
MILITARY POLICE



Military Police Corps' 50th Year
PRESENTATION OF COLORS

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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


ABOUT THE COVER

Presentation of the Colors is that special moment during military ceremonies—that special point in time when soldiers honor their nation's flag. This year marked the fiftieth year that MP soldiers have done so as members of the U.S. Army Military Police Corps.

Commandant's Notes

Major General Charles A. Hines





Now that we have put the celebrations of the 50th Anniversary of our Military Police Corps behind us, it is time to look to the future challenges facing the Corps. The challenges we face are many.

It is easy to stay preoccupied with simple survival, whether of the Corps' continuation as a key player in combat support and contingency missions, or of our personal careers when facing a downsized and restructured Army in the next few years. While important, however, survival alone cannot be our primary concern.

We need to maintain a sense of urgency about our day-to-day military police business. We cannot afford to be complaisant about what we accomplished in the past, but must continue to look for even better ways to support Army missions and to protect our Army family. This sense of urgency compels us to take action now, to act on our responsibilities rather than react and to think rather than repeat routine.

Through thinking MPs who choose to act, crime prevention programs no longer merely deter criminals with fences and locks; the programs include activities to educate our youth and to prevent them from choosing crime. Counterdrug operations begin in the families and schools with education, not out on the streets with apprehensions.

Our combat support missions demanded the same sense of urgency. In the past ten years we rescued American students in Grenada, restored law and order following Hurricane Hugo in St. Croix, and helped to secure our nation's treaty rights in Panama. We helped guard the demilitarized zone in Korea and maintained our security mission with sensitivity in the face of upheavals in Germany. We assisted nation-building efforts in Honduras and supported Operation Desert Storm by providing security, traffic control, reconnaissance and EPW operations.

Our ability to perform all these missions and more, as the Army continues to respond to contingencies worldwide, is based in preparation and training by leaders with that essential sense of urgency about our military police business.

Nowhere is this sense of urgency more important than in our junior officers and noncommissioned officers--the first-line leaders within the Corps. These men and women set the pace for what we do and what we fail to do. They train and supervise MP soldiers, enforce MP standards, encourage initiative and get the job done.


These junior leaders need support with training, professional development opportunities and mentoring. This is where our personal sense of urgency about military police business sets an unmistakable example. It is an example we cannot afford to ignore—it is too urgent.



Charles A. Hines
Major General, USA
Commandant

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

CSM David W. Stalter





Our great Military Police Regiment has said farewell to a great soldier and friend, CSM Joshua Perry. No soldier is more deserving of the praise and admiration bestowed upon CSM Perry. He is an outstanding NCO and has set a standard for excellence and caring for soldiers that should be emulated by all. I know that all of us in the Regiment wish Josh and his wife, Mickey, the very best in all their future endeavors.

I am honored to have been selected to be your MP regimental command sergeant major. My selection is really attributed to all the great young soldiers and NCOs who have served with me in the past. Success in my tenure as the Regiment CSM will be possible only with the support of all our soldiers and NCOs in the Regiment today.

I have always felt that the *team's* victory is more important than success of a team member. Prominent MP units become successful because of the selfless service and sacrifice of the soldiers and NCOs who work to make their unit the best. I shall always remember that I am *Of the Troops, for the Troops.*

In this first article I must reflect back on the great success of our military police soldiers during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The ability of our soldiers to go the distance under tough conditions and tremendous stress was never in doubt. Noncommissioned officers demanding excellence, enforcing standards, and caring for their soldiers were the real key to the success that we enjoyed.

All the hard work has been rewarded, and the distinguished reputation of the Military Police Corps has been further enhanced. Our soldiers who are still serving in Southwest Asia today continue to build on that reputation.

The pride in the great accomplishments of our military police soldiers during the Gulf War should not only be felt by the soldiers who served in the desert, but by every member of our MP Regiment and those great folks we call the family support group. I hope I speak for all my fellow soldiers who served with me in the Gulf War—our sincere thanks and gratitude for the tremendous support provided by soldiers and families who were left behind.

Rear detachment soldiers, wives, and family members got actively involved with unit family support groups. Their efforts gave peace of mind to the soldiers serving in the desert. Soldiers knew there was someone back home to lend a hand, lend an ear, or provide whatever assistance was needed by the family. Soldiers had to worry only about what was happening or going to happen in the sand, not about what might be going wrong back home.

Some family support groups were well established before the deployments for Desert Shield. Some had to be formed quickly and thrown into action on short notice. Now that the Gulf War is over, we can't let our support groups become inactive. There will continue to be MP units that will make deployments, and even in peacetime soldiers and families will continue to have problems and need assistance from the MP family.

If we all stay involved with the family support group, they will only get better and be more prepared for those unforeseen deployments that may come in the future. Taking care of soldiers also means taking care of families. "I care" has to be a top priority for all of us in our MP Regiment.

Looking ahead, our noncommissioned officers must still focus on day-to-day training of our soldiers. Success in the past is no assurance of success in the future. With reductions that are coming in size of the force, only the very best NCOs will be around to train our soldiers in the Army. Quality, not quantity, will be the guide.

Training our soldiers to perform all tasks on the battlefield and to survive is what it's all about. Self-study to improve our performance as trainers is essential. An NCO can ill afford to have idle time on his or her hands. To be around in the Army of the future will require a total commitment to excellence on the part of every NCO in our Regiment.

Look and act every day as you would want a promotion board to see you. A true professional cannot look and act professional only *some* of the time--professionalism is measured by appearance, conduct, and performance *all* the time.

In closing, let me say that I look forward to the challenges ahead and working with all our true professionals. I pledge my total commitment and enthusiasm to the position of regimental command sergeant major. We are all part of the team and our future looks great. And for those of you who have served with me in the past, and for those who will get to know what this means in the future—*keep 'em high and tight.*

Living on the Edge in Korea

Second Lieutenant Stephen A. Laurance

The 2d Military Police Company, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Korea—the most forwardly deployed MP company in Korea—is located only about twenty kilometers from the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that has separated North and South Korea since the Korean War.

The company is made up of both United States and KATUSA (Korean Augmentation to the United States Army) soldiers. Organized into five line platoons, a headquarters platoon, and a provost marshal support platoon, three of its platoons are dedicated as direct-support platoons to the division's three maneuver brigades.

One platoon is responsible for the security of the division main and joint tactical operations center, and one platoon is responsible for the division enemy-prisoner-of-war collection point. In addition to their battlefield missions, the line platoons are responsible for all law enforcement activities on and around division installations.

MP Professionalism During a Violent Strike

Recently the company was committed to several significant activities.

The 2d Platoon was deployed for two weeks last November to handle a violent strike by the Korean security guards (KSGs). The site of the protest was CP Essayons near Uijongbu, a major Korean city. Prior to the arrival of the military police the KSGs had clashed with members of the installation, causing CP Essayons to request the MP support.

The military police were often outnumbered about six to one during the two-week period. Because of the limits of the installation boundaries, they could not disperse the crowd. The MP mission was to ensure that the daily operations of the installation were not affected and to keep intruders from entering the installation. The situation became violent several times during the two-week period as the KSGs attempted to force their way onto the installation.

The protesters blocked the access to the installation by setting up a human wall so that the MPs were forced to clear an area whenever vehicles entered or departed the installation. The only defense the MPs had against this was professionalism—as they were spit on, pelted with rocks and sticks, and verbally abused daily.

By the end of the two-week period there had been numerous attacks on the military police, several apprehensions of trespassers, and various reports of damaged government property; but the strikers dispersed. The MPs had successfully defended the division's personnel and property.



Combat Ready and Combat Effective

The company participates in numerous exercises throughout the year. It recently participated in Korea's first battle command training program and was instrumental in rear area security being rated as a strength for the division, proving MP value as a combat multiplier.

The company is preparing for another Team Spirit exercise, where it will complete the training and evaluation for the company. This training is focused on keeping the unit combat ready and combat effective.

In addition to the military police, there are also a number of personnel who support the company. One such person is Mr. Sop Om, who had been a part of the 2d MP family for twenty-five years before he retired on March 30.

Mr. Om, who is better known as Honcho, worked for the division resource and utilities section for thirty-five years. He had been the miracle worker the unit turned to when it needed anything built, fixed, painted, or refurbished. Mr. Om, who is a veteran of the Korean War, is a part of the 2d MP Company's history.

The company was affected by the stop-loss program, which caused all the soldiers in the unit to be extended indefinitely. These soldiers serve in an often forgotten corner of the world; many of them have already stayed well beyond their one-year hardship tour. They and their families have willingly made this sacrifice because they take great pride in the defense of this country.

At times the soldiers at Camp Casey wished they could have been deployed to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The answer for these soldiers is always the same: They are a necessary part of the peacekeeping force in Korea. The DMZ is a testament to the fact that the Korean War never really ended, but has lingered in the status of a cease-fire agreement.

The 2d MP Company would like to wish the rest of the Military Police Corps Regiment a Happy 50th Anniversary.

2d MP Company, Second to None.

Second Lieutenant Stephen A. Laurance was a Platoon Leader, 2d MP Company, 2d Infantry Division, Camp Casey, Korea at the time this article was written.

U.S. Forces Continue Peacekeeping Role

Thirty-eight years after the Korean War armistice U.S. troops still provide security as part of the United Nation peacekeeping force.

Korea has been divided since Japan left the peninsula at the end of World War II. North Korea invaded the south in mid-1950, and signed an armistice in July 1953. A demilitarized zone 151 miles long and 4,000 meters wide has separated the two Koreas at the 38th Parallel ever since.

The U.S. forces in Korea number almost 42,000 and represent all four military branches. South Korean forces total more than 600,000.

The north refuses to recognize the legitimacy of the south and adheres to a policy of unification on its own terms, by force if necessary. In the last ten years North Korea modernized and restructured its armed forces extensively. With more than one million members under arms, those forces present a considerable threat to the south. Over 60 percent of their forces are within 100 kilometers of the demilitarized zone.

The theater is unique in that the threat is so close and evident. There is a common understanding that there will be no time to prepare. The come-as-you-are warning available produces a command philosophy that makes readiness a nonnegotiable standard. *(SFC Linda Lee, USA, American Forces Information Service)*

Law Enforcement Activities Days

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Foster

For the third straight year over sixty federal, state and local law enforcement agencies competed against each other in unique police tasks designed to test their skills at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The competition tests the professional skills, tactics and physical stamina unique to the police profession; it covered ten events simultaneously over two consecutive days. There were over four hundred competitors this, the third, year of LEAD.

The law enforcement activity days (LEAD) was an attempt to evaluate Fort Dix military police against civilian police departments. For the fiftieth MP Corps anniversary the competition was designed to get all installation MPs involved, especially the ones pulling road duty.

Fort Dix MPs receive unique training rarely obtained in the military. Each MP attends at least eight days of training at the New Jersey State Police Academy, and specialized courses are taken at the Burlington County Police Academy. The MPs were good, but lacked confidence in their abilities.

Some civilian police agencies don't regard military police as professional. This misconception was shattered when the Fort Dix MPs won six first places and two seconds in stiff competition. Four military police units from other installations also did well.

A secondary benefit included establishing professional contacts and liaisons between police agencies. To solve crimes today law enforcement officers cannot isolate themselves. They must share information and work together. The LEAD epitomized the spirit of cooperation with state, federal and local departments from a seven-state area.

Events were sponsored and judged by Fort Dix military police and representatives from outside agencies including FBI, customs, IRS, Navy, Air Force, state police, and local police departments. Different events were sponsored by various police agencies, who also helped develop the scenarios. The events had to test police skills or ability to handle physical and mental demands placed on police.

SRT and Street Survival

For the special reaction team (SRT), or the similar civilian SWAT



SRT competition



Police iron-man competition

team, competition consisted of two phases. The first phase required each 5-man team to accomplish a physically demanding confidence course testing those skills necessary for SRT teams to get into different locations.

The second phase immediately followed the first, while the teams were still physically stressed. They were required to clear a building in an attempt to free hostages being held by terrorists, utilizing issue weapons and live fire.



SRT competition



SRT competition

It was a shoot-don't-shoot scenario with points for the fastest time and technique. The teams had to clear the building by shooting the terrorists, losing points for any hostages hit. They were judged on safety, time, tactics, and communications.

The street survival test consisted of two-man teams responding to a burglary in progress at a warehouse. They were graded on proper procedure and successful accomplishment in a programmed incident similar to one they might encounter on the road. A possible scenario might be the following:

As the patrol drove up, there was a woman in the vicinity of her car (the get-away driver). When the patrol entered the building carrying blank pistols, they were confronted by a man carrying a gun, coming at them in the dark. (He was the nightwatchman, who had been asleep until awakened by the incoming police; he had no idea a burglary was in progress.) Next the patrol had to find the burglar, who was hiding in the building.

Run, Swim, Shoot, Drive

The police iron-man contest consisted of a 5-kilometer run, followed by jumping into a swimming pool to rescue a drowning victim by swimming with him three laps. (The "drowning person" was an innertube with eighty pounds of rocks.)

After saving the victim, the competitors had to ride a bicycle six miles to a range and fire an M-16 rifle and a 9m pistol five rounds from each into different silhouettes. The fastest time, minus penalties for shots missed, won.

The evasive-driving course simulated a high-speed chase in the department's squad car. The event was judged on time and number of cones still standing.

A variety of other events tested police skills. The MWD (military working dog) competition tested the patrol dog and narcotics dog detection abilities. The sniper competition tested long-range accuracy. Competitors had to run one mile, drop and fire two rounds for zero. Run another 100 meters, climb a 12-foot scaffold and fire one head shot for score. Best times plus weapons accuracy won.

Other events included a police chief competition that required the chief or supervisor to shoot a M-16 rifle they had never handled before at downrange targets. The 5-kilometer run tested both teams and individuals. A weight-lifting competition was added.

The final event of the competition was the vehicle push in which a patrol officer and partner push a vehicle up a slight incline; the fastest time won.



K-9 competition

Entrance fees for LEAD paid for trophies and refreshments. One year the superintendent of the New Jersey State Police was guest speaker at a formal dinner and ball. Another year there was a picnic for participants and their families.

Results of LEAD

The results of the two days of grueling competitive events exceeded expectations. Police made valuable liaisons and were given the opportunity to test their skills against other professionals. They received realistic training not normally available and learned more about each other's work.

In a day when professional jealousy between police organizations can impede crime solving, these two days enhanced police unity – making it tougher for the criminal of tomorrow.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis J. Foster was the Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Dix, Fort Dix, NJ at the time this article was written.

Combined Arms Training Strategy

Major Ralph K. Ellison and Captain John M. Huey

The Army is developing a combined arms training strategy (CATS) that identifies training events, their frequency of occurrence and supporting resources. The strategy will enable the Army leadership to focus and manage all unit and institutional training in an integrated manner.

Upon implementation, CATS will support training integration of heavy, light, and special operations forces for both the active and reserve components. At the Army level it will allow senior leaders to justify resources based on how units train. At the unit level it will give commanders a recommended method for attaining their training goals.

The CATS resulted from guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) in December 1988. The CSA needed an efficient plan to chart the force training effort through the year 2007, a strategy that would optimize decreasing training resources and enable units and soldiers to train to standard. The plan could also serve as the justification for the FY 92-97 program objective memorandum for the budget and for future programming and planning documents.

To provide justification for force training, CATS had to portray unit and institutional training and associated resources in a succinct, standard format. Because the format is succinct, it can also function as a training management tool. Since the tasking by the CSA, the Training and Doctrine Com-

mand (TRADOC) developed a process for accomplishing both purposes through the development of unit and institutional strategies.

Impact on Training Programs

The CATS will not fundamentally change how units train. Instead it will provide an additional tool for commanders to use in managing their unit's training program. A unit's mission essential task list (METL) and an assessment of training will identify what needs to be trained.

The CATS will provide the commander a recommendation of *how often* and *with what* to train. It identifies the events, the frequency of occurrence and the resources needed to train the event for a particular type of unit. The identification of available training aids, devices, simulators and simulations (TADSS) gives the commander training alternatives.

As part of the CATS development process TRADOC developed a format to depict unit training strategies. The strategies for battalion and below have three major components: maneuver/collective, gunnery and soldier strategies.

The *maneuver/collective strategy* (figure 1) is intended to provide a set of recommended training frequencies for key collective training events in a unit and depict those resources that are required to support the training events (data based on the training event hierarchy in FM 25-100, *Training the Force* and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training).*

The *gunnery strategy* (figure 2) is built around weapon systems found in the unit. It is intended to provide an annual training plan and to depict resources required to support weapons training (data from the gunnery strategy is derived from the Standards and Training Commission [STRAC] manual, DA Pam 350-38, *Standards in Weapons Training*, or appropriate field manual publications).

The *soldier strategy* (figure 3) provides an annual plan for training and maintaining skills at the individual level and lists the resources required to train a soldier (based on data available in Army regulations and soldier training publications).

Elements of the Unit Training Strategy

Critical gates are training events that must be conducted to standard before moving on to a more dif-

TOE 19333L000 — Heavy Division Military Police Company
Manuever/ Collective Training Strategy

LEVELS		EVENTS															
		DRILL	MAPEX	TEWT	CELL/STF SEC TNG	TOCEX	STAFFEX	CPX	FCX	STX	LCX	CFX	DEPEX	FTX	EXEVAL CTC	JTX CTX	CSS CUST SPT OPS
Crew	AC	WKLY															
	RC	10															
Squad	AC																
	RC																
Sect/Div PM Staff	AC			2	WEEKLY	4	12	3		12							
	RC			1	4	2	2	1		2							
Platoon	AC																
	RC																
Company/ Troop	AC			4		4		4		12			4	2	1	1	
	RC			1		1		1		2			.25	1	.25	.25	
Battalion/ Squadron	AC																
	RC																
Critial Gates	AC																
	RC												MOB TNG	STX	FTX	FTX	
Resources (Base Vehicle: HMMWV)																	
OPTEMPO								80		200			20	500	500	500	
Ammunition										(1)				(1)	(1)	(1)	
TADSS		(2)					(4)	(4)		(2)				(2)	(2)	(2)	
Training Land																	
Training Ranges																	

(1) See ammunition annex (listed with the gunnery strategies).
(2) MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system).
(3) CCTT (close combat tactical training).
(4) FB BN-Corps (first battle battalion-corps).

FIGURE 1

ficult or resource-intensive event or task. For example, a situational training exercise (STX) is a critical gate for a field training exercise (FTX). It is recommended that the unit commander conduct the STX to standard before proceeding to the FTX.

Operational tempo (OPTEMPO) resources figures reflect total mileage or hours per event for the base vehicle or equipment listed in the battalion-level training model. The base vehicle for the Military Police Corps is designated as the HMMWV.

Ammunition figures are listed by event, based on DA PAM 350-38 and 350-39, *Standards in Weapons Training*. Maneuver strategies will reflect blank ammo requirements while live ammo is depicted in the gunnery strategies.

The TADSS selected to support specific training events should also train other tasks or events. In other words, if two different TADSS train the same task, only one will be chosen by using the following criteria, not listed in any specific order of priority: (1) trains the skill best, (2) trains the most units, (3) is most cost effective and (4) saves most OPTEMPO and ammo. The strategies list only TADSS that will be fielded by the end of FY 93.

Training land is a resource category listing land requirements by event for an echelon to conduct maneuver training. Pending publication of the new TC 25-1, *Training Land*, this category will be left blank. After the fielding of TC 25-1 training land requirements will be addressed in the CATS strategy.

Listed on the training range line are range requirements derived from TC 25-8, *Training Ranges*.

The Maneuver/Collective Training Strategy

Maneuver/collective training strategies have been developed for all military police echelons. Figure 1 shows a sample maneuver/collective training strategy for a heavy division military police company.

Headings across the top show training events, and the columns on the left shows unit echelons (crew through battalion) and resource categories (OPTEMPO, ammunition, TADSS, training land, and training ranges).

Across the top of the training strategy are major events. The order in which the events appear, from left to right, is not prescriptive; however, the events follow a logical progression of how a unit might proceed through an annual training cycle. Explanations of these events are found in FM 25-101 or the glossary of the mission training plan (MTP).

Beginning with *crew,* the levels column (left side of chart) lists each echelon that exists within a battalion. For each echelon there is an active component (AC) and a reserve component (RC) line for listing appropriate training frequencies.

In each column are the number of iterations of each event recommended for annual execution by a specific echelon or level. The number of iterations reflect how many times a unit will train at that particular echelon. To determine how many times a unit participates in a training event annually, add up the frequencies in the event column.

For example, look at the FTX training event. Here, it is recommended that an AC company should conduct an FTX at company level two times a year. An RC unit should conduct one FTX on an annual basis. An AC platoon would, of course, conduct the same number of FTXs with the company on an annual basis; and, in addition, they would support each training event as required with their maneuver brigade.

A critical gate to a company FTX would be to conduct a STX. The base planning OPTEMPO figure for a HMMWV for an FTX would be 500 miles. The numbers in parentheses refer to footnotes listed in the unit strategy. For ammunition the user would refer to the ammunition annex listed in the heavy division strategy, and TADSS used for an FTX would be MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system).

The Gunnery Training Strategy

Gunnery strategies exist for all weapons in the Military Police Corps. Figure 2 shows a sample gunnery training strategy for the M-16A1 and M-16A2 rifle.

M-16A1 and M-16A2

Individual		PRELIM INSTRU	Zero	QUAL
Team				
Squad				
Platoon				
Company/ Troop/ Battery				
Battalion/ Squadron				
Critical Gates			IAW FM 23-9	IAW FM 23-9
FREQUENCY				
IM/SCT				
SQDS	A	2	2	2
& LRSD	L	2	2	2
	S			
	C	1	1	1
	D			
CA/CS/				
CSS	A	2	2	2
Arms	L	2	2	2
	S	4	4	4
	C	1	1	1
	D	1	1	1
RESOURCES				
OPTEMPO				
Ammunition		Dummy	18 Ball	160 Ball 20 Trace
TADSS		WPNR MACS	WPNR/ MACS LOMAH	WP/MAC LOMAH
Training Land				
Training Range			25m Zero Range	Auto Firing Range

Qualification includes daylight, NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) and night practice and record fire. FIGURE 2

Gunnery strategies have been developed by schools that are identified in the STRAC manual as proponents for weapons or weapons systems. Since the U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia is the proponent for the M-16 rifle, the M-16 strategy it developed is applicable to the Military Police Corps.

Training events are shown in the top position of the gunnery strategy. The levels or echelons that will train on these tasks are shown on the left. As shown, qualification for the M-16 is conducted at the individual level; the critical gate tasks for qualification are listed in FM 23-9, *M-16A1 and M-16A2 Rifle Marksmanship*; for example, an individual must have preliminary instruction before moving on to the zero range. The unit commander will ensure the individual meets these requirements before moving on to qualification.

Frequency depicts how often the tasks listed in the upper part of the strategy should be conducted annually. Based on guidance provided in the STRAC manual, the frequency block for the M-16 has been divided into two categories: category 1 applies to soldiers with either an 11B or 11M MOS; and category 2 applies to all combat arms, combat support and combat service support soldiers (including military police) not assigned to rifle or infantry squads.

These two categories are further subdivided by training readiness condition (TRC) in accordance with the STRAC manual:

- TRC A—AC units,
- TRC L—light infantry,
- TRC S—special reaction teams (AC, military police),
- TRC C—RC units, and
- TRC D—USAR training division, reception stations and separate training brigades, and National Guard Bureau training cadre.

Based on figures for ammunition given in DA Pam 350-38 (STRAC), qualification with the M-16 requires 160 rounds of ball and 20 rounds of tracer ammunition per weapon.

Soldier Training Strategy

Figure 3 shows a sample matrix for the soldier training strategy.

While the maneuver/collective and gunnery strategies focused for the most part on collective training, the soldier strategy focuses on individual skills and soldier tasks. This strategy applies to all soldiers in an organization. Specific 95B,C,D military occupational specialty (MOS) requirements can be added in additional columns on the right side of the matrix.

Training events selected are listed across the top of the strategy. In the left column are frequencies depicting how often an event should be executed on an annual basis. Again active component soldiers are represented by the letters AC and reserve component by the letter RC. Thus, in this example, physical training is recommended for the AC soldier on a daily basis, but required only three times weekly (footnote 5). For the RC soldier physical training is recommended monthly.

SOLDIER TRAINING STRATEGY

EVENT / FREQ (1)		PHYS TNG	MOS TNG	CTT	CMT (4)	NBC TNG	LDR DEV (3)	SQT/ SDT	MAINT TNG	DRVR TNG
MOS		All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Daily	AC	X	X							
	RC	(5)								
Weekly	AC			X						
	RC									
Monthly	AC					X	X		X	
	RC	X	X	X					X	
Quarterly	AC									X
	RC					X	X			
Semiannual	AC	T								
	RC									X
Annual	AC			T	X			T		
	RC	T			X			T		
BIENNIAL	AC									
	RC			T						
AS REQ'D										
RESOURCES										
OPTEMPO										
AMMO										
TADSS										
Training LAND										
Training Range										

(1) Areas may be trained more often based on NCO feedback and commander's assessment to support METL proficiency.
(2) *AC* is Active Component; *RC* is Reserve Component. *T* is the testing requirement.
(3) Leadership development includes NCO professional development, career counseling, civilian education skills, military qualification standard (MQS), *etc.*
(4) Common military training (CMT) is mandatory IAW AR 350-1, *Army Training,* (*e.g.*, UCMJ [Uniform Code of Military Justice] SAEDA, combat life saver, etc.)
(5) Physical training is required to be conducted only three times a week.
FIGURE 3

No resources have been set aside at this point in the development of the soldier training strategy.

The Institutional Strategy

The military police institutional strategy is in the early development stage. Like the unit strategy, it is comprised of several subcomponents, with each having several key elements.

The institutional strategy components are the MOS-producing courses (one station unit training, officer basic course, *etc.*), the ASI (additional skill identifier) producing courses (V5, *etc.*); and the professional development courses (Noncommissioned Officers Advanced Course and Officer Advanced Course).

The elements of each component within the institutional strategy are (1) course requirements, including major subject areas, the individual military qualifications standards or soldier's manual tasks that comprise each major subject area, the percent of total academic hours allocated to each major subject area in the program of instruction (POI), and the critical gates associated with moving to the next major subject area or graduation; (2) the resource requirements, including OPTEMPO, ammunition (pyrotechnics, blank, and live), training land, and training ranges; and (3) finally, the TADSS requirements.

The TADSS matrix being developed is intended to show the linkage of TADSS taught in each course and those employed by the soldier or leader in the unit. The objective is to expose and teach the individual soldier or leader those TADSS they will use during the execution of various training events upon their arrival at their unit.

Institutional strategies are being developed *via* electronic media utilizing the new TRADOC program of instruction management model (POIMM). The POIMM was designed to fully automate all POI submissions. The projected completion date for institutional strategies is August 1992.

The completed institutional training strategies will be prescriptive in nature. They will identify resource requirements and assist resource managers in the acquisition process.

The critical payoff of the institutional strategy is the refinement of individual tasks and skills and the resources required to train them, thereby providing field commanders with a foundation of trained soldiers and leaders to execute the unit strategy for achieving unit readiness.

Readiness to Fight and Win

Simply stated, CATS is a concept for leaders and managers to ensure that individuals and units achieve the necessary level of readiness for the U.S. Army to go to war and win, and to achieve that readiness in the most economical manner possible.

As illustrated in figure 4, readiness is the target to focus on. Readiness must be jointly supported by congress and the Army's senior leaders in accordance with the keystone training manuals, FM 25-100 and FM 25-101.

Just as the arrow head is the cutting edge of the arrow, MP training serves as the cutting edge of all efforts to the bull's-eye of readiness. To get there requires training, training, and more training; and that training must be integrated across the mix of forces and appropriately encompass both active and reserve components.

The shaft of the arrow is connected to the cutting edge and functions as the means of transferring the thrust of the bowstring into driving the arrow head toward its intended target. Much like the shaft of the arrow, the key ingredient that drives training to standard is availability of the required resources to conduct training.

In a time of severe budgetary constraints MP leaders must guide each soldier or unit through the critical gates before attempting to move to a higher task or event. Not to do so would be failure in the responsibility

List of Abbreviations Used in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4

AC—active component.
APFT—Army physical fitness test.
CELL/STF SEC TNG—cell staff section training (Combined-Armed Center—Training, Fort Leavenworth).
CA/CS/CSS Arms—combat arms, combat support, combat service support.
CFX—command field exercise.
CPX—command post exercise.
CSS CUST SPT OPS—combat service support customer support operations.
CTX—combined training exercise.
DEPEX—deployment exercise.
EXEVAL CTC—external evaluation, combat training center.
FCX—fire coordination exercise.
FTX—field training exercise.
JTX—joint training exercise.
LCX—logistical coordination exercise.
LDR DEV TNG—leadership development training.
LOMAH—location of miss and hit.
MACS—multipurpose arcade combat simulator.
MAPEX—map exercise.
MOB TNG—mobilization training.
OPTEMPO—operating tempo.
RC—reserve component.
SGT's Time—sergeant's time.
STAFFEX—staff exercise (Combined-Arms Center—Training, Fort Leavenworth)
STX—situational training exercise.
TADSS—training aids, devices, simulators, and simulations.
TEWT—tactical exercise without troops.
TOCEX—tactical operation center exercise
WPNR—weaponeer.




FIGURE 4

to manage scarce resources efficiently and effectively.

The flight of the arrow is stabilized by its fins, allowing it to remain on course toward the target. Should either of the fins not function properly, the course will not be true. The stability for the process of attaining readiness is the comprehensive and systematic development of viable descriptive unit strategies and prescriptive institutional strategies.

Conclusion

Maneuver/collective, gunnery and soldier strategies will appear in unit training products soon. By the end of June 1992 strategies will be fielded as appendices to each mission training plan (MTP). The U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, Alabama began development of the draft strategies in January 1991.

The Combined Arms Center—Training, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas packaged these and other proponent strategies into brigade-, division-, and corps-sized units (light and heavy). These packages were sent to select units in the field for input during March through June 1991.

Feedback from units and MACOMs is currently being considered and modifications made to the unit training strategy. These revised strategies will be published as MTP appendices by the end of June 1992.

The Military Police School will soon provide MP commanders a recommended method to achieve their training goals—CATS. The unit strategies should help commanders identify training opportunities, necessary resources and training alternatives to consider when developing their own unit training strategies. The objective is to make training more efficient while maintaining the current high level of training readiness. Given the anticipated resource constraints the Army faces, this efficiency is more important than ever.

Units that have comments or course development questions about CATS institutional strategies may call the Individual Course Developement Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Military Police School at AUTOVON 865-3321/4550/3433 or commercial(205) 848-3321/4550/3433.

Units that have comments or questions about CATS unit strategies, may call the Collective Training Branch, Unit Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, Army Military Police School at AUTOVON 865-4797/3226/3721 or commercial (205) 848-4797/3226/3721.

Major Ralph K. Ellison was the Chief, Enlisted Training Branch, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written.

Captain John M. Huey was the Chief, Developing Systems, Unit Training Division, Directorate of Training and Doctrine, US Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL at the time this article was written.

Reserve Support and Planning for a Crisis Plan Test Exercise

Major Douglas M. Brown

A test of an installation's crisis management plan is required by FORSCOM to be conducted at least once a year. Fort McCoy, Wisconsin conducted such a test exercise to evaluate the installation's emergency operations center (EOC), crisis management team (CMT), threat management force (TMF), and special reaction team (SRT). They were evaluated by the provost marshal office (PMO).

Support to the exercise scenario was provided by Fort McCoy's U.S. Army Information and Signal Command Office (USAISC), the Directorate of Logistics (DOL), the Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH), and the Public Affairs Office (PAO). Exercise controllers were Army reservists assigned to the Fort McCoy PMO as individual mobilization augmentees (IMAs). Members of the 5064th U.S. Army Garrison, USAR, Romulus, Michigan were used as controllers and exercise players.

Test Scenario

The test scenario began at 1400 hours with a simulated message from FORSCOM directing the post to upgrade to THREATCON BRAVO. The EOC was activated, and various intelligence items were received through MP channels. This intelligence led the CMT commander at the EOC (the deputy installation commander) to declare THREATCON CHARLIE at 1533 hours.

The intel items included a simulated teletype from a civilian police department in reference to college students planning a demonstration at Fort McCoy, and a threatening note dropped off by a player with the main gate guard.

The EOC and the rest of the installation simulated operations for the evening and night. The PMO began operating on 12-hour shifts, alerted the SRT and implemented actions required by THREATCON CHARLIE throughout the night.

At 0700 hours the exercise reconvened with a nonviolent, civil disobedience demonstration blocking the entrance to the ammunition supply point (ASP).

Demonstrators were played by administrative personnel from the 5064th U.S. Army Garrison and civilian clerical employees from the PMO. They portrayed college students and faculty from a liberal university who were unhappy with U.S. overseas defense policy.

On order from the EOC, the demonstrators were apprehended with minimum resistance and the ASP cleared. This was accomplished by a civil-disturbance equipped MP squad.



The Fort McCoy MP desk. (U.S. Army photo by MAJ Douglas M. Brown)

About 0800 hours, immediately after the ASP scenario was completed, the duress alarm at the post commander's quarters was activated. Military police patrol units were dispatched and established a perimeter. An unidentified male subject was seen in front of the quarters, and there was no answer to the desk sergeant's phone call to the house.

Within two minutes of the desk sergeant's attempted call, a terrorist called the MP station and advised that the installation commander's wife had been taken hostage. The terrorists were played by MP reservists assigned to the 5064th U.S. Army Garrison. The installation commander's wife herself participated in the exercise as the hostage.

The hostage negotiation team (HNT) and the SRT were activated. A scene command post (CP) was established in the incident area by the TMF commander. Negotiations were undertaken by the HNT, and the SRT was deployed at the incident site. Negotiations with the terrorist leader were conducted for approximately two hours by the USACID special agent negotiator.



Special reaction team (SRT) briefing by threat management force commander at the command post established at the hostage incident scene.



The SRT entry section clearing the installation commander's quarters.

Through the EOC, the FBI (role-played by a controller) directed the hostage takers be given a van and escorted to the Fort McCoy airport. As the exercise terminated at about 1100 hours with the hostage takers at the airport, the SRT was clearing the commander's quarters.



One of the SRT marksman-and-observer teams in an overwatch position at the hostage incident site.

Logistics Preparations

Successful handling of criminal and terrorist actions requires that the PMO conduct detailed planning, extensive coordination, and thorough training prior to an incident. Some guidelines for preparing installations to survive such attacks are presented in the rest of this article, beginning with logistics.

Vehicles. As additional MP manpower becomes available, additional patrol vehicles should be obtained from installation assets. Use of single-MP patrol vehicles allows flexible response to multiple incidents and enhances MP patrol visibility and omnipresence.

Water. Provisions for individual portable water supplies for gate guards, incident perimeter MPs, and SRT members must be made. These personnel will be performing lengthy tasks while wearing soft-body armor. They will be at risk as heat-injury casualties, no matter what the season.

Keys. Spare keys to mission essential vital areas (MEVAs) need to be readily obtainable by the MPs. Using the keys to enter an incident area could be a critical tactical advantage for the SRT.

Communications and Personnel

Procedures. EOC notification and activation lists must include the directorate, general, and primary staff, and special staff. JAG, PAO, and the chaplain will be directly involved in assisting to manage a crisis incident.

Local civilian law enforcement agencies must be continuously updated of progress of the incident.

Spot report formats should be established to allow the MPs on the scene to pass essential elements of information (EEI) on suspect descriptions and numbers quickly through the MP desk to the EOC. Telephone communications between the TMF CP and the MP desk need to be established as early as possible in the incident.

Equipment. The EOC should be able to transmit messages to the MPs at the incident scene, as well as monitor the MP operations channels.

For continuous emergency communications, a direct open phone line needs to be planned between the PMO at the EOC and the MP desk. As the situation develops, the

capability to add the TMP CP into the direct line may be required.

The HNT will require that hostage negotiation telephones perform with maximum effectiveness. Plans will need to be coordinated with installation telephone services to provide additional phone lines to the TMF CP and the HNT for coordination and liaison calls.

Coordination of the contingency plans to curtail and isolate phone service to suspects should be done between the PMO and installation telephone services. Plans to curtail other utilities (water, heat, electricity) should be coordinated with the proper post services.

Handi-talkies and spare batteries should be available in sufficient quantity for additional MP support personnel deployed to assist with the crisis incident.

Duress alarms from critical areas must be tested on a regular basis. This is an area that should be standard procedure.

Personnel. Non-MP clerical support is needed at the incident site for the TMF commander and for the hostage negotiator. This will release MPs for MP missions.

Augmentation of the MP desk is necessary for control of the MP patrol units continuing to handle normal law enforcement calls and to coordinate elements at the incident scene.

Intelligence and Evidence

Tactics employed to neutralize a criminal or terrorist threat will vary with the nature and seriousness of each threat. Military police personnel coping with the threat must continually update other MP elements with new EEI on the suspects and the situation as it is developed. Possible escape routes for suspects should be reconned.

The primary focus for the military police during any crisis incident must be on the protection of life and property. However, along with tactical considerations military police working a criminal threat incident must be prepared to document crime elements that will lead to successful judicial prosecution of the suspects.

Objects handled by suspects must be processed as evidence. Photographic evidence of ongoing criminal activity may be obtained with TSC video and still-photo support. Fixed observation cameras may be able to record a suspect's actions.

After an incident is defused, MPs should check and secure the entire incident area(s). Trained investigators should process the incident scene(s) and impound any possible evidence.

Gathering evidence and documenting the criminal acts are not performed in some exercises because of time constraints. However, these procedures require practice just as much as tactical skills.



The provost marshal, players, and controllers at a coordination meeting prior to the exercise.

Conclusion

The use of Reserve Component soldiers as players and controllers gave the Fort McCoy provost marshal the manpower to conduct a good test of Fort McCoy's regularly assigned military police and command and control assets.

Prior planning and the use of an evaluation checklist provided the maximum training benefit and realism for permanent party personnel. Reserve Component personnel benefited by participating in the planning, execution, controlling and evaluation of a major exercise.

(U.S. Army photos by MAJ Douglas M. Brown)

Major Douglas M. Brown was assigned as the Confinement Facility Commander (IMA), Provost Marshal Office, Fort McCoy, WI at the time this article was written. His civilian occupation is as the Law Enforcement Sergeant, University of Central Florida Police Department, Orlando, FL.

"A Bill of Rights is what the people are entitled to against any government on earth, general or particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference."

Thomas Jefferson
Letter to James Madison
December 20, 1787



3ID Military Police Combat Role in Divisional Rear Operations

Part II

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Silva

(This is the second installment of a two-part article that began in the last issue. – editor)

All the operations described below are on order to general support (GS) military police platoons. Their normal activities are directed by the division provost marshal (PM) and include battlefield circulation control (BCC) and reporting the identity, size and location of all units they encounter so the rear command post (CP) can maintain control over division rear area (DRA) tenancy.

Military police conduct two basic forms of ground reconnaissance in the DRA: solo recon by individual MP teams to confirm DRA tenant units' reports, and duo recon with aero scouts.

Solo recon is a single-arm operation. Duo recon is a combined-arms operation in which the aero scout cues the supporting MP teams; each provides support to the other.

In both forms of reconnaissance MP teams use a mix of mounted and dismounted reconnaissance techniques, and the same basic sequence of action applies to both. Mortar sections directly support MP teams on solo and duo recon missions.

Solo Recon Mission

The rear CP operations officer will most often frag order MP teams, through the provost marshal (PM) and MP company commander, to confirm or deny reports rendered by other DRA tenant units.

The team leader's orders include the reported size, location and direction of enemy movement, and other details such as to move ahead of the enemy and surveil an area until the enemy moves through it. This allows the MP team to make visual contact under favorable conditions (a visual ambush).

The rear CP warns other friendly units and alerts mortar sections and combat elements of the DRA reserve for employment. When a mortar section is positioned to support the MP team, the rear CP gives the team leader OPCON (operational control) of that section. If not, the mortar section moves to a planned firing position that can range the area of reported activity.

Unless placed under OPCON of the DRA reserve, the MP team conducts its mission on the DRA operations/intelligence (O/I) net—not on the MP company net—and reports directly to the rear CP operations cell.

The MP team moves mounted to the area of the reported enemy sighting and conducts dismounted reconnaissance to gain visual contact. Two members of the MP team conduct dismounted reconnaissance to find the enemy and maintain communication with the third MP at the vehicle via hand-held walkie-talkie radios (bricks) commonly used in garrison law enforcement activities.

The third MP mans the vehicular machine gun, monitors the brick, and maintains FM radio communication with the rear CP and mortar section. Communication between mounted and dismounted elements via the brick allows the third MP to maneuver the vehicle to a more advantageous position ahead of a moving enemy while the dismounted reconnaissance patrol shadows the enemy unit on foot.

Other MP teams may be fragged to complement the first team. They operate in the same manner and communicate on the DRA O/I net unless an MP squad or platoon is committed to the operation. The squad or platoon leader then collates reports, passes them to the rear CP operations cell, and maneuvers his unit to maintain continuous contact with the enemy.

Duo Recon Mission

Duo recon requires the division G3 to task the combat aviation brigade to reconnoiter in the DRA. When working with aero scouts, MP teams and heavy mortar sections are under the operational control of the lead aero scout pilot.

The zone or area to be reconnoitered is determined by the rear CP operations officer; the lead aero scout determines specific reconnaissance objectives within the zone or area. Aero scouts conduct an overview aerial reconnaissance and order mounted MP teams to reconnoiter specific points in the zone or area, much as the division cavalry squadron would employ a mix of ground and aerial scouts.

The MP teams move mounted between reconnaissance objectives assigned by the lead aero scout and conduct dismounted point reconnaissance of each assigned objective. Two members of the MP team conduct dismounted reconnaissance of the objective.

The object of the point reconnaissance is to check areas closely for signs

of enemy activity. Visual contact with enemy units is the ideal; direct contact (*e.g.*, a firefight) is the undesired worst case.

The MP team making visual contact with an enemy unit reports (to the aero scout) its size, activity, location, composition and disposition, and whether the enemy is equipped with heavy weapons such as mortars, antitank weapons or air-defense weapons.

If the enemy is moving, the MP team reports direction and speed of movement. The team avoids detection while maintaining visual contact. When the enemy moves, the MP team remounts and moves with the enemy unit.

Mortar sections provide indirect fire support from planned firing positions and remain laid on MP team reconnaissance objectives. The MPs request fires through the lead aero scout and adjust them with the mortar section FDC, either directly or through the third MP. The MP team uses indirect fires to break direct contact or to pin the enemy. Enemy attrition is a by-product of these two primary purposes.

When the MP team makes visual contact with an enemy unit, the team leader makes every effort to maintain contact and prevent the enemy from moving freely to escape. Normally the aero scout reports to the rear CP, which then frag orders additional mortar sections and MP teams to gain contact and support the initially committed team until a combat unit can be employed.

Normally MP directly engage in combat only when the enemy unit is small enough to be overwhelmed and destroyed quickly, or if a high-priority combat service support unit is in imminent danger of attack. Military police attempt to attack by fire to spoil the enemy's plans, not to decisively engage him.

Handover and Screening

The object of MP reconnaissance is to determine how much, if any, combat power to commit to the enemy's destruction. Since the MP team is in contact with the enemy before a combat unit is committed, the MP team leader must hand over the battle to the combat unit commander.

If all goes well, the enemy will not know he has been detected, will not know he has been under trained observation, and will not realize he is about to be attacked.

The rear CP alerts the DRA reserve for movement when the first MP team is fragged to confirm or deny enemy activity, informs the progress of MP reconnaissance, and moves mortar sections to support MP teams in contact. The DRA reserve commander puts one rifle platoon at immediate notice to move to support or extract the committed MP team if required.

When MP reconnaissance confirms that the DRA reserve should be committed to combat, the rear CP operations officer gives the DRA reserve commander a frag order that includes the following information:

Situation. Reported size, location, disposition and activity of enemy unit; location(s) of committed MP team(s) and other friendly units, including mortar sections.

Mission. Attack to destroy, attack by fire, fix, defend.

Area of operations (AO). Defined by four six-digit grid coordinates, by checkpoints, by terrain features, or by a combination.

Task organization. At a minimum, defines the command support relationship of each unit committed to or affected by the fight within the AO defined above, includes FM radio callsign of units under the OPCON of the DRA reserve commander.

Coordinating instructions. Includes link-up points for MP escort and dispersed elements of the DRA reserve, firing position locations for mortar sections, pyrotechnic signals, and rear CP imposed fire-control measures and rules of engagement.

The frag order to the DRA reserve commander is best delivered face-to-face. It may also be given over the radio using brevity codes in the 3ID standing operating procedure (SOP), wherein information security is deliberately sacrificed for speed and clarity.

The rear CP informs the MP team leader of the DRA reserve's mission, where the team will link up (physically or *via* FM radio) with the DRA reserve commander, and that the MP team(s) in contact will be OPCON to the DRA reserve commander.

Additional MP teams may be fragged to escort the DRA reserve to designated link-up points or mortar sections to firing positions. Both move at high road speeds by the most direct route to link-up points or firing positions.

Before reaching the link-up point the DRA reserve commander directs the committed MP team(s) on the DRA O/I net to switch to the DRA reserve command net and assumes OPCON of the MP team(s). The MP team leader updates the DRA reserve commander and receives orders.

By SOP and training, the DRA reserve commander is constrained from using military police in direct contact with the enemy. Instead MPs hand over the battle to the DRA reserve commander and then move to echelon on the flanks of the DRA reserve combat formation. The MP screen the DRA reserve so the commander is free to focus on destroying the enemy through offensive action.

Military police teams move mounted to keep station with the DRA reserve as it moves to gain contact or to attack. The MP role is analogous to the traditional cavalry flank screen of a larger force: Military police prevent surprise by providing early warning.

In screening the DRA reserve, MP teams normally move mounted from outpost (OP) to outpost on the reserve's flank. The distance between OPs and the frequency of MP movement depends entirely on the movement of the DRA reserve.

Military police may also be ordered to make wide flanking moves to get ahead of the enemy. The MP units, normally platoons, may be ordered to establish a defensive blocking position against which the DRA reserve will drive the enemy.

Summary

The 3ID uses GS military police as finders, not as fighters, in recognition of the limits of MP organization, equipment and training opportunities.

The 3d MP company commander tasks MP teams for reconnaissance based on requirements established by the rear CP operations cell through the PM. Once committed to a reconnaissance operation, MP teams report to the rear CP operations cell on the DRA O/I net.

The MP teams gain and maintain visual contact with the enemy using any and all reconnaissance surveillance techniques, including a judicious mix of dismounted and mounted patrolling.

All this has implications for MP unit training. The MP unit commander can narrow battle focus to tasks that can be realistically mastered, given garrison law enforcement training distractors.

Military police can train to reconnoiter, scout and use indirect fires. They can easily be included in maneuver and artillery unit rotations to major training areas for live-fire training.

Lieutenant Colonel Jack Silva was assigned to Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division, Wurzburg, Germany at the time this article was written.

50th Anniversary Greetings from the Commander-in-Chief to the Military Police Corps for "Exemplary Tradition of Excellence"

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 17, 1991

I am delighted to send greetings to the United States Army Military Police Corps as you celebrate your 50th anniversary.

As this year's events in the Persian Gulf region so clearly demonstrated, members of the Military Police Corps are a vital part of our Nation's total force. Indeed, millions of Americans vividly recall how, despite adverse conditions, you successfully processed and guarded tens of thousands of prisoners of war. We also remember your role in maintaining civil order in the newly liberated Kuwait. Such outstanding achievements are found throughout the long and distinguished record of America's military police.

While celebrating your exploits in foreign wars, we cannot overlook your daily contributions here at home. Whether maintaining installation security or providing patrol service, our military police have proved to be truly "Of the troops, for the troops." At home and abroad, in peacetime and in times when peace has failed, you have upheld an exemplary tradition of excellence, and I salute you.

You have my best wishes for a memorable anniversary celebration.

George Bush

Centurion Shield
MP Participation in *REFORGER 90*

Major Charles J. Dietrick

For the 194th Separate Armored Brigade, Fort Knox, Kentucky task force deployed to Germany to participate in REFORGER 90, what made the exercise unique was the reduced size of most participating units. REFORGER 90 featured several significant new training initiatives that emphasized economical training.

Absent were the large force-on-force armor maneuvers of years past. Present were the less conspicuous command post exercises (CPXs) featuring computer battle simulations using the joint exercise simulation system (JESS) and command field exercise (CFX), where a reduced number of soldiers and vehicles represent a much larger unit. For example, one HMMWV might represent an entire company of M1 tanks.

These initiatives were implemented in part to reduce training costs (including maneuver damage), to emphasize the training of commanders and staffs from corps to battalion, and to help ease growing political and social tensions in Europe.

The 194th participated in Operation Centurion Shield 90, a CPX pitting the 194th, as part of V Corps, against the 13th German *Panzer* Brigade, an element of VII Corps. The brigade deployed 642 soldiers, 167 wheeled vehicles, 38 tracks and 50 trailers.

Supporting this force was a team from the brigade provost marshal office (PMO) and one squad from the brigade's organic MP platoon. The PM cell had a duel mission: provide staff input to brigade plans, orders and operations including the CPX, and exercise command and battlefield circulation control, area security and law enforcement.

As part of the Status of Forces Agreement four German police officers *(polizei)* were attached to the PMO to assist in convoy planning and movement, maneuver damage control, traffic and criminal incident investigation, and liaison between the brigade and host-nation officials.

Commanders and Staffs

The CPX, using JESS, emphasized the training of commanders and staffs without the actual use of maneuver forces. The JESS used maps, unit TOEs and capabilities and conflict symbols to portray the situation on the battlefield. The JESS allowed units to maneuver, engage targets, expend fuel and ammo, take losses and add replacements.

Unit players, including an MP platoon player, maneuvered their respective units on the computer, based on orders issued by the brigade and battalion tactical operations centers (TOCs). The TOCs in turn revised plans and issued orders based on observations and feedback provided by unit players.

The MP platoon leader controlled two platoons (one attached from V Corps) and could maneuver these down to squad level. Lack of rear operations, EPW or refugee play precluded extensive MP computer play. The PM cell did get extensive practice producing the MP annex of brigade orders.

The primary MP contribution to the "battle" was to pin down small opposing force units, eliminating their ability to maneuver or employ artillery. This tactic bought time for friendly forces to exploit the situation, but usually at a significant cost to MP resources. This tactic was also somewhat unrealistic in that MP forces had to move well into the main battle areas to find and engage the enemy.

Battlefield Circulation Control

Battlefield circulation control (BCC) demanded the greatest amount of MP resources. As a CPX unit, the 194th did not have to counter the actual OPFOR actions on the ground or deal with enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) and refugees; but other activities demanded extensive MP support.

During REFORGER 90 five brigade-level "jumps" and numerous subordinate unit "jumps" were conducted with MP assistance. Every convoy route had to be reconnoitered by MP and German *polizei* to ensure trafficability of selected routes. Map spotted routes often had to be altered after MP recon because of constraints posed by small towns, roads and bridges.

Finally, every convoy move was conducted under radio-listening silence. Military police route signing, traffic control points (TCPs) and convoy escorts were essential to moving and controlling the brigade.

Area Security

Area security was the second most demanding mission, often competing with BCC for MP resources.

All battalion TOCs and supporting units were doctrinally dispersed throughout the brigade area of operations, imposing a significant challenge to area security operations. Priority was placed on the brigade

class I, III, and IX bulk storage areas, the brigade TOC and, while in the redeployment assembly area, the consolidated sensitive-item storage site and motor pool.

Military police provided VIP security for visiting dignitaries, augmenting USAREUR and host-nation protective-service details (PSD) during visits by the Army Chief of Staff, USAREUR and V Corps commanders, as well as NATO and Warsaw Pact senior officers. Resource constraints dictated that only real-world security operations were conducted.

Law Enforcement

Law enforcement was a small, but critical brigade MP mission. The USAREUR, NATO military police and German civilian police provided superb general support during REFORGER, freeing the 194th MPs for other missions.

Brigade MPs investigated several minor incidents within the brigade and were called upon to investigate four military- involved traffic accidents, and three involving German nationals. In these cases the attached *polizei* were extremely helpful.

Military police conducted walking patrols and rode with *polizei* in the town of Dinkelsbuhl when the brigade and other units "stood down" for the mid-exercise break. Joint MP and *polizei* activities were instrumental in providing proactive police presence and timely coordinated assistance when needed.

Conclusions

Provost marshals and MP commanders must deploy with sufficient MP assets to sustain operations on a 24-hour basis. The 194th could easily have used another MP squad.

Coordination with USAREUR and German law enforcement agencies facilitated MP operations. Operational ammunition for MP must be available and is critical to MPs involved in real-world operations as were the 194th MPs. The 9mm is not readily available in USAREUR since the majority of USAREUR sidearms are still .45 caliber.

Military police with 9mm pistols may want to bring their own ammunition. They must be well versed in Status of Forces Agreement and Soviet military liaison mission issues. The MP, particularly in the PM cell, should have a working knowledge of German language and customs.

Polizei, if attached, should be included in unit convoy planning and movement, as well as any incident involving German nationals. Military police must be knowledgeable of USAREUR and European driving regulations, road signs and traffic laws.

All MP vehicles should be marked as military police and equipped with functional blue lights. Each MP team should have a complete set of maneuver area maps down to 1:50,000 scale. They may want commercial road maps of Germany; these can come in handy more than once when providing directions to lost units.

REFORGER will continue to be a major exercise for United States and NATO forces, but future REFORGERs will likely be conducted in the CPX and CFX modes. The era of large armored formations moving across the German countryside are gone.

However, reduced unit size will not eliminate the need for MP support. Military police must still approach REFORGER as an opportunity to practice wartime skills. As JESS capabilities are expanded, hopefully a scenario that incorporates MSR (main supply route) management, EPWs, refugees and rear operations will be developed to exercise not only the MPs but other combat support and service support branches.

The MP real-world support will, however, remain a major factor in the success of REFORGER, and REFORGER will remain a continuing challenge for participating MP units.

Major Charles J. Dietrick was the Provost Marshal, 194th Armored Bde, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Knox, KY at the time this article was written.

Training with *Feldjaegers* in Centurion Shield

Private First Class Gregory C. Davis

Feldjaegers, German military police, assisted the 18th Military Police Brigade, Frankfurt, Germany in accomplishing its mission during Operation Centurion Shield. During such training exercises they worked with the MPs at traffic control posts and in battlefield circulation control, bridge security, authorization for convoys, and basic law and order.

The *feldjaegers*' cooperation in military exercises has been an important asset for twenty-one years. Many of them speak both languages and they are familiar with the terrain. They also have the trust and cooperation of the local German citizens.

In addition to their authority on German roads, *feldjaegers* have been an asset during large exercises because they provide additional legal authority to U.S. military operations. Because safety and environmental concerns are military priorities, *feldjaegers* act as a liaison between the U.S. military and the local communities to meet any special requirements.

Operation Centurion Shield and similar joint training exercises offered valuable training opportunities. Americans fired German weapons at Schwartzenborn, and Germans



A feldjaeger sergeant of the 760th Force Company indicates an accident location for a member of the 18th Military Police Brigade. *(Photo by Teresa Carlsson, ARNG.)*



The 18th Military Police Brigade trained with *feldjaegers* in joint cooperation during auto accidents. *(Photo by Teresa Carlsson, ARNG.)*



An assaulting V Corps tracked vehicle roars toward the REFORGER 90 front as an MP guards a bridge during bridgehead security operations. *(U.S. Army photo by SFC Steve Davis.)*



An MP provided bridgehead security as Northland (V Corps) forces attack. *(U.S. Army photo by Steve Davis.)*

trained side by side with Americans at Wildflecken and Grafenwohr. The 18th Military Police Brigade went on joint patrols on a regular basis in Frankfurt.

As liaison to the German population, German military police represented an important part of NATO; and, with budget constraints reducing MP resources, the 18th Military Police Brigade will probably continue to depend on German assistance.

Private First Class Gregory C. Davis was a writer for the V Corps Public Affairs Office, Frankfurt, Germany when this article was written.



An MP keeps watch on a bridge in Wornitzstein, West Germany, during exercise REFORGER 90. *(U.S. Army photo by SSG Randy Piland, ARNG.)*



New Military Police Corps Regimental Command Sergeant Major David W. Stalter

Command Sergeant Major David W. Stalter, a native of Ennis, Texas, entered the Army in August 1963. He completed basic training at Fort Polk, Louisiana and Military Police Advanced Individual Training (AIT) at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

His overseas assignments have included tours in Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Germany, Panama, and most recently in Southwest Asia during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Stateside tours include Sandia Base, New Mexico; Fort Gordon, Georgia; Fort Campbell, Kentucky; Fort Monroe, Virginia; Fort Polk, Louisiana; Fort Hood, Texas; Fort McPherson, Georgia; Fort Riley, Kansas; and present assignment at Fort McClellan, Alabama.

He has performed in a wide variety of leadership positions, both as a military policeman and as a drill sergeant. Positions have included patrol leader, squad leader, MPI supervisor, traffic investigator, physical security inspector, senior MP instructor, platoon sergeant, provost marshal operations sergeant, first sergeant, S-3 sergeant major, and command sergeant major. In addition, he performed duties as a drill sergeant at the Fort Polk Drill Sergeant School.

Command Sergeant Major Stalter has completed numerous military and civilian schools that include the Physical Security Course, Traffic Accident Investigations, Military Police Investigator Course, Drug Enforcement Agent Course, Hostage Negotiation Course, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course, and First Sergeant Course (FRG). He is a graduate of the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas.

His most noteworthy achievements have included Distinguished Graduate, Drill Sergeant School, Fort Jackson, South Carolina; Honor Graduate, Advanced Noncommissioned Officer Course; Fort Polk Drill Sergeant of the Year (1974); First Sergeant, 545th MP Company, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood; and his appointment as a Command Sergeant Major.

Command Sergeant Major Stalter's awards include the Bronze Star Medal (1st OLC), Meritorious Service Medal (4th OLC), Joint Service Commendation Medal, Army Commendation Medal (4th OLC), Army Achievement Medal (1st OLC), Good Conduct Medal (9th award), National Defense Service Medal (2d Service Star), Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, Vietnam Service Medal (2d Service Star), Southwest Asia Medal (2d Service Star), Noncommissioned Officer Development Ribbon (Numeral 4), Army Service Ribbon, Overseas Service Ribbon (Numeral 3), Vietnam Campaign Medal, Vietnam Cross of Gallantry, and the Drill Sergeant Badge.

Command Sergeant Major Stalter and his wife, Linda, have raised three children, David, K'lane, and Kianne, and are the proud grandparents of six grandchildren. They reside on Fort McClellan.

Defending *Enemy-Prisoner-of-War* Camps

Part II

Major Harry F. Noyes, III

(This is the final installment of a two-part article that began in the last issue. – editor)

Fighting Off Ground Attack

By forcing the enemy to attack on the ground from a distance, through a thicket of obstacles, and with little time to set up he is deprived of surprise and speed. It will then be easy to outfight him.

Any EPW-liberation raid will almost certainly be conducted by a small force. The enemy cannot spare major forces unless he dominates the main battlefield, as the United States did when raiding the Hammelburg (Germany) and Los Banos (Italy) PW camps late in World War II.

If the foe somehow evades the security, he will surely want to control gates or fences long enough for EPWs to escape. He may want to control compounds or adjacent areas long enough to remove obstacles and land aircraft to evacuate key EPWs or to organize and arm the EPWs.

He probably will not try to destroy U.S. people or facilities. Doing so is impossible unless he can arm many EPWs and useless unless it's the only way to escape. He wishes to escape or to attack key installations. Killing MPs won't help him much.

Raiders become increasingly vulnerable to U.S. reaction units the longer they are entangled with camp defenders, so they will normally try to break contact as soon as possible.

The EPW compounds must be defended, not billets or logistical areas or headquarters. To the enemy the latter are blind alleys, potential delays irrelevant to his mission. If he hits them it will be incidental.

Resources must not be squandered on a massive perimeter defense around the whole area. Protective shelters and buildings can double as emergency fighting positions if raiders happen to move through support areas. Emergency fighting positions give people who cannot reach better positions a way to defend themselves.

The focus of *primary* fighting positions is to defend the EPW compounds, to support the people who defend them, or to protect critical support points such as weapon and ammunition storage, security-light generators, communication centers, *etc.*

Such points can be placed near the compounds, so they can be defended by the same positions as the compounds. They can also be made less vulnerable by decentralizing them and building in redundancy.

Light systems should have back-up generators, battery packs, and flares at key points such as towers and gates. Communications should be operable if the base station is knocked out. Main and alternate command posts should be within the compound defenses. Camp personnel must be able to fight without central control.

The enemy may use stand-off direct fire to support an attack, gapping the fences and suppressing guard posts with precision weapons. He could attack by precision fire alone, to create an escape opportunity. However, few EPWs would exploit such an opportunity during a firefight.

Guards must be alert for stand-off fire and trained to spot its sources. They must know surrounding terrain well, and each guard position should have range cards.

A survey of likely weapon and assembly sites for on-call air and artillery strikes should be made. If such support may not be available the camp will need its own means of suppressions such as mortars and heavy machine guns.

Most of these weapons can be ground-emplaced. However, each camp needs one or two armored cars or armed Humvees for mobile firepower, especially if it is surrounded by broken terrain.

Organizing and Training Personnel

Whenever an attack occurs, troops will be caught divided into two components--those who are on shift guarding the camp and those who are off-duty or working elsewhere.

The on-guard shift should fight where it is, since it is already on the enemy's objective. However, normal guard towers will be too dangerous even if armored with sandbags or metal. Unless they are impracticably massive concrete forts, they will be vulnerable to antitank weapons and heavy automatic fire. Elevated observation cannot protect the people.

Each tower needs a fireman's pole for rapid emergency exit. At the foot of the pole should be a strong, low-profile fighting position. A good choice is a slope-sided pillbox or bunker built of reinforced concrete, logs and dirt, or metal armor with portholes for all-around fire and sturdy overhead cover. The position may be a bit removed from the tower but connected to it by a trench.

There might be exceptions to the fight-where-you-are rule for guards at outer security points. In general, however, these posts will still be needed during attacks to prevent infiltration under cover of the shooting. Therefore, these posts also need sturdy pillboxes or well-built foxholes. If the guards move, they must still be able to cover their posts with fire.

Americans working inside the cages must get out at once. The value of watching EPWs during an attack is outweighed by the hazards from fire or dangerous EPWs. The EPWs who aren't dangerous will crawl into their own bunkers and won't need watching. The workers can reinforce guard posts near their cages. Extra weapons may be stored at the guard posts to equip them.

Soldiers caught away from the compounds cannot reinforce the guard posts because that would require crossing a hail of fire. They must race to preassigned positions. Some will go to prepared fighting positions to cover vital spots with fire. Others will go to assembly areas to form counterattack forces. Each soldier must be assigned to a specific counterattack unit and mission.

Personnel not on shift work form the cadre of these units, participating in all training and combat actions. Shift workers, *e.g.*, guards, will also have counterattack units but will be available for training and attacks only when off duty. Thus much of each counterattack unit will require much repetition of training for the various shifts.

Each counterattack unit has its own zone of responsibility, usually based on a likely enemy avenue of approach. The unit must be trained for primary responses when its zone is attacked and secondary responses when it supports another zone.

Counterattacks will be hazardous because the fire that camp guards will direct toward the foe will also be near the camp counterattack forces. Effective coordination is critical to prevent friendly-fire casualties; training guards as shift counterattackers helps by familiarizing them with counterattack plans.

Counterattack units need good communications with each other, the command post, and compound defenders. They must know where the enemy is, and they must communicate their own locations and intentions to the defensive positions to avoid friendly fire.

Radio is important, but a prelaid phone net linking compound defenses and counterattack assembly areas will be useful until counterattack elements move out.

Troops must know how to use back-up communications such as light and sound signals (flashlights, strobes, beacons, whistles, sirens, gunshots, smoke, flares, *etc.*). To avoid misidentification counterattack forces should wear a subdued but distinctive emblem such as the MP brassard.

Flexibility is important; actual attacks rarely follow rehearsed scenarios. Practice is a starting point, and rigidity can be reduced by varying the rehearsal scenarios.

Host-nation reservists, militia and police might be attached to a camp or called in for an emergency. Nearby U.S. units should be briefed on the EPW camp defense plans and asked to help in emergencies.

However, a camp's own troops can defeat most attacks if they analyze the threat intelligently and design realistic defenses appropriate to the force available.

Conclusion

There will usually be a lack of resources to do everything listed above. Do the most important ones based on the threat analysis.

As fixed installations, EPW camps can buy on the civilian economy, hire civilian construction contractors, and use EPW labor. Never stop improving defenses, however hopeless the task may seem. Exploit time; a bit here and there will add up.

The better a camp prepares for assault, the less likely it is to face one. If the foe sees strong defenses, he will probably not attack at all.

Major Harry F. Noyes III was assigned to the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Army Health Services Command, Fort Sam Houston, TX at the time this article was written. He previously was assigned to the Public Affairs Office, 300th Military Police Command, Inskster, MI.

"Keep your eye on the Constitution. This is the guarantee, that is the safeguard, that is the night watchman of democratic representative government—freedom of speech, freedom of press, the right to public assembly and the right to petition the government. Save all these things in the constitution and let the Supreme Court stand behind it, and then you can get off all the hot air in Congress and in the Senate that you want to."

Alfred E. Smith
Speech to Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
June 22, 1933

Regimental Crest



The U.S. Institute of Heraldry developed the Military Police Corps' colors and regimental crest to symbolize the proud history and rich heritage of the Military Police Corps.

The regimental crest depicts the support that military police provide the Army in executing their three missions: assist, protect, and defend. The crest identifies the Military Police Corps as a member of the Army Regimental System.

The centerpiece of the Military Police Corps regimental crest is the Roman fasces. The fasces was carried by Roman soldiers who performed peacekeeping duties. The fasces is the ancient symbol of the magistrate's authority. The sword that appears on the crest represents military leadership and guidance. The sword symbolizes the idea that military police soldiers must set the example for all soldiers.

The key represents security and embodies the role of protecting the vital military assets that are necessary for combat. The scales of justice embody the values of impartiality and fairness that must govern every military police action. The crossed pistols are the traditional insignia of the Military Police Corps and represent military and martial preparedness.

The banner on the regimental crest denotes the three military police missions. The word ***protect*** *stands for the MP combat support role of protecting fellow soldiers and equipment on the battlefield. The word* ***assist*** *embodies the law enforcement mission of aiding the commander in maintaining order and in safeguarding the right of soldiers and their families to be secure in their homes.*

The word ***defend*** *represents the combat mission of resisting, containing and defeating the enemy in the rear area to secure forward support and command and control elements that are needed to sustain and win the main battle.*

The encirclement of the shield by the banner and crossed pistols symbolizes the unity of the Military Police Corps.

The regimental colors show the regimental crest superimposed on the breast of the American bald eagle, the national symbol. The eagle with crest is centered on a background of green, and the flag is trimmed with gold fringe.



Military Police

From the dragoons of the Marechaussee Corps of the Revolutionary War...





...To the combat team of today's Military Police Corps Regiment.



Following tradition, the MP Corps commanding general is shown as he is about to pick up the commander of the troops and then will inspect the troops.



As the color guard passes, the Commandant salutes the nation's flag—the flag that the MP Corps has defended for more than fifty years.



Photos by TSC Photo Lab,
Fort McClellan, Alabama



Passing in review

The official Army song, "The Army Goes Rolling Along," was dedicated at all Army installations on Veterans Day, November 11, 1956. The Army found its song in words and music composed almost fifty years apart.

Adoption of the official Army song was accomplished in 1952 after an eight-year search. A nationwide contest was conducted; and leading music composers, publishers, and recording studios assisted the Army in the selection process.

The basic melody is that of the rousing familiar "Caisson Song," which was composed in 1908 by Lieutenant E.L. Gruber (who later became a brigadier general). He was assisted by several other lieutenants who were stationed with him in the Philippines.

Lyrics for "The Army Goes Rolling Along," based on the old "Caisson Song," were revised and adapted by Harold W. Arberg, Soldier Music Advisor, Special Services Division, the Adjutant General's Office. The new lyrics were selected from about 140 contributions from major commands.

The Army Goes Rolling Along

Verse

March along, sing our song
With the Army of the free.
Count the brave, count the true
Who have fought to victory.
We're the Army and proud of our name!
We're the Army and proudly proclaim:

First Chorus

First to fight for the right
And to build the nation's might.
And THE ARMY GOES ROLLING ALONG.
Proud of all we have done,
Fight till the battle's won,
And THE ARMY GOES ROLLING ALONG.

Refrain

Then it's hi! hi! hey!
The Army's on its way.
Count off the cadence loud and strong:
For where'er we go, you will always know
And THE ARMY GOES ROLLING ALONG.

Second Chorus

Valley Forge, Custer's ranks,
San Juan Hill and Patton's tanks,
And the Army went rolling along.
Minutemen from the start,
Always fighting from the heart,
And the Army keeps rolling along.

Refrain

(Same as above)

Third Chorus

(slower, more freely)
Men in rags, men who froze,
Still that Army met its foes,
And the Army went rolling along.
Faith in God, then we're right
And we'll fight with all our might,
As the Army keeps rolling along.

Refrain (in tempo)

Then it's hi! hi! hey!
The Army's on its way.
Count off the cadence loud and strong:
(two! three!)
For where'er we go, you will always know
And THE ARMY GOES ROLLING ALONG!
(Keep it rolling!)

Stubby Pencil Approach to Terrain Management

Staff Sergeant Sandra Farley

No one will dispute the importance of terrain: the characteristics of the ground, what dangers and opportunities it offers, or its allocation and utilization.

A commander may assign numerical values to general terrain factors and mathematically estimate their effect on the mission. A contemporary analysis of terrain can be aided by digitized terrain data banks and computer networks.

During REFORGER exercises the 21st SUPCOM (Support Command) employed a network of computers to track thousands of deployed forces as they moved in and through the rear combat zone and communications zone. Such sophisticated approaches were, however, beyond the resources of most units; and all units were affected by terrain management decisions.


For example, the 3d Infantry Division (3ID) was doctrinally assigned the task of terrain management to the G3 located in the division tactical operations center (DTOC). Because of limited time and personnel, terrain management was a part-time task tracking only major units; for all others it was not done at all. Regardless, the DTOC continued to be singularly responsible.

The solution to this significant shortfall was to structure the approach to terrain management in the rear tactical operations center (RTOC).

The division provost marshal (PM) took the staff lead in developing a methodology to manage terrain. The PM resources did not include a digitized terrain data bank; however, plexiglass and stubby pencils could be used.

The resulting terrain management methodology serves as a shorthand graphic checklist for complete staff coordination.

Third Infantry Division Rear Tactical Operations Center Terrain Management Methodology



PM CELL IS RTOC SINGLE POC FOR TERRAIN ACCOUNTABILITY INFORMATION.
OPERATIONS IS SINGLE ALLOCATOR OF DRA TERRAIN AND FACILITIES.

Military police, as the eyes and ears of the ADC-S in the rear area, were the natural choice to take the lead in verifying the identity and location of units moving through or positioned in the division rear area (DRA). The military police are not trained to make terrain utilization recommendations, so the task of terrain management was divided into terrain accountability and terrain allocation.

The PM cell became the terrain accountant responsible for accurately locating, identifying and plotting the location of all units and facilities in the 3ID area of operation, while the operations cell was charged with the allocation of terrain or facilities to requesting units in the DRA.

The PM cell continued to track the location of units forward of the DRA as the brigades moved into battle and attack positions. This facilitated deconflicting

terrain, particularly as the brigade support areas (BSA) relocated. A brigade commander does not request approval to occupy terrain during the fight, so the role of allocation was limited to the DRA.

The terrain accountant initiated the process by obtaining the division lateral boundaries, division rear boundary, brigade rear boundary, and reserved areas from G3. Each RTOC staff cell was tasked to provide the identification and location of any division unit in the DRA and to coordinate with its corps staff counterpart to obtain data on nondivision units. This was submitted to the terrain accountant as obtained, with a minimum report of "no new information" required every four hours.

Each staff section was directed to track specific units and information. The G1 was responsible to report adjutant general and medical units; G2 reported the locations of military intelligence units and air corridors into the DRA. The G4 provided the location and identification of all combat service support (CSS) units.

The G5 cell was charged to provide the location of German territorial army units, civil affair units and other NATO units; additionally G5 reported information derived from GTA presence reports which located CSS units, combat support (CS) units' trains, and brigade command posts. The G5 was also the point of contact for facility availability.

The RTOC fire support officer reported the positions of all field artillery, and the RTOC air defense officer reported the locations of all air defense units.

The assistant division signal officer reported the locations of the area signal centers and their subscriber units. The RTOC chemical cell supplied the location of chemical units, contaminated areas, downwind hazards and the locations of proposed decontamination sites.

The RTOC engineer staff officer provided the location of engineer units, of executed and unexecuted obstacles and demolitions, and of FASCAM (family of scatterable mines) status. Information was also extracted from periodic unit reports such as the commander's situation report.

The terrain accountant maintained all submitted data on a work sheet that reflected the location as either proposed, confirmed, or unconfirmed. The work sheet shown below was designed to reflect current information and allowed the accountant to backtrack information provided over approximately twelve hours.

This proved invaluable when conflicting data was reported from different sources or at different times. The information from the work sheet was posted on a 1:50,000-scale map that also reflected reserved and contaminated areas.

The reported identifications and locations were evaluated; and a decision to confirm was based on the following criteria: no reported location, the critically of a unit, the source of the report, or the likelihood of the reported location being correct.

When confirmation was necessary, one of the following was tasked: a known 3ID unit located close to the reported location, a military police team, the DRA reserve, or an RTOC liaison officer (LNO).

The DRA reserve is a combat arms unit designated in the division task organization to rear area combat operations, under the operational control of the ADC-S. Normally it is comprised of a mechanized infantry company headquarters with a mix of rifle, tank and mortar platoons.

Reports of confirmation were received through specified channels. Any tasked 3ID unit reported to the operations cell, PM cell, or proponent staff cell.

Military police teams reported to the MP company headquarters, where the information was compiled and

THIRD INFANTRY DIVISION
REAR TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER (RTOC)
TERRAIN ACCOUNTABILITY WORKSHEET

UNIT	CURRENT LOCATIONS (Black, Confirmed; Green, Unconfirmed; Red, Proposed)				
	AS OF	AS OF	AS OF	AS OF	AS OF

relayed to the terrain accountant every four hours *via* courier. The DRA reserve reported directly to the operations cell every eight hours *via* courier. The LNOs reported to the operations or PM cell immediately on returning to the RTOC.

The terrain accountant transferred the confirmed information to the work sheet and updated the map board. The operations cell used the information displayed on the map board to allocate terrain. This continuous display proved a valuable tool for all RTOC staff cells also.

The PM cell exercised the methodology during the battle command training program command post exercise (CPX) WARFIGHTER 89, and it became obvious that the terrain accountant could provide the manager with more information beyond occupied or unoccupied, or empty or full.

In most cases other data were readily available regarding the proximity of CSS units, soil and vegetation and road conditions, proximity of units to class III and class V storage, dispersion of units, contaminated areas and downwind hazards.

The terrain accountant maintained information that did not require continuous display on overlays; one or more of these could be dropped when the information was needed. Separate overlays were maintained reflecting:

- DRA defense plan including sector and zone boundaries;
- Assembly areas, battle positions, and attack positions;
- Proposed chemical decontamination sites;
- Obstacles, demolitions, and FASCAM information; and
- Avenues of approach and air corridors.

The basis for allocating terrain facilities was the terrain accountability map. Requests for terrain in the DRA were received by the RTOC operations cell and were compared with available terrain and facilities.

The following factors were considered: proximity to controlled routes and the availability of cover and concealment and protection of buildings to CSS units; soil and vegetation conditions and internal road networks in proposed forested areas; FM communication to the RTOC; compatibility with future force dispositions (desired and state); G2 intelligence preparation of the battlefield and pattern analysis indicating areas most vulnerable to enemy attack.

The G1 and G4 advised the operations cell about the requesting unit's criticality to sustainment and its self-defense potential. Terrain allocation decisions require a balance between mission and security requirements, and CS or CSS mission requirements were evaluated so as to enhance mission capability by effective placement.

Sites near or on enemy avenues of approach and air corridors were avoided. If a trade-off was required, CS units were located closer to those avenues and corridors than CSS units.

Units with like capabilities (with the exception of medical units) were dispersed to preclude one attack from incapacitating a support system. To preclude collateral damage, units were not located near class III and class V storage sites.

Air defense units were positioned between high-protection-priority units and air avenues, and elements of the DRA reserve were positioned to protect high-priority units in the DRA. All elements of the DRA reserve were positioned within FM range of the DRA reserve headquarters. Coordination was made with the RTOC engineer to harden critical-nonrecuperable units with survivability positions.

Normal priorities for allocating requested terrain and facilities in the DRA were as follows:

- Area signal centers, retransmission sites, and the DTOC;
- Class III and class V storage sites;
- Class IX storage sites and maintenance units;
- Other supply units;
- Aviation maintenance units;
- Controlled routes when crossed by air corridors;
- RTOC/DISCOM command posts;
- Nondivision, back-up direct support units;
- CS unit trains; and finally
- Nondivision CS unit trains.

The support of technology is welcome when it aids the production of higher quality work. Introducing a sophisticated system at some levels does not, however, necessarily improve quality or quantity.

High-tech is not always a viable option, especially in the field. The question of how to execute MP missions during war if computers become dysfunctional or destroyed must, at a minimum, be acknowledged. This methodology, when aggressively and tenaciously executed, can provide valuable terrain and force-tracking information to commanders.

(This article describes an approach to terrain management used by 3ID. At present provost marshal offices normally are not manned or resourced to perform it, and thus being tasked to do so could have a degrading effect on the ability of the PM section to accomplish its wartime functions. The term ROTC is used in this article as it is used in the field. Doctrinally the term ROTC applies only at EAC [echelons above corps]. --editor)

Staff Sergeant Sandra J. Farley was NCOIC, Tactical Operations, Provost Marshal Office, 3d Infantry Division, Wurzburg, FRG at the time this article was written.

A newspaper reporter's perspective

Enforcing the Law

Ms. Karen H. Gambone

Military police enforce the law. They are on the scene at a domestic dispute, a traffic accident, a school crossing. They are also young soldiers asked to do one of the toughest jobs in the Army. No civilian police force would have police as young as 20 carrying weapons and making as many decisions as MPs do, and often it's a life-and-death situation they're in.

They Are Trained

Put two 18-year-olds in uniform, in a vehicle, each with a .45—you don't know what they'll come across, but they have to react either to diffuse or gain control of a situation. They do this, and they do this well because they are trained.

The Frankfurt MP training ground encompasses missile sites that must be guarded—57 square miles with more than 29,000 soldiers, family members and civilians who must be protected from terrorist threats; 144 physical sites with weaponry, classified documents and high-ranking officials that must be guarded; and a culture that is different from their own.

Being an MP in Frankfurt is one of the most difficult assignments. There is no other city in V Corps that has a Sachsenhausen, an area that draws all kinds as that place does.

Much of the training for those who serve the Frankfurt community happens right in their own back yard. Patrols encounter everything from lost bikes to drug deals, from residents locked out of their apartments to domestic violence.

In a quasi-controlled environment the things that civilian police would deal with, the MPs don't have—horrendous, blood-and-guts crimes—because the military justice system and the control commanders have keep them from having to deal with those kinds of things.

Instead the military police have pathetic crimes resulting from alcohol and drug abuse, or they have the normal pressure of pulling someone over in traffic and having a major tell a private first class he'll not take a speeding ticket. The MPs have to be tactful. They have domestic disturbances, one of the most dangerous situations because you don't know what or who is in the house, maybe with a gun....

The hours are long; soldiers may sign on for an 8-hour shift that is really ten to twelve hours or more. To deal with the shift work and long hours, unit's provide stress-management training. For example, the gyms are open to the max, so the MPs who get off late or early in the morning can work out.

They Balance the Mission

The MPs are the law, but they are also combat soldiers who must be trained in river-crossing security; night firing of weapons; and nuclear, biological and chemical warfare, to name a few of the training exercises.

Military police are a major corps command and are responsible for rear-area protection—providing security for corps command convoys, guarding ammunition storage and signal outlets, and circulating and controlling traffic. As part of that mission, monitoring for nuclear-biological-chemical contamination becomes a critical part of the MP responsibility.

Training Is Intense

They gear tactical exercises for those missions. A field exercise has had representatives from each platoon of the battalion's companies divided into eighteen three-man teams competing through six possible NBC scenarios over three kilometers of hilly terrain to test for time, endurance and performance of skills.

With almost twenty pounds of protective clothing, for a total of nearly fifty pounds of gear, and a backpack increasing ambient temperatures by almost 10 degrees, traversing the course became more than just a walk in the woods.

Having to stay in such gear for two to three hours to save your life can impair you emotionally and physically. It's demanding, but it's well worth all the training because you need to know how to survive the pressure of a nuclear or chemical accident.

The soldiers learn what it will be like to fight a war with all that gear on. The course was demanding both physically and technically, but they gained a far greater appreciation for teamwork and reliance on their fellow soldiers.

Law enforcement is the mission 24 hours a day, 365 days a year; but training is also a real-world mission. They do it well.

*Ms. Karen H. Gambone was a reporter for the **Frankfurt Chronicle** community newspaper, Frankfurt, Germany at the time this article was written.*

Providing Security for an International March

Mr. Brian Pigott

In providing security for the international 4-day, 100-mile marches at Nijmegen, Netherlands, the 93d Military Police Battalion, Frankfurt, West Germany worked with military police from Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany. The marches included military and civilian teams from around the world.

The mission for the MPs was to provide security for the American tent city at Camp Heumensoord, the living quarters for the military marchers; for 3d Corps Support Command (COSCOM) Commander; and for the wreath-laying ceremony for Canadian soldiers at Groesbeek Canadian War Cemetery, the resting place for many Canadian soldiers who died on Dutch soil in World War II.

In addition, the military police assisted marchers at aid stations along the marching routes. During the marches ten MPs were on duty at all times. There were three shifts working twelve hours on, twenty-four hours off.

Despite the presence of a Soviet marching team for the first time, no special requirements were made. Security for the Soviet marchers was the responsibility of the Dutch military police.

After 3d COSCOM requested thirty-two military police for Nijmegen, the brigade selected the 93d to provide security. Soldiers were handpicked from various posts throughout West Germany to provide security for the American camp at the marches.

In training for Nijmegen one week before the marches a preinspection was conducted in Hanau to ensure the MPs had the proper equipment and uniforms, and they were briefed on the special paperwork required on the job in the Netherlands.

Brian C. Pigott was assigned to the Public Affairs Office, 3d COSCOM, Frankfurt, West Germany at the time this article was written.

Project Partnership

Ms. Karen H. Gambone and Staff Sergeant Carrie Gobeli

Joint training involving American, Italian and German military police offer valuable opportunities for professional development for MPs stationed in Europe.

Units of the 709th Military Police Battalion, V Corps have hosted twenty soldiers of the Italian army's 13th Battalion Carabinieri and five from the German army's 740th *Feldjaeger*, Kassel. The two-week Operation Project Partnership emphasized combat training for the 284th Military Police Company, Frankfurt; the 564th Military Police Company, Butzbach, Bad Hersfeld and Fulda; and the allied soldiers.

The joint training, which took place near Friedberg and Kirchgoens, covered squad battlefield tactics, rappelling, physical fitness training, equipment familiarization, field navigation and other tasks. Differences in language presented few problems because of the availability of interpreters, and the soldiers soon learned enough common words to accomplish their mission.

The Italian and German MPs also received a Fulda border tour, made a Frankfurt shopping tour, took part in a mess kitchen competition and participated in an 80-kilometer run.

After the joint training in Germany twenty soldiers from the 709th traveled to Gorizia, Italy as part of the exchange. The Italian army military police mission is different from that of the American MPs.

When they go off duty they carry weapons and can make arrests, unlike off-duty U.S. military police. The *carabinieri* have control over the civilian populace. Although they have a similar mission and training as U.S. military police, they are more like U.S. federal police.

Instruction at Gorizia included antiriot training, approach-and-attack tactics, apprehending isolated persons, assisting during natural disasters and helicopter squadron landing techniques.

The Americans also received guided tours of Udine, Trieste, Venice and battlefields of Carso Plateau. They learned that their Italian counterparts are highly respected.

By training together, military police from different countries can learn to accomplish missions, taking advantage of shared similarities and adapting to differences.

Ms. Karen H. Gambone and Staff Sergeant Carrie Gobeli were writers for EurArmy, *Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, U. S. Army Europe, and Seventh Army at the time this article was written.*

Security Forces Training and Evaluation System

First Lieutenant Melinda C. King

Accurately determining the results of a field training exercise can be difficult to accomplish. The 980th Military Police Company (Physical Security), Sierra Army Depot, California successfully used an exercise evaluation method, the security forces training and evaluation system (SFTES). The system has the ability to record both audio and video components of a tactical exercise and allow playback at a later time for an exercise critique.

A data collection network and an array of field equipment were synchronously time coded for playback results. The data collection network centered around the data network computer with digitizer for radio remote-control operations (figure 1).

Three touch-control screens were connected to the main component for relay of messages to critical control areas. In addition, two stationary VCRs were attached to




figure 1

fixed cameras within the site security control center (SSCC) for further monitoring of the exercise. The field equipment consisted of three nighttime and three daytime cameras and three portable VCRs with accompanying monopods or tripods (figure 2).




figure 2

Linking this entire network together was a set of six hand-held UHF radios. Two of these had touchtone pads for a communication link to the main computer *via* the digitizer. The others provided a means for the exercise controller to communicate with the camera operators.

Synchronous Playback

As stated earlier, the system used a synchronous playback system (SPS). At the completion of the exercise all of the field videotapes were brought to the playback room, where four television monitors with stationary VCRs, one edit unit and the synchronous playback computer were located (figure 3).

The SPS computer controlled the playback units and ensured that all tapes were synchronized. As the computer read the time code, it played the tapes corresponding to the appropriate sequence and paused others. During evaluation the observer could view different aspects of the exercise as they occurred simultaneously.

The person reviewing the tapes had the ability to freeze, fast forward, stop, play or slow down the actions. The edit unit allowed the controller the opportunity to select specific portions of time-encoded tapes for retention. This unit allowed for audio dubbing, thereby creating a miniature video production facility from the SPS system.

For initiation of the exercise the controller could use either direct audio commands *via* the radios to the affected areas, visual messages through the touchscreens, or interfacing with the intrusion detection system (IDS). Connection with IDS system enabled the IDS alarm to display its alarm in the video image.

By programming an exercise prior to initiation of an exercise, the controller could use the touchtone pad on the radios to begin the exercise. All messages from the touch-control screens were printed on the stationary VCRs in the security control center (SSC). The option of the time between messages could be controlled by the computer (programmed earlier) on a time-delay setting or at the discretion of the controller.

Technology and Realism

Besides allowing supervisory personnel to measure the weaknesses and effectiveness of their personnel, it also allowed for the integration of modern technology and realism in day-to-day training of security forces.

Because of the dynamic pace of any tactical exercise it is difficult to develop critiques that include first-hand observation of all areas by an evaluator. This SFTES system enabled the evaluator to "be" four places at once—three through the lenses of the cameras and one from the brain of the control room, the security control center.

Because threat analysis is a continuing concern in the physical security field, vulnerability studies can be used daily to ensure compliance with regulations, SOPs and policies. Vulnerability analysis can aid Department of the Army personnel in assessing key areas of interest, such as the effectiveness of doctrine on the subject of convoy security and surety operations surrounding the protection of items or information vital to national security.

Another area of interest is the documentation and support for corrective actions taken by security management personnel in assessing new technical security systems.

Military Police Company the SFTES was used to evaluate the effectiveness of security forces response to alarms and emergencies and to improve training in the performance of security duties.

The SFTES allowed for a better method of critique, as well as assisting supervisors in establishing policies and procedures in situations such as bomb threats, civil disturbances and perimeter penetrations.

The system was used to evaluate MOUT (military operations on urbanized terrain) exercises with MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) equipment, where it proved effective for the observation of individual movement techniques and use of the high-and-low method for clearing buildings.

Since its introduction to Sierra Army Depot's security forces the SFTES was introduced for evaluation at ten other Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) units to include Dugway Proving Ground, Utah; Pueblo Army Depot, Colorado; Anniston Army Depot, Alabama; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Round, Umatilla Proving Ground, Oregon; Tooele Army Depot, Utah; Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, Kentucky; and White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico.




Figure 3

Evaluation and Training

The SFTES has the potential for use Armywide as an evaluation system. Since its installation at the 980th

First Lieutenant Melinda C. King was a platoon leader, 980th MP Company, Sierra Army Depot, Herlong, CA, at the time this article was written. Alabama; Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas; Umatilla Proving Ground.

Train Smart, Evaluate Smart: The Squad Evaluation Exercise

Major Gary W. Kosinuk

During the 1980s the Army began to emphasize "training smart" to conserve limited training resources. For the 1990s resources are even more constrained, and training smart is only half of the equation. To ensure that MP soldiers are getting the most out of training and at the same time maximizing training resources, "evaluating smart" is just as essential as training smart.

The 14th Military Police Brigade, VII Corps, Stuttgart, Germany developed a physically and mentally challenging exercise designed to make the most of evaluation resources while assessing training throughout the brigade: the squad evaluation exercise, or SQUADEX.

To Assess Training and Readiness

The SQUADEX is a two-day, "come-as-you-are" exercise that evaluates combat operations at the MP warfighting level—the squad. Each quarter two squads from each company are selected at random by the brigade commander and command sergeant major and evaluated on the individual and collective tasks that support the brigade's mission essential task list (METL). This evaluation provides leaders with an assessment of training effectiveness and mission readiness across the brigade.

Military police squad missions such as EPW (enemy prisoner of war) collection and battlefield circulation control were evaluated, along with general squad combat tasks such as plan and conduct an attack, conduct and react to ambushes and prepare a squad defensive position. The scenario also required squads to be able to conduct operations in an NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) environment.

Ten individual tasks that supported SQUADEX collective tasks were evaluated as part of the exercise. Squads divided into their 3-man teams to negotiate an orienteering course as a transition from the collective to the individual phase of the evaluation.

Although intended as an evaluation tool, SQUADEX was also conducted as a competition to provide additional incentive for peak performance. Points were awarded for each event, and the best squad was selected from each battalion. The winning squads received plaques to display in their company areas, and each member of the winning squads received a medallion from the brigade commander.

The winning squads during the last SQUADEX were the 3d Squad, 4th Platoon, 204th MP Company, 385th MP Battalion from Stuttgart and the 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, 595th MP Company, 793d MP Battalion from Nuernberg. Soldiers whose performances were clearly superior throughout the exercise were awarded the Army Achievement Medal.

Sequence of Events

STATION 1 Process an enemy prisoner of war.
Cross a contaminated area.
Conduct survey and monitoring.
STATION 2 Evacuate an enemy prisoner of war.
React to an ambush.
STATION 3 Weaponeer.
Assemble and disassemble the M60 machine gun.
Function check.
STATION 4 Conduct a hasty ambush.
STATION 5 Move tactically to an objective.
Clear a roadblock.
STATION 6 Plan a hasty attack.
STATION 7 Conduct a hasty attack into a built-up area.
STATION 8 Negotiate orienteering course.
STATION 9 Establish a squad defensive position.
STATION 10 Perform individual tasks.
First aid and CPR.
Map reading: intersection and resection.
Weapon selection.
Individual movement techniques.
Movement under fire.
Establish a sniper position.
Hand grenade course.
Send a radio message.
AT-4.
Call for fire.

The training benefits derived from SQUADEX were not limited to the evaluated squads. The NCOs who set up and ran the exercise learned a great deal about planning and conducting a major training event.

To Demonstrate NCO Leadership

Their task was a radical departure from their usual involvement with individual and small-unit training. The coordination accomplished by the NCOs to link the various scenarios smoothly and to arrange logistical support over a large training area is normally done at battalion level under the supervision of officers and senior noncommissioned officers.

Because there was minimal officer involvement in SQUADEX, the success of the evaluation was directly attributable to the ability of the NCOs to grasp the complexities of their task, and to organize their resources to complete their mission. Commanders and other leaders throughout the brigade were invited to observe the training and get new ideas on how to train.

The 14th MP Brigade will conduct the SQUADEX quarterly. The evaluated tasks and the standards will vary with each exercise based on other training evaluations and leader assessment of the unit METL.

For example, a reverse-cycle evaluation was planned for December during the long hours of darkness in Germany. By evaluating two squads per company, it was possible to assess training throughout the brigade at a cost of less than one company per battalion.

In contrast, a resource-intensive company ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Program) provides a snapshot of one unit's capabilities every twelve to eighteen months. Several company ARTEPs must be conducted before a brigade or battalion commander can get a feel for the status of training throughout the command.

Unlike the ARTEP, the quarterly SQUADEX provides commanders with a continuous assessment of training in every unit in the brigade. The results of the evaluation form the basis for future training of combat tasks at the MP warfighting level and for training the individual skills that support the squad tasks. Virtually all of the training needed to correct identified weaknesses and to sustain strengths is conducted by the NCOs during "Sergeant's Time" training throughout the brigade.

As a low-cost, high-payoff training event, the SQUADEX is a key component in the 14th MP Brigade efforts to train—and evaluate—smart.

Major Gary W. Kosinuk was the Training Officer, 14th MP Bde, VII Corps, Ludwigsburg-Kornwestheim, Germany at the time this article was written.

The DOD Police Program

Captain David W. Haywood

This article presents data obtained from U.S. Army military police officials nationwide regarding the use of DOD civilian police personnel on U.S. Army installations. Its aim is to provide insights on the DOD police program in support of military police law-enforcement activities and to recommend improvements.

The study evaluated education of officers at entry level, salaries, training required prior to and after hiring, and structure of the DOD police organization on installations.

Input from the Field

Questionnaires were sent to 192 military police officials at twenty-four installations within the continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii. It asked fixed alternative questions as well as open-ended questions for discussion of more complicated responses.

The opinions of the provost marshals, deputy provost marshals, and police operations officers and noncommissioned officers impacted heavily upon the results of the study.

Many Problems

Integrating a civilian organization with its chain of command into a military organization with its chain of command can be difficult and confusing at best. Civilians and military personnel work under different operational rules. Military and civilian personnel who expect to supervise DOD police personnel must be aware of the rules and regulations that govern civilian employees before supervision of civilian personnel begins.

Training on how the civilian hiring, disciplinary, firing, and promotion system works can be attained prior to the initiation of a DOD police program within a military police organization by coordinating with the installation civilian personnel office.

If law-enforcement experience is not required in the job description, training must be provided to new employees. Certification as law-enforcement officers for DOD police employees should be attained within a reasonable time in accordance with standards required in the state where the installation is located.

Responses

Responses received indicated satisfaction by military supervisors with the ability of DOD police to perform their duties. The majority of respondents (73.5 percent) rated the ability of DOD police to perform their duties as average or above.

When respondents compared the abilities of military personnel to that of civilian law-enforcement personnel, 61.3 percent viewed the abilities of civilian personnel to be equal to or above those of military personnel. However, nearly half of those military personnel filling the positions of provost marshal, deputy provost marshal, police operations officer and police operations noncommissioned officer viewed civilian personnel as less capable than military personnel.

When asked what training civilian law-enforcement personnel

were required to have prior to assuming law-enforcement duties on their installations, respondents gave a variety of answers with no single majority response.

The largest percentage (28.4 percent) stated civilian personnel needed a classroom orientation, plus on-the-job training with experienced police before assuming law-enforcement duties. Only 17.2 percent stated that civilian employees performing law-enforcement duties on their installations were required to graduate from an accredited police academy.

However, when asked what training civilian employees should receive, 56.9 percent answered that they felt graduation from an accredited police academy prior to assuming law-enforcement duties should be a requirement.

Over half of the respondents stated they felt that DOD police personnel were underpaid. When asked if they believed better qualified DOD police employees would be attracted and retained if salaries were increased, 88 percent of respondents answered yes.

Federal Program

A majority of respondents (71 percent) indicated the DOD police program should be more efficient and effective centrally managed by a federal agency. Standardization of police training and law-enforcement practices and opportunities for geographic transfer and upward mobility would enhance attraction and retention of quality employees.

Most respondents did not believe DOD police should replace military police on Army installations. Over 70 percent of respondents were opposed to replacement of military police by DOD police, reflecting the sentiment among respondents that there is, within the military, a special relationship created between leaders and those led--soldiers should police soldiers. Law enforcement provided solely by a civilian agency would circumvent the principles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Conclusions

Results of this study provided some answers to questions posed at its outset. Military supervisors were satisfied with the ability of DOD police to perform their duties. Sixty-one percent of the sample population viewed the abilities of civilian and military law-enforcement personnel to be about equal.

In regard to training, a majority of respondents indicated that DOD police need to achieve a higher level of training. Graduation from an accredited police academy prior to employment was recommended.

Salaries needed to be increased for all levels of DOD police personnel to attract and retain quality personnel. The majority of respondents were in favor of making the DOD police organization a centrally managed federal agency, but strongly opposed the replacement of military police by civilian counterparts.

The DOD police program supplements military police assets on U.S. Army installations throughout the continental U.S., Alaska, and Hawaii. The program is viable, but in need of some modifications, according to responses to the questionnaires from the field.

Captain David W. Haywood was assigned to the U.S. Army ROTC Battalion, Western Illinois University, Macomb, Il at the time this article was written. He holds a master's degree in law enforcement administration from its graduate school.

To Speak Up for Freedom

Each year Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, along with the Pennsylvania Department of the Military Order of the Purple Heart, sponsors a military essay category in the national awards program for servicemen and women on active duty, reserve, ROTC and JROTC components to encourage them to think about and to speak up for freedom.

This year the subject is "The Price of Liberty." Essays submitted must be typed, individual efforts of not less than one hundred or more than five hundred words. Entries must include the following: name, rank, service designation, social security number, military address, and permanent home address, and also provide the name, rank, and address of the commanding officer. All ROTC and JROTC entries must include the school name and address and the military instructor's name.

Entries must be postmarked by May 1, 1992 and addressed to the Awards Department, Freedoms Foundation, Route 23, Valley Forge, PA 19481. Framed George Washington honor medals and U.S. savings bonds will be awarded to the winning essays.

A Soldier's Request

Sergeant Major Frank M. McMahon

Treat me with respect, Sergeant.
For no heart in all the world is more loyal than the heart of an American Soldier.

Do not break my spirit with your words, Sergeant.
For although I will do what you demand, your guidance, patience, and understanding will more quickly teach me to be, know, and do."

Speak with me often, Sergeant.
For the praise and counseling you give is expected. I am an American Soldier, expecting to be trained. Discipline must be a part of my life.

Train me for the elements, Sergeant.
For I must learn to fight and win in the heat, the cold, the wet, and the desert. Those who would be our enemies will use these elements. I must be prepared.

I ask no greater glory, Sergeant.
Than to defend our country and our way of life, against all enemies, both foreign and domestic. Allow me that privilege, Sergeant. Train me.

Provide me the necessities of food and drink, Sergeant.
Train me to be self-sufficient, that I may lead the way, and stand ready, willing, and able to protect you, with my life if necessary, should your life be in danger.

Train me, Sergeant.
That one day I, too, can be called Sergeant, the trainer of soldiers, the backbone of the Army. Train me to accept those responsibilities that are yours. Train me to train my soldiers to be the greatest defenders of freedom in the world.

Sergeant, train me to be a Sergeant.
I shall leave this Army knowing, with my last step and my last breath, that my fate was always safest in your hands.

Sergeant, train me.
That I, too, can earn the title "Sergeant."

Sergeant Major Frank M. McMahon was assigned to the Schofield Barracks MP Battalion, HI at the time this poem was written.

The Basics on SDT for Military Police

Armywide the SQT (skill qualification test) program for the Active Army ended September 30, 1991, and the SQT program for the reserve components will end September 30, 1992.

The new SDT (self-development test) targets all MP sergeants, staff sergeants, and sergeants first class. These 95B,C,D soldiers must take the SDT in their MP military occupational specialties (MOSs) to be promoted. To ensure fairness, no one is exempt from taking the tests unless Department of the Army provides for special circumstances, such as for Desert Storm service.

These formal written tests evaluate leadership, training, and MOS-specific skills. Units will not expend training resources to prepare NCOs for the SDT. Besides affecting promotions the SDT influences assignments, school selection, retention, and reclassification.

Notification procedures for the SDT are basically the same as those for the SQT. Each NCO will receive written notice about ninety days before the test window. The SDT notice identifies only the tested subject areas.

Three Sections

The test is divided into three sections: leadership, training, and MP-specific questions. With some exceptions, the SDT will contain one hundred multiple-choice questions and will take no more than two hours to complete. The difficulty of the questions depends on the skill level.

Twenty questions about leadership for each test equal 20 percent of the score. The Center for Army Leadership, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas prepares these questions by using FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, FM 22-101, *Leadership Counseling* and FM 22-102, *Soldier Team Development.*

Similarly, twenty questions about training for each test equal 20 percent of the score. The U.S. Army Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas uses FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training* to prepare questions.

The sixty MP-specific questions, taken as much as possible from the soldier's manual, equal 60 percent of the score. The SDT is designed to evaluate NCO development, not to test MOS proficiency. The MP-specific questions will be broad, considering MP systems, equipment, and duty positions. A broad spectrum of questions will motivate the NCO to keep current on all MP systems, prepare for future assignments, and remain versatile.

Feedback

A goal of the SDT program, scheduled to begin in October 1993, is to provide the results of the SDT to the NCO within thirty days of the test date. The results will be broken down by section, and then by subjects within that section. Unit commanders will also receive their soldiers' test results.

Once testing is completed, the U.S. Army Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), Alexandria, Virginia, will receive the NCO's total scores, and will receive a percentile ranking to show how well each NCO fared among other MP soldiers.

The chain of command, through the major Army command, will get composite results of how the NCOs in the unit fared on the three sections of the test. In FY 92 and 93, the Army Training Support Center, Fort Eustis, Virginia, will provide the results of the SDT only to the individual soldier for self-development purposes only.

The scores and percentile ranking will link the SDT to the enlisted personnel management system (EPMS) beginning in FY 94. The link to EPMS includes promotion, assignments, school selection, and retention. PERSCOM will rank the scores once testing is complete and results are validated. The following paragraphs outline the proposed linkage of the SDT to the enlisted personnel management system.

SDT and Personnel Management

First-time SDT failures will be ineligible to attend any NCO education system schools. Also, the commander will consider either reclassification or separation for any NCO who fails. After the second test failure the commander will initiate reclassification or separation action, and the NCO is ineligible to reenlist.

Semicentralized promotion system. The skill level one soldier will no longer take an annual test. Therefore, an 800-point semicentralized promotion system has been adopted for promotion to sergeant.

Sergeants will continue to use the 1,000-point system and will get two promotion points for each point earned on the SDT for a maximum of two hundred points. Sergeants must have a passing score on the SDT to get promoted. This is no longer a waivable requirement.

Centralized promotion system. Sergeants first class and staff sergeants must have a passing score to be promoted. This requirement is nonwaivable. Each soldier's SDT score will be used as a favorable discriminator under the whole-soldier concept. Headquarters, Department of Army will provide further guidance on the linkage of SDT to EPMS prior to FY 94.

Distribution of Manuals

SDT Pubs is the title for a packet of manuals consisting of FM 22-100, FM 22-101, FM 22-102, and FM 25-101. The chain of command is responsible for obtaining and issuing the initial set of manuals and subsequent

changes to each NCO and newly promoted sergeant.


Each NCO is responsible for keeping a personal copy of the four manuals in addition to the correct soldier's manual. NCOs must maintain these publications until promoted to master sergeant. Soldiers who do not receive SDT Pubs must use manuals in the MOS library. *(Sergeant First Class James. L. Roberts, Department of Enlisted Training, Fort Rucker, AL)*

The Self-Development Test

A New NCO Evaluation Tool

Last October marked a major change of course in the Army's individual testing program. At that time the first self-development test, or SDT, was administered.

The new test was recommended by senior command sergeants major (CSMs) at an October 1989 conference. They felt the Army had outgrown the need for the skill qualification test (SQT), which was designed to promote and evaluate individual training in units. The NCO corps was the best trained in this nation's history, due largely to the highly successful Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) Education System and continuing advances in training doctrine.



What was needed instead of the SQT was an instrument to evaluate an NCO's progress in self-development as part of leader development. This led to the CSMs' recommendation for the SDT, whose stated purpose is to allow NCOs to measure and guide their growth in the skills and competencies they will need as they continue to develop as leaders. The Chief of Staff of the Army accepted the recommendation and directed implementation of the SDT in fiscal year (FY) 92.

The SDT is, in fact, an important part of the self-development pillar of leader development. Leader development rests on the three pillars of institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development.

Under the first two pillars the NCO learns fundamental skills, knowledge, and attitudes and puts them to use in his various job assignments. Under the third pillar, self-development, he initiates and completes a program of self-development to round out leader development needs not addressed or satisfied under the first two pillars.

The Army has instruments to measure NCO performance under the first two pillars (*e.g.*, resident course tests, NCO evaluation report) but none for the self-development pillar. The SDT is the Army's response to that shortcoming. While it does not provide a complete profile of NCO self-development, it does measure certain critical aspects: MOS (military occupational specialty) knowledge, leadership, and training.

A Written Test

So what can we say about the SDT itself? Every sergeant, staff sergeant, and sergeant first class will take the SDT, with each of those ranks in an MOS having its own test.

Active Component and active guard and reserve NCOs began testing in October (FY 92) and will test annually; Reserve Component NCOs will begin testing in FY 93 and will test every other year. The FY 92 SDT test period schedule is laid out in DA Circular 350-91-1, now in the field. The training standards officer network now in operation will administer the new test.

The SDT is a written test, normally taking two hours or less to complete. It has twenty questions each on leadership and training and about sixty questions on MOS knowledge. To promote NCO versatility in an MOS, the MOS knowledge section is broad based, testing the NCO on his entire MOS rather than a single duty or equipment system. This is a fundamental difference between the SQT and SDT.

The NCOs will prepare for the SDT on their own. This matches up with the self-development philosophy, which stresses personal responsibility. Units will no longer allocate time on their training schedules to prepare soldiers for an upcoming test.

The NCO will receive an SDT notice about two months before the test period. To prepare for the leadership section of the SDT the NCO must study FM 22-100 (*Military Leadership*), FM 22-101 (*Leadership Counseling*), and FM 22-102 (*Soldier/Team Development*). For the training section the NCO must study FM 25-101 (*Battle-Focused Training*).

For the MOS knowledge section the NCO will need to study the MOS-specific soldier's manual (SM) and any supporting references shown in the SDT notice.

By now each NCO should have a personal set of the above leadership and training manuals. Any NCO who does not yet have the manuals should immediately notify the unit publications clerk to order them. The NCO should be able to obtain the MOS-specific SM and needed supporting references in their work area or the installation or unit learning center.

Two Reports on Results

Following testing, the NCO will receive two reports showing their SDT results. The first report, the initial individual soldier's report (ISR), within 30 days after testing, tells the NCO how many questions were answered correctly on each section of the SDT–leadership, training, MOS knowledge–and on each subject area of the MOS knowledge section.

The NCO will receive the second report, the final ISR, about 2 1/2 months after the test period closes. In addition to SDT section feedback, the report will show the NCO's official SDT score (0 to 100) and a corresponding percentile or ranking. If, for example, the NCO receives an SDT score of 85 and a percentile of 65, the SDT score of 85 was as good as or better than the scores of 65 percent of the NCOs taking that SDT.

The FY 92 and FY 93 iterations of the SDT will not be used for personnel management purposes. Individual test results will go to the NCO only. The results can be used to steer self-development.

Beginning in FY 94, however, the NCO's SDT results will become a part of Army permanent records and be tied to the enlisted personnel management system. As such, they will be an important factor in promotion, retention/separation, and school attendance decisions.

The Army has high expectations for the SDT. Properly designed and administered, it should be a highly useful new NCO evaluation tool. *(U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA)*

SDT and the Enlisted Personnel Management System

Department of the Army announced that the results of the FY 92 and FY 93 self-development test (SDT) will not be used within the enlisted personnel management system (EPMS). The U.S. Army Training Support Center (ATSC), Fort Eustis, Virginia will provide only one copy of the individual soldier report (ISR) to the soldier. This copy is to be forwarded through the TSO (training standards office) and is to be used by the NCO for self-development purposes only.

During FY 92 and FY 93, ATSC will not provide the Total Army Personnel Command a copy of the ISR for posting and updating the enlisted master file (EMF). During this period, the SDT scores will not be used for EPMS.

Beginning in October 1993 the Department of the Army's goal is to link the results of the SDT to the EPMS as follows:

Training Management. Soldiers with non-passing scores will be ineligible to attend NCOES (Noncommissioned Officer Education System).

Reclassification. First non-passing score results in the commander considering reclassification. Second non-passing score, the commander initiates reclassification or separation.

Retention Management. First non-passing score the commander considers separation. Second non-passing score the commander will initiate separation proceedings and the soldier is ineligible for reenlistment.

Promotion System. Passing score is a nonwaivable requirement. Promotion points are granted according to the score.

Finally, until October 1993 the results of the FY 91 skill qualification test (SQT) will continue to be used in the EPMS system as they were in the past. In other words, the commander may still consider a soldier who did not pass the SQT for reclassification, deny their reenlistment, or not recommend their promotion. These decisions may be made on the basis of the FY 91 SQT results.

Communicative Skills-- A Must for NCOs

Sergeant Major Jack L. Hooper

The importance of good communication skills to NCOs cannot be overemphasized. Field Manual 22-100, *Military Leadership* lists communications as a major factor of leadership.

How well NCOs communicate with their soldiers either builds or breaks down the relationship to them. It affects unit discipline and cohesion. Two essential principles of Army leadership involve communication: (1) keep subordinates informed and (2) ensure the task is understood, supervised and accomplished.

In order to be effective, soldiers must understand what is expected of them and if a task is to be accomplished in a specific way. Oversupervision of soldiers causes resentment, and undersupervision causes frustration. Performance that meets standards depends, to a large degree, on an NCO's ability to communicate what is wanted in clear, concise and complete terms.

Counseling is a fundamental responsibility of every leader. The Army regards it as important enough to devote an entire manual to it. FM 22-101, *Leadership Counseling*, acknowledges effective communication skills as an essential element of leadership counseling.

To counsel effectively, actively apply the skills of listening, watching, responding and guiding. Nonverbal communication is often as important as speaking and listening. Facial expression, posture and eye contact all impart messages to the soldier being counseled.

Communication is also covered in the chapter "Enlisted Aspects of Command" in AR 600-20, *Army Command Policy*. This regulation authorizes the NCO support channel, which parallels and reinforces the Army chain of command. Both are means of communication and control--a support channel to pass information, issue orders, and accomplish missions directed by commanders, and to pass policies and procedures that affect training, appearance, and standards of performance and conduct.

Communication coordinates and controls all parts of a unit. Effective communication results in accurate and timely flow of information, and assists in building a cohesive, coordinated unit.

In October 1988 the NCO Leader Development Task Force was chartered to produce an action plan for improving the Army's NCO leader development system. This group identified skills, knowledge and attitudes (SKAs) NCOs must have to support the nine leader competencies in FM 22-100. Communicative skills were high among the SKAs identified.

The task force recommended an integrated program that establishes standards and guidelines for assessment and remediation of all NCO communicative skills. This training follows guidelines set in TRADOC Regulation 350-25, *Communicative Skills Program.*

TRADOC prescribes the following standards for effective communication:

- Writing that can be understood in a single, rapid reading and is generally free of errors in grammar, mechanics, and usage;
- Speaking that is immediately understandable, substantive, brief, and grammatically correct;
- Reading with the ability to interpret materials that soldiers need to do their primary duties; and
- Listening closely to get the full meaning in every message.

An informed soldier is a better soldier. It is an NCOs responsibility to develop better soldiers. Communication is such an important part of this process that it can't be ignored. In fact, it must be one of highest priorities.

Sergeant Major Jack L. Hooper was the Sergeant Major of Public Affairs for Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. at the time this article was written.

SDT Exemptions for Desert Storm Soldiers

Headquarters, Department of the Army recently announced interim guidance for the administration of the SDT (self-development test) requirements for soldiers who participated in Operation Desert Storm.

In FY 92 commanders may request an exception from SDT for units that participated in Desert Storm. However, a blanket unit exception should be used sparingly because units typically are comprised of NCOs in many MOSs, each with a unique test window.

After returning from Southwest Asia, NCOs should have about six months to study the doctrinal publications before being tested on the SDT. Units and individual NCOs who do not meet this criteria are eligible for exemption.

The approval authority for blanket unit exemption is the MACOM (major army command) commander. Individual NCO exemptions associated with Operation Desert Storm may be granted by the first commander (lieutenant colonel or above) in the chain-of-command.

The servicing TSO (training standards office) should be notified of the approval and provided a list of affected NCOs.

Warfighting Readiness

Throughout the history of the Army, the noncommissioned officer has played an indispensable role in the warfighting readiness of the force. Today NCOs are expected to display the highest professional standards in leading soldiers and ensuring that the Army is trained and ready.

Noncommissioned officers are the day-to-day leaders of soldiers. They ensure individual soldiers attain and maintain required standards of proficiency, and they link soldier performance to unit missions.

Noncommissioned officers are both leaders and trainers. As leaders, NCOs must reconcile the imperatives of mission accomplishment with the needs of their soldiers and must place both ahead of their personal welfare.

In the face of constrained fiscal resources, the Army's leadership has consistently proven that it values noncommissioned officers by sustaining and expanding the tools NCOs use to accomplish their mission, ensuring opportunities for promotion, enhancing the Noncommissioned Officer Education System, linking NCOES to promotions and emphasizing quality-of-life programs.

The Army's goal is to make an already outstanding noncommissioned officer corps even better by focusing on NCO missions to lead, train, maintain standards and enforce discipline. *(Extracted from the November 1989* Army Focus*)*

Prepping for the Point

Colonel James A. Orahood

Any soldier between the ages of 17 and 21 may be eligible to attend the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School (USMAPS) Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, gain admission to West Point, and graduate as a Regular Army (RA) officer.

This unique opportunity, created by act of congress in 1916, authorized the president to appoint enlisted soldiers as cadets at the United States Military Academy (USMA), West Point, New York. From this act the Army derived the mission of preparing selected soldiers scholastically for the academy.

The first preparatory school was run by General Pershing in the trenches of France in World War I. Several different types of programs were tried over the next three decades, finally settling on a formally established school much in the form that it is today.

Created in 1945 by General Maxwell Taylor, this final form established a well-rounded academic, military and physical training program designed to prepare RA soldiers to meet the rigorous entrance standards for West Point.

The USMAPS has many distinguished graduates in its lineage. There have been general officers, Rhodes scholars, and decorated veterans of four wars. One graduate went on to become the superintendent of USMA and to reach the rank of four-star general. Another graduate, BG Robert Scott Jr., of Flying Tiger fame in World War II and author of *God is My Copilot*, credited the school with giving him the boost he needed to go on to West Point and to what he called the finest career a young American could possibly have.

Each year the school selects 170 RA soldiers from more than a thousand applications to compete for eighty-five appointments to West Point. Those selected then report to USMAPS in late July to begin the 10-month curriculum.

To be eligible to attend USMAPS, the soldier must meet the following requirements:

- A citizen or able to become a citizen prior to July 1 of the year graduating from USMAPS;
- At least 17, but not over 21 prior to July 1 of the year in which attendance at the school is desired;
- Unmarried, with no legal dependents;
- A high school graduate or GED equivalent;
- Medically qualified for admission to the United States Military Academy; vision correctable to 20/20 with glasses; pregnancy results in medical disqualification;
- Of high moral character, with no civilian or military felony conviction and no history of venereal infection or of alcohol or drug abuse; and
- Highly motivated toward a career as an officer.

Primary emphasis of the school is on academics (math and English) mixed with military training, physical conditioning, and the development of ethical and leadership traits. While the main emphasis is on preparation for passing the entrance exams for West Point, the course is also designed to prepare students for the rigors of cadet life.

Students gain valuable leadership training through rotation in the student chain of command, learn team sports, conduct peer evaluations, train in drill and ceremony, participate in map-reading competitions, and have a variety of other experiences that follow the model that students undergo as cadets at West Point.

The typical student learned about USMAPS when first contacted by an officer who knew of this unique opportunity. That officer had sought out the young soldier because of demonstrated special qualities--those personal characteristics cherished and sought in the profession of arms.

That officer, by recognizing those traits in the young soldier and then acting to assure that the soldier was able to compete for this opportunity, left one of the most valuable legacies to the Army. That officer renewed and perpetuated the professional body as well as its standards by choosing the talented younger soldier.

Whether the reader of this short article is a soldier, a noncommissioned officer or an officer, the message is the same as it was when congress initially established this opportunity for enlisted soldiers to gain appointment to West Point.

The academy needs former enlisted soldiers to graduate and become officers because they bring a unique and well-rounded view to USMA and to the officer corps. The only way by which many of the enlisted soldiers can succeed at West Point is if they have the one extra year of preparation that the U.S. Military Academy Preparatory School provides.

For more information about USMAPS, write the Commandant, USMAPS, Fort Monmouth, NJ 07703 or call AUTOVON 992-1807 or commercial (201) 532-1807.

Colonel James A. Orahood was the Commandant of the USMA Preparatory School at the time this article was written. He gained an appointment to West Point from the school in 1964. He also holds a master's degree from Central Michigan University, Mount Pleasant, MI.

Importance of Effective Communication

Lieutenant Colonel Richard St. Denis

A great deal of time is spent communicating with others. Studies show that officers and NCOs typically spend over 75 percent of the duty day communicating—writing, reading, listening, and speaking in meetings, briefings, and conversations all day long. Effective communication is important and needs to be done well.

Vital to Leadership

Good communication is vital to good leadership. Soldiers must know, as clearly as possible, the policies to be followed and the plans to be executed. A leader must always communicate ideas and orders clearly, concisely, correctly, completely, and convincingly to followers.

Our soldiers deserve leaders who think and communicate clearly and concisely. Anything less wastes time, money, and possibly lives.

Simply put, the information communicated is the lifeblood of the unit. It is always flowing in many different directions, in many distinct forms, and in many separate channels. That information, and how it is communicated, is important. A unit just cannot operate effectively without good data, clear orders, understandable plans, and excellent feedback.

Poor communication can lead to serious problems. It may hinder success on the battlefield or elsewhere. As noted in FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, failure to communicate effectively while solving problems and while executing plans is one of the greatest obstacles to success in training and in battle.

History is filled with examples of military disasters caused by poor communication, and today the challenges to leaders are greater than ever. Consider the prospects: future war will most likely begin with a rapid deployment of joint forces to a distant battlefield to fight alongside allied forces. The complexities of information flow in this situation of staggering. Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm were only a sample of future possibilities.

Just for a moment let your imagination wander and envision this scenario:

It is late at night on the third day of the next war in a distant land. Your unit has been heavily committed. Your soldiers have been without sleep or a hot meal for two days.

Suddenly, you receive a major change in mission that takes effect in eight hours. Your staff must prepare new movement plans, battle plans, and overlays for linking up with an allied brigade to secure a major objective.

What are the communication objectives? What barriers will you face in communicating your intent to your staff? How do you overcome them?

Later, as the combined force begins to carry out the new mission, you receive a spot report from allies of heavy enemy resistance in what you thought was a quiet sector. Your attempts to verify the information are blocked because of poor radio contact. You are six kilometers from the scene.

How reliable is the information? What is meant by "heavy" resistance? How will this development affect your thinking? What follow-up orders do you issue?

Clear and Concise

It is plain to see how important good communication is to that scenario. If the written or spoken communication from the allies is clear and concise, the commander will have confidence in planning and taking action. If, however, that commander is unsure of the information provided there will likely be more uncertainty about what course of action to take.

Whether following the examples from the past or that scenario of the future, the bottom line is still the same. Effective communication—be it speaking, listening, writing, or reading—is a necessary ingredient to Army success.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard St. Denis was the Chief of Strategy and Leadership Support Branch, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, FORSCOM at the time this article was written. He holds a bachelor's degree from the U.S. Military Academy, and master's degrees from Duke University, Durham, N.C. and Oklahoma City University, OK.

Logistics Management Training

The senior officer logistics management course (SOLMC) is specifically designed to update commanders and their primary staff at the battalion and brigade level in the logistics arena. The course encompasses maintenance, supply, and transportation procedures and hands-on experience with vehicles, weapons, ammunition, medical, communications, NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) and quartermaster equipment.

The course is open to officers in the grade of major or above in the active and reserve Army, Marine Corps, and allied nations and to DOD civilians in the grade of GS-11 or above. The one-week course is conducted ten times each fiscal year at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

Class quotas may be obtained through normal TRADOC channels. For more information telephone AUTOVON 464-7133/3411 or commercial (502) 624-7133/3411. *(U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox Ky)*

SOLMC Schedule

Course Number: 8A-F23

Class Number	Report Date	Start Date	End Date
1	6 Oct 91	7 Oct 91	11 Oct 91
2	5 Jan 92	6 Jan 92	10 Jan 92
3	26 Jan 92	27 Jan 92	31 Jan 92
4	1 Mar 92	2 Mar 92	6 Mar 92
5	29 Mar 92	30 Mar 92	3 Apr 92
6	5 Apr 92	6 Apr 92	10 Apr 92
7	26 Apr 92	27 Apr 92	1 May 92
8	10 May 92	11 May 92	15 May 92
9	14 Jun 92	15 Jun 92	19 Jun 92
10	20 Sep 92	21 Sep 92	25 Sep 92

95D Self-Development Test

Since each MOS retains the same test window it has for the skill qualification test (SQT), 95Ds (skill levels 2, 3 and 4) still test between January 1 and March 31, 1992.

The four field manuals to be used as references to answer the forty leadership and training questions (FM 25-101, *Battle-Focused Training* and FMs 22-100, *Military Leadership*, 22-101, *Leadership Counseling*, and 22-102, *Soldier/Team Development*) were shipped CONUS-wide beginning April 22 and completed within ninety days. Arrangements were also made for OCONUS shipment. The SDT notice for skill levels 2, 3 and 4 was fielded about ninety days prior to the test window.

The sixty MOS-related questions were selected from previous test task analyses and confirmed using current doctrine. A key to assist in studying for the SDT is to read the notice carefully and highlight what tasks will be tested in the soldier's manual (STP 19-95D15-SM-TG).

Unlike the SQT notice, all tasks listed in the SDT notice are tested. The notice also provides a listing of all references needed to study in order to answer the questions. Additional references listed in the soldier's manual are not required to pass the SDT. The study time and references for MOS questions are kept to a minimum.

There are no forms to be reviewed during the test's MOS portion, so poor copy quality will no longer be a problem. Also, the MOS questions are now only cop-related and will not consist of "ID of threat weapons" or "blackout driving."

Another big change in the SDT is that only a broad subject area (for example, elements of proof) is provided, followed by questions from any of the tasks listed under that heading in the soldier's manual. This is different from the SQT's more detailed subject areas (for example, specify the elements of proof for the offense of robbery) which were always followed by a set of five questions that were directly related.

Hopefully, by now military police 95Ds have a better understanding of the SDT and the importance of preparation for the tasks listed in the notice.

Career Opportunities in the Army Acquisition Corps

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel D. Ziomek

(The following article reflects the importance to the Military Police Corps to develop the best Army acquisition officers possible. Although only a small number of MP officers are projected for annual accession into the Army Acquisition Corps, the unique career opportunities provided by this new corps warrant serious consideration.—editor.)

Junior officers can apply for the new Army Acquisition Corps (AAC), which offers single-track career progression with promotion potential to the highest ranks and technical training and graduate schooling.

As of July 1989 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney required each of the services to establish a dedicated corps of military acquisition specialists. The goal of the AAC is to develop a pool of specialists to fill critical materiel acquisition management positions, with the specialists applying their knowledge of operational realities and technology.

The annual assessments from the Army totals about 220 officers. From captain through colonel, the AAC will have a target population of approximately three thousand officers.

Career Progression

A DA board will review all MP officers who hold functional areas 51 (research, development and acquisition), 52 (nuclear weapons), 53 (systems automation), and 97 (contracting and industrial management) during their eighth year of service for entry into the AAC. Officers may apply for the AAC if they hold eligible functional areas; but the board will determine who enters the program, to include officers who haven't applied for the AAC.

Once selected, officers receive a skill code of 4M (AAC candidate for certification), and their career files move from their branches to the acquisition branch at the Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM).

Any officer selected for the AAC who does not have an advanced degree will be scheduled for the Army's advanced civil schooling program for a master's degree in management, business, science or engineering.

After civil schooling the officer will attend a nine-week materiel acquisition management course at the Army Logistics Management College, Fort Lee, Virginia, *en route* to the first acquisition assignment.

At least 50 percent of AAC officers will be selected for the resident Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas and programmed for acquisition-related operational assignments as majors—their last branch assignments. From this point AAC officers serve exclusively in acquisition assignments after attending the program management course at the Defense Systems Management College, Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

Memorandums of instructions (MOIs) to lieutenant colonel and colonel promotion boards will ensure that selection rates for AAC officers are at or above the rate for the entire Army competitive category. The AAC officers will not be eligible for battalion- or brigade-level commands.

As lieutenant colonels, members compete for 285 critical acquisition positions, including 88 product manager positions. As colonels, AAC officers compete for 139 critical positions, which include 79 project manager assignments.

By law, all general officers assigned to procurement commands must meet the AAC certification standards, thus providing AAC officers potential for promotion to the highest general officer ranks.

Early Career Planning

It isn't too early for junior officers to begin thinking about an AAC career. Officers request their functional areas at approximately the fifth year of service; those military police officers wanting an AAC career must select functional areas 51, 52, 53, or 97. Having the right functional area will not guarantee entry into the AAC, but it is a prerequisite to applying for and entering the AAC at the eighth year of service.

The Army is committed to establishing and maintaining a world-class acquisition corps. Through the AAC, officers have challenging and rewarding opportunities to provide the best soldiers in the world the best equipment in the world.

For more information about the AAC, call AUTOVON 284-9571/9572 or commercial (703) 274-9571/9572 or write the Chief, Army Acquisition Proponency Office, Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency, Alexandria, Va 22333-0001.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel D. Ziomek was Chief, AAC Proponency Office, Army Acquisition Executive Support Agency, Alexandria, VA at the time this article was written.

Training with Industry

Captain Michael S. Galloucis

The Army offers branch-qualified officers an opportunity to work in the civilian sector for extended periods as participants in the training with industry (TWI) program. Numerous large companies in the United States participate in the program.

The Military Police Corps traditionally sends two MP officers a year to TWI assignments related to the field of physical security and functional area 51 (research and development). Additionally, other MP officers participate in the TWI program each year in other functional areas, for example, a TWI tour with a civilian newspaper firm for an MP who holds the functional area 46 (public affairs).

The intent of the TWI program is to assign an officer to a TWI assignment that relates to the specialty (either basic branch or functional area) the officer will be utilized in after the TWI tour. The TWI tour lengths are usually six to twelve months.

Participants usually receive a warm reception at the company. During the first two weeks the TWI participant works closely with the company and their follow-on command to develop a TWI training plan.

While some companies may already have expectations and work assignments, an officer's initiative and imagination can influence the types of projects to undertake. There will be numerous opportunities to utilize Army training in a TWI assignment.

The TWI participants work the same hours as the other employees; and although the work hours are not as long as a typical Army MP unit, TWI participants are expected to work a minimum of forty hours a week and may work on weekends.

A good way for MP officers to prepare for their first assignment in their functional area is to attend a specialty school followed by a TWI tour. The Army benefits from the TWI program when the officer

reports for a follow-on assignment and applies the knowledge gained during the tour. The sponsoring corporation benefits from having a dedicated professional with a wealth of supervisory experience working for them at no cost.


The TWI program is governed by AR 621-1 (Chapter 3), *Training of Military Personnel at Civilian Institutions.* Any branch-qualified officer may apply, using DA Form 1618-R, *Application for Detail as a Student Officer at a Civilian Educational Institution or at Training with Industry.*

Captain (P) Mike Galloucis was serving in the Office of the Chief of Army Public Affairs, Washington, D.C. at the time this article was written. He successfully completed a TWI assignment with a civilian newspaper firm; he holds functional area 46 (public affairs).

Military Police Officer Strength

The military police officer strength in October, 1991 was as follows:

	ACTIVE	USAR	NG
Total male officer	1865	1003	1194
Total female officers	440	168	151
Total officers	2305	1171	1345
Lieutenant population	615	455	706
Captain population	810	312	319
Major population	516	245	187
Lieutenant Colonel population	261	132	93
Colonel population	97	26	36
Brigadier General	4	1	4
Major General	2		
OVERAGE or SHORTAGE			
Lieutenants	Overage		
Captains thru YG 82	Overage		
Captains before YG 82	Overage		
Majors	Overage		
Lieutenant Colonels	Overage		
Colonels	Overage		



TO: Readers
FROM: Editor

To Perpetuate a Tradition

During the past fifty years military police worldwide have established a tradition of unflagging competence, commitment, and caring. With these words of praise in a message of congratulations on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Corps, the Secretary of the Army issued a challenge to perpetuate the tradition of service emblazoned on the Regimental crest: *assist, protect* and *defend* our nation and those soldiers who defend America worldwide.

The articles in this issue again reflect the varied missions performed by military police on the battlefield and at home station to contribute to the readiness of the Total Army.

A Voice in Deciding

The Army relies heavily on field input in its efforts to modernize doctrine, equipment, and support for the soldier. To give soldiers and commanders a voice in deciding what a soldier wears, carries or consumes in a tactical environment, the TRADOC Systems Manager-Soldier now has a 24-hour hotline.

Recommendations to improve battlefield capabilities of lethality, command and control, survivability, sustainment, and mobility are being sought, as are recommendations on lightening the soldier's load. To make recommendations, call the hotline at commercial (404) 545-1245 or AUTOVON 835-1245. These numbers will be used until a toll-free line can be established.

Unit Inactivation or Relocation?

Commanders of units scheduled for inactivation or relocation are requested to notify the Editor, Military Police Magazine, U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan, AL 36205-5030. This will enable us to update our distribution lists. Telephone numbers are AUTOVON 865-4326 or commercial (205) 848-4326.—editor.

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MP COLONEL COMMAND
BRIGADE LEVEL COMMAND DESIGNATED UNITS
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1991

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
William L. Hart	Michael L. Davis	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Howard E. O'Brien	Morgan H. Merrill	Trng Bde	Ft McClellan, AL
Charles W. Cox	Burt Arthur	USACB	Ft Riley, KS
Floyd J. Davis	Thomas J. Davis	8th MP Bde	Seoul, Korea
Ronald E. Jones	Devone Kinston, Jr.	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Alexander P. Sowa, Jr.	Carl L. Kreiger	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Lucious E. Delk	James R. Armour	18th MP Bde	Frankfurt, GE
John G. Meyer, Jr.	Curtis E. Thomas	14th MP Bde	Stuttgart, GE
Charles L. Haynes	James G. Shakell	42d MP Group	Mannheim, GE
Robert H. Taylor	Billy Vaughn	2d CID Rgn	Heidelberg, GE
Roy L. Nicholson	Danny Wimmer	3d CID Rgn	Ft Gillem, GA
Linda L. Norman	Camilo D. Saaverda	6th CID Rgn	Presidio of SF, CA
Forrest S. Chilton IV	Bradley J. Dunn	7th CID Rgn	Yongsan, Korea

MP LIEUTENANT COLONEL COMMAND
BATTALION LEVEL COMMAND DESIGNATED UNITS
AS OF 1 OCTOBER 1991

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Miles Lehmann	Donald E. Thomas	92d MP Bn	Ft Clayton, Panama
Charles D. Lowman	Michael Brandstetter	93d MP Bn	Frankfurt, GE
James L. Saunders	Joseph Cruz	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
Gareth Nicholson	Thomas Lorenzini	97th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
David L. Walker	Clifford Adams	385th MP Bn	Stuttgart, GE
David Hulme	Charles E. Joas	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Ted Hashimoto	Roselle Robinson	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Charles MacPherson	Alexander Evans	519th MP Bn	Ft Meade, MD
Scott Larson	Benny K. Conner	709th MP Bn	Frankfurt, GE
Jean F. Burleson	Layton Benson	716th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Stephen J. Curry	Gary N. Travis	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
George Smith	Chester Warlick	728th MP Bn	Taegu, Korea
Mary A. Maier	Forest Guess	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Michael A. Pearson	Bobby L. Henry	793d MP Bn	Fuerth, GE
Robert W. Neubert	Jimmy W. Stacy	795th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Jonathan H. Cofer	Oren C. Barclay	787th MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Larry M. Forster	Harold L. Burleson	701st MP Bn	Ft McClellan, AL
Dennis Davis	Richard A. Youngs	772d MP Bn	Seoul, Korea
Charles W. Cox III	Vacant	3d Bn, USACB	Ft Riley, KS
Marvin L. Nickels	Thomas E. Kolle	MP Bn, USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Arnold W. Carter	Thomas J. Quinn	LEC	Ft Campbell, KY
Bruce R. Conover	Benigno M. Pineda	IDF	Ft Lewis, WA
Walter L. Chalkley	Jeffrey Sollinger	CID District	Frankfurt, GE
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