charge.

All the stops were pulled for Joint Exercise Sentinel Warrior in terms of resources, such as specialized tactical vehicles, UH-60s from the Colorado National Guard, ground burst simulators, and elite heavy weapons. Exercises such as Sentinel Warrior have resulted in overall improvements to security policy, equipment, and tactics; and they have strengthened the protection of the Nation’s armed forces. This exercise also allowed the military police platoon to see how sister Services conduct sensitive convoy security and tactics, techniques, and procedures that they can take with them as lessons learned. All the Services, together with

Regular Army, National Guard, and Army Reserve members achieved holistic problem solving.


The stakes are high, and the safety and security of sensitive assets and those security professionals guarding them require that things be done right. Thanks to this joint exercise and others like it, the U.S. military remains ready and able to detect, delay, deter, deny, and defeat potential enemy threats. Numerous high-ranking officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian executive visitors attended a Distinguished Visitor Day during Joint Exercise Sentinel Warrior. Admiral Cecil Haney, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, had only positive comments about the military police actions during the event. The platoon executed Distinguished Visitor Day without any SOCOM members—a first in the 20-year history of the joint exercise. With such outstanding results, the DTRA Force-on-Force Branch will keep military police forces at the top of the list for future force-on-force exercises.



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Adversary forces assault a convoy.



An adversary force sniper supports the assault element.



Standardizing Military Police Unit Level Police Training and Certifications

By Lieutenant Colonel Jon P. Myers, Chief Bobby S. Lungrin, First Lieutenant Joshua J. Larson, and Sergeant First Class Jason R. Wilburn

The Military Police Corps continues to conduct unit level police initial and sustainment training in a non-standardized, archaic format that varies from installation to installation, unit to unit, and commander to commander. By instituting a five-tier training and certification framework, the 519th Military Police Battalion has achieved a systemic, rigorous, and thorough training regimen, which has standardized and increased technical policing proficiency and confidence in military police Soldiers.

Five-Tier Police Training and Certification System

The tiered training concept was developed in an effort to link requisite skills and performance with a commensurate grade and position. The training concept is designed to provide newly arriving military police Soldiers or Department of the Army civilian police officers (DACPs) with the minimum training standards needed to perform law enforcement duties at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The topics instructed in the tiers are selected to provide the highest payoff for the training time invested in the student. The tier training is structured into categories based on the ranks and position levels of the battalion or department of emergency services (DES) population. The courses are based on, and closely resemble, the Louisiana State Peace Officer Standards and Training program of instruction.

In addition to the tier training system, the battalion requires each unit to conduct law enforcement scenario-based training lanes after completing a green cycle. These lanes consist of basic military police tasks (Conduct a Traffic Stop, Conduct a Field Interview, Respond to a Domestic Disturbance); however, the lanes are usually tailored to address the calls for service most recently received on the installation.

The law enforcement training and certifications for each student are tracked by a standard law enforcement packet system. As a student progresses through each tier, his or her progress is tracked on a checklist that is signed by each instructor. The packets are maintained at the unit operations section. Each military police Soldier/DACP is authorized to perform garrison law enforcement duties once the necessary certifications are complete and his or her packet is signed by the battalion commander. Once students complete the appropriate tier training (basic certification, patrol

supervisor, watch officer), they are required to complete on-the-job training with a senior military police/DACP of similar rank or position.

Causation and Need for Development of the System

Before the development and implementation of the tiered training concept, each company conducted law enforcement training on its own, with only basic guidance and oversight from the battalion and DES staff. Naturally, this approach led to wide variations in the quantity and quality of law enforcement training that was conducted. The impact to law enforcement was predictable: The proficiency varied widely from Soldier to Soldier, company to company, and leader to leader. The tiered training concept addresses the proficiency gap by providing a single set of cadre to instruct every class; presenting a uniform set of relevant, high-payoff training topics; and applying a uniform training standard across the formation.

Tier 1-Basic Patrol Certification

The 519th Military Police Battalion operations and training officer/police operations officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO) are the primary coordinators for Tier 1. They are responsible for all resourcing and instructor assignments based on the course curriculum.

The instructors are subject matter experts (SMEs) who are sourced throughout the battalion, DES, and other agencies on the installation. They primarily consist of NCOs who have the requisite experience and instructor certifications. DES SMEs teach classes such as Army law enforcement reporting and tracking system and access control point operations classes. The police operations officer teaches a variety of classes, including training on jurisdiction, policies and procedures, standard operating procedures, traffic stops, high-risk stops, investigations of impaired drivers, report writing, and apprehensions.

The Emergency Vehicle Operators Course (EVOC), Interservice Nonlethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC), and basic marksmanship ranges are taught by certified instructors sourced throughout the battalion. Staff judge advocate SMEs provide classes on proper procedures for testifying in court (Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, *Compulsory Self-Incrimination Prohibited*);

search and seizure; and the use of force. The airfield operations SMEs certify the patrols for driving on the airfield in the event that an incident occurs on the runway.

Population

All company grade military police Soldiers (private through captain) and newly hired DACPs are required to attend the Tier 1 course before performing law enforcement duties. All military police Soldiers are then required to complete a 6-day, on-the-job training program where they are placed with an experienced patrol, supervisor, or military police duty officer before operating solo. Military police Soldiers/DACPs then attend the other tier courses based on rank and position. Each class size ranges from 10 to 20 personnel.

Major Tasks

Tier 1 provides the basis for patrol certification. The participants are taught many basic law enforcement topics; each class is instructed from a standardized program of instruction based on industry standards, Army regulations, and local policy. A policies and procedures class covers the basic policies and standard operating procedures governing DES law enforcement activities. All military police Soldiers are required to attend a use-of-force briefing that is instructed by a judge advocate general representative. This briefing is scenario-based and covers a range of incidents that military police Soldiers/DACPs could face while working in law enforcement.

The EVOC is a 2-day course that covers classroom instruction and includes a backing course and a high-speed driving course. The students are required to successfully navigate the driving courses, receive a "GO" status from the EVOC instructor, and pass a written test covering the entire block of instruction. INIWIC certifications are completed over a 3-day period and cover training on unarmed self-defense, mechanical-advantage control holds, the Taser®, and oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray.

Results

The results are performance-driven and assessed based on practical and physical exercises, written exams, after action reviews, and course critiques. The course results are quantified and recorded on an order-of-merit list. At the end of the 85-hour course, the students must successfully complete a written test, with a grade of at least 80 percent. The Tier 1 training has created a uniform standard of training throughout the battalion.

Tier 2–Advanced Patrol Certification

Tier 2 is primarily staffed by DES DACP personnel. Every Tier 2 instructor is a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Instructor Course and has been Louisiana State Peace Officer Standards and Training-certified.

Population

All military police Soldiers are encouraged to attend Tier 2; however, the target population of the course is every

Soldier/DACP who serves as a single-person patrol, senior patrolman, or patrol supervisor. The course is modeled after portions of the Louisiana Peace Officer Standards and Training curriculum. The students benefit most from the advanced patrol tactics taught in this course.

Major Tasks

Tier 2 gives students an in-depth knowledge on topics such as advanced patrol tactics, crime scene protocol/evidence collection, criminal patrol, patrol as investigators, officer safety and survival, search and seizure, domestic violence response/investigation, use of force, and active-shooter response. The students are also introduced to more advanced topics (police models, incident command, crime awareness, computer-aided dispatch). The classes give patrol officers a better understanding of how to incorporate officer safety and survival skills into calls for service, how to conduct a criminal investigation, what to document on a case, and what to look for to meet the elements of a crime as mandated by applicable laws.

Results

At the end of the 80-hour course, students must successfully complete a written test, with a grade of at least 80 percent. The results of the Tier 2 course have been significant. Patrols are more confident in their abilities, which is evidenced by an overall increase in the quality of work demonstrated by those who have graduated from Tier 2. Nearly every aspect of performance (report writing, citations, evidence collection, neighborhood canvassing) has exhibited marked improvement.

Tier 3–Patrol Supervisor Certification

Tier 3 is also instructed by senior members of the DES staff who have completed the Federal Bureau of Investigation Instructor Course.

Population

The patrol supervisor (not the desk sergeant) holds the most important position on a Fort Polk law enforcement shift. The Fort Polk DES operates with a consolidated 911 communications center responsible for all emergency medical service, fire, and police dispatch on the installation. Therefore, the structure is different than a standard military police station containing desk sergeants and radio/telephone operators. The burden of responsibility for the shift is placed on the patrol supervisor and the watch officer. Tier 3, which was developed with the patrol supervisor in mind, provides the most benefit for the battalion, DES, and the installation. The tier is intended for prospective patrol supervisors and builds on topics taught in Tier 2.

Major Tasks

Students begin the course with an in-depth discussion on the policing model used at Fort Polk (a combination of problem-oriented policing and Computational Statistics [COMPSTAT]).¹ The supervisor's role in that model is then trained in detail. Students are instructed in crime scene management, incident command, report writing, criminal

patrol, local/state legal statutes, communications plans, response plans, patrol distribution, consolidated dispatch, and emergency 911 operations. Tier 3 is taught in a small-group format, and information is discussed rather than presented as a lecture.

Results

As in Tier 1 and Tier 2, the 40-hour Tier 3 ends with a written test that students must successfully complete with a grade of at least 80 percent. The results from Tier 3 have been dramatic. The immediate benefit has been to pass ownership of the law enforcement shift from the desk sergeant to the patrol supervisor, which has improved the performance of the patrols in every aspect. Equally as important has been the establishment of a working relationship between senior DACP staff and the NCOs who work as patrol supervisors. The intangible benefits of these relationships cannot be overstated.

Tier 4–Military Police Duty Officer Certification

Tier 4 is staffed by senior members of the DES. It is intended for senior NCOs and officers who will be working as duty officers on the installation. The tier is designed to introduce prospective duty officers to incident command, consolidated dispatch, installation policy, response protocols, and notification procedures and to their role in developing products used for the daily COMPSTAT-style meetings. The training has established a pool of trained leaders who can readily assume incident command responsibilities. It also helps maintain habitual relationships with installation staff and leaders from the fire and security divisions within DES.

Tier 5–Semiannual Certification/Provost Marshal General-Directed Training and Specialized Certifications

As of August 2015, DES has been certifying radar and standardized field sobriety test (SFST) instructors; however, due to manpower turnover, the battalion currently has only one certified SFST instructor. The battalion goal is to increase and stabilize certified instructors across the units in order to increase the number of military police Soldiers certified in each specialized task.

Certification by Specialization

DES and the 519th Military Police Battalion work with the Louisiana State Police Academy to train and certify military police Soldiers/DACPs on SFST and Intoxilyzer® 5000EN operations.² As of August 2015, the 519th Military Police Battalion had 47 military police Soldiers certified to conduct SFSTs. The battalion is projected to send two more Soldiers to the SFST instructor school to increase training and certification opportunities.

Currently, the 519th Military Police Battalion has 39 radar-certified military police Soldiers. The battalion is hosting a Radar Instructor Train-the-Trainer Course with the capability of certifying 30 personnel. The course is scheduled for the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2015. The Radar

Mobile Training Team Course supplies the battalion with a large pool of instructors who are capable of teaching and certifying military police Soldiers/DACPs on radar/lidar operations. This will have a ripple effect on Military Police Corps law enforcement training as these instructors depart and take their knowledge and abilities to other installations.

Major Tasks

All military police Soldiers are required to qualify semi-annually on duty weapons. Currently, small-arms ranges are routinely conducted by units within the 519th Military Police Battalion. The battalion recently started incorporating the marksmanship techniques taught in the Law Enforcement Firearms Train-the-Trainer Course. The battalion hosted a Law Enforcement Firearms Train-the-Trainer Course mobile training team and is planning on transitioning the law enforcement qualifications to the Law Enforcement Weapons Training and Qualifications standards once the ammunition allocation changes outlined in Department of the Army (DA) Pamphlet 350-38, *Standards in Training Commission*, take effect.

EVOC Retraining

EVOC retraining is offered to military police Soldiers/DACPs based on need. Military police Soldiers/DACPs who are involved in on-duty traffic crashes can be directed to attend a scheduled EVOC class, based on the commander's guidance. Retraining is done on a case-by-case basis and is conducted in conjunction with the Tier 1 EVOC class.

Motorcycle Training

Two battalion military police Soldiers are currently detailed for police motorcycle duty. Before conducting motorcycle patrol, military police Soldiers complete a Louisiana State Peace Officer Standards and Training-certified basic police motorcycle school. One NCO recently completed motorcycle training provided through the Northwestern University Center for Public Safety (hosted at Louisiana State Police Barracks, Zachary, Louisiana). Military police Soldiers continue to hone their motorcycle skills through daily drills conducted before, during, and after their shifts. The police motorcycle section is a highly effective traffic enforcement unit that provides the traffic section with better mobility and the ability to maneuver through traffic to identify and stop violators. The police motorcycle section also provides many community policing services (leading parades, providing traffic control for installation runs, supporting other events). The police motorcycle section heavily patrols residential sections, primarily responding to traffic-related complaints and traffic crashes.

First-Year Results

The tiered system of police certifications began in early 2014. The identification and use of SMEs to instruct classes greatly increased the content value of each class. As assessed by DES personnel, the quality of police work (such as report writing [content and diction], case work [Community-Oriented Policing Services/the Army Law

Enforcement Reporting and Tracking System], and the correct use of citations and forms) has greatly improved since the inception of Tier 2 and Tier 3.

Throughout 2013, DES received numerous interactive customer evaluation (ICE) comments that directly related to military police Soldiers' performance and proficiency levels or tasks ranging from directing traffic to responding to calls for service. Approximately 12 percent of the comments received were positive, but an overwhelming majority were negative. Throughout 2014, the ICE comments dramatically improved—approximately 50 percent of the comments received for that year were positive. For the first 8 months of 2015, approximately 55 percent of the ICE comments were positive—a 5 percent increase over 2014. Although these are nonstandard representative samples, the numbers are somewhat indicative of the public perception of military police Soldiers conducting law enforcement duties.

Since the implementation of tier training, the battalion has continually received positive feedback from senior leaders throughout the installation, mostly commenting on the increased professionalism seen in on-duty military police Soldiers.

Way Ahead

Currently, the Tier 1 training is implemented on a monthly basis, with the other tiers scheduled quarterly or as needed based on demographics. The battalion is testing a pilot program in which the tier courses are melded together to create a police certification course. The goal of the new course composition is to provide the newly arriving military police Soldiers/DACPs with the training needed to effectively work law enforcement at their level. For instance, a captain attending the entire course would complete Tiers 1, 2, and 4 and be certified to conduct military police duty officer on-the-job training. The police certification course is designed to be modular, allowing military police Soldiers/DACPs who have already completed a portion of the tier program to complete the required classes for the next tier course. The goal is to create a more capable, proficient military police Soldier/DACP at the end of the course. Once the 2015–2016 population completes their tier courses, the new certification course model will be solidified and will become the standard for police certification.

To address the lack of specialized instructors available to the battalion, units are to semiannually send NCOs to the specialized instructor courses to maintain two instructors for INIWIC, SFST, and radar/lidar courses based on projected losses of current instructor staff.

A program to reinstitute Digital Training Management System job books at the squad leader level is being implemented in fiscal year 2016. This program will allow units to observe and record semiannual and annual training requirements for their military police Soldiers, as directed by the Provost Marshal General. In addition, the job books will streamline the requirements and allow the critiques to be completed in real time while the squad leader and military police Soldier are on duty.

Conclusion

Before the implementation of the tiered police certification system, the standard for police training and certification was inconsistent and dependent on the SME and instructor populations of the military police companies at any given time. The goal of the tier system is to standardize training and provide DES with better-trained military police Soldiers/DACPs who understand law enforcement concepts and conduct themselves as police officers on patrol. Great strides have been made by focusing the training on law enforcement tasks identified as lacking across the formation by the units and DES senior leadership. Moving forward, the battalion and DES continue to resource certified instructor schools, increase military police Soldier/DACP proficiency, and ensure the continuity of institutional knowledge with the goal of ever improving police training and certifications at Fort Polk and across the Military Police Corps. 

Endnote:

¹According to the New York Police Department, COMPSTAT is a statistics-based policing model.

²An Intoxilyzer calculates the alcohol concentration in a breath sample.

References:

DA Pamphlet 350-38, *Standards in Training Commission*, 6 October 2015.

Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 31, *Compulsory Self-Incrimination Prohibited*, <<http://www.ucmj.us/sub-chapter-6-pre-trial-procedure/831-article-31-compulsory-self-incrimination-prohibited>>, accessed on 5 February 2016.

Lieutenant Colonel Myers was the commander of the 519th Military Police Battalion and garrison director of emergency services for Fort Polk, Louisiana, from October 2013 to September 2015. He holds a bachelor's degree in aviation management from the Florida Institute of Technology, Melbourne, Florida; a master's degree in business and organizational security from Webster University; and a master's degree in military arts and sciences from the School of Advanced Military Studies.

Chief Lungrin is the chief of police of Fort Polk, Louisiana. He retired from the U.S. Army Military Police Corps in 2004 as a first sergeant. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice administration from Columbia Southern University, Orange Beach, Alabama.

First Lieutenant Larson is the police operations officer and special reaction team officer in charge for the Fort Polk DES. He holds a bachelor's degree in business administration from Kaplan University, St. Louis, Missouri.

Sergeant First Class Wilburn is the first sergeant for the 204th Military Police Company. He was previously the police operations NCO for the 519th Military Police Battalion. He is currently pursuing an associate's degree in criminal justice from Northwestern State University, Natchitoches, Louisiana.

Platoon 21-Day Green Cycles

*By Lieutenant Colonel Jon P. Myers, Major Chris B. Treuting,
and First Lieutenant Joshua J. Larson*

The reduction of two military police combat support companies at Fort Polk, Louisiana, coupled with ever-increasing installation policing, access control, and general tasking requirements, drove the development of a high-intensity, short-duration green cycle training framework that increased focus on key collective tasks and the reinforcement of team and individual tasks for shoot, move, communicate, and field craft, which enabled continued police operations and support to the installation. Additionally, the growth of technical and tactical leadership abilities at the team, squad, and platoon leadership levels is a benefit of employing the 21-day training regimen. Finally, keeping training cycles in line with a 14-, 21-, or 28-day training pattern helps build readiness that directly translates to a “prepare to deploy” order and helps units focus valuable training time on the appropriate areas.

After the change of command of the 519th Military Police Battalion in October 2013, the battalion began Army structure reductions of two combat support military police companies (the 209th Military Police Company and the 272d Military Police Company) throughout fiscal year (FY) 2014. Aside from immediate requirements to gain senior commander approval of tenant units supplementing access control points in late FY 14, the battalion did an in-depth validation of all policing requirements (such as two mandatory military police patrols, which were reduced to one military police patrol) to free up as much manpower as possible. Finally, the battalion continued to support the U.S. Central Command with up to 78 military police Soldiers deployed throughout FY 14 and FY 15. All told, the need to meet the U.S. Army Forces Command unified land operations training requirement led to the establishment of an 18-day green cycle (later changed to a 21-day cycle) that companies executed at a platoon or platoon (-) (equivalent to two military police squads) level, beginning in the last quarter of FY 14.

An 18-day green cycle was chosen so that each one of the six military police line platoons would have a chance to train at least twice annually. Otherwise, the conventional, 6-week green cycle would limit most platoons to training once a year. Although shorter, the 18-day training cycled

through multiple iterations, building tactical and technical competence in platoon leadership beginning with key leader, individual, team, and collective tasks associated with deployment and redeployment. The training included quartering-party operations; field site operations; platoon defense (of a patrol base); and all baseline shoot, move, and communicate team level tasks that are involved in all key collective task training. After the third iteration of an 18-day green cycle, each team, squad, and platoon is capable of focusing on the specific key collective tasks assigned for that green cycle. Basic tasks are already sufficiently mastered and do not detract from the overall training effect.

After the initial positive feedback, the battalion expanded the training to include the 41st Medium Transportation Company, which is assigned to the battalion for training, readiness, and assessment. The first green cycle iteration for the 41st Medium Transportation Company began in May 2015. Above all else, the lessons the 519th Military Police Battalion revealed during the design and implementation of short-duration, high-intensity training cycles serve as a great example for other battalions that experience a reduction in force or an increase in requirements, negating company size green cycles.

Following the first full year of employing the 18-day green cycle format, the battalion lengthened the cycle to 21 days to—

- Provide more military police surge capacity to the department of emergency services for driving under the influence, force protection, community-oriented policing initiatives, and other short-duration efforts.
- Allow more transition time between red cycle road assumptions for the green cycle platoon.

As proven during the 3d quarter of FY 15, the concept of squad- and platoon-mounted fire and maneuver combined arms live-fire exercises (CALFEXs) in the green cycle works. The concept drives home the importance of shoot, move, and communicate baseline task proficiency and equipment maintenance and employment proficiency for our military police Soldiers, squads, and teams.

21-Day Green Cycle

The basic 18-day green cycle is best depicted in Figure 1. The cycle is broken down into individual team level task training, squad collective task training, and a culminating event. The culminating event is a 3- to 5-day field exercise in which the platoon or platoon (-) conducts an emergency readiness deployment exercise, deploys to a field site, establishes a defense and patrol base, and conducts crawl-walk-run lane training for key collective tasks identified for that green cycle. To help shape and prepare platoon leaders for this effort, the population was tasked with several professional development readings and sessions. Professional readings included—

- Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*.
- Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 7-0, *Training Units and Developing Leaders*.
- ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.
- ADP 5-0, *Special Operations*.
- ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.
- ADRP 5-0, *Special Operations*.




Figure 1. The 18-day green cycle

T+8 to T+6 Training Assessment and Leadership Planning

The Army training management model seems to present a great challenge to our company grade leaders, especially when linking planning and preparation to resource forecasting. These challenges are further amplified when operating completely under the Digital Training Management System with the FY 15 upgrades to a not-fully-functional Version 7. Throughout this transition, the battalion

operations and training officer was critical in leading company commanders, operations sergeants, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants through a gated implement strategy that focused on the Army physical fitness test; weapons qualifications; and critical Army Regulation (AR) 350-1, *Army Training and Leader Development*, training requirements structured to avoid impacting key collective task training. As a military police battalion, this entire training synchronization was set against the backdrop of a police five and two, 8-hour shift schedule that negated individual and team level training afforded during a typical amber cycle.

To help shape the green cycles for the companies and platoons, the battalion fully extorted the Army Training Network and the combined arms training strategy to conduct a mission-essential task list crosswalk across supporting key collective tasks and their corresponding key leader and individual tasks. Although digitally based, the battalion conducted training management leader proficiency development sessions focusing on how to use analog methods of conducting a mission-essential task list crosswalk and high-payoff task analysis that was digitally replicated. This was necessary to establish and promote the appropriate context

for leaders across the formation as doctrinal knowledge deficiencies in the Basic Officer Leader's Course and Advanced Officer Leader's Course were observed. Notably, company grade officers and noncommissioned officers were raised in the Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom training management models wherein companies were usually given a set of deployment tasks and requirements, with battalion and higher headquarters conducting training planning, resourcing, and forecasting for them. Reacquiring a 1990s era (pre-Operation Iraqi Freedom) mind-set built up training management competencies in

our junior leaders, which directly relates to increasing the professional military leader vernacular in our platoon and company grade leaders.

In addition to instructing and employing analog and digital training management systems, the battalion also conducted leadership development and the employment of past military police training frameworks (the Eight-Step Training model, lane training) to accomplish key collective task training.

Green Cycle Briefings

The primary feedback mechanisms for platoon leaders to the battalion commander were green cycle training briefs conducted at T+4 to T+3 (4 to 3 weeks before training began). Before briefing the battalion commander, platoon leaders briefed the battalion operations and training officer at T+5 to ensure that their training plans, preparations, and resource coordination were on track with no threats to meeting the training objectives. The Eight-Step Training Model was used as the backbone for the green cycle training briefs, along with key collective task and high-payoff task selection and prioritization, concept of operations, timelines, training support resources, and the deliberate risk assessment for the specific training events.

In addition to providing a quality control mechanism before training, the green cycle training briefs provided real-time leader development and feedback to the platoon leader from the battalion commander and staff. In conjunction with sand table-based, five-paragraph operation order range briefs, platoon leaders were given sufficient opportunity to gain confidence in briefing senior leaders; gauge the effectiveness of their planning and preparation cycles; and directly obtain the commander's intent, direction, and guidance.

Green Cycle Composition

As previously explained, the 21-day green cycle is composed of key individual and team tasks, team and squad collective tasks, leader tasks, and a platoon collective task execution in a field environment. Based on the actual size of the training audience (platoon, platoon [-], squad), the tempo of the individual, team, squad, or platoon training tasks varied. As a backbone, lane training was used as the primary training framework for all green cycle training. Within this construct, the crawl-walk-run methodology was followed and squad and platoon leaders self-assessed whether their respective elements were ready to progress to the next phase. The training management model helped platoon leaders pick two to three key collective tasks on which the platoon would focus during the culminating lane training field training exercise. Based on company and battalion commander vision, intent, and guidance, the platoon leaders conducted mission-essential task list crosswalks wherein the specific key collective tasks were identified and prioritized. Due to the frequency of the training cycles, high-payoff collective tasks such as alert, upload, and deploy and the majority of shoot, move, and communicate individual and team tasks were executed in each green cycle iteration. This allowed units to build a baseline of core competencies relating to decisive action, unified land operations, and deployable readiness regardless of the key collective tasks selected for the field training exercise.

Each 21-day green cycle iteration consisted of deployment-related tasks, to include load plan validation, maintenance checks, mounted patrol and convoy procedures,

Joint Capabilities Release/Blue Force Tracking, frequency hop/cypher text using the Advanced System Improvement Program, weapons mounting and employment, and platoon and squad troop-leading procedures. Maintaining training consistency in these tasks allowed platoon leaders and squad leaders to build upon tactical standard operating procedures. Upon arrival at the field site, platoons also conducted quartering-party operations, established a platoon patrol base, and conducted platoon defense and many related field-operating tasks. This raised the baseline core competencies of each platoon, focusing on deployable readiness.



Following the lane training of key collective tasks, platoons conducted redeployment and recovery, usually in 1 to 3 days, depending on the platoon police lanes and the assumption date for day-, swing-, or mid-shiftwork. The police lanes were introduced to get the military police platoon back into a garrison law enforcement mind-set, and they encompassed department of emergency services-identified weak areas or specific high-payoff law enforcement tasks. They were conducted with the crawl-walk-run methodology, with battalion and department of emergency services police operations instruction as required by the company. The focus of the culminating event for the police lanes was determined by the department of emergency services and the provost marshal and included driving-under-the-influence checkpoints at access control points, community watch surge patrols, and requested military police platoon mission sets.

Practical Applications

The inactivation of two military police combat support companies and the fielding of several new modified table of organization and equipment systems and upgrades (Raven® Unmanned Aerial Vehicle System, Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station, Light Vehicle Obscuration Smoke System, M2A1 heavy machine gun, armored security vehicle



combat vehicle crewmen equipment, AN/PEQ-15, vehicle information and communications systems in M1151 fleet, M26 shotgun, M320 40-millimeter grenade launcher, integrated laser white light pointer, Joint Capabilities Release/Blue Force Tracker mission command system) simultaneously took place in the 519th Military Police Battalion in FY 15. The short-duration, iterative green cycle exposures allowed military police platoons to field new and upgraded equipment on a piecemeal basis and integrate the equipment into their formations ahead of the major battalion level training events during the same period. The battalion executed the first deliberate mounted gunnery in August 2014, with the newly fielded Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station as the primary focus. The battalion used the M1117 armored security vehicle military police team certifications conducted earlier and used the gunnery training as the capstone. In preparation for the first mounted fire and maneuver CALFEX scheduled for June 2015, the battalion conducted another mounted gunnery training in February 2015. The training established a major collective effort as a semiannual requirement, as a mechanism to maintain gunnery qualifications, to enforce military police team certification maintenance, and to reinforce military police team shoot tasks.

In June 2015, the 519th conducted the mounted fire and maneuver CALFEX, rotating military police platoons through a daytime and nighttime squad-mounted, live-fire exercise and a platoon daytime CALFEX as the culminating training event. Due to the nature of sustaining police requirements, the battalion orchestrated and administratively operated the ranges and area of operations to allow company commanders and platoon leaders to focus on planning, preparation, and execution tasks and to evaluate training. The battalion incorporated the newly trained and upgraded Raven system and a rudimentary call for fire to simulate the combined arms support that military police platoon leaders could experience in a theater of operations. But the focus was on squad fire and maneuver of sections and platoon fire and maneuver of squads. The gunneries and the

CALFEX were only possible due to the baseline core competencies achieved through platoons conducting multiple green cycle iterations.

Conclusion

With the specter of future military police battalion and combat support company Army structure reductions ever present in our branch, high-intensity, short-duration green cycles provide a manageable and effective methodology to continue to build and sustain combat readiness at the military police squad and platoon levels. Leaders will continue to face training distractors such as lack of time or funds, taskings, and land availability. The next generation of company commanders must understand how to plan effective training around such constraints. Using a 21-day green cycle construct will enable platoon, company, and field grade officers to build readiness and collective task proficiency across battalions and companies and will help bring us in line with the vision behind the *Military Police Strategic Plan 2025*.



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THE POST-9/11 EVOLUTION OF THE USBP

By Lieutenant Colonel Matthew A. Mertz

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 significantly changed the priorities of the U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) due to a renewed focus on immigration enforcement.¹ In 2003, USBP became part of the newly established Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which was tasked with securing the Nation's borders.

A Strategic Organization

In 2004, USBP issued its first strategic guidance as a DHS component. The resource-based guidance was designed to apply resources to border areas that were identified as priorities.² This strategy continued through 2010. During this time, USBP experienced growth in manpower and resources and expanded its operational partners outside the DHS to the Army National Guard.³ Before 11 September 2001, the USBP had 8,619 agents assigned to the southwest border of the United States. That number has more than doubled and continues to grow today. In addition to the enormous personnel growth, the agency has increased its operational capabilities and capacity by adding extra border fencing, underground sensors, aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, water vessels, mobile surveillance systems, and remote video surveillance systems.⁴ In the last 15 years, during the William J. (Bill) Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack H. Obama presidencies, the U.S. government invested more resources in USBP than during any other time in the Nation's history.

Using the resource-based strategy, USBP experienced great success in reducing the number of illegal immigrants. However, the strategy did not address the source of the problem, and when Chief Michael J. Fisher took command of the USBP in 2010, he shifted the strategy to a risk-based approach.⁵ The shift was made as a result of the changing operational environment in which USBP agents worked. Lately, transnational criminal organizations have become more sophisticated and elusive. USBP agents can no longer apply additional resources and boots on the ground to combat an enemy that is agile and intelligent.⁶

Chief Fisher's new strategy contained two goals:

- **Goal 1.** Secure the Nation's borders through the application of information, integration, and rapid response.
- **Goal 2.** Strengthen USBP through an investment in the workforce and expansion of organization capabilities, including personnel.⁷

An Agency That Plans Doctrinally

USBP recognized that adopting a doctrinal approach to planning was required as the agency continued to mature and grow in the 21st Century.⁸ To establish the risk-based approach strategy, the USBP developed a three-prong

design:

- Threats, targets, and operations.
- Intelligence preparation of the operational environment.
- USBP planning process.

The three prongs were developed from numerous previously established sources, but were mostly influenced by the Department of Defense (DOD).⁹

USBP agents are required to complete the Border Patrol Academy, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, before assignment to a USBP station. It takes 66 days to complete the academy, which encompasses immigration and nationality law; statutory and criminal law; USBP operations; firearms care and use; physical training; motor vehicle operation; antiterrorism training; Spanish language courses; and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center course on ethics, report writing, computers, fingerprinting, and U.S. Constitutional Law.¹⁰ If a USBP agent is selected for a first-line supervisory role, he or she is also required to attend supervisory leadership training and the USBP technical training class—each 2-week courses—in addition to the Border Patrol Academy. Agents learn about their next higher positions through on-the-job training or mentorship by senior agents as opposed to an academic environment.¹¹

To build on the USBP planning culture foundation, CGSC interagency fellows perform a 1-year tour of duty with the USBP headquarters. These Army fellows serve as fully integrated USBP staff officers, filling positions while senior USBP agents attend CGSC. While assigned to the USBP headquarters, Army fellows employ their talents in the military decisionmaking process to assist the USBP and learn the dynamics of an interagency environment. Army fellows directly contributed to the development of the USBP planning process manual, which is the doctrinal foundation of USBP operational planning. The efforts provided by the Army fellows significantly contributed to Chief Fisher's first strategic goal to secure the Nation's borders through the application of information, integration, and rapid response.

In an effort to meet the second strategic goal of strengthening USBP through an investment in the workforce and expansion of organization capabilities, agents attend courses offered by the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC).¹² CGSC has provided senior USBP agents with the necessary skills in campaign planning, leadership, critical thinking, problem solving, and operations to perform their duties in a complex operating environment when they return to the field. These agents also pass along lessons learned at CGSC to subordinates to establish basic planning

skills and develop a planning-based culture.

The border patrol planning process enables USBP agents to plan against identified risks to the border through intelligence-driven planning. Rather than applying resources and manpower to risks as conducted during the resource-based strategy, the border patrol planning process enables planners to more efficiently use resources in a resource-constrained environment. Like Army planning, the USBP planning process employs a design methodology to define a complex problem and applies critical and creative thinking to develop courses of action to solve the root cause of the problem.¹³

However, USBP has only a few agents who have attended CGSC and who are trained and practiced in the military decisionmaking process. While assigned to the USBP, Army fellows fill the education gap, sharing their experiences and guiding the strategic and operational planning process.

Like most government agencies, USBP is experiencing a shortage of financial resources and manpower. Therefore, USBP cannot spare many agents to attend CGSC to continue broadening the planning experience and education of senior agents. The Leader Training and Development Directorate, USBP, began developing the USBP Basic Planner's Course as a solution. This course was designed by USBP agents experienced with the military decisionmaking process, retired military officers, and Army fellows. The USBP Basic Planner's Course covers the border patrol planning process. The end state of this course is to be the model for future Department of Homeland Defense joint planning and will be offered to all Department of Homeland Defense agencies.

Whole-of-Government Approach

The USBP has already experienced the whole-of-government approach to securing the Nation's borders through interagency and joint task forces. The Border Patrol Special Coordination Center, located at Fort Bliss, Texas, serves as a liaison between DOD and the USBP, through Joint Task Force North, to synchronize efforts for border security.¹⁴

In 2010, the Department of Homeland Defense requested DOD support along the borders of California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. Army National Guard troops were initially used as entry identification teams, criminal analysts, and aerial support. However, since 2012, the support has primarily been aerial.¹⁵ DOD support has expanded the USBP ability to interdict illegal entry into the United States.

In addition to troop support, DOD provides assistance to USBP through the DOD Technology Reutilization Program. Under this program, USBP acquires equipment for USBP agent use until USBP can obtain the equipment through the acquisition process. USBP has received more than 900 pieces of equipment for use along the border.¹⁶

Coordination between USBP and DOD is not a one-way street. During operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, USBP agents were deployed to support coalition operations along the borders of those countries. USBP agents provided expert guidance on detecting and deterring illegal entry into Iraq

and Afghanistan along a vast, sparsely populated border region. Many of the techniques demonstrated by U.S. agents were learned through their experience along the southwest border of the United States and through partnerships with foreign countries such as Israel.

In support of the President's National Security Strategy, USBP conducts operations to combat transnational organized crime within an interagency environment. These operations employ a whole-of-government approach, creating a collaborative operating environment for multiple agencies to coordinate agency-specific capabilities in a unified effort.¹⁷ The USBP wants its planning process to become the common planning tool across multiple agencies within DHS and a planning process that is identical to its DOD partners.

The South Texas Campaign is an example of a situation in which lessons learned from DOD were applied to coordinate intelligence, investigation, and interdiction through a unified command.¹⁸ The South Texas Unified Command was designed to identify criminal targets, which were shared among the unified command members for discussion and evaluation. Members included federal, state, and local law enforcement officers. Once the targets were voted on by the unified command members, each member agreed to dedicate resources and efforts toward degrading the identified target. The center of gravity of each target was analyzed along with the ends, ways, and means of the criminal organization to best target illegal activity.¹⁹

In an attempt to synchronize and focus the efforts of the DHS, the Southern Border Campaign Plan was established. The department-wide plan is designed to employ the combined efforts of the entire DHS to enforce lawful trade, commerce, and travel and to reduce transnational crime across the border.²⁰ Currently, each agency operates independently of the others and works together through requests and information sharing. Under the Southern Border Campaign Plan, three joint task forces will be developed and commanded by a senior official of the Department of Homeland Defense. Under the joint commander, he or she will have operational control over assigned assets from Customs and Border Protection, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigration Services, and the U.S. Coast Guard.²¹ Therefore, the operations of separate agencies are combined into a single line of effort.

Conclusion

The USBP currently partners with DOD, other federal agencies, and state and local law enforcement organizations. Before the USBP effort to establish joint task forces and develop strategic and operational campaign plans, much of the whole-of-government approach was conducted by establishing connections and cooperation with other agencies. The USBP, through the development of strategic partnerships and joint task forces, has shown its partner agencies the benefits of joint cooperation and how each agency can mutually benefit when resources are combined and focused toward a common interest.



(Continued on page 33)

Developing Adaptive Military Police Leaders Through Joint Duty Assignments

By Major Scott R. Blanchard

Military police leaders who are interested in leader development, joint assignments, or joint matters—take note! If these topics don't generate immediate interest, then pause and consider the role that joint assignments play in developing adaptive military police leaders or ponder the former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's remarks on the importance of jointness in the advancement and preservation of our Profession of Arms.¹ Military police leaders must understand that joint experience and education affect the force of the future and that joint matters maintain relevancy in leader development programs.² For the benefit of our profession and the U.S. Army Military Police Corps, this article presents information on joint matters and affirms that military police leaders must rigorously compete for joint duty assignments.

In addition to the reasons already mentioned, statutory law (supported by a brief analysis of American military history) illuminates the need for joint Services to cultivate jointness. Jointness is derived from "the integration of Service cultures and competencies and requires teamwork amongst all Services and military departments to accomplish objectives in the best interest of national security."³ Jointness, which is perishable, requires the military to place special emphasis on sustaining this capability. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that military police leaders should compete for joint duty assignments and for joint assignments at a combatant command (CCMD), such as Africa Command (AFRICOM). Joint assignments—

- Develop adaptable military police leaders by exposing them to the joint planning and execution community.
- Provide military police leaders with opportunities to influence joint planning matters that impact the Army operating concept and the *Military Police Force 2020 Strategic Plan* (STRATPLAN).⁴
- Offer military police leaders the opportunity to become joint-qualified officers, which can lead to increased assignment opportunities.

As mentioned, joint assignments to geographic CCMDs expose military police leaders to the joint planning and execution community. This complex series of interactions between people, processes, and programs influences the progress of the national military strategy and develops adaptive military police leaders who are prepared to effectively operate at the strategic and operational levels of war.⁵ Through the crucible of staff planning, military police leaders learn to integrate, synchronize, and translate "national strategy into strategic and operational concepts of military

force employment."⁶ CCMD military police leaders generate unified action in unison with other instruments of national power and represent a "vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces that conduct operations."⁷ To thrive in joint assignments, joint officers must learn to operate within a "system of systems" and a "process of processes," which may include joint strategic planning, programming, budgeting and execution, the adaptive planning and execution community, and the joint operation planning process. Assignments to joint staff positions provide an experience-based context for the jumble of acronyms learned during Intermediate-Level Education, solidifying the interrelationships between these complex processes and systems.

In addition to gaining exposure to the joint planning and execution community, joint assignments motivate leaders to apply critical thought and analysis to the main planning documents that drive strategic direction. Internal documents become essential planning documents that, when translated into plans and operations, lead to the assignment and employment of military capabilities to achieve U.S. strategy. As eloquently stated, "The joint officer who understands the intricacies of this system of systems will be better equipped to develop the most efficient and effective ways and acquire the most appropriate means for meeting ends that are in concert with the national strategy of the United States."⁸ Without question, joint assignments develop military police leaders to align the operational and tactical employment of military police capabilities to the U.S. strategic direction.

Joint assignments also develop military police leaders by providing unique insight into current and future theaters of operation, such as the AFRICOM area of responsibility.⁹ The U.S. Africa Command 2015 posture statement outlines the combatant commander's thoughts and priorities about Africa's emergent geopolitical significance. This statement to Congress provides an overview of the current operational environment and captures several of the strategic and operational risks that Africa presents to U.S. security interests which, according to the posture statement, "[continue] to present a broad spectrum of opportunities and challenges to the United States and our allies and partners."¹⁰ Continental Africa, roughly four times the size of the United States, consists of many unstable countries that possess ineffective leadership and exercise weak governance. Corrupt institutions and violent extremist organizations (al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Islamic State in North Africa, al-Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram) often have

more influence over African governments than do Westerners with their expectations of representative democracy and rule of law. Limited operational reach across the air, sea, cyber, and land domains of AFRICOM's 53-country area of responsibility, coupled with the fierce competition for interdepartmental Department of Defense resources, poses significant challenges to U.S. government diplomatic, informational, military, and economic influences.

By virtue of assignment to joint billets, military police leaders procure seats at the executive and corporate levels of leadership when it comes to strategic- and operational-level planning. Military police leaders who serve within the CCMD framework (including nonjoint military police leaders who operate at the assigned subordinate Army service component command) influence joint planning matters that directly impact the Army operating concept and the military police STRATPLAN. Military police leaders integrate and operationalize complementary aspects of the military police STRATPLAN with CCMD theater campaign plans, performing a critical capability for the protection warfighting function. Military police leaders synchronize protection function end states, objectives, effects, and CCMD theater campaign plans by executing security force assistance planning; employing military police capabilities in exercises and engagements; and participating in decisive-action operational activities by improving force protection posture, presence, and agreements with African countries.

In addition to campaign planning, military police leaders participate in joint and operational planning teams. Through the application of operational art, operational design, and the joint operation planning process, military police officers influence contingency and crisis action planning and current and future operations by providing expertise on the protection warfighting function. Within the joint operation planning process and adaptive planning and execution framework, military police planners review the full scope of operational plans, write orders, and capture protection-related tasks that often include policing, detention, and investigation. Overall, military police leaders ensure that the joint force commander has a tailored mix of protection capabilities that are synchronized in time and space and contribute to effective mission command.¹¹ By intelligently linking the Military Police Regiment mission, core competencies, and military police disciplines to CCMD theater campaign plans and operations, military police leaders leverage the Army operating concept and military police STRATPLAN to achieve the Military Police Regiment vision, goals, and objectives.

During fiscal year 2015, the AFRICOM joint protection team moved the Military Police Regiment forward through a deliberate focus on military police STRATPLAN objectives 2.4, 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 5.3, and 5.5.¹² In one of the more extensive operations that AFRICOM has conducted since its inception as a geographic CCMD, the J-34 (Protection) Division led the CCMD protection operational planning team during Operation United Assistance. Throughout this experience, the J-34 team conducted threat working groups and crisis action

planning strategies that resulted in recommendations to the combatant commander for protection priorities and the employment of the joint force for force protection, law enforcement, and customs purposes. In addition to Operation United Assistance, the joint protection team coordinated military-to-military engagements and initiated planning for the fiscal year 2015–2017 employment of allocated military police regionally aligned forces in the AFRICOM African Lion and Southern Accord Exercise series. Furthermore, the joint protection team executed program management for antiterrorism and force protection for 53 African nations, generated a multitude of travel restrictions, and assessed the annual area of responsibility force protection baseline for AFRICOM. Finally, the joint protection team coordinated the movement and repatriation of detained personnel, staffed service component command requests for high-risk personnel protection, and implemented identity activity program management.

Joint assignments and experiences provide military police leaders with opportunities to obtain joint qualification.¹³ Joint qualification can lead to added assignment options and increased promotion potential. Military police leaders who are competitive for promotion and demonstrate a most-qualified potential are likely candidates for joint duty assignments. The U.S. Army Human Resources Command develops joint-qualified officers via officer assignments to standard joint duty assignment billets. Standard joint duty assignments, which are limited and closely managed, are captured on the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff's joint duty assignment listing. The Military Police Corps currently has 15 standard joint duty assignment positions, nine of which are major and lieutenant colonel billets that are managed by the Military Police Branch; the other six military police positions are for colonels and are overseen by the Senior Leader Division at the Human Resources Command. Officers who obtain a Level III joint qualification during a standard joint duty assignment normally complete a mandatory 36-month tour and must complete Joint Professional Military Education–Level II. Military Police Regiment leadership acknowledges the rigor that is required for the completion of these assignments, but views joint assignments as rewarding opportunities that are designed to acculturate future military police leaders to other Service cultures.

To illuminate the value of a joint assignment, compare two fully branch-qualified battalion commanders, one of whom is joint-qualified and the other of whom is not. The joint-qualified officer may compete for the full range of senior Service college fellowships; however, the nonjoint-qualified officer is likely unable to compete for fellowships because many of these opportunities are governed by Joint Professional Military Education–Level II prerequisites or career progression timelines.

In summary, joint assignments matter! Joint assignments benefit our profession and the military police STRATPLAN and develop adaptive military police leaders for the force of the future. Earned through the crucible of joint assignment, joint experiences expose military

police leaders to the people, processes, and programs that determine strategic direction. Translated into plans and operations at a CCMD, strategic direction results in the employment of military capability and, therefore, directly impacts the Army operating concept, the military police STRATPLAN, and military police Soldiers. Joint military police leaders who serve at a CCMD integrate and synchronize Military Police Corps strategy with campaign planning and operations to prompt the positive employment of military police capabilities. Early exposure to joint assignments during a leader's career timeline results in additional assignment options and can compel leaders to be more competitive during their careers. For the benefit of our profession, the military police STRATPLAN, and individual leader development, military police leaders must rigorously compete for joint duty assignments.

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EXPANDING HORIZONS: DETENTION OPERATIONS AS GREEN CYCLE TRAINING

By Second Lieutenant Molly V. Buis

Military police companies within the 92d Military Police Battalion rotate through four cycles annually: red cycle (tasking), green cycle (combat training), amber cycle (law enforcement train-up), and blue cycle (access control and law enforcement). The green cycle typically focuses on mobility support operations or operational area security. However, this year, the green cycle brought unique challenges for the 988th Military Police Company. These challenges encompassed planning, constructing, securing, and operating a field-expedient detainee holding area (DHA) large enough to support 80 detainees for a period of up to 14 days, with the additional ability to support up to 500 detainees if necessary. According to Field Manual (FM) 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, when conducting detainee operations, a military police company will attempt to fall in on existing structures, if possible. However, the intent of the green cycle was to prepare for a completely expeditionary environment with no existing hard structures available.

Planning

As the 988th Military Police Company was heading into its 2015 green cycle, the command team received the order to train on detainee operations in support of the company mission-essential task of Conduct Detention Operations. Using the combined arms training strategies database of collective and individual tasks, the company commander and platoon leaders began a mission-essential task list crosswalk for detainee operations. Company leaders used the mission-essential task list crosswalk to identify the high-payoff tasks on which they would need to train within each platoon. According to FM 3-63, platoon leaders identified team, squad, and platoon level tasks, which aided them in developing detailed training plans on which to certify by the end of the green cycle. As planning progressed and the timeline for the green cycle was developed, it became clear that time management emerged as one of the keys to success during the planning and preparation phases. The company conducted team certifications during Week 5, squad certifications during Week 6, and platoon certifications during Weeks 8 and 9. Thus, the unit leaders needed to capitalize on every available minute of training time.

Preparation

Throughout the 988th Military Police Company planning phase, it became clear that the materials and assets organically available to the company would not be enough to construct a DHA according to FM 3-63. The company executive

officer took on the task of resourcing. This consisted of acquiring hundreds of rolls of concertina wire, concertina wire stakes, barbed wire, tents, cots, blankets, pillows, halal meals, detainee uniforms, hand-washing stations, examination gloves, evidence collection materials, and riot gear. With the philosophy of “nothing will be notional” in mind, the executive officer enabled company success by allowing platoon leaders to focus on training with the knowledge that the necessary supplies would be available when the time came to construct the DHA.

Company leaders also emphasized information management during the preparation phase. They focused on how to collect, organize, and access information about the detainees in the DHA in a field environment according to FM 3-63. The platoon leaders developed a system to enable the Soldiers working in the DHA to efficiently in-process each detainee, ensuring the completion of all necessary documentation in an organized manner. Soldiers used prefabricated trifold folders to create a packet for detainees as they arrived at the DHA in-processing facility. Each section of the folder contained a cover sheet detailing the forms required in each section. As each detainee progressed through the in-processing area, the Soldiers added the appropriate forms to the detainee’s packet. There were numerous advantages to these packets: any missing documentation became obvious upon inspection, the system functioned smoothly no matter the skill level of the Soldiers on shift, and the organized packets facilitated easy access to information when needed.

Team certifications, conducted during Week 5 of the green cycle, set the foundation for the 988th Military Police Company to successfully complete platoon certifications. During team certifications, platoon leaders certified their teams on the approved individual and team level tasks that support the mission-essential task of Conduct Detainee Operations. In keeping with the Army’s training philosophy of crawl-walk-run, team certifications took place at a training area specifically constructed for detainee operations, with all necessary infrastructure (secured holding areas, hard sites, fences, gates, latrines) already in place. This allowed the platoon leaders to focus their training on improving required tasks and processes without spending large amounts of time setting up and tearing down concertina wire and tents.

Using individual stations and a round-robin methodology, team certifications focused on individual and collective tasks that would serve as the building blocks of a successful integrated operation of a DHA. Tasks included receiving

detainees from the capturing unit, searching the detainees upon arrival, completing each of the required forms based on the information available, conducting strip searches of detainees during in-processing, facilitating medical examinations of the detainees by the company medics, collecting and recording each detainee's biometric information, escorting detainees within the facility, guarding detainees in their holding areas, and reacting to an escape attempt as a guard. The Soldiers and their team leaders had the opportunity to go through each task, and they received feedback on their performance. They also had the opportunity to observe other teams conducting the same tasks, which allowed them to learn from the successes and mistakes of their peers.

During squad certifications, the 988th Military Police Company built upon the skills refined during team certifications. Instead of training at an existing DHA site, the squads constructed a scaled-down version of a DHA, including holding tents, triple-strand concertina wire perimeters, and an in-processing facility. Teams executed their tasks throughout the DHA, while the squad leaders supervised the integrated DHA operations. This ensured the smooth flow of detainees through in-processing and the proper supervision of



Soldiers of the 988th Military Police Company construct the perimeter of the DHA.

detainees within the facility. In addition, the squad leaders coordinated the response to various contingency scenarios such as uncooperative detainees or detainees attempting to escape.

Execution

As the 988th Military Police Company arrived at the training site for platoon certifications, it established perimeter security, a DHA, a sleeping area, an eating area, a motor pool, and the company tactical operations center. During Week 8, Soldiers mowed grass, hammered stakes, and stretched concertina wire, while the rain poured and the mud got deeper. Platoon sergeants coordinated their efforts, and the executive officer continued to provide resources, which ensured that the company area and the DHA were ready for 24-hour operations by the beginning of Week 9.

Once Week 9 arrived and platoon certifications began, the management of work and rest cycles became one of the most critical challenges. With only three platoons available to secure and operate the DHA, each platoon ran 24-hour operations. In each 24-hour period, one platoon conducted perimeter security, one operated the DHA (in-processing and guarding the detainees), and one provided quick-reaction forces. The quick-reaction forces consisted of one squad on a 5-minute recall for external threats, one squad on a



A squad leader meets with a village elder to address concerns about personnel detained in the DHA.

15-minute recall for external threats, and one squad on a 5-minute recall for threats within the security perimeter (such as a detainee riot). Due to the high operating tempo of the mission, platoon leadership focused on the proper management of work and rest cycles to set the conditions for successful sustaining operations.

To enhance training and expose Soldiers to nonorganic equipment that they might see on deployments, the 988th Military Police Company coordinated with the Base Expeditionary Targeting Surveillance System—Combined Training Academy at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, to use a Cerberus Long-Range Mobile Surveillance System. Equipped with long-range cameras, thermal-imaging systems, and laser range finders, this system provided immediate detailed information on perimeter threats. In addition, the 988th Military Police Company coordinated with the Fort Leonard Wood Noncommissioned Officers Academy to use several Biometric Automated Toolset and Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment systems. Thus, the Soldiers gained experience with the operations and capabilities of several systems used in deployed environments.

After Action Review

The experience of the 988th Military Police Company resulted in numerous lessons learned that can contribute to further success for other units hoping to conduct similar training. The most influential factor in the success of the 988th Military Police Company was the contribution made by knowledgeable and experienced noncommissioned officers. These leaders shared what they learned through previous training exercises and through operational experience, providing important guidance to less-experienced Soldiers. There will never be enough time to train before executing complex missions such as running a DHA. It is absolutely essential to empower subordinate leaders to share their knowledge and expertise even during execution, filling in the knowledge gaps and enabling Soldiers and leaders to perform their duties with maximum success.

Each military police line company is assigned one Military Occupational Specialty 31E (correction/detention specialist) noncommissioned officer according to the modified table of organization and equipment. This noncommissioned officer played a critical role in the success of the 988th Military Police Company green cycle. As the only noncommissioned officer specifically trained in detention operations, he served as an advisor to the company commander and to the company as a whole. The knowledge and expertise of the 31E allowed him to provide critical insight; especially during the development of the DHA standard operating procedures (SOP) and the planning and resourcing of the DHA facility.

The hard work that went into resourcing the DHA greatly enhanced the 988th Military Police Company training exercise. It is possible to train Soldiers on detainee operations with notional detainees and engineer tape placed on the ground. However, an increasingly realistic training environment provides opportunities for progressively complex and realistic training—thus, better preparing the Soldiers

to execute the mission at combat speed and their leaders to lead efficiently and effectively.

The adverse weather conditions experienced during the 988th Military Police Company training exercise highlighted the importance of site selection when planning for a DHA. While the site would have been adequate during ideal weather conditions, the nature of the terrain caused the entire training site to turn into a field of mud during periods of rain. The DHAs became swamps, making it a challenge to maintain hygienic living conditions for the detainees. In a deployed environment, terrain and security considerations strongly influence site selection. However, when operating within an installation such as Fort Leonard Wood, site selection is limited to the available training areas. Although the terrain was not ideal, the site was the best training area available to the company given the dual requirements of a large amount of space and the ability to bivouac on-site with gray water capabilities for field feeding systems.

Another challenge faced by the 988th Military Police Company during the green cycle was the timely development and dissemination of the DHA SOP. During the weeks of training leading up to certifications, the team and squad leaders trained their Soldiers on high-payoff tasks identified in the company mission-essential task list crosswalk. However, the training guidance for each task in the combined arms training strategies database frequently provided only the most basic information, instructing leaders to train according to the local SOP. In addition, an SOP would provide a means of standardizing tactics, techniques, and procedures across the company, enabling each squad to seamlessly work with squads from other platoons. Thus, the training would have been even more effective if a completed SOP had been available in advance.

Conclusion

The 988th Military Police Company ventured into new territory for the 92d Military Police Battalion during its last green cycle. The company experienced some unforeseen challenges, but also gained tremendous skills and experiences. These are skills and experiences that can be put to use, whether deployed as a company to conduct detention operations or whether individual Soldiers go on to spread their knowledge to other Soldiers in other units throughout the rest of their military careers. By venturing out of the comfortable familiarity of security and mobility support operations, the 988th Military Police Company paved the way for other units in the 92d Military Police Battalion to learn from, and expand upon, its experience.



Reference:

FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 28 April 2014.

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94TH MILITARY POLICE BATTALION



"POLAR BEARS" STAND READY TO FIGHT TONIGHT

By Captain Roger J. Foley and Second Lieutenant Erin K. Flickinger

The 94th Military Police Battalion (Polar Bears), headquartered in Pyeongtaek, South Korea, is the largest forward-deployed military police battalion in the U.S. Army today. The 94th has six subordinate units that stretch nearly the length of the South Korean Peninsula, from Dongducheon to Daegu. The Polar Bears provide more than 330 military police Soldiers (trained military police investigators, traffic accident investigators, physical security specialists, dog handlers) daily to conduct law enforcement by establishing and maintaining discipline throughout the Korean peninsula. The battalion also uniquely trains and executes its mission alongside our Korean allies through the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) program, which provides an average of 80 additional Soldiers to each subordinate military police company, enhancing functionality and combat power within the formation. While law enforcement support remains our No. 1 priority, the battalion has placed significant emphasis on the ability to "fight tonight" should armistice with North Korea fail.

The Motto: When in Need

When in Need is more than the motto of the 94th Military Police Battalion. Under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Jimmy Carlson and Command Sergeant Major Lee K. Sodic, the battalion revitalized its tactical training plan to better posture the more than 1,200 Soldiers and 180 combat platforms of the battalion to alert, marshal, and deploy at a moment's notice to support 8th Army wartime efforts. Polar Bear Tactical Training (PBTT) is a 6-week green cycle training program that is planned and executed at the platoon level and rotated amongst each platoon within the four combat support military police companies of the battalion. Each PBTT cycle is designed to continually improve squad and platoon tactical capabilities and to fully train on mission-essential tasks in support of the wartime mission. The challenge is, without fail, to simultaneously maintain the large law enforcement support requirements in four separate U.S. Army garrisons, which includes manning all provost marshal offices with personnel who have additional skill identifiers and with desk crews in Areas I, II, III, and IV throughout the Republic of Korea. With this and the frequent Soldier turnover rate (due to 1-year tours), limited availability of crew-served weapon ranges, and geographical dispersion of subordinate units, the PBTT concept was the best solution to improve mission readiness.

PBTT Program

For every 6-week PBTT green cycle, one platoon from each company is responsible for planning and executing a collective training event using the Eight-Step Training Model. The PBTT 6-week green cycle training program consists of five phases:

- **Phase 1:** 2 weeks of shoot, move, communicate, and survive (medical) training.
- **Phase 2:** 1 week of battalion consolidated gunnery training.
- **Phase 3:** 1 week of field training exercise or live-fire exercise.
- **Phase 4:** 1 week of recovery operations.
- **Phase 5:** 1 week of law enforcement refresher training.



A 94th Military Police Battalion squad leader directs a gunner to engage a target during gunnery training.

Phase 1

Two weeks of shoot, move, communicate, and survive (medical) training is completed at home station. The training consists of Army warrior tasks and battle drills, gunner validation, communications training, and other mission-essential tasks determined by the company to best prepare for the training events that will take place in Phase 3. During Phase 1, platoons conduct a 2- to 3-day

field training exercise emphasizing troop-leading procedures, dismounted and convoy training simulators, the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST) 2000, night driver's training, land navigation training, communication through battlefield communication systems, and rehearsals.



A 94th Military Police Battalion Soldier fires the M240B into a building, suppressing the enemy.

Phase 2

Phase 2 is initiated with an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) and deployment to the field, followed by a week of crew-served weapons gunnery training. Each of the green cycle platoon EDREs is conducted at home station, and the exercise is not complete until the platoon arrives at one of the two major training areas in Area I. The platoon EDRE is evaluated by the brigade or battalion staff using the battalion "Rolling Thunder" checklist to ensure the safety, proper licensing, and convoy certifications of operators deploying from up to 400 kilometers away. Additionally, each company and the battalion operations and training section establish command posts at their respective headquarters to battle-track the deployment of each platoon element, from home station to the training site. The battalion consolidated gunnery consists of crew-served weapons qualification on the M1151 and M1117 armored security vehicle combat platforms using the M240B, MK19, M2A1, and M48 weapons systems. During gunnery training, a platoon from each company is assigned the responsibility to conduct operations for a specific range, ensuring that qualifications are completed to standard for each assigned weapon system. The end states for Phase 1 and Phase 2 are to ensure that all platoon combat platforms and crews are 100 percent qualified and mission-ready for the culminating event that takes place during Phase 3.

Phase 3

Phase 3 consists of a week of field training and includes a culminating training event. Through this capstone event, Soldiers and KATUSAs are able to experience and better understand mounted and dismounted military police

operations, to include conducting a cordon and search operation, a hasty attack, and a convoy security mission. Additionally, each company headquarters assumes the responsibility as the mission command element for each Phase 3 portion. As the mission command element, the company headquarters is responsible for all sustainment, life support, and command post operations for the duration of the exercise. Battle rosters for each platoon are also validated to ensure accuracy. The mission command companies train their headquarters sections by establishing a company command post, a field feeding site with a mobile kitchen trailer, a medical tent, a field maintenance area, and an ammunition supply point.

The mission command responsibility and culminating training event includes—

- PBTT Cycle I—Squad Lanes.
- PBTT Cycle II—Squad Lanes.
- PBTT Cycle III—Squad Live-Fire Exercise.
- PBTT Cycle IV—Squad Live-Fire Exercise.
- PBTT Cycle V—Platoon Field Training Exercise/24-Hour Operations.
- PBTT Cycle VI—Platoon Field Training Exercise/24-Hour Operations.
- PBTT Cycle VII—Squad Lanes.
- PBTT Cycle VIII—Squad Lanes.

Following the culminating training event, platoons re-deploy back to their respective area garrisons and begin Phase 4.

Phase 4

Phase 4 consists of recovery operations. During Phase 4, equipment that was brought to the field is refueled and cleaned and preventative maintenance checks and services are completed. The green cycle platoon conducts inventories of its assigned equipment and Soldier organizational clothing and individual equipment for accountability and documentation of any damage or shortages. Once leaders have completed an inspection of all recovery tasks and reports have been submitted, the platoons have completed the tactical portion of PBTT and begin to execute Phase 5.

Phase 5

The final phase of PBTT is made up of law enforcement refresher training. Phase 5 ensures that the green cycle platoon is prepared to assume its law enforcement commitment, which enables the next platoon to begin its green cycle rotation. Throughout this final week of the green cycle training, the platoons conduct training exercises dedicated to law enforcement tasks. The exercises include training on responding to active-shooter events, driving patrol vehicles, interviewing, completing military police paperwork, performing guard mount, conducting field sobriety tests, and responding to various scenarios. The scenario-based law enforcement training enables Soldiers to think on their feet and smoothly transition back to their law enforcement mission.

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Forming Partnerships: 511th Military Police Company Involvement in Operation Fused Response



By First Lieutenant Tristan D. Shaw

On 9 May 2015, 2d Platoon, 511th Military Police Company, Fort Drum, New York, assumed a security force and opposing force (OPFOR) mission in support of a training exercise, code name Operation Fused Response. The exercise was conducted at Soto Cano Air Base, Honduras. Operation Fused Response was executed by the Special Operations Command South in cooperation with Joint Task Force Bravo, used to train special operations teams on a variety of mission sets in the area of responsibility.

2d Platoon was tasked with providing critical site security for the training exercise and personal security detail teams for distinguished visitors. In addition to the security mission, 10 Soldiers played OPFOR roles for a variety of mission sets. As a result, a variety of special operations teams within the Department of Defense and the Honduran military police experienced maximum training time.

Road to War

2d Platoon trained on many tasks and battle drills before its departure to Soto Cano. The training varied from weapons qualifications for Soldiers who were individually assigned weapons to critical site security operations. Soldiers trained on multiple M4 and M9 ranges during the train-up for Honduras. During this time, 2d Platoon also completed Soldier readiness processing and all required online training courses. The online training courses focused on antiterrorism and human rights. Soldiers were trained and certified on the X26 Taser®, providing them additional means of subduing an individual without the use of lethal force. During the train-up to support this exercise, the Soldiers completed various training events to increase their proficiency on the escalation-of-force measures, convoy operations, and personnel and site security tasks. The Soldiers also familiarized themselves with the language and customs of Honduras. Upon completion of this training, 2d Platoon was prepared to undertake any mission assigned to it with the utmost proficiency and professionalism.

Mission

Upon arriving at Soto Cano, 2d Platoon hit the ground running. Soldiers participating as security forces were required to set up all necessary entry control points (ECPs) around the area of operations, while the 10 OPFOR Soldiers started train-up for their mission. Once the set-up was complete, security force Soldiers were ready to begin allowing the entry of the special operations teams and Department of Justice personnel participating in the exercise. The teams came from a variety of military branches within the Department of Defense and agencies of the Department of Justice, including U.S. Navy sea, air, and land (SEAL) teams; the Defense Threat Reduction Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment; and the 7th Special Forces Group. Once the teams arrived and set up operations in their designated areas, it was time to start the exercise.

Security Force Soldiers

From start to finish, the security force Soldiers manned three ECPs—one at the main gate of the logistics support area, one at the sensitive compartmented information facility, and one at the entrance of the flight line. Soldiers secured these three ECPs 24 hours a day for the entire exercise. The Soldiers securing the ECPs had the opportunity to work with soldiers of the Honduran army. This opportunity allowed our Soldiers to learn Honduran tactics, techniques, and procedures and to share best practices with them.

The Soldiers also needed to be flexible due to the changing nature of the mission. On multiple occasions, 2d Platoon was asked to perform security on the rugged landscape of Honduras. Military police Soldiers integrated with the Honduran army and military police forces to secure an airfield to facilitate a forward arming and refueling point for a real-world situation and personal security details for distinguished visitors who were visiting the area of operations. Adapting to these situations demonstrated to the special operations community the versatility of military police Soldiers and their uncanny ability to plan, resource, and integrate with a host nation force to execute a mission. Leaders

of the exercise praised 2d Platoon for its adaptability in overcoming adversity with short execution timelines. The versatility of Soldiers and leaders is a staple of any military police platoon or company. Military police Soldiers also provided valuable training and information to the special forces Soldiers and Honduran military police participating in the exercise. Military police Soldiers trained Navy SEAL team members, Army special forces, the Honduran army, and other military police on nonlethal weapon tactics, security operations, and law enforcement tasks. This training was valuable to the special forces teams participating in the exercise because many of them had mission sets that included advising and assisting host nation forces.

OPFOR Soldiers

OPFOR Soldiers trained and worked with Navy SEAL team members and Army special forces. During the train-up and after completing the target set-up, they executed close-quarter combat tactics and room entry and clearing procedures. Training of this magnitude is valuable to the military police Soldier; it can easily be translated and used in the garrison law enforcement mission set. OPFOR Soldiers also had the opportunity to work with Honduran military police; during that time, the Soldiers observed the similarities and differences in the use of tactics. Leaders were able to see similarities in how host nation soldiers were led during a mission. The host nation leadership followed almost the same troop-leading procedures used during the preparation of a mission in any U.S. military branch. Due to the high level of success and achievement of the platoon during this exercise, the military police Soldiers established a strong relationship with the Special Operations Command South, which may allow for follow-on training opportunities and partnership with special operations forces.

Conclusion

Soldiers of 2d Platoon, 511th Military Police Company, were grateful for the opportunity to participate in Operation Fused Response and to receive such valuable training and experience in a foreign country. This was the first time that many of the Soldiers trained outside the country or worked with special forces and foreign forces. The Soldiers came to understand the mission and importance of military police Soldiers. They came to understand the significance of improving the relationship between the U.S. military and allied nation militaries. The trip to Honduras was an opportunity that many Soldiers may not experience again during their time in the military, and the Soldiers of 2d Platoon, 511th Military Police Company, will not soon forget it. 

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In July 2015, the battalion dedicated a green cycle specifically to advanced law enforcement training.

Fight Tonight

During the first eight PBTT green cycles, the Polar Bears qualified more than 367 crew-served weapon systems and 78 armored security vehicle crews, performed a mounted squad live-fire exercise with 12 military police squads, conducted a mounted and dismounted convoy live-fire exercise with 12 military police squads, and battle-tracked more than 200 squad tactical missions. As a result, Soldiers and KATUSAs have gained confidence in their weapons systems, combat platforms, and communications equipment to increase combat power and readiness. Finally, to ensure that the lessons are captured, the squad and platoon level field training exercise concludes with a comprehensive evaluation from the observer-controllers and an after action review session with Soldiers and leaders to share lessons learned, evaluate squad capabilities, and build momentum. This provides a valuable product for company level leaders to develop training management programs and to properly assess mission-essential task list proficiency.

Katchi Kapshida

The dedicated effort by the Soldiers and KATUSAs in the 94th Military Police Battalion highlights the strength of an alliance unlike any other in our Army today. Whether serving together in a joint law enforcement patrol or convoy security mission or moving as a member of a fire team during training, the Polar Bears continue to embrace the saying *Katchi Kapshida* or *We Go Together* while standing ready to fight tonight! 

Reference:

Field Manual 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 26 August 2013.

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Second Lieutenant Flickinger is a platoon leader in the 204th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, Fort Polk, Louisiana. She was previously a platoon leader in the 55th Military Police Company, Camp Casey, Korea. She holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from California University of Pennsylvania, California, Pennsylvania.

Challenges Facing Today's Provost Marshals

By Captain Michael J. Robey

After serving as a brigade provost marshal (PM) and observer-coach trainer at the Joint Multinational Training Center, I now realize that there is a significant disconnect between the capabilities of military police and the missions to which military police are assigned during direct-action engagements. When military police are used simply for manpower instead of as combat multipliers, the support that they provide to a maneuver brigade is greatly diminished. According to the modified table of organization and equipment, brigade provost marshals are junior captains who do not possess enough experience in military police and staff operations to properly integrate military police forces or advise the brigade commander.

If PMs are to be successful in maneuver brigades, they must know how to bridge the gap between fulfilling PM responsibilities and providing the commander with support by executing primary staff functions. As stated in Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, PM responsibilities include, but are not limited to—

- Conducting maneuver and mobility support operations, including route reconnaissance, surveillance, circulation control, dislocated civilian and straggler control, and information dissemination.
- Directing components of area security operations, including activities associated with antiterrorism operations; zone and area reconnaissance; checkpoint access control; and critical asset, node, and sensitive-material physical security.
- Managing, in coordination with the assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4), the internment and resettlement of enemy prisoners of war, civilian internees, dislocated civilians, and U.S. military prisoners.
- Coordinating and directing law and order operations, including liaison with local civilian law enforcement authorities.
- Conducting police intelligence operations, including activities related to the collection, assessment, development, and dissemination of police intelligence products.
- Coordinating customs and counterdrug activities.

Shared Understanding and Training Focus

As the senior military police officer on staff, it is the PM's responsibility to learn how the brigade fights and to know which military police capabilities will support the unit

during combat operations. The brigade may need military police to execute only one of its disciplines, but it more commonly needs them to execute different tasks from the three military police functions (security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations). Because training resources and time are finite, it is impossible for military police to simultaneously conduct all military police capabilities in an efficient manner; therefore, the PM must conduct an analysis of the brigade mission to determine which requirements would be the most beneficial to the brigade mission and should be met by military police. After the analysis is concluded, the PM makes brigade-specific recommendations on the use of military police. Next, the PM establishes momentum on shaping the use of military police within the brigade. This allows the PM an opportunity to plan military police operations, rather than react to mission sets that have been assigned without a full understanding of military police capabilities and limitations.

One way to ensure that military police focus areas are nested within brigade operations is to provide the brigade operations staff officer (S-3) and executive officer with a capabilities briefing before meeting with the brigade commander. The briefing should recommend focus areas based on expected mission sets and examine military police capabilities based on troop allocations or as a whole. The briefing should also assess the ability of military police to shift from one mission set to another. This provides the S-3 and executive officer with a better understanding of military police operations. It also provides the PM with a clearer perception of the brigade needs that can be met by military police. After the briefing, the PM should be able to clearly articulate to the brigade commander which tasks military police should fill and how filling them will benefit the brigade.

The Military Decisionmaking Process

The PM should understand his or her role throughout the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) and know how to align staff planning efforts. During combat training center rotations, brigades commonly develop planned courses of action without PM integration or input. The prevalent warfighting functions (such as fires and intelligence) are incorporated into the planning process because they are necessary to develop the overall concept of operations. The warfighting functions that encompass the support of the

operation (such as protection) are often not considered until after a course of action has been approved; therefore, it is unlikely that the courses of action have been evaluated accurately or that they contain the correct planning variables, which can include restrictions ranging from national caveats (when working with allied or partnered nations) to rules of engagement that prevent the use of established standard operating procedures.

A common reason protection is often omitted from the planning process is that planners have a natural tendency to want more time to create “their” plan—and protection, as a warfighting function, is made up of maneuver mobility support elements (military police, chemical, engineer). This leads to a limited overall mission plan and an increased likelihood that available forces, including military police, will not be organized to meet all likely contingencies. The disadvantage of ignoring the principles of mission command is that approved courses of action pose significantly more risk than what is communicated to the brigade commander (see Figure 1). Variables that are overlooked ultimately cause staff sections and subordinate units to conduct additional analyses and planning to mitigate gaps that may lead to unnecessary operational risks. PMs must develop a shared understanding throughout the brigade staff on the integration and use of military police forces before a mission, combat training center rotation, or deployment.

Allies and Partners

When operating in a multinational environment, the capabilities and limitations of allies and partners must be clear. Areas to be considered include effects of multinational procedures, equipment, and national caveats. The most important (and the hardest to plan for) are national caveats. National caveats are restrictions that are placed by a nation on its forces with regard to operating within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or with coalition nations. These restrictions encompass the types of munitions that can be employed, the capacities in which Soldiers can be used, the areas in which Soldiers can operate, and the handling

of civilians and captured persons. For example, a national caveat may restrict an allied country from conducting detention operations. To limit the effects on operations, the PM

needs to identify the national caveats for each multinational military police force and determine the effects that the caveats would have on the mission to ensure that constraints are considered during the MDMP.

It is also important to know the standard operating procedures for allies and partners. Many of the multinational military police forces with whom we currently operate have differing opinions about what is considered to be the appropriate amount of force and treatment that should be applied to captured persons. It is the

commander’s responsibility to enforce mission and national rules of engagement, regardless of the home country of the Soldier. To assist the brigade commander in maintaining the rules of engagement throughout the formation, the PM needs to consider the historic lessons and tendencies of multinational elements before recommending task organization adjustments for military police operations. This incorporates risk mitigation into task organization and ensures that assigned mission sets are fitting for the culture and military mindset of each multinational unit.

Success and Excellence

Successful PMs have synchronized their lines of effort with the rest of the staff by injecting themselves into planning meetings, briefings, and working groups. These PMs have established standard operating procedures that are understood throughout the staff, and they have been active participants in the MDMP, enabling them to help operations personnel incorporate protection into brigade orders. These PMs also understand that, although they work closely with operations staff, they actually work for the executive office. If they have coordination issues (whether in garrison, in a combat training center rotation, or in a deployed environment), the executive officer has the ability to connect the PM with the rest of the staff.

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


Figure 1. Mission command warfighting function tasks from Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0.



The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same

By Captain Andrew B. Ginther



Which year was it? After more than a decade of war, the Army had transitioned back to its peacetime mission while still maintaining its presence in the Middle East. Operation Bright Star had kicked off in Egypt, so U.S. forces could assist the Egyptian military with training exercises. Military police units continued serving as professional police forces, providing support to their respective installation commanders. And due to wartime standards and force generation, leaders at all echelons were being challenged by readiness; the Uniform Code of Military Justice; compliance with Army Regulation 670-1, *Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia*; and general discipline issues.

So again—which year was it? It was 1980. That year also marked the beginning of Lieutenant Colonel Bill Blissett's (Retired) tenure as commander of the 591st Military Police Company, Fort Bliss, Texas. After the end of the Vietnam War and the decade of the 1970s, recreational drug use was common among Soldiers—and the Soldiers of Fort Bliss were no exception. Blissett (who was then a captain) was hand-selected to reestablish unit discipline and standards to better support the installation. At the time, the 591st Military Police Company consisted of 335 Soldiers—almost twice the size of a current combat support military police company.

Fort Bliss wasn't always the state-of-the-art force projection platform that it is today. During the 1980s, it was the home of the Air Defense Artillery Branch. It was host to the 11th Air Defense Artillery Brigade and to the thousands of air defenders who arrived to attend basic, advanced, and individual training; and it was home to 10,000 Soldiers. Today, it is home to the 1st Armored Division and to more than 35,000 Soldiers.

The Soldiers in Captain Blissett's formation held the ranks of private through colonel. The company served as the sole law enforcement entity for the installation. In addition, it had an absent without official leave apprehension team stationed in Tucson, Arizona; it manned the installation detention facility located at Biggs Army Airfield; and it operated the provost marshal's office with a nine-dog (all narcotics dogs) kennel facility.

Fast-forward 30 years: A retired Lieutenant Colonel Blissett began reminiscing about the 591st Military Police Company—which was, admittedly, his favorite unit. While conducting an Internet query in 2011, he learned that the unit had been reactivated on Fort Bliss in 2008 to train and deploy Soldiers to support Operation Iraqi Freedom 09-10.

In an attempt to reconnect with his former unit, Blissett contacted the current commander. They corresponded via e-mail and made plans to exchange some historical documents that Lieutenant Colonel Blissett had stored for years.

Unfortunately, due in part to the unit's heavy involvement in chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives consequence management reaction force support and its subsequent deployment to Cuba, communication between the two individuals eventually ceased.

On 16 June 2014, shortly after the unit's redeployment from Cuba (which had taken place under the leadership of Captain Osvaldo Santiago), I assumed command of the 591st Military Police Company. As usual, there was a massive turnover in leadership at all echelons immediately following the redeployment. With the help of First Sergeant Keith Walker, the unit regained its focus and training initiative to provide a professional police force for Fort Bliss. After delving into the unit's storied past, I contacted Lieutenant Colonel Blissett. He was instrumental in providing the unit with historical information. He supplied documents describing the unit's support to a very unique and significant mission, Operation Orbit Stars (the funeral of General of the Army Omar Nelson Bradley), during which the unit provided traffic control and honor guard personnel. In addition, he contributed information to the unit file in the U.S. Army Center of Military History, eventually leading to the distinctive designation of the 591st Military Police Company as the Iron Spartans.

Much like Lieutenant Colonel Blissett during his tenure as commander of the 591st Military Police Company, I faced the many challenges of discipline, standards, and demanding and diverse mission sets. The unit, which currently consists of less than 200 Soldiers with a full complement of equipment, is the primary law enforcement provider for Fort Bliss, working law enforcement/security augmentation 14 of 18 months to date. The unit provides most of the special reaction team positions, supports the drug suppression team, and mans the only trained company operational intelligence support team, providing criminal intelligence support to Fort Bliss. Furthermore, like Lieutenant Colonel Blissett, I look toward the past to solidify and strengthen my unit's future. In an effort to motivate and inspire Soldiers and leaders to continue the legacy, I—with assistance from previous commanders of the 591st—took the opportunity during the Military Police Regimental Week celebrations to highlight many of the incredible feats that had been accomplished by the unit.

After nearly 35 years, Lieutenant Colonel Blissett returned to Fort Bliss with his wife to help the 591st Military Police Company and the 93d Military Police Battalion celebrate Regimental Week from 24–28 August. During that week, Blissett toured the unit area, participated in hands-on vehicle and equipment experiences, took a tour of the new provost marshal's building, and observed military working dog training and the battalion Iron Eagle Competition. "So much has changed," he said over and over again as he observed the events.

Lieutenant Colonel Blissett also visited with Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy Willingham, commander of the 93d Military Police Battalion and director of emergency services for Fort Bliss. They discussed the similarities between the difficulties that military police encountered in the 1980s and the challenges that they face today. A significant difference that Lieutenant Colonel Blissett noted was the number of responsibilities that a battalion commander must now carry (director of emergency services, provost marshal, and battalion commander). However, the exchange of stories and circumstances also enabled them to draw stark parallels between the former and current 591st Military Police Company.

Reconnecting with the unit past and discovering some of its rich, underlying history help leaders shape unit legacy and instill pride in their subordinates. As the current commander of the 591st Military Police Company, I make it a point to celebrate the milestones in our unit history by holding formations on special days and directing a lieutenant to brief the significance. I then add relevance with regard to our current mission.

Leaders who examine the history of their units frequently find that their predecessors have faced the same challenges that they currently face, and these predecessors can often offer solutions to many of the problems. Just knowing that others have succeeded after facing the same difficulties can provide assurance and confidence. The changing variables, equipment, standards, and environments may make it difficult to fathom the similarities between generations of Soldiers and leaders. However, sometimes the more things change, the more you can look back and realize just how much they stay the same. 

Acknowledgement: This article was made possible by the generosity of Lieutenant Colonel Blissett (Retired).

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("Challenges Facing Today's Provost Marshals," continued from page 42)

PMs who excel at combat training centers can coordinate with nongovernment organizations and host nation agencies, known collectively as unified action partners (UAPs). UAPs can—

- Provide food, shelter, and medical support to dislocated civilians.
- Provide emergency services for civilians.
- Repair damaged infrastructure, such as power and water plants.
- Provide law and order over the indigenous population.

UAPs typically have an extensive knowledge of the operational environment because they have operated there for a significant amount of time; therefore, UAPs may be used in an advisory capacity. UAPs need to be incorporated into the staff and work closely with PMs to address the manner in which captured persons and dislocated civilians should be handled. For example, if the operational environment contains various groups of people who have long histories of violence, that must be a consideration by the PM as he or she assists in plans for the placement of refugees and the confinement of combatants.

Summary

Serving as a brigade PM is a challenging assignment, especially for a precommand captain who is expected to understand troop allocation, staff synchronization and communication, the MDMP, and the ability to work outside the organization. In most cases, PMs have no military police leadership within their chain of command, leaving them without mentorship while they operate within a staff in which most primary positions are filled by field grade officers. The lack of emphasis on programs to educate these junior officers should be addressed, and significant consideration should be given to incorporating instruction into the Captain's Career Course to bridge the gap. Providing a solid foundation and a common understanding of the roles and responsibilities of a brigade PM would allow the junior officers to concentrate on planning, recommending, and managing military police missions within the brigade fight. 

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Leaders Learn About the Importance of Mission Command During a Staff Ride

By Staff Sergeant Ryan L. Hohman

On 27–28 May 2015, 89th Military Police Brigade leaders gathered from across the country at the Washita Battlefield National Historic Site, near Cheyenne, Oklahoma, for a 2-day brigade staff ride. The leaders learned about Lieutenant Colonel George Custer and the 7th U.S. Cavalry attack against the Southern Cheyenne village of Peace Chief Black Kettle.

Staff rides, a tradition in the Army, allow Soldiers to better understand past events and obtain best practices and lessons learned that can be applied in today's operational environment. "A well-planned and -executed staff ride gives professional Soldiers the unique opportunity to take a historical battle and try and use a theory of action to determine the complex chain of cause-and-effect modalities that were

made during the battle," said Lieutenant Colonel Karst Brandsma, commander of the 720th Military Police Battalion. "In doing so, we also gain a better appreciation for the rich heritage of our Army, which deepens our overall professional commitment."

While not as well-known as other battles, the history of the Battle of the Washita River offers a wide range of educational opportunities. Lieutenant Colonel Brandsma knew that, by choosing an obscure battle, leaders would be forced to prepare ahead of time in order to bring value to the ride.

The objective of the staff ride was for the leaders to strategically understand the linkages associated with the battle and the connection to the battlefield environment within a strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level context. Accord-

ing to Captain John Snider, commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 97th Military Police Battalion, it was obvious that Lieutenant Colonel Custer's failure to learn about the total ability of the enemy to quickly mass on an objective, as it related to the actions of warriors from nearby camps after the initial assault, led to his demise.

Leaders from the brigade started the staff ride by visiting Camp Supply, Oklahoma. They were able to view tools and artifacts and gain a better understanding of the way of life during the 1800s. After touring Camp Supply, the leaders began to retrace the steps of the 7th Cavalry toward the Washita River. They stopped at each campsite



Soldiers with the 89th Military Police Brigade visit the Washita Battlefield National Historical Site.

to discuss what decisions had been made during that day and how those decisions would affect the future battle. Captain Andrew Briggs, commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 759th Military Police Battalion, felt that viewing the sites in person was more useful than just looking at a map.

The second day of the staff ride was spent touring the actual site of the Battle of the Washita River. "The staff ride overall was an excellent opportunity to apply our doctrine against a historical battle," said First Sergeant Stephen Palazzo, 212th Military Police Company, 93d Military Police Battalion. "Being able to stand on the same spot that Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his troops once occupied was quite nostalgic." As they toured the battlefield, the leaders stopped at key decision sites to discuss the decisions that were made at each point and relate them to what was going on during the battle. "Application of the mission command principles during analysis, specifically in regards to Custer's inability to create a shared understanding among his subordinate commanders and provide a clear commander's intent for actions to take immediately after the attack on Black Kettle's village, highlighted how critical all aspects of mission command are during battle," said Captain Megan Evans, commander of the 977th Military Police Company, 97th Military Police Battalion.

Leaders from throughout the 89th Military Police Brigade will be able to use the lessons learned during the staff ride in current and future assignments. Moreover, they'll be



Soldiers with the 89th Military Police Brigade discuss historical events that took place on the Washita Battlefield National Historical Site.

able to apply these lessons learned to the present-day operational environment and share them with the Army leaders of tomorrow.

Captain Steven Abadia, commander of the 202d Military Police Company, 93d Military Battalion, stated that staff rides offer units the ability to gather lessons learned from military predecessors and enhance leaders' critical thinking ability regarding military strategy. He also stated that staff rides provide an excellent venue for leaders to congregate, share ideas and experiences, and build unit *esprit de corps*.

This event proved to have a lasting impact on the leaders of the 89th Military Police Brigade through in-depth discussions on the actual battlefield. Captain Matthew Morgan, commander of the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 93d Military Police Battalion, stated that having the major successes and failures of the battle broken down in detail for 2 days straight provided a very clear idea of the mission command role in each phase and how all of the external factors and elements can affect or change the outcome throughout the entire process.

Overall, the staff ride was a world-class event in which the 89th Military Police Brigade set the standard for others to emulate.



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Soldiers take a moment to read some of the memorials at the Washita Battlefield National Historical Site.

FLETC TWI and International Engagement on ISIL

By Major Christopher J. Rivers



FLETC TWI Overview

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) Training With Industry (TWI) Program is currently in its second year. The program was established because the U.S. Army desires exposure to civilian law enforcement officer training and because FLETC benefits from interaction with the military community. The 12-month training program consists of rotations through 10 FLETC divisions within the Glynco Training Directorate and the Regional and International Training Directorate, both located in Glynco, Georgia. The program also includes a partnership with an administrator from the FLETC administrative headquarters, participation in the curriculum review/development process, certification as an assessor for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Accreditation Organization, and completion of the FLETC Law Enforcement Instructor Training Program. While participating in the FLETC TWI Program, I also studied the threat of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and was asked to brief my findings at an international law enforcement seminar.

European Police College Seminar

FLETC is uniquely positioned to partner with international law enforcement agencies to explore timely and critical issues that impact our national security. In February 2015, FLETC was the only U.S. agency that was invited to participate in an international seminar hosted by the European Police College (CEPOL) to address the global threat posed by ISIL. At the invitation of FLETC and with the support of the U.S. Army Military Police School, I attended this seminar as the only U.S. representative and provided an unclassified briefing consisting of an overview of ISIL from the U.S. perspective. The seminar was attended by 90 senior police officers



representing 34 countries and seven European agencies. CEPOL, which was established in 2000, is a European Union (EU) agency that is dedicated to providing training opportunities for senior police officials on issues that are vital to the

security of the EU and its citizens. The training and activities hosted by CEPOL are designed to facilitate the sharing of knowledge and best practices and to contribute to the development of a common European law enforcement culture. Originally based in Brams Hill, United Kingdom, CEPOL moved its headquarters to Budapest, Hungary, in late 2014.¹

ISIL: A New Threat to Internal Security

ISIL has rapidly risen to international prominence as it has progressed from representing a regional threat to posing a danger to peace and security worldwide. Its military victories in Syria and Iraq have been largely due to the influx of foreign fighters, large cash reserves, and the ineffectiveness of security forces. The terrorist group, which began as a Jordanian-led extremist organization in 1999, moved to Iraq in 2004 under the leadership of Abu Musab al Zarqawi and became known as al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI). In 2013, under the direction of its current leader Abu Omar al Baghdadi, AQI



Caliph Ibrahim

rebranded itself as ISIL to reflect a wider geographic focus. In early 2014, the al-Qaida central leadership rejected ISIL, at which time ISIL became an entity unto itself. After significant success in Syria and Iraq, ISIL changed its name to the Islamic State, underscoring its determination not to be limited by geographic borders in restoring its vision of the caliphate.² Al Baghdadi then changed his name to Caliph Ibrahim and demanded that the Muslim world recognize him as the leader of the world-wide Islamic caliphate.³

No longer confined to fighting in Iraq and Syria, ISIL now poses a global threat. The attacks in Canada, France, Belgium, Denmark, Tunisia, and the United States emphasize the need for all countries to be prepared for attacks by ISIL and those inspired by ISIL. The difficulty of identifying and preventing “lone wolf” attacks was a major topic of discussion at the seminar. Many democratic nations struggle with effectively countering terrorist threats without infringing on the personal liberties of their citizens. The seminar also triggered an in-depth discussion about the ability of ISIL to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize foreign fighters and about the relative ease with which they are able to move across international borders.



European nations active in CEPOL

Best Practices From the International Community

As the international community continues to build a military coalition to fight ISIL in Iraq and Syria, law enforcement agencies must use a combination of traditional police tactics and innovative new approaches to combat the threat at home. Funded by the EU and cofunded by the Belgian Federal Police, Belgium is working on a project called Community Policing Preventing Radicalization (CoPPRa). Launched in 2010 and supervised by the EU counterterrorism coordinator, CoPPRa is used in 15 EU nations to train officers to work in partnerships with local communities to identify and prevent radicalization. A pocket guide that helps officers on the street understand and recognize signs of extremism and preattack preparations is available.⁴ The United Kingdom has implemented a prevention strategy at national and local levels in which uniformed counterterrorism unit officers (called security and partnerships officers) focus on establishing and developing successful community partnerships that are aimed at deterring extremism. Schools, colleges, mosques, prisons, community centers, youth and sports clubs, and women's groups are invited to play active roles in this initiative.⁵ In Germany, a dedicated Joint Internet Center monitors and analyzes extremist and terrorist Web sites used for recruitment, radicalization, and training.⁶

Conclusion

Upon my return from the CEPOL seminar, I provided the FLETC director with a briefing (open to all FLETC

personnel) on ISIL. I was then tasked to share my knowledge on this terrorist organization with the Counterterrorism Division and work with the division to enhance the terrorism curriculum with regard to how the threat impacts the law enforcement mission. We must learn from the successes and failures of our partners as we strive to prevent tragedies from happening on American soil. The U.S. Army Military Police Corps can play an integral role in preventing such tragedies—not only through the training that we provide, but also by serving as a conduit for the exchange of ideas and best practices.

This broadening assignment with FLETC is in line with the Provost Marshal General's military police force strategic plan to part-

ner with institutions of higher knowledge and expertise. I recommend the continued use of programs such as this to enhance the Army ability to interact and conduct business with civilian law enforcement institutions.



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Lessons Learned During ODT Rotations

By First Lieutenant John A. Perdigao

In January 2015, the 709th Military Police Battalion, Grafenwoehr, Germany, began hosting overseas deployment training (ODT) rotations. These rotations involve transporting Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers to locations outside of the continental United States to perform missions associated with their occupational specialties, thereby affording them valuable work experience. With current fiscal constraints and never-ending time constraints, the ODT rotations provide valuable training for the ODT unit and the host unit.

Current professional law enforcement (PLE) commitments in Germany, combined with taskings and other operational requirements, significantly limit the collective training of each of the five companies within the 709th Military Police Battalion. Circumstances vary by company; but on average, only one squad can train at a time—and to do so, the company must implement 12-hour shifts to reduce the PLE commitment. Each ODT rotation facilitates 14 uninterrupted days for a platoon to train on high-payoff collective tasks during a protected green cycle and affords the ODT unit an opportunity to “regreen” its law enforcement skills. Since these ODT rotations are the first in recent 709th Military Police Battalion history, a great deal of planning and resourcing was required to ensure mission success. There have been many lessons learned throughout the ODT process—several of which can be leveraged by other military police organizations that need creative means to carve out time to hone their critical warfighting skills.

Lesson 1

The 709th Military Police Battalion compiled a robust operations order, providing guidance to all participating units. The operations order covers the requirements for working as a military police officer overseas, including the need for PLE certification, computer access, a U.S. Army Europe vehicle license, a knowledge of the concept of integration, and other host unit requirements. This comprehensive revision and clarification of training requirements provides clear purpose and direction for all participating units. A researched and thorough order serves as the starting point for defining expectations for an ODT rotation.

Lesson 2

With very disparate organizations and an ocean in between, consistent communication is critical in facilitating the ODT rotations. The 709th Military Police Battalion achieves this consistency by appointing one primary point of contact for the battalion and each host unit and hosting monthly inprocess reviews via Defense Connect Online. In contrast to a video teleconference (with restricted bandwidth), Defense Connect Online can be accessed by anyone on any network and can accommodate hundreds of participants. The Defense Connect Online inprocess reviews cover the status of actions required by the ODT unit, the host unit, and other supporting agencies; clarify training requirements and requests for information; and once the rotations begins, lessons learned that are shared to facilitate a common understanding and limit future issues. The use of single points of contact for the battalion and the host units enables the streamlining of information, which allows issues to be remedied faster since they are not being relayed through multiple echelons of bureaucracy or translated to all subsequent rotations. It also enables the establishment of a rapport among the operators before the rotations even begins.

Lesson 3

The total length of the ODT rotation is 21 days from departure to return. Once the unit is received and integrated and has completed on-the-job training, that equates to 14 days of training, which means that some PLE certification requirements need to be reduced. As mentioned, the robust operations order covers training; however, many hours were spent identifying PLE certification requirements for which the battalion and the directorate of emergency services were comfortable assuming risk. Representatives of the 709th Military Police Battalion; the 18th Military Police Brigade; the Office of the Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Europe; and the Installation Management Command Europe (which was to obtain buy-in from the directorate of emergency services community) formulated an expedited PLE certification plan. According to the plan, ODT units are to conduct most of their basic military police skill training in the continental United States, while their highly resourced training requirements (M9 pistol qualifications, emergency



Military police conduct a traffic stop.

vehicle operations course [EVOC], oleoresin capicum [OC] certifications, and Community-Oriented Policing Services [COPS] refresher training) are to be conducted in Germany. The plan also calls for an accelerated on-the-job training program while Soldiers are orienting on the road, which involves Soldiers patrolling the same areas and working the same shifts for the duration of the rotation. The host unit provides supplemental training in cases where the ODT unit feels it is lacking specific skill sets (conducting a felony traffic stop, responding to a domestic disturbance). In addition, host units provide ODT units with quick references (common codes, maps, sample forms) to assist in overcoming the learning curve while working the road.

Lesson 4

Not all of the completed ODT rotations were perfect. One of the significant issues that arose with moving more than 640 Soldiers was the need to ensure that Defense Travel System authorizations were properly completed, funded, and ticketed. This became especially significant during the first rotation, as only nine Soldiers from the incoming platoon of 42 arrived on time. The issue was addressed by increasing Defense Travel System process checks for subsequent rotations. But of the nine ODT rotations that have been completed, the biggest challenge has consistently been the management of expectations. Soldiers usually associate temporary duty with the opportunity to live in comfortable accommodations and to be well compensated for food. In order for U.S. Army Europe to afford the sixteen 709th Military Police Battalion ODT rotations during calendar year 2015, many cost-saving measures needed to be taken into account. ODT Soldiers stayed in barracks and old stairwell housing. The food they received was only that which the government could provide through dining facilities; mermite

containers; sack lunches and, at times, meals, ready-to-eat (MREs). With the shift work of military police and the limited dining facility hours at smaller kasernes, Soldiers did not always get three meals per day in a dining facility; multiple sack lunches or mermite meals a day were common. ODT Soldiers often wrote to their home stations to request temporary duty or missed-meals compensation. Unfortunately, funding is just as restricted for National Guard and Reserve units as it is for the Regular Army.

The value of these training rotations is evident in a myriad of ways. Reserve Component Soldiers get time to focus on tasks that cannot be accomplished within a weekend or without a standing requirement. According to the operations and training officer (S-3) of the 633d Military Police Battalion, the ODT rotations afforded his Soldiers an opportunity to do more training in a couple of weeks than they would have otherwise (often due to fiscal constraints) done all year. In addition, these missions freed enough time for host units to conduct aggressive, collective training with platoon size elements, which is impossible without the personnel augmentation. For example, according to the commander of the 554th Military Police Company, the ODT support allowed the 554th to train at the collective level, which is something it is not capable of doing without augmentation. The Soldiers of the 933d Military Police Company provided outstanding PLE support to the U.S. Army Garrison Stuttgart community in Germany, which allowed the 554th Military Police Company to deploy two platoons to the Grafenwoehr Training Area to train collectively on their key collective tasks, increasing their proficiency. This arrangement also allowed the 933d Military Police Company to gain knowledge and experience in performing law enforcement duties in an international community. Most importantly, it fosters the interoperability between the Regular Army and Reserve Component that is typically only leveraged during wartime. This arrangement is mutually beneficial for Regular Army and Reserve Component units and will continue to serve as a unique solution for the time- and resource-constrained Military Police Corps and Army.



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The Heart of MWD Pitt (L567)

By Sergeant Jajuan X. Burton

One of the least-discussed subjects in the military and the United States is the loss of our unsung hero, the military working dog (MWD). MWDs do not work for a paycheck, and they do not receive retirement benefits. They simply work for the love and affection of their handlers.

The military has used canines for more than 70 years. MWDs received their first call to action during World War II, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The United States partnered with an organization called Dogs for Defense. This group of professional breeders helped the Army train the first war dogs, which were known as sentry dogs. The dogs were then sent to prove their worth in North Africa, where commanding officer General F. S. Gage reported that, because the base was practically blacked out at night, having a sentry dog team was like having two sentry Soldiers on guard.¹

In 1969, the Sentry Dog Program became the Military Working Dog Program. The U.S. Air Force is responsible for the initial training of MWDs for all military branches and U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U. S. Department of Homeland Security. Training for MWDs is conducted at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. The preferred MWD breeds are the German shepherd and the Belgian Malinois. However, the military boasts a wide range of MWDs, including Labrador retrievers, boxers, Doberman pinschers, and rottweilers.

MWDs have also filled a vital role in Afghanistan and Iraq by detecting improvised explosive devices, locating large caches of weapons, and tracking enemy insurgents.

To slow down the use of marijuana in Southeast Asia, the military began to use drug detector dogs to sniff out the drug in 1971. The training for these dogs has evolved over time, and they are now also capable of detecting harder drugs, such as cocaine and heroin. MWD Pitt was a dual-purpose service dog, certified to perform narcotics detection and law enforcement patrol duties. As a patrol dog, MWD Pitt provided the capability to help apprehend a fleeing person, perform handler defense, increase security for restricted areas, and protect government property.

On 22 September 2015, Fort Bliss lost one of its finest guardians to a battle with cancer. MWD Pitt was one of the best MWDs that the handlers on Fort Bliss had ever

encountered. His most shining moment came perhaps just 1 week after his arrival. MWD Pitt was a master of his craft, and he passed a force command certification just 3 days after being teamed with his handler. When asked about MWD Pitt, his handler stated, "When I met Pitt, I could immediately tell he was a dog that worked solely for the handler rather than reward. He showed that man's best friend was more than companionship. The ability to build rapport was the easiest thing to do because of his dedication to work for his handler."

The last handler to certify on MWD Pitt had this to say about his fellow guardian: "I had no confidence in myself as a handler before I teamed with Pitt. The first time I pulled him to train, I went to the obedience yard and did everything off leash, and to the standard; so I knew at this point, I had found my dog and he was very special."

MWD Pitt logged countless hours and even deployed to Kosovo as a patrol drug detection dog. The consensus within the 513th Military Police Detachment was that MWD Pitt was a handler trainer who worked until the day he died doing what he loved to do. Upon hearing the news of his death, the handlers were heartbroken. It was obvious how much MWD Pitt meant to the kennel personnel at Fort Bliss. For a time, he was unbeatable and nothing passed him undetected. He was caring, and he was the best dog that a handler could ever hope for. MWD Pitt is, and always will be, a true guardian. 

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Military Police Trends During Decisive-Action Training at the Joint Readiness Training Center

By Captain Clinton G. Davis and Captain Stephen J. Caraluzzi

Because of changes due to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) 2020 Initiative, military police companies now deploy to the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Polk, Louisiana, as nonorganic enablers rather than as organic platoons under the brigade special troops battalion. These changes highlight the need for military police units to be prepared for all facets of a JRTC rotation in order to be properly trained for a worldwide BCT deployment.

Military police companies perform well at the JRTC and represent the Military Police Corps with honor and distinction. However, military police units must make specific changes when preparing for a deployment or JRTC rotation to ensure that they remain the Army's force of choice. First, it is imperative that a JRTC rotation not be approached as a training opportunity but as an external evaluation. Units must train as much to prepare for a JRTC rotation as they would for a combat or contingency deployment. Individual, team, squad, platoon, and company evaluations must be completed, and parent battalions should provide their units with ample training and preparation time to deploy to JRTC. This is a challenge as difficult as the last 12 years of juggling garrison professional law enforcement missions, military working dog support, and deployments to Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. When a brigade is ordered to a combat training center, it is vital that a military police company be alerted at the same time to allow adequate planning and training time. This ensures that the unit is properly trained and succeeds in a decisive-action training environment (DATE) scenario.

Personnel and Equipment Deployment

Military police companies historically have not deployed their entire set of equipment and personnel to JRTC, so they miss out on essential facets of training. They do not deploy their organic wreckers, water buffaloes, trailers, and contact trucks or exercise their unit deployment list. Therefore, they miss a large part of the deployment and redeployment training that is intended for JRTC rotations. Military police units arrive incapable of operating independently and are heavily reliant on higher units that do not have the capabilities



A military police Soldier assigned to the 118th Military Police Company (Airborne) conducts noncombatant evacuation operations.

or combat power to support a military police element that is spread across the battlefield in numerous squad size elements. Also, the mission command warfighting function is degraded when military police units do not bring the proper communications equipment to fully mirror the published BCT communications plan. Bringing the proper personnel to support the company is also important. Communications specialists; mechanics; cooks; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear specialists; and other support personnel help maintain military police combat power. Equipment and personnel issues often result from a lack of funding and the BCT guidance to pack lightly. Units can certainly pack

lightly, but deployment-specific support and communication equipment are essential to mission accomplishment and should not be removed from the packing list.

BCT Provost Marshal

The final remaining organic military police personnel in the BCT are the provost marshal's office (PMO) cadre, who comprise a primary staff section that directly supports DATE operations. Responsible for the planning and use of attached military police combat power, the provost marshal (PM) is in a unique position to enhance or degrade the reputation of the Military Police Regiment in the eyes of the BCT commander. The PM's isolation from the Regiment requires an extensive knowledge of military police doctrine and the operations process. The PM must also have extensive knowledge of the BCT staff. An inability to articulate the capabilities and limitations of assets and explain how they can support the mission will quickly discredit a primary staff officer. The BCT PM who has not had the benefit of company command is very susceptible to this pitfall. A consistent pattern of underperformance by precommand PMs has emerged at JRTC. This is due in part to inexperience, but is also a consequence of failing to establish a relationship or share training events with the attached military police company before the rotation. Mutual training in preparation for JRTC would allow the PM to better understand the capabilities and limitations of the military police company and reduce some of the friction of planning missions. Failing to achieve a good understanding of military police support and the subsequent minimization of the PMO role on the staff negatively affects attached military police combat power.

Although not in direct control of attached military police Soldiers, the PM is responsible for participating in the BCT military decisionmaking process to plan military police missions to support each phase of the operation. Security and mobility support and detention operations are the standard mission sets within a DATE scenario at JRTC. An effective PM comes to the process armed with accurate and detailed staff estimates and uses an understanding of the military police forces available to plan appropriate, sustainable missions that enable the main effort. Once military police missions are planned, the PM must focus on sustainment. Historically, BCT PMs have struggled to proactively plan for sustainment needs, such as combat-configured loads of Class IV building materials for the detainee collection point (DCP) and food, fuel, and shelter for the military police company.

Doctrine

Junior military police leaders historically struggle to clearly articulate to the BCT how military police skills can assist the other war-fighting functions. If military police leaders are unable to use doctrinal terms and references when explaining what they bring to the fight, they immediately lose respect and

credibility and are generally not given a proper mission set that aligns with their unique skills in support of the BCT mission. Examples of pertinent military police doctrine include Field Manual (FM) 3-39, *Military Police Operations*; Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-39.10, *Police Operations*; ATP 3-39.20, *Police Intelligence Operations*; ATP 3-39.30, *Security and Mobility Support*; and FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*.^{1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

Command Support Relationships

Military police support to BCTs is relatively new, resulting from the transition of brigade special troops battalions to brigade engineer battalions. Despite the recent change, there appears to be an emerging norm in how military police are task-organized in the BCT. Most brigades assign military police elements to the BEB, and the BCT staff then sends military police-specific missions, such as detainee operations and security and mobility support, through them. When they are not assigned to a BEB, military police elements are dynamically retasked in direct support of the main effort during a particular phase of the operation and the same direct tasking relationship applies. When BCT battalions receive a military police element as an attachment, they are surprised at the amount of firepower and mobility the element possesses. The battalions usually add battalion security missions on top of BCT-directed military police-specific missions. The number of missions usually leads to an overuse of military police elements compared to other organic and attached elements. Battalions historically have trouble supporting and sustaining military police units due to shortages of personnel and the deployment equipment. The dispersion of military police across the battlefield stresses the ability of a battalion to exercise mission



Soldiers of the 21st Military Police Company (Airborne) conduct sustained airborne training as they prepare to conduct a joint forcible entry into JRTC.

command over them and strains the resources necessary to properly support them. As a consequence, military police elements often operate without proper maintenance support, hot meals, and other specific support that most units receive. To alleviate some of the command support relationship challenges, military police leaders must ensure that the attaching battalion commander and the BCT operations officer and provost marshal are aware of general military police and unit-specific capabilities and understand the importance of coming fully manned and equipped. They must also be prepared to brief unit capabilities at a moment's notice when command support relationships change. This responsibility primarily falls upon the PM.


Tactical Standard Operating Procedure Development

A unit should develop a tested tactical standard operating procedure (SOP) that all Soldiers use during predeployment training. During many JRTC rotations, companies did not have an SOP or they came with a new one on which their Soldiers had not trained. The rigorous operational tempo at JRTC makes it nearly impossible to test a newly created SOP. The SOP must be well known and practiced during the various levels of predeployment training.

Detainee Operations

The latest version of FM 3-63 removed set time limits for holding detainees. The new guidance states that from the point of capture, to the BCT DCP, to the division detainee holding area, detainees must be moved to a safer location as soon as transportation is available. This specific wording requires that internment/resettlement specialists and senior leaders understand that failure to promptly move detainees when transportation is available could be seen as failing to safeguard the detainees. The Geneva Conventions state that enemy prisoners of war (which includes all detainees until they are assigned a proper legal status) must be safeguarded from violence to the greatest extent possible. FM 3-63 supports this by moving from strict timelines to more general guidance to move detainees to safety as soon as transportation is available. This gives units the latitude to safeguard and speed the detainee processes more effectively. The PM must communicate this guidance to BCT leaders through all available channels before rotations and training events. This will allow the brigade to develop an SOP that properly covers detainee movement, processing, and treatment from the point of capture through transition from the DCP to the detainee holding area. Possible friction from limited or degraded communications must be addressed and exercised before the forcible-entry event to ensure the integrity of the communications plan.

Facility commander responsibilities at the DCP are discussed at length in FM 3-63. It is imperative that military police leaders and internment/resettlement specialists understand the responsibilities of the facility commander. When a military police company is not deployed to a rotation,



A military police fire team guards the perimeter of the brigade main command post during a direct-fire engagement with enemy forces.

the military police platoon is attached to a company element and is usually directed to run a DCP as one of its tasks. This is a good use of resources, but it still involves the BCT DCP under the command of the BCT commander. Although not directed in doctrine, the first commander in the chain (usually a BEB or infantry headquarters company commander) becomes the commander of the DCP. It is important that military police subject matter experts brief these commanders on their responsibilities and on the importance of the proper operation of the DCP.

Junior Leadership

Leadership at the junior commissioned and noncommissioned officer (NCO) levels suffers from limited knowledge of, and experience with, true field craft. This is an Army-wide issue that comes to light in combat training centers and other challenging training events. At the team, squad, and platoon leader levels, officers and NCOs are not properly developed to conduct even basic leadership tasks such as precombat checks and precombat inspections. Most Soldiers are unaware that there is a difference between the two. Young leaders either rely on their experiences in Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom deployments or on lessons learned by others from those deployments. The Army is now focusing on the concept of a DATE, and many of the principles and lessons learned in years of unified land operations in the Middle East do not apply. Tactical skills and field craft are not well known and are not being passed down from senior leaders through realistic field training and leader professional development.

Movement Techniques

Although mounted movements are generally well trained and performed, weak dismounted movement skills is another



A brigade provost sergeant (MOS 31E) (right) teaches a class on detainee collection point operations to military police Soldiers (left) tasked to conduct detainee operations.

area where a lack of training and preparation is observed among military police units. Despite the operational need to conduct dismounted operations or a combination of mounted and dismounted operations at JRTC, most military police elements attempt to complete each mission mounted, which often leads to mission failure. When dismounted movements are attempted, they are often not properly executed. This highlights a lack of proper training at home stations. Mixing mounted and dismounted movements and planning into training before deployment will help Soldiers become more comfortable in a wider variety of mission sets on the battlefield.

Assigned and Guest Observers-Coaches Trainers

Military police observers-coaches trainers (OCTs) at JRTC are in short supply since manning is still based on a brigade special troops battalion model rather than on the pairing of a military police company to a BCT when it deploys. Because the brigade special troops battalion model contained only a single platoon of military police Soldiers, only five OCTs were needed at JRTC. This meant that the training could be facilitated using an experienced platoon leader, a platoon sergeant, and three squad leaders. JRTC is currently authorized only one commissioned officer and three NCO OCTs for military police companies. This legacy authorization is insufficient to support an entire company deployment to JRTC. A company element needs four commissioned officer and 13 NCO OCTs to properly cover the movements of a military police company down to the squad level. Serving as a guest OCT is a great way to develop and learn while not actively participating in an exercise.

Sending leaders from units that will participate in a later rotation will give them a good idea of how to train troops for a future JRTC rotation. It is important to send high-quality guest OCTs since they will be helping adjacent units and the Military Police Corps as a whole to become stronger.

More permanently assigned OCTs are needed to ensure that military police units receive the realistic, rigorous, and relevant training they deserve. Officer and NCO OCTs should be deliberately appointed with quality in mind. While the current authorization of two provost OCTs is sufficient, an additional 11 company OCTs would ensure proper training support. This would also relieve operational units of most of the burden of losing Soldiers to serve as guest OCTs, while preserving the opportunity to send their best Soldiers as guest OCTs to learn the latest institutional and doctrinal training and then return to share their knowledge with their units.

The following PMO table of distribution and allowances would not change under the proposal:

- One captain (commanding officer OCT—post-command assignment).
- One first sergeant (first sergeant OCT—post-first sergeant assignment).
- One captain (platoon leader OCT—post-Captain's Career Course—1-year assignment while awaiting command at a follow-on assignment).
- Two sergeants first class (platoon sergeant OCTs—post-platoon sergeant assignments).
- Seven staff sergeants (squad leader OCTs—post-squad leader assignments).



Soldiers of the 21st Military Police Company (Airborne) discuss operations at the Evacuation Control Center as part of a noncombatant evacuation operation.

Military police Soldiers interact with internally displaced persons while guarding the U.S. consulate building at JRTC.

These numbers would reduce the number of guest OCTs per rotation to five leaders (two captains or first lieutenants, a sergeant first class, and two staff sergeants), but would still keep current tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine (as it applies on a DATE battlefield) flowing to military police battalions and brigades.

This article is not meant to give the impression that the Military Police Corps Regiment is not completing missions and impressing other units while conducting operations at the JRTC. Military police Soldiers continue to be disciplined, dependable, and hardworking on the battlefield; and they display these qualities during every rotation. To continue to develop and grow, the Military Police Corps Regiment must look at itself in a realistic manner and determine what it does well and what it must improve upon. There is no doubt that, based upon current successes and future improvement, military police Soldiers will continue to lead the way in security and law enforcement on installations and on the battlefield.

Endnotes:

¹FM 3-39, *Military Police Operations*, 26 August 2013.

²ATP 3-39.10, *Police Operations*, 26 January 2015.

³ATP 3-39.20, *Police Intelligence Operations*, 6 April 2015.

⁴ATP 3-39.30, *Security and Mobility Support*, 30 October 2014.

⁵FM 3-63, *Detainee Operations*, 28 April 2014.

References:

BCT 2020 Initiative, Maneuver Center of Excellence, Fort Benning, Georgia, <<http://www.benning.army.mil/mcoe/>>, accessed on 29 February 2016.

Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, <<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/publication/p0173.htm>>, accessed on 19 January 2016.

Captain Davis is a former military police company trainer at JRTC. He now serves as an instructor at the Basic Officer Leader Course at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Captain Caraluzzi is the former senior provost mentor at JRTC and now serves as a member of the Military Police–Security Force Assistance Team for 1st Special Forces Command. He is a graduate of the Pennsylvania State University.

Multinational Force Interoperability in Action During Operation Cavalry Ride

By First Lieutenant Hannah M. Miller

The buzzword *interoperability* was thrown around so often in the 2d Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment tactical operations center at Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Romania, that the squadron commander admitted that the word threatened to become meaningless through careless repetition. But for the platoon size element that the 709th Military Police Battalion deployed to Romania to support the regiment's Operation Cavalry March, interoperability in action proved to be anything but meaningless. Romanian and U.S. military police forces provided reconnaissance, convoy security, and route screening for the 100-vehicle tactical road march along the 400 kilometers from the air base to Cincu Training Center. Along the way, they executed a concept of protection that integrated Romanian federal police and the local police in three cities where the squadron conducted ceremonies and large-scale engagements with civilians.

The newly revised Army Regulation 34-1, *Multinational Force Interoperability*,¹ derives its definition of multinational force interoperability (MFI) from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Administration Publication-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*.² MFI is defined as "the ability of the forces of two or more nations to train, exercise, and operate effectively together in the execution of assigned missions and tasks . . ." and "the ability to act together coherently, effectively and efficiently to achieve allied tactical, operational, and strategic objectives."³ These definitions suggest that parties seeking MFI undergo the following progression:

- Coherence (communication and understanding).
- Effectiveness (mission accomplishment).
- Efficiency (improvement).

Operation Cavalry March was simultaneously challenging and appealing because it put military police teams in positions with international, civil-military, and unit overlap, where team members could best observe this progression.



A Romanian platoon leader based in Bucharest patrols with a platoon leader with the 615th Military Police Company. They were partnered for the entirety of Operation Cavalry March.

Coherence: Communication and Understanding

Romanian jurisdiction mandated that three patrols (one lead, one trail, and one response-ready) provide the primary escort, traffic control, and force protection for each of the four serials, or groups, of convoy vehicles. Layered within the Romanian protection, the U.S. military police teams commanded the leading and trailing Humvees to bolster security during movement. These teams acted as a conduit between the squadron serial commanders and their Romanian escorts. To overcome incompatible communication platforms, truck commanders of the lead Humvees in each serial lent a handheld radio to the Romanian officer in charge and kept its mate to relay relevant information. However, the Humvee commanders usually found that face-to-face conversation with their Romanian counterparts during stops was the most efficient method of coordination.

For example, one junior noncommissioned officer (NCO) from the 615th Military Police Company explained to his

Romanian counterpart that he had to stop his serial, which included all of the squadron fuel trucks, because of an overheating vehicle. The U.S. Soldier knew that his counterpart was nervous about hitting checkpoints on time; if the fuel trucks arrived late at the refueling site in Brasov, all other serials at this crucial rally point and civil engagement location would be delayed. The carefully sequenced traffic control plan approved by the state and city police would devolve into a congested mess. The NCO helped set up hasty traffic control positions in the small town where they stopped. He had developed a rapport with the Romanian leaders of the serial and reassured them about the progress of repairs to the vehicle. The NCO articulated a new timeline and negotiated a contingency course of action in case the repairs failed. The Romanians needed decisions like this many times during the convoy, and they frequently turned to military police Soldiers to get them.

Effectiveness: Mission Accomplishment

Providing four screening and security teams in nontactical vehicles (NTVs) represented the other half of the platoon mission. The primary task was to depart first each morning and report unanticipated obstacles along the route. But since these teams were the most maneuverable and least timeline-constrained units in the squadron, they could also accomplish a number of small but crucial tasks supporting freedom of movement for the main body.

For example, one team secured an alternate landing zone in a mountain village to facilitate the arrival of a U.S. general. The landing zone had just been approved late the previous evening, so the team coordinated with the local officials who had earlier planned the use of the primary site. Another NTV team, traveling on another route, ensured that a particularly long section of packed dirt road remained



A 527th Military Police Company Soldier bolsters a combined security effort at a landing zone in front of Peles Castle in Sinaia, Romania.



A 615th Military Police Company Soldier joins Romanian federal police, Brasov city police, and Romanian Land Forces military police as part of a security perimeter at a ceremony site in Brasov, Romania.

clear of commercial tractor trailers. During a combined reconnaissance mission the week before, that section had been identified as the only viable rest point for the serials. The NTV team, with a Romanian military police soldier attached, explained the situation to business owners who used the space for customer parking and coordinated with the local police to keep the area free of civilian vehicles.

After completing intermediate tasks like these, the NTV teams concentrated on key locations. An NTV team verified that the access control personnel at the refueling site at Brasov understood which entrance and roads within the compound were preferred by the combat sustainment support team in charge of refueling operations. Another NTV team pushed ahead to screen the final route approaching the convoy's ultimate destination at the Cincu Training Area. The other two teams carried out a unified security plan at the engagement location in downtown Brasov.

This event, which drew crowds of more than 1,000 people, was secured by a combination of local forces, federal police, private security personnel, and Romanian and U.S. military police soldiers. Such large crowds increased the probability of pro-Russian intelligence collection and petty theft. A mix of static overwatch positions and walking patrols helped deter this threat and also served as a visible depiction of the partnership and interoperability that the event was designed to promote.

Efficiency: Improvement

As the last large engagement of Operation Cavalry Ride, the event in Brasov culminated a military police partnership that had begun 2 weeks earlier. Working groups, conferences, and rehearsal-of-concept drills may have formalized the relationship, but the true bonding occurred over shared meals and long hours spent on the road. Two combined reconnaissance missions helped the Romanian military police escorts and their U.S. counterparts become familiar with the convoy routes and taught them to appreciate the other's capabilities. The U.S. Soldiers learned that the Romanian military operates with a much-reduced notion of command authority, recruits locally for units (much like the U.S. Army National Guard), and has only recently begun integrating women into its ranks. Funding and training time are shared struggles. The experience also taught the U.S. platoon how to better leverage the military police skill set to become better, more efficient team players. The lessons learned for leaders include—

- **Encourage face-to-face contact.** Interpersonal skills are often the first and best tool when working the road, and the same is true when building relationships with Romanian partners. The time spent driving and drinking coffee together created a level of honesty, trust, and comfort that Soldiers later relied on during the mission. These relationships were built as much on conversations about music and pets as they were on discussions about vehicle clearances and access control.
- **Build interoperability within U.S. units.** Teamwork between the military police platoon and its 2d Cavalry Regiment operational control unit did not constitute MFI, but it was certainly a prerequisite. Nearly all military police teams worked with a different convoy commander and first sergeant. These teams were often required to represent their respective commanders when communicating with Romanian escort patrols, so understanding leadership styles and intent was imperative. Likewise, information gained from partnering with the Romanians would have been useless if the 709th Military Police Battalion staff representatives had not invested an equal amount of time building relationships among 2d Cavalry Regiment staff who could use the information.
- **Become an information asset.** Having small units dispersed throughout the formation and integrated at many points across a complex timeline means that an officer in charge can either settle on being a figurehead or become a valuable resource for decisionmakers. With a robust and redundant communication plan, isolated teams

transform into the eyes, ears, and voices across the operational area. Combined with an open link to a similar network of host nation law enforcement, the officer in charge will have the most current and complete picture, be able to anticipate decision points before they arise, and be able to articulate them to U.S. battle captains and host nation commanders.

- **Empower team leaders.** As first responders, military police Soldiers are accustomed to operating alone or in small teams, interacting with high-ranking personnel, and acting decisively—even when all of the details have not yet developed. This should be encouraged by involving junior leaders in as many battle rhythm events as possible and informing them about more mission details than might otherwise be shared.
- **Learn the strengths and weaknesses of subordinates.** An officer must know the strengths and weaknesses of subordinates when organizing teams. Infantry leaders would undoubtedly appreciate an unassuming and dependable military police team that knows what needs to be done without being told. However, when a language barrier exists, consideration should be given to using team leaders with outgoing personalities as a way to overcome the barrier. Kindness reads well in any language. One U.S. military police Soldier on the mission brought cold drinks for a pair of Romanian security personnel when he was sent to join their rooftop observation post in Ploiesti. That simple gesture solidified a relationship that might have otherwise never been made.

The success of military police support to Operation Cavalry March suggests that the military police skill set makes U.S. military police Soldiers uniquely interoperable; adaptable to modular configurations; and able to build coherence, effectiveness, and efficiency in combined environments. One Soldier said that the mission reversed her recent decision not to reenlist. She joined the Military Police Corps because of a strong desire to help people, but she had begun to question whether she was making a difference. During this mission, she met Romanian citizens and service members who were happy not only to see U.S. Soldiers, but to see U.S. Soldiers so willing and able to work with Romanian partners. She did not need to use the buzzword *interoperability* to learn firsthand about the importance of the concept it describes.

Endnotes:

¹Army Regulation 34-1, *Multinational Force Interoperability*, 10 July 2015.

²NATO Allied Administration Publication-06, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)*, 1 April 2008.

³Ibid.

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Fort Bliss Kennel Ceremony

By Sergeant Jajuan X. Burton



On 18 September 2015, the 513th Military Police Detachment hosted a military working dog (MWD) kennel-opening ceremony. The opening of this kennel serves as the focal point for MWD operations in support of the Fort Bliss, Texas, law enforcement mission; national interest; and worldwide contingency operations.

Kennel Development Process

The Army has provided the 513th Military Police Detachment with additional resources to compete with the rapid growth of Fort Bliss and the booming Soldier population. The 513th provides law enforcement support to the installation, the Nation, and overseas locations. The 513th Military Police Detachment MWDs previously shared a building with the customs and border patrol dogs, but there was not enough space for expansion. Construction of the new kennel facility spanned 4 years, cost \$2 million, and required a collaborative effort with multiple organizations.

The 93d Military Police Battalion command sergeant major and assistant director of emergency services and his staff were instrumental in lobbying for this project from its inception. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Fort Bliss Department of Public Works interfaced with the contractors to ensure that a quality facility was delivered and swiftly addressed all issues during the construction phase. These agencies ensured that the facility was in compliance with the contract and Department of Defense standards and that the 513th Military Police Detachment received an operational facility. The Fort Bliss veterinary team provided an excellent building inspection. It identified more than 55 issues and wrote a thorough assessment that was critical in improving the functionality and the safety of the Soldiers and MWDs.

Guest Speaker

Air Force Master Sergeant Allen Farkas (Retired) was the guest speaker at the Fort Bliss MWD kennel-opening ceremony. He was selected because of his extensive career in law enforcement and his service as an MWD handler. He also had a connection with the Soldiers; he had been assigned to Biggs Air Field, Fort Bliss, with the 95th Air Police Squadron and Sentry Dog Section more than 50 years ago. Master Sergeant Farkas and his dog were responsible for securing the nuclear silos positioned on Biggs Army Airfield. According to Air Force Manual 125-6, *USAF Sentry Dog Manual*, the Sentry Dog Program had but one objective: "To provide commanders with a means for increasing the security of restricted areas and for protecting government

property against theft or pilferage."¹ The armed forces have continuously strived for improved MWD team capabilities. The Sentry Dog Program was the precursor of today's MWD program. According to current Army Regulation (AR) 190-12, *Military Working Dogs*: "Military working dog teams are used in garrison and combat support missions including area security; movement and mobility support operations; law and order; and force protection, including narcotic, human, landmine, firearm, ammunition, and explosive detection."²

Following the ceremony, Master Sergeant Farkas provided the Soldiers with a tour of the old kennels and shared the history of the MWD program and the impact of the program on the installation, police work, and the armed forces. The knowledge that he shared with current MWD handlers spanned decades.

During his visit, Master Sergeant Farkas was amazed by the expansion of the installation and thankful that the unit invited him as a guest speaker for the ceremony. He shared a powerful message that resonated with all law enforcement and MWD handlers in attendance. The message was relevant, timeless, and it transcended all branches of Service: *Professionalism, knowledge, and confidence are traits that law enforcement personnel must embody. Military police must have confidence in their ability as professionals and the ability to enter a room and control any situation.*

Conclusion

The 513th Military Police Detachment is proud of its new kennel facility. It will be home to fine Soldiers and MWDs who are motivated and dedicated to the mission of narcotic, human, landmine, firearm, ammunition, and explosives detection. The unit goal is to increase readiness and be prepared to deploy MWD assets in support of this great Nation. The 513th Military Police Detachment looks forward to answering that call, and the new kennel facility will serve as the future operations center.



Endnotes:

¹Air Force Manual 125-6, *USAF Sentry Dog Manual*, 15 May 1956.

²AR 190-12, *Military Working Dogs*, 11 March 2013.

Sergeant Burton is a specialized search dog handler for the 513th Military Police Detachment, 93d Military Police Battalion, Fort Bliss, Texas. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from the University of Dubuque, Dubuque, Iowa.



Operation Dragoon Ride Readies a Relevant Force

*By Major Ranjini T. Danaraj, First Lieutenant Leigh M. Hackbert,
and First Lieutenant Hannah M. Miller*

In December 2014, the commander of U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), Lieutenant General Frederick Hodges, commented in an open forum about a desire for freedom of movement on the European continent that was as easy as driving from Virginia to Georgia. Immediately recognizing that the 18th Military Police Brigade (which is uniquely composed of one military police battalion, one engineer battalion, and the European regional confinement facility) could be relevant to this task, Colonel Zane Jones, commander of the 18th Military Police Brigade, directed his staff to develop a proof of principle.

This proof of principle morphed into Operation Vigilant Express, which was a reconnaissance of three different routes in Germany and neighboring Operation Atlantic Resolve countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland) with combined military police and engineer teams. Operation Vigilant Express was aimed at testing the unit ability to conduct route reconnaissance and surveillance, liaise with host nation authorities to fulfill country requirements, and challenge the serviceability of Humvee platforms that are significantly underutilized in Europe. As the battalion executed Operation Vigilant Express, rumblings about Operation Dragoon Ride, a 1,800 kilometer tactical road march from Estonia to Germany, started to filter to the battalion. News of this operation did not originate from a USAREUR operation order, but from the brigade commander, who learned of the operation and took the initiative to contact the 2d Cavalry Regiment (2CR) to offer the services of the brigade. His next call was to the 709th Military Police Battalion commander to plan the military police concept of support for the operation.

The battalion seized the initiative quickly, deploying liaison officers to the 3d Squadron, 2CR (3/2CR), tactical operation center in Riga, Latvia, within 5 days, to nest directly with the squadron planning the operation. This step single-handedly ensured planning synchronization and, ultimately, mission success. The battalion and brigade staff quickly divided lines of effort and began planning efforts with

2CR, the 21st Theater Sustainment Command, USAREUR, and the numerous country teams. The embedded military police liaison officers quickly demonstrated their worth by articulating what the military police could do to bolster movement protection, coordinating with host nation security forces to determine the response to contingency events (actions on halt, actions on accident, actions on protest, actions on hostile act) and staffing the monumental requirements for diplomatic clearances for the military police. The liaison officers conducted daily conference calls with the battalion operations officer (S-3) to ensure that the most up-to-date information was integrated in the planning effort back at the military police battalion headquarters.

Through mission analysis, the battalion executive officer and staff quickly identified Soldier readiness processing, resourcing, and unit movement coordination gaps and initiated a series of in-progress reviews to synchronize efforts. The brigade spearheaded the effort to coordinate diplomatic clearances for the movement forward, which included socializing with the embassies where military police would be transiting with weapons and ammunition (an infrequent occurrence).

The most significant planning event involved the battalion S-3's participation in the USAREUR rehearsal-of-concept (ROC) drill. What had begun with a simple directive from the USAREUR commanding general to 2CR to road march back to Germany now involved the majority of USAREUR units. At the ROC drill, it was evident that the logistical infrastructure was adequate, there was a viable recovery and medical evacuation plan, and there was sufficient airspace deconfliction for USAREUR fixed- and rotary-wing assets. During the rehearsals, the battalion S-3 consistently advised of the military police concept of support and contingency response actions. Additionally, attending this planning event helped the S-3 to understand the larger strategic context for the mission and its significant information operations campaign.

Understanding that three troops of the squadron would converge in Prague—a heavily trafficked thoroughfare and one from which 3/2CR deployed a liaison officer too late in the planning process—the 709th offered to deploy a company tactical action center to Prague to facilitate the traffic control plan and protect the rest overnight (RON) sites. To begin to socialize the plan, the battalion commander and the S-3 went to the embassy in Prague to meet with the Czech Republic Royal Police. Throughout the operation, the embassies were the perfect entry points from which to identify the appropriate host nation security officials for coordination. The embassy personnel understood the force structure and the personalities and advised about how to frame the discussion so that it would be mutually beneficial. Additionally, an introduction by known embassy personnel brought the battalion commander immediate validation, so that the conversation could quickly transition to operational planning. The battalion commander's engagement with Brigadier General Milan Schulc, chief of the Czech Republic Royal Police, provided valuable insight into the Czech views of the operation and a major concern of the Czechs (for example, commencement of the operation during the construction season, which would restrict movement). At the conclusion of the meeting, an agreement regarding a combined reconnaissance of the RON and traffic control point locations to ensure security and traffic flow was reached. That conversation paved the way for the commander of the 615th Military Police Company to liaise with the action officers of the Royal Police. Multiple reconnaissance operations were conducted with the Royal Police counterparts to ensure that Prague was ready to receive the squadron of Strykers and support vehicles that would soon be arriving at their location.

At the unit level, there was significant ongoing preparation. Units adjusted training plans to focus on convoy security tasks and Joint Capabilities Release communications. Soldiers participated in multiple classes on Joint Capabilities Release functionality and on troubleshooting the system. Unit preparation also included mission briefings, public affairs briefings, communication exercises internal to the battalion and with 3/2CR, and vehicle load-outs and inspections. Some of the units validated these preparatory actions with a deployment readiness exercise. This no-notice recall challenged units to quickly gain accountability, scrub for Soldier readiness processing deficiencies, draw weapons, load out, and conduct a mission brief. Soon after the deployment readiness exercises, the M1151s were line-hauled to the three start points for the road march in Estonia, Lithuania, and Poland. The culminating preparatory event was the deployment of the lieutenants to participate in the 3/2CR ROC drill. At this event, leaders began to solidify their reputation as a competent and responsive force and to confirm for troop counterparts their understanding of the mission and specified tasks.

On 10 March 2015, the battalion started deploying squads to their start points so that they could be on site no less than 3 days ahead of the troop-initiating movement. Squads in nontactical vehicles (NTVs) convoyed to their start points,

one squad was flown to Estonia, and the remaining two squads were bused to Lithuania and Poland. The squadron maneuvered at staggered intervals on three routes during this operation. Iron Troop road marched along Route Mandi from Estonia through Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland before consolidating with the squadron in Prague. Lightning Troop road marched along Route Melissa, from Lithuania through Poland, before Prague consolidation. Killer Troop maneuvered along Route Mindy in the march from Poland to Prague.

The military police concept of support was fairly simple. Each troop was provided two squads—one in NTVs and one in tactical vehicles. The NTV squad departed 3 to 4 hours ahead of the troop-initiating movement. It used a low-profile vehicle to identify any potential obstructions to the route, link up with the host nation security forces to confirm the security plan while in-transit and at the static display locations, and finalize the traffic control plan to determine where the troop would RON. The tactical squad remained integrated within the troop's different movement serials (or iterations), prepared to move forward should it need to respond to a contingency event. Not all of the tasks were tactical; when the 527th Military Police Company Soldiers arrived at the Polish 85th Air Defense Artillery barracks in Skwierzyna, Poland, they coordinated the barracks location and plan and the chow payment and execution, executed combined security patrols with the local security forces, and established a parking plan for 179 Soldiers and 47 vehicles of Killer Troop. The flexibility of the leaders and Soldiers who participated in Operation Dragon Ride was invaluable in endearing them to the unit they supported, accomplishing the mission, and posturing the troops for fun events. First Lieutenant Leigh Hackbert of the 529th Military Police Company, explained that "The Polish 85th Air Defense Artillery commander and his Soldiers greeted us with enthusiasm, opening up their unit museum to give the troop commander and myself private tours before allowing Soldiers to explore the history of the unit."

First Lieutenant Hannah Miller, 615th Military Police Company, explained that "As the first element to wake up and the first to arrive at all of the day's sites, members of 3d Platoon, 615th Military Police Company, often forged the first impression that local nationals would have of the entire convoy and provided a crucial conduit for further communication. Additionally, 3d Platoon, 615th Military Police Company, developed the traffic control plan and the refuel plan for each of the 10 RON locations, saving the troop countless hours and the hassle inherent in trying to fit over 40 pieces of rolling stock in small, unmaneuverable areas."

First Lieutenant Michael Bush, also of the 529th Military Police Company added, "On 22 March 2015, we began our movement along Route Melissa in Lithuania. Our mission was to push ahead and gain eyes on the location of the static display. The Ozas Mall in Vilnius, Lithuania, was our objective and the first display for the troops. Once on-site, we met with the local police to assist in traffic control, parking, and provide communications liaison between the participating

forces. Overall, the execution of the static display was without issue and the people of Lithuania were able to meet the Soldiers and take pictures with the vehicles.” First Lieutenant Bush and his Soldiers went on to meet the mayor of Bialystok, Poland, and visit Auschwitz on one of their low-battle-rhythm days.

The road march was more than just the practical movement of equipment from the training area to home station. It was also a show of solidarity with countries that live within Russia’s sphere of influence. First Lieutenant Hackbert said, “One elderly gentleman showed the Soldiers a book of pictures his family had taken when General Patton’s Army came through his town when he was only 3 years old. Another woman hugged a Soldier and cried about how happy she was that the American Soldiers were back in the Czech Republic. Military police Soldiers received handmade gifts, notes, drawings, and more from people in the crowd. One young man asked a [military police Soldier] how it felt to be a hero. The whole affair was amazing and exhilarating.”

On 1 April 2015, the 3/2CR and its embedded military police vehicles paraded with great fanfare down the main street of the Vilseck military installation to crowds of Service members, Families, and German nationals. During the welcome home ceremony that followed the parade, the 709th Soldiers who participated in the operation received Silver Spurs (a coveted cavalry tradition marking the long journey); but more importantly, they received recognition that military police are a vital component to the success of the operation. The battalion has since supported similar operations in Romania and a 3,100 kilometer operation with the 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team from Vicenza, Italy, to Estonia.

Overall, the mission was a success. But this experience was not without some major lessons learned. Aggressively insert yourself into relevant operations. If it hadn’t have been for the brigade commander recognizing the significance of Operation Dragoon Ride, the 709th Military Police Battalion would have never received an invitation or order to participate.

Staff synchronization between numerous headquarters was challenging due to the compressed timeline. The Operation Dragoon Ride routes weren’t approved until right before the operation, and RON and static display sites remained moving targets during the operation. The entire staff rallied at frequent intervals to ensure that everyone had the same operational picture and that all required tasks were being addressed. The staff continued to identify and resource solutions until the day of execution.

Don’t get trapped by modified tables of organization and equipment. NTVs and iridium satellite telephones are not included on military police modified tables of organization and equipment, but both were critical to mission accomplishment. The NTVs provided less of a signature for the squad moving ahead of the troop so that the squad could observe nefarious indicators. This also decreased the chance that the screening action would alert an enemy of troop movement.

The iridium satellite telephones served as part of a robust communication primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency (PACE) plan established by the battalion communications officer.

In the course of preparing for this operation, it was clear that the lack of training and familiarization with communications equipment (primarily Joint Capabilities Releases) meant that faults were missed. Some equipment that had been presumed to be fully mission-capable had failing faults. The battalion has worked tirelessly to improve this training deficiency since Operation Dragoon Ride.

Another skill that atrophies when units are not frequently deployed is the ability to perform movement-required actions. Fortunately, the battalion had just published a command deployment discipline standard operating procedure, which contained a checklist of actions, and helped delineate movement responsibilities between headquarters. But it didn’t make it any easier to properly request line haul, coordinate dip clearances, or chase down a Hazmat 15-qualified Soldier who could validate the vehicle fuel load.¹ Operation Dragoon Ride created a renewed battalion emphasis on self-reliance so that there are no limits to moving Soldiers or equipment effectively and efficiently.

Not only were the 709th Soldiers able to participate in the longest tactical road march the U.S. Army has made across Europe since General George S. Patton diverted his Third Army to relieve Bastogne, Belgium, in 1944, but their participation in the operation was also a welcome change of pace to the extremely high level of law enforcement commitment in Europe.² The Soldiers returned from this operation confident in their skill, motivated by their mission, and possessing a rejuvenated sense of purpose.



Endnotes:

¹Hazmat 15 is a certification that allows Soldiers to transport ammunition.

²Rick Lyman, “An American Military Convoy in Europe Aims to Reassure Allies,” *The New York Times*, 29 March 2015.

Major Danaraj is the executive officer of the 709th Military Police Battalion, 18th Military Police Brigade, Grafenwoehr, Germany. She holds a bachelor’s degree in economics from the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California; a master’s degree in business and organizational security management from Webster University; and a master’s degree in policy management from Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

First Lieutenant Hackbert is currently attending the Military Police Captain’s Career Course at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. She holds a bachelor’s degree in criminal justice and a master’s degree in criminology and criminal justice from Loyola University, Chicago.

First Lieutenant Miller is a platoon leader with the 615th Military Police Company, 709th Military Police Battalion, Grafenwoehr, Germany. She holds a bachelor’s degree in English from Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.

INTEGRATING AND SYNCHRONIZING ANTITERRORISM PHYSICAL SECURITY MEASURES

By Mr. Michael J. Owczarzak and Colonel Richard S. Vanderlinden (Retired)

This article discusses the interrelationship between Army antiterrorism and physical security programs, primarily from an antiterrorism point of view. The Army Protection Program (APP) provides the overarching management framework for synchronizing, integrating, and prioritizing protective efforts, including physical security and antiterrorism. APP, antiterrorism, and physical security are inextricably linked, and the combined efforts of corresponding personnel are essential despite different program scopes and objectives. Physical security adds strength to the antiterrorism program, seeking to defend against a broader spectrum of adversaries—and not just terrorists; antiterrorism provides a wide scope of capabilities beyond those in a limited physical security program. Synchronizing and integrating planning processes allows Army commanders and leaders to better manage risks to Soldiers, civilians, Family members, contractors, facilities, infrastructure, and information in any environment.

Antiterrorism Synchronization and Integration

Planning and executing an effective antiterrorism program is one facet of protecting Army assets and American values. Despite our success after more than 10 years of war, persistent and advanced adversaries continue to generate a dynamic operational environment. This environment includes terrorist capabilities expected to threaten the Army and evolve well beyond the visible horizon. Mental and physical agility in our protective programs are required to carefully select effective tactics and wisely commit scarce resources. The antiterrorism program is closely aligned with physical security programs and efforts to prevent a terrorist attack and effectively respond to an attack if necessary. These efforts occur on the battlefield, at installations, and at standalone facilities. Antiterrorism and physical security are functional elements that are embedded in the APP and build a holistic and resilient framework for Army protection.¹ Although there are many dependencies among the 12 elements of the APP, few are closer than the linkage between antiterrorism and physical security.

Synchronization and integration with horizontal and vertical elements are the two key actions that enable the success of the antiterrorism program. Synchronization is “the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose

to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time.”² Integration is the arrangement of efforts to reduce redundancy and to operate as a whole.³ The Army antiterrorism program is synchronized to, and integrated with, physical security activities through a framework of working groups and activities within the APP. These groups (Antiterrorism Working Group, Threat Working Group, Physical Security Council) serve to address individual program requirements and provide interlocking forums for advancement of a powerful and effective overall protective posture. Army commanders and leaders at all levels are responsible for managing security risks and building a more resilient security program by including antiterrorism requirements in physical security activities and vice versa.

Physical Security in the Forefront

Within Department of Defense (DOD) and Army regulations, there is an explicit requirement to embed physical security in antiterrorism. In Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2000.16, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards*, Antiterrorism Standard 13 (Physical Security Measures) specifically requires the development of a holistic physical security system to counter terrorist capabilities, while the standards for random antiterrorism measures (RAM) and force protection conditions (FPCONs) directly complement antiterrorism and physical security program efforts. The overlap of the antiterrorism and physical security programs occurs in the employment of permanent or temporary physical security measures to deter or defeat terrorists. Success in antiterrorism depends on physical security so significantly that all efforts must be integrated no matter the situation. Applying this requirement in garrison and in the expeditionary environment; while static or in-transit; and during steady-state operations, periods of increased threats, and special events is no small task. Fortunately, the characteristics of the nexus of antiterrorism and physical security provide key considerations and alignment for planning and execution and lend themselves to overall collaboration. First, the program objectives for antiterrorism and physical security have significant overlap, and the programs are designed to deter and defeat enemy threats rather than natural or safety hazards. Stemming from the objective to defeat a sentient adversary, antiterrorism and physical security efforts are closely aligned. Second, many of the

tactics, techniques, and procedures at the operational level are similar, if not the same. Third, antiterrorism and physical security share many resources at the operational level. With these considerations in mind, Army commanders and leaders find a natural tendency to closely align antiterrorism and physical security during deliberate planning and troop-leading activities.

Antiterrorism Standard 13: Physical Security Measures

Antiterrorism Standard 13 for physical security measures provides specific direction for physical security capabilities required to support the antiterrorism program. The Antiterrorism Standard 13 requirements include—

- Develop a holistic security system to counter terrorist capabilities.
- Establish multilayered defense in depth.
- Integrate and synchronize detection, assessment, delay or denial, communications, and response capabilities.
- Develop area of responsibility and other mission-specific policies.
- Coordinate and integrate tenant and unit plans and measures.

These requirements equate to mission-type orders, proving that no two situations are alike. Every situation necessitates a unique assessment and flexible response to attain a protection level tailored to the existing threat. The requirement for defense in depth specifically provides for resilient prevention of a successful terrorist act against the Service, command, unit, or facility. In many ways, this provides the

pivot point for physical security integration into antiterrorism. On one side of defense in depth, we achieve holistic protection and this is counterbalanced by the need to integrate physical security defensive elements (detection, assessment, delay or denial, communications, and response), area- or mission-specific requirements, and tenant unit coordination.

While holistic security is the objective at the tactical and operational levels, defense in depth against terrorist activity is a performance requirement. Antiterrorism Standard 13 provides five activities or essential elements to achieve an adequate physical security posture, while Army Regulation (AR) 525-2, *The Army Protection Program*, provides six principles for implementation, as outlined in Figure 1. The implementation principles and the requirements of Antiterrorism Standard 13 are congruent and become visible through the implementation of physical security measures at the unit, facility, and installation levels. By evaluating antiterrorism physical security measures against the elements and principles in Figure 1, Army leaders, antiterrorism officers, antiterrorism coordinators, and physical security inspectors can ensure that they are developing a comprehensive, holistic, and effective physical security system. For example, when activities ensure that the protection principles of security, scalability, and redundancy are incorporated in physical security detection and assessment measures, they increase the likelihood of physical security system success by eliminating single points of failure and assuring availability of the measures in any environment. When physical security measures incorporate the protection program principles of being forward-looking and having an end-state focus, the measures directly align with commander and leader priorities,




Figure 1. Principles for implementation of The Army Protection Program^{4,5}

and risk tolerances. Protection program principles are flexible enough to meet antiterrorism and physical security requirements for emerging threats and hazards. Ensuring that the physical security response elements are integrated with assessment and communications is important in guaranteeing that the forces are ready, trained, equipped, and capable as required by Antiterrorism Standard 13.

Standards for RAM and FPCONs

Closely coupled with steady-state or baseline physical security measures are RAM and FPCONs—two of the largest and most visible areas of crossover between antiterrorism and physical security in antiterrorism program implementation.⁶ RAM and FPCONs, which are integrated with Antiterrorism Standard 13, are developed during the planning and execution phase of the antiterrorism program.

RAM change the defensive signature of the organization, and they are conducted at installations and standalone facilities. RAM supplement physical security measures; they are not intended to replace effective and prudent physical security planning. Commanders and leaders are required to mitigate vulnerabilities, and compensatory measures are primary elements of the physical security system; RAM support this system. When possible, RAM should particularly emphasize any measure or effect that increases the physical security of the activity. Planning physical security measures such as RAM should include a deliberate time, place, and purpose in order to achieve the desired results. The randomness in RAM should be targeted toward terrorists or their supporters' ability to discern our operational posture, not statistical randomness. The end state should complicate the planning and execution cycle of an adversary engaged in hostile surveillance or action against Army missions or assets. Properly planned and executed RAM supporting a physical security program specifically tailored to the existing threats are a powerful tool to increase risks for our adversaries. Additionally, if RAM are coordinated and integrated with other physical security activities (Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design) or with intelligence and awareness activities such as the Army iWATCH program, our probability for success in defeating terrorists rises significantly.

Graduated FPCON activities also build upon the physical security capabilities resident in cohesive Army organizations and activities. A large number of FPCON measures, especially those within FPCON C and higher, are physical security measures intended to support the detection of, assessment of, delay or denial of, and response to terrorist activities or attacks. The FPCON system benefits from, and is built upon, physical security activities beginning in FPCON Normal. The physical security activities, being designed for a wider spectrum of threats (including criminals and foreign intelligence actors), provide the backbone from which procedural and physical FPCON measures are implemented. Without the physical security baseline from the Army physical security program and support from other APP elements, antiterrorism efforts would be insufficient for protection against terrorist attacks.

Conclusion

Physical security measures, RAM, and FPCONs are a result of deliberate mission- and threat-focused planning. As each environment is different (as in the case of standalone facilities that have characteristics limiting physical security, RAM, and FPCON employment), there is always a requirement for integrated, synchronized solutions and the creative application of doctrine. The environment requires dynamic antiterrorism and physical security planning and integration. Army organizations have strength and resilience in physical security and antiterrorism working groups, which should be leveraged to develop and maintain capabilities for deterring and defeating terrorists and their supporters. Physical security measures and RAM should change as activities cycle through higher FPCONs, always ready for immediate action and implementation. By developing and embracing the natural relationship between the antiterrorism and physical security programs, Army commanders, leaders, and staff at all levels can meet protective requirements no matter the threat.



Endnotes:

¹Army Regulation 525-2, *The Army Protection Program*, 8 December 2014, lists the APP elements as antiterrorism, computer network defense, continuity of operations, critical infrastructure risk management, emergency management, fire and emergency services, health protection, high-risk personnel, information assurance, law enforcement, operations security, and physical security. The enabling functions are intelligence, counterintelligence, and security engineering services.

²Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, 22 October 2013.

³JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 8 November 2010.

⁴DODI 2000.16, *DOD Antiterrorism (AT) Standards*, 2 October 2006.

⁵AR 525-2, *The Army Protection Program*, 8 December 2014.

⁶In DODI 2000.16, RAM are covered under Antiterrorism Standard 14 and FPCONs are covered under Standard 22.

Mr. Owczarzak is a contract senior analyst with the Antiterrorism Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor's degree in administration of justice from Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, Illinois, and a master's degree in security management from Webster University. He has been a defense force commander and installation antiterrorism officer in deployed and garrison organizations.

Colonel Vanderlinden (Retired) is a contract principal military analyst with the Antiterrorism Branch, Office of the Provost Marshal General. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from Northern Michigan University, Marquette, Michigan, and master's degrees in criminal justice from Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, and strategic studies from the U.S. Army War College. He is also a graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy.



Headquarters and Headquarters Company

5th Military Police Battalion



Lineage and Honors

Constituted 26 December 1942 in the Army of the United States as the 5th Section, Criminal Investigation.
Activated 25 January 1943 at Fort Custer, Michigan.

Reorganized and redesignated 29 December 1943 as the 5th Military Police Criminal Investigation Detachment.

Inactivated 15 March 1949 in Germany.

Allotted 8 June 1949 to the Regular Army.

Activated 20 June 1949 at Washington, D.C.

Inactivated 19 May 1954 at Washington, D.C.

Redesignated 31 July 1956 as the 5th Military Police Detachment.

Activated 15 August 1956 in Italy.

Inactivated 9 June 1969 in Italy.

Activated 8 March 1971 in Vietnam.

Inactivated 15 August 1972 in Vietnam.

Activated 1 October 1983 in Germany.

Reorganized and redesignated 1 September 1996 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 5th Military Police Battalion.

Campaign Participation Credit

World War II

Normandy

Northern France

Rhineland

Vietnam

Counteroffensive, Phase VII

Consolidation I

Consolidation II

Cease-Fire

War on Terrorism

Global War on Terrorism

(Additional Campaigns to be Determined)

Decoration

Meritorious Unit Commendation (Army), Streamer embroidered SOUTHWEST ASIA 2011–2012

Round Mountain Detention and Rehabilitation Center



By Master Sergeant Patrick V. Garland (Retired) and Mr. Mark S. Lindsay

In a previous issue of Military Police, Master Sergeant Garland (Retired) wrote about the penal institutions established in the European theater of operations during World War II; but until recently, historical documents on prison facilities in the Far East were extremely difficult to uncover.¹

In December 1941, U.S. armed forces arrived in Australia prepared to wage war against the Empire of Japan. Military police units were among those arriving, and they began policing the areas used by our forces. A provost marshal's office was established in Base Section 3, situated around the city of Brisbane. Headquartered in the South Brisbane Municipal Chambers (town hall), the basement of the building housed detention cells and a solitary confinement facility for detained U.S. military personnel. As the need grew, the Eagle Farm Stockade (an even larger facility) was established in the vicinity of the Doomben Racecourse. Initially, this facility was secured by C Company, 738th Military Police Battalion, and was later replaced by the 1st Provisional Guard Company. On 24 November 1942, the 1st Provisional Guard Company was redesignated as the 345th Military Police Escort Guard Company.² Soon, it was apparent that this facility was not large enough to accommodate the prisoner population, which had risen to 110.

The U.S. Army proposed a Detention and Rehabilitation Center at Round Mountain, south of Laravale in Beaudesert Shire in southeast Queensland, Australia. Round Mountain was once a quarry that provided ballast for the Brisbane to Kyogle section of the interstate railway line.³ The assistant minister for the Australian army approved a £36,000 budget for the project in October 1942, on the grounds that a military detention camp with satisfactory accommodations was urgently required for U.S. prisoners serving sentences for major offenses.

According to a 1943 map of the completed complex (and confirmed by contemporary photographs), the stockade was located north of the quarry at Round Mountain, east of the main road. It had two outer fences and guard towers at each corner and midway along the west, south, and east sides. The southern part of the stockade contained rows of tents for the inmates, divided into three sections by internal fences. The northern part of the stockade contained timber buildings, including a hospital and chapel. There were power, supply, and repair buildings to the north of the stockade on either side of the entrance. North of these buildings, a road from Round Mountain Road ran east, to a timber trestle bridge over the Logan River, linking to today's Mount Lindesay Highway. North of this road, opposite the stockade, was a parade ground; and north of the parade ground were timber buildings and tent lines for the prison guards.

The headquarters buildings were located west of Round Mountain Road, to the northwest of the stockade. A tennis court and motor pool were located north of the headquarters area. Water mains ran northwest from the stockade compound, past the south end of the headquarters buildings, up the hill west of the road to six water tanks just south of a house. A swimming pool, complete with what appeared to be a sandy beach, was located west of the water tanks. A poultry farm was located north of the house.

On 1 July 1943, the 120 men of the 345th Military Police Escort Guard Company and 116 military prisoners took up residence at Round Mountain. White and black Servicemen were held in the stockade. The prisoners worked in the ballast quarry at Round Mountain (linked by a railway spur to the interstate railway line) and other areas in the camp (constructing pallets, repairing shoes, working in the lumberyard). The camp raised its own pigs, and a poultry farm

consisting of 875 hens was in operation by March 1944. By the first week of May, there were enough eggs produced from the chicken project that they were served for breakfast to the prison population and company mess.⁴ The first wedding performed in the prison was on 10 May 1944. Garrison prisoner Allen Chase wed Miss Bertha Anderson. The ceremony was performed by the base chaplain and a local minister in the office of the base commander.⁵

Lieutenant Colonel Carl V. Shoemaker, who was from Portland, Oregon, was the commanding officer of the Round Mountain Detention and Rehabilitation Center from 9 August 1943 until early January 1945. Captain Edward N. Usnick, who had been the executive officer since the center was activated in June 1943, assumed the duties of the commanding officer after Colonel Shoemaker's departure. Before the activation, Usnick had been the utilities and operations officer. He often provided prisoners to work on the local farms. On one occasion, he sent six prisoners to a farm where they picked 50 to 80 acres of corn for the farmer.

The guard force for the prison consisted of members of the 345th Military Police Escort Guard Company, initially commanded by Captain Harry E. Hoch, who was assisted by First Lieutenant Ernest H. Skiver and Second Lieutenant Roy E. Neilson. The enlisted component was augmented and divided into three sections: the headquarters (one master sergeant and nine men), the provost section (one first sergeant and nine men), and the guard section (155 men). On 7 April 1945, General Order 104 from Headquarters, U.S. Army Services of Supply, cited the 345th Military Police Escort Guard Company and the headquarters detachment of the Round Mountain Detention and Rehabilitation Center with the meritorious service unit plaque for superior performance of their duties and appearances.

Based on newsletters of the time, the guard force and administrative staff had many opportunities available during leisure time, including rifle marksmanship matches, golf, swimming, baseball, parties, dances (with local women or members of a local Woman's Army Corps Unit as guests), movies, and pig weight-guessing competitions (with prizes of cigarettes and bottles of beer). The movie shown on 21 January 1945 was *What's Buzzin' Cousin*, starring Ann Miller and Jack Okie; and on 23 January 1945, the movie *Comando Raid at Dawn*, with Paul Muni, was shown.⁶ For a brief period, a number of horses were provided to the camp for the recreational use of the guard force. A noncommissioned officer's club was dedicated and opened on 24 June 1944.

In 1944, Round Mountain was also used to house military prisoners from the U.S. Navy. The Navy provided a contingent of guards and administrators, who arrived on 12 September 1944 to handle the additional work load.

Captain Walter A. Luszki, a staff member at Round Mountain, was detailed to oversee the construction of a second detention center at Oro Bay, New Guinea, and to command that facility for rehabilitating Soldiers back into combat units. During May 1944, gallows were constructed

at Oro Bay, where six black U.S. Army Soldiers, who were found guilty at a court martial for the crime of rape committed in Milne Bay, were hung.⁷ The hangings were performed by Master Sergeant Charles C. Rexroad, a military policeman, who had also been assigned to Round Mountain. A third detention center was constructed in the Philippines when that country was being reoccupied by U.S. forces, and a fourth detention center was established at a former Japanese prison when Japan was occupied by U.S. forces. 

Endnotes:

¹Patrick V. Garland, "Penal Institutions in the European Theater of Operations," *Military Police*, Spring 2012, p. 64, <http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/pdfs/Spring%2012/MP%20Garland.pdf>, accessed on 12 January 2016.

²Carl V. Shoemaker, "History of the 345th Military Police Escort Guard Company for the Month of June 1944," 345th Military Police Escort Guard Company, 1 July 1944, p. 1.

³U.S. Army Detention and Rehabilitation Center Map, <<http://www.ozatwar.com/locations/roundmtn01.jpg>>, accessed on 27 January 2016.

⁴Carl V. Shoemaker, "History of Organization From 1 December, 1942 to 1 May, 1944," 345th Military Police Escort Guard Company, 5 June 1944.

⁵Ibid.

⁶"Stone Age," Volume 3, Edition 3, Round Mountain Detention Center and Rehabilitation Center, 20 January 1945, <<http://www.ozatwar.com/locations/stoneage20jan45.pdf>>, accessed on 20 January 2016.

⁷Walter A. Luszki, *A Rape of Justice*, Madison Books, 1991.

Master Sergeant Garland retired from the U.S. Army in 1974. During his military career, he served in military police units and criminal investigation detachments and laboratories. At the time of his retirement, Master Sergeant Garland was serving as a ballistics evidence specialist at the European Laboratory. He remained in this career field until retiring from civilian law enforcement in 1995.

Mr. Lindsay began his career in law enforcement as a military police Soldier in 1972. In 1978, he left the military to enter civilian law enforcement. After retiring from the Baltimore City Police Department in 1999, he entered federal law enforcement as a criminal intelligence specialist assigned to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms. In 2008, he returned to military law enforcement, where he was assigned to the Command Intelligence Operations Center, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) and finished his career working cold cases.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE LEVEL AND ABOVE COMMANDS				
COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
Mark Inch	Timothy Fitzgerald		OPMG	Alexandria, VA
Mark Inch	Crystal Wallace	John Welch	HQ USACIDC	Quantico, VA
Kevin Vereen	Richard Woodring	Leroy Shamburger	USAMPS	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Mark Inch	Timothy Fitzgerald		Army Corrections Cmd	Alexandria, VA
Michael White	Catherine Farrell		46th MP Cmd	Lansing, MI
Michael Hoban	NA		USARC PM	Ft Bragg, NC
Phillip Churn	Craig Owens	Mary Hostetler	200th MP Cmd	Ft Meade, MD
Duane Miller	Angelia Flournoy		8th MP Bde	Schofield Barracks, HI
Cary Cowan	Winsome Laos		11th MP Bde	Los Alamitos, CA
Niave Knell	David Tookmanian		14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Erica Nelson	Steven Raines		15th MP Bde	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Eugenia Guilmartin	Jeffrey Maddox		16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Arturo Horton	James Breckinridge		18th MP Bde	Sembach AB, Germany
Christopher Burns	Jon Matthews		42d MP Bde	Ft Lewis, WA
Javier Reina	Joseph Klostermann		43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Peter Cross	Byron Robinson		49th MP Bde	Fairfield, CA
Ross Guieb	Bradley Cross		89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Thomas Vern	Jon Sawyer		177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Peter Vanderland	John Schiffli		290th MP Bde	Nashville, TN
Richard Giles	Abbe Mulholland		300th MP Bde	Inkster, MI
Keith Nadig	Lawrence Canada		333d MP Bde	Farmingdale, NY
Roger Hedgepeth	Tara Wheadon	Edgar Collins	3d MP Gp (CID)	Hunter Army Airfield, GA
Detrick Briscoe	Jeffrey Ceregrino	David Albaugh	6th MP Gp (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Thomas Denzler	Clyde Wallace	Celia Gallo	701st MP Gp (CID)	Quantico, VA
David Heath	Janet Harris		Joint Detention Gp	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS				
Wesley Huff	Terrence Allen		2-80th MP Bn (TASS)	Owings Mill, MD
John Schwab	David Swain		2-95th MP Bn (TASS)	Baton Rouge, LA
Patricia Hamilton	Gregory Jackson		1-100th MP Bn (TASS)	Nashville, TN
Stephen VanDoren	Andrew Johnson		2-104th MP Bn (TASS)	Aurora, CO
Edward Diamantis	Paul Duros		2-108th MP Bn (TASS)	Ft Jackson, SC
Kevin Hanrahan	Peter Harrington	Anderson Wagner	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kleber Kaserne, Germany
Gerald Mapp	Chad Aldridge	Billy Higgason	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Juan Nava	Francisco Huereque	Phillip Curran	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Michael Crane	Gordon Lawitzke	Paul Bailey	19th MP Bn (CID)	Wheeler Army Airfield, HI
Christine Whitmer	James Sanguins	Joel Fitz	22d MP Bn (CID)	Joint Base Lewis-McChord, WA
Marcus Matthews	Marcus Jackson		33d MP Bn	Bloomington, IL
Phillip Lenz	Bryan Schoenhofer		40th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Jason Turner	Kevin Pickrel		51st MP Bn	Florence, SC
Michael Jensik	Russell Erickson		91st MP Bn	Ft Drum, NY
Chad Goyette	Brian Flom		92d MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Jeremy Willingham	William Mayfield		93d MP Bn	Ft Bliss, TX
Brian Carlson	Michael Jeanes		94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Peter Robertson	Freddy Trejo		96th MP Bn (C/D)	San Diego, CA
Alexander Murray	Billy Ray Counts		97th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Michael Fowler	Mark Duris		102d MP Bn (C/D)	Auburn, NY
Craig Maceri	Scott Smilinich		104th MP Bn	Kingston, NY
Steven Jackan	Alpheus Haswell		105th MP Bn (C/D)	Asheville, NC
Robert Watras	Darrell Masterson		112th MP Bn	Canton, MS
Mary Staab	Aarion Franklin		115th MP Bn	Salisbury, MD
John Gobel	Michael Plemons		117th MP Bn	Athens, TN
Kenneth Niles	Robert Wall		118th MP Bn	Warwick, RI
Luis De La Cruz	Jose Perez		124th MP Bn	Hato Rey, Puerto Rico
Richard Candelario	Francisco Ramos		125th MP Bn	Ponce, Puerto Rico
Norberto Flores II	Roger Flores		136th MP Bn	Tyler, TX
Dawn Bolyard	James Summers		151st MP Bn	Dunbar, WV
John Dunn	Gregory Derosier	David Knudson	159th MP Bn (CID)	Terra Haute, IN
Thomas LeMoine	Daniel Williams		160th MP Bn (C/D)	Tallahassee, FL
Jennifer Steed	Victor Watson		168th MP Bn	Dyersburg, TN
Erik Anderson	Callie Leaver		170th MP Bn	Decatur, GA
Larry Crowder	Edward Stratton		175th MP Bn	Columbia, MO

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION LEVEL COMMANDS (continued)				
COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	CWO	UNIT	LOCATION
Robert Paoletti	Andraus Williams		185th MP Bn	Pittsburg, CA
Paul Deal	Boyd Dunbar		192d MP Bn (C/D)	Niantic, CT
Isaac Martinez	Richard Yohn		193d MP Bn (C/D)	Denver, CO
Timothy Starke	Michael Rowan		198th MP Bn	Louisville, KY
John Whitmire	Nathan Deese		203d MP Bn	Athens, AL
Lance Shaffer	Jonathan Stone		205th MP Bn	Poplar Bluff, MO
Kenneth Dilg	Ed Williams		210th MP Bn	Taylor, MI
James Blake	James Sartori		211th MP Bn	Lexington, MA
Michael Treadwell	Theodore Skibyak		226th MP Bn	Farmington, NM
James Lake	Robert Engle		231st MP Bn	Prattville, AL
Timothy Winks	Ben Adams		304th MP Bn (C/D)	Nashville, TN
Loring Bush	Rogelio James		310th MP Bn (C/D)	Uniondale, NY
Damien Garner	Fred Waymire		317th MP Bn	Tampa, FL
Rudy Placencia	Corey Echols		324th MP Bn (C/D)	Fresno, CA
Richard Vanbuskirk	Kyle Jenkins		327th MP Bn (C/D)	Arlington Heights, IL
Andre Holder	Joseph Rigby		336th MP Bn	Pittsburgh, PA
Karen Connick	Keith Magee		340th MP Bn (C/D)	Ashley, PA
Alexander Shaw	Juan Mitchell		372d MP Bn	Washington, DC
Vance Kuhner	Kathleen Menard		382d MP Bn	Westover AFB, MA
Kelly Jones	William Henderson		384th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Wayne, IN
William Rodgers	Michael Robledo		385th MP Bn	Ft Stewart, GA
John Myers	Vacant		387th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Roger Glenn	Michael Poll		391st MP Bn (C/D)	Columbus, OH
Antoine Williams	Anna Vega	Manuel Ruiz	393d MP Bn (CID)	Bell, CA
Cheryl Clement	Shelita Taylor		400th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Meade, MD
Eric Hunsberger	Richard Cruickshank		402d MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Andrea Schaller	Jason Litz		437th MP Bn	Columbus, OH
Timothy Macdonald	James Stillman	Mauro Orcesi	502d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Campbell, KY
John Curry	Mark Hennessey		503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Yvonne Miller	Lisa Piette-Edwards		504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Stephen Newman	William Ramsey		508th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Lewis, WA
Kirk Whittenberger	Clayton Sneed		519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
John Fivian	Janet Harris		525th MP Bn	Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Jason Ruffin	Mark Bell		530th MP Bn (C/D)	Omaha, NE
Jennings Bunch	Vacant		535th MP Bn (C/D)	Cary, NC
Daniel Kuhn	Troy Gentry		607th MP Bn	Grand Prairie, TX
Christopher Wills	Casey Freeman		701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Rebecca Hazelett	James Lea		705th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Matthew Gragg	Michael Weatherholt		709th MP Bn	Grafenwoehr, Germany
Michael Johnston	John Vicars		716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
Karst Brandsma	Darren Boruff		720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Sean Brown	Brian Bertazon		724th MP Bn (C/D)	Ft Lauderdale, FL
Omar Lomas	James Tyler		728th MP Bn	Schofield Barracks, HI
Eric Prugh	Donald Rackley	Robert Mayo	733d MP Bn (CID)	Forest Park, GA
Christopher Minor	Rodney Ervin		744th MP Bn (C/D)	Easton, PA
Jason Marquiss	Scott Anderson		759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Emma Thyen	Shawn McLeod		761st MP Bn	Juneau, AK
Mark Howard	Todd Marchand		773d MP Bn	Pineville, LA
Daniel Orourke	Richard Weider		785th MP Bn (C/D)	Fraser, MI
Jeffrey Bergman	Teresa Duncan		787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Mark McNeil	Eric Vogt		795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Lonnie Branum Jr.	Scott Flint		850th MP Bn	Phoenix, AZ
Randolph Morgan	Cole Pierce	Martin Eaves	Benning CID Bn	Ft Benning, GA
Russell Stewart	David Astorga	Lane Clooper	Washington CID Bn	Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, VA
Derek Bellows	Frank Jeppe	Gerald De Hoyos	Protective Services Bn	Ft Belvoir, VA
Current as of 8 February 2016				
For changes and updates, please e-mail <usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.ppo@mail.mil> or telephone (573) 563-7949.				

DOCTRINE UPDATE


U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
Current Publications			
FM 3-39	Military Police Operations	26 Aug 13	A manual that describes the military police support provided to Army forces conducting unified land operations within the framework of joint operations; increases the emphasis on simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks; and contains a critical discussion of the defense support of civil authorities. Status: Current.
FM 3-63	Detainee Operations	28 Apr 14	A manual that addresses detention operations across the range of military operations and provides detention operations guidance for commanders and staffs. Status: Current.
ATP 3-37.2	Antiterrorism	3 Jun 14	A manual that establishes Army guidance on integrating and synchronizing antiterrorism across the full spectrum of conflict and into the full range of military operations. It shows how antiterrorism operations nest under full spectrum operations, the protection warfighting function, and the composite risk management process. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.10	Police Operations	26 Jan 15	A manual that addresses each element of the military police law and order mission, including planning considerations, police station operations, patrol operations, police engagement, traffic operations, and host nation police capability and capacity. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.11	Military Police Special-Reaction Teams	26 Nov 13	A manual that serves as a guide for commanders, staffs, and trainers who are responsible for training and deploying military police special-reaction teams. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.12	Law Enforcement Investigations	19 Aug 13	A manual that serves as a guide and toolkit for military police, investigators, U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (commonly known as CID) special agents, traffic management and collision investigators, and military police Soldiers conducting criminal and traffic law enforcement (LE) and LE investigations. It also serves to educate military police commanders and staffs on LE investigation capabilities, enabling a more thorough understanding of those capabilities. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.20	Police Intelligence Operations	06 Apr 15	A manual that addresses police intelligence operations which support the operations process and protection activities by providing exceptional police information and intelligence to support, enhance, and contribute to situational understanding, force protection, the commander's protection program, and homeland security. Status: Current.

DOCTRINE UPDATE

U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center of Excellence Capabilities Development Integration Directorate Concepts, Organization, and Doctrine Development Division			
Publication Number	Title	Date	Description
ATP 3-39.32	Physical Security	30 Apr 14	A manual that establishes guidance for all personnel responsible for physical security. It is the basic reference for training security personnel and is intended to be used in conjunction with the Army Regulation 190 (Military Police) series, Security Engineering Unified Facilities Criteria publications, Department of Defense directives, and other Department of the Army publications. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.33	Civil Disturbances	21 Apr 14	A manual that addresses continental U.S. and outside the continental U.S. civil disturbance operations and domestic unrest, including the military role in providing assistance to civil authorities. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.34	Military Working Dogs	30 Jan 15	A manual that provides commanders, staffs, and military working dog (MWD) handlers with an understanding of MWD capabilities, employment considerations, sustainment requirements, and the integration of MWDs in support of full spectrum operations. Status: Current.
ATP 3-39.35	Protective Services	31 May 13	A manual that provides guidance for protective service missions and the management of protective service details. Status: Current.
TC 3-39.30	Military Police Leaders' Handbook	11 Aug 15	A manual that is primarily focused on military police operations at the company level and below. TC 3-39.30 provides an overview of fundamental guidelines and is a quick reference guide to help commanders, leaders, and Soldiers successfully execute key military police missions in support of unified land operations through the three disciplines of security and mobility support, police operations, and detention operations. Status: Current.
TM 3-39.31	Armored Security Vehicle	20 Aug 10	A manual that provides military police forces with the TTP and related information necessary for the employment of the armored security vehicle. Status: Current.
Note: Current military police publications can be accessed and downloaded in electronic format from the U.S. Army Military Police School Web site at < http://www.wood.army.mil/usamps/ >. Comments or questions about military police doctrine can be e-mailed to < usarmy.leonardwood.mscoe.mbx.cdiddcoddmpdoc@mail.mil >.			

“Doctrine is indispensable to an Army. Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.”

—General George H. Decker,
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 1960–1962



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