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MILITARY POLICE



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
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Chief, Military Police Corps Regiment, and Commandant, United States Army Military Police School

Brigadier General Stephen J. Curry



On September 26, 2002, our Military Police Corps Regiment will celebrate its 61st Anniversary as a Branch of our Army. We look forward to the opportunity, once again, for all MP soldiers throughout the Regiment to pause and reflect on the sacrifices of the MP warriors who have given their lives defending this great nation. I expect our MP units to participate to the greatest extent possible, without any degradation to the war on terrorism, the defense of our nation, and the training of our soldiers. The Anniversary Celebration this year, at the Home of the Regiment, will consist of the Regimentwide Warfighter Team Challenge and our traditional Anniversary Week Celebration consisting of the Regimental Hall of Fame inductions, Regimental Memorial Grove observance, and Regimental Review. Additionally, our activities are structured to serve as a rehearsal for the consolidation of the Regimental Anniversary Celebration and the Annual Military Police Regimental Conference which will take place in Fall 2003.

Our Regiment is completely engaged in the war on terrorism. The events of September 11, 2001, have forever changed our nation. What has not changed is the way our Army responds to disaster or tragedy—in every case, the Military Police Corps Regiment receives the call to action. A year later, as I travel across the world, I see our great MP forces—Active, Guard, and Reserve—defending our nation here and abroad. Our Military Police are actively engaged from our nation's airports to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and from the Pentagon to Baghram, Afghanistan. I am extremely proud of the commitment and service by all of our MP soldiers, but particularly those from our Reserve and National Guard units. Reflecting the ever-increasing need for Military Police, 36 percent of both our Reserve and Guard units have been mobilized and deployed to various locations around the world. Our installations and overseas operations are safe and secure because of the tremendous work of our entire Regiment and its soldiers. The road ahead is unclear as we continue to bring the fight to the enemies of democracy. What I do know is that wherever that fight takes us, the Military Police Corps Regiment will be there and will continue to be the Force of Choice.

The year 2003 will bring new and exciting challenges for the Regiment. Here at the Home of the Regiment, the Military Police School will continue to train and develop outstanding soldiers and leaders for the Regiment. Even as the Army moves forward with the Transformation Campaign Plan, our maneuver commanders still need the tactical MP team on the ground to conduct MP combat support operations to standard. While our combat support role remains absolutely primary in its importance, the emerging Homeland Security and Force Protection concepts will require us to achieve a more balanced focus and ability to perform our wartime combat support and peacetime law enforcement missions to an equal standard of excellence. Currently, we are forming a team of subject matter experts, training developers, and curriculum designers to conduct a top-to-bottom review of all training requirements that support provost marshal operations. We look forward to working closely with many of you in the Regiment, our sister service military police agencies, and our civilian law enforcement academies and departments in this endeavor.

My personal thanks goes out to all of the great men and women serving our great Regiment.

Assist, Protect, Defend

Regimental Command Sergeant Major

Command Sergeant Major James F. Barrett



I am deeply honored to be the eighth MP Corps Regimental Command Sergeant Major. There are many great command sergeants major across our Regiment, and to be selected from among them is very humbling.

As I visit the training areas, directorates, and great organizations here at the home of our Regiment, I am impressed by the hard work that our soldiers and civilians are doing to support the military police around the world. These visits, together with the opportunity to travel and see some of our units, serve to solidify my belief that our soldiers' outstanding performance continues to validate our reputation as the "Force of Choice." This hard-earned reputation has resulted from our many years of excellent service and continuous deployments. Our great soldiers excelled at everything they did!

The demand for our services will continue, and even grow, in the future. Our senior commanders have consistently asked for more military police n every theater of operation. Since the tragic 11 September 2001 attacks on our homeland, there is even more demand for our services as we execute our worldwide force protection mission.


We cannot rest on our past accomplishments. We have several tough issues facing our Regiment—now and in the future. There will be many decisions to make concerning the direction of our Corps. I am convinced that we will continue to work together to tackle those tough issues and make those hard decisions.

I have begun to focus on a few of these issues. Specifically, I am looking at our Noncommissioned Officer Education System, leader development, additional skill identifiers, doctrine, and the proponent packets that guide the centralized promotion board panels, as well as many other areas. Noncommissioned officers will play a key role in ensuring that we stay on course in these areas. Training, leading, caring for our soldiers and their families; maintaining our equipment; enforcing standards; integrating safety into all that we do; and supporting our commanders will remain our top priorities during this time. Simply put, noncommissioned officers will continue to be the "bedrock of readiness."

Once again, I am honored to be YOUR Regimental Command Sergeant Major. I look forward to visiting our units around the world. I am confident that the soldiers of this great Regiment will continue to do what is necessary to ensure that we remain the "Force of Choice."

Assist, Protect, Defend

Simply put, noncommissioned officers will continue to be the "bedrock of readiness."



A Glimpse of Your Future

By
Lieutenant Colonel Randy Mock
and Mr. Ed Pyatt

In April 2002, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), along with representatives from the major commands and joint services, converged on Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, for the Army Transformation War Game (ATWG) 2002. Army branch proponent commandants, senior staff officers, and civilians participated in the event. During the months before the ATWG, staff exercises and planning sessions were conducted. These events focused on the operational environments and the transformed warfighting capabilities that are envisioned for the year 2020.

Over the last three years, TRADOC has been working at full speed to transform Army forces. The Army is digitizing a large portion of our Legacy Forces (where feasible), developing Interim Forces to gain a hedge against the future, and pursuing scientific and technological advances and more synergistic Objective Force organizational designs. During the next 15 years or so, these forces will still need to support each other to achieve our nation's strategic objectives.

The Operational Environment

Future operational environments will expand beyond the typically predictable, conventional threats and our own expected response to—

- Stability operations.
- Support operations.
- Small-scale contingencies (SSCs).
- Major theater-of-war (MTW) operations.

History certainly suggests that SSC operations will continue to be the most likely U.S. response. They are normally characterized as short-notice, early-entry operations into complex or urban terrain with no front lines, unsecured flanks, dismounted combat, and constantly fluctuating situations. In many SSC and stability and support operations, the enemy may not be clearly defined or easily identified. The threat could be a belligerent, not yet in conflict; a nongovernmental force, such as guerillas; a religious faction; or a crime-based organization. Threat forces may be heavily armed, formation-based organizations or highly organized using only small-unit tactics and very selective weapons. Such forces will attempt to avoid the strengths of U.S. weapons and units by conducting operations that exploit our forces' perceived or real weaknesses. Capitalizing on their adaptability and asymmetric warfare tactics, the threat will likely seek to achieve strategic effects using tactical action.

The geographical locations associated with SSC operations have occurred, generally, in regions with weaker infrastructures, either in terms of quality or quantity (examples, roads, railroads, bridges, airports, seaports, and power sources); challenging, complex terrain; and large urban areas relative to the rest of the country. These characteristics are expected to frame future U.S. military challenges. As the physical infrastructures deteriorate due to lack of maintenance and investment, the competition for resources in the growing population centers—that tend to become more segregated and secular—strains the social infrastructures. In many cases, regional powers may not have the required response capabilities or the political desire to assist and resolve crises appropriately.

In addition to geographical and social threats, violent threats are likely to come from the following groups:

- Guerrillas
- Terrorists
- Paramilitary
- Special-purpose forces
- Special police and militia organizations
- Criminal organizations

These forces will likely be equipped with man-portable air-defense systems, guided antitank missiles, mortars, mines, explosives, and machine guns. While communication architectures are organized around traditional military devices, commercial systems (cell phones and satellite imagery) are readily available. The innovative adaptation of munitions and the use of advanced systems, such as unmanned aerial and ground sensors, will further enhance the threat capabilities and create unknown or unconfirmed challenges to U.S. forces.

Advanced technology; weapons proliferation; and less predictable tactics, techniques, and procedures will continue to spread. This proliferation may enable an enemy to achieve limited or unexpected parity, and possible superiority, in selected niche technologies or tactics. These situations may be further complicated by the fact that countermeasures may not be fully developed or available. Threat forces may employ a variety of low-tech systems and methods. These will include homemade combat vehicles such as the "technicals" encountered in Somalia. These were civilian vehicles equipped with machine guns, cannons, or guided antitank munitions. Unforeseen technological surprises should be expected, given global technology transfers and thefts. These hybrid systems will achieve a greater lethality, given threat analysts' limited exposure to them.

The threat will first attempt to deny the United States entry into a theater. Our opponents will attack (or threaten to attack) airports and seaports of embarkation and debarkation. The coordination for these types of attacks will involve, typically, nonconventional forces. These activities may occur in locations other than the immediate operational or tactical areas of operation. The international media will be manipulated to prevent, slow, and discredit our intervention.

The threat will attempt to prevent a quick U.S. victory by setting the conflict conditions. The enemy will display adaptability in both his tactics and employment of weapon systems. He may saturate an area with small lethal teams and limit the instances where he presents himself as a target. He may choose not to engage our forces at maximum ranges, letting some of our forces pass into a strike area where threat antitank systems, such as rocket-propelled grenades, could prove lethal.

Nation-states will continue to be the dominant actors causing either global strife or maintaining global stability. *In some instances, however, the actual power may shift away from the nation-states to fragmented groups with a tribal, ethnic, criminal, or religious power base over which there is limited international control or influence*. This trend—the ability to wage war without sanctuary and nation-states that no longer hold a monopoly on making war—is with us and will only worsen with time.

Effects of Urbanization and Population

As the world's population continues to grow, so will the influence of overurbanization on social stabilization and unrest. *Population dynamics is the most influential and destabilizing force in the world today*. The world population is expected to double in 40 years with 95 percent of the growth occurring in developing nations. Significant increases in the number of young people (15- to 24-year-olds) are likely to generate much of the potential violence. More than half of the world's population will live in urban areas. U.S. forces should expect to be in direct competition with the local populations for the same terrain, routes, and infrastructure.

Noncombatants and refugees can easily, yet possibly unintentionally, create a significant burden to a military movement/operation; their mere presence can block a route. They may be anticipating humanitarian support or, further complicating the issue for our troops, there may be enemy forces, criminal gangs, vigilantes, and paramilitary factions hiding and moving within these groups. The Chechen rebels and the Hezbollah used this technique with great effectiveness.

Future adversaries will take full advantage of urban surroundings to hide or blend into the local community until they are ready to strike a target. Being part of an urban sanctuary affords a certain degree of protection. It negates the intelligence and weapon-system technological overmatch, historically representative of U.S. operations. Threat forces operating from a population- or urban-based sanctuary can easily negate the effectiveness of a weapon-system standoff. Their presence threatens logistical and movement security, drains troops and supplies, and adds complexity to the maneuvers and fires required to avoid collateral damage and noncombatant injuries. Operating in slum areas will present its own set of challenges: gang infighting; disease; hunger; and poor, transient populations. While the majority of these environmental characteristics are representative of SSC operations, future threat tactics will remain adaptable even when nations are at risk in major conflicts.

Our Transformation Forces

When visualizing our forces' future, it is clear that we will rely on the inherent characteristics and capabilities of Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces for a number of years. Implementing the Army's vision of Transformation as rapidly as possible is absolutely imperative. *Our Legacy Force will remain the strategic hedge, providing the essential warfighting capabilities supporting national-security objectives for the foreseeable future*. Inherent in this requirement is the need to modernize, sustain, and selectively upgrade the Legacy Force to guarantee the maintenance of critical warfighting readiness. The Army will recapitalize and modernize selected Legacy-Force formations in both the Active and Reserve components, enhancing key armored and aviation systems as well as light-force lethality and survivability.

The Interim Force is designed with key capabilities and characteristics that will provide distinct advantages for deployment in SSC operations and, with augmentation, significant contributions in MTW operations. It is organized as a rapidly deployable force intended to provide commanders with increased land power options. It is a combined-arms force with an enhanced deployment ability needed to execute specified missions at the operational and tactical levels. The two core qualities of the Interim Force will be its tactical/operational mobility and its decisive close-combat capability. This Interim Force will provide the joint and multinational force commander increased operational and tactical flexibility to execute the fast-paced, distributed, noncontiguous operations envisioned in Joint Vision 2020. The Interim Force will consist of six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs), including at least one Reserve SBCT. The SBCTs, when augmented, are capable of full-spectrum operations. These units compliment the Legacy Forces by providing the operational flexibility and tactical overmatch required to meet the full range of future operational requirements.

Our Objective Force is the future full-spectrum force, equipped and organized to see first, understand first, act first, and finish decisively. It will be organized, manned, equipped, and trained to be strategically responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable during all military operations.

The Army Transformation War Game Experience

The ATWG 2002 was designed as a war game seminar involving a single, global-strategic (GS) blue team focused on the game's totality with a number of subordinate teams providing input to the strategic team. The GS team was responsible for reviewing courses of action developed by the other teams, assessing the global situation, and making national-level decisions about future strategies and actions while constantly monitoring the resources and forces available to support the strategy. Other teams included the—

- Homeland security team.
- Caspian operational team.
- Sumesia (fictional location) operational team.
- Red (threat) team.
- Rest-of-the-world (ROW) team.

The homeland security team looked at a range of possible threats from adversary elements that were tied to a number of concurrent global crises. The team then assessed the organization and allocation of U.S. capabilities and identified the necessary roles and missions for protecting the nation and negating threat activities on U.S. soil. The team was periodically presented with a series of vignette-based dilemmas throughout the war game that required developing courses of action and related resource or force requirements.

The Caspian and the Sumesian regions operational teams focused on these concurrent crises. Road-to-war scenarios for these two teams were developed and war-gamed during staff exercises in the months preceding the ATWG. The fictional scenarios addressed the geographical and political complexities of a future operational environment. The Legacy, Interim, and Objective Force combinations available to these operations highlighted the advantages associated with the emerging concepts of future warfare. Each of these teams had opposing red teams representing a "thinking" or adaptive threat. The red teams' actions generated responses from each operational team. The operational teams then responded to the U.S. strategic team that reacted and gave international views on the crises.

The ROW team provided input and game challenges to the GS team. Many of their dilemmas were based on ongoing operations involving U.S. forces. These scenarios were intended to stress the national decision-making process while incorporating the Caspian, Sumesian, and homeland issues.

Throughout the course of the war game, the GS team was asked to make difficult decisions regarding the strategies, priorities, force allocations, and resources required to meet the needs of each mission. Limited time was given to resynchronize the strategic plan in an attempt to simulate real-world challenges. Each of the operational teams had mixed capabilities consisting of Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces. This mixed-force capability challenged the operational and strategic teams and drove a number of key strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.

Initial Proponent Insights

The proponents' initial thoughts resulting from the exercise were as follows:

- Protection assets (versus only offensive combat maneuvers) supporting homeland security and airports and seaports of embarkation were critical in the early stages.
- The traditional echelons (division, corps, and theater-support command) were less distinguishable when planning and executing an operation from a joint operational area perspective. This required

considerably more functional mission-analysis focus at the joint operational level, not just identifying force requirements by echelon. It was clearly easier to figure out what needed to be accomplished than it was to figure out which specific echelon would perform the mission.

- The chaos associated with future conflicts, from the military police doctrinal perspective, will continue to require capabilities representative of current doctrinal functions. While some proponents have embraced the value of area-security operations in conducting their mission, they are challenged to cover all areas (without an unacceptable drain on combat power) and will continue to rely on the military police to cover many high-value assets and routes and defeat threats within their capabilities. Anticipated technological advances in position-location capabilities and force-tracking systems will cause the military police to reassess "how" we enable movement and mobility. Most significant is the increased acknowledgement and appreciation of police/criminal intelligence and its implications for engaging and controlling populations (including enemy prisoners of war and detainees).
- The magnitude of concurrent full-spectrum operations, as represented in this war game, significantly challenges the availability of military police assets. Double or triple apportionment will likely continue to be a reality. Units arriving early to multiple theaters will quickly stress the current force distribution between the Active and Reserve components. The need for early-deploying military police for homeland security missions will compete equally with the operational needs outside the continental United States.


At the conclusion of the ATWG, each team was asked to develop issues, insights, and implications resulting from the war game play. Each participant represented key organizations, staffs, and force elements that could be involved in the strategic and operational decisions required by the war game's 2020 scenario. The ATWG provided a forum for developing findings and recommendations and promoting a common understanding of Objective-Force capabilities and concepts. Complicating factors included the—

- Integration of Legacy and Interim Forces' capabilities.
- Combatant commanders competing for resources during multiple or concurrent crises.
- More adaptable threats in the future environments.

Final TRADOC and Army insights are expected over the next few months, and a follow-on ATWG 2002 article will be published in the next issue of *MILITARY POLICE*.

Force Protection in the Modern War Zone

By Mr. Gregory Ferguson



Baghram flight line

As I write this article, in the wee hours of a sunny February morning in Afghanistan, the roar of rotor blades from three Marine CH-53s, laden with international security armed forces, draws my attention beyond my room's makeshift Plexiglas® window. The noise level peaks as two AH-64s lift off the tarmac, following the same flight path of their much larger brethren, making me thankful that I am on the right side of this war.

Two weeks before this particular morning, I had jumped onto a C-17 for a short flight south to join my parent unit's—the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry)—Combined Joint Task Force Mountain that had taken up residence in the ruins of an old Afghan hangar at Baghram Air Base. My mission was to help enhance the 10th's force protection plan by reviewing the current plans and procedures and giving the commander input about the base's defense, force protection, emergency services, and security profile. I had done this sort of thing before in Uzbekistan. My commanding general had brought me into the war on terrorism by sending me there to assist Logistics Task Force 507.

You will note as you read this article that this was not an MP-specific mission. It has been my experience, in both Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, that the senior chain of command looks to the MP representatives to pull everything together into a viable force protection plan. More than likely, your chain of command will want quick results. You will be able to provide a force protection plan but, without the proper time and energy, not one that has been coordinated and staffed properly. To have an effective force protection plan, all players must be involved in the development process (especially the emergency service personnel). Everyone must understand the concepts, their roles and the roles of others, and how everything interacts. The intent of this article is to share my experiences in the "modern" war zone and provide my fellow force protection and physical security officers with a list of proven, viable planning and implementation documents.

Suggested Procedures

The following are some force protection policies and procedures that I have developed from my own experiences. Most of these may be implemented in a base camp with few modifications. The items are not listed in any particular order and are not intended to serve as a 190-Ferguson concept—adapt the list as needed. **Note:** *Remember to stay flexible when using these policies and procedures. The base camp you are responsible for will change daily during the deployment with populations and missions fluctuating constantly.*

To expedite matters and remove obstacles before they start, one person must be in charge—the designated (on orders) theater of operations force protection officer. One force protection officer at each base camp is also needed. Unlike the continental United States garrison environment, force protection, intelligence, security, and emergency services must be tied into and controlled by one entity—the base security operations center (BSOC) or the base camp S3 tactical operations center (TOC). If a BSOC is not available, then a force protection battle captain, armed with a copy of the force protection plan and checklists, located in the TOC will suffice.

Before proceeding with the initial assessment, look for a recent force-protection-vulnerability assessment from higher headquarters. This document is a good starting point and will help you develop solutions to those vulnerabilities already identified. Also, if you are not the first force protection individual at the location, find the existing force protection plan and update it accordingly. It is easier to modify the existing plan than it is to bring in a whole new process that people have to relearn. However, you will need to ensure it includes all force protection and security requirements.

To ensure that procedures and policies are genuine and implemented properly, use the simple **crawl, walk, run** concept:

- **Crawl** means walking around and talking to the players while researching, writing, and coordinating plans.
- **Walk** means exercising and modifying plans through after-action reviews.
- **Run** means routinely enacting the plans in a coordinated and professional manner.

Start your analysis in the base defense mode and adapt, according to intelligence, for base security. If warranted, switch to the base security mode, but always have a plan for reverting expeditiously back to base defense. Begin coordinating the emergency services. Depending on your circumstances, the plan will require several risk assessments before you reach the final product. You should develop the following plans:

- Base defense
- Barrier requirements and placement
- Consequence management
- Giant-voice response
- Airfield operation, fire response, and flight-line security
- Camp security-badge system
- BSOC/the operations of the TOC
- Weapons of mass destruction response
- Emergency service and incident command response—ensure that fire stations are positioned to meet these response requirements:
  - *Five minutes for structural fire
  - *Three minutes for unannounced aircraft-crash rescue
  - *One minute for announced aircraft-crash rescue—check for an adequate supply of foam for aircraft and fuel berms. Ensure that streets are named, signage is in place, and tents are num-bered. Fire extinguishers should be placed on a picket outside each tent. Use air horns as firealert alarms for tents. Purchase smoke and carbon monoxide alarms for tents and administrative areas. Because telephones will probably not be plentiful, consider using strategically placed call boxes (add rotating lights for instant nighttime recognition if force protection conditions allow).
- Preaccident aviation
- Ground accident
- Notification matrixes
- Ammunition supply point (ASP)
- Lifesaver drill
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical response
- Perimeter security—incorporate different modern technologies ranging from a combination of base defense systems (such as the Q36 counterbattery radar system and Sentinel® aircraft tracking system) and base security systems (such as the wide-area-surveillance thermal imager and Tactical Automated Security System). Cheaper and simpler systems are available (LK-100HD/ LK-150HD outdoor infrared [IR] beam detectors, concertina wire, passive IR and thermal imagery cameras, and household motion sensors) and, depending on the intent of their use, make acceptable detection alternatives. In this environment, do not limit yourself to any category or costs. Your job is to provide options and recommendations.
- Spill response—make sure that the firefighters are trained in hazardous-material containment and have the required equipment and spill kits.
- Radio—this is a very critical element. Determine and coordinate the signal requirements (programming software; cables for programming; encryption loader; and cables for XTS 3000, Sabre I and IIIs, and ASTRO mobiles) and design **one** system to meet all activities' requirements. Determine the number of primary and alternate channels, and obtain the frequencies from the responsible C6 or Signal Command. At a minimum, the plan should incorporate emergency service agencies, base command, BSOC/TOC, and security personnel.
- Random-antiterrorism-measures plan (RAMP)—advise the camp units of the upcoming week's RAMP at your weekly force protection meeting.
- Detainee diversion—this concerns the housing of enemy prisoners of war or detainees that may be diverted to your location. A tactical hangar, located as close to the airfield as possible, is a great solution. Remember, the less movement, the better.
- Army and Air Force Exchange Service security—there will probably be a post exchange/base exchange (in a tent or a building) anywhere that there is a camp. Review its location, funds handling procedures, and duress procedures.

Additional Advice

Plan the camp layout. Develop a building standard for tent placement to minimize the spread of fire. There should be a minimum of 6 feet (12 feet is preferred) between tents—side to side—and 15-foot-wide fire lanes. Proper spacing is imperative—it also lessens soldier causalities during direct and indirect attacks. Initially there will be a push to get the tents up and overlook spacing. You will have to push this aggressively unless spacing restrictions say otherwise. After a risk assessment is completed, the commander may decide to accept the risk of closer tents. In an environment where there is a large amount of dirt and potential mud, plan on contracting for gravel. This will not only ensure that emergency vehicles will not get stuck in the mud, but it will also make for a safer, healthier, and more pleasant living environment.



Mr. Ferguson at the Taliban mortar pits

Determine where the ASP, or temporary ammunition holding area; observation posts; entry-control points; overwatch positions; quick-reaction force; fire; and MP stations will be located. Ensure that survivability and defensive positions are also strategically placed. Make firing-position range cards.

Unify emergency services. Align law enforcement, fire, intelligence, physical security, and medical/ambulance personnel; foreign national soldiers; security (MP and infantry); and interpreters into one entity. There may be some hesitation, but regardless of their branch of service, if the task force unit has operational control over them, develop them into a unified emergency service response capability.

Establish a force protection committee. By involving unit representatives, you can quickly distribute information and ask them to buy into the plan and provide input and intelligence about what is happening in the camp area. This group is not to be confused with the force protection working group consisting of the force protection officer and representatives from the Public Affairs Office, Directorate of Emergency Services, intelligence (G2 and installation security office), operations (G3 and Directorate of Plans, Training, and Mobilization/readiness business centers), and information technology.

Read the appropriate country handbook. In this case, you need to read DOD-2630-AFG-001-02, *Afghanistan*. This is a great way to become familiar with your new assignment area, the local region, and the customs of the indigenous people. It is also a good idea to have, and read, a book on soviet weapons and their specifications. These graphic training aids (GTAs) are also helpful tools for setting up base defense:

- GTA 05-08-001, *Survivability Positions*
- GTA 07-06-001, *Fighting Position Construction-Infantry Leader's Reference Card*

Obtain maps of the area of responsibility to include satellite overviews. Your S2 can help with this.

Use aircraft as much as possible. Have the tower request that returning aircraft do a base flyover and report observed movement or anything unusual on the installation or its perimeter. If there is intelligence about a possible strike on your location, arrange to have a designated, armed quick-response aircraft.

Identify mission-essential vulnerable areas and high-risk targets. Identify the safe haven and extraction

point (such as a temporary helipad) for the high-risk personnel (HRP). Examples of tactical safe havens are—

- An earth-bermed tactical hangar.
- A trench.
- An armored HMMWV that can also move HRP to a preestablished extraction point.

Remember the entry control point. Carefully consider the following so that the entry points are as safe as possible:

- Mission-appropriate lighting—when practicable, get a white light (metal halide) that allows guards to see under vehicles with mirrors. If force protection conditions do not allow this, night-vision devices may be your only option.
- Explosive-detecting military working dogs
- Redundant communication (secure radios, TA-312 telephones, and/or FM ASIPS)
- Ingress protection (road fangs/dragon teeth)
- Badge system
- Environmentally controlled guard shacks.
- Guard orders and rules of engagement on laminated index cards
- Barrier systems
- Vehicle search area designed with blast mitigation material
- Serpentine approaches—when jersey barriers are not available, look for large, solid items such as old aircraft engines or large pieces of bombed out buildings.
- Handheld metal detectors
- Personnel gates
- Up-armored, weapon-fitted HMMWVs that have adequate reaction time and clear fields of fire
- Vehicle searches of non-U.S. military vehicles
- A location for local-national identification badging—the first entrance checkpoint should also have an interpreter on 24-hour duty. Further, due to the large number of local vendors who may be contracted to build and supply the base, the contracting personnel should be located near, or adjacent to, this checkpoint. Depending on the threat, a group of borrowed military manpower may be used to act as escorts for the local-national vendors or employees. It is always recommended that the local nationals be escorted, at least initially, while they are anywhere on the base.

Design a drawing for jersey bounces, or other barriers, that may be fabricated or purchased locally. You need to be able to provide local national contractors with a simplistic drawing, in metric. Remember, the simpler, the better.

Coordinate with the counterintelligence unit about the employed local nationals' background investigations. The background checks are usually done by the host nation. Make sure that the requirement for background investigations has been specified in the local vendors contracts.

Other Force Protection Measures

Force protection measures come in tangible and intangible forms. For instance, some of our protective measures resulted from agreements that we made with the Northern Alliance and the Afghan government. Several of their generals announced that the Americans were under their protection; therefore, if an American was injured or had died as a result of their action, the responsible individual and his family would die.

Intelligence discovered another intangible measure. There were severe droughts during the Taliban regime, but once the American and allied forces arrived, it rained and snowed. It was reported that the Afghan people saw this as a sign from Allah, blessing the relationship between their new government and the coalition forces.

The most obvious measure was that the coalition governments and their personnel were pouring money into Afghanistan and rebuilding it. The government also wanted to remain a viable entity to the world.

A Final Thought

Make sure that you get the plan out to personnel through the "shared" files section of the Secure Internet Protocol Router Network system, or print and disseminate it. It cannot be stressed enough, especially in a war zone, that everyone has to be involved in base force protection.

Once you have validated your force protection plan, forward it to your higher headquarters for global use. There is no sense reinventing the wheel; having a starting point greatly assists others when they hit the ground running, especially in a potentially hostile environment. They only need to review the plan and modify the existing procedures to fit their situation and location.

If you would like to obtain a copy of my force protection plan, e-mail me at fergusong@drum.army.mil, or call DSN 772-5721/1077 or (315) 772-5721/1077.

Typical Force Protection Plan Format and Annexes

Annex A. Task Organization

Annex B. Joint Services Directorate, Central Command, Vulnerability Assessment

Annex C. Operations

- *Appendix 1.* Contingency Plan Lifesaver with Battle-Drill Schematic
- *Appendix 2.* Force-Protection-Condition Measures
- *Appendix 3.* Fire Protection Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)
- *Appendix 4.* WMD Planning
- *Appendix 5.* EOC Operations
- *Appendix 6.* Aerial Support
- *Appendix 7.* Access Control
- *Appendix 8.* Predeployment Training
- *Appendix 9.* Destructive Weather
- *Appendix 10.* Postal Operations
- *Appendix 11.* Force Protection Working Group
- *Appendix 12.* Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations (includes unexploded ordnance reporting and bomb threats)

Annex D. Threat Analysis

Annex E. Rules of Engagement

- *Appendix 1.* Status of Forces Agreement

Annex F. Engineer Force Protection Plan

Annex G. MEVA List

- *Appendix 1.* Airfield Security Plan
- *Appendix 2.* ASP Guard Orders
- *Appendix 3.* Entry-Control-Point SOPs

Annex H. Signal Annex

- *Appendix 1.* Emergency Mass Notification Plan

Annex I. Service Support Medical SOP

- *Appendix 1.* Mass-Casualty-Response Plan
- *Appendix 2.* Force Health Protection Plan

Annex J. NBC Plan

- *Appendix 1.* NBC Response Checklist
- *Appendix 2.* Test Kit Locations
- *Appendix 3.* Decontamination Container/Equipment
- *Appendix 4.* Decontamination Site
- *Appendix 5.* Master Events Synchronization List of Locations

Annex K. Provost Marshal

- *Appendix 1.* Law Enforcement Reporting Matrix
- *Appendix 2.* Law Enforcement Baseline Operations
- *Appendix 3.* Accident Response Checklist
- *Appendix 4.* Hostage Response
- *Appendix 5.* HRP
- *Appendix 6.* Notification Matrix

Annex L. RAMP Measures

Annex M. Antiterrorism Plan

Annex N. Aircraft Scramble Plan

Annex O. Operations Security

- *Appendix 1.* Information Management


Annex P. Host-Nation Liaison

Annex Q. Public Affairs

Annex R. Glossary

Annex S. References

Force Protection During Exercise Victory Strike II



By Major Eric Nikolai

Exercise Victory Strike II, a V Corps training event conducted in Poland during September and October 2001, deployed nearly 4,000 soldiers to two training areas. The available land and less stringent aviation restrictions made training with one of the newest members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization very attractive. V Corps exercised its rapid-deployment and deep-strike attack aviation capabilities, a rail deployment, and an air self-deployment while supporting two training areas that were 130 kilometers apart.

The implementing agreement between the Army and Poland set September 12th as the first day that U.S. troops would be allowed to enter Poland. To allow for a full day in Poland, the first V Corps soldiers deployed to a convoy support center just south of Berlin on the afternoon of September 11th. As they prepared to cross the German/Polish border early the next morning, terrorists were attacking the Pentagon and World Trade Center towers.

The commanders and their staffs recognized immediately that the force protection requirements for the deployed forces had changed with the terrorist attacks and grappled with the decision to continue, cancel, or adjust the deployment. After recalling the torch party and reevaluating the threat situation, V Corps's commander, in consultation with higher headquarters, gave the order to continue the deployment of forces.

The commanders were now faced with increased force protection requirements at their home stations and for the deployed forces—a post-September 11th mission analysis showed a clear need for additional force protection measures at all U.S. base camps and railheads. Although the main threat to U.S. interests was dangerous road conditions and pilferage attempts by local nationals, the staff could not discount the possibility of a transnational attack or a sympathy attack by factions within Poland. But force-protection-condition Charlie requirements and exercise strength-caps prevented V Corps from deploying forces that were significant to cover the additional requirements.

The Search for Solutions

A review of available combat power within the 18th MP Brigade revealed that although some additional forces could be deployed immediately, sending them to Poland would restrict V Corps's ability to react to other situations during the exercise. The 18th's decision not to deploy additional military police was validated a few weeks later when it was necessary to deploy an additional force within Germany for a new area security mission.

Another option considered was to reduce the mobile patrols and convoy escorts and use two platoons of military police from the 212th MP Company to bolster point

security at high-value targets within V Corps's footprint. V Corps's plans staff realized quickly that stripping the military police of their inherent mobility during area-security missions would reduce the overall deployment force protection posture.

The V Corps staff and the 11th Aviation Regiment recognized that the highest-value target was clearly the almost 100 NATO helicopters on the ground at Poland's Ziemsko Airfield. In addition to the bulk of the 11th Aviation Regiment and the 12th Aviation Brigade, the airfield held nearly 40 aircraft from the Italian Furelli Brigade (Air Assault).

The aviation units were simply not staffed to secure the 8 kilometers of perimeter around the airfield properly. Although additional military police forces were not available within V Corps, a scout troop from the 1st Armored Division was available and tasked to deploy on short notice. Once on the ground, it was placed in a direct-support role to the airfield's base cluster commander. The scouts secured the backside of the airfield—a thick wood line that normally would have provided excellent dismounted avenues of approach—almost up to the flight line. Operating with their organic equipment, which is in many ways similar to an MP platoon, they employed both mounted and dismounted patrols, resulting in zero reports of airfield infiltration attempts. The scout troop and unit guards provided sufficient force protection—contract guards at the airfield were not required. This allowed the Corps to use contract guards at several other sites that would have had only unit guards.

A review of V Corps's use-of-force rules indicated that they were just as appropriate after 11 September as they were before. There was a renewed effort through the staff judge advocate (SJA) and command sergeant major channels to ensure that all soldiers were aware of the rules and knew how to employ deadly force. The SJA trained V Corps's non-military police after a decision was made to arm additional force protection guards throughout the exercise area.

Doctrinal Answers

The solutions to these questions were contained within the framework of current military police doctrine. It describes base/base cluster security and commanders' responsibilities (military police also provide support outside the base perimeter). Commanders may assign combat forces to protect critical bases/base clusters. Host-nation assets—whether civilian police, civilian security guards, or military units—are also essential in many parts of the globe where the United States envisions sending troops. Doctrine recognizes that any single measure, when used alone, is almost never the best method that can be used to secure an asset. Thus, normal physical security measures (including barriers and fencing) were a key part of the exercise's force protection equation.



Sergeant James Hiatt, 212th MP Company, walks the perimeter, making sure that the area is secure.

Contract Security Guards

The exercise's original security plan called for contract security guards to be at the railheads only during deployment and redeployment; their mission was to control curious onlookers and prevent petty theft. The provost marshal expanded the guards' role, increasing the time that they were to work and the number of guard posts. Unfortunately, the original contract was with a local company that had difficulty providing all the additional guards required for the new, expanded mission.

A specific mission analysis on the use of the contract guards identified a number of questions that had to be answered before they could begin work:

- Should the guards be armed?
- What were their rules on the use of deadly force?
- Would it be sensible to change their use-of-force rules to mirror V Corps's? How could that be accomplished?
- Who would serve as the contracting officer's representative?
- What were the guards' training standards?
- How flexible were the contract companies? Would they be able to deal with frequent changes during the exercise's deployment and redeployment phases as railheads and bases shut down or expanded?
- Did any of the guards speak English? How many translators would be available?
- How many companies would be available to bid on the contract? Could the Corps conduct any "comparison shopping," or would it be restricted to just one provider?

The most critical of these questions was the use of deadly force and whether or not armed guards were required. Initially, the military police were the only

soldiers who would be carrying live ammunition daily. The 11 September attacks resulted in all force protection guards carrying ammunition, allowing V Corps to hire unarmed security guards.

The rules of engagement for the armed security guards were reviewed. Polish law allows for a fairly low threshold for the use of deadly force. A properly bonded security guard is allowed to employ deadly force to prevent the theft of any property he is guarding. Those rules allow a Polish security guard to use deadly force to prevent the theft of a case of MREs or a soldier's rucksack. Those standards are generally outside the Army's rules for the use of force; therefore, the rules for the security guards were modified to mirror the Corps's.

A contractor was able to provide armed security guards on very short notice but at a substantially higher cost. That contract was signed for only one week due to the availability of funds. During the time this contract was in effect, the contracting office found another contractor capable of providing security guards—armed with stun guns and batons—at a much lower cost. Those guards were also employed for the duration of the exercise. V Corps now had two contracts: one providing armed security guards and the other unarmed security guards. Although a single contract for all security guards was preferred, that was simply not available. The critical question then became how to deploy these two separate forces.

The exercise's provost marshal cell, with V Corps's force protection representative and the base commanders, conducted a mission analysis to determine the best use of guard resources. Armed guards were deemed to be the most valuable at the ammunition supply point (ASP) that contained small-arms ammunition, rockets, and missiles for use during a planned Apache helicopter live-fire exercise. The ASP used the bulk of the armed guards from the original contract. The remaining guard days under that contract were used to provide security at V Corps's rear command post, finance office, and alternate airfield where three UH-60 Black Hawks were on the ground during the final days of the exercise.

V Corps also reached back to the U.S. Army Europe provost marshal and obtained its contract requirements for civilian security guards. Although these requirements were well thought out and comprehensive, it was impossible to implement them during the month-long exercise. However, there are plans to use these requirements for hiring the civilian guard forces for future exercises.



Sergeant James Hiatt of the 212th MP Company gets a call concerning a Polish citizen in an off-limits area. Private Michael McFarland listens in on the call.

As in most deployments, V Corps depended on host-nation assets to provide portions of our force protection. These included Polish military and civilian police and the contract security guards. All these organizations worked through the exercise provost marshal and the military police desk sergeant who interfaced with V Corps's force protection personnel, the exercise director, base/base cluster commanders, and the movement control team.

Throughout the 40-day deployment, U.S. forces reported the theft of two rucksacks within the base camps. Additionally, one soldier reported the theft of a rucksack from an unsecured vehicle during a visit to a local community. The 212th MP had escorted more than 500 convoys, driven more than 70,000 miles, conducted 18 criminal and traffic accident investigations, and responded to several unplanned helicopter landings during the exercise. The overall force protection posture for the deployed soldiers was excellent, thanks to a combination of proactive unit commanders, alert and mobile military police, and a strong cooperative effort involving the local civilian and military police and the extensive use of contracted security guards.

Throughout the continental United States, leaders are using a similar formula to secure critical assets. They are using contracted security guards and Reserve Component military forces, (including many activated military police units) local police, and federal agencies. As in Poland, coordination is critical in identifying the lead agency and ensuring that each understands its responsibilities.

"The military police are an invaluable partner in Kosovo; I am convinced that the steps that we have taken together to share intelligence and provide mutual support will be retraced in other places around the world."

Mr. Donnie Hensley, UNCIVPOL Regional Commander

Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement in Peacekeeping Operations



By Major Jeffrey Jennings and Captain Jennifer Gaddis

Military intelligence (MI) support of law enforcement during peacekeeping operations is a necessity and a combat multiplier. Success to a peacekeeper means a reduction in violence and a return to normalcy—the creation of an environment where the rule of law is primary and people feel safe in their homes. During Operation Joint Guardian, elements of the 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) deployed to Kosovo to provide the people with a safe, peaceful, and secure environment.

A functioning and honest police force is paramount for continued stability in any country. As elements of the 10th became Task Force Falcon (TFF), our commanding general focused on preventing acts of violence and ensuring freedom of movement for honest citizens while keeping that same freedom from insurgents and criminals. This focus allowed the task force Intelligence Battlefield Operating System (IBOS) to look at crime as a destabilizing factor. MI soldiers assigned to the TFF analysis and control element (ACE) were not accustomed to collecting evidence or analyzing crime. Given the commander's focus, we made some adjustments to our intelligence-analysis techniques and methods of peration, allowing us to use crime experts and share critical intelligence with law enforcement agencies to combat crime in the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E).

The intelligence cycle is relevant in the peacekeeping operational environment. Directing, collecting, assessing, and disseminating information in a continuous cycle allows the commander to maintain flexibility and prevent violent activities that destabilize operations. In the Kosovo area of operations, we had a flexible IBOS and an aggressive MP battalion, so we expanded our information-processing capabilities by including the law enforcement agencies.

As Kosovo stabilized and the rule of law matured, crime and crime prevention became a focus. This focus put the IBOS on a path of closer information sharing and cooperation with the military police and the civil police authority—the U.N. Civil Police (UNCIVPOL). As trained intelligence analysts, ACE soldiers knew how to identify trends, research historical data for comparative analysis, and develop products based on potential courses of action. In peacekeeping, these efforts typically identify areas of interethnic strife that might manifest as violence. Adding crime analysis to ACE was critical in answering the commander's critical information requirements.

Organizing ACE for peacekeeping was not unlike organizing it for wartime. One unique change made in Kosovo was the addition of two criminal investigation division (CID) agents as liaison officers and crime experts. These agents worked directly with the human intelligence (HUMINT) analysis and requirements cell (HARC) and greatly increased HUMINT collection capability by giving a firsthand understanding of crime scene analysis and direct access to the investigative information. These professionals allowed ACE to take a more informed approach to crime analysis. We learned what to look for in the volumes of information collected by our HUMINT, signal intelligence, and imagery intelligence collection platforms. By learning about crime investigations, we learned what indicators to look for in our own reporting that, with further investigation, could be turned into evidence. Turning intelligence into evidence was the challenge. By adding the CID agents to our analytical efforts, we learned to identify crime trends better and focus on the effects of crime that affected the secure environment within the MNB-E. The next challenge was to take this information

and analysis and put it into the hands of the police.

The first step in our support to criminal intelligence was complete with the integration of the CID into ACE. The second step included fully using all collectors in the sector. The national and theater collection platforms provided critical information, the maneuver battalions provided their collected intelligence and analysis through their daily intelligence summaries, and the task-force-level assets helped complete the command's picture.

As we gained experience in the HUMINT-rich Kosovo environment, we found that one of the most flexible collectors was the military police. As a general-support asset, they had free reign throughout the sector. Each squad contained trained law enforcement observers (in itself critical assets) who had digital cameras for photographing personnel and locations for further analysis. We learned to rely heavily on the military police and their flexibility to confirm or deny information for us, across the sector, day or night.

The third step was to increase ACE's cooperation and information sharing with UNCIVPOL. Without it, the analyzed criminal intelligence would not get into the hands of the civil authorities for prosecution in the courts. This step began within the deployment's first month, as the 504th MP Battalion collocated its MP substations with the UNCIVPOL stations, creating a closer working relationship. This effort also established a new level of trust and cooperation between the Kosovo peacekeepers and the police, who shared the responsibility of maintaining stability.

Next, the 504th established a weekly police intelligence collection and analysis council (PICAC) that became the critical link between the MI's analytical assets and the police's investigative and judicial mandate. This law enforcement forum allowed for greater cooperation regarding policing activities within the MNB-E. Furthermore, as a primary participant, ACE used the PICAC forum to provide analyzed intelligence (with the support of the CID agents working in HARC). We quickly established a system by which relevant law enforcement information, collected by the TFF assets, was downgraded and provided to UNCIVPOL station chiefs for their use in law enforcement operations throughout the sector. This weekly PICAC meeting allowed the TFF and the civil police authority to coordinate joint military and police operations and expand the collective ability to search for known and suspected criminals.

Through the working relationships established at the substations and PICAC, we quickly established procedures for working together to reduce sector crime. For example, when the police were searching for or investigating a particular individual, they provided the name to ACE through the MP UNCIVPOL liaison or the CID agent. ACE would then check for that name in its databases, declassify relevant information, and provide it to UNCIVPOL at PICAC, or directly if it was time-sensitive.

On one particular occasion, a UNCIVPOL station commander brought the name of an individual (who was wanted for attempted murder) to PICAC. The station commander did not have a picture of the individual and, therefore, was unable to identify him. Within an hour, ACE provided a photograph (from our databases) of the criminal to the station commander who instantly recognized him. The criminal was arrested the following day and is currently serving his sentence. This is just one example of how PICAC created conditions by which shared information facilitated justice. This type of cooperation also increased our collective ability to identify and arrest known or suspected criminals. We routinely shared information about who was wanted by our respective organizations, effectively doubling the number of people looking for that individual. This cooperation increased arrests within the MNB-E and was a factor in reducing crime and supporting the success and integration of UNCIVPOL into the local community.

Since the events of 11 September, demands on the U.S. military have increased. As we prepare for current and future operations in support of the President's war on terror, we will continue to work with our partners around the world in multinational peacekeeping operations. As a member of the U.N., the United States will also work with UNCIVPOL in other countries to help create stability so that families can live without fear. The lessons learned from Kosovo during the 3B mission are reminders of the importance of using all available assets. Building strong working relationships with civil police, sharing information, and building trust are key in combating the destabilizing effects of crime.

The Military Police Corps Regimental Hall of Fame Selection Process

By Captain John R. Larson

The U.S. Army MP Corps Regimental Hall of Fame was established in 1992 to honor soldiers and civilians who have made significant achievements and exceptional contributions to our country and our Corps. U.S. Army Regimental Regulation 870-1, prescribes policies and procedures for the nomination, selection, and induction of personnel into the Hall of Fame.

The Nomination

Nominations may be made for commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, and civilians who have served in, or supported, an active or Reserve MP unit or agency. Only nominations for individuals will be accepted; no unit or group nominations will be considered. Nominees must have departed U.S. government service for at least two complete years prior to consideration. An individual who is retired from military service but continues to serve as a U.S. government civilian, in any capacity, is precluded from consideration until two complete years after retirement from all forms of federal service.

A nominee must have made a significant and long-term contribution to the development of the Corps. The nominee should have contributed, in some significant fashion, to the evolution and definition of the Corps's character, doctrine, mission, and/or training. In certain instances, the nomination may be based on a heroic action.

Anyone may nominate an individual for induction into the Hall of Fame. Nominations must be based on genuine knowledge or documented research. To the best extent possible, nomination packets should contain a complete personal biography, detailed career biography, complete justification for induction, a black and white 8-x10-inch photograph, and a suggested narrative to display underneath the photograph if selected. Nominations are forwarded to—

The Office of the Chief of Military Police, U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS), ATTN: ATSJ-MP-Z, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri 65473-8926.

Before submission, each nomination will be forwarded through, and approved by, an MP commander or provost marshal in the rank of colonel. There were twelve nominations submitted for the 2002 board's consideration.

The Board

The selection board convenes once a year with sufficient time to complete the induction process prior to anniversary week. According to RR 870-1, the board consists of at least four voting members who have served in MP-related positions of major responsibility. Most board members will be active duty or retired general officers, colonels, or command sergeants major. Whenever possible, a representative of the Army Reserve or Army National Guard will be a member. The Chief of Military Police approves the final board panel.

In previous years, this requirement was met with a five-member panel consisting of leaders who have served within the USAMPS footprint. This year, the commandant expanded the panel from five to nine members and included representation from around

the Corps. The 2002 board was truly diverse: Colonel Scott R. Larson, Provost Marshal, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia; Colonel Timothy J. Lamb, Assistant Commandant, USAMPS, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri; Colonel Colleen L. McGuire, Commander, U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Major Starrleen Heinen, Deputy Assistant Commandant, Army National Guard, Fort Leonard Wood; Chief Warrant Officer 5 Glenn Schultz, Chief, MP Operations and Investigations Branch, USAMPS, Fort Leonard Wood; Command Sergeant Major Tommie Hollins, 701st MP Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood; Command Sergeant Major Mark F. Offermann, 95th MP Battalion, Mannheim, Germany; Command Sergeant Major George Olavarria, 16th MP Brigade, Fort Bragg, North Carolina; and Command Sergeant Major (R) Joshua Perry, Hall of Fame Member.


The board selects the current year's inductees and submits the list to the Chief of Military Police. Unless specifically approved by the Chief of Military Police, the board selects a minimum of one but not more than three inductees each year. Nominations initially considered, but not selected, are retained and automatically reconsidered for the next two years. If, after the third consideration, the nominee is not selected, the nomination packet will be retired under the control and management of the regimental historian. Individuals not selected can be re-nominated and the nomination process begins again.

Inductees selected and approved for induction to this year's Hall of Fame are Major General (R) Paul M. Timmerberg and Command Sergeant Major (R) Charles E. Joas. These great Americans will be inducted during our 61st MP Regimental Anniversary Celebration Week, 24 September 2002.

The Induction

Each person selected for induction will be notified in writing and formally invited to attend the induction ceremony. If the inductee is deceased, his/her next of kin will be invited. The ceremony will be held in conjunction with the annual MP Anniversary in September. Official announcement of the inductees will be made at the induction ceremony. During the ceremony, a certificate of induction and Hall of Fame medallion will be presented to the inductee, next of kin, or designated representative. Each inductee will also be honored with a permanent display in the MP Regimental Museum at Fort Leonard Wood.

For a copy of Regimental Regulation 870-1, contact Captain Larson at 573-596-0131, extension 37801; or e-mail larsonj@wood.army.mil.



U.S. Army Military Police Corps Regimental Hall of Fame

Major General Harry H. Bandholtz	Service Career 1897-1923
Major General Allen W. Gullion	Service Career 1905-1944
Major General William H. Maglin	Service Career 1917-1955
Major General John G. Granger	Service Career 1954-1982
Command Sergeant Major James W. Frye	Service Career 1955-1984
Major General Harley L. Moore Jr.	Service Career 1940-1973
Brigadier General David H. Stem	Service Career 1960-1987
Colonel Henry H. Tufts	Service Career 1942-1974
Command Sergeant Major Roland M. Gaddy	Service Career 1960-1988
Major General Eugene R. Cromartie	Service Career 1957-1990
GM15 Robert A Brisentine, Jr.	Service Career 1945-1989
Major General Charles A. Hines	Service Career 1954-1992
Brigadier General Jeremiah P. Holland	Service Career 1927-1957
Colonel Orville N. Butts	Service Career 1958-1988
GM14 Ronald E. Decker	Service Career 1943-1990
Colonel C. Victor Cadwell	Service Career 1917-1954
Colonel Carl C. Sutherland	Service Career 1968-1992
Major Fouad K. Aide	Service Career 1953-1996
Brigadier General Francis E. Howard	Service Career 1927-1956
Command Sergeant Major Joshua Perry	Service Career 1964-1994
Colonel Michael L. Sullivan	Service Career 1968-1996
Brigadier General Thomas F. Barr	Service Career 1865-1901
Brigadier General Evelyn P. Foote	Service Career 1960-1989 1996-1997
Chief Warrant Officer Four Maurice A. Parker	Service Career 1940-1972 1983-1997
Major General Peter T. Berry	Service Career 1962-1995
Command Sergeant Major David W. Stalter	Service Career 1963-1993
Chief Warrant Officer Four Marvin P. Parker	Service Career 1966-1993
Brigadier General Sherian G. Cadoria	Service Career 1961-1990
Colonel Alexander Paul Sowa, Jr.	Service Career 1967-1992
Command Sergeant Major Marcelino Malavet, Jr.	Service Career 1966-1996
Colonel Angus B. MacLean	Service Career 1943-1971
Colonel Walter N. Ferguson	Service Career 1965-1991
Colonel John F. Hyde	Service Career 1942-1973



Modular Command Post Systems Lead Military Police Into the 21st Century

By Private First Class Kristopher Joseph

Training and preparing for war are at the heart of U.S. Army operations. As the Army transforms to meet the demands for future operations, units are increasingly faced with the need to put state-of-the-art equipment to work to help commanders make more effective decisions.

To enhance its command and control process, V Corps's 18th MP Brigade has employed a Modular Command Post System (MCPS) to conduct battle procedures. The MCPS is a command-and-control display tool that allows commanders to track their units on the battlefield using large, multiscreen electronic maps, according to Captain Keith T. Nichols, the 18th's signal officer. The Army still uses paper map boards, but the MCPS greatly increases the speed, scope, and efficiency of information delivery. Resultantly, paperwork and man-hours are drastically reduced.

A computer software program called the command-and-control personal computer (C2PC) provides the electronic maps, icons, and tracking information for MCPS. "The commander and his staff can see everything at once," said Nichols. "They can track friendly and enemy situations, and all the information can be seen instantly by the higher command through what is called the corps operations picture."

"This program is a baptism of fire for the 18th," said Sergeant Kristofer J. Britton, an administrative supervisor. "V Corps is the only corps in the Army to use C2PC, and they filtered it down to us. The Windows-compatible C2PC is user-friendlier than previous programs used by the brigade," Britton added. For example, it is easier to track and plot unit movements and supply routes. And, unlike previous programs, the C2PC allows members of a unit to teleconference with higher command or view any projection, even from outside the MCPS area, from a personal computer.

The MCPS is also designed to allow section leaders to simultaneously input battle-related data via their laptop computers. A battle captain and noncommissioned officer (NCO) can then analyze all the section data, recommend a course of action, and brief the unit commander for a final decision.

"The battle captain or NCO can control the laptops to look quickly at what needs to be seen on the big screens by a simple click of a button," said Sergeant First Class James M. Shultz, training NCO in the 18th's operations section. "Even with the big screen displayed, the staff can still work on their current projects and see the battlefield. To be able to see the whole battle progress, second to second, makes our MP mission much easier to accomplish."

The battle is instantaneous and always up to date—every soldier is accounted for at any given moment.

Before MCPS, the operations center would have to wait for phone calls and section briefings that could sometimes lead to unintentional miscommunication.

There are more benefits to the system than just its battle-tracking capabilities. Its modular design also keeps the soldiers who must install it happy. "I like the MCPS because the wiring is already built into it," said Nichols. "Wiring something like this would normally take an hour and a half, but with this wiring conduit, it only takes 10 minutes to plug everything in."

The MCPS's frame structure can also be customized. When units order the system, they can alter it to fit their unique needs. It is also portable and can be assembled in just 20 minutes by a four-man team.

The MCPS and its associated systems give the 18th the ability to conduct the brigade's wartime missions at a level never before achieved. The brigade has taken one giant leap into the 21st century.

Private First Class Joseph, 18th MP Brigade, is a contributing writer for the V Corps Public Affairs Office.

2002 Board Winners— Noncommissioned Officers of the Year (NCOYs)

Staff Sergeant Randy L. Cheadle, B Company, 795th MP Battalion, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, Drill Sergeant of the Year (DSOY), February 2002, and TRADOC DSOY, June 2002

Sergeant Derrick M. Davis, Law Enforcement Activity, MP Company, Fort McPherson, Georgia, January 2002

Sergeant Kyle D. Hill, 5045th Garrison Support, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, March 2002

Sergeant Maria E. Yost, 221st MP Detachment, Fort Story, Virginia, March 2002

Staff Sergeant Lee K. Sodic, U.S. Army Security Force, Fort Detrick, Maryland, February 2002

Staff Sergeant Raymond Lingley, HHC Basic Training Brigade, Fort Benning, Georgia, April 2002

Sergeant Gregory B. Gray, 13th MP Company, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, April 2002

Staff Sergeant Timothy J. Morgan III, 25th MP Company, MP Brigade, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, February 2002; U.S. Army Pacific, April 2002

Staff Sergeant John R. Cherubini, 812th MP Company, 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, June 2002

Sergeant Ruben C. Herrera, 3d MP Company, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, Georgia, March 2002

Sergeant (P) Clint J. Jeffries, HHC White Sands, Army Testing and Evaluation Command, April 2002

Sergeant First Class Thomas E. Mortenson, 2d of the 363d Training Support Battalion, 5th Army, May 2002, and U.S. Army Reserve Center, May 2002

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN D. GRANGER—MILITARY POLICE CORPS INNOVATOR

By First Lieutenant Philip Orotelli



At the end of the 1970s, the MP Corps faced extinction as it began to feel the effects of mandated force structure reductions. These reductions came as military officials grappled with personnel shortages in an expanding and modernizing Army. The future role of the shrinking military police force was uncertain and unpromising until Major General (MG) John D. Granger assumed command in August 1980. With his visionary goals and innovative thinking, the commandant revitalized the Corps's purpose and mission and transformed it into the "highly mobile, well-armed, combat multiplier of today."[1]

The problems that MG Granger inherited upon assuming command included an undetermined wartime mission, a poorly equipped force, and a discredited image in the eyes of the rest of the Army. To solve the root cause of the Corps's most prominent problems, MG Granger became a proponent of the new battlefield mission-doctrine, specifically, fighting the rear battle against Level II threats—that is, airborne, seaborne, and infiltrated assaults by elite Soviet troops. By incorporating this mission into doctrine, he changed the way that military police would fight in the predicted North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) war against the former Soviet Union. Along with this innovation in combat doctrine came follow-on changes in force structure, equipment, and weaponry.

From the beginning, MG Granger used U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) training and advanced schooling to instill the developing doctrine into the officer corps. He conveyed his innovative vision for the Corps by explaining that the Army "looks for new doctrine and weapons that will permit us to fight more effectively...[and] to achieve maximum effectiveness as a total-combat force."[2]

Recognizing the impact of the force reductions on the Corps, he sought to develop new and effective roles for the military police in times of war. He declared, "We must be exceedingly circumspect and exceptionally visionary to assure that our MP Corps is looking to the future and is not overly wedded to missions of the past."[3] MG Granger's vision successfully freed the Corps from its traditional roles and prepared it for the future conflict that was being outlined by the developing AirLand battle doctrine.

Looking toward the future, MG Granger worked with the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to develop three types of MP forces—base-defense, response, and tactical-combat. Under this doctrine, the base-defense forces would defend against Level I threats as they do during traditional rear-area-security missions. However, response- and tactical-combat-force operations require military police to seek out, close with, and destroy enemy forces.[4] This doctrinal change represented the single most important innovation in the post-Vietnam MP mission.

MG Granger's next innovation was to modify the Corps's existing force structure, equipment, and weaponry to make them fit with its new battlefield mission. Organizations changed at the lowest level. Each squad would now consist of an E6 squad leader and two E5 team leaders forming three "fully-mobile squad(s) possessing more firepower than any squad in the Army other than Armor squads."[5] The new squad composition—now equipped with high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles and MK19 grenade launchers—gave commanders enormous flexibility in positioning fighting teams in locations where they could most effectively accomplish the mission without sacrificing firepower or troop safety. With these changes in place, the Corps became a lethal force capable of executing versatile missions on the NATO battlefield.

Lastly, MG Granger strengthened the Corps's image, reputation, and professionalism. Through the

implementation of doctrinal and force structure changes, the commandant successfully influenced his vision of the future Corps. By dispelling the notion of a solely garrison police force, the modern force quickly earned the respect and support of the entire Army. Its new image—an important combat multiplier on the battlefield—made the Corps into the "Force of Choice" that is so extensively recognized and respected today.

Endnotes

[1] John D. Granger, "From the Commandant," *Military Police Journal*, Spring 1981, p. 1.

[2] Thomas H. Cornick, "Rear-Area Operations in the U.S. NATO Corps," *Military Police Journal*, Winter 1982, p. 5.

[3] Granger, p. 1.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Gary W. Lawhead, "Force Modernization of the MP Corps," *Military Police Journal*, Winter 1982, p. 14.

First Lieutenant Orotelli is a platoon leader in the 25th MP Company, supporting the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii.

2002 Board Winners— Soldiers of the Year (SOYs)

Specialist Daniel Davis, 705th MP Battalion, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, May 2002, and Combined Arms Center, May 2002, and TRADOC August, 2002

Specialist Kathryn J. Ward, 40th MP Detachment, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, March 2002

Specialist Erica D.S. Coleman, 221st MP Detachment, Fort Eustis, Virginia, March 2002, and Combined Arms Support Command, June 2002

Specialist Benjamin Stephens, 194th MP Company, Fort Campbell, Kentucky, April 2002, and 101st Airborne Division, April 2002

Specialist Alan J. Suskey, HHC 18th MP Brigade, V Corps, April 2002, and U.S. Army Europe, May 2002

Specialist Robert B. Cabrera, U.S. Army Security Force, Fort Detrick, Maryland, February 2002

Specialist Brian J. Pehrson, 13th MP Company, U.S. Army Southern European Task Force, April 2002

Specialist Ebony Q. Jenkins, 58th MP Company, MP Brigade, Hawaii, February 2002

Specialist Kelly D. Reeves, 223d MP Company, State of Kentucky, April 2002

Specialist Jennifer Warrington, Company C, 704th MP Battalion, Fort Lewis, Washington, July 2002

Force Protection Support to Army Materiel Command—



The M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) range was one of five ranges completed during the mobilization of the 1139th Military Police Company in support of Operation Noble Eagle.

By Captain Lance A. Shaffer

The 1139th MP Company (Combat Support), Missouri Army National Guard (MOARNG), has been serving as part of Operation Noble Eagle since last fall by providing force protection to three designated Army Materiel Command (AMC) sites in the midwestern United States. This article chronicles the unit's mobilization, deployment, and mission.

Congressional Visit

Following the events of 9-11, our unit was prepared for any mission that it was called to execute. After receiving a visit from Missouri's U.S. Representative, the Honorable Ike Skelton, during the October drill, unit members could not help but realize that he was a harbinger for the events to come. Many soldiers began to prepare mentally for a near-future activation.

Mobilization

The "near future" came on Thanksgiving Day 2001 when I received the official mobilization notification. I started the alert roster call-up quickly and had unit members reporting to the armory on Monday morning for soldier readiness processing (SRP). We accomplished the required processing in one day. This included the typical preparations involving legal, financial, personnel, medical, dental, and family readiness issues that are always addressed before deploying. It was at the end of this first day that the designated advance party departed for our mobilization station, Fort Riley, Kansas.

The rest of the unit had two more days to order and issue supplies and prepare and load the platoon equipment for the convoy. The soldiers also had to deal with their civilian employers who, at most, had one afternoon's notice that they would be losing an employee for up to two years.

After accomplishing these tasks, we held a departure ceremony at both of our units' locations. Our guest speakers were the Honorable Bob Holden, the Governor of Missouri, and Brigadier General Dennis Shull, the Adjutant General of Missouri. Many of the local and regional VIPs were also present. The local Veterans of Foreign Wars and the American Legion provided color guards; the local school bands provided the music; and friends and family provided the spirit for a festive, yet bittersweet, departure. Following the ceremonies, the unit convoyed to Fort Riley.

Upon arrival, the unit transitioned smoothly into our mobilization station environment. The advance party provided this ease by coordinating the logistical issues and completing training schedules for our entire two-week

stay. The next morning, the unit went through the installation's SRP without a hitch. This was primarily due to the intense screening at our home armories. Days three through six consisted of platoon lane training.

Lane Training

The three lanes chosen to prepare us for our designated mission were—

- Perimeter security.
- Conventional ammunition-supply-point security.
- Response-force operations.

The lanes were chosen to complement and reinforce the training that had been conducted recently. Each platoon had trained on a single lane—day and night—for three consecutive days. They were barraged with scenarios and scrutinized closely by trained observer/controllers (O/Cs). Specific incidents may require a platoon to conduct an after-action review, regroup, and do it again. The platoons worked on weaknesses and honed their skills and teamwork until they were able to "run" through each lane. The platoons continued to work their way through the crawl, walk, run phases of the lane-training process until both the platoon leader and the O/Cs felt that the platoon was ready to perform at the optimum level. The culmination of the training occurred on the fourth day as each platoon's feet were put to the fire during the validation process. Although encountering many difficult situations, each platoon resolved the situations properly. They pulled together, shined, and received validation on each lane.

Weapons Qualifications

The next morning, and for the next five days, we began weapons qualifications in the following order:

- MK-19
- M249 SAW
- M203
- M9
- M16

The 924th MP Battalion supported our ranges outstandingly. Shooting one weapon per day allowed us to concentrate our resources at a particular range and supplement the 924th's range support personnel with our own. Typically, we must fire and support five ranges by ourselves on a drill weekend (Saturday).



Sergeant First Class Don Hubbard (left) and First Lieutenant Bryan Jobe (right) confer over platoon operations during the lane training portion of mobilization at Fort Riley, Kansas.

After completing the weapons ranges, the company trained for three days on a set of mission-specific training requirements focusing on individual soldier homeland defense tasks with a focus on security, medical and weapons tasks, and night-vision-goggle training. It was also imperative to perform maintenance on the equipment, particularly the weapons and vehicles. We were also continuing to receive individual equipment through supply.

Leader's Reconnaissance

While at Fort Riley, I managed to go with my training support battalion mentor, Major Andrew Lark, to our mission sites. We traveled to Lake City Army Ammunition Plant (LCAAP) in Independence, Missouri; the Kansas Army Ammunition Plant (KSAAP) in Parsons; and the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant (IAAAP) in Middletown and met with the staff members at each site. The LCAAP and IAAAPs have one military person assigned, and the KSAAP site has one nonmilitary commander's representative. Each site has a small number of Department of Defense (DOD) employees and hundreds, sometimes thousands, of civilian employees working for the contractor or its subcontractors. The most important issue we faced was that none of the sites had an infrastructure to support troops. The bottom line was, we were beginning a military operation at three sites with nothing to sustain the troops.

Quick planning addressed the logistical basics of food, billeting, and working environments. We established levels of support similar to, or based on, what is expected on a regular military installation. We coordinated space for our supply, administrative, medical, and operations sections as well as for guard mount and weapons vaults. We were also able to coordinate an area for unit maintenance at each site. We then spent time discussing the integration period and the agenda for the first

week at each site. My intention was to create the most fluid transition possible, enabling us to assume the mission as early as possible.

We completed a site reconnaissance to evaluate the mission and expectations of each site commander more accurately. This would also help me determine the distribution of my soldiers to meet the expectations for mission accomplishment. Upon completion of the site and map reconnaissances, the site commander (or his representative) and I worked out a comprehensive plan of what we could, and would, provide to secure their plants. Additionally, we now had an understanding of the logistical arrangements for food, billeting, working environments, morale, welfare, recreation, and the other major logistical areas.

Deployment

After completing the required training and coordinating the logistics, we prepared for three separate convoys to LCAAP, KSAAP, and IAAAP. The LCAAP and KSAAP convoys departed on the same day while the IAAAP convoy departed two days later. Each convoy made it to its site without incident. The platoons set up and received a thorough overview of the mission. The overview included briefings by the site commander, the corporate contractor's representative (the people making the munitions), the contract security manager, the Department of the Army's civilian security manager, the plant's fire department chief, and the safety and environmental representatives. The reason for giving the soldiers such a thorough overview was to provide a clear understanding of whom everyone was and to create a sense of purpose for the individual soldier. This was critical because these locations are isolated and remote. The contract security briefing clarified the specific details of what contract security does and what our forces do. This created clear lines of responsibility and enabled both sides to thoroughly understand how we would mesh to make this the most formidable security force available.

After the briefings were completed, we rode along with each site's contract security force while familiarization patrols began getting familiar with the terrain and mission-essential vulnerable areas (MEVAs). Within the first week, we gained a thorough understanding of the mission and a familiarity with the terrain.

Mission

Our mission was to secure, deter, and defend against attempts to gain unlawful entry into and delivery of weapons, explosives, or other unauthorized materials to designated sites. We also had to be prepared to apprehend or destroy an attacking force, secure the zone of attack, and restore the preattack operations. The bottom line was that we had to be prepared to defeat any attempt to access sensitive areas. The purpose of our mission seemed small until you realized what it was that we were protecting. The Lake City plant manufactures all of the small-arms ammunition for the DOD, the Kansas plant manufactures "bombs" for the Air Force, and the Iowa plant manufactures tank ammunition. The important facts are that these sites are "sole-source providers" for the munitions they manufacture. From a security standpoint, these sites could be considered targets for large payoffs.

Each of our assigned AMC sites has a contract security force that could have been categorized, prior to 9-11, as an "industrial" security force. This is a small, lightly armed force that has been reduced to all-time low manpower numbers. Following 9-11, the post was closed to thru traffic and the size of the security force more than doubled because of the new security demands placed on the AMC sites to protect vital DOD assets.

When we were called to active duty, the plan was to integrate the military police with the new, enhanced contractor security force to



Static security at the front gates and at designated MEVAs, coupled with roving patrols of the perimeter and designated sectors, is the main mission focus of the MP at designated AMC sites.

complement the latter by providing firepower and a visible deterrent to would-be attackers. With the numbers of military police assigned to each site, we provided roving patrols through designated sectors and static security at priority MEVAs and the main gates, 24/7.

Mission Analysis

A team of force protection planners, (from the Operations Support Command in Rock Island, Illinois) the platoon leader, and I conducted an extensive mission analysis of each site. Afterward, we recommended how to enhance the security posture. We based our recommendations first on ideal conditions and then on the availability of funds and assets. We suggested enhancing barrier systems and lighting techniques—areas typically covered in FM 3-19.30, *Physical Security*—using security videotaping.This process proved to be a valuable learning tool.

As a follow-up, we met again several months later to develop an off-the-shelf CD version of each site's protection plan that will be available for future missions. This comprehensive plan includes deployment and movement plans, platoon battle books and standard operating procedures, site-protection plans, and unit mission plans—everything a unit needs to repeat this mission.

Lessons Learned

National Guard (NG) MP units will probably continue to receive similar missions. These units are well-versed in missions of this nature. We perform security missions at nuclear plants; during natural disasters; at major events in our state (like the Y2K crisis and gubernatorial inaugurations); and, more recently, at airports. Typically, many of these missions are part of our state's Emergency Response Operations Plan (EROP). We train on the EROP tasks and missions to fulfill state requirements and the standard MP company mission-essential task list. Another important supporting fact is that, in this company, 31 percent of the military police are civilian law enforcement officers. The mature, well-seasoned demeanor of these soldiers makes the transition to their mission easy and enables each squad to have numerous professional soldiers to lead and mentor the new or less-experienced troops. The quick adaptability of personnel and units, coupled with the convenient locations of NG units, makes them a perfect match for local, regional, and national security missions of this nature.

Deploy Units, Not Numbers

Another important issue is calling entire units to active duty. By doing so, the support areas of personnel, supply, communications, operations, medicine, and maintenance can perform their duties, as trained. They can focus on the mission and not erode their mission or deplete the troop base by performing other tasks. It is also critical to have available the equipment assigned to a particular modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). By deploying units, not numbers, you enable them to support themselves. This is essential in an environment—like that of AMC sites—where there is no life-sustaining infrastructure. It would not have been possible to accomplish this mission successfully without the support personnel assisting and sustaining the military police every step of the way.

Activate and Establish the Chain of Command

The 1139th is assigned to the 5th Army. The 3/75th Brigade (Training Support) has administrative control of it, and the individual AMC sites operationally control each platoon. Although we have made this work, it is not the most logical chain of command out there. In the future, I would recommend implementing the typical battalion and brigade structure to support the company-level units assigned to a mission. A company commander would no longer have to talk to an Army-level emergency operations center on a fairly regular basis. Also, it would provide a supporting unit that has personnel and staff assigned to support MTOE units. The current situation does not provide a structure with military personnel who are assigned to support units such as ours.

Conclusion

Performing a vital security mission, while traversing through a part of the contractor-laden AMC that few troops know anything about, has been a thoroughly interesting and valuable experience. The soldiers of the 1139th adapted to the situation and accepted the mission without hesitation, as they did during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the Mississippi River flood in 1993, and Hurricane Mitch in 1999. They are executing the AMC site-security mission flawlessly and will, no doubt, stand ready to answer America's call, no matter what the mission.


Transporting Enemy Prisoners of War—Operation Ironclad

By First Lieutenant Eric A. Kready

The events of September 11th terrorized hearts and minds around the world. America, and its security, had been exposed to an enemy that was unfamiliar to the homeland. This new breed of enemy caused actions and reactions across a wide spectrum. Agencies and proponents struggled diligently. In only a few short months, the world's greatest military acquired its enemy and began capturing personnel in Afghanistan.

The task of escorting these detainees was so unique that current doctrine did not yet conceive of it. The concept of transporting enemy prisoners of war (EPWs) on a linear Afghan battlefield was not yet feasible. Instead, the captured fighters needed to be transported from Kandahar to the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. By doctrine, division military police move to the forward collection point (CP) to escort captives to the central CP. The Corps's military police then move forward to the central CP to escort the captives to the central holding area (CHA). Finally, the echelons-above-corps (EACs) military police move forward to the CHA to escort the captives to the internment/resettlement facility. FM 3-19.40, *Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations*, states that the sequence of detainee transportation is usually marching by foot, riding by truck, and finally sailing by ship to the final destination. The complexity of the situation, combined with the landlocked country of Afghanistan—issues unaddressed in doctrine—created a scenario that required unique planning and creative leadership.

Army Reserve and National Guard units normally conduct EPW missions. However, the time-sensitive nature of this operation did not allow for these units to activate. The XVIII Airborne Corps called on the 194th MP Company from Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and the 64th MP Company from Fort Hood, Texas, to initiate the movement of the detainees while their Reserve counterparts prepared to assume the mission. Early in January 2002, these military police units, in conjunction with the Transportation Command, became a formal part of Operation Ironclad—a mission supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. On January 6th, the 194th received its mission order and vigorously conducted troop-leading procedures and mission preparation. Within hours, the unit was uploaded. By January 9th, 116 military police and support personnel (medics, mechanics, communication specialists, and administration), deployed for a rendezvous with destiny.




Enroute to Afghanistan in a C-17

Each detainee escort mission consisted of an MP platoon and elements of the Air Force's security forces. Integration of the teams and the required training and rehearsals were conducted at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Each team received critical instruction from Air Force Raven team members who specialize in aircraft and cargo security procedures—at airfields and in flight—for all operations. Training included becoming familiar with the aircraft, practicing close-quarters combat and unarmed self-defense, using the baton, safeguarding detainees properly and humanely, and developing contingency operations for aircraft movement. Upon synchronization of each element, the teams flew to an undisclosed location to prepare for the journey to Afghanistan.

In the interest of current and future operational security, many details of this operation remained classified. Crossing over 100,000 miles of airspace, the 194th's Operation Ironclad teams safely escorted 232 captured Taliban and al Qaeda fighters to Cuba. In just over one month, mobilized Army Reserve units assumed the mission.

It is likely that this mission will be repeated in the months and years ahead. Certainly, whatever MP unit is called on will conduct the operation with the same efficiency and professionalism as those who went before, helping to establish new doctrine and becoming a part of history.



THE BRIGADIER GENERAL JEREMIAH P. HOLLAND AWARD—LINEAGE AND HISTORY

By Sergeant Major Charles V. Slider, Jr. and Dr. Ronald Craig

Brigadier General (BG) Jeremiah P. Holland initiated an award that is presented to the best company or smaller element in the Military Police Corps. He wanted to promote esprit de corps and recognize the unit that had displayed excellence during a 12-month period (1 October to 30 September)—the best in the Military Police Corps. The award (a trophy and letter) is based on total unit accomplishments, encompassing every phase of activity bearing directly on mission accomplishment. He donated $2,500 to establish the award and asked that the first award be presented on the Corps's anniversary. Major General Karl W. Gustafson then developed the procedures and established the award program on 18 August 1969. The first award was presented on 26 September 1970.

To this day, BG Holland's selfless dedication and dream of excellence live on through the lineage of the numerous award winners. The following is a list of the award recipients:

1970	545th MP Company, Fort Hood, Texas
1971	118th MP Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
1972	570th MP Platoon, Frankfurt, Germany
1973	20th MP Company, Okinawa, Japan
1974	529th MP Company, Heidelberg, Germany
1975	82d MP Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
1976	287th MP Company, Berlin, Germany
1977	284th MP Company, Frankfurt, Germany
1978	984th MP Company, Fort Carson, Colorado
1979	561st MP Company, Military District of Washington
1980	2d MP Company, Camp Casey, Korea
1981	534th MP Company, Panama (no city)
1982	6th MP Company, Germany (no city)
1983	300th MP Company, Stuttgart, Germany
1984	118th MP Company, Germany (no city)
1985	287th MP Company, Berlin, Germany
1986	552d MP Company, Pusan, Korea
1987	287th MP Company, Berlin, Germany
1988	549th MP Company, Panama (no city)
1989	556th MP Company, Oberusel, Germany
1990	65th MP Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
1991	501st MP Company, Bad Kreuznach, Germany
1992	188th MP Company, Camp Walter, Korea
1993	300th MP Company, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
1994	3d MP Company, Wurzburg, Germany
1995	Fort Myer MP Company, Military District of Washington
1996	230th MP Company, Kaiserslautern, Germany
1997	1st MP Company, Wurzburg, Germany
1998	21st MP Company, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
1999	230th MP Company, Kaiserslautern, Germany
2000	92d MP Company, Baumholder, Germany
2001	552d MP Company, Pusan, Korea

Award Evaluation Criteria

On 2 November each year, a special awards board is convened to select the award winner. The following areas are considered essential criteria in evaluating and determining the outstanding military police unit of the year:

- Annual general inspection
- Command maintenance inspection
- Army training test
- Individual and crew-served weapons qualification
- MOS qualification
- Reenlistment rate
- Savings bond rate
- Personal injury rate
- Article 15s
- Unit citations
- Individual awards and decorations
- Major accomplishments, significant achievements, or extracurricular activities in furtherance of the Army's mission

THE LINEAGE OF THE BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID H. STEM AWARD



By Sergeant Major William D. Moisant
and Sergeant Major Charles V. Slider, Jr.

The Brigadier General (BG) David H. Stem Award was established in 1985 as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Liberty Award and is awarded annually to the best Military Police unit, company size or smaller, in TRADOC. It was renamed the BG David H. Stem Award in August 1987, in honor of BG Stem who was killed in a tragic plane crash on 21 January 1987. The winner of the Stem award is the TRADOC nomination for the BG Jeremiah P. Holland Award, which recognizes the most outstanding Military Police unit, company size or smaller, in the Army.

Biography

David H. Stem was born on 23 January 1938 in Easton, Pennsylvania. He spent most of his childhood in the foothills of the Pocano Mountains in northwest New Jersey. General Stem's parents instilled in him the ideal of living out his dreams. General Stem had several dreams. The first was to attend West Point, and the second was to become a general officer in the U.S. Army. He attained both of these and ultimately the standard for a gifted few—the position of Commandant of the Military Police Corps Regiment. The Corps will be grateful for his achievements forever.

In General Stem's last commandant's notes, he made this statement, "Military Police will play a key role in rear operations, but it is not an exclusive role, and we must recognize our limitations." Through this award, his fire that raged for Duty, Honor, and Country lives on and gives the Regiment spiritual inspiration.

General David H. Stem Award Winners

1985	MP Company, Fort Gordon, Georgia
1986	MP Company, Fort Monroe, Virginia
1987	MP Company, Fort Jackson, South Carolina
1988	MP Company, Fort Monroe
1989	MP Company, Fort Gordon
1990	MP Company, Fort Knox, Kentucky
1991	MP Company, Fort McClellan, Alabama*
1992	MP Company, Fort Sill, Oklahoma
1993	MP Company, Fort Benning, Georgia*
1994	MP Company, Fort McClellan*
1995	MP Company, Fort Benning*
1996	MP Company, Fort McClellan*
1997	MP Company, Fort McClellan
1998	MP Company, Fort Knox
1999	MP Company, Fort Knox
2000	B Company, 5th MP Battalion (USDB), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2001	71st MP Det, Fort Benning

*In these years, Stem awards were presented to MP units from small, medium, and large installations; therefore, the units were the overall winners.

All BNCOC Graduates to Get 40 Promotion Points

By Staff Sergeant Marcia Triggs

Reprinted from the Army News Service, July 30, 2002

Soldiers who successfully complete the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course (BNCOC) will be awarded 40 promotion points beginning August 1, 2002.

Soldiers will no longer receive four promotion points per BNCOC-course week. This change will lessen administrative mistakes and level the playing field for BNCOC graduates with similar military occupational specialties (MOSs), personnel officials said.

"Clerks will no longer have to do the math," said Sergeant Major Louisa Scott, the chief of Enlisted Promotions, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command.

Under the current system, when soldiers complete both phases of BNCOC—common core and military occupational specialty specific—they submit two Department of the Army Form 1059s to their Personnel Support Branch (PSB) for points, Scott said.

Then the PSB clerk decides how many points a soldier gets, Scott said. For example, if phase one is five weeks and three days and phase two is two weeks and two days, one clerk may give 32 points for eight weeks but another clerk may give 28 points for seven weeks.

By implementing a 40-point standard, there's no room for interpretation, Scott said.

Some soldiers may have the perception that they are going to lose points because their particular BNCOC is longer than 10 weeks, said Sergeant Major Gerald Purcell, personnel policy integrator with the Army's G1. "That's not true. The point system will be applicable to every soldier in the MOS, and the cut-off score will reflect that," he said.

Soldiers will still be competing against others in their MOS, and everyone in that MOS will have 40 points, Scott added.

The soldiers most greatly affected are the ones who are in MOSs that have merged, such as some in the medical field, and those that are planning to merge under the implementation of Army Development System XXI initiatives, which was designed to consolidate MOSs with similar functions, Purcell said.

Last year, several medical skills were combined under the umbrella 91W. After the merge, some soldiers had promotion points based on a 12-week BNCOC course while others had points based on an 8-week course. Other potential merges include personnel administrative specialists (75B) and personnel services specialists (75H) who would be renamed as 42A.

It's also been proposed to merge light-wheel-vehicle mechanics (63B), heavy-wheel-vehicle mechanics (63S) and wheel-vehicle repairers (63W). While the wheel-vehicle repairers would lose 32 points if the merger goes through, each of the soldiers, who would be competing amongst one another for promotion, would receive the same number of promotion points for BNCOC completion. This eliminates inequities based solely on their BNCOC course length, Purcell said.

"We're treating BNCOC as an equal element. So as we merge similar MOSs; no one is at a disadvantage," Purcell said.

In July, all personnel support battalions began converting the BNCOC points and adjusting promotion points. Soldiers will not have to do anything, Purcell said.

A Special Book Review

The Army

Brigadier General Harold W. Nelson, USA (R), Editor-in-Chief;
Major General Bruce Jacobs, AUS (R), Editor; Colonel Raymond K. Bluhm, Jr., USA (R), Graphics Editor

By Dr. Ronald Craig, USAMPS Command Historian

This beautifully bound and excellently illustrated book is a celebration of the history of the Army and a milestone in presenting an informal history of this armed service. The editors and authors have composed a near-perfect picture and have successfully accomplished their stated purpose of telling "about soldiers and their contributions to the nation." They also accomplished this in a pleasing and informative manner.

The first and most apparent success of this book is its organization. The editors answered the nagging question that most historians ask themselves when writing a book—chronological or topical treatment? The editors accomplished this by addressing the subject from both perspectives and overlapping them. Included in the chronological treatment is the unique technique of illustrating history with stamps.

Following a comprehensive chronological view of Army history, the reader takes a voyage richly illustrated with graphics and photographs that animate the past. This voyage begins with an examination of the great leaders of the past, written by Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) (R) Samuel J. Newland. It is an excellent presentation of the qualities of leadership, despite a couple of flaws. LTC Newland concentrates too much on Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain's 3 days of superb leadership at Gettysburg, relegating Robert E. Lee, an acknowledged leader of great stature, to a small note and picture. Command Sergeant Major Scott Garrett continues the theme of great leaders with "Top Soldiers: The Noncommissioned Officers of the Army." While the chapter is enlightening and extremely informative, its information does not conform to its title. The chapter title implies a history of the noncommissioned corps and, instead, 95 percent of the information is focused on sergeants major.

One of the book's highlights is the chapter on the Medal of Honor winners, "Brotherhood of the Brave: The Army's Medal of Honor Winners," written by Major General (MG) (R) Bruce Jacobs. Its bonus is a discussion of the medal's award regulations.

The chapter titled "The Army and the Building of the Nation: Soldiers Who Waged Peace and Progress" is extremely gratifying because it illustrates the fact that much of military duty is not glorious. Brigadier General (R) Harold W. Nelson composed this admirable chapter using great period photographs, superb topics, and striking graphics but unnecessarily downplayed (or avoided) some negative aspects of Army history. These include the harshness of the Indian Industrial School at Carlisle Barracks and the use of soldiers against organized labor and World War I veterans during the 1930s.

A richly illustrated and informative addition follows with the chapter, "Where Soldier Leadership Begins: The Evolution of Army Schools and Training," written by General (R) Gordon R. Sullivan. It intelligently tells about the transition of the Army schools and the emergence of the U.S. ArmyTraining and Doctrine Command. Of particular interest are the pictures showing how the U.S. Military Academy cadet uniforms have changed and the biographical sketches of men influential in the training process.

The next two chapters paint a grand picture of Army history and have intriguing titles: "Army Blues to Olive Drab: A Modern Fighting Force Takes the Field" and "Khaki to Army Green." They briefly summarize the transition of Army tactics and doctrine—through the transformation of uniforms—while presenting a good combat history. The first of these chapters, written by Colonel (R) Cole Kingseed and one of the most interesting in the book, takes the reader on a pictorial excursion from the Philippine Insurrection through World War II. He not only portrays the evolution of uniforms and the reasons for those changes but also addresses weapons and tactics. Dr. Lewis Sorley's chapter continues the historical odyssey with amazing pictures, colorful graphics, and an admirable coverage of the Korean War.

Thank goodness they are not forgotten! In the "Patriots All of the Time: The Guard and Reserve—Only in America," MG (R) Bruce Jacobs adeptly presents the history and evolution of the Reserves and National Guard, including their activities during crisis, emergency, and warfare.

The final chapter, "America's Army Tomorrow: Technology to Win the Land Battles of the Future," by LTC (R) Clayton R. Newell, stresses the growing dependency on computers and the amazing abilities provided by this technology. With this contribution, the reader is projected into a futuristic vision of the Army.

The Army can be ordered directly from the Army Historical Foundation (703-522-7901 or *www.ArmyHistoryFnd.org*).

National Guard Troops Honored to Be Part of Detainee Mission

By Lieutenant Colonel Michael McNamara and Sergeant John Cervone

On 28 March 2002, Brigadier General (BG) Rick Baccus, Rhode Island Army National Guard (ANG), assumed command of Joint Task Force 160 and the detention mission at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base detention facility in Cuba. He is not only the first National Guard officer but also the first Army officer to be given command of the task force that oversees security for more than 300 detainees from the war on terrorism in Afghanistan. "I'm very honored to have been chosen for this mission," BG Baccus stated. A member of the Rhode Island ANG for 24 years, BG Baccus' last assignment, before being called to active duty in March, was commanding the Rhode Island ANG's 43d MP Brigade.

In mid-May 2002, soldiers from the 43d's Headquarters Company joined their commander for duty, specifically assisting with the detention center's security operations. This type of mission is not new to many of these veterans who guarded Iraqi prisoners during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Others participated in the August 2000 Adult Correctional Institute job action in Cranston, Rhode Island, by taking over the prison's security when the guard force went on strike. Nevertheless, these Rhode Islanders are still learning to adapt quickly to this new, politically sensitive mission.

The detainees—hailing from 33 different countries—are both dangerous and remorseless. Security is kept at an extremely high level to ensure that control of the prison is never lost. So far, the detainees have not caused any major problems for the 1,400 troops. "We have plans in place should anything happen, but there is no reason to believe [that] there is any organized resistance," BG Baccus said. Not that organizing resistance would be easy under these circumstances. The detainees are each locked in cells that are furnished with a metal bed, a flushing toilet, and a sink with running water. The holding area is set up in such a way as to keep all detainee communication very restricted.

BG Baccus has stressed that while he is in command, detainees will be treated humanely and according to the reputation of the United States as a nation of laws. He has also stressed that he expects all detainees to respect the camp rules. Finally, he explained that his first priority is safety—for both his soldiers and the detainees.

The men and women of the 43d have been tasked with a challenging and dangerous mission. They have to maintain their professionalism and tactfulness under very tense conditions. Because of the ever-present danger, these soldiers will have to look out for their comrades as well as themselves. Tact and discretion are the tools that all military police use on a daily basis, and are certainly being tested during this mission.

Mannheim Confinement Facility Accredited by the American Correctional Association

By First Lieutenant William Torrey

On 4 June 2002, a team of inspectors from the American Correctional Association (ACA) traveled to the U.S. Army Confinement Facility-Europe (USACF-E) in Mannheim, Germany, to conduct an accreditation audit. The team consisted of Warden George Wagner from the Hunterdon County Department of Corrections in Flemington, New Jersey, and Sheriff Stanley Glanz of Tulsa, Oklahoma. The audit lasted three grueling days, during which time the ACA team inspected the facility's compliance with 438 standards relating to health, safety, security, and operational procedures. In the end, the USACF-E had a remarkable 98.4 percent compliance rating—a mark that places the facility in the top 3 percent of all ACA-accredited prisons and jails.

The ACA is the oldest and largest international corrections association in the world. The first military facility to be accredited by the ACA was the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The USACF-E is the first overseas facility in the Army Corrections System to receive its accreditation. More significant, however, is the fact that the USACF-E is the first overseas facility of any type, civilian or military, to receive accreditation by the ACA. This drew the attention of the ACA's executive director, Mr. James Gondles, and the Director of Standards & Accreditation, Mr. Bob Verdeyne, who both traveled to Germany to oversee the audit. The facility officially received its accreditation certificate and indoctrination into the ACA in August 2002.



Specialist Jennifer Boyle demonstrates the security system in the central control room.



Sergeant First Class John Stir answers questions on tool room procedures during the inspection.

THE JOINT TASK FORCE CREDIT RULE

More officers will be given credit for temporary joint task force (JTF) deployments as the result of a credit expansion. The JTF credit rule, approved upon release of the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act on December 28, 2001, was expanded to include operations conducted in an environment where an extremely fragile state of peace and a high potential for hostilities coexist. Previously, the rule only granted JTF credit for operations conducted in a combat area of operations.

Officers eligible for credit must have served at least 90 consecutive days on the JTF headquarters staff (not subordinate organizations or service components); be in the grade of O3 filling an O4, or above, billet; and be on the "active-duty list" affected by joint officer management legislation and policy. Reserve Component members and "professional" specialties are excluded. Joint-duty credit is not automatically awarded; however, it may be recommended for officers who meet the criteria.

Eligible officers should submit a credit nomination package that includes—

- A memorandum and enclosure noting their service data, including a summary recommendation for cumulative joint-duty assignment credit identifying the nominee by name, grade, dates of JTF service, number of days served, and name of the specific JTF.
- An enclosure detailing his or her service data and position identification.
- The source documentation, including the officer-record brief, award citation, and travel orders and vouchers.

Multiple officer requests may be consolidated into a single submission; however, each request must contain a separate summary.

Retroactive joint-duty credit applies to the following:

Operation Northern Watch	August 1, 1992 – To be determined (TBD)
Operation Southern Watch	August 27, 1992 – TBD
Operation Able Sentry	June 26, 1993 – February 28, 1999
Operation Joint Endeavor	December 25, 1995 – December 19, 1996
Operation Joint Guard	December 20, 1996 – June 20, 1998
Operation Desert Thunder	January 24, 1998 – December 15, 1998
Operation Joint Forge	June 20, 1998 – June 10, 1999
Operation Noble Anvil	March 24, 1999 – July 20, 1999
Operation Joint Guardian	June 11, 1999 – TBD

Nomination packages must be received at the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM) no later than November 1, 2002. The memorandum should be addressed to—

Commander, PERSCOM
ATTN: TAPC-OPB-J (Major Pressley-Sanders)
200 Stovall Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22332-0411

Army officers are advised to contact Major Pressley-Sanders, joint-policy officer, for other information about the process.

DSN 221-8129 or (703) 325-8129
E-mail presslel@hoffman.army.mil

A Look Back

The U.S. Disciplinary Barracks and the 705th MP Battalion

The U.S. Disciplinary Barracks



The USDB, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was originally designated as the U.S. Military Prison and established by an act of Congress in 1874. Its mission is to incarcerate military prisoners of all the services who are sentenced to long terms of confinement and conduct correctional and treatment programs that maintain good order and discipline and reduce recidivism. It is the only maximum-security facility in the Department of Defense.

Brigadier General Thomas F. Barr is referred to as the father of the USDB. In 1871, he submitted a communication to the secretary of war calling attention to the treatment of military prisoners at various military stockades and state penitentiaries. An investigation resulted and recommendations for changes were approved.

On January 16, 1872, a bill was prepared and submitted to Congress requesting approval for a military prison. On March 3, 1873, a bill was passed to establish the first military prison at Rock Island, Illinois. The Ordnance Department and the secretary of war lodged a strong protest against the proposed location. They stated that prisoners could not be trusted to work with munitions, and the security measures necessary for the operation of a prison would greatly restrict the primary mission of the arsenal located there. On May 21, 1874, the original bill was amended establishing the military prison at its current location.

Twice in its history, the institution was transferred to the Department of Justice and used as a prison for civil offenders. It was first transferred in 1895 and returned to the Army in 1906. In 1915, by an act of Congress, its name was changed from the U.S. Military Prison to the USDB. In 1929, it was again transferred to the Department of Justice and designated as the Leavenworth Penitentiary Branch. It was reestablished as the USDB in November 1940. The Department of the Army has operated it there since that date.

705th MP Battalion—"The Guard"



Since the establishment of the U.S. Military Prison in 1874, a unit has been responsible for providing guards and support personnel. Among the early predecessors of the 705th were the Disciplinary Barracks Guard Battalion; the 1st Guard Company; the Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), USDB.

The USDB MP Battalion (Provisional) was activated September 24, 1982. The battalion retained its provisional status until May 24, 1984, when it activated into a permanent status.

Pursuant to Permanent Orders 29-1, dated April 3, 1991, the USDB MP Battalion was redesignated as the 705th. It consists of an HHC and companies A, B, and C. The battalion's mission is to conduct custody and control, support correctional programs and services, and be prepared to conduct no-notice emergency and disaster relief contingency operations in support of the USDB.

Deadline Approaches for High School Stabilization Program

Reprinted from the Army News Service, August 8, 2002

Soldiers with high school seniors who graduate in 2004 should start talking to their assignment branch now if they wish to be stabilized at their present duty station for their child's graduation, said personnel officials. More than 1,300 soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers have signed on to this program since its inception in April 2001.

"My family has made great sacrifices for me and my military career," said Sergeant First Class Raymond Almendarez, medical operations sergeant in Camp Casey, Korea. "So, it is only fitting that the military and I should reward my son by allowing him to finish his senior year." Almendarez was one of 1,380 soldiers who have applied for the stabilization program. So far 1,155 enlisted personnel have applied for stabilization; of these, 1,153 were approved.

"Approximately 48 percent of the requests came from the sergeant-first-class rank," said Lieutenant Colonel Patrick Sedlak, Enlisted Personnel Management Division at the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM). "We did, however, have command sergeants major through privates first class apply as well." More than 225 officers have applied for the program; of these, 220 were approved.

Soldiers must submit requests not later than 12 months prior to the beginning of the senior school year. For example, if the student's senior year starts in September 2003, the request must be submitted to PERSCOM not later than September 2002.

Soldiers may initiate a request for stabilization by submitting a DA Form 4187 listing the family member's name and social security number. The family member must be enrolled in the Defense Eligibility and Enrollment Reporting System, better known as DEERS. A letter from the high school stating when the family member is projected to graduate must be attached to the 4187. Soldiers stationed overseas must state on the form that they will extend their foreign-service tour to meet the stabilization requirement.

Enlisted soldiers must also list any scheduled training, such as schooling or temporary duty enroute, on the 4187. Officers with scheduled training should contact their branch assignment officer to reschedule that training.

Stabilizing Army families with high school seniors to reduce turbulence was among the top recommendations of an Army Education Summit held in July 2000. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric K. Shinseki heard the summit's outbrief and promised attendees to move forward quickly on the recommendations.

PERSCOM remains the approval authority for all stabilization requests.



Military Police Regimental Week and Warfighter Team Challenge

Events marked with an * are **Warfighter Team Challenge** activities.
Events written in *italics* are *NOTIONAL ONLY.*
All other events are Regimental Week activities.

Thursday, 19 September

0800-1200 Warfighter Registration*
0800-1200 *Regimental Conference Registration*
1200-1800 Warfighter Registration*
1200-1800 *Regimental Conference Registration*
1300-1700 *Regimental Conference SR Ldrs Session*
1800-UTC *Regimental Conference Icebreaker*

Friday, 20 September

TBD Warfighter Team Challenge*
0700-1100 *Regimental Conference*
TBD Warfighter Team Challenge*
1300-1700 *Regimental Conference*

Saturday, 21 September

TBD Warfighter Team Challenge*
0700-1130 *Regimental Conference*
1300-1700 *Regimental Conference*
1830-UTC *Regimental Conference Dinner*

Sunday, 22 September

0600-1100 Warfighter Roadmarch*
1200-UTC Regimental Picnic

Monday, 23 September


0700-1100 *Regimental Conference*
0800-0900 Regimental Review Key Leader Rehearsal
1100-1230 Warfighter Awards Ceremony*
1330-1700 *Regimental Conference*
1700-UTC Regimental Review Full Dress Rehearsal
1830-UTC Warfighter Awards Social*

Tuesday, 24 September

1000-1100 Memorial Tribute
1130-1230 Hall of Fame Luncheon
1300-1430 Hall of Fame Induction
1700-UTC Regimental Review and Reception

Wednesday, 25 September	**OPEN—No Activities Planned**
Thursday, 26 September	**0600-UTC** Regimental Run
Friday, 27 September	**1000-UTC** Regimental Golf Tournament
Saturday, 28 September	**1800-UTC** Regimental Ball

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
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MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Peter M. Champagne	Daniel J. Barry	8th MP Bde	Yongsan, Korea
Brian F. Bocklage	Douglas E. Porterfield	14th MP Bde	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Samuel J. Hernandez	George Olavarria	16th MP Bde	Ft Bragg, NC
Teddy R. Spain	Charles Guyette	18th MP Bde	Mannheim, GE
David D. Phillips	Angela C. Wilson	89th MP Bde	Ft Hood, TX
Gerald A. Mocello	James M. McVeigh	3d MP Grp (CID)	Ft Gillem, GA
Paul R. Capstick	Robert L. Murray	6th MP Grp (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Donald G. Salo, Jr.	Jeffry S. Huber	701st MP Grp (CID)	Ft Belvoir, VA
Stuart S. Taylor	William F. Merrill	202d MP Grp (CID)	Heidelberg, GE
Joel G. Himsl		Garrison, FLW	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Christopher G. Essig		Garrison, MDW	Ft Myer, VA
Colleen L. McGuire	Keith D. Daly	USDB	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Mary Christine Frels	Jerry K. Bennett	1st MP Bde (P)	Ft Lewis, WA
Arnaldo Claudio	Michael P. Hamilton	USAMP Bde, HI	Ft Shafter, HI
Jeffrey T. Christiansen		USA Spt Act I	Camp Red Cloud, Korea
	Raul Salinas, Jr.	Garrison	Ft Detrick, MD

RESERVE COMPONENT MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM	UNIT	LOCATION
Charles R. Brule	Raymond W. Funaro	43d MP Bde	Warwick, RI
Ted Szakmary	Varney D. Smith	220th MP Bde	Gaithersburg, MD
Dion P. Lawrence	Richard N. Espinosa	260th MP Bde	Washington, DC
James Payne	John R. VanNatta	300th MP Cmd (EPW)	Inkster, MI
Paul H. Hill	Roy Clement	800th MP Bde (EPW)	Uniondale, NY
Mitchell Leclaire	Eugene R. Bowman	177th MP Bde	Taylor, MI
Sanford E. Holman	Frank E. Johnson	1st Bde, 80th Div (IT)	Ft Meade, MD
Charles Luce	David B. Nemec	367th MP Group (EPW)	Ashley, PA

MILITARY POLICE BATTALION-LEVEL COMMANDS

COMMANDER	CSM/SGM/1SG	UNIT	LOCATION
Allen Scott Jones	Douglas J. Delzeith	94th MP Bn	Yongsan, Korea
Randall E. Twitchell	Mark F. Offerman	95th MP Bn	Mannheim, GE
Wade F. Dennis	Jeffrey A. Butler	503d MP Bn	Ft Bragg, NC
Thomas H. Tatum	Brian K. Wiles	504th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Paul K. Warman	Michael A. White	519th MP Bn	Ft Polk, LA
Richard V. Vanderlinden	Dale J. Paff	709th MP Bn	Hanau, GE
Kim S. Orlando	MIchael Hayes	716th MP Bn	Ft Campbell, KY
David J. Poirier	Stanley L. Staton	720th MP Bn	Ft Hood, TX
Jeffrey A. Mello	Robert M. Loe	728th MP Bn	Taegu, Korea
Byron A. Freeman	Edgar Dahl	759th MP Bn	Ft Carson, CO
Mark S. Spindler	Geraldine Rimpley	793d MP Bn	Bamberg, GE
Anthony Cruz	Charlie J. Wilson	704th MP Bn	Ft Lewis, WA
Timothy A. Weathersbee	Izel W. Rhym	705th MP Bn	Ft Leavenworth, KS
Zechara J. Miller	Tommie Hollins	701st MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Donald J. Kennedy	Michael W. True	787th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Debra A. Sanwaldt	Kevin B. Johnson	795th MP Bn	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
John M. Huey	Charles D. Medley	LEC, 3d MP Bn (P)	Ft Stewart, GA
Sabrina M. Sanfillipowebb	Michael T. Sampson	LEC, 25th MP Bn (P)	Schofield Bks, HI
Clayton W. Cobb	William J. Ladd	LEC, 10th MP Bn (P)	Ft Drum, NY
Pamela L. Martis	Carl E. Hemler	924th MP Bn	Ft Riley, KS
Christy M. Samuels	Clyde E. Davison	LEC	Ft Leonard Wood, MO
Stephen M. Wilkins	Curtis R. Rodocker	76th MP Bn (P)	Ft Bliss, TX
Bruce E. Vargo	John Schoenrock	5th MP Bn (CID)	Kaiserslautern, GE
Marlene R. Carter	Gary B. Belcher	10th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Bragg, NC
Sibylla M. Albertson	Lance R. Brown	11th MP Bn (CID)	Ft Hood, TX
Gregory Robinson Sr.	Benjamin M. Kellam	19th MP Bn (CID)	Yongsan, Korea
Jeffery T. Harris	Jimmy Hendrix	22d MP Bn (CID)	Ft Lewis, WA
Mike French	John Dillon	CID District	Ft Riley, KS
Odie L. Butler III	David Schumann	3rd RGN WA, District	Ft Myer, VA
Deborah L. Geiger	Kenneth Dowless	86th CID District	Ft Benning, GA
Eric R. Belcher	Craig P. Brott	31st CID District	Ft Campbell, KY
Joe E. Ethridge, Jr.	Paul W. McDonald	262nd CID District	Bamberg, GE
Debra Broughton	A. J. Morrow	254th Base Support	Schinnen, Netherlands

The United States Disciplinary Barracks





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