MILITARY POLICE



HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

This publication approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

PB 19-90-
DECEMBER 199

USAMPS

Autovon 865-xxxx Commercial (205) 848-xxxx

COMMANDANT
MG Charles A. Hines 4333

ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
COL Larry B. Berrong 3626

EXECUTIVE/ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
MAJ Thomas B. Howe 3371

COMMAND SERGEANT MAJOR
CSM Joshua Perry 3603

DIRECTORATE OF COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS
COL Carl C. Sutherland 3016

DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING AND DOCTRINE
COL George Jones, Jr. 3413

DIRECTORATE OF EVALUATION AND STANDARDIZATION
LTC Joseph O. Carter, Jr. 3851

DIRECTORATE OF TRAINING
COL Robert V. Baker 4405

PROPONENCY OFFICE
LTC Patricia M. Sudnik 3183

TRAINING BRIGADE
COL James T. Rackstraw 4221

701st MP BATTALION
LTC Larry M. Forster 3927

RESERVE COMPONENT ADVISOR
MAJ Paul Thompson II 3112

CHIEF OF PUBLICATIONS
MAJ Orlando J. Perez II 4326

EDITOR
Lois C. Perry

DESIGN STAFF
James F. Moats
David J. Lewis
Kenneth D. Godfrey
Patricia M. Hulsey

This medium is approved for the official dissemination of material designed to keep individuals within the Army knowledgeable of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
CARL E. VUONO
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

Official:
THOMAS F. SIKORA
Brigadier General, United States Army
The Adjutant General

MILITARY POLICE, an official U.S. Army professional bulletin for the Military Police Corps Regiment, contains information about military police functions in combat, combat support, combat service support, battlefield circulation control, area security, EPW, law and order, and rear operations. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Objectives of *MILITARY POLICE* are to inform and motivate, increase knowledge, improve performance, and provide a forum for the exchange of ideas. Unless otherwise stated, the views herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Department of Defense or any element thereof. Articles may be reprinted if credit is given to *MILITARY POLICE* and the author. All photographs are official U.S. Army photos unless otherwise accredited. The word "he" as used in *MILITARY POLICE* includes both sexes; any exception will be noted.

CORRESPONDENCE: Correspondence should be addressed to: Editor, *MILITARY POLICE*, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030. Please provide complete return address. Telephone number is AUTOVON 865-5405 or commercial (205) 848-5405.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: Individual subscriptions are available through the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402-9317.

MILITARY POLICE (ISSN 0895-4208) is published quarterly by the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030. Third-class postage paid at Anniston, AL and additional mailing offices (No. 00971).

POSTMASTER: Send address changes to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402-9317.

MILITARY POLICE

A PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

PB 19-90-2

DECEMBER 1990

CONTENTS

TRAINING

14 Reserve Military Police in Panama . . . . . SGT Jim Thomas
36 USDB Staff Corrections Training . . . . . CPT Yvonne Doll
38 MP Safety Database As a Guide for Training . . . . . MAJ Tom Loyd and CPT Keith Howerton
40 1990 Update on Safety . . . . . CPT Jeniphr G. Kistler

ARTICLES

6 The Triple Threat in Operation JUST CAUSE . . . 1LT Robert R. Mackey
11 A JUST CAUSE Christmas . . . . . .PVT Thomas A. Gardella
12 Law and Order South of the Border, Part II . . CPT Anthony M. Schilling
16 Computer-Related Crime: A Primer for Leaders, Part I . . . . . .CPT Michael R. French
18 Taking On Hurricane Hugo . . . . . SSG Michael H. McMichael
23 Marsena R. Patrick, Provost Marshal of the Army . . . . . .MAJ Thomas M. Moncure, Jr.
26 Satanism a Lesson . . . . . LTC(P) Robert V. Baker
28 Progressive Prisons . . . . . CPT Marc Miller
29 Correctional Mental Health Treatment in the Military . . . . . CPT Gregory A. Gahm, Ph.D.
33 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robot . . . . . Jay Schaaf
34 The Threat of Terrorist Bombers . . . . . SFC Richard L. Stanley, II
41 Lineage and Honors: The 159th Military Police Battalion . . . . . .CPT Anthony D. Zabek
42 In Response to Hostage Situations . . . . . SFC David Johnson

EDITORIALS

43 Accepting the NCO Challenge . . . . . .SGM Marcelino Malavet, Jr.
48 Comments on the Military Police Code of Ethics . . . SGM O. C. Barclay

DEPARTMENTS

2 Commandant's Notes
5 Regimental Command Sergeant Major
42 From USAMPS
43 NCO Corner
49 Officer Corner
51 Editor's Page

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE AND BATTALION LEVEL COMMAND LIST (Inside Back Cover)

MILITARY POLICE Subscription Form (Page 44)



See page 8



See page 25



ABOUT THE COVER

The original artwork on the cover of this issue of MILITARY POLICE represents the combat role of the military police soldier. Appropriately, the American flag and MP Corps regimental flag provide the backdrop.

Commandant's Notes



Major General

Charles A Hines

Force Selection and Military Police in Contingency Operations

Most strategic planners agree that although there has been some easing of the Soviet land force challenge in central Europe, today's geopolitical environment presents imposing arrays of regional threats against U.S. national interests. These conditions are not easily quantifiable; they are unpredictable and highly reactive to external events.

U.S. responses to threats at the lower end of the operational continuum are typically aimed at securing national interests without further exacerbating the situation and provoking escalation from peacetime competition to conflict. It is here that the Army's quality of versatility takes on added meaning as both mission capability and political acceptability become key decision points in force selection.

The process of tailoring force packages that demonstrate resolve and protect U.S. interests, without destabilizing the political situation at hand, is rapidly becoming an important component of strategic planning.

During the last few years the military police have been prominent participants in a number of contingency operations where force protection rather than combat operations has been the desired international and domestic signal. Under these circumstances restrictive rules of engagement, confrontation management and avoidance of collateral damage have initially taken precedence over combat power.

In an effort to help MP leaders better understand the force-mix equation, the Military Police School has developed an instrument to describe actual force selection decisions made in support of contingency operations within the last ten years. This force selection model graphically portrays how forces should be tailored dependent upon the nature of the conflict and where it falls along the operational continuum.

The unique capabilities of the military police, coupled with their domestic and international acceptability as a security force, often cause them to be identified as the force of choice for contingencies on the lower end of the continuum. Conversely, as the lethality of a situation intensifies and combat operations become inevitable, MP suitability declines.


Military Police Corps involvement in contingency operations has spanned the last decade touching various points along the force selection model's mission continuum. During Operation Urgent Fury in October 1983, MPs were sent to Grenada as part of the initial deploying force. While combat arms operations were the focus during the mission's early phases, MPs in their protect and defend roles performed a variety of security missions, patrolled and conducted detainee and internee processing.

When hostilities ended and combat operations terminated, the need remained for a force capable of helping host-nation law enforcement authorities recapture their effectiveness. The MPs were chosen to stay in Grenada to provide this aid and remained there long after the end of Urgent Fury.

Operation Golden Pheasant in Honduras illustrated how contingency missions can transit the model's continuum. Military police had been performing security and force protection operations in Honduras for some time, demonstrating a nonthreatening but tangible U.S. presence.

In March 1988 when Nicaraguan Sandinistas crossed the Honduran border, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) initiated Operation Golden Pheasant, ordering combat arms units in as a show of force. This action achieved the desired results and the Sandanistas withdrew.

At the cessation of the exercise combat arms forces were redeployed while the MPs resumed force protection operations, maintaining the desired U.S. presence there. These events demonstrated the dynamic character of contingency operations and the model's ability to portray the force selection process associated with them.



MISSION	FORCE PROTECTION		COMBAT OPERATIONS	
	ASSIST	PROTECT	LOW	HIGH
THREAT	• Antagonistic Populace • Criminal Element • Riots • Demonstrations	• Saboteurs • Terrorists • Hostile Groups ← (PLUS)	• Small Unit Tactical Operations ← (PLUS)	• Combat (FM 100-5) ← (PLUS)
TASKS	• UN Liaison • Training Assistance • Law & Order	• Site Security • Personnel Protective Services • Antiterrorism Operations • Area Security ← (PLUS)	• Defensive Operations • Offensive Operations ← (PLUS)	• FM 100-5 ← (PLUS)

Force Selection Model

The MP's unique capability to respond to civil disorders formed the basis for their deployment to St. Croix after the devastation of Hurricane Hugo in September 1989. The hurricane had a traumatic effect on the National Guard, police, and medical and governmental agencies on the island.

Riots and looting ensued, threatening the safety of U.S. personnel and facilities. A force was needed adept at operating in an environment with use-of-force and rules-of-engagement limitations. Military police were selected for this mission and provided security, patrolled areas and assisted local government agencies in regaining their effectiveness.

Prior to Operation Just Cause, military police had been rotating to Panama providing security augmentation forces capable of responding to U.S. interests in the area while projecting a nonthreatening signature. The critical need for the restrained application of use of force and the necessity to interface with Panamanian paramilitary police forces made MPs the force of choice.

As Operation Just Cause began and gained momentum, MPs intensified site security operations, performed detainee and internee processing missions and provided ready reaction forces. When the situation deescalated, MPs assisted the host-nation law enforcement agencies in the reestablishment of discipline, law and order and returned to their security enhancement duties.

The force selection process, as depicted by the model, may be initiated anywhere along the continuum and periodically reassessed and adjusted to accommodate changing international conditions and evolving national policy objectives. Force-mix adjustments by the CINCs (Commander in Chief) and National Command Authority can serve to escalate, deescalate, or simply stabilize a situation to allow time for further assessment.

Grenada, Honduras, St. Croix and Panama have demonstrated the applicability of a decision-making tool, like the model discussed here, in the force selection process. Even more significant, these successful operations have clearly shown the importance of maintaining versatility in today's Army through a well-structured force mix.



Charles A. Hines
Major General, USA
Commandant

Army Senior Leaders Respond

The preceding article by General Charles A. Hines initially appeared in the Chief of Staff's *Weekly Summary*, a publication distributed to the secretary of the Army, the undersecretary, assistant secretaries, all general officers and senior Department of the Army civilians who hold general officer equivalent status. A more detailed version appears in the September 1990 issue of *Parameters,* a quarterly publication of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

To date, General Hines has received over forty letters from general officers who have taken the time to express their views on the role of the Military Police Corps in support of contingency operations. Respondents included the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Colin L. Powell, and General Carl E. Vuono, the Army Chief of Staff.

Every letter has been highly supportive and strongly encouraging. One general, in referring to military police contributions to contingency operations stated, "no one has done more in recent times."

Another general bluntly wrote that the active Army does not have enough military police combat support companies and that more need to be acquired. Yet another general asserted that the article will spark increased interest in the study of contingency operations throughout the Army.

The responses included numerous points that require careful examination, such as the following examples.

- The demands placed on the Army and MP Corps require that officers, NCOs and enlisted soldiers are always ready to perform their jobs under the most challenging circumstances.
- Military police units must work closely with other branches of the Army (civil affairs, psyops, engineer, medical) to ensure that all available resources are brought to bear in accomplishing the mission.
- As MP units perform their missions in a contingency environment, they need timely and accurate intelligence information. Military police units need to work closely with intelligence organizations to ensure that available intelligence data are put to timely use.
- The Army will undoubtedly become significantly smaller in the near future. As the MP Corps reduces in size, it is imperative that it retain those units that are essential to support contingency operations.
- Plans need to be developed that identify an appropriate role for Reserve Component MP units in contingency operations.
- The MP Corps must continue to stress law enforcement as well as combat training, for it is the wide range of skills possessed by MP soldiers that make them so valuable in a contingency environment.
- The MP corps must establish and cultivate in peacetime those command and control relationships to be employed in contingency operations.


Many letters contained praise for the dedication and professionalism of MP soldiers. It is reassuring to know that the Army senior leadership appreciates the contributions made by military police men and women who have made operational deployments the successes they have been.

The force selection model discussed by General Hines lays out a logical methodology for choosing units that are best designed, equipped and trained to carry out United States national objectives within limited contingency operations. General officers are in agreement that the Military Police Corps contains the assets frequently needed to achieve national goals in politically sensitive contingency environments.

This shrinking world means for the United States more international involvement as well as more hazards, more military commitments to the defense of freedom, as well as more demands on our economy and military strengths.

General Harold K. Johnson,
Army Chief of staff, 1965

Regimental Command Sergent Major





CSM Joshua Perry

Congratulations to all military police soldiers who participated in operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. A job well done.

Everywhere I travel as the Regimental Sergeant Major I hear positive feedback on how well you performed your missions. Not only from military police sources, but other branches have stated how well impressed they are with your performance.

Your performance is a direct indication that you have trained hard to tough and realistic standards. Training is the key to readiness, survival, and success in battle. Operation JUST CAUSE should serve as a reminder of our obligation always to maintain a high state of readiness.

Let there be no doubt in your mind as leaders that if your platoon, squad or team is tasked with a combat mission tomorrow, you have trained them to the best of your ability to perform the mission. You must constantly train to build your units into disciplined, effective, and cohesive fighting teams.

Fostering cohesion, *esprit de corps* and building morale are essentials for the fighting effectiveness of any unit. When thinking of sophisticated, innovative and creative programs to enhance unit morale, do not overlook the simple power of military ceremonies in this area.

I am not speaking of the full-blown-out, ruffles-and-flourishes, Army-band-playing, units-passing-in-review type of ceremony. I mean a platoon ceremony to honor soldiers who have received the good conduct medal or to recognize those who have advanced to private E2, private first class and specialist.

These ceremonies accomplish several important things for your soldiers. The most obvious one, of course, is public recognition among soldiers' peers for their accomplishments. These ceremonies also indicate that good performance is rewarded; they provide incentive for continued good work and emulation by other soldiers participating in the ceremony. The ceremonies also convey the message that the particular honor or award is important and has to be earned.

Underlying this is the positive impact that these ceremonies have on unit cohesion, pride and enhanced morale. Just the opposite effects are obtained if the first accomplishments of our young soldiers are *not* recognized as important.

Imagine a young soldier witnessing an elaborate promotion ceremony for a sergeant first class in which the battalion commander bestows all kinds of kudos on the individual in front of his wife, children and special invitees. Then the company commander does likewise. Afterward there's coffee, doughnuts and cookies for everyone.

Earlier that morning that young soldier himself had also been advanced in grade; but there had been no ceremony, no congratulatory remarks. Advancement orders had been received impersonally through distribution. What could possibly be going through his mind?

Does he feel like an important member of the command? Does he doubt that anybody cares about his advancement? Does he feel that advancing to the specialist grade is any big deal? Did he earn it? Was it automatic?

What happened to this young soldier in this hypothetical situation is regrettable because of its profoundly negative impact. His leader lost a golden opportunity to harness strong human emotions and channel them toward building morale and unit pride.

Some of you old soldiers out there who have perhaps grown a bit cynical and too sophisticated for ceremonies think you have the option to decline an awards ceremony for yourself.

("Sir, just give me the orders, and I'll sew on my stripes tonight in the privacy of my home," you might say; or "Sir, don't go to the trouble of setting up an awards ceremony; you can just give me the citation right here in your office;" or "I'll reenlist, sir, with just you, the REUP NCO, one witness, the flag and myself in your office.")

Does that sound familiar? Stop a minute to consider how selfish that sounds as opposed to how selfless you are supposed to be as a leader. A military ceremony is not yours even if you are the sole reason for the ceremony. It belongs to all soldiers.

Don't miss any opportunity to stop and recognize well-deserving soldiers, especially the opportunity to reward young soldiers receiving their first awards or advancements--a simple tradition in our Army, packed with a powerful stimulus for soldiers.

The Triple Threat in Operation JUST CAUSE

First Lieutenant Robert R. Mackey

(A number of outstanding military police units participated in the Panama operation JUST CAUSE [519th MP Battalion, 92d MP Battalion, 82d MP Company, 7th MP Company, etc.]. This is but one article about one battalion that participated. There is no intent to slight or ignore those other units, since this is not intended to be a comprehensive article covering the total military police involvement in the operation.--author)

For the 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) "triple threat," the 503d MP Battalion, whose motto is Airborne--Air Assault--AirLand, the Christmas season of 1989 will never be forgotten. The battalion's 550 soldiers spent the holiday season in active combat operations in the Republic of Panama.

The soldiers of the 503d and its subordinate elements--the 65th MP Company, the 108th MP Company (Air Assault), and the 21st MP Company (Airborne)--are veterans of no-notice deployments.

One month before the Panama deployment the last elements of the battalion returned from a two-month emergency deployment to St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands in response to the destruction, looting, and civil disorder in the aftermath of Hurricane Hugo. From March until August 1989 the 108th MP Company was deployed to Honduras, and the 65th MP Company served in Panama.

So when the alert began on December 19, 1989 with the word that the entire battalion would deploy on an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE), the MPs of the 503d began their 18-hour emergency deployment sequence that had become second nature.

Upon alert notification, the battalion commander issued a warning order to his four company commanders; and the subordinate companies began preparing for movement. Concertina wire was strung across the street behind the battalion, phones were shut off, and doors were locked to maintain operation security (OPSEC).

The soldiers, not knowing yet whether this was an EDRE or an actual deployment, began to assemble the massive amounts of live ammunition and supplies. Soldiers drew weapons, assembled their rucksacks, and packed their B-bags.

Pallets were assembled and vehicles marshalled as the squad leaders quickly made last-minute checks and the platoon leaders received their briefings. The soldiers updated emergency data cards, wills and powers of attorney and were given booster immunizations. In less than ten hours the battalion and its subordinate companies were prepared to load onboard the C-141 aircraft.

The vehicles were driven to Green Ramp, the marshalling area at Pope Air Force Base, North Carolina. The soldiers went to a separate holding area where they were informed of their mission and destination: combat operations in the Republic of Panama.



The quartering area on Fort Amador for the 503d MP Battalion at one time had been the headquarters for the Panamanian forces. It was attacked by U.S. forces on December 19, 1989.

Although none of them had expected to spend Christmas in combat, each was prepared to meet any challenge that Panama's President Noriega and his PDF (Panamanian Defense Forces) could give. The 503d MP Battalion was going to battle not as a support element or for mopping-up operations, but at the forefront of combat.

At 6 a.m. on December 20, 1989 the first elements of the 503d and Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 16th MP Brigade boarded C-141 transport aircraft for Panama, each soldier weighted down with rucksacks,

ammunition, and weapons. Within ten hours of the initial assault by members of the 75th Infantry Regiment (Ranger) and the 82d Airborne Division the first elements of the Battalion--the 65th MP Company and Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment (HHD)--touched ground at Howard Air Force Base outside Panama City. They were immediately deployed by the brigade commander, who had entered Panama the day before the invasion.

Quickly HHD established a marshalling area for the battalion and issued missions to each subordinate element as it arrived in the combat zone.

EPW Detention

The 65th MP Company was given the mission to establish and maintain an enemy-prisoner-of-war (EPW) detention facility to handle the massive numbers of captured PDF personnel and Noriega's Dignity Battalion members. By nightfall the camp was established, and the first forty prisoners were received.



This aerial view of the front gate of Empire Range EPW compound shows how the tower had an unrestricted view of the entire compound and the HMMWV used for mobile perimeter patrols.

The company's EPW compound at Empire Range quickly became its collection center for all personnel captured during operation JUST CAUSE. The camp, which was to become the largest EPW facility operated solely by U.S. personnel since the end of the Korean War, absorbed all of the company's available soldiers. Not only did the soldiers have to provide around-the-clock security for the facility, they also became responsible for the construction of holding areas, showers, messing and medical facilities, and guard towers.



View of EPW compound from a guard tower.

The critical logistical support for the construction was supplied by the 41st Area Support Group, which is the U.S. Army South Logistics Group. Nearly a thousand rolls of concertina wire, 150 general-purpose (GP) medium tents, and a veritable mountain of meals ready to eat (MRE), cots, clothing, and hygiene items were supplied to meet the needs of the growing number of prisoners.



View of EPW compound from a guard tower

From December 20-29, 1989 the 65th MP Company processed over 4,500 personnel and detained 2,500 enemy prisoners. The operation received laudatory comments from the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) commander, the joint task force commander, the International Committee of the Red Cross, three independent international human rights organizations, and other distinguished visitors.

mobile patrols using high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs). Two U.S. MPs and two PNPs per vehicle patrolled their area on 12-hour shifts.

As critical supplies began to arrive from the United States and other countries, the PNP became able to operate without the MP supervision. On February 26, 1990 the 65th MP Company was the first company of the 503d MP Battalion to begin redeployment to Fort Bragg.



The quartering area for the 21st MP Company (ABN) after January 2, 1990. The big hole in the building is from 105mm direct fire round hit on December 19

Law Enforcement

A constant stream of reporters conducted interviews at the compound. As the numbers of prisoners began to dwindle and many of the detainees were repatriated, the unit received its follow-on mission to assume law enforcement operations in conjunction with the Panama national police (PNP) in the Bethania district of Panama City.

During the invasion the Bethania precinct house was destroyed, so the company set up operations in the area substation at Pueblo Nuevo. To their surprise, the MPs found that some of the new police they would train and work with were former prisoners at the EPW facility they had operated. However, this proved to be no barrier to the 65th soldiers and the Panamanians.

A combined desk sergeant and MP duty officer system was established so that the Panamanians would have a U.S. counterpart to serve as both teacher and advisor. As in the rest of the battalion, the company operated combined

BCC and Escort Duties

The 21st MP Company (Airborne) arrived several hours after the 65th MP Company. The company was given the mission of battlefield circulation control and VIP escort duty, during which the company experienced most of its battle action. The company also served as a floating reserve for the battalion.

The operations were the most varied in the battalion. Between December 20-29, 1989 the paratroopers planned and executed over 150 convoys and VIP escorts in support of the 82d Airborne Division, the 2d and 3d Ranger Battalions, 7th Infantry Division (Light), the 193d Infantry Brigade, and Joint Task Force-Panama.

Although they were fired upon by hostile forces on several occasions, all convoys under the unit's protection arrived at their destination without delay and without loss of vital supplies or personnel. The MPs were the only

available force with sufficient vehicles and firepower to protect these ammunition convoys.

When Noriega took refuge in the Vatican Embassy in Panama City, soldiers of the 21st were on the scene providing crowd control and security for the area.

and participated in the joint operations to clear Panama City and establish defensive positions to secure critical facilities.

The company's first mission from the brigade was to establish a defensive perimeter covering three city blocks



t the papal nunciature where Noriega sought refuge on December 24, 1989 the security force included the 503d MP Battalion.

During a combat operation led by the 3d Ranger Battalion at Coiba Island Penal Colony, a large number of political prisoners were being held by pro-Noriega forces at the prison. The company gave needed firepower and support to the successful operation. The 20-mile-long island is located in the Pacific Ocean off the southwest coast of Panama.

The company was the primary unit involved with escorts and successfully moved over $75 million in U.S. currency without incident. The currency that over a period of time totaled $75 million was a combination of DOD payrolls and U.S. currency that was moved from various banks to keep it out of the hands of pro-Noriega forces.

When a group of Columbian smugglers attempted to escape from Panama with stolen property, the 21st MPs arrested thirteen of them. When the order came to begin joint patrols with the PNP, the company was the second U.S. unit to begin the patrols and the first unit to begin patrolling in the "San Francisco" district of Panama City.

The company returned to Fort Bragg in April 1990. During a ceremony held May 4, 1990 at Fort Bragg, three soldiers from this company received Army Commendation medals with V-device for valor in combat.

Panama City Operations

The 108th MP Company (Air Assault) was attached to the 193d Infantry Brigade (Light) immediately upon arrival in downtown Panama City. Inside the perimeter were several critical government buildings--the ministries of finance, health, and foreign relations. The duly-elected government of President Endara of Panama, which was still endangered by pro-Noriega forces, designated the buildings as the new seat of government; and the company's mission was to hold them from seizure by enemy forces.

The first night in Panama City was spent under constant, harassing fire. The MPs returned fire and dispersed the scattered PDF troops, who would return later and continue their harassment tactics. By dawn the soldiers of the 108th were tired, but relieved--they had made it through their first mission without casualties.

At the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama the Department of Basic Military Police Training tries to instill in each graduate a sense of duty, aggressiveness, and courage. But the real test of this training is when the bullets are flying. The soldiers of the 108th MP Company proved the value of the training when a test came.

When several innocent Panamanian civilians were wounded during a gun battle in Panama City between the company and PDF troops, military police of the 3d Platoon placed themselves in the crossfire to get the civilians to safety. In another incident two 3-man teams from the platoon led a raiding party on a PDF holdout in an under-

ground parking lot and captured five 2-ton trucks filled with equipment, weapons, and uniforms of the elite Panamanian Battalion 2000.

Late on December 23, 1989 the company was relieved in place by the 511th MP Company, Fort Drum, New York. The 108th returned to the battalion, which had its command post set up in the Curundu Elementary School on Fort Clayton. The company began to prepare for is next mission: The first U.S. unit to begin joint patrols in Panama City with the new PNP.

On Christmas Eve President Bush and President Endara enacted a joint agreement that gave U.S. military police the power to arrest in order to halt the looting and lawlessness in Panama. Military police were tasked to enforce the law in the then-chaotic Panama City. When the 108th began patrolling on Christmas Day, shopkeepers and citizens of Panama City cheered the astonished MPs, who expected a less-than-warm welcome.



A water-cannon riot-control vehicle used by Noriega against Panamanian demonstrators.

A Quick-Reaction Force

While the rest of the 108th MP Company operated joint patrols, the 4th platoon served as a quick-reaction force and was used to respond to intelligence leads throughout Panama City.

When a report came from a Panamanian civilian of what was described as a war tank in an uncleared part of Panama City, two 3-man teams from 4th platoon re sponded. Upon arrival at the location the MPs found an unoccupied V-300 Commando armored car. They commandeered a nearby civilian tow truck and transported the vehicle back to company headquarters.

Later that same day a 4-man team from the platoon raided a suspected weapons cache and instead of weapons found a communications and operations center for the pro-Noriega irregular forces, the so-called Dignity Battalion. The capture of the operations center and its equipment aided the success of maneuver forces in the suppression of enemy elements in Panama City.

On December 29, 1989 the 108th MP Company established the first combined U.S. and Panamanian police precinct covering their portion of Panama City in the old Department of National Investigations (DENI) building in the San Felipe area. The average case load per day of the unit climbed to approximately twenty cases, ranging from assault to homicide. The cases in the company's area soon numbered more than all other districts combined on a daily basis.

Historic Significance

The historic significance of military police participation in JUST CAUSE is considerable.

Not since the end of the Korean War has such a large number of captured personnel been processed, as were the approximately 4,500 by the 65th MP Company.

Not since the reconstruction of Japan and Germany at the end of World

War II have U.S. military police reestablished a civilian police force on such a massive scale after totally defeating them in battle.

Never before have female soldiers fought at the forefront of combat as they did with the military police.


A new page has been written in the history of the Military Police Corps, and a new standard of competence and professionalism has been established that will endure for years to come. The 16th MP Brigade's (Airborne) triple threat stands ready to deploy worldwide in support of our nation and allies; *Airborne--Air Assault-- AirLand.*



First Lieutenant Robert R. Mackey was a Platoon Leader, 108th MP Company (Asslt), 503d MP Battalion (ABN), 16th MP Brigade (ABN), Fort Bragg, NC at the time this article was written.

A Just Cause Christmas

Private First Class Thomas A. Gardella



'Twas a few days before Christmas, and all
through the house
every creature was stirring (even the mouse).

The stockings were hung by the chimney with
care,
in hopes that all would be there to share.

A roar and a thunder were all that we heard,
the sounds of some planes, a giant war bird.

The troops were loaded and without delay they
went;
fearing for their lives was how Christmas was
spent.

Families worried for all, and some even cried
for they knew not if loved ones had died.

Military police went in courageous, and they
went in strong--
the days too short and nights too long.

The mission to bring peace to a troubled land
that was run by a man with an evil hand.

Loved ones sent packages and letters, too,
for their sons and daughters brave and true.

Sadly some lives were lost,
but to live a life of freedom there was a cost.

Hopefully, peace will soon rule the land,
and all will live beneath God's hand.

Private First Class Thomas A. Gardella was assigned to the 65th MP Company, 503d MP Battalion, 16th MP Brigade (Airborne) at the time this poem was written.

Law and Order South of the Border

Part II

Captain Anthony M. Schilling

(This is the final installment of an article that began in the last issue. --editor)

Installation Gate Inspections

In Panama the Provost Marshal Office, 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) Fort Bragg, North Carolina conducts up to ten or more inspections each month on irregular schedules, covering many locations for varying lengths of time. It is not unusual for the PMO (Panama) to have two or three inspections in one day.

Inspection teams set up and conduct inspections and move to new locations after a specified period of time. Up to six hundred cars have been inspected at some locations (Fort Clayton gates). These inspections are useful; a variety of weapons, stolen property, false or altered ID cards and vehicle passes, and contraband or blackmarket items have been seized.

Installation Gates and Checkpoints

There is an unusually high number of gates or checkpoints at the entrances or exits to U.S. installations in Panama. The treaty authorizes these gates to permit the entry of eighteen different types of ID card holders and nine types of vehicle stickers.

The MP on the gate checks all stickers and ID cards prior to entry. It is a regular event to confiscate outdated or false ID cards and stickers and to apprehend the individuals. All gates and checkpoints have SOPS, policy letters, and a picture of the eighteen different types of ID cards and nine types of vehicle stickers readily available to the MP working the gate.

Gate duty is often exciting. The PDF has tried to detain, arrest, assault, run over, or harass MPs working the gates and checkpoints. This is in addition to the normal challenges experienced by the MP assigned to gate duty. From one to four MPs are assigned to each gate.



Installation gate inspections are conducted on a regular basis; K-9 units are used to inspect vehicles.

Jungle Patrols and Observation Posts

Most installations are surrounded by thick, triple-canopy jungle with no fence line. During 1987 the military police command initiated the use of jungle patrols and observation posts to provide early warning and security for installations.

The patrols vary in size; MP team- to squad-size patrols are the norm. The patrols are equipped with M16s or 9mm pistols, PRC-77 radios, radios to contact the MP desk sergeant, and night-vision goggles, if needed. These patrols are usually led by an MP sergeant or staff sergeant.

The length of the patrols varies from several hours to twenty-four hours. Patrols are targeted into known areas of approach onto installations. In addition, jungle patrols operate over a wide area of jungle to cover blind spots. These patrols receive regular updates on crime locations and avenues of approach into installations from their unit through the PMO.

All movements of patrols are coordinated with PM operations, the MP desk sergeant, and MPC S3 section to prevent any conflicts with other patrols. The patrols enter the jungle at varying times and locations, and follow a preplanned route of patrol or set up OPs.

Jungle patrols are successful in reducing the number of trespassers or intruders from entering U.S. installations. Caches of stolen property hidden in the jungle are often recovered.

A number of trespassers or intruders have been intercepted and apprehended. The patrols also report any unusual sightings in areas outside of U.S. control.

Sweep Operations

Another successful tactic is the sweep operation. Normally operating during daylight hours MP teams up to squad size conduct sweeps of an entire installation. These operations start at one end of an installation and move to the other end, stopping and conducting ID checks of everyone moving on foot.

The patrols use regular military police DLO gear and maintain secure communications with the desk sergeant. Sweep operations usually result in the apprehension of trespassers, seizure of false or altered ID cards, and recovery of stolen property. The MPC and battalion S3, in coordination with the PMO, plans and executes the sweeps.

Physical Security Enhancements

Inspections of housing areas, barracks and key facilities are ongoing. The PMO physical security section maintains and constantly updates locations for the use of installation guard force assets.



Reaction force exercise using UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters at Fort Sherman

All sets of quarters are receiving bars or grilles on windows and additional security lighting. Improved locks and iron grille doors are in stalled on many sets of quarters. Some sets of quarters, because of their location, receive extra lighting, fencing and barbed wire on rooftops or window sills. Some residents purchase low-cost alarm systems for additional security.



For a Panama Canal Commission retiree payday. MP from the Military Police Command and 16th Military Police Brigade (ABN) conduct identification checks. They processed approximately 10,000 civilians onto Fort Clayton and secured over $5 million.

Many entrance gates to the installations are now closed to restrict entry. Barriers are installed at all gates or are located nearby; they are emplaced by using on-call special equipment. Other improvements such as surveillance cameras, pop-up barriers, and visitor entrances are in the planning or construction stages.

Other Initiatives

The military police occasionally use aviation support, mainly helicopters, to patrol jungle lines, housing and troop areas and to move VIPs. As tensions increase, helicopters employ their searchlights at night to locate or deter intruders around jungle lines.

At night AC-130 Spectre gunships, using their high-resolution cameras and low-light TV sets, locate possible intruders and direct patrols to their locations. In addition, MP reaction forces use helicopters to deploy around the Canal Zone when riots or demonstrations block the roads.

Ground sensors are emplaced around key installations or avenues of approach to detect intruders. When a sensor activates, an MP reaction force deploys to intercept the intruder at a predicted location. Coordination by the MPC is important to prevent accidents with other units.

The PDF and the Courts

Constant pressure is placed on the PDF to live up to its treaty obligations to assist with security of U.S. installations. Obtaining this support is accomplished by frequent letters to the PDF requesting support and by visits by the PMO to demand support.

Mysterious crime waves that occur on installations stop when the PMO confronts the PDF. Evidence suggests many of these crime waves are orchestrated by elements of the PDF. Only by constantly leaning on and putting heavy pressure on the PDF and the court system is any support received.

Summary

Military police in Panama are on the cutting edge. They accomplish a difficult, low-intensity conflict mission daily by providing security to U.S. personnel and installations.

This starts with the basics: education and support of the public and judicious use of aggressive MP mounted and dismounted patrols. Specialized HIVE patrols, jungle patrols, and sweep operations provide a shield of internal and external security.

The efforts of the MPs are rewarded by a drop in crime in most housing areas and installations. As the crisis in Panama continues unabated, the Military Police Corps daily bolsters its record and effectiveness by outstanding performance of MP units assigned to or rotating through Panama.

(This article depicts the daily military police mission in Panama prior to the U.S. intervention of December 20, 1989.
--editor)

Captain Anthony M. Schilling was the Operations Officer, Provost Marshal Office (Panama) at the time this article was written. He holds a bachelor's degree in criminal justice from St. John's University, Staten Island, NY and is a graduate of the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Fort Benning, GA. He has served as a staff officer and company commander with the 503d MP Battalion, Fort Bragg, NC.

Reserve Military Police in Panama

Sergeant Jim Thomas

Last year before operation JUST CAUSE Panama's tropical weather, national culture and the language barrier tested a group of Colorado Army National Guard soldiers' ability to train and work in unusual surroundings.

For its 2-week annual training the 220th Military Police Company from Golden, Colorado performed law and order tasks such as patrolling military installations, guarding gates and detecting contraband at Fort Clayton, Panama.

Although the unit was overseas-ready and capable of doing the mission, the unique thing was the political situation and how fast it changed and not knowing what tomorrow would bring. The unit happened to be scheduled for its annual training during a change of government in Panama.

Many of the National Gaurd soldiers had never been out of the United States. Unlike their normal training sites in the United States--places like Fort Carson, Colorado or Fort Hood, Texas--the Panama environment created a sense of urgency.

The training in Panama was good experience because it was different from the unit's normal role as a combat support military police company. The unit normally spends about six months a year in a field environmen; most annual training dealt with field and tactical subjects.



While on front gate duty an MP keeps a watchful eye on entering motorests. (Photo by SGT Jim Thomas, North Carolina Army National Guard)

The training in Panama was the first purely law-enforcement condition the unit had in a long time. The unit trained extensively in law and order techniques before deploying. The 220th is a corps-level MP company and as such is flexible in what it can do. Missions could require the unit to work with retained persons or other detainees, physical security of facilities, patrolling or riot control, and other regular duties of law enforcement.

Many civilians think the military police just direct traffic and function like a local police force. Actually the law and order duties of the unit are minimal, and duties and training in a garrison environment use considerable simulation. However, the duty in Panama was no simulation--it was real.

The duty in Panama consisted of four overlapping daily shifts of eight hours each. One of the four thirty-soldier platoons rotated every two weeks. The Colorado MPs rode with an active duty MP on each shift to learn the post layout, duties and procedures, and to augment the active duty police force.

Each shift began with a guard mount; the MP frequently stand a uniform inspection before going on patrol. Except for the various unit patches on the MP brassards, the Colorado military police looked no different from the active duty MPs. The active-duty military police stationed



Waving them on post, an MP performs gate duty at Fort Clayton.



An MP checks ID cards on the pedestrian gate at Fort Clayton, Panama.

in Panama had worked long hours, and the National Guard MPs gave them a boost and relief from the hard job and long hours.

As part of the One-Army concept developed over the last decade, National Guard and Reserve units have been aligned and have trained frequently with active-duty forces. The training in Panama reinforced the concept.

The Colorado unit had trained in the Philippines, Alaska, California, and on many other active Army posts. In 1990 the unit will go to Japan. A good mix of ATs allows National Guard units to do the missions required.

The duty in Panama wasn't all work and no play. While living at the Harvest Bare temporary city on Howard Air Force Base, the Guard soldiers worked eight hours followed by twenty-four hours off. This gave them time to explore the sights and sounds of Panama City such as the outdoor bazaars, open-air markets and street vendors.

Although the patrols were routine, gate duty hard on the feet, and the high-school Spanish classes long forgotten, the National Guard military police can say they trained well and gained valuable experience in Panama.

Sergeant Jim Thomas was assigned to the 382d Public Affairs Detachment, North Carolina National Guard, Raleigh, NC at the time this article was written.

Computer-Related Crime: *A Primer for Leaders*

Part I

Captain Michael R. French

Army leaders today face a cost of business the likes of which they neither fathomed nor fully prepared themselves to control. Computers and automated systems have virtually permeated the work place and are nearly as ubiquitous as the telephone and typewriter. We are now in an age of information.

To meet the challenge of this age, leaders and managers must be able to store, process and retrieve large amounts of information quickly and economically. The computer has become an indispensable aid in this effort. Inventory, maintenance, financial and personnel management functions all benefit from the lighting speed with which computers manipulate information. This new technology brings with it, however, the potential for unprecedented abuse.

In May of 1987 the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a report on computer crime which estimated the average loss to industry of over $600,000 per computer fraud. Some researchers in the field suggest this figure is underestimated and only represents the proverbial tip of the iceberg.

This article paints a broad-brush view of the subject of computer crime in an effort to heighten awareness of the problem. It addresses the threat, costs, and characteristics of computer crime and suggests some simple protective measures that may help to prevent or minimize financial losses.

Scope of Computer Crime

A respected author on the subject of computer crime spent many years analyzing computer crime cases and plotting trends. As a result of his research, he developed a model of the computer crime phenomenon that analyzes the computer environment and describes the computer as an object, instrument, and symbol of crime.

The computer as an object. Computers become the object of a crime when they are specifically targeted for disruption or destruction. This category includes sabotage, theft, destruction of computer hardware, or alteration of program software. The computer may be attacked physically through arson, bombing or vandalism, or electronically through software contamination or erasure.

The computer as the subject or environment. A computer can be the site or environment of a crime through the creation of conditions conducive to the commission of a crime. The computer may not itself be a target or tool of the crime; instead it merely provides the venue for the crime. Banking and inventory frauds that involve falsified input documents (*e.g.,* vouchers, work orders, and requisitions) fall within this category.

The computer as an instrument. The next category involves the criminal using the computer's data-processing capability as the tool for perpetrating a crime.

An individual might use the computer, without authority, for their own purposes or might even manipulate the computer to perform tasks for financial or material benefit. Examples might include programming a computer to automatically issue checks on a nonexistent account to an unauthorized payee or simply using the employer's computer without permission.

Because this category involves manipulating the computer to achieve the criminal's goals and objectives, it presents the greatest and perhaps most extensive threat, as well as the most lucrative method of committing computer crimes.

Some methods of crime are so complex as to specifically require the use of a computer as a breaking tool. A computer can be used actively to generate telephone access codes automatically. Once found, these working combinations can later be used to gain unauthorized access to computer or telephone exchange systems.

A computer can also be used passively. Examples include using a computer to simulate a general ledger in the planning and control of a continuing embezzlement or fraud.

The computer as a symbol. A computer can be used as a symbol for intimidation or deception. Such use would involve the false advertising of nonexistent services, as in the cases of several fraudulent computer dating services.

Organizations could be blackmailed with the threat of disclosure of confidential information or trade secrets. The threat could be made even though the individual had not yet obtained the information. So-called terrorist freedom fighters could hold hostage an organization's computer system to further some political purpose. The possibilities seem endless.

Profile of the Computer Criminal

It was once generally held that computer criminals tended to be 18-30

years old, well-educated, and technically competent and to have an aggressive personality. Evidence suggested that they tended to be amateur, nonprofessional criminals seeking personal reward or power--simply game playing or out to beat the system.

In 1976 the General Accounting Office (GAO) released a report entitled, "Computer-Related Crimes in Federal Programs." The GAO painted a somewhat different picture of the computer criminal in the government sector.

According to the GAO, the computer criminal tended to be a person with limited technical knowledge of computers, such as a keypunch operator, rather than an individual with more technical knowledge, such as a systems programmer.

A 1983 study by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) revealed that over one-fifth of the perpetrators of computer crime within the government had a prior criminal record. This study concluded that generally, computer criminals were young, good employees with an average of five years of employment with the agency.

These studies suggest not one, but several, criminal profiles. On the whole, the literature seems to bear out the following general stereotypes.

Juvenile system hackers: The juvenile system hacker has received perhaps the most public notoriety, both in the printed media and in films. Hackers tend to be the source of most commonly held computer criminal stereotypes.

Plainly stated, hackers are individuals who attempt to gain unauthorized access to another party's computer--regardless of whether it is a governmental, educational or business computer system.

Hackers tend to be male adolescents from middle-class families. Most frequently they employ the use of an inexpensive home computer and a device called a modem.

They attempt to "hack" their way (via telephone lines) into targeted computer systems by trying one access code combination after another until they finally break in. Once inside the system, a hacker's activities might range from simply exploration, to gameplaying, to vandalism, to outright larceny or fraud.

Phone phreakers. This is a relatively new genre of hackers whose primary modus is to defraud and disrupt phone companies and business telephone systems (sometimes referred to as private business exchanges, or PBXs) of telephone services.

With the advent of credit-card phone services, voice mailboxes, and telephone facsimile machines, "phone phreakers," as they call themselves, have available an entirely new host of challenges to conquer.

Losses to industry in the forms of unauthorized charges, stolen services, and disrupted operations may ap proach from $3 to $5 billion a year. One phone company alone experienced losses in excess of $5 million originating from a single telephone hacker.

Larcenists. This category of computer criminal encompasses the broad range of individuals who either use or target computers in the commission of a larceny, fraud, or embezzlement. Cases falling into this category include incidents ranging from automatic teller machine (ATM) fraud to major corporate fraud conspiracies.

Extortionists. Cases that chronicle the use of computers to blackmail individuals and organizations are beginning to appear.

One case involves an insurance salesman who, upon becoming disgruntled with his employer, locked down $400,000 worth of company account by confining computer access to a password only he knew. The company was effectively brought to a standstill until the disgruntled employee relinquished the password (which happened to be "wgaca") in exchange for $100 in cash, his own personal computer, and (of all things) a letter of recommendation for employment to his next employer. The crook ended up facing ten years in jail and a $5,000 fine.

Criminal bookkeeping: Because computers lend themselves so readily to data storage, more and more cases are documenting abuses in which computers are being used to process and store evidence of criminal activity.

Incidents have been reported of drug dealers using legitimate, corporate computers to store records of illicit transactions and money laundering. Voice mailboxes are being illegally accessed and used as voice bulletin boards to post and exchange information from stolen credit card numbers, to illicit drug trafficking, and to perverse sex crimes.

With alarming frequency government computers are becoming an unwitting communications conduit for the criminal underworld



(To be continued)

Discipline is based on pride in the profession of arms, on meticulous attention to details and on mutual respect and confidence.

Gen. George S. Patton

Taking on Hurricane Hugo

Story and Photos by Staff Sergeant William H. McMichael



Hugo's battering winds devastated valuable beachfront properties throughout the Virgin Islands.

"A war zone," one public official on St. Croix, U.S. Virgin Islands called the scene. He was right in more ways than one.

Only concrete buildings remained standing, their roofs for the most part torn away. Cheaper structures were destroyed. Telephone and power lines lay scattered like strands of spaghetti. There was no electricity, no running water. The stench of rotted food and burning trash filled the air. Except for a few isolated palm trees, not a leaf remained.

That was the scene on St. Croix after its September 18, 1989 battering by Hurricane Hugo. And yet as Hugo's 200-plus-mph gales abated and the worst seemed over, a human menace rose from the rubble-strewn island. The war zone picture became complete: armed looters took to the streets.

Looters are nothing new to scenes of disaster. Such activity was also reported on the U.S. mainland after Hugo later slammed into Charleston, South Carolina; but in Charleston local law enforcement authorities kept matters in hand.

St. Croix, on the other hand, suffered a near-total breakdown of law enforcement; some of the island's authority figures allegedly took part in the looting. More than two hundred convicts walked away from the island's two prisons after high winds blew the fences down. For three days criminals had free rein. The majority returned of their own accord when military police began arriving on the island.

On Wednesday, September 20, 1989 President George Bush ordered in Army military police and federal law enforcement agents. The alert was sounded late that afternoon, and by daybreak Thursday the first military police were on the island.

The 463d Military Police Company, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri and the 503d Military Police Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina put patrols on the street as soon as they landed to give people the feeling they could go out of their houses and put away their guns.

Even a week after the storm, no matter where one went, it seemed everyone was armed. People guarded their homes, their stores and themselves. Despite a federal



Merchant assures military police that his group will disarm.

police presence the paranoia remained among the islands fifty thousand residents. People seemed crazed the first days following Hugo. The looting wasn't for survival; people drove around with items such as aquariums and rolls of carpet on top of their cars.

The owner of the only undamaged grocery store in the only undamaged shopping center in Christiansted, with twenty heavily armed friends, stood guard for a week.

There was a riot in Frederiksted on Tuesday night. The rioters burned down a large restaurant, and there was



Visibility alone could not establish law and order. Military police worked with the FBI and U.S. marshals to get the job done.



Live ammunition was issued prior to a law enforcement patrol in Frederiksted.

gunfire all night on Tuesday and Wednesday before the military came. Every store in Frederiksted was gone. People walked around with guns, not going anywhere without them.

The first nights on the island were no vacation for the more than twelve hundred military police and support troops sent from Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Many of the Bragg MPs flew directly from Exercise MARKET SQUARE. Ground zero was a large field at the edge of an oil refinery. It was raining heavily, and the field was a quagmire.

Creature comforts were not immediate concerns. The troops lived out of their rucksacks as they established airfield security for more in coming soldiers and supplies and completed radio contact with Fort Bragg. The military police had secure voice communications within three and a half minutes from the time they got off the plane, which is about standard. Follow-on support arrived in the form of the airfield seizure package devised by Bragg's 46th Support Group.

Twenty-three soldiers got on the ground first to assess what the problems were, then report back on what assets were needed. The deployment was exactly the way it would go during a war at any place they were committed.

St. Croix is a U.S. protectorate, and law forbids the military from enforcing civil law. The military police were instructed to detain criminal suspects for possible arrest by FBI agents, U.S. marshals or Virgin Islands police and to use force only when absolutely necessary.

In addition to regular patrols and a quick-reaction force established at the centrally located airfield, static posts manned by military police were set up at various key properties and businesses across the battered island. The airport, the prisons and island utilities received top priority.

Visibility alone could not establish law and order. To complete the chain of authority the military police had to coordinate operations with the FBI. It was an unusual mission for both federal law enforcement and the military police, but there wasn't one problem because of their professionalism. Everybody saw the need and the urgency, and interagency differences were gone.

For example, one morning there was a law enforcement action that consisted of five searches and what turned out to be two arrests. The FBI agents requested some

backup, and the military police were there in about ten seconds. Working together they got the job done.

Initially joint teams of military police and federal law personnel patrolled the island in humvees. They faced a number of immediate problems over and above unfamiliarity with the area. One difficulty was driving on the left side of the road, as the British do, and another was dodging downed tree limbs and overhanging wires.

After two days the FBI began to concentrate on rounding up prisoners who hadn't already surrendered, leaving the patrols to the military police and U.S. marshals. Within a week only nineteen prisoners remained at large.

Nearly as important as securing the island was creating a water supply. Each soldier flew in with a pair of filled canteens, and one water trailer was aboard the first wave of planes. The first major supplement arrived from Fort Bragg soon after--water purification units that convert sea water into drinking water. One unit can purify six hundred gallons of water per hour.

Clerks, cooks and other support personnel were assigned to fill residents' water jugs at the two distribution points. Water buffalo tanks were towed to other points on the island. Offshore the Navy support ship *USS Pensacola* generated three thousand extra gallons of drinking water a day, most of which was used to fill township reservoirs.

Coast Guard personnel secured container ships and piers. The Air Force kept a constant flow of people and supplies moving on and off the island. Operation HAWKEYE was a true joint-service effort.

Dispensing water wasn't the only job performed. Soldiers helped move patients at the main hospital into rooms with roofs. Mechanics repaired islanders' generators. Food service inspectors watched local eateries for spoilage and sanitation problems.

In addition, representatives of the 20th Engineer Brigade, Fort Bragg, repaired the two local prisons and moved downed telephone poles. They also moved concrete slabs at the hospital so a field hospital could be built. At the racetrack next to the airfield a field medical center was established under the stands. Sick call was provided for residents and soldiers. Local citizens came and said they were glad somebody showed up to help and that somebody cared. Most of the injuries were minor cuts and scrapes.



The deployment was exactly the way it would go during a war.

Army personnel worked with a number of agencies including National Guard, customs, immigration, and the Federal Aviation Administration to expedite the relief effort.

In the aftermath of the hurricane one question nagged at many residents. How had the looting started? The consensus seemed to be that it was a combination of consequences and simple human nature. The people who were supposed to respond didn't. People saw the opportunity, and everything was wide open.

As military police patrolled the streets an occasional negative comment might be heard, but after tasting four



"A war zone" was how one local offical described the scene on St. Croix. Armed looters had taken over the litter-strewn streets.

Eye on the Storm

What's it like to be trapped in the midst of a hurricane? Hugo taught a St. Croix attorney a terrifying lesson September 17-18, 1989.

The attorney, like many residents, chose to ride out the hurricane in what he considered to be the safety of his home, a beachside condominium. By the time he found out that the storm packed sustained winds of 140 mph and that it would strike the island head-on, it was too late to leave.

After huddling inside throughout the tumultuous evening he and his wife experienced a few minutes of what he thought might be the calm of "the eye." However, the entire night was so turbulent that it was difficult to distinguish one side of the hurricane from the other.

All windows were boarded up with plywood. At 6 p.m. (Sunday, September 17) the sliding glass doors began to bend a little. An hour later he moved valuables to the center of the house and decided to hang in there as long as possible.

The storm gained strength throughout the evening before the brief period of calm. Then Hugo began to build again.

By 1:30 a.m. the glass blew out. He crawled out and opened the front windows to release the air pressure. Pulsating pressure waves hit every ten to fifteen seconds. They would pop your eyes. While crawling back to a hiding place he saw a solid oak door bending in and out. By 2 a.m. the 5-inch-thick concrete floor began bowing up and down incredibly.

The storm began to subside around 3:30 a.m. Although the condominium sustained a great deal of damage, the basic structures and roofs remained intact.

days of lawlessness the majority of islanders reacted positively to the federal military presence. The first night after the Army landed people could finally get some sleep, stop guarding roofs, and go to their individual stores. The looting stopped; the military police meant business.

Maintaining order and lending a hand. It was an experience few of the soldiers sent to St. Croix will forget.



Staff Sergeant William H. McMichael was a photojournalist assigned to the staff of *Soldiers Magazine*, Alexandria, VA at the time this article was written.

Marsena R. Patrick,

Provost Marshal General of the Army

Major Thomas M. Moncure, Jr.



General Marsena R. Patrick. (National Archives photo)

General Marsena R. Patrick, Provost Marshal General of the Army of the Potomac, had been on the job two months when the Battle of Fredericksburg occurred. He described what happened:

"The Soldiery were sacking the town! Every house and store was being gutted! Men with all sorts of utensils and furniture--all sorts of eatables and drinkables and wearables--were carried off, and I found one fellow loading up a horse with an enormous load of carpeting and bedding. I ordered him to unload it, which, failing to, I gave him a cut or two with my riding whip that started him in a hurry and then put him with my prisoners..."


Despite General Patrick's efforts, even with his whip, the pillage of Fredericksburg was complete.

At the beginning of the Civil War there were about sixteen thousand men in the entire U.S. Army. Before the end of the war it was not unusual to have sixteen thousand casualties in a single day of fighting. This was the first time that the United States had undergone a mass mobilization. This experience led to the development of the modern staff system.

Today's provost marshal is accustomed to all manner of missions not properly under the scope of other staff sections. When General George B. McClellan created his staff, he grouped duties not previously designated under the provost marshal. The following subjects were the responsibility of the provost marshal:

- Suppression of marauding and depredations, and of all brawls and disturbances, preservation of good order, and suppression of disturbances beyond the limits of the camps; prevention of straggling on the march;
- Suppression of gambling-houses, drinking houses or bar-rooms, and brothels; regulation of hotels, taverns, markets, and places of public amusement;
- Searches, seizures, and arrests; execution of sentences of general courts-martial involving imprisonment or capital punishment; enforcement of orders prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers, and of orders respecting passes; and
- Deserters from the enemy, prisoners of war taken from the enemy; countersigning safeguards; and complaints of citizens as to the conduct of the soldiers.

The demands of the job had already caused one provost marshal general to resign because of ill health. General Patrick took over on October 6, 1862 after the Battle of Sharpsburg. A native of New York, he had graduated from West Point in 1835 and stayed on active duty fifteen



The sack of Fredericksburg. (National Archives photo)

years. When the war broke out, he left his farm and became a brigadier in the New York state militia. He was a brigade commander before becoming Provost Marshal General.

Patrick's diary contains numerous references to the sort of pillage he had witnessed in Fredericksburg. Because most soldiers considered the Southerners to be traitors, they had little respect for property rights of the rebels. General Patrick's job was made all the more difficult because of the lack of command support.

For example, "Grant had expressed himself strongly against protecting these people at all; and I learned that his Staff were themselves engaged in sheep stealing, fowl stealing, and the like," Patrick wrote. He rather obviously disagreed with Grant's ideas of discipline.

Most of the missions set out for the provost marshal by General McClellan--the maintenance of discipline, handling of prisoners, and the control of stragglers and deserters--will sound familiar to today's provost marshal. However, there were a number of other problems, with solutions unique to the Civil War.

The execution of soldiers was not an unusual punishment, and it was the responsibility of the provost marshal to carry out these executions. Patrick, being a believer in stern discipline, noted in September of 1863 that "This business of deserting, I should think, would soon be dried up, seeing that so many have been shot of late...."

Two events would add increasing burden as the war progressed. First was the Emancipation Proclamation, which caused slaves to seek the freedom and protection offered by the Army of the Potomac. Second was the ending of the prisoner exchange, so that Confederate prisoners had to be held instead of being sent south. The transport of newly freed slaves and finding adequate prisoner space only increased Patrick's problems.

As provost marshal, Patrick would have units assigned to him to serve as provost guards. A private in the 23d New York Regiment was impressed by vigilance of these guards, but also noted that the large "number of infamous wretches" was too great for effective control. Typically, cavalry units would be assigned to the provost marshal.

With virtually all assignments to the provost being temporary, it was all too easy to take on the identity of the Provost Guard. General Patrick observed that one of his scouting parties captured "ten men of the 6th Cavalry out on a robbing expedition and representing themselves as belonging to a patrol from me..."



General Ulyses S. Grant and his staff including General Patrick. (National Archive photo)

The greatest recurring problem faced by Patrick throughout the war was that of sutlers (people who followed the Army selling provisions, tobacco, liquor and the like). Much of his time was spent trying to control these sutlers and illegal trade, particularly with the Confederates.

It became necessary for him to draw up rules and regulations governing this activity. He even had as autograph stamp made (an unusual item in those days) for sutlers orders, to spare him the burden of personally signing them all.

While the provost marshal did not have responsibility for the rear area as we know it today, he was likely to be blamed for any incidents occurring there. When camped near Warrenton, a cavalry officer was killed by some of Confederate Colonel Mosby's men. As a result both the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief wrote to Patrick "charging very great delinquencies and misconduct upon the provost marshal...."

General Patrick did bring about one particularly innovative change. There was no formal staff responsibility for the collection of intelligence. Under McClellan this function was handled by Allan Pinkerton and his detectives. Patrick created the Bureau of Information under his jurisdiction, which utilized spies and the interrogation of prisoners as well as the hiring of detectives.

At the close of the war General Patrick held the position of provost for the Department of Virginia, headquartered in Richmond. His concern for the property of civilians, even Southerners, had already been noted. He was relieved from this position because General Grant felt "his kindness of heart may interfere with the proper government of the city." Within a month Patrick had returned home, having established the parameters of today's provost marshal.



Major Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., USAR, was the S3 Control Officer for the Military Police Rear Area Protection Team, 80th Division Maneuver Training Command at the time this article was written. A lawyer by profession, he is also currently pursuing graduate studies in history.

Satanism a Lesson

Lieutenant Colonel (P) Robert V. Baker



Case Study

At approximately 0930 hours military police were contacted by friends of a 19-year-old white male stating he would commit suicide sometime that day. Several locations were reported as the probable site for the act. Patrols failed to find the subject.


A second call was received and the subject's name was requested. At 1000 hours patrols located the subject at his home with his mother. The provost marshal, an MP patrol, and a family counselor talked with the subject for approximately thirty minutes.

The counselor signed a contract with the subject stating he would not commit suicide. Subject stated that all the reports were exaggerations. Subject's mother confirmed the paranoia. Subject was left with his mother and was to be at work at a local food facility by 1200 hours. At 1230 hours the subject committed suicide.

Findings

Evaluation of the crime scene revealed that the subject was the leader of a satanist cult (five males and two females age 13 to 16). The subject committed suicide in front of one member of the cult. The cult member who witnessed the act hid the weapon and escorted other members of the coven to the crime scene.

It was at this time that another member of the coven (female) called an ambulance; concurrently the police were informed of the act. Investigators concluded that a possible suicide pact was made within the group; actions were taken to eliminate the threat of future acts by physically separating the members of the cult and placing each member under psychiatric care.



Psychiatrists stated the deprogramming would vary from six months to several years, depending on the child. One female member was evaluated as permanently damaged psychologically because of the mental and physical abuse, and complete recovery was questionable.


Medical evaluation revealed that the subject had control of all members of the coven, both physically and emotionally. Source of his control was through fear--his references to satan, threats of violence and suggestions of loyalty that induced symptomatic physical responses (*e.g.*, headaches and rashes) in the members.

An album cover from a rock group was used to conduct membership meetings and satanic services. All members had committed themselves, through a satanic mass, to satan by following the guidelines on the back cover of this album.

The subject had used this commitment to establish the group's emotional dependency and psychological persecution. This included recitals of commitments to satan, acts of loyalty (killing animals or violence against other youths), and directed daily contact with the group.

Identification

The group members were visibly identifiable by their conduct and clothing. Each member predominantly wore black clothing, with specific pentagrams depicting loyalty to satan openly displayed as jewelry.



Membership in the group varied from seven months to two years. Parents interviewed realized a change in the conduct of their children but were not aware of the degree of danger in the group. The parents were totally unaware of the satanistic conduct of the group.

The subject, using reading material and songs found in the public "hard rock" domain (hard rock and heavy metal music albums) conducted all the control actions of the group.

Alcohol was readily used, and some drugs were also used to reduce resistance during coven meetings and worship.

Although the group had been visible in the school and community, the parents, teachers, and law enforcement officials failed to recognize the group as a satanic organization; but the signs were there.

Art work created in the high school art class contained the same symbology but remained unidentified because teachers and students did not recognize the symbology associated with satanism. Most thought it was art of death scenes or Halloween.

Symptoms of Satanic Groups

Key items and actions to look for in determining whether groups are leaning toward satanic worship include the symbols shown below. They are utilized by various occult groups. Symbology is described in the satanic bible published in California in 1969.

A reference to the goat is often used by satanists to refer to the satan. The hand position used for identifying satan is the forefinger and little finger raised, the thumb and two middle fingers extended to symbolize the extended face of the goat. This hand gesture is easily misconstrued as the symbol from the University of Texas "hook 'em horns"--the difference being the extension of the two middle fingers to form the head of the goat.

The audience in many heavy-metal concerts openly use this symbol, and several of these rock groups use it in their group logos. Many of the logos and verses from the satanic bible are used in heavy-metal music. Common symbols used on albums to reveal the use of satanic or occult sources include crystal balls, skulls, and goat's-head symbols.

Material is openly available to support satanic worship: the satanic bible is available through hard-rock magazines and cultist and satanistic information. Often listed as alternate lifestyles, it includes reincarnation, lycanthropy (changing into animals, *e.g.*, werewolf), and karmatic law information (another term for reincarnation).

Back Masking

Back masking is a common reference to rock groups using records to pass subliminal messages on record albums. One reason for using things in reverse stems from the reverse values of satanism.

In the satanic bible is the discussion for teaching satanists to talk, read, and write backwards because it is the way of satan. The reverse philosophy is the basis of departure because it is the way of satan. The reverse philosophy is the basis of departure from the judaeo-Christian ethics. The satanic instruction begins the exposure to effectively lie and deny all personal intentions.

Logically, reverse values and morals are a product of this lifestyle. A failure to understand this resulted in the belief by the counselor that the victim's logic and statement were binding.

Military police need to realize that confrontations with these people and groups may result in conduct and statements that are unreliable and opposed to normal value systems. People associated with this value system will not conduct themselves in patterns commensurate with accepted ethics. Trust, honesty, and commitments should not be considered binding.

The subjects should be evaluated cautiously by the most experienced personnel (psychiatrist, psychologists, clergy, *etc*) associated with probable or suspected criminal behavior.

It is the intent of the author to assist the reader to understand the numerous sources of subliminal and overt satanic sources that are available in songs and activities currently found on television and in music. Simple references to the occult, black or white magic, reincarnation, karma, witchcraft, wizardry, and sorcery are basic sources of satanic information.

(The self-styled satanist is one of the most dangerous types of satanist. This is because of their adding to the rituals to meet their own needs, which could include human sacrifices and torturings.--editor)

SATANIC SYMBOLS

Symbology taken from the santanic bible published in California in 1969

The inverted 5-pointed star (pentagram)




The letter A in a circle (international symbol for Anarchy)



Inverted crosses (symbolizes human sacrifice)



Other forms of inverted crosses found in the satanic bible





LTC (P) Robert V. Baker was the Commander, 40th MP Battalion, Fort McClellan, AL, at the time this article was written.

PROGRESSIVE PRISONS

Captain Marc Miller

At 0415 hours the drill sergeant flips on the lights and hollers the morning wake-up calls. In fifteen minutes all prisoners are on the yellow line for the first accountability formation and the morning's physical training. Beds are made, and the prisoners are in appropriate training attire-T-shirts and gym shorts, the closest thing to civilian clothing they possess.

Except for Sundays and holidays this is the latest wake-up call of the week. Living in an austere military environment, most prisoners look forward to having a carpeted rather than a tile floor and sleeping in late upon their release. Life as a minimum-custody prisoner in the United States Army Correctional Activity (USACA), Fort Riley, Kansas has its benefits; but overall the system is highly regimented and tough. Very tough.

The USACA has one of the most progressive prison programs in the area of corrections. The mission of USACA is to operate a basic correctional training program that confines and provides correctional treatment for medium-term Army enlisted prisoners and discharges or returns them to duty, based upon the needs of the Army.

The USACA receives enlisted prisoners with a sentence of four to twenty-four months, the vast majority arriving with a punitive (*i.e.* bad conduct or dishonorable) discharge. Only a small percentage of those demonstrating outstanding potential are recommended for return to duty by their battalion commanders.

Corrections and Confinement

Corrections and confinement follow prisoners from arrival to departure. Upon initial arrival all prisoners receive a minimum of eight weeks medium custody behind the wire at alpha company. During this time a clinical evaluation and a core curriculum are accomplished.

An assignment board is held to determine job placement, initial problems, and a correctional treatment program. Here, under close supervision, hard labor is emphasized for medium-custody prisoners.

After prisoners have demonstrated that they are ready to enter minimum custody, they are assigned to one of the four minimum-custody companies. There they will be employed in a job selected by the assignment board. These vocational employment training positions are designed to be skill producing, thereby enhancing the prisoner's value in the job market upon release.

Minimum-custody prisoners are similar to local parolees. There are no fences or walls. Prisoners are controlled *via* military discipline. They constantly have to prove that they are responsible and reliable.

The key to the system is leadership. Drill sergeants (95C) and senior corrections NCOs run the platoons, while junior corrections NCOs are assigned as primary counselors, performing duties similar to those of a squad leader. Each has approximately ten prisoners to lead, counsel and train. In addition to the daily physical fitness program, training consists of vocational employment and correctional treatment classes.

Strict Attention to Discipline

Private Freddie Foxhole is on the yellow line. He lets out a sigh of apprehension as Drill Sergeant Banks approaches. Private Foxhole secretly hopes the drill sergeant isn't feeling good today; physical training with him is not something to look forward to.

Many thoughts race through his mind as he waits for the platoon to finish forming up, "After PT it's a quick shower, stand reveille, and go to work, maybe I'll learn to drive the end-loader. The supervisor said he'd teach me soon. Group counseling is tomorrow, and I gotta go see my case analyst on my parole appeal. Hope it's approved; these guys never cut any slack.

"I wonder who'll inspect the billets; I gotta pass all this week or I blew my good day for the month. My dust cover should be tight enough. When I get outta here, the first thing I'm gonna do is sleep late. Real, real late."

Private Foxhole is shocked back into reality as the drill commands, "EXTEND to the left, MARCH."

Basic soldier discipline prevails in minimum custody. Prisoners are counted by name, on the yellow line, throughout the day. Movement control passes are issued each time they leave the company area. Prisoners are required to stand both reveille and retreat each day and are marched to each meal and to work. If more than two prisoners leave the unit area, one will march the others.

This strict attention to discipline, which teaches self-discipline and individual responsibility, is being adopted by civilian institutions.

States implementing this type of program usually select first-time youthful offenders. These offenders would normally receive 3- to 7-year sentences for a variety of

offenses ranging from car theft to purse snatching. A court had found them guilty and the resulting sentences were for the maximum punishment allowed by law. However, sentences were suspended, provided they complete a 90- to 180-day program at an institution similar to USACA. The remainder of their time would be spent on parole.

Rigorous System

The USACA system is rigorous. Prisoners are up at 0430 hours and to bed at 2200 hours. Housing, in open-bay World War II billets, is spartan. They have a minimum number of personal possessions.

Prisoners receive written evaluations in all areas; and these evaluations are used to determine their performance, their potential and, in essence, their future. Duty hours are filled with vocational training and correctional treatment. The evening hours are devoted to activities such as Alcoholics Anonymous, basic skills improvement, church choir, and, for a fortunate few, attendance at college classes.

Approximately ninety days prior to release prisoners are provided job search assistance. This includes finding job information, work search planning and completing applications.

Chaplains play a key role as the prisoners' time in confinement draws to a close. The final phase is the reentry program, where chaplains prepare the prisoners for the transfer from military to civilian life and how to cope with the reactions of family and friends.

Prison Without Fences

Unusual as it may seem, operating a prison without fences has proven extremely successful at USACA. Prisoners are provided positive support while developing work ethics and demonstrating individual responsibility. While being taught vocational skills, prisoners provide the Army with valuable manpower support.

The prisoners have a chance to examine closely the problematic behavior that brought them into confinement, and they are provided the opportunity to make constructive changes. The Army does take care of its own, and USACA is one example of this in action.

We can make a difference is USACA's motto, and the prisoners leaving firmly attest to the fact that it does make a difference.



Captain Marc Miller was the Executive Officer, 3d Battalion, U.S. Army Correctional Activity, Fort Riley, KS, at the time this article was written.

Correctional Mental Health Treatment in the Military

Captain Gregory A. Gahm, Ph.D.

The role that mental health treatment plays in the rehabilitation of the military offender is a frequently misunderstood element of the correctional system. The military correctional system has the dual mission to provide correctional treatment and training as well as confinement in a safe, secure environment.

The overall objective is to return inmates to military duty or civilian life as useful citizens with improved attitudes and motivation. Mental health services play an important part in this process by identifying and treating mental health problems and assisting the individual in adjusting to confinement.

It is important to understand that while these functions generally support the goals of rehabilitation, they are but one part of the rehabilitative process. Mental health treatment may also go beyond its focus on rehabilitation to include treatment for specific problems that may not be directly related to the offender's crimes.

While mental health treatment definitely contributes to the rehabilitative process, any confinement setting necessarily limits the mental health services that can be provided. These limitations include staff size, security considerations, and other institutional requirements reducing inmate availability. Furthermore, inmates may sometimes resist treatment based on the perception of mental health as part of the confinement system.

This article will address some of the issues associated with providing mental health services in a correctional setting. The United States Disciplinary Barracks provides the basis for this article; however, the issues addressed apply in some measure to all correctional settings.

United States Disciplinary Barracks

The United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB) is the military's multiservice, maximum security prison. It confines approximately fifteen hundred inmates and has a mission to provide the custodial supervision and correctional treatment necessary to return military prisoners to military duty or civilian life as useful citizens.

Hopefully, the inmates receive training in a marketable skill and acquire improved attitudes towards responsible behavior. The philosophy of military corrections at the USDB is clearly rehabilitative and is expressed in the motto of the institution: *Our mission, your future.*

Confinement, Rehabilitation, and Treatment

To understand the role of mental health treatment it is first necessary to clarify the relationship between confinement and rehabilitation.

The objectives of confinement are varied; but they include protection of society (incapacitation), punishment of the criminal (retribution for the offense), rehabilitation, deterrence.

The aims of rehabilitation are to help the offender control his criminal behavior and impulses, to encourage him to change his antisocial behaviors and associated belief, and to prevent recurrence of his crime.

While rehabilitation is appropriate for all inmates, not all inmates require mental health treatment. Treatment of the offender is one facet of the rehabilitative process; and it is an activity that can take place before, during, and after confinement.

Mental Health Services

At the USDB the Directorate of Mental Health (DMH) provides mental health services for inmates. Its staff employs more than forty mental health practitioners and consists of social workers, behavioral science specialists, a psychologist, a psychiatrist, a researcher, and a clerical support group. It also utilizes students, Red Cross volunteers, and visiting reserve officers.

These service providers are organized into four divisions and interact to provide a broad spectrum of services for the military offender.

Mental health services are provided to inmates both individually and in groups. Individual treatment, including counseling and therapy, is provided for inmates who have a specific mental health problem or who desire assistance with general adjustment issues.

In contrast, group treatment programs are generally directed toward criminal acts such as sexual offenses against children, larceny, drug and alcohol abuse, rape, and assault. They may also provide information to inmates on such topics as social skills, assertiveness, coping strategies, and sexual knowledge.

Focus of Treatment

The focus of most mental health services provided by the USDB is to help the inmates explore the thoughts and actions related to their offenses and to adjust to confinement. The counseling is not designed to cure offense-related behavior.


The counseling encourages inmates to take responsibility for previous criminal actions, to understand the underlying causes of the unacceptable behavior, and to recognize the precursors and thought patterns associated with their offenses. They are encouraged to work on personal growth in an effort to decrease the likelihood of future harmful behaviors. While most inmates do not require treatment for mental illness, they can benefit from the generalized programs offered by the mental health staff.

A few service members sentenced for confinement suffer from serious psychological problems requiring intensive, one-on-one clinical therapy. In some of these cases the treatment concentrates on a mental illness or disorder that was directly related to the specific offense.

However, it is rare that an inmate is convicted of an offense directly attributable to a mental disorder, and treatment based on this criterion involves only a small percentage of the population. All inmates are assigned a mental health counselor and receive an initial interview and psychological testing. The extent to which inmates receive mental health services while confined at the USDB depends largely on individual motivation for change.

Few inmates are considered to have significant mental illness; however, all are encouraged to participate in counseling programs related to their confining offenses. Individual treatment is generally provided primarily to those most in need and to inmates desiring such services.

Inmates are not forced to receive mental health service. However, they realize that refusal to participate greatly reduces the likelihood that the mental health staff will make positive recommendations for parole and custody upgrade.



DIRECTORATE OF MENTAL HEALTH ORGANIZATION

Some Resistance to Treatment

Inmates frequently have a negative attitude toward the mental health system. This negativity often stems from a misunderstanding of the limits on confidentiality of mental health services.

DIRECTORATE OF MENTAL HEALTH GROUPS

OFFENSE SPECIFIC GROUPS

Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Assaultive Offenders
Sexual Offenders Against Children
Larceny Group

INFORMATION AND SELF-HELP GROUPS

Reality Therapy
Sex Education: Knowledge and Attitudes
Social, Coping and Assertiveness Skills
Stress Management in Confinement
Women: Stereotypes and Attitudes
Alcoholics Anonymous
ACOA (Adult Children of Alcoholics)
Narcotics Anonymous
Drug and Alcohol Related Issues
R4 (Sex Offender Self-Help Group)
Larceny Group
Afro-American Culture Organization

The concept of physician-patient confidentiality is well established in the civilian medical community. Confidentiality means that communications between the physician and the patient are privileged and cannot ordinarily be divulged to a third party without the patient's permission. The physician-patient relationship has been extended to most mental health providers.

However, when a service member receives treatment in a military medical facility, confidentiality and privileged communication are limited.

In many cases inmates have received counseling or therapy prior to their courts-martial. Information obtained from this treatment may have been used as evidence that led to their conviction and sentencing.

Take, for example, the case of a service member who entered a government-sponsored drug rehabilitation program and was given the opportunity to receive treatment and return to service. Any information that the individual divulged during treatment becomes a matter of record. Even if the information does not relate to criminal matters, it can be used to assess the prior motivations of the individual being charged.

Comments that the service member made about his family or military associates may have seemed harmless at the time. However, they can always be surfaced by the government as evidence of the character of the accused.

In other cases it may have been the mental health system that first became aware of the service member's activities and made the report to the authorities, which resulted in the preferral of charges.

For example, all medical authorities are legally obligated to report instances of sexual offenses against children. These service members may have assumed that they had a right to privileged communication in therapy and that statements made during this treatment could not be used against them.

Such confidentiality generally does not exist in the military health care system. All health records and medical test results are the property of the government and can be subpoenaed as evidence.

Inmates who arrive at the USDB are briefed on the limitations of confidentiality in the prison setting. It is clear that any information they give to a mental health staff member can be used in the evaluation of their potential for rehabilitation. Furthermore, they realize that their mental health counselor plays a significant role in determining the institution's recommendation for parole and institutional privileges.

In light of these factors, it is not surprising that inmates may resist treatment, be less than honest with their mental health counselors, or feel pressured into cooperating with mental health staff members.

Limitations on Treatment

The USDB devotes significantly more resources to inmate mental health care than do federal or state prisons. Nevertheless, this care is still administered in a confinement setting that must remain safe and secure.

Accordingly, both the amount of treatment and range of treatment options offered to the inmates are limited to some degree. Furthermore, it is clear that treatment offered to inmates in a prison environment is affected by the overall prison atmosphere.

The amount of the mental health services at the USDB is limited by staff size, security considerations, and other institutional requirements limiting inmate availability. Inmates receive an average of one individual counseling session per month. If they participate in group programs that are available, they can receive several hours of group contact per month.

In contrast, a treatment facility or inpatient hospital setting may provide weeks or months of intensive therapy devoted solely to the psychological issues surrounding a specific offense.

As a result, in a treatment facility all the energies of the individual can be directed toward the psychological aspects of the deviant behavior. In addition, release from the program is often contingent on positive change rather than time served. This type of treatment simply cannot be provided in a prison setting.

The range of treatment options available in prison is also substantially reduced. Because of security restrictions and logistical considerations family member involvement in the treatment process is limited. This reduces the op-

tions for family and marital therapy and results in family members receiving mental health services separate from those of the inmate.

In contrast, a typical medical treatment facility can offer treatment programs that integrate family members into the entire process.

Mental health treatment in any confinement facility is also limited by the overall prison environment. The personal growth that takes place in a prison is not subject to the same stresses that are present in everyday living.

The rules of conduct limit normal interpersonal relations, especially with members of the opposite sex. Access to alcohol and drugs is also reduced. Thus when an inmate is successful in casting off old behaviors and thinking patterns, his changed state is still not tested under real-life circumstances. In a nonprison setting treatment can be more easily integrated into the patient's normal living pattern; thus the likelihood of lasting change is increased.

These limitations on the provision of mental health services in confinement should not be considered as justification for not confining criminal offenders. While mental health services provided in a treatment facility are certainly more extensive than those offered in any prison, service members are sent to prison for breaking laws. If treatment is the sole objective, they should not be sent to prison.

If, however, an individual is to be sent to prison, mental health services may be provided in this setting. The USDB, with its rehabilitative mission, provides far more extensive mental health services than are offered in other prisons.

Conclusion

The USDB is a prison and is not designed, nor does it have the resources, to serve as a mental health treatment hospital or medical rehabilitation center. Service members are sentenced for confinement and correctional treatment as a result of a criminal offense. They are not sentenced to the USDB for mental health treatment. Participation in treatment is not mandatory, and change cannot be forced onto an inmate who does not care.

The mental health system is not idealistic in the belief that all inmates are treatable. Many inmates are not motivated for change and growth. The majority of inmates are mainly concerned with getting out of prison and continuing on with their lives.

For them mental health treatment may have little effect on producing personal change or decreasing the likelihood of recidivism. Inmates can benefit from the mental health services offered, but they have to accept the major burden of rehabilitation.

Routine daily interactions between staff and inmates sustains atmosphere of disciplin and respect.

Mental health treatment is one part of the total rehabilitation process. Confinement and correctional treatment for criminal offenses are the primary purposes of corrections in the military. People are sent to prison for breaking the law, not solely for mental health treatment.

Those individuals who truly suffer from treatable mental health disorders will be helped, but the criminal justice system must realistically understand the limits of curing criminals. The correctional staff, who interact with the inmates on a daily basis to maintain custody and control, play a key role in the correctional treatment process.

It is largely through the routine, daily interactions between the staff and inmates that an atmosphere of discipline and respect is sustained. This atmosphere nurtures successful rehabilitation.

Correctional specialists, mental health providers, MP officers, and civilian workers all play a vital and important role in the reintegration of the military offender into society as a productive citizen.



Captain Gregory A Gahm was the Chief, Clinical and Research Psychology Division, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, KS at the time this article was written. He holds a doctorate degree in clinical psychology and master's degree in psychology and management.

CORRECTION

On page 20 of the last issue of *MILITARY POLICE (PB 19-90-1, June 1990)*, "Command and Control in Air Base Ground Defense" by CPT Robert W. Kenyon, the first paragraph in the section about area security should have read as follows:

"Military police are assigned areas of operation (AOs) based upon a number of considerations: size of the area to be covered, number of units to be assisted or protected, the estimated logistical effort to be supported, the number of EPW that are expected, the commander's intent, risk, METT-T (mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available), intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), etc."

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Robot

Jay Schaaf

Two years ago Army leadership saw an urgent need for a remotely controlled machine to search for, pick up and move suspected bombs without endangering the operator. The concept was later changed to include the capability of neutralizing, examining, and moving explosive devices.


Meet the EOD robot--the explosive ordnance disposal robot, a device resembling a miniature tractor.

There were four procurements: the robot system, a tool set, a system of wires and pulleys called a hook-and-line kit, and an explosives detector known as the "sniffer." The robot system was procured competitively as an off-the-shelf item with no money allocated for research and development.

From commercially available parts a relatively simple device powered by two wheelchair batteries was built. Virtually all the components of a 76-item tool set were in government inventory and needed only to be packaged at the Rock Island Arsenal; U.S. Army Armament, Munitions, and Chemical Command; Rock Island, Illinois. The hook-and-line set used to move a bomb remotely and the explosives detector were also obtained off-the-shelf from private industry.

The first seventy-two robots were delivered to the Army early in 1989 for fielding to Army EOD units around the world. The Marine Corps has ordered fifteen robots for use by its EOD teams. Delivery of the robots and other items was accomplished in a comparatively short time and at a total cost of $3.7 million--a reduction from the original authorization of $6 million.

For its money the Army obtained a mobile robot equipped with both color and black-and-white video cameras, an arm that can reach out with its claw "hand" in all directions, accessories that accommodate an X-ray machine for observing what's inside a package, a water disrupter to destroy a bomb's electronic detonator, and special tools to neutralize a bomb. The robot is also being fitted with a .12-gauge shotgun that can be used to open locked doors or desks.



The EOD robot

The robot system weighs under two hundred pounds. It can climb stairs or a 45-degree slope, stop, maintain its position and resume the climb. The separately packaged explosives sniffer, although not part of the robot, may be used in conjunction with the system or by itself.

If the efforts to prevent a bomb from detonating fail, the remote control systems of the robot at least keep the operator well away from the explosion. Used on the radio control mode, the unit has an operating range of up to nine hundred feet. The fiber-optic control system has a range of 325 feet.

The robot will soon support the Army's peacetime mission of protecting people and property from acts of terrorism--without becoming a budget buster.



Jay Schaaf was assigned to the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Armament, Munitions and Chemical Command; Rock Island, IL at the time this article was written.

The Threat of Terrorist Bombers

Sergeant First Class Richard L. Stanley, II

Bombs and their devastation have struck terror for centuries. Because of the inherent potential for massive fatalities and chaos, bombs are a favorite instrument of warring armies.

For the same reasons bombs are the most frequently used tactic of the terrorist. It is one of the easiest methods of attack; bombs can be prepositioned and command-detonated. Bomb construction is normally inexpensive and relatively easy.

Bombing does not, however, have the dramatic effect of hostage taking (the third-ranking terrorist tactic) unless they are coordinated and directed against a highly visible target. Nevertheless, fatality ratios in one act of bombing can be astronomical. Material destruction caused by bombing can be extremely costly as well.

Bombers are found the world over and cannot be categorized exclusively as transnational or international terrorists. Bombers are found to be professional criminals, racists, students, jealous lovers, disgruntled employees and the mentally distraught. Bombing motives run the gamut of sabotage and subversion to revenge, intimidation and protest. Motivation coupled with devious desire and opportunity can become a deadly combination.

As a result of the PanAm flight 103 incident there is an increased awareness that explosives could easily be placed in postal channels destined for air transportation by terrorist organizations or hostile intelligence service (HOIS) operatives.

Recent attacks on civilian aircraft have been associated with international terrorists. Their targeting was partly due to the ease of bomb emplacement, vulnerability of expensive aircraft, and high concentration of personnel and travelers in a congested area (aircraft or flight ticket counters). Plane fragments are also subject to indiscriminate crash into areas of population if the bomb exploded while airborne.

The potential loss from a single bombing in a deviously or professionally preplanned emplacement of minimal explosives can kill several hundred people, not to mention the destruction of a million dollar aircraft in a single blast. Though not as significant, bomb-threat hoaxes are also damaging to morale and cause loss in manpower hours and staff support expenditure.

Simplicity of Bomb Construction

The threat to air transportation and centers of mass population is very real. Considering the ease of bomb construction, the relative anonymity (if desired) and freedom of movement it affords the bomber, the threat can be awesome.

A simple timing device can facilitate a great distance between the bomber and the target at the time of explosion. A child's simple radio-control device used for remotely controlled toys can allow the bomber to detonate the bomb at a whim. Bombs may be equipped with altimeters set to explode at specific altitudes or in such a manner that the device is unknowingly detonated by an innocent.

Bomb components are easily accessible. More than a few bomb components are supplied by countries supportive to particular terrorists groups. This includes the vast narco-terrorist network that operates on a mutual intelligence and supply basis. Explosives can also be bought or stolen from gun shops, construction sites and military arms and ammo storage facilities.

Some forms of explosives can even be manufactured by knowledgeable bombers. Detonation-initiation devices may be constructed from mousetraps, dried beans in a mason jar, ice cubes, burning cigars, vitamin gelatin capsules, or garage door openers. Initiation sources such as blasting caps and fuses are readily available, especially in the construction and military communities; any standard battery can provide a suitable power source.

Fatality ratios and material destruction cost can be astronomical.....

Activation mechanisms are either time-delay, target-activated or remotely activated and can be constructed from items in the average home kitchen or local hardware store. Without going into an elaborate description of construction methodology it is safe to say that nearly anyone can become a bomber.

The U.S. Postal Service (USPS) system is a convenient means for sending improvised explosives to particular targets including the postal service and transportation services themselves. Scores of such devices have been encountered worldwide.

Although letter bombs vary from device to device, there are relatively few basic types. In an attempt to describe examples of some of these basic types, this report is not meant to be the ultimate authority on methodology, nor should it be assumed that letter bombs and the like are limited to the following examples.

Parcels vary widely in size, amount and type of filler, and weight. The amount and the type of initiating system is usually dictated by the thickness or volume of the container. For this reason it is convenient to consider them in three size ranges: those less than 6mm, between 7mm and 30mm, and those over 30mm.

Less than 6mm. Letter bombs in envelopes thinner than 6mm would not generally cause suspicion. This size imposes severe limits on what components can be used. Commercial blasting caps, which in general have a diameter of approximately 6mm, determine the minimum thickness of any postal improvised explosive device (IED) containing an unmodified detonator.

From 7mm to 30mm. In the 7mm- to 30mm-thickness range (from thick envelopes to flat boxes, for example), a wide variety of explosives and components have been used. Explosive devices in this category have employed sticks or compressed packs of dynamite, bags of incendiary mix, and electric or nonelectric blasting caps or igniters in conjunction with various power sources (from camera batteries to flashlight batteries) and actuating mechanisms.

To ensure that components (1) function correctly, (2) do not get jostled about while enroute through the postal system, and (3) cannot be felt through the outer wrapper, it is necessary to provide rigid support inside the package. Hollowed-out books, greeting card boxes, and thick card mounting boards have been utilized. If this is not carried out properly by the bomber, initiating system might become dislodged while enroute and pose the risk of premature detonation.

Larger than 30mm. In parcels greater than 30mm thick it is not necessary to compress the bomb's components. Consequently such devices can obtain large explosive or incendiary charges in rigid boxes (cigar boxes or shoe boxes, for example) in improvised boxes made from a wooden frame covered with cardboard, or even hidden in a gift inside a box. Initiation systems have included a wide vareity of switches.

Target Participation

Where an explosive device is intended for a specific target (as opposed to a device that will fire at a preset time no matter where it is), target participation is required. This includes such action as opening a letter by inserting a letter opener, undoing an envelope flap, untying a string, lifting a lid, or removing a parcel's contents.

It is unlikely that a bomb in an unopened container would be triggered simply by handling it, since it has already gone through various types of postal machinery before arriving at its destination. And, of course, it has been designed with this in mind.

This means that the initiating system of a postal explosive device intended for a specific target must be based on any manipulating that is necessary to open or separate the inner contents from the wrapping. (Note: This conclusion should never be reason for handling a suspect device with less than the greatest of caution; safety depends largely on how well the device was made.)

All initiation systems have one thing in common: they are designed to produce a flame. The flame is directed either into an incendiary mix to start a fire or into detonator to start an explosion. This may be achieved chemically, mechanically, or electrically.

Identification and Response

Keep in mind that a bomb can be enclosed in either a parcel or an envelope, and its outward appearance is limited only by the imagination of the sender. Mail bombs have, however, exhibited some unique characteristics that may assist you in identifying a suspect mailing. To apply these factors it is important to know the type of mail normally received by your organization. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (an investigative division of USPS) advises everyone to be aware of the following factors.

Mail bombs may bear restricted endorsements such as "Personal" or "Private." This factor is significant when the addressee does not normally receive personal mail at the office.

The addressee's name or title may be inaccurate. Mail bombs may reflect distorted handwriting, or the name and address may be prepared with homemade labels or cut-and-paste lettering.

Mail bombs may have protruding wires, aluminum foil, or visible oil stains and may emit a peculiar odor. They may have an excessive amount of postage stamps affixed.

Letter-type bombs may feel rigid or appear uneven or lopsided.

Parcel bombs may be unprofessionally wrapped, with several combinations of tape used to secure the package and may be endorsed "Fragile--Handle with Care" or "Rush--Do Not Delay." Parcel bombs may have an irregular shape, soft spots, or bulges; they may make a buzzing or ticking noise or a sloshing sound.

Pressure or resistance may be noted when removing contents from an envelope or parcel.

If you are suspicious of a mailing and are unable to verify the contents with the addressee or sender it is important to take action.

Do not open the article! Do not put the suspect mailing in water or in a confined space such as desk drawer or filing cabinet.

If possible, open windows in the immediate area to assist in venting potential explosive gases. Isolate the mailing immediately in a nonvital area and evacuate. If an item is large, it may be necessary to evacuate the entire building.

In the event a suspicious item is received, police and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) personnel should be

notified and informed of all pertinent information immediately.

Summary

While powerful bombs may be concealed on a person or bomb components delivered by various persons to the target, most bombers will carry or send the bomb to the target in some form of a container. Thus any reasonable degree of security requires the inspection of all incoming parcels, handcarried items, briefcases and other containers.

Anyone with or without proper motivation can become a bomber. Skills required to accomplish the devastating task are miminal. The required components are varied and abundant as is the potential to conceal and emplace a bomb. Any individual or organization can become a target.

Therefore, a successful counter-bomb-threat plan requires a carefully constructed system coordinated with the intelligence and law enforcement community to shield personnel and property from the potential bomb threat.



Sergeant First Class Richard L. Stanley II was the 29th Area Support Group Command Security and Terrorism NCOIC at the time this article was written. He holds both military police and military intelligence MOSs and has served in a variety of responsible positions during his eighteen years of service.

United States Disciplinary Barracks

Staff Corrections Training

Captain Yvonne Doll

As most soldiers know, the USDB (United States Disciplinary Barracks), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas is the maximum security prison for the military. Its mission is to provide correctional treatment and training, care and custodial supervision necessary to return military prisoners to civilian life as useful citizens with training in a marketable skill and with improved attitudes and motivation.

To fulfill this mission, all staff members, military and civilian, must receive specialized corrections training. The USDB staff includes 774 members of the U.S. Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force and 154 civilian employees working together to achieve a progressive correctional community.

A confirmation of the USDB's self-proclaimed status as the center for correctional excellence was obtained in January 1988 when the USDB qualified for accreditation by the (ACA) American Correctional Association Commission on Accreditation for Corrections after an intensive four-day inspection of 404 required standards.

Accreditation is an impressive achievement considering that less than 20 percent of all correctional institutions meet the rigid accreditation standards.

To meet ACA training standards, the USDB staff training program had to be drastically improved. Ongoing since 1975, a mandatory forty-hour preservice training course is completed by all newly assigned personnel prior to being given duties inside the walls of the USDB. The preservice course ensures all USDB staff members are properly trained and oriented for their unique duty assignment within the military corrections environment.

The original preservice course was necessary and effective; however, no annual refresher corrections training was given. The enlisted soldiers, airmen and marines received only mandatory training on military-related subjects. The civilians and officers had virtually no corrections-related training after the preservice course was completed.

In-service training was initially designed in the spring of 1988 as a 40-hour annual training program (to supplement preservice training) for correction guards, supervisors, professional specialists, and support employees who have frequent contact with inmates. Clerical and support employees who have minimal contact with inmates are required to attend sixteen hours of annual in-service training.

In-service training officially began on June 1, 1988 under the management of the USDB military police battalion operations and training section. Qualified instructors were carefully chosen by each USDB directorate to write various corrections-related lesson plans and to provide classroom instruction as an additional duty on a monthly basis.

The original program of instruction included classes on subjects such as stress management, supervision of inmates, first aid, report writing, hostage situations and civil liability. Classes are given eighteen days out of every month in two-hour blocks of instruction. This gives everyone a

TRACK TRAINING

CORE SUBJECTS	TRACK	I	II	III	IV	V
Escort Procedures (DCL)			1	1	1	
Report Writing (MPI)		1	1	1	1	
MGI/Inmate Rights and Responsibilities (DOC)		1	1	1	1	1
Hostage Situations (Hostage Negotiation Team)		1	1	1	1	1
Safety/Fire Procedures (DRM)		1	1	1	1	1
Communication Skills (DMH)		2	2		2	2
First Aid (DMH)		2	2	2	2	2
Inmate Lifestyle (DMH)		2	2		2	2
OPSEC/SAEDA (Bn-S2)		1	1	1	1	1
Stress Management (DMH)		3	3		3	3
Standard of Conduct/Privacy Act (CJA)		1	1	1	1	1
HIV (MEDDAC)		1	1	1	1	1
		16	17	10	17	15
POSITION/JOB TRAINING						
*Riot Control (SORT)			4	4	4	
Contraband/Sensitive Items (DOC)			1	1	1	
Supervision of Inmates (DOC)			1	1	2	
Use of Force (DOC)			1		1	1
Effective Writing (Bn-CGSC)			1	1		1
DMH Programs & Administration (DMH)			1			1
DCL Policies & Administration (DCL)			1	1		1
DOC Policies & Administration (DOC)			1	1		1
EOC (Bn-S3)						1
Access/Egress & Key Control (DOC)			1	1	1	1
Civil Liability (CJA)			1	1	1	1
Labor Law (CPO)						1
Military Justice (CJA)			2	2		2
Service Relationships (DRM-ISSAs)						1
Suicide Deterrent and Prevention (DMH)			1	1	1	1
*Weapons Training (Bn)			4	4	4	2
Frisk/Strip Search (DOC)					1	
Area/Room Shakedown (DOC)			1		1	
**Supervisor Training			10	30	10	12
	Subtotal	0	31	48	27	27
	***TOTAL HOURS	16	48	58	44	42

*Mandatory for military personnel only.
**Supervisors must provide the S3 a copy of Lesson Plans/Plan of Action and the AnnualTraining Schedule NLT 1 May 89.
***A minimum of 40 hours is required for all tracks (excluding Track I).
( ) Directorate responsible for lesson plan and instructor.

chance to attend each training class twelve times a year.

As needed with any good training program, the training must be reviewed and updated. The USDB training officer and representatives from each USDB directorate and the Air Force and Marine detachments make up the training advisory committee. This committee meets quarterly to review the in-service program and resolve problems.

The committee finalized its annual needs assessment recently and recommended in-service training classes be modified to better accommodate USDB and individual training needs. A track system, consisting of five tracks, was proposed to meet compliance of all ACA standards, to allow for tailored training to fit individual needs, and to provide maximum flexibility to the directors. The mission of custody, control and training for nearly fifteen hundred inmates never ends and training must revolve around it.

The five tracks include the following categories of personnel:

Track I includes clerical and support personnel who have minimal inmate contact; they need a minimum of sixteen hours of annual corrections- related training.

Track II includes support personnel (chaplains, noncommissioned officers in charge, work-detail supervisors, food service cadre) who have regular contact with inmates; they need a minimum of forty hours of annual corrections-related training.


Track III includes professional specialists (social workers, behavioral science specialists [military occupational specialty 91G]), who need forty hours of annual corrections-related training.

Track IV includes correctional officers (military occupational specialty 95C and 95B guards), who need forty hours of annual corrections- related training.

Track V includes administrative and management supervisors (commandant, chief of staff, commanders, directors), who need forty hours of employee-management subjects.

The track system has been approved and incorporated into the in-service training program. Directorates and commanders are responsible for ensuring their personnel attend the proper classes and that the training is documented.

The operations and training officer is responsible for coordinating, scheduling and resourcing the in-service training program. Staff training at the USDB is taken seriously and is fully supported by the military police battalion commander and the commandant.



Captain Yvonne Doll was the Operations and Training Officer, United States Disciplinbary Barracks, Military Police Battalion, Fort Leavenworth, at the time this article was written.

MP Safety Database as a Guide for Training

Major Tom Loyd
and
Captain Keith Howerton

The importance of safety in all aspects of soldiering can never be underestimated or overemphasized. This consideration applies as much to the Military Police Corps Regiment as it does Armywide.

When considering the millions of dollars lost each year because of accidents, even a casual observer can see the importance of safety. The loss is measured not only in terms of equipment damaged or destroyed, but also in terms of lost manhours, medical expenses and sometimes even loss of life. Safety becomes a significant issue of daily life when evaluated in these terms.

Safety considerations must become second nature for all soldiers if accident statistics are to be significantly reduced. MP officers and noncommissioned officers need to understand the importance of a proactive safety program and allocate the necessary training time to enhance safety awareness to prevent avoidable accidents.

The MP Safety Database

The Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort McClellan, Alabama developed a safety database containing all reported accidents involving military police on a fiscal year (FY) basis.

The U.S. Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama provides the initial accident statistics in a raw data report. The safety center compiles the data from all DA Forms 285, U.S. Army Investigation Accident Report, from military police units and installations worldwide. The raw-data report contains a brief explanation of each reported accident.

The data is categorized by accident type for analysis. This allows for identification of both positive and negative trends in MP accidents. Positive trends are determined by a low per-capita percentage ratio and negative trends by a high ratio. This identifies specific problem areas, as well as areas where the regiment is doing well.

All reported accidents are categorized into seven major types: (1) unit physical training, (2) all other training, (3) privately owned vehicle, (4) Army motor vehicle, (5) individual sports, non-unit; (6) organized sports, and (7) other. The seventh accident type includes all accidents not classified into one of the other six types. This category can be considered the "clumsy type" of accidents, for example, an accident where a soldier cut himself while chopping wood at home.

Each accident is further categorized by location, grade, activity, duty status, injury received, body area injured, and cause. Alcohol involvement is also noted. In the case of a privately owned vehicled (POV) or Army motor vehicle (AMV) accident the specific type of vehicle is identified. This range of categories gives the safety database a multitude of combinations that can be created for statistical analysis.

The database contains all reported accidents for FY 1988 and all reported accidents for first quarter FY 1989. Each fiscal year will be maintained in a separate database and each quarter will be recorded as the data is received from the safety center.

Recent Accident Trends

Military police personnel were involved in 411 reported accidents during FY 1988. Compared with a total MP force strength of approximately 48,000 worldwide (all components), 411 equals approximately 0.08 percent. This simply means that statistically a MP has less than a one percent chance of being involved in a reportable accident.

The first quarter FY 89 ratio decreased to approximately 0.07 percent. These ratios suggest that the regiment is doing well in terms of safety. However, there are some areas that may require special attention by MP leaders.

Of the 411 accidents reported for FY 88, 168 (40.8 percent) were vehicle-related. There were 45 POV accidents for a total of 10.9 percent, and the AMV accident category had 123 reported accidents for a total of 29.9 percent. The AMV category by far had the largest percentage ratio of any other category. This combined with the POV category, suggests possible problems with safe vehicle operation.

Also, all MP fatal accidents that occurred in FY 88 (one AMV, five POV) were vehicle-related. Trends for FY 89 tended to suggest even higher ratios than these.

Emergency runs (Code III) also tend to be a problem for the regiment. In FY 88 there were fourteen AMV accidents involving MP sedans on emergency runs. All accidents occurred at an intersection and were caused by the MP vehicle failing to yield.

Another area that could be of particular concern to MP leaders is on-duty accidental shootings. In FY 88 there

MP Safety Database as a Guide for Training

Major Tom Loyd
and
Captain Keith Howerton

The importance of safety in all aspects of soldiering can never be underestimated or overemphasized. This consideration applies as much to the Military Police Corps Regiment as it does Armywide.

When considering the millions of dollars lost each year because of accidents, even a casual observer can see the importance of safety. The loss is measured not only in terms of equipment damaged or destroyed, but also in terms of lost manhours, medical expenses and sometimes even loss of life. Safety becomes a significant issue of daily life when evaluated in these terms.

Safety considerations must become second nature for all soldiers if accident statistics are to be significantly reduced. MP officers and noncommissioned officers need to understand the importance of a proactive safety program and allocate the necessary training time to enhance safety awareness to prevent avoidable accidents.

The MP Safety Database

The Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization at the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort McClellan, Alabama developed a safety database containing all reported accidents involving military police on a fiscal year (FY) basis.

The U.S. Army Safety Center at Fort Rucker, Alabama provides the initial accident statistics in a raw data report. The safety center compiles the data from all DA Forms 285, U.S. Army Investigation Accident Report, from military police units and installations worldwide. The raw-data report contains a brief explanation of each reported accident.

The data is categorized by accident type for analysis. This allows for identification of both positive and negative trends in MP accidents. Positive trends are determined by a low per-capita percentage ratio and negative trends by a high ratio. This identifies specific problem areas, as well as areas where the regiment is doing well.

All reported accidents are categorized into seven major types: (1) unit physical training, (2) all other training, (3) privately owned vehicle, (4) Army motor vehicle, (5) individual sports, non-unit; (6) organized sports, and (7) other. The seventh accident type includes all accidents not classified into one of the other six types. This category can be considered the "clumsy type" of accidents, for example, an accident where a soldier cut himself while chopping wood at home.

Each accident is further categorized by location, grade, activity, duty status, injury received, body area injured, and cause. Alcohol involvement is also noted. In the case of a privately owned vehicled (POV) or Army motor vehicle (AMV) accident the specific type of vehicle is identified. This range of categories gives the safety database a multitude of combinations that can be created for statistical analysis.

The database contains all reported accidents for FY 1988 and all reported accidents for first quarter FY 1989. Each fiscal year will be maintained in a separate database and each quarter will be recorded as the data is received from the safety center.

Recent Accident Trends

Military police personnel were involved in 411 reported accidents during FY 1988. Compared with a total MP force strength of approximately 48,000 worldwide (all components), 411 equals approximately 0.08 percent. This simply means that statistically a MP has less than a one percent chance of being involved in a reportable accident.

The first quarter FY 89 ratio decreased to approximately 0.07 percent. These ratios suggest that the regiment is doing well in terms of safety. However, there are some areas that may require special attention by MP leaders.

Of the 411 accidents reported for FY 88, 168 (40.8 percent) were vehicle-related. There were 45 POV accidents for a total of 10.9 percent, and the AMV accident category had 123 reported accidents for a total of 29.9 percent. The AMV category by far had the largest percentage ratio of any other category. This combined with the POV category, suggests possible problems with safe vehicle operation.

Also, all MP fatal accidents that occurred in FY 88 (one AMV, five POV) were vehicle-related. Trends for FY 89 tended to suggest even higher ratios than these.

Emergency runs (Code III) also tend to be a problem for the regiment. In FY 88 there were fourteen AMV accidents involving MP sedans on emergency runs. All accidents occurred at an intersection and were caused by the MP vehicle failing to yield.

Another area that could be of particular concern to MP leaders is on-duty accidental shootings. In FY 88 there

were three accidental weapons discharges with injuries. In each case the soldier shot himself, and thankfully none of the wounds proved to be fatal.

Military police are the only soldiers in the Army who carry live ammunition on a regular basis. Considering the number of weapons that are loaded, unloaded, and cleared daily, it could be stated that three accidental discharges with injuries is nominal or acceptable. Even when compared with the total number of accidental discharges (accidental discharges are recorded only if an injury results) the number of resulting injuries would still be small.

However, when a MP accidentally shoots himself, it is blatantly negligent and careless. Although the low number of accidental shootings suggests that training and preventive procedures are good, they could be better. Even a low number of accidental shootings shows that the problem is not completely solved.

Safety Training and Training Safely

Databases and statistics are useful only if they can be analyzed and used to support preventive measures. If the statistics cannot be used in prevention, they are simply a waste of time.

The purpose of the MP safety database program is prevention. The program can be used as evidence of a need for more safety training or a heightened interest in a given area--to do what needs to be done to preclude accidental damages and injury.

MP leaders can use the database information to compare it to specific problems in their organization and to determine if their unit is better or worse than the worldwide average for any particular category.

As can be seen by the FY 88 and first quarter FY 89 data, the MP regiment tends to have a high rate of vehicle accidents. Although most of these accidents are minor, they are costly in terms of property damage and reputation. It is simply embarrassing when an on-duty MP is at fault in a traffic accident.

The reasons these accidents occur are as specific as the circumstances that surround them. However, two main underlying causes can be attributed to each accident--inattention and bad judgement.

Both inattention and bad judgment can be addressed in safety training. The training can be formalized by inclusion in guard-mount training, special safety briefings or individual accident critique sessions. The training can also be informal. Informal training is nothing more than MP leaders making on-the-spot safety corrections when they need to be made.

Major Tom Loyd was the Chief, Evaluation Division, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL , at the time this article was written.

The purpose of any type of safety program is to improve safety awareness. It does not take an inordinate amount of time or effort to improve safety awareness; even a minimal amount of effective safety training can show a measurable result. This is true for all accidents. An enlightened attitude about safety will prevent vehicle accidents, sports-related accidents and training accidents.

The relationship between safety and training is often misunderstood, such as the belief that safety must be sacrificed for the sake of realism. This could not be farther from the truth. Warfare is a hazardous business, so training for warfare is also hazardous. Training by itself does not need added hazards to be more realistic.

The opposite is true. Ranges, live-fire exercises, night movements, etc., are dangerous by themselves. These types of training activities need to have safety measures added, not taken away because of a misguided perception of increased realism.

This same basic philosophy holds true for all activities engaged in by soldiers. Whether it is training, organized sports, or normal duty the activity can be made safer if the participating soldier understands he could get hurt. Soldiers do not intentionally hurt themselves or get involved in accidents. It happens when the soldier does not really think about what he is doing. This is where leadership and the MP leader assume their most important role.

The leader must constantly stress the importance of safety to subordinates. If the proper command and leadership safety environment is created, the soldiers will stress safety to themselves. No one likes to get hurt or have an accident.

All soldiers need to see themselves as safety leaders. Officers and noncommissioned officers are not the only soldiers who can spot an unsafe act. Anyone can. When they do, they should attempt to make the situation safer. This is especially true for the MP Corps Regiment because of the inherent hazards that are involved in the ordinary duties of military police.

Remember, a soldier getting hurt or killed is a tragedy that probably could have been prevented. Prevention does not take much time or effort.

If desired, additional information regarding the safety data in this article is available. Contact the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, U.S. Army Military Police School, ATTN: ATZN-MP-EE, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030. Telephone numbers are AUTOVON 865-3251 or commercial (205) 848-3251.



Captain Keith Howerton was a project officer, Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL , at the time this article was written.

1990 Update on Safety

Captain Jeniphr G. Kistler

In fiscal year (FY) 89 safety again proved to be essential for the conservation of the Army's resources--soldiers and equipment. Accidents had caused one of every five casualties from World War II and Vietnam. Accordingly, safety considerations justify and deserve a high priority in military police daily activities and training programs.

In FY 89 the MP Corps had 371 reported accidents, which represented 4 percent of the Army's 9,906 FY 89 accidents, and was a 10 percent reduction from FY 88's 411 accidents. There were six fatalities, seven partial disabilities, and 286 days lost from duty. Privately owned vehicle accidents accounted for five of the six fatalities.

The total cost for military police damages and injuries was $4,358,674. This expense, coupled with increasing manpower and budget constraints, provides another reason to integrate safety consciousness and safety training at all levels.

The significant amount of time military police spent on duty in vehicles resulted in 46 percent of the accidents (169 total, an increase of one since FY 88).

For example, five HMMWVs were travelling in a file along a roadway; the drivers were equipped with night-vision devices. The moon had not yet risen, so visibility was poor. Along the course of the road was a flat engineer bridge with no markings or side rails. The platoon leader told the drivers in the file to stop and turn around, unaware that only four of the five vehicles had crossed the bridge.

Unfortunately, all drivers complied with the directive, including that of the last vehicle, which was still on the bridge. The vehicle dropped ten feet and landed on its top. The driver was found outside the vehicle, and the two passengers inside. All personnel sustained injuries. The machine gun mounted on the HMMWV was damaged.

Safety training, including guardmount training, briefings, and individual accident analysis, has proven effective in alleviating these types of accidents. It is important to target vehicular accidents because of the negative publicity military police receive when the accident involves an infraction of traffic laws and regulations

One area in which the MP Corps did not improve was weapon-related accidents. During FY 88 there were three accidental weapons discharges; but in FY 89 there were nine. Weapons discharges are recorded only if an injury occurs that results in one or more lost duty days.

Weapons discharges, however unintentional, were again caused by carelessness and negligence in the performance of MP duties. Although the low number of discharges suggests that preventative measures exist and that training occurs, there is still room for improvement.

Commanders are safety officers (AR 385-10, *The Army Safety Program)*, but all soldiers must be involved. Safety conserves the Army's most important resources--soldiers and equipment.



Captain Jeniphr G. Kistler was a Student in the MP Officer Advanced Course, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Al, at the time this article was written. She previously was a Project Officer, Directorate ofEvaluation and Standardization There.



"The Constitution of the United States . . .
is the most perfect Federal Constitution that ever existed . . ."

Alexis de Tocqueville,
French statesman, author

Lineage and Honors: 159th Military Police Battalion

Captain Anthony D. Zabek

The 159th Military Police Battalion was originally constituted during World War II on August 30, 1944 as the 159th Military Police Service Battalion. Its mission was to keep supply lanes open to China and provide support to the British Fourteenth Army in India.

On September 5, 1944 the unit was activated at Chabua, India as a result of the War Department's inactivation of the 502d, 782d, and 792d Military Police Battalions. It was organized under the table of organization and equipment (TOE) 19-500.

During the war the 159th Military Police Battalion operated in the China-Burma theater, never seeing a city and never assembling as a battalion in one place. Battalion units were spread for five hundred miles along the Assam line of communications leading to areas of conflict in China and Burma. The battalion received a campaign streamer for its participation in the Asiatic-Pacific theater and earned the name "the Burma Road battalion."

It was composed of the 167th MP Company, the 156th MP Guard Platoon, the 271st MP Company, the 152d MP Company, and the 269th MP Company. Its total authorized strength was 659 officers and enlisted soldiers.

The battalion headquarters and headquarters detachment was located near Chabua, collocated with the 167th MP Company. The 156th MP Guard Platoon was at the intermediate section No. 2 stockade north of Chabua. The facility was a military prison capable of housing a maximum of 150 prisoners.

The 271st MP Company was located to the east toward Ledo, India; and the 152d MP Company was located to the west at Dibrugarh, a Brahmaputra River port and the largest town in the area. The 269th MP Company was located downriver at Gauhati, a railroad ferry transfer point on the Brahmaputra River.

The battalion commander, with the rank of brigadier general, also served as provost marshal at the intermediate section No. 2 stockade, and as a staff officer to the commanding general of the intermediate section No. 2 supply complex.

As a staff officer, he was responsible for attached MP companies temporarily in the area, K-9 scout dog units at ammunition supply points, Gurkha Guard detachments at installations, U.S. Negro provisional MP detachments, Chinese MP detachments, and prisoners at the stockade for a total of 1,250 soldiers.

One of the battalion's achievements was the apprehension of an American soldier who had murdered his company commander and had then taken to the bush, where he married a native girl and managed to escape apprehension numerous times. On March 9, 1945 the 159th battalion commander personally apprehended the fugitive as he tried to escape from a native hut. The convicted soldier was the only American soldier to be executed by order of court-martial in the China-Burma-India Theater.

The 159th Military Police Battalion was inactivated on October 27, 1945 in India and remained inactive until its redesignation May 4, 1959 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 159th Military Police Battalion, allotted to the U.S. Army Reserve and assigned to First United States Army.

The battalion was again activated on May 25, 1959 at Hamden, Connecticut and served there until inactivated March 1, 1963.

On April 15, 1976 the unit was redesignated as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 159th Military Police Battalion, assigned to the Fifth United States Army, and activated at Kansas City, Missouri. On February 1, 1981 the battalion was relocated to Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base, Missouri, its current home.

The 159th Military Police Battalion is now organized under modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) 19-76H. The unit's present CAPSTONE headquarters is the 6th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Richardson, Alaska.

During peacetime subordinate units assigned to the battalion are Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 159th Military Police Battalion; the 102d Military Police Battalion (Guard), organized under MTOE 19-247H; the 494th Military Police Detachment (CF), organized under MTOE 19-53H; and the 671st Adjutant General Detachment, organized under MTOE 12-57H.

The wartime mission of the 159th Military Police Battalion is to command, control, and coordinate from two to five 19-77 MP companies providing combat support missions to the division theatre of operations.



Captain Anthony D. Zabek was the Active Duty Operations officer, 159th MP Battalion, Belton, MO at the time this article was written. He holds a master's degree in criminal justice from Anna Maria College, Paxton, MA.

USAMPS Physical Security and Crime Prevention Course

The Conventional Physical Security Course (7H-31D/830-ASIH3) has been realigned to include portions of the now discontinued Crime Prevention Course and renamed the Conventional Physical Security and Crime Prevention Course (7H-31D/830-ASIH3).

This is the only Department of the Army course that awards the additional skill identifier (ASI) of H3, physical security specialist. Those personnel attending the installation security or physical security courses in Germany (Vilseck), Korea, or any other location are not authorized to maintain the ASI of H3 after leaving that command.

According to AR 190-13, *The Army Physical Security Program*, a physical security inspector must attend a recognized course that awards an ASI of H3. The course at USAMPS is the only U.S. Army recognized course.

To obtain quotas for the Conventional Physical Security/Crime Prevention Course, call the appropraite numbers listed below. Do not call the course manager.

The course manager, who can be reached at AV 865-4397/3942 or commercial (205) 848-4397/3942, can provide the latest information about the course and reporting and inprocessing information.

SERVICE	AUTOVON	COMMERCIAL
Army (Officers)	221-3160	(205) 235-3160
Army (Enlisted)	221-4585	(205) 325-4585
Navy	966-5987	(901) 872-5987
Civilian	680-2161/2162/2163	(804) 727-2161/2162/2163

Army Law Enforcement's Role in Spouse and Child Abuse Cases

Efforts are under way to upgrade the training of investigators and supervisors on the roles of military police and CID in handling spouse and child abuse cases. AR 608-18, *The Army Family Advocacy Program*, contains the policies for handling these offenses.

The family advocacy case management team (FACMT) on each installation is crucial to the successful resolution on these multidisciplinary cases. Both the provost marshal's office and the supporting USACIDC (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command) field element should be actively involved with the FACMT to ensure that these sensitive, and sometimes highly complex, offenses are handled properly.

For information concerning the law enforcement role in family advocacy, please contact the Military Police Operations and Investigations Department, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama. The telephone numbers are AUTOVON 865-4554 or commercial (205) 848-4554.

In Response to Hostage Situations

Dateline: Yesterday

At about 7:40 a.m. on June 30, 1980 at a Leighton Barracks bank in Wuerzburg, West Germany the loan officer, a teller, and a cleaning lady entered by the employee entrance to begin their business day.

Shortly afterward the buzzer rang at the side door, and the teller responded. When she saw no one at the employee show-up window, which is prescribed identification procedure, she assumed the person to be one of several recently hired tellers. She opened the door.

She was confronted by a man wearing fatigues, a field jacket, and a pile cap; an OD tee shirt covered one hand, and he pulled down a stocking mask with the other. The man removed the tee shirt to expose an automatic pistol, pulled the door open and entered. The teller screamed as the man brandished the pistol and demanded money. (*After-Action Report, Hostage Incident, Wuerzburg, West Germany*, July 21, 1980)

Thus began one of the most infamous hostage incidents the U.S. Army has ever experienced. It culminated

with the perpetrator, an active-duty staff sergeant, exiting the bank after midnight the following morning with a single hostage held in front of him at gunpoint.

Instantly the hostage taker was shot in the head twice, and the incident came to a close with all hostages safe and all monies recovered.

Although it had a first-class special agent force, the CID district was unprepared for such an eventuality. The district had no plan or standing operating procedure devised, and had only limited district-initiated training.

Dateline: Today

The U.S. Army has made significant strides in its capability to confront and handle situations such as the one cited. Not the least of which is the publishing of an Army regulation that provides authority and responsibility for concerned personnel who may find themselves in similar situations.

Army Regulation 190-58, *Personal Security*, states that the installation commander will maintain contingency plans for response to hostage situations and that hostage negotiations will be identified and designated in contingency plans.

The regulation also provides training requirements that must be met by organizations concerned. It does not require that installation commanders utilize CID special agents as the sole point of contact available to that command between the hostage taker and itself.

Commanders may elect to use USACIDC (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command) hostage negotiators or other personnel who have successfully completed the USAMPS Hostage Negotiation Course or other basic hostage negotiator courses consisting of at least eighty training hours. However, CID agents are trained to operate within the legal restrictions involved in hostage situations.

A Basic Hostage Negotiations Course and a Hostage Negotiations Refresher Course are taught at USAMPS. The basic course, which is two weeks long, provides the essential information needed to insure successful mission accomplishment in a hostage situation.

A hands-on course, it emphasizes role playing and practice of negotiations techniques. It has been accredited for undergraduate college credit, and graduate credit can be secured through completion of extra assignments.

The prerequisite for attending the course is having an assignment with responsibility in hostage-negotiation duties. Soldiers in CMF 95 who meet this condition may attend the basic course.

The prerequisite for the 3-day Hostage Negotiations Refresher Course is completion of a negotiations course of at least eighty hours. Basic courses other than the USAMPS basic course meet the requirement for attendance at the USAMPS refresher course. The USACIDC requires that negotiators receive refresher training every four calendar years.

The USAMPS course catalog provides the course dates and information needed to secure quotas. For additional information contact the course manager, Special Operations Branch, USAMPS, telephone (205) 848-5138/5388 or AUTOVON 865-5138/5388. *(Sergeant First Class David Johnson, Special Operations Branch, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL.)*

Accepting the NCO Challenge

Sergeant Major Marcelino Malavet, Jr.

Do times make persons or is it persons who make times? Were historical figures hopelessly caught in a whirlwind of events that brought them to the center stage of history? Or did they play an active hand influencing conditions that changed the course of history? One can present strong arguments to substantiate either of these premises.

Army NCOs can well ask themselves: Which of these claims apply to my military career? To be sure, there is no analogy between the above statement and your career unless you believe that without your active participation the system will automatically hand you a successful military career.

Choosing the Army as a career is accepting the challenge to be all you can be. A necessary first step toward that goal is to become deeply and personally involved with your career development. This means a constant search for individual professional growth by tackling a variety of assignments with increasing levels of responsibility.

It's no secret that soldiers who do well performing tough, high-risk, and demanding jobs have demonstrated promotion potential, and this fact is presented to the members of promotion selection boards who review records for promotion.

Career management field 95 (CMF 95--Military Police) contains three military occupational specialties --military police (MOS 95B), corrections NCO (MOS 95C), and CID special agent (MOS 95D). CMF 95 offers soldiers a wide range of challenging and rewarding assignment opportunities. The tables shown list many of the professional opportunities associated with the three military police MOSs.

Although in many cases individual soldiers have limited control over the assignments they might receive, there are means available for soldiers to let personnel managers know

their assignment preferences. Career assignments are not made by insensitive computers programmed to fill requirements; people make assignments.

Consistent with the Army's needs, attempts are made to assign soldiers to an area of preference. Army Regulation 614-200, *Enlisted Personnel Selection, Training, and Assignment System*: Grades E-1 through E-9, states that the primary goal of the enlisted distribution assignment system (EDAS) is meeting the Army's personnel requirements.

The following are the secondary goals of EDAS:

- Equalize desirable and undesirable assignments by reassigning the most eligible soldiers from among those of like MOS and grade;
- Meet the personal desires of soldiers; and
- Assign soldiers to positions offering the greatest opportunities for professional development and promotion advancement.

Human factors weigh heavily on the assignment system. Reclassifications, compassionate reassignments, early outs, UCMJ (Uniform Code of Military Justice) actions, sickness and death, tour curtailments and extensions, medical profiles, deferments, deletions, stabilizations and promotions can all impact suddenly on the assignment process.

The regulation further states that the equity, efficiency and responsiveness of the entire assignment process depend on the accuracy of information describing both the requirement and the soldier being reassigned.

Data in the personnel assignment system must be accurate. Nearly every soldier, from the company clerk to the

ENLISTED CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD 95 (MOS 95B)

YRS OF SV	RANK	ASSIGNMENT OPPORTUNITIES	NCO EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM (NCOES)	OTHER COURSES AVAILABLE
30 20	Command Sergeant Major (CSM) or Sergeant Major (SGM)	Battalion and Higher CSM Operations Sergeant Staff Assignment Instructor USAR Advisor	Resident SGM Academy U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA)	Battle Staff NCO (USASMA)
19 17	First Sergeant (1SG) or Master Sergeant (MSG)	Company 1st Sergeant Operations Sergeant Staff Assignment Instructor Provost NCO	Resident SGM Academy (USASMA) Non-Resident SGM Academy	First Sergeant NCO
16 10	Sergeant First Class (SFC)	Platoon Sergeant MP Investigator Supervisor Physical Security Sergeant Operations Sergeant Patrol Supervisor Detachment Sergeant Provost Sergeant Section Sergeant Instructor Drill Sergeant	Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC)	Physical Security MP Investigations Instructor Training
9 6	Staff Sergeant (SSG)	Squad Leader Desk Sergeant MP Investigator Physical Security Inspector Crime Prevention NCO Drill Sergeant Instructor Recruiter	Basic NCO Course (BNCOC)	Drill Sergeant School Traffic Accident Investigation Detector Dog Handler Master Fitness Protective Service Instructor Training
5 4	Sergeant (SGT)	MP Team Leader MP Investigator	Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)	Special Reaction Team
3 2 1 0	Specialist (SPC) Corporal (CPL) Private First Class (PFC) Private (PVT)	MP Investigator Patrol Dog Handler Radio Operator Traffic Accident Investigation	Junior Leadership Course	Traffic Accident Investigation Patrol Dog Handler MP One Station Unit Training (OSUT)

ENLISTED CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD 95 (MOS 95D)

YRS OF SV	RANK	ASSIGNMENT OPPORTUNITIES	NCO EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM (NCOES)	OTHER COURSES AVAILABLE
30 20	Command Sergeant Major (CSM) or Sergeant Major (SGM)	Region CSM Senior Staff NCO	Resident SGM Academy U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA)	Operations and Intelligence NCO (USASMA) FBI Academy Scenes of Crime (Scotland Yard)
19 17	First Sergeant (1SG) or Master Sergeant (MSG)	First Sergeant Chief, Investigative Support	Resident SGM Academy (USASMA)	First Sergeant Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Law Enforcement
16 10	Sergeant First Class (SFC)	CID Special Agent Chief, Investigative Support Evidence Custodian	Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC)	Economic Crime Investigation Hostage Negotiations
6-9	Staff Sergeant (SSG)	CID Special Agent	Basic NCO Course (BNCOC)	Master Fitness Protective Service
4-5	Sergeant (SGT)	CID Special Agent		Apprentice CID Special Agent
3 0	Accession into MOS 95D is IAW AR 195-3		Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC)	

ENLISTED CAREER MANAGEMENT FIELD 95 (MOS 95C)

YRS OF SV	RANK	ASSIGNMENT OPPORTUNITIES	NCO EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM (NCOES)	OTHER COURSES AVAILABLE
30 20	Command Sergeant Major (CSM) or Sergeant Major (SGM)	Battalion and Higher CSM Operations Sergeant Senior Corrections NCO Staff Assignment	Resident SGM Academy U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy (USASMA)	Battle Staff NCO (USASMA)
19 17	First Sergeant (1SG) or Master Sergeant (MSG)	Company 1SG Operations Sergeant Senior Corrections NCO Staff Assignment Instructor	Resident SGM Academy (USASMA) Non-Resident SGM Acaemy(USASMA)	First Sergeant Course Battle Staff NCO
16 10	Sergeant First Class (SFC)	Platoon Sergeant Senior Corrections NCO Drill Sergeant Instructor Staff Assignment	Advanced NCO Course (ANCOC)	
9 6	Staff Sergeant (SSG)	Squad Leader Corrections NCO Drill Sergeant Recruiter	Basic NCO Course (BNCOC)	Drill Sergeant School Master Fitness Course
4-5	Sergeant (SGT)	Corrections NCO		Corrections NCO Course
0-3	MOS 95B is feeder MOS for MOS 95C			

highest level commander, is in some way directly responsible for reporting, recording and transmitting these data.

Each soldier should regularly be able to answer basic career questions. Are my records accurate? Is my CONUS and overseas area of preference meshed with my career desires and professional development needs? When was the last time I was assigned in my ASI? Is my ASI (additional skill identifier)still valid?

Most ASIs associated with CMF 95 are to be withdrawn if not worked in for four or more years. It is essential to maintain records accurately and clean up clutter that can easily create glitches in assignments.

Soldiers have considerable influence on their career progression. Challenging professional opportunities can be found at all Army installations. That next appointment with the Command Sergeant Major to "look for a job" can turn into an opportunity for a "person to make the times" and change the course of personal career history.



Sergeant Major Marcelino Malavet, Jr. was the Proponency Sergeant Major, Branch Proponency Office, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Al at the time the article was written.

Army Implementation of the Self-Development Test

The Chief of Staff of the Army has ordered implementation of the self-development test (SDT) program. Only skill levels 2, 3, and 4 will take the SDT. Skill level 1 soldiers took their last skill qualification test before October 1, 1990. The SDT contains one hundred questions given during a 2-hour test period and is divided into three sections:

Leadership. Twenty questions drawn from FM 22-100, FM 22-101, and FM 22-102 developed by the Center for Army Leadership.

Training. Twenty questions drawn from FM 25-101 developed by the Sergeant Major Academy.

MOS Specific. Sixty questions developed by proponent schools from soldiers manuals and references.

The SDT for the Regular Army will start in FY 92 (1 Oct 91) and for the Reserve Component will start in FY 93 (1 Oct 92); SQTs will be given until these dates. The following chart shows when each MOS and component takes SQT or SDT tests.

The Chief of Staff has stated once again that preparation for the self-development test will be the responsibility of the individual NCO, not the unit. The SDT will definitely be linked to the Enlisted Personnel Management System by Department of the Army.

Although there are plans to print enough copies of the references for the training and leadership sections, soldiers should make all attempts to read and make pertinent notes from those references. In fairness to all, hoarding of the references is discouraged.

	REGUALR ARMY		RESERVE COMPONENT	
MOS	TEST TYPE	TEST DATES	TEST TYPE	TEST DATES
95C	SQT	1 Oct 90-31 Dec 90	SQT	1 Oct 90-30 Sep 91
95D	SQT	1 Jan 91-31 Mar 91	SQT	1 Jan 91-31 Dec 91
95B	SQT	1 Apr 91-30 Jun 91	SQT	1 Apr 91-31 Mar 92
95C	SDT	1 Oct 91-31 Dec 91	SQT	1 Oct 91-30 Sep 92
95D	SDT	1 Jan 92-31 Mar 92	SQT	1 Jan 92-31 Dec 92
95B	SDT	1 Apr 92-30 Jun 92	SQT	1 Apr 92-31 Mar 93
95C	SDT	1 Oct 92-31 Dec 92	SDT	1 Oct 92-30 Sep 93
95D	SDT	1 Jan 93-31 Mar 93	SDT	1 Jan 93-31 Dec 93
95B	SDT	1 Apr 93-30 Jun 93	SDT	1 Apr 93-31 Mar 94

Our reliance is in the love of liberty which God has planted in us. Our defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands everywhere. Destroy this spirit, and you have planted the seeds of despotism at your doors.

Abraham Lincoln
(Speech at Edwardsville, Ill. 1858)

Battle Proficiency and Leadership Skills

The NCO Education System (NCOES) is being changed to ensure that combat support and combat service support soldiers become as battle proficient as those in combat arms.

Battlefields of the future will not have set front and rear areas. Administrative NCOs must know how to lead and perform in combat situations.

Including combat leader skills is just one change in store for NCOES. The primary leadership development course (PLDC), basic NCO course (BNCOC) and advanced NCO course (ANCOC) for each military occupational specialty, including the military police, soon will contain elements that reflect a new approach to training NCOs.

The changes to the NCOES were initiated in early 1989 after a review of basic NCO courses. The review indicated that NCOs were not being trained in all the skills and knowledges they required. Improvements were also needed in PLDC and the advanced NCO course.

Training has to be administered in a progressive and sequential approach. A soldier must learn the basics of any task before he can lead others.

With marksmanship, for example, at skill level one a soldier is trained to fire his weapon and to handle it safely. At skill level two he is trained to coach the use of the weapon and weapons safety. At skill level three he trains and supervises coaches, conducts marksmanship training, and oversees range safety. At skill level four he plans and supervises marksmanship training and conducts and supervises range operations.

Marksmanship training will become part of every NCOES course. Both BNCOC and ANCOC students will have to shoot qualifying scores to graduate because if soldiers can't do it, they can't teach it. Training the skills NCOs need to conduct unit physical training will also be included in every NCOES course.

Small group instruction will become standard in all courses. A small group consists of eight to sixteen students and a leader. In addition, students will be given teaching assignments during the course.

Shared field training exercises will become a fixture in BNCOC and advanced individual training courses (AIT). During the field training exercise BNCOC students will supervise AIT students in a realistic field scenario.

TRADOC NCOES includes standardizing the content of the officer basic course and ANCOC for each military occupational specialty. These courses produce the platoon leaders and platoon sergeants. The lieutenant and the sergeant need to know how to work together to run a platoon effectively.

A key part of the NCOES model is train-the-trainer instruction.

The objective of NCOES is to produce noncommissioned officers who will support and help develop the unit's training plan based on its mission essential task list; but if a unit does not continue the NCO's training by assigning him duties and responsibilities the school has prepared him for, those skills and knowledges will soon be lost.

(TRADOC News Service)

Detector Dog Handler Additional Skill Identifiers

Last year the Air Force consolidated the two courses leading to award of military police ASI P7 (narcotics detector dog handler) and ASI Z6 (explosive detector dog handler). Technically this change invalidated ASIs P7 and Z6 because there is no longer a course aligned with these specific ASIs, and two ASIs cannot be awarded as a result of attending one course.

Creating a new ASI was considered, which would solve only part of the problem, leaving two dog handler ASIs technically in limbo. In order to correct this disconnect, the U.S. Army Military Police School at Fort McClellan, Alabama proposed elimination of ASI P7 and expansion of ASI Z6 to encompass both narcotics- and explosive-detector dog handler skills.

Employment of dual-trained soldiers will be determined by the soldier's grade. Handlers of dogs required to detect narcotics drugs will continue to be authorized in the rank of sergeant. Handlers of dogs possessing the more sensitive skills of explosive detection are staff sergeants.

As an interim measure, soldiers holding ASI P7 will be identified with ASI Y2 (transition). These soldiers can be assigned to Z6 positions requiring only drug-detector-dog handling skills. ASI Y2 will be withdrawn following completion of detector-dog-handler training at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas and award of ASI Z6.

This proposal assumes that soldiers currently in the more demanding ASI Z6 hold staff sergeant rank, have previously been awarded ASI P7, or will not be assigned to detector-dog-handling positions required at a lesser grade.

If approved, this administrative change will not require personnel actions by soldiers in these ASIs.

Comments on the Military Police Code Of Ethics

Sergeant Major O.C. Barclay

The key to understanding what should be expected of military police can be found in the wording of the military police code of ethics. Probably the most important idea is contained in the very first sentence: *I am a Soldier in the United States Army*

Too often MPs lose sight of the fact that they are first and foremost soldiers. What can be called a deputy-sheriff mentality still exists in much of the MP Corps. Although law enforcement is one of the missions of the military police, it is far from being the primary mission. More emphasis at all levels of command needs to be placed on the combat and combat support training of the Corps. Wars are not won through law enforcement.

I am of the troops and for the troops. This second ethic from the code is also one that needs to be stressed more to young MPs. Too often MPs forget that the majority of the people they deal with are their fellow soldiers and should be treated accordingly. How to go about this is highlighted in the fifth ethic: *I will assist and protect my fellow soldiers in a manner that is fair, courteous, and impartial.*

Allegiance to country, devotion to duty, integrity, loyalty, and honesty are principles that pertain to all practitioners of the profession of arms, but especially to the military police, who are constantly in the public eye. The MP must set the example within a command, along with the officers and NCOs, of what is the expected standard.

Often the MP is the first soldier seen upon arriving on an installation and the last soldier seen when leaving. It is often said that the first and last impressions are the most enduring. For this reason it is essential that MPs maintain the highest of standards. This idea is stressed by the sixth ethic: *I will promote, by personal example, the highest standards of soldiering, stressing performance and professionalism.*

In summary, if all military police stationed around the world would strive for professional excellence through adherence to the seven basic tenets contained within the code, they will be well on the way to having the elite, professional Military Police Corps toward which all strive.

For these reasons leaders should take every possible opportunity to increase the understanding of, and adherence, to the spirit of the military police code of ethics.



Of the Troops and for the Troops

The Military Police Code of Ethics

I am a Soldier in the United States Army.
I am of the Troops and for the Troops.
I hold Allegiance to my Country and Devotion to Duty above All Else.
I Proudly Recognize my Obligation to Perform my Duty with Integrity, Loyalty, and Honesty.
I will Assist and Protect my Fellow Soldiers in a Manner that is Fair, Courteous, and Impartial.
I will Promote, by Personal Example, the Highest Standards of Soldiering, Stressing Performance and Professionalism.
I will Strive to Merit the Respect of Others, Seeking No Favor because of Position but, Instead, the Satisfaction of a Mission Accomplished and a Job Well Done.

Sergeant Major O. C. Barclay was assigned as Sergeant Major, Department of Basic Military Police Training, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written.

Accuracy of Officer Record Brief

The Officer Record Brief (ORB)--perhaps the most frequently used portion of your official file--provides a snapshot of your career experience, education, and skills and is used by promotion boards, career managers, and commanders to make critical decisions on promotions, assignments, and training.

It is imperative that each officer be able to interpret the ORB to ensure it accurately portrays their career. At a minimum, review and correct your ORB at your local military personnel office (MILPO) annually with particular attention to the following items:

PDOR (permanent date of rank). This is the date of rank in the Regular Army or USAR permanent grade to which the officer has been appointed.

TDOR (temporary date of rank). This is the date of entry on active duty or adjusted date for noncontinuous duty. Total active federal service (AFS) is computed from this date.

PULHES (physical profile serial code [numerical]). This entry includes physical profile data and the date of your last physical exam.

Height/weight. This data is taken from the physical exam and is frequently compared to OER (officer evaluation report) data. Ensure the entry is accurate and consistent with that on the most recent OER.

Mailing address. Frequently used as the primary means of communication from HQDA, this information must be current, including zip code. This is usually your civilian home address but may be your unit address, if preferred, if assigned overseas.

Military education. Ensure that all military schools satisfactorily completed are listed. It never hurts to send your career manager a copy of your academic efficiency report, diploma, or certificate of completion for schools. Also ensure that you are not credited with completion of schools not attended or from which you were withdrawn.

MEL (military education level). A single letter code indicates the highest level of military schooling. Ensure this code is accurate. An error may cause you to be overlooked for a training opportunity or to be ineligible for some board selections.

Civilian education. Civilian schools and degrees attained must be listed. Civilian schools attended without award of a specific degree may also be listed to show progress toward the goal of attaining an associate's degree.

CEL (civilian education level). A single numeric code indicates the highest level of civilian education attained: 8, high school graduate or GED; 7, less than two years college (60 semester hours or equivalent); 6, two or more years of college or an associate's degree; 5, baccalaureate degree; 4, one or more years postgraduate; 2, master's degree; 1, PhD. Promotion boards pay particular attention to this entry.

Awards and decorations. This section should contain only authorized awards, decorations, tabs, and badges and is frequently cross-referenced with official photo and orders in the official file. Ensure entries are complete, accurate and consistent with your photo and orders when required.

Assignment history. This information is input from the MILPO and should be reviewed for accuracy of dates, organizations, and duty titles. These entries can depict depth and breadth of experience, time spent in various assignments, supervisory positions, etc.

Date last photo. This is the date of the last photo. It confirms receipt of the last photo you sent and should be current within five years. You are authorized to request a new photo upon promotion or when you are scheduled for review by a selection board.

CONUS or OCONUS area preferences. This information reflects your most recent preference statement and provides a ready reference for assignment decisions. If no preference is indicated, it may be interpreted as apathy.

Your ORB is you on a single page. It is the first place your career manager or commander looks for information about you. The items highlighted above are of particular importance, but not all encompassing. Refer to the appropriate regulations for detailed information regarding ORB entries and codes. (Warrant Officer News, *January-March, 1990)*

Selection Board Procedures

Selection boards convened at Headquarters, Department of the Army follow guidance provided in a memorandum of instruction (MOI) issued by the Secretary of the Army.

Additionally, the board is briefed by a representative of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, who highlights specific areas of the MOI.

Representatives of the commander, PERSCOM (Personnel Command), brief the board on such topics as demographics of the population being considered, the officer evaluation system, and the officer system of management.

Information and Documents

The board is provided the following information and documents:

- The names of all officers to be considered,
- The performance portion of the official military personnel file (OMPF) microfiche, including authorized hard copy documents not yet filmed,
- The Officer Record Brief,
- The official photo in hard copy,
- The service portion of the OMPF microfiche when requested by the board, and
- The restricted portion of the OMPF microfiche when approved by the proper authority.

Officers in the zone of consideration may write to the board in order to provide documents or other information pertaining to themselves that they consider important to their consideration.

The ORB provided the board is forwarded to military personnel offices (MILPOs) for the officer's personal review and signature approximately sixty days prior to the convene date.

You may obtain a copy of your OMPF microfiche at no cost by writing Cdr, PERSCOM, ATTN: TAPC-MSR-S (Selection Board Processing Unit), 200 Stovall St., Alexandria, VA 22332-0444. Include your social security number and current mailing address in your request.

Selection Process

Board composition is dependent on the type of board. If an other than Regular Army (OTRA) officer is being considered, at least one member of the board must be OTRA.

Phase I. The board determines those fully qualified in and above the zone. Independent panels consider and evaluate the entire record on each officer. Each board member votes and awards a numeric score to assess each officer's promotion potential.

Each panel rank orders records sequentially by relative score standing, and the board then merges panel scores to produce a single relative score standing of all officers in and above the promotion zone.

Phase II. Warrant officer promotion boards identify potential below-the-zone selectees. In this phase each panel screens the files of officers eligible for consideration from below the zone.

Regular Army promotion boards are conducted in a similar fashion except that there is no below-the-zone opportunity provided by law nor are warrant officer board members permitted. Proposed legislation would eliminate these differences under the single promotion system.

Files of officers receiving a majority of yes votes during this screening are then voted by each panel member and awarded a numeric score.

The panel scores are then merged to produce a relative standing list of officers eligible from below the zone. This list is again integrated into the relative standing list created in phase I.

Phase III. Next, the board determines those best qualified for promotion. In this phase the list is arranged and reviewed in separate relative standing lists for each MOS.

Once the review is complete, the board uses the overall relative standing list from phase II to tentatively identify those who are considered best qualified for promotion to meet the needs of the Army.

At the conclusion of its deliberations the board conducts a formal vote to ensure that no officer is recommended for promotion unless they receive the recommendation of a majority of the members of the board. (Warrant Officer News, *January - March 1990.*)

The Master Warrant Officer Program

The Army's move to implement recommendations and proposals generated by total warrant officer study (TWOS) also affected the warrant officer education system.


The new concept for the system eliminates the military occupational specialty specific Warrant Officer Advanced Course and the branch immaterial Warrant Senior Course. A new course for technical and tactical certification of warrant officer candidates is now required before soldiers can be appointed as WO1.

At present CW2(P)s attend a military occupational specialty specific warrant officer senior course. Selected CW4s attend the Master Warrant Officer Training Course before they can be promoted to MWO4.

United States Army Criminal Investigations Command (USACIDC), Falls Church, Virginia has nineteen positions identified and authorized for MWO4. There are four other positions for this grade with a military occupational specialty of 311A. Three of these positions are at the U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama and one is at the Personnel Command in Alexandria, Virginia.

The rank of MWO4 does not equate to CWO5, the proposed rank and pay grade pending legislation before congress. Even if the new rank is approved, individuals who hold the rank of MWO4 will have to be selected by a Department of the Army promotion board to the rank and grade of CWO5. There is no automatic selection and transition to CWO5.

If congress approves the CWO5 rank and grade, the Army will stop selecting and promoting soldiers to the rank of MWO. Individuals holding the rank of MWO4 will continue to hold that rank until they are promoted to CWO5 or until they retire from active service. (The Detective, *Winter 1989, U.S. Army Criminal Investigations Command, Falls Church, VA.*)



TO: Readers
FROM: Editor

50th Anniversary

The year 1991 marks the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps. All over the world MP soldiers will hold special events to celebrate the milestone; they will be joined by other branches of the service, DA civilians, family, and friends.

Today military police soldiers serve the nation at home and in distant areas of the world from Saudi Arabia to Alaska, Panama, Korea, Germany, South America, *etc*. Special anniversary events will indeed occur in a wide variety of climates and terrain.

New Technology

This issue of *MILITARY POLICE* is the first to be produced using desktop publishing equipment. From now on, all stages of production up to the final printing will be done at USAMPS. New computer equipment was installed in Publications Division recently, and designers here are now preparing the layout and camera-ready materials. This first attempt has been a learning experience, but well worth the effort in achieving considerable reductions in printing costs.

COMMANDANT'S INVITATION

50th Military Police Corps Anniversary

In commemoration of the 50th Military Police Corps anniversary, the Commandant invites battalion and brigade commanders to bring their colors and participate in the regimental parade being held at Fort McClellan, Alabama on September 27, 1991.

Interested units should contact the USAMPS POC, telephone AUTOVON 865-3717/3509 or commercial (205) 848-3717/3509.

SUBSCRIBE TO MILITARY POLICE TODAY

To order a new subscription. Please use the subscription form. Cost of a subscription is $5.00 (domestic and APO) or $6.25 (foreign). Single copies can be obtained for $2.50 (single copy domestic) or $3.13 (single copy foreign).

To renew your subscription. To keep subscription prices down, the Government Printing Office mails each subscriber only one renewal notice. To be sure that your service continues without interruption, please return your renewal notice promptly. If your subscription service is discontinued, simply send your mailing label from any issue to the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C. 20402-9372 with the proper remittance and your service will be reinstated.

To change your address. Please send your mailing label, along with your new address to the Superintendent of Documents; Attn: Chief, Mail List Branch; Mail Stop: SSOM; Washington, D.C. 20402-9373.

To inquire about your subscription service. Please send your mailing label, along with your correspondence, to the Superintendent of Documents; Attn: Chief, Mail List Branch; Mail Stop: SOM; Washington, D.C. 20402-9375.



Superintendent of Documents Subscriptions Order Form

Processing Code
6214

Charge your order. It's easy! MasterCard VISA CHOICE

] **YES,** please send me ____ subscriptions to **MILITARY POLICE** at $5.00 each subscription per year.

The total cost of my order is $_____. All prices include regular domestic postage and handling and are subject to change. International customers (except APO/FPO) please add 25%.

ease Type or Print

_____
(Company or personal name)

_____
(Additional address/attention line)

_____
(Street address)

_____
(City, State, ZIP Code or APO/FPO)

(_____)
_____
(Daytime phone including area code)

3. Please choose method of payment:

☐ Check payable to the Superintendent of Documents

☐ GPO Deposit Account ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐-☐

☐ VISA, CHOICE or MasterCard Account

☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐

_____
(Credit card expiration date)

Thank you for your order!

_____
(Signature)

12/90

Mail To: Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402-9371

MP COLONEL COMMAND
BRIGADE LEVEL COMMAND DESIGNATES UNITS
AS OF 1 AUGUST 1990

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
William L. Hart	Donald A. Hood	UASDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
James T. Rackstraw	Jean L. Huet	Trng Bde	Ft McClellan, AL
Gregory M. Dunn	Vincent A. Shenosky	USACB	Ft Riley, KS
Floyd J. Davis	Thomas Davis	8th MP Bde	Seoul, Korea
Lawrence Brede, Jr.	Devone Kinston, Jr.	16th MP Bde (Abn)	Ft Bragg, NC
Alexander P. Sowa	Thomas Harris, Jr.	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Lucious E. Delk	James L. Armour	18th MP Bde	Frankfurt, GE
Richard Pomager	Curtis E. Thomas	14th MP Bde	Stuttgart, GE
George Powers	Terrance M. Seely, Sr.	42d MP Group	Mannheim, GE
Ernest H. Dinkel	Horst G. Lindenberg	1st CID Rgn	Ft Meade, MD
Robert Taylor	Thomas Smith	2d CID Rgn	Heidelberg, GE
Roy L. Nicholson	William G. Hileman	3d CID Rgn	Ft Gillem, GA
Carl L. Lockett	Billy Vaughn	6th CID Rgn	Presidio of SF, CA
Wilmer D. Snell	Herman L. Deavers	7th CID Rgn	Yongsan, Korea

MP LIEUTENANT COLONEL COMMAND
BATTALION LEVEL COMMAND DESIGNATES UNITS
AS OF 1 AUGUST 1990

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Donald J. Ryder	Michael Brandstetter	93d MP Bn	Frankfurt, GE
James L. Saunders	Joseph Cruz	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
Herbert H. Tillery	James D. Ralls	385th MP Bn	Stuttgart, GE
Michael L. Sullivan	Charles E. Joas	503d MP Bn (Abn)	Ft Bragg, NC
Richard R. Majauskas	Roselle Robinson	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Michael K. Shanahan	James F. Slusser	519th MP Bn	Ft Meade, MD
N. Wayne Ruthven	Carl L. Kreiger	709th MP Bn	Frankfurt, GE
Jean F. Burleson	David W. Stalter	716th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Stephen J. Curry	Gary N. Travis	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Jon F. Bilbo	Chester Warlick	728th MP Bn	Taegu, Korea
Mary A. Maier	Forest Guess	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Michael A. Pearson	Bobby L. Henry	793d MP Bn	Fuerth, GE
Robert W. Neubert	Michael L. Davis	795th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Jonathan H. Cofer	Morgan H. Merrill	787th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Larry M. Forster	Ellis C. Monk	701st MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
George Abraham	Richard M. Thrasher	772d MP Bn	Seoul, Korea
Joel Dickson	Thomas K. Lorenzini	97th MP Bn (USACF)	Mannheim, GE
Vicki S. Longenecker	Burt F. Arthur	2d Bn, USACB	Ft Riley, KS
Charles W. Cox, III	David W. Keller	3d Bn, USACB	Ft Riley, KS
Marvin L. Nickels	Steve Plimmer	MP Bn, USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Arnold W. Carter	Michael O'Brien	LEC	Ft Campbell, KY
Bruce R. Conover	Ben Pineda	IDF	Ft Lewis, WA
David B. Vaughn	Roland M. Jackson	CID District	Stuttgart, GE
Walter L. Chalkley	John L. Smith	CID District	Frankfurt, GE
Mark F. Foelker	Troy Richards	CID District	Kaiserslautern, GE
George J. Kinoshita, Jr.	John M. Dunaway	CID District	Ft Bragg, NC
Joseph M. Tyo	Martin Travers	CID District	Ft Hood, TX
Daniel J. Lynch	Eugene C. Gonzales	CID District	Ft Lewis, WA

Military Police Creed

I am a soldier and proud member of the United States Army Military Police Corps Regiment. I am Of the Troops and For the Troops. I believe there is no higher calling than to ASSIST, PROTECT, and DEFEND my fellow soldiers, their families, and the basic ideals of our Constitution that guarantee our freedom and our American way of life. I am always ready to help individual soldiers retain or regain their dignity. I assist commanders in performing their missions, safeguarding their commands, and maintaining discipline, law and order. I am proud of the Military Police Corps Regiment and fully understand the awesome responsibility given to all military police soldiers. At the same time, I am humble because I know that I am a servant of my country and my Army. To perform my duties properly, my honesty, integrity, and courage must be balanced by competence, alertness, and courtesy. I know I am constantly in the public eye and my behavior sets the standards of excellence for my fellow soldiers. To my unit, my commander, and myself, I promise sustained, just and honorable support. To my country, the Army, and my Regiment, I promise the skills of my training, my physical ability, my mental initiative, and my moral courage, for I am a soldier in the

MILITARY POLICE CORPS REGIMENT!

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

BULK RATE
Postage & Fees Paid
GPO
Permit No. G26

Official Business

PIN:045828-000