

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ABOUT THE COVER

Planning the division and combat aviation brigade fight.

The Command Corner

In the last volume of Aviation Digest, I discussed the changing face of warfare, as the world evolves and possible threats continue to advance techniques and technologies that are designed to disrupt, deny, or degrade the systems we use, limiting our ability to gain a position of relative advantage and win decisively. As a branch, we must continue to explore this idea and look at ways to shift our current warfighting paradigm, bringing organizational change to our units, in a way that focuses on training individuals and units at home station, through rigorous training at our combat training centers, and continued coordination with our unified action partners. We must continue to define our role as a part of the land component and to explore how that role drives our capacity to fight across multiple domains.

As we shift from focusing exclusively on counterinsurgency operations (COIN) to rebuilding our capability to fight decisive action (DA) and multi-domain battle (MDB), our combat aviation brigades must be able to fight as maneuver units, integrated into their divisions' schemes of maneuver. We must retain our hard-won proficiency in the COIN fight and still be able to support our brothers and sisters in the combined arms community with aviation units that are capable of mastering all seven core competencies of Army Aviation, regardless of the operational environment. If not, we risk eroding the trust and confidence that we have earned throughout our branch's existence.

In this issue, I call your attention to two articles in particular that I would like for you to look at because of their direct relevance to us as professional warfighters. The first, by LTC Emmanuel Wolff, the French Liaison Officer at Fort Rucker, examines French Army Aviation maintenance operations. Presented through the lens of one of our allies, this article suggests how U.S. Army Aviation could leverage our organic maintainers to a greater extent, and gives us the opportunity to think differently about how we conduct maintenance operations. This article also highlights how cooperation with our unified action partners reinforces relationships that better prepare us for future conflicts.

The second article, "People Will Be What They Can See," is a leadership case study that looks at organizational change, a crucial element in setting conditions for success as we tackle the challenges of training for DA and MDB. In September 2016, the Army lost a great leader in General Robert Cone, former Training and Doctrine Command and III Corps commander. This study of his command of 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in 1994-1996 remains relevant today, both as an example of positive transformational leadership, and to ensure we remember his lessons and to honor his legacy.

Finally, I would like to congratulate MAJ Tom McCarthy, the Aviation Digest Author of the Year. MAJ McCarthy's article ("ARB Support to the JAM-GC," October-December 2016) demonstrates the kind of innovative analysis and unconventional thinking that will keep Army Aviation relevant in joint operational planning. I encourage each of you to read this and the many other superb articles presented in the Aviation Branch's Professional Bulletin – Read and Contribute!

As always, I could not be more proud of you, our Aviation Warfighters, Families, and Civilians. Every day I am honored to serve as your Center of Excellence Commander. Thank you for continuing to support our Nation through operations around the world while looking to the future to ensure that we remain Above the Best!

William K. Gayler
Major General, USA
Commanding

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The Jiu Jitsu of Fighting the CAB in Support of a Division

By COL Robert T. Ault

The martial art and sport of Jiu Jitsu is based on flowing around an opponent's strengths and yet presenting strength to the same opponent's weakness. As a sport and a form of self-defense, Jiu Jitsu allows a smaller and weaker athlete to dominate and submit a much stronger opponent. The key to success in a conflict is an awareness of the subtleties within the struggle and presenting multiple problem sets to the opponent. The objective is to gain and maintain a position of advantage over the opponent in order to force him to make bad decisions that ultimately result in the opponent's decisive defeat.

Unified Action

Unified action is the nation's approach to winning decisively. Just as in Jiu Jitsu, a fighter must be able to integrate all his efforts to achieve a dominant body position in order to win; so too, decisive action is about synchronizing all the national efforts to win decisively. Within the national level strategy of decisive action, the Army's role is the conduct of unified land operations.

Unified land operations are sustained land operations that seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of advantage over the enemy in order to win decisively. In the context of decisive action, the Army conducts four operations: offense, defense, stability, and defense support to civil authorities. There are two core competencies the Army must be able to conduct: wide area security (WAS) and combined arms maneuver (CAM). An example of WAS is the counter-insurgency operation we conduct in Afghanistan. Combined arms maneuver can best be illustrated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Regardless of the condition or competency, Army tenets of war apply to both CAM and WAS operations.

"The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, ... and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy"

- Sun Tzu

The tenets of unified land operations are:

-Flexibility in both planning and operations in order to take advantage of the enemy's mistakes.

-Integration of the various efforts and capabilities available to the fight.

-Army capabilities (such as the combat aviation brigade [CAB]) must ultimately produce or support lethal effects on the battlefield.

-Just as a fighter must be able to modify and respond to different opponents, the Army must adapt, be able to understand, learn, and overcome the enemy.

-Army forces must be able to operate in depth not just at the point of contact with the enemy. The tenet of depth means being able to shape those forces out of contact in order to defeat them when they do make contact with friendly forces in close and security areas. Depth provides space and time to control and synchronize both the forces and the operational tempo of the battle.

-Understanding the integration of capabilities and efforts is critical for the commander to both see the battlefield and bring decisive force to bear at the right place and time to win.

Operational Art

The tenets of Army operations allow successful completion of strategic end states, such as the restoration of an international border, to be connected via operational art to the tactics that defeat enemy forces or take and hold terrain. Operational art is the translation of strategy into tactics. It is concerned with

sequencing and prioritizing operations to create the desired effects of the strategy (the strategic end state). There are very few forces that can create operational effects by themselves.

Divisions are generally considered to be the highest level of tactical formations and often function as operational forces. Within the divisional structure, two formations are directly charged with creating operational effects - the division fires brigade (DIVFIRES) and the CAB. Because of their ability to operate over long distances, in both space and time, (like the division itself) the DIVFIRES and CAB are uniquely manned, equipped, and trained to directly support the creation of the strategic end state.

The Unique Contributions of Army Aviation - Asymmetric Offense

In order to operate as a force that can produce operational effects, the CAB must be employed across the battlefield framework (deep, close, and security) simultaneously. Given the speed, reach, and capability of the CAB, the result is an asymmetric force that is capable of shaping forces out of contact and attacking from a position of dominance on the battlefield. When fought in support of the divisional fight, the CAB is able to rapidly reposition forces and capability to force the enemy into making multiple bad decisions.

The Air Assault

In Jiu Jitsu there is a common saying - position before submission. A fighter does not enter a match and expect to submit his opponent outright without first placing himself in a position of advantage or dominance. Force is never met with force. Rather, fighters attempt to find holes in the opponent's position and maneuver to a position of advantage. This is accomplished by simultaneously presenting the opponent with multiple problems and forcing him to make a bad decision.

The air assault is a ground maneuver mission that is designed to leverage surprise by maneuvering friendly forces to create a positional advantage over the enemy. Traditionally, the result of a successful air assault operation is that the enemy is pressed to turn some portion of his force and fight in an unexpected direction; in essence, he is forced to deal with multiple dilemmas at once. The ability to maneuver a large force in the enemy's security area during darkness is exponential and contributes to the asymmetric advantage of Army Aviation in the division fight.

The Attack Out of Contact

While position and maneuver are important elements in Jiu Jitsu, they are not enough to win by themselves. This is also true in combat. Maneuver to a position of advantage is only beneficial because it sets the conditions for a decisive victory thru a submission of the opponent.

In its reconnaissance role, the CAB, in conjunction with the division intelligence effort, is able to gain and maintain contact with the second echelon of an enemy force not yet in contact with the friendly main body. Since the DIVFIRES set the destruction of enemy air defense as a priority for fires, the CAB is able to take full advantage of its parallel planning effort and launch an attack beyond friendly forces. The CAB's attack is intended to attrit the enemy capabilities to allow the brigade combat teams to win the close fight as the division attacks.

The asymmetry of the CAB can best be seen in the simultaneity of its operations across the battlefield framework and across the full range of missions. At any given time, the CAB fighting in support of a division will be conducting reconnaissance, attack, air assault, general support, aeromedical evacuation, and ground operations across the division area of operations. This broad, powerful capability requires strong, capable leaders and extensive planning in order to harmonize with the ground scheme of maneuver as well as deliver effects to the enemy.

While Army Aviation excels at creating asymmetric effects, its combat power must be preserved until it can be decisive in the fight. Deliberate decisions must be made about the level of risk that will be assumed on every mission. This risk to mission is best represented in the balance that must be struck between Army Aviation assets allocated across the battlefield framework. The level of Army Aviation assets committed to the deep or the close and security fights must be understood in terms of supporting the division fight to create conditions for the strategic end state or at the operational level. The attack platoon committed to the close fight will more than likely not be available to support the deeper shaping of the enemy follow-on forces.

Conclusion

Just as Jiu Jitsu requires skill, conditioning, and strength, fighting the CAB requires leaders with tactical skill and the capability of understanding the larger operational plan that seeks to achieve the strategic end state. Clausewitz reminds us that in war, the simple is hard. Fighting the CAB as part of a divisional combined arms fight requires training at all levels from aircrew to battle staff and brigade commander. The CAB's staff must be able to successfully plan ahead of and in parallel with the division staff. This is not an easy task. Much like a good grappling technique, it requires consistent practice and a discerning eye in order to bring the full power of the modern division to bear on the enemy, maneuver to a position of advantage, and win decisively.

You win the fight in the training camp, not on the day of the fight.
- Royce Gracie

Colonel Robert T. Ault is currently serving as the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence (USAACE) Chief of Staff. Previous assignments include Director, Directorate of Training and Doctrine and Commander, 4th Infantry Division Combat Aviation Brigade. COL Ault is a graduate of the National War College.

Acronym Reference

CAB - combat aviation brigade	**DIVFIRES** - division fires brigade
CAM - combined arms maneuver	**WAS** - wide area security

Reconciling the Rapid-Decisionmaking & Synchronization Process and the ATO/ACO Cycle

By LTC Lee Robinson

The air tasking order/airspace control order (ATO/ACO) cycle is a structure that imposes order on an otherwise chaotic system. As strategists from Clausewitz to Luttwak note, unpredictability is a constant in war that challenges the order commanders and their staffs attempt to impose. The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process (RDSP) is intended to account for the fog, friction, and enemy counter-actions that lead to unpredictability by compressing the orders process for timely decisions, but adapting the RDSP to the ATO/ACO cycle is a challenge. This article provides a framework for adapting the RDSP to the ATO/ACO cycle by adapting features of the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) into a battle rhythm that supports rapid decision making. While its lessons are applicable across all facets of decisive action operations, this article utilizes examples heavily weighted toward offensive operations.

RDSP and the ATO/ACO Cycle: A Square Peg in a Round Hole

The ATO/ACO cycle provides the combat aviation brigade (CAB) an opportunity to synchronize fires and maneuver in time and space with joint and host-nation airspace users. As Figure 1 illustrates, it is helpful to conceptualize the ATO/ACO cycle as a function of time. To illustrate an example using Figure 1, assume operations on D-day include a deliberate operation in the division's deep area such as an air assault of a reconnaissance force. The CAB staff will plan this operation over the preceding week, culminating in submission of planned targets and airspace control measures (ACMs) on Day-3 to be included in ATO-A.



Figure 1- Air Tasking Order Battle Rhythm

A lot can, and will, happen between the submission of these requests on D-3 and execution on D-day. Inevitably the CAB's higher headquarters or supported unit will adjust the plan, the enemy disposition will be counter to what planners expected, or a combination of the above will occur. In turn, the staff transitions from the deliberate planning that led to the approved course of action (COA) codified in the ATO/ACO to the RDSP.

Continuing this example, imagine the air assault planned for D-Day was no longer tenable due to a concentration of enemy forces near the planned landing zones discovered on D-2. The division staff determined a second location was feasible, but it is located on a different objective and the time for execution shifted from early evening to early morning. Utilizing the principles of RDSP expressed in *Field Manual 6-0, Mission Command*, the CAB staff draws on the existing order to adapt the commander's priorities to support the new COA. As Figure 2 indicates, the RDSP is composed of five steps, with the first two performed in any order and the last three interactively until a new COA is reached:



Figure 2 - Five Steps of the Rapid Decision-making and Synchronization Process[1]

Successful execution of the RDSP depends on the staff's ability to identify variance to the original plan and, if necessary, develop a new COA, often with incomplete information and in a time constrained environment. Continuing with the air assault example above, the new COA will likely result in changes to fires, maneuver, intelligence, and sustainment from the original operation. Depending on the division's priority for joint assets, the time for execution may shift to a point where the joint assets originally requested are no longer available. Similarly, while the ATO/ACO cycle enables units to submit changes to their airspace control plan (ACP), there is no guarantee the new targets and airspace control measures can be incorporated into the ATO/ACO for execution on D-day if conflicts with other joint airspace users emerge from the requested changes. The best the staff can do is develop processes to support the RDSP, thereby submitting adjustments to the ATO/ACO as quickly as possible.[2]

These processes are best captured by the events in a unit's battle rhythm. Field Manual 6-0 defines the battle rhythm as "a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations."[3] Current operations (CUOP) can, and will, affect future operations (FUOP), thus the battle rhythm must enable the staff to consider these two aspects in a systematic process to enable the staff to synchronize fires, maneuver, and sustainment. A successful battle rhythm maximizes the staff's opportunity to fit the square peg of the RDSP (characterized by fluidity and change) in the round hole of the ATO/ACO cycle (characterized by predictability and order).

How well do CABs execute this process? According to recent observations from the Mission Command Training Program (MCTP), the trend for most units is that battle rhythms "do not follow a logical process and lack procedures for refinement and adjustment."[4] Since the CAB staff must adjust to the ground scheme of maneuver, especially in the division's deep area which requires the CAB staff to look far ahead in time and space to synchronize assets, it must be prepared to execute the RDSP as conditions change.[5] Since the battle rhythm is the key to successful execution of the RDSP, the next section briefly discusses important components of a battle rhythm before turning to an example used in a recent warfighter exercise.

Battle Rhythm Dos and Don'ts

There is no one size fits all solution for a battle rhythm. Since the operations process is commander centric, the battle rhythm for each unit will adjust to suit how each commander receives and analyzes information and makes decisions. The battle rhythm will also depend on the requirements of a unit's higher headquarters. Table 1 summarizes principles from doctrine and lessons learned from the MCTP for constructing a successful battle rhythm.

Incorporating the battle rhythm principles requires creativity on the part of the commander and staff. When spread over a 24-hour period, staff availability may present a challenge to some WfFs. While it may seem feasible to consolidate the CUOPs and FUOPs functions of some WfFs into a single person, doing so will be counterproductive for the staff as the pace of current operations and the analysis for FUOPs demands these functions be spread among at least two people per shift. To meet the demands of operations, some officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO) will have to dual hat between their staff and WfF responsibilities. For instance, the unit Judge Advocate General representative can dual hat as the Protection FOUP Chief while his NCO assumes this role on the opposite shift.

Minimizing the duplication of products is also critical for the staff to execute a successful battle rhythm. The pace of operations does not permit the staff to create and update multiple products for

Do's	Don'ts
Include a CUOP and FUOPs representative per warfighting function (WfF) on each shift.	Think one person can execute both CUOPs and FUOPs functions for a WfF. This person will become overwhelmed with requirements.
Include all WfF representatives in each battle rhythm event. Exclusion of a particular WfF should be a deliberate decision.	Schedule a meeting without a clear purpose, inputs, requirements, and outputs for each WfF.
Be predictable for the time and location of battle rhythm events.	Be inflexible with the battle rhythm and refuse to adjust it when conditions necessitate a change.
Maximize the use of distributed resources (command post of the future [CPOF], Defense Collaborations Services, etc.) to enable remote dial-in for meetings	Forget to include liaison officers for adjacent and subordinate units in battle rhythm events.
Streamline the running estimate products for each WfF so they are used throughout the battle rhythm events (i.e., the movement and maneuver running estimate should be nested with the current operating picture (COP) and other battle rhythm events).	Require duplicate products from each WfF for meetings or working groups.
Focus on priority information requirements/essential elements of friendly information and the decision support matrix	Focus on the past.

Table 1: Battle Rhythm Principles

different meetings across the WfFs. An effective method is to utilize the running estimate for each WfF as part of the unit's COP. Utilizing command post of the future, the staff can create a top level dashboard for the commander and staff to view the most critical information with additional efforts containing more detailed analysis. This COP should be utilized for each meeting so each WfF is only updating one product. In meetings such as the commander's update, the WfF representatives brief from the commander's dashboard and by exception from their more detailed running estimate efforts.

Example CAB Battle Rhythm

Based on the principles above, the 1ID CAB developed a battle rhythm for a recent warfighter exercise that the staff continued to refine throughout the event's execution. While the battle rhythm itself was vital to the staff's ability to execute MDMP and RDSP, equally important was the familiarity of the staff with the unit's standing operating procedures (SOP). The backbone of the battle rhythm is the unit's mission Division (1ID) CAB during a recent warfighter exercise.

prepared him for this meeting by executing an update brief based on the current COP when he initially arrived to the command post. Following the targeting board meeting, the CAB commander provided planning guidance followed by battlefield circulation in the mid-day timeframe. This battle rhythm allowed him to influence higher headquarters' decisionmaking in the targeting board meeting and then assess current operations while the staff executed his planning priorities. The CAB commander returned for the CAB's CUA meeting at 1600 which prepared him for the division's CUA at 1800. This battle rhythm enabled multiple



Figure 3 - Example Battle Rhythm

Lastly, the battle rhythm, as a component of the operations process, must be commander centric.[7] The overall purpose of the battle rhythm is to facilitate staff planning and commander decisions. The staff must, therefore, consider the placement of events based on staff requirements and the commander's decisionmaking style. For instance, a commander may prefer to conduct battlefield circulation and receive input from his subordinates before making decisions. The staff's battle rhythm must support this style of decision making by scheduling events accordingly. The staff and commander must also design the battle rhythm so the commander is best prepared to influence the decisions of the organization's higher headquarters. With these principles as a background, the next section describes a specific battle rhythm utilized by the 1st Infantry

command SOP, tactical SOP, and plans SOP. These documents provide the basis of the people, processes, tools, and organization that support the battle rhythm.[8] A staff that is versed in the means to gain information and share information is well poised to successfully utilize their battle rhythm.

As demonstrated in Figure 3, the CAB staff designed the battle rhythm to nest with its higher headquarters and account for the decision-making style of the CAB commander.

The key touchpoints for the CAB commander with the division commander were the division targeting board meeting at 0900 and the division CUA meeting at 1800. The CAB commander preferred to attend the division targeting meeting in person, so the CAB staff

touch points for the CAB commander with the staff to ensure shared understanding throughout operations.

Drawing on the principles outlined in FIGURE 3 above, the battle rhythm events included a "seven-minute drill" that specified the following requirements for each meeting:[9]

1. Name of the meeting
2. Purpose
3. Frequency/Time/Location
4. Composition (Attendees)
5. Inputs
6. Outputs
7. Agenda

The operations synchronization meeting (OPSYNCH) synchronized operations for the next 48 hours while the targeting meeting incorporated operations beyond

48 hours. Figure 4 details the "seven-minute drill" for the OPSYNCH.

Each battle rhythm event had a similar product to focus the battle staff on the requirements for the meeting that were also captured in the unit's mission command SOP.

The battle rhythm enabled the CAB staff to conduct continuous MDMP and balance the demands of CUOPs and FUOPs. The staff nested the steps of MDMP with the battle rhythm as outlined in Figure 5 to facilitate the orders process.

The battle rhythm enabled a continuous process of MDMP through routine events with clear inputs and outputs for each WfF. This battle rhythm was especially helpful to integrate the CAB into operations in the division's deep area. By deliberately focusing on operations beyond 48 hours in the future through the CAB's targeting meeting, the CAB commander was well positioned to advocate for resources at the division targeting board the following morning. In turn, the CAB staff stayed proactive in the allocation of its assets based on the input of each WfF into COA development.

Purpose: Promote shared understanding across the WfF to ensure synchronization of capabilities, resources, and requirements.
Frequency: Daily
Duration: 40 minutes, not to exceed 1 hour
Location: Plans Tent

Composition
Chair: DCO / XO
Facilitator: S-3
Attendees: WfF Chiefs, Primary Staff, Battle Captain, LNOs
Notes: No slides. Be prepared to discuss WfF estimates.

Inputs	Outputs
All:	
Recommended updates to PIR/EEFI	Updates to PIR/EEFI
S2:	
Initial Collection Plan	Refined Collection Plan
Event Temp	Geoint product focus
SITTEMP	
Mission Command:	
Retrans Priorities	Refined Retrans priorities
LOS Analysis for PACE	LOS analysis priorities
Movement & Manuever:	
Current Orders & Graphics	Approved priorities and resource allocation
Future Planning Efforts	WARNOS/FRAGOs
Fires:	
Assets available	Refinements to TSM and HPTL
TSM	
HPTL	
Protection:	
Enablers available	DAL Adjustments
LOC Security	Asset Requests
ADA Coverage	
Sustainment:	
Route status & Sustainment Overlay	Refined Execution Matrix
Sustainment Execution Matrix	Refined MEDEVAC locations and forward advance

Agenda
- Current Operations Update (next 24, then next 48)
  - Battle Captain Update
  - PIR/EEFI Review
  - LNO Review of CUOPs
- WfF updates (next 24, then next 48)
  - Movement and Maneuver
  - Intelligence / SWO
  - Mission Command
  - Fires
  - Protection
  - Sustainment
- LNO Backbriefs and WfF Alibis

Figure 4 - Example of OPSYNCH

Step 1: Receipt of Mission	DIV BUB, DIV CUA, DIV Targeting Board, DIV OPSYNCH, DIV Orders/FRAGOs
Step 2: Mission Analysis	Targeting Meeting, OPSYNCH, Intel Synch, LOGSYNCH
Step 3: COA Development	Targeting Meeting, OPSYNCH, Intel Synch, LOGSYNCH
Step 4: COA Analysis (War-game)	OPSYNCH, Targeting Meeting
Step 5: COA Comparison	OPSYNCH, Targeting Meeting
Step 6: COA Approval	CUA
Step 7: Orders Production, Dissemination and Transition	Ongoing

Figure 5 - MDMP to Battle Rhythm

Legend (Figures 4 and 5)

ADA - air defense artillery
BUB - battle update briefing
CUA - commander's update assessment
COA - course of action
DCO - Deputy Chief of Staff
DIV - division
EEFI - essential elements of friendly information
FRAGO - fragmentary order
HPTL - high priority target list
INTEL - intelligence
LNO - liaison officer
LOC - local
LOGSYNCH - logistics synchronization
LOS -line of sight
MEDEVAC - medical evacuation
OPSYNCH - operations synchronization
PACE - primary, alternate, contingency, emergency
PIR - priority intelligence requirement
SITTEMP - situational template
SWO - staff weather officer
SYNCH - synchronization
LOS -line of sight
WARNO - warning order
WfF - warfighting function
XO - executive officer

When circumstances called for transitioning from the MDMP to RDSP, several touchpoints already existed to leverage the expertise of each WfF. The shift change briefs, OPSYNCH, and targeting meeting each served as meetings to conduct the RDSP. The battle rhythm therefore enabled the staff to execute quick, but staff integrated, RDSP to shape requests for the ATO/ACO to the maximum extent possible.

The exercise highlighted the importance of developing branches and sequels for each deliberate operation. Branches and sequels reduced the planning necessary for RDSP by providing the staff a template to work from based on anticipated friendly successes or enemy counteractions.

During the ten-day exercise, several instances emerged that required the staff to execute RDSP outside of the battle rhythm events. The development of RDSP teams serves as a concluding point to prepare CAB staffs to fit the requirements of the RDSP into the ATO/ACO cycle.

RDSP Teams within the Warfighting Functions

The RDSP differs from a battle drill or the execution of a branch or sequel in that it may involve development of a new COA. The danger of RDSP planning is that it can become compartmentalized as members of the WfFs focus on CUOPs. A recent MCTP lessons learned publication noted that RDSP planning is usually "compartmentalized, and collaboration and cross-functional discussions do not occur."[10] The result is that a small team of planners develops a new COA without leveraging the expertise of the other WfFs.

The preparation for RDSP planning must therefore occur before the onset of a crisis. To make the RDSP planning a staff integrated event, the staff must identify members of the RDSP teams from each WfF that will assemble when required. While seemingly a simple solution, it is difficult to execute in practice. Spread across a 24-hour period, each WfF is challenged to execute CUOPs, participate in planning for FUOPs, and conduct other battle rhythm events. Instead of dictating whether the CUOPs

or FUOPs representative from each WfF is the dedicated RDSP team member, a recommendation is to let each WfF chief decide the RDSP team member for each shift. Briefing this person's name at each shift change ensures the RDSP teams can quickly form when needed.

Despite integrating additional planners from the battalion staffs, the 1ID CAB was unable to staff a FUOPs and plans section within the movement and maneuver WfF consistently over a long duration, 24-hour operations exercise. Instead, these functions were combined into a "future plans" (FUPLANS) section that had planning responsibility for operations beyond 24 hours. The FUPLANS chief for each shift became the RDSP team planner for the movement and manuever WfF. While this decision did impact future planning efforts, the event that triggered the RDSP team will likely alter future planning efforts, so leveraging the expertise of the FUPLANS chief is likely worth the risk to future planning when a RDSP team is needed.

A final consideration for RDSP planning is deciding which events trigger the assembly of the RDSP team. A general threshold should be the identification of variance to current orders, either written or verbal. Because each operation is unique, further specification is likely futile. The commander, executive officer, and S-3 play a critical role in using their judgment to identify the threshold at which RDSP teams assemble to execute RDSP outside of established battle rhythm events.

An Effective Battle Rhythm is a Foundation for Successful Operations

The ATO/ACO process provides the CAB with the capability to leverage fires and coordinate airspace planning to support operations, but the pace of operations often demands the staff be able to quickly adjust this plan as conditions change. Developing an effective battle rhythm is a means to reconcile the requirement to conduct RDSP with the demands of integrating these changes into the ATO/ACO. An effective battle rhythm also provides predictability to the staff, facilitates staff interaction, and ultimately improves the information available to the staff and commander for decisionmaking.

[1] Department of the Army, FM 6-0: Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (Washington, DC, 11 May 2015), 14-3.
[2] For more details on ACO development, consult JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, Chapter II.
[3] FM 6-0: Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 1-12.
[4] Edward T. Bohnemann, "MCTP Trends in a Decisive Action Warfighter Exercise," Paper published by the Mission Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS (2015), 9.
[5] Eric Megerdoomian, "The Lost Art of Reconnaissance and Security," Aviation Digest (January-March 2016), 34. Also see FM 3-04, Army Aviation, p. 1-5 for a discussion of deep operations.
[6] For additional d etails on battle rhythm components and trends, see FM 6-0 p. 1-12 and "MCTP Trends in a Decisive Action Warfighter Exercise" available from http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cact/FINAL%20-MCTP%20Trends%20in%20a%20Decisive%20Action%20WFX%20%28EDITED%2014%20January%202015%29.pdf
[7] Department of the Army, ADRP 5-0: The Operations Process (Washington, DC, 17 May 2012), 1-14.
[8] FM 6-0: Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, 3-3. Chapter 3 of FM 6-0 describes the process of knowledge management. 1ID CAB integrated the principles of knowledge management into its Mission Command SOP to provide a sole source document for the staff to receive and distribute information.
[9] Instruction on the "seven-minute drill" was part of the MCTP-led academic preparation for the Warfighter Exercise.
[10] Bohnemann, "MCTP Trends in a Decisive Action Warfighter Exercise," 13.

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Acronym Reference

1ID - 1st Infantry Division	**DSM** - decision support matrix
ACO - airspace control order	**FUOPs** - future operations
ACM - airspace control measures	**FUPLANS** - future plans
ACP - airspace control plan	**MCTP** - Mission Command Training Program
ATO - air tasking order	**MDMP** - military decisionmaking process
CAB - combat aviation brigade	**NCO** - non-commissioned officer
COA - course of action	**OPSYNCH** - operations synchronization
COP - current operating picture	**RDSP** - rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process
CUA - commander's update assessment	**SOP** - standing operating procedures
CUOPs - current operations	**WfF** - warfighting function

The Challenges and Successes of Planning, Resourcing, and Training a Home Station Combat Aviation Brigade Focused Exercise

By CPT Richard C. Threlkeld

In May of 2016, the 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) conducted a two-week live, virtual, constructive-integrating architecture (LVC-IA) field training exercise. The field training exercise was a CAB exercise supported and command and controlled by 3rd Infantry Division. Without a critical task list for a CAB, the brigade established the following training objectives: mission command operations process, command post operations, sustainment planning, aeromedical evacuation operations, air assault operations, deliberate attack operations, aerial reconnaissance and surveillance operations, and aerial security operations. The exercise included a joint air attack team (JAAT) training event at Fort Stewart, Georgia. The 3rd CAB developed the scenario, coordinated life support, and built the digital architecture while simultaneously preparing for the training exercise.

Resourcing and support from 3rd Infantry Division and training assistance from outside organizations were keys to the success of the field training exercise. Three Soldiers from the Mission Command Training Program, Fort Leavenworth, KS; five Soldiers from the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence, Fort Rucker, AL; three Soldiers from the 1st Army's Army National Guard 120th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, TX, and one Soldier from the 188th Infantry Brigade, Fort Stewart, GA provided assistance and oversight of the Falcon Focus training exercise. The exercise consisted of multiple live air assaults, the JAAT as a deliberate attack, hasty attacks, and sling load operations in a LVC-IA environment.

The JAAT consisted of two autonomous AGM-114 Hellfire missile engagements from AH-64D Apache helicopters and eight remote AGM-114 Hellfire missile engagements from an AH-64D utilizing manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with a MQ-1C Gray Eagle unmanned aircraft system (UAS) in a decisive action training environment (DATE). The JAAT included six AH-64 Apaches delivering 30mm and 2.75 inch rockets, one MQ-1C Gray Eagle, one Marine Corp F-18 Super Hornet, and a platoon of M777 Howitzers from the 3rd Infantry Division. The JAAT allowed the 3rd CAB to develop tactics, techniques, and procedures for the DATE mission that are critical to the attack reconnaissance battalion and attack reconnaissance squadron's ability to provide lethal effects. The event demonstrated how Army Techniques Publication 3-04.1 *Aviation Tactical Employment* would allow our aviation forces to defeat a near-peer threat and reassure the ground force commander of battlefield dominance.

The primary challenges for the field training exercise were the complexity of planning, resourcing, and executing a CAB focused exercise in a LVC-IA environment at home station. Major Peter Exline, the 3rd CAB S-6 explained the challenges of creating and executing the simulation simultaneously:

> "Just like a unit going to a combat training center rotation does not provide its own opposing force or run the simulation, the training unit going into the LVC-IA "box" should have a minimal interface with running LVC-IA and the simulation. The best solution is to work agreements that allow the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) Network Operations Center to directly transmit data into the Mission Training Center (MTC) and vice versa over existing landlines instead of the warfighter information network-tactical (WIN-T). There is a cost for this regarding accreditations and equipment like firewalls, but it is a far more robust and reliable solution compared to "laundering" the data through a tactical WIN-T setup.

A short-term solution would be to task an adjacent or higher unit with signal exercise support -- provide a joint network node/small tactical terminal team and warrant officer [Information Systems Technician or Network Management Technician]

expertise to configure and run the simulation connectivity and let the unit being trained simply connect to "higher" (the signal exercise support node) like they normally would under tactical conditions. Note that there are at least three weeks of configuring and testing for the signal exercise support team to fully integrate both simulations from the MTC and the FBCB2 paths into the data flow."

A key part of being expeditionary is being able to jump the command post; however, this was not exercised due to the communication architecture. Major Wade Hatzinger, the 3rd Infantry Division planner for Falcon Focus, describes the challenges experienced with planning and resourcing the CAB focused exercise:

> "One of the challenges was that the division was currently going through the Capability Set 16 Fielding to upgrade its WIN-T. Due to the non-availability of division communication architecture, the 3rd CAB had to run the simulation as well as their own mission command systems on their organic equipment."

The effect of the division not having a robust response cell was that the opportunity to provide division stressors and a known battle rhythm to exercise the brigade staff was a missed opportunity.

During Falcon Focus, the division headquarters had previously been tasked to be the higher command for Warfighter Exercise 16-05 which made a significant portion of the division staff unavailable for the division response cell. As a result, the division response cell was forced to replicate several staff jobs to provide the 3rd CAB staff the necessary simulation.

Since both of the 3rd Infantry Division's brigade combat teams (BCT) were conducting regionally aligned force (RAF) missions during Falcon Focus, the BCT response cells were very small and had no planning capability. This limited the amount of cross brigade coordination the 3rd CAB could conduct with the ground maneuver units.

The CAB; therefore, was forced to replicate the ground force commander or use unit personnel as role players for the brigade/battalion commanders during the exercise.

The successes for the exercise were proving the concept of integrating virtual, constructive, and live operations during a combat training exercise. The 3rd CAB successfully executed multiple iterations of each training objective allowing for well targeted and refined training exercises in the future. The unit validated brigade command post operations and identified several opportunities to transition to a more expeditionary setup. Lastly, the 3rd CAB validated MUM-T principles between AH-64s and MQ-1Cs by using remote and autonomous hellfire engagements. Major Exline describes the successes from the exercise:

> "From a brigade staff perspective, the organization of staff processes around the warfighting functions was implemented and tested. Gaps were identified and filled. The value of things like non-fires officers attending the targeting meetings was shown, and the brigade commander's direct input to the process was available which led to the staff thinking of things and working out plans that they would not have otherwise."

The 3rd CAB Executive Officer, Major Kevin White, describes the first ever CAB focused event in the 3rd Infantry Division:

> "This training event was a key milestone that enabled our success during the division war fighter exercise. We made it harder on ourselves by having to build the scenario while simultaneously fighting it. We were able to see our blind spots, and create a very deliberate training plan coming out of Falcon Focus."

The CAB, as the supported unit, provided a unique training opportunity that permitted dedicated aviation focused mission essential task list training. Additionally, it allowed the unit to train collective aviation tasks at the company and higher level that specifically address the skills required in a DATE environment.

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Acronym Reference

BCT - brigade combat team	**MTC** - Mission Training Center
CAB - combat aviation brigade	**MUM-T** - manned-unmanned teaming
DATE - decisive action training environment	**RAF** - regionally aligned force
FBCB2 - Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below	**UAS**- unmanned aircraft system
JAAT - joint air attack team	**WIN-T** - warfighter information network-tactical
LVC-IA - live, virtual, constructive-integrating architecture	

DECISIVE ACTION TRANSITION CHALLENGES

By CPT Paul R. Holoye

The Blackhawk circled overhead looking for the proper approach into the forward arming and refueling point (FARP). There was no response over the radio. There was no reason to worry because the pilots had transported the forward support company (FSC) commander to the FARP a few hours previously. The Soldiers and leadership were probably showing her their field site. The pilots landed at the FARP with no problems. The fuelers did not emerge to refuel them. That was odd. After what felt like an eternity, the FSC commander limped to the aircraft and explained that the fuel trucks had been destroyed by a T-72 and they had several wounded Soldiers. The enemy was still maneuvering in the area and the FARP was compromised. The pilot then became very agitated but was forced to wait until the wounded were loaded onto the aircraft. As he took off, the pilot thanked his lucky stars that the enemy did not return to finish the job.

On a hill 100 meters away, the same T-72 crew and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC) Observer Coach Trainers (OCT) were watching the entire scene play out. The OCTs at the different combat training centers (CTC) have the privilege of seeing units conduct brigade level exercises and throughout several rotations the Falcon OCT Team at the JMRC witnessed several incidents. The incidents unfolded while units were training to fight a near peer force in a decisive action training environment (DATE). Leaders made assumptions based on their experience in a counter-insurgency (COIN) environment. Those assumptions led to shortfalls against a determined enemy who had the ability to take advantage of every failure. Many battalion planners did not have the experience to properly identify logistical shortfalls or integrate the specialists into the planning process. Some units worked through this problem but some did not. Aviation units at the JMRC are finding it challenging to identify problems and utilize their sustainment sections properly.

Across all branches and units, leaders are working through the differences in fighting a COIN and fighting an enemy with similar capabilities. This is usually referred to as COIN vs. DATE dilemma.

The stage was set for the opening storyline when battle rhythms were set, 24 hour command post duty was set, guidance was given, and assumptions were made. The battalion level leadership accepted risk based on their COIN experience. It was assumed that everyone understood the logistical needs of the unit and there would be no shortfalls. The battalion would fall in on pre-staged stockpiles and housing. Forward support companies would set up a 24/7 FARP, a dining facility would serve hot breakfast and dinners, and ground maintenance personnel would ensure that all ground vehicles would be operational. Seen through the lens of a COIN fight, every unit has planned correctly. However, the situation in DATE is vastly different and these assumptions lead units to make poor decisions.

One of the major differences in a DATE is the lack of readily available supplies, housing, transportation assets, or sanitation. Units operated under assumptions that they have access to large quantities of readily available supplies. In a DATE scenario, units only have what they can carry and they must protect it. This presents problems that junior leaders have never experienced such as digging foxholes, light discipline, noise discipline,

field sanitation, establishing security, managing ammunition expenditures, managing lift capacity, and forecasting future requirements. In the post COIN environment of Iraq and Afghanistan, there are new challenges when facing near peers such as: cell phone discipline,

information management, cyber warfare, and enemy unmanned aerial vehicles. Faced with these challenges and lack of experience, units have struggled in coordinating the warfighting functions. Without integration, these failures have led to some interesting situations. Pilots on a quick reaction force detail have run out to their aircraft, only to find that the aircraft had been defueled for maintenance. Apaches landed at FARPs when there was no ammo or armament Soldiers to rearm them. A battalion air movement almost ended in failure because twenty aircraft tried to land at a FARP at the same time. Pilots landed at the battalion headquarters and marched into the command post and began yelling at the planners and sustainers for failing. These situations led to the units failing to bring enough combat power to the fight. An Apache adds no combat power when there is no armament Soldier on the FARP to rearm it. Low mission priority Chinooks that sneak into a FARP drain the entire fuel inventory with serious second and third order consequences and critical mission timelines are compromised when crews argue about who is next for refuel. When fighting a counterinsurgency, there is generally more forgiveness from the enemy. They do not have the capability to capitalize on these failures. This is not true when engaged with a near peer enemy. They have the combat power to make units pay a high price for the lesson.

After mid rotation after action reviews, unit leaders universally agreed that they need to integrate their logistics personnel better. Over several rotations, however, the Falcon OCTs realize that almost all battalion staff officers were too inexperienced to do this. They were usually capable lieutenants or pre-command captains, but they simply did not have the experience in integrating all of the actors needed. They did not know how to effect the planning process and ensure "the right forces are in the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment and other resources ready to execute the operation … This includes positioning sustainment units and supplies.[1]"

The units that became successful had field grade leadership that became very involved with integrating logistics into the operations plan. Some units began requiring the distribution platoon leader to brief a field grade officer on an upcoming mission, similar to an air mission command brief. This put pressure on the battalion staff to make themselves available to any and all needs that the FSC had before the mission began. It also allowed them to see if the operations cell was passing information properly to the FSC. Battalion leaders also began requiring FSC representation at the aircrew briefs. This is in line with *Army Training Publication (ATP) 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment* description of an Air Assault Aircrew Brief, "5-86. In the aircrew brief, the aviation unit briefs all flight crews and support personnel executing the air assault mission to include the forward support company, aviation maintenance company, and air traffic services. The aircrew brief covers all essential flight crew actions and the ground support necessary to accomplish a successful mission..."[2]

A battalion commander, executive officer, nor any single leader can fix these problems on their own. It takes a team effort. Leaders across the Army need to wargame the requirements that a decisive action operation presents. The solutions need to be integrated across the formation. The assumption that all logistical requirements are understood and are already covered by the FSC undermines integration. Integration is understood as "combining all of the sustainment elements within operations assuring unity of command and effort."[3] The Falcon Team saw orders published, rehearsals conducted, and missions launched without a representatives from the FSC or S-4.

Units must change how they integrate and utilize their logistical assets. The very idea of what an FSC is capable of doing needs to change and they need training to reflect their new requirements. The FSC is not a "gas station." The S-4 is not "the guy that makes me do inventories." *Field Manual 3-04, Army Aviation* sums it up nicely, "Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number and quality of options available to the commander. Freedom of action is enabled by aviation commanders preparing and putting sustainment capabilities in place."[4] *Army Training Publication 3-04.1* puts logistics operations on the executive officer because "Logistics, particularly FARP operations, and maintenance are often the center of gravity for aviation operations."[5] The battalion S-4 helps plan and track logistics operations while the FSC commander ensures the plan is executed. Since FARP operations are critical for every type of aerial operation, it seems counter intuitive to not have the distribution specialists involved in the planning process for aerial missions.

A few units were able to integrate their logistics leaders after initial setbacks. A

few took integration a step further and began integrating them into training throughout the battalion. Some units began forcing their pilots to train with their FSC by having aviators be convoy commanders. This led to more training where communication classes were taught between the FSC Soldiers and the pilots. The aviator's support of ground forces improved dramatically after they worked with their internal ground support personnel. These units found that an integrated FSC had the ability to extend their time on station, cut their return time, and dramatically increase their operational reach. Commanders began to understand that the importance of the FSC increases exponentially in a decisive action scenario.

Units have struggled to identify their logistics requirements in DATE scenarios. The hardest part is getting the right forces with the right equipment in the right place at the right time. This is especially difficult in a DATE. The result was a lack of combat power brought to the fight. Leaders throughout the battalion need to ensure their logistics personnel are integrated into the operations. The COIN enemies of Iraq and Afghanistan were unable to pose significant threat to our logistics chain. This is not true in a DATE environment. Near peer forces will place a high priority on targeting logistical assets throughout a theatre. Few are as prized as the logistics unit that support an aviation unit. Armed with new capabilities and better integration, units will have the tools to defeat any enemy presented to them at their CTC rotations.

[1] U.S. Department of the Army, The Operations Process, Army Doctrine Publication 5-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, May 17, 2012), 50.
[2] U.S. Department of the Army, Aviation Tactical Employment, Army Techniques Publication 3-04.1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, April 13, 2016), 5-18
[3] U.S. Department of the Army, Sustainment, Army Doctrine Reference Publication 4-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, July 31, 2012), 1-2.
[4] U.S. Department of the Army, Army Aviation, Field Manual 3-04 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, July 29, 2015), 4-9.
[5] U.S. Department of the Army, Aviation Tactical Employment, Army Techniques Publication 3-04.1 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, April 13, 2016), 1-7.

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Acronym Reference

ATP - Army training publication	**FARP** - forward arming and refueling point
COIN - counterinsurgency	**FSC** - forward support company
CTC - combat training center	**JMRC** - Joint Multinational Readiness Center
DATE - decisive action training environment	**OCT** - observer, coach trainer

Reshaping An Army

photo by Willard Owens

General Frederick M. Franks Jr
Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command



by LTC Colin K. Dunn

*Excerpts from a recent interview conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Colin K. Dunn, Editor, **Field Artillery Professional Bulletin,** Fort Sill, OK, with General Frederick M. Franks Jr, Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA.*

As the Army moves toward a continental U.S. [CONUS]-based contingency force, what do you see as the capabilities critical to responding to crises?

General [Gordon R.] Sullivan [Chief of Staff of the Army] is reshaping our Army into a post-Cold War Army and not just a smaller version of our Cold War Army. We are reshaping both intellectually and in our training and leader development programs.

As we move toward a strategic Army, the majority of our forces will be in the United States. But forward presence also will be part of our national military strategy. So we'll deploy from either forward presence or CONUS locations.

With this strategy, rapid mobilization and deployment become increasingly important. The circumstances under which the Army can deploy are more ambiguous now than they were a few years ago. When we had the certainty of the Cold War contingencies, commanders trained and prepared to win in those particular circumstances.

Now we must be more versatile—mix and match units in tailored force packages, fight battles at the tactical and operational levels, and organize our contingency theater to defeat threats in many scenarios. This versatility is critical, but we've shown such versatility before. A lot of the capabilities we demonstrated in operations such as Just Cause and Desert Shield and Storm will continue to be important for our contingency Army in the future.

What are some of the greatest challenges the Army faces in training for joint operations?

First, we have to base our training on the situations we could face—the circumstances unified commanders need their forces to practice. We must have a relevant set of circumstances or conditions within which the training takes place.

Scenarios are very important in joint operations. So, as we watch scenarios being developed in unified commands, in our schools, leader development programs, and CTCs [combat training centers], they should be relevant for the U.S. Army now and in the future. Next, we must capitalize on the significant strengths each service brings to the operation and harmonize them in accordance with emerging joint and Army doctrine. For example, joint special operations at the JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Chaffee, AR] harmonize air-ground fires, both close and deep. As the organic fires of our Army systems reach out farther and farther—MLRS [multiple launch rocket system], cannon artillery, Army tactical missile system [Army TACMS], AH-64 Apaches—as the ground com-

mander can employ these assets at greater distances, that requires more coordination and more training in joint operations.

How do you see the Army's increasing the lethality of our early deploying forces in a contingency operation?

We can increase our lethality in several ways. The most talked about way is through materiel solutions. Certainly, we'll pursue developing the armored gun system [Armor's lightly armored gun system with a high-velocity cannon, which is transportable by C-130 Hercules aircraft]; HIMARS [Artillery's high-mobility, artillery rocket system, a lightweight, wheeled version of MLRS]; the Javelin [Infantry's one-man-operated, fire-and-forget, advanced antitank weapon with a 1.25-mile range]; and others that give us more lethality on the ground early.

Fielding the M119 light howitzer and adding fuel pods to UH-60 Black Hawks, Apaches, and the CH-47D Chinook plus the helicopters' capability to be refueled in midair give us lethality options early on. Our aviation now can self-deploy as well as deploy aboard ships and inside strategic aircraft. Again, ***versatility*** is key.

Depending on the contingency's circumstances, deployment means, and time available, the commander can increase the lethality of his deploying light forces by introducing other types of units early on. He can mix and match his light, special operating, and heavy forces to meet that particular threat.

You'll see more mixing and matching in your NTC [National Training Center, Fort Irwin, CA] and JRTC rotations as you train on contingency operations. Those CTCs are employing heavy and light forces in operations specifically aimed at developing versatility.

In the joint arena, our sister services are helping us get forces on the ground faster in contingencies. The Navy, for example, is committed to building more fast sea-lift ships in the next few years. So we'll see a dramatic improvement in our forces' ability to deploy by surface means. The Air Force has committed to the C-17 Airlifter. So our strategic transport aircraft capability is improving. Additionally, we can preposition Army materiel on ships at selected locations.

The materiel, force package, and other solutions to increasing our lethality early on are all part of being versatile enough to meet any contingency. What we don't want to do is get locked into inflexible ***formulas*** for specific scenarios. Our doctrine should guide us—describe how to ***think about*** mobilization and deployment—how to think in terms of versatile force mixing and matching in combat, combat support, and combat service support forces, etc. Using such doctrine, we would be flexible enough to organize and operate in any situation.

As the sponsor of the "Fighting with Fires" initiative being worked by the Field Artillery School, would you explain your notion of the combined arms commander's role in synchronizing operating systems?

My goal—with Major General [Fred F.] Marty, Brigadier General [Tommy R.] Franks [Field Artillery School Commandant and Assistant Commandant], and the Field Artillery School leading the way—is to ensure the Army makes the most of our increasingly lethal fires.

In what General George S. Patton called the "Musicians of Mars," the combined arms commander is the "conductor of his orchestra" of operating systems performing on the battlefield. He's responsible for pulling together all the elements of combat power to fight and win. In the tactical battle, major engagements or campaigns, the elements of combat power are the same: firepower, maneuver, protection, and leadership.

The combined arms commander must be as involved in the fires part of his battle as he is in the maneuver part. I want combined arms commanders Army-wide to know how to skillfully maneuver fires, and we accomplish that first in our doctrine and leader development programs and then in training. And I want those skills honed.

The lethality of our fires has increased significantly. During Desert Storm, in one-half hour we delivered more fires more effectively than World War II artillery could have delivered in 8 hours. So we have extraordinary fires capabilities—and the systems and munitions under development promise even greater lethality.

The maneuver commander must become the combined arms commander and fight more than the maneuver battle—know how to fight with fires and make them an integral part of the battle. He must be able to quickly maneuver and mass fires and skillfully employ counterfire. If the fire support officer [FSO] plans fires as a separate entity—not integrated in the total battle by the combined arms commander—the plan ends up having little relevance to the conduct of the battle. Fires are too important to be left solely to the artillery.

Fire planning by the FSO is certainly necessary, but the plan has to have an agility built in—an interrelationship with maneuver—to make the maximum contribution to winning. Planning is one thing, fighting is another. The fire plan can't be "put on automatic" and executed as though the enemy's not going to react to it. He will. In a fight, you've got two minds working on the same problem: the commander's and the enemy's.

Points of Main Effort

In this interview, General Franks emphasizes five "points of main effort" to guide TRADOC in helping to shape the Army for a changing world situation:

- Lead the Army through intellectual change.
- Propose modernization alternatives to maintain the technological edge for soldiers on future battlefields.
- Sustain excellence and relevance in training and leader development.
- Foster organizational excellence.
- Focus on soldiers.

How would you rate our ability to synchronize operating systems at the combat training centers?

I was enormously proud of the Desert Storm commanders' orchestrating capabilities, at least those I observed personally. Their abilities to synchronize fires and maneuver were superb. The 1st Infantry Division in the breach; the 1st Armored Division (United Kingdom) with the 142d Field Artillery National Guard from AR; and the 1st Cavalry Division in their raids, feints, and demonstrations; the artillery raids and counterfire ambushes with MLRS were all professional, skillful operations. The 1st and 3d Armored Divisions in their zones of action against the Iraqis demonstrated their success in employing massed fires. (I define "massed" as the fires of two or more battalions, not batteries.)

We need to continue this awareness of the capabilities of fires, an awareness forged in Desert Storm. And we need to practice it at the CTCs. I'm encouraged by some recent work at the NTC. Both counterfire and target acquisition are beginning to get the attention they deserve. I also see some encouraging changes at the JRTC, such as the participation of key players, for example ANGLICO [air naval gunfire liaison company] teams. We need continued emphasis on getting every player on the combined arms team on the field at the CTCs. Thus, combined arms commanders can train to synchronize the team.

How do you envision the future CTCs' evolving to maintain our Army's warfighting edge?

We've got to ensure our practice fields remain relevant to the circumstances in which the Army finds itself. At one time we trained to fight based on the Cold War world order. Now the playing field has changed, and we've changed our training accordingly.

General Sullivan has directed we conduct contingency operations at both the NTC and JRTC. At the JRTC, you'll see joint operations on a continuing basis and armor-mech, light, and special operating forces. You'll see light and armor-mech forces at the NTC. Units now face the threat in a variety of configurations as opposed to one threat. In our BCTPs [battle command training programs] for our divisions and corps, you'll see the same type of changes occurring. We're shifting quickly to post-Cold War warfighting.

But ***relevancy*** is key. Our training has to be relevant to the circumstances in which the Army finds itself. We must sustain excellence and relevance in training and leader development.

Current doctrine addresses the commander's intent in his concept for fires and maneuver but in general terms. What should fire support and maneuver expect from the combined arms commander?

The commander needs to precisely describe the effects he's trying to achieve and ***where*** and ***when*** he wants them. In simple, straightforward language, he should describe his desired effects in the conduct of the operation, the point of his main effort, a sensing of the speed of the operation, and where it needs to be relatively tightly controlled. And, depending on the echelon, the commander may have to tell where he chooses to fight the decisive battle over time. If he's the corps commander, he's probably describing 2 to 4 days of operations.

But the combined arms commander doesn't come up with his intent in isolation. Before he expresses the intent, either verbally or in the order, there needs to be continual dialogue face-to-face with subordinate commanders and his staff so he can harmonize his operating systems. He gets advice for his running estimate by talking to subordinate commanders, members of his staff, commanders of fire support and engineer units, and so forth. That's the way to make the combined arms orchestra play.

But when the intent arrives, then it's the responsibility of the logistician, fire supporter, engineer, etc., to say, "How can I involve my organization to best achieve the desired effects?" For example, at the division or higher level, the fire support officer should give the commander some alternatives for task organizing the artillery and weighing the effects of fires to achieve his desired outcome.

What impact do you believe future intelligence and fire support systems will have in terms of achieving success on the bat-

tlefield without major engagements of maneuver forces?

Most combined arms commanders would tell you that the major intelligence shortcoming in terms of identifying targets is their inability to see over the hill. What they're trying to avoid is unplanned meeting engagements. Friendly reconnaissance out front, either in the defense or the attack, is of utmost importance to commanders. Our ability to see over the hill will be improved, by and large, by the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle].

We need the ability to rapidly target and deliver fires that contribute to the overall tactical scheme. For example, in Southwest Asia, we were fortunate to have the Pioneer [UAV]. So we flew it and, with a quick-fire capability, spotted and fired on targets in real time. It's the real-time capability we're looking for in delivering fires—not only with cannons, but also with the Army TACMS and MLRS.

As far as fires substituting for maneuver engagements are concerned, you have to watch how you think about that. Fires and maneuver are linked; one contributes to the other.

Of course, it depends on the type of target you're talking about. With MLRS and Army TACMS, you can achieve lethal effects without involving maneuver forces. For example, if you're firing at a SAM [surface-to-air missile] site with Army TACMS, you can probably put it out of business.

How can the combined arms commander make the most of his fire support and aviation assets?

In the factors of METT-T [mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available], he looks for those elements of combat power he can rapidly shift from one part of the battlefield to another. I call those "reusable combat assets." Though the commander can usually shift his artillery the quickest, his reusable combat assets also include aviation and close air support.

We've got a great Army, and I'm proud to be part of it.

So the commander formulates his plan to take advantage of reusable combat power available to him. But a fire plan is just that—a plan. The fire supporter, the aviator, and the Air Force representative must understand the commander will have to deviate from the plan to seize opportunities, and rapidly adjust to take advantage of situations as they occur during the fight.

The Army's capstone warfighting doctrinal Field Manual [FM] 100-5, Operations is under revision. How is this manual changing?

The Chief of Staff of the Army has charged TRADOC with leading the Army through this intellectual change to a post-Cold War world by using doctrine as the engine of change. A part of this effort includes revising FM 100-5. Our doctrine isn't broken. But we need to include in it the operational versatility our Army now requires in a post-Cold War era.

FM 100-5 will describe how to think about mobilization and deployment, how to think about employing Army forces in actions short of war and other intellectual changes we must make—all of which we've done before in some form or other. But the centerpiece of the revised FM 100-5 will continue to be fighting at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels—guidelines for employing forces, conditioned by the factors of METT-T.

We're engaging not only TRADOC, but the total Army in developing FM 100-5. The process is as important as the product. If we do the process right, if we have the kind of dialogue we need, we'll accomplish two things. First, we'll inform the Army about the need for change as we change. And second, by the time we publish the manual sometime in 1993, we'll have tapped the collective wisdom of the Army to include in the revised manual. FM 100-5 is TRADOC's "point of main effort" and requires the full attention of leaders Army-wide.

What message would you send to combined arms soldiers worldwide?

We've got a great Army, and I'm proud to be part of it. It's one that's confident in itself, as proved by its successes in Just Cause, the Cold War, and Desert Storm.

But we have work to do. We must rapidly shift our focus from preparing to fight the battles of a Cold War world to the battles of the future. And to do that in our smaller Army, we must optimize all our combat capabilities, including making the most of our fires. So our doctrine, training, and leader development strategies must evolve as we reshape the Army.

Then, as we reduce forces in Europe, move units to our TRADOC installations and as our Army gets smaller, we must do it all while caring for our soldiers, civilians, and their families. For those who leave the Army, we must show our great appreciation for their service in peace and war, helping to make the Army the best in our nation's history. Every Army alumni should depart with a sense of dignity and respect.

To our many soldiers who will remain in the Army, all of whom play some part on the combined arms team, I thank you for all you've done and challenge you to continue your record of excellence. ❐

TRAINING FRENCH ARMY AVIATION MAINTAINERS

By LTC Emmanuel Wolff

French Army Aviation can be compared in many ways to U.S. Army Aviation. There are many converging points in doctrine, training, tactics, and operational experience that give our formations interesting similarities. There are also, of course, notable differences. One of these is the organization of aircraft maintenance and the training and employment of the maintainers.

These similarities and differences originate from different perspectives, culture, and traditions which guide the French and the American Army and result in different choices or courses of action. The intent of this article is to describe the training and mission at the core of French Army Aviation maintenance system and why, unlike U.S. Army Aviation maintenance practices, contracted maintenance is rarely used.

As with any armed force, the current organization of the French Army evolved from the country's history and culture and lessons learned from numerous conflicts and operational deployments. More specifically, and also similar to other countries, choices made to find the best suitable or most efficient command and control system are strongly governed by the policies and regulations of France. These considerations explain why military personnel make up the majority of the French Army Aviation maintenance force, why dependence on civilian personnel is minimal, and especially why contracted personnel are rarely used.



Note: Only maintenance related acronyms have been identified
MAINT – maintenance **CMD** – command **LOG** - logistics

In the French Army, the maintenance of all equipment is the responsibility of the Maintenance Command. This includes aircraft maintenance. Even though they serve in the Army Aviation Command, the maintainers are also managed by the Maintenance Command. Generally speaking, field maintenance is performed by the Soldiers while depot level maintenance is performed by civil servants. Therefore, the maintenance workforce in a combat helicopter regiment is almost exclusively military with a few civilians with specialized knowledge/skills included as part of the team.

As an exception, the Army Aviation Training Center in charge of the Initial Entry Rotary Wing Training has a specific mission. As a non-deployable organization under contract to the government, civilian personnel provide the aircraft, instructors, and maintenance.

French Army Aviation's exclusive reliance on military personnel for its field maintenance is linked to operational deployments. As any force, the Army has to be ready to deploy, sometimes on short notice, and it is the mission of the military personnel to form a cohesive unit ready to fight in any environment. French regulations make it difficult to authorize the deployment of civilian personnel because of rules relating to risk and security. They are, therefore, rarely deployed. If their expertise is in critical need, they may be deployed for very short and specific missions.

In a more stabilized environment, it would be technically possible to employ contracted maintenance to ensure the support of the aircraft deployed. This solution has its advantages. Contractors are as efficient in their profession as the military personnel but are not burdened with requirements of specific military activities such as physical training or guard duties that detract from their maintenance tasks. Contracted maintenance forms a very capable and agile workforce perfectly able to perform the mission. It also offers the obvious advantage of complementing the total strength of the branch and allowing the units to more efficiently perform the training mission at home station. However, despite the potential advantages of using contracted maintenance, their use has not been preferred by French Army Aviation units deploying as combat teams. Typical of military units, aircraft crews and mechanics train together as a matter of standard practice so they form a combat unit bonded by personal relationship and trust. The maintainers are proud of their unit and their job and wouldn't understand why they couldn't deploy along with their comrades, to take care of "their" Puma or Tiger aircraft.

Additionally, as most deployments occur in austere environments, contracted maintenance personnel would have less resilience and tolerance for the environment than a Soldier. This reasoning was reinforced when a combat helicopter regiment commanding officer, returning from a deployment in Mali in 2013 with a high operational tempo, was asked to defend the use of military maintenance personnel on the mission. Financial experts had analyzed the maintenance costs in the regiment for this particular deployment and explained that civilian or contracted maintenance would have been less expensive for the same efficiency. The commander described the living and working conditions of his unit during several months, where the maintainers did a magnificent job of keeping the aircraft operational in the severe Mali desert environment, working with no shade with temperatures at 50°Celcius. He further explained that the extreme heat made it difficult to manipulate tools without getting burned and that Soldiers were constantly required to exercise extreme precautions to protect aircraft components from sand contamination. The explanations and pictures showed that only trained Soldiers were motivated and physically capable to carry on the

mission under such conditions. The financial analysts were convinced and realized that there was more to the equation than monetary issues.

Finally, French Army Aviation maintenance training design places the aircraft mechanic at the core of a system in which he is one of the most precious assets of an operational unit. The initial training of an avionics, airframe, and engine specialist is over a year long. This training is followed by a demanding and complex specialization course, which will allow the young non-commissioned officer to work, under supervision, on an aircraft. After months of on-the-job training honing maintenance skills and gaining experience in his field, the Soldier becomes a reliable and efficient maintainer. In order to maximize this learning process, regulations forbid any commander to use an aircraft maintainer outside his specialty. The non-commissioned officer will carry on all the missions of a Soldier and will be able, from time to time, to participate in short missions outside of his field. He will predominately be employed in his specialty as an aircraft mechanic and can't be used extensively for other duties while he is in the Army. This will help the maintainer gain experience and confidence, which will allow him ultimately to become an expert. It is the belief of the French Army Aviation Command that such an essential asset of the Aviation team cannot be kept aside for a deployment. The belief is that the maintainer will most certainly learn more working in the often extreme environments of a deployed unit under conditions of increased mission pressure, time constraints, and austere conditions. The French Army believes that to maximize the time and money invested in an aircraft mechanic, it is essential that this specialist be used at home station and in operational deployments exclusively in his career field.

The French military has its own particular organization and regulations which do not facilitate the use of contracted maintenance, especially for operational deployments. Additionally, the Maintenance Command and Army Aviation favor the employment of Soldiers for field maintenance to enhance team work and trust that evolves between Soldiers during extensive training. This relationship creates favorable conditions during a deployment and facilitates the realization of the mission. Finally, as noted above, the extensive resources invested to train and develop a proficient aircraft maintainer requires that he be retained within this profession as long as he serves in the Army at home station and when deployed.

LTC Emmanuel Wolff is the French Army Aviation liaison officer to the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence. His experience includes command of a reconnaissance and attack platoon, an attack company, and an aviation support battalion. He deployed in several operations with the French Army in the Balkans, Africa, and Afghanistan.

Manning the Heavy Attack Reconnaissance Squadron

By MAJ Cameron Gallagher and
CPT Melanie Mansbach

In October 2015, the 4th Combat Aviation Brigade's 1-4 Attack Reconnaissance Battalion (ARB) officially converted to 6-17 Heavy Attack Reconnaissance Squadron (H-ARS) under the Aviation Restructure Initiative. Like many other Army Aviation ARBs that converted to the H-ARS Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), the squadron gained three aero scout platoons. Each platoon consists of a Shadow Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) with three Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles (the TO&E is four Shadows). These platoons were nearly identical to the personnel and equipment in the Shadow platoons assigned to the division's brigade combat teams (BCT), which on the surface may have made sense. Unlike the BCTs that utilize their independent Shadow platoon within the brigade engineer battalion (BEB) as an internal intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset, the H-ARS were designed to integrate the AH-64D Apaches and Shadow UAS for manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) to replace the capability of the divested OH-58D Kiowa Warrior that performed the reconnaissance and security mission set so well. In order to fully integrate the Shadows into the existing aviation structure, the manning required for a Shadow UAS platoon in an H-ARS is considerably different from a BEB.

Despite the increase in UAS equipment and personnel, the H-ARS TO&E remained similar to the ARB for the line and support troops. With the exception of the additional platoon in each of the three line troops and a UAS standardization warrant officer, the numbers of support personnel added to the H-ARS TO&E to support the additional UAS personnel and equipment are inadequate to sustain these three additional platoons.

In the current fiscal environment and "zero sum game" force management, we fully recognize that the proposals below are difficult; however, if we are to fully integrate unmanned aviation with MUM-T, then the H-ARS TO&E must change to support full integration – from operational flying, maintaining, to sustaining. Based on two years of operational experience that include two National Training Center rotations, a Network Integration Evaluation at Fort Bliss, and a comparative analysis of the current ARB and H-ARS TO&E, we recommend adding a total of 32 personnel to the H-ARS by increasing manning levels as shown below:

Headquarters and Headquarters Troop (HHT):

S-1: 2 x 42A1O, Human Resources Personnel
S-4: 2 x 92Y1O, Unit Supply Specialist
S-6: 1 x 25B, Information Technology Specialist, 1 x 25U, Signal Support Systems Specialist and 1 x 25Q, Multichannel Transmission Systems Operator-Maintainer
S-3: Master Gunner: 1 x 15W3O, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator

Aviation Maintenance Troop (AMT):

Production Control: 1 x 150U, UAS Maintenance Technician; 1 x 15E3O and 1 x 15E1O, UAS Repairer; and 2 x 92A1O, Automated Logistical Specialists
Quality Control Section: Move from current attack reconnaissance troop (ART) TO&E to the AMT 3 x 15E30 and 3 x 15E2O
UAS Maintenance Section: 1 x 15E4O; 2 x 15E2O; 6 x 15E1O.

Forward Support Troop (FST):

Field Feeding Section: 2 x 92G1O, Food Service Specialists
Maintenance Control: 2 x 92A1O
Maintenance: 5 x 91B1O, Wheeled Vehicle Mechanics; 1 x 91C1O, Utilities Equipment Repairer; and 1 x 91D1O, Generation Equipment Repairer.

A discussion of the recommended increases for each section follows. In each, the obvious increase in squadron assets (personnel and equipment) comes at a cost not adequately addressed in the TO&E modification. Other than the increased workload on assigned

personnel, consideration should be given to the eventual decrease in mission effectiveness that will occur as Soldiers attempt to do more with less if these manning increases are not met.

Recommended Additions to Headquarters & Headquarters Troop

S-1 (Personnel): The S-1 section supports personnel actions for the entire squadron. With the addition of approximately 94 personnel in the three Shadow platoons and without an increase in the S-1 section's assigned personnel, their workload increases dramatically. In order to properly support the squadron, the S-1 section's manning should be increased by two 45As, to maintain the S-1 staff to assigned personnel ratio that existed prior to the transition to the H-ARS TO&E.

S-4 (Supply): The S-4 section supports logistical requirements as well as assisting troop commanders manage assigned property. As the number of personnel and equipment in the squadron increases, the S-4 section's workload increases to issue & turn in equipment, process proposed sourcing decisions/lateral transfers and the like. In order to properly support the squadron, the S-4 section's manning should increase from the current H-ARS TO&E by two 92Ys. This is especially important considering that none of the ARTs have 92Y personnel assigned.

The increase of two 92Y personnel for the combined S-4 staff and HHT supply sections will allow theses sections to provide logistics support and expertise to the ARTs. This expertise and logistics support is incredibly important to the ARTs, especially with the additional UAS equipment assigned in the H-ARS TO&E.

S-6 (Communications): The S-6 section is tasked with providing communications and automations support to the squadron. As the number of communications and automations equipment in the squadron increases along with the management of the frequency management of KU and other bands for UAS, the S-6 section's workload increases. In order to properly support the squadron, the S-6 section's manning should be increased by three personnel. This would include a 25B, a 25U, and a 25Q to support the increased demand placed on the section by the additional UAS.

S-3 (Operations): The master gunner is responsible for ensuring aircrews are gunnery qualified and ready for deployment. Recent initiatives to aviation gunnery highly recommend the participation of Shadow UAS in H-ARS aerial gunneries. With the addition of Shadow UAS, the transition from ARB to H-ARS has greatly increased the master gunner's workload without providing additional personnel to monitor and verify unit gunnery training of the three platoons of aero scouts. An E-6 15W3O, should be assigned to provide UAS training, standardization, and records maintenance oversight in accordance with the appropriate training publications.

Since the Shadow UAS platoons closely resemble the UAS organization in the BCT, it is reasonable to expect that the H-ARS would be most likely tasked with fulfilling Forces Command's Command Training Guidance for Fiscal Year 2016 and assist the BCT with the Aviation Resource Management Survey program.[1] In light of the additional workload to assist the BCT UAS in these safety, training, and standardization programs, this additional position is essential to sustain H-ARS and BCT master gunner obligations.

Recommended Additions to the Aviation Maintenance Troop

Production Control: The monthly aviation maintenance reporting requirements required by the Department of the Army (DA) Form 1352, *Army Aircraft Inventory, Status and Flying Time* and DA Form 7752, *Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Inventory, Status and Flying Time;* managing maintenance priorities for the squadron; and coordinating with internal and external support personnel to maintain the highest level of readiness possible for the squadron necessitates a UAS production control section in the AMT that mirrors AH-64D production control. This would include adding a 150U; a 15E3O, and a 15E1O.

In an effort to fully integrate Shadow maintenance into 6-17 H-ARS D Troop, we moved a 150U from one of the flight troops into D Troop, sent him to the Aviation Maintenance

Managers Course, and made him the assistant production control officer for UAS. Despite the disadvantage to the line troop, this has paid dividends for the squadron as a whole in both reporting and maintaining readiness for the UAS fleet.

Quality Control Section: Technical inspectors in the ARTs should be reassigned to the AMT's quality control section. This consolidation would facilitate procedural uniformity between the manned and unmanned maintenance sections within the squadron. Furthermore, reassigning all technical inspectors protects the ART commanders from the appearance of undue influence of maintenance operations by separating the owners of the aviation equipment from the commander of the technical inspectors, who are responsible for upholding the quality of the maintenance performed. This would involve moving one 15E3O and one 15E2O to the AMT from each of the three ARTs.

RQ-7 Shadow Maintenance Section: Currently, a large percentage of UAS maintenance is conducted by contract maintenance support. As the Army transitions from contractor maintenance to maintenance conducted by Soldiers, there should be a Shadow maintenance section already in place within the AMT that is trained and ready to fill this void. This maintenance section is important as it will allow the AMT to provide maintenance support to meet mission requirements. It will take further analysis to fully understand the extent to which contractors currently support and man this maintenance requirement and how many Soldiers it will take to complete the transition. As a start, we recommend a section consisting of one 15E4O; two 15E20s; and six 15E10s.

Production Control (Technical Supply) Section: Shadow maintenance parts are provided through contract support. As the Army transitions these parts to the Army supply system, there will a need to increase the number of specialists to order, manage, and issue these parts. Based on current assignment of AH-64D parts specialists there should be three additional 92As assigned to the AMT in advance of the transition of UAS parts to the Army supply system.

Recommended Additions to the Forward Support Troop

Field Feeding Section - The FST field feeding section is tasked with providing culinary support to the squadron. As the number of personnel assigned to the squadron increases, the field feeding section's manning should be adjusted to support the additional personnel. Two additional 92Gs should be added to the FST's manning level.

Maintenance Control Section - The FST maintenance control section provides parts support to enable the ongoing maintenance of the squadron's ground fleet and assigned equipment. The amount of equipment assigned to the squadron significantly increases with the addition of three additional UAS platoons. The maintenance control section manning should be adjusted with the addition of two 92As to support the increased inventory of approximately 131 vehicles and other essential ground support equipment.

Maintenance Section - The FST maintenance section provides maintenance support for the squadron's ground vehicles (over 330+) and power generation equipment. The same rationale is used to support the requirement for additional personnel in the maintenance section as with the maintenance control section. With the increase in equipment from the addition of three UAS platoons, the maintenance control section manning should be adjusted with the addition of five 91Bs, one 91C, and one 91D to support the increased inventory of vehicles and ground support equipment.

The support troops of the H-ARS were the focus of the recommended increases of personnel because they have the most impact – both direct and indirect – on the materiel and operational readiness of the unit. With these positions filled at the recommended levels, the Forces Command and Human Resources Command guidance to man the H-ARS at 95% will have less impact on the operational readiness of the unit. Homegrown short term fixes – like moving a UAS maintenance technician from a flight troop to the maintenance troop to be the production control officer for UAS will allow us to improve efficiencies in the near term; however, if manning shortages within the H-ARS is to be fixed in the long term, changing the organization to the manning levels recommended here will allow the Army to fully integrate UAS into the H-ARS. These personnel increases are what we have identified through operational experience as necessary to support the addition of the three UAS platoons to the H-ARS and do not include excess. These additional personnel are essential to ensure that the squadron can provide for, maintain, and sustain its personnel and equipment over the long term to effectively perform its assigned mission – especially in austere and expeditionary environments.

[1] Forces Command, "Command Training Guidance for Fiscal Year 2016."

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CPT Melanie Mansbach commanded D Troop, 6-17 CAV (previously D Company, 1-4 ARB) from March 2014 to May 2016. She is a qualified AH-64D Maintenance Test Pilot who is now enjoying her post-Army career living in the Northeast.

Acronym Reference

AMT - aviation maintenance troop
ARB - attack reconnaissance battalion
BCT - brigade combat team
BEB - brigade engineer battalion
DA - Department of the Army
FST - forward support troop
H-ARS - heavy attack reconnaissance squadron
HHT - headquarters and headquarters troop
MUM-T - manned-unmanned teaming
TO&E - Table of Organization and Equipment
UAS - unmanned aircraft systems

FIXING THE AIRPLANE IN FLIGHT: Aviation Maintenance During Aviation Restructuring Initiative Transformation

By MAJ James Watts and
SFC Randall McNutt

The Army's Chief of Staff number one priority is readiness during a time of great transition and restructuring within Army Aviation. The 1-6th Cavalry Regiment, Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB), 1st Infantry Division is ground zero for the implementation of the Aviation Restructuring Initiative (ARI) as it divests an old warhorse in exchange for the AH-64.

In October 2015, 1-6th CAV accepted 24 AH-64Ds and associated peculiar ground support equipment (PGSE) and special tools and test equipment (STTE) from the National Guard Bureau (NGB). Our one assigned AH-64D qualified maintenance test pilot (MTP) accepted the aircraft with a quality control section manned at 25% of authorized strength and the only one military occupational specialty qualified platoon sergeant assigned to the regiment's troops. In the following five months, the squadron gradually gained experience in the non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks from new arrivals and in-house training, but still remains critically short of maintenance test pilots.

As we were receiving these aircraft, the Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) directed modification work orders (MWO) requiring the installation of manned-unmanned teaming level-2 capability and three additional modifications which significantly reduced the number of aircraft available to conduct either maintenance or flight training. The unit needed to improve readiness rates in order to train aircrews and rebalance maintenance phase bank time while at the same time continuing to train everyone in the squadron on the new equipment. As we struggled to meet the challenges of accepting and making major MWOs to the aircraft and training unit personnel, the squadron received the mission to deploy to Pacific Command in early February, 2017. Time was critical and the squadron had to learn how to "build the airplane in flight."

The uncertainty of equipment, parts, personnel, and tools created challenges to maintain Department of the Army (DA) unit readiness standards required to build capacity to meet our mission requirements. We approached the challenges of rebuilding the airplane in flight, using the familiar problem, plan, people, parts, time, tools, and training (P4/T3) management tool found in TC 3-04.7, *Army Aviation Maintenance*. Additionally, we looked at our leaders to drive the change.

Problem

In January 2016, the senior maintenance leaders, squadron executive officer (XO), and the Delta Troop Commander looked at how we could overcome a mission capable rate that, at our lowest point, would drop to less than 40%. Many of our Soldiers lacked experience with the AH-64D, the particular tooling, and maintenance manuals that created longer than anticipated maintenance timelines. We were short parts required to respond to unscheduled maintenance. We had no funding to repair electrical faults that left a majority of our fleet partially mission capable (PMC) dating prior to the transfer. We were critically short MTPs and were projected to be short for the next three quarters. We had to devise a way to increase aircraft readiness and accomplish this while maintaining a positive environment for our Soldiers to learn and grow while holding them to the high standard set forth by the squadron and the Army.

Plan

Our plan was simple - back to the basics. The squadron standardized the production control meeting to ensure we discussed the level of detail required to prioritize support. This detail included the number of maintenance personnel, to include supervisors, on hand per shift. We asked each of squadron's troops to provide their auxiliary power units and operators to facilitate maintenance operational checks (MOC). Each troop maintenance officer briefed their P4/T3 for all non-mission capable (NMC) aircraft and tech supply provided the update for outstanding NMC-supply and PMC-supply document numbers with estimated shipping and delivery dates.

The Delta Troop Commander instituted a standardized shift change meeting to expand capacity into the night and ensure we achieved a shared understanding. Quality control created checks and balances within the system by implementing P4/T3 briefing sheets prior to any maintenance action. This ensured that leaders had briefed Soldiers on the task at hand and provided the requisite resources to complete the task in a timely manner. The quality control section also aided the production control (PC) section by increasing aircraft log book inspections to ensure that the aircraft were ready for MOCs and maintenance test flights when they were scheduled.

The coordination and progress we were able to realize was not a result of one meeting or a single brain storming session but, instead, a constant dialogue between NCOs, the PC section, the Delta Troop Commander, the flight troop commanders, and the squadron leadership. Weekly "command" PC meetings focused emphasis on those issues requiring special attention. Each session included lessons learned from the previous week and ended on high notes with positive examples of observations from the squadron leadership about where we were getting better and where we still needed improvement.

People

People are the most important aspect of any solution set and this transition was not an exception. In January, the squadron leadership conducted a review of our manning situation. The squadron senior warrant officer advisor, XO, S-3, standardization pilot, and S-1 determined that the unit was not going to be ready to meet the ARI operational order readiness level for key personnel. Specifically, MTPs were identified as the most critical personnel shortage. Leaders engaged the brigade, division, and branch managers at Human Resources Command to articulate unit shortages using the Unit Status Report (USR) and the *DA 1352, Army Aircraft Inventory, Status, and Flying Time* Report.

These conversations allowed decision makers directly involved in the ARI process to understand the situation within the unit, and reallocate resources across the enterprise. Within the formation, unit leadership identified the right training and experience mix to ensure career Apache maintainers and Kiowa re-class maintainers became effective teams. The brigade cross-leveled experience across the organization by moving Soldiers from the aviation support battalion (ASB) and the attack reconnaissance battalion (ARB) to the cavalry squadron where they were given responsibility to grow the squadron brick by brick, using task, conditions, and standards to achieve success.

Parts

The National Guard sent prescribed load list (PLL) items and bench stock items to fill our immediate needs as we received our new aircraft. As these items arrived, they had to be processed into the Unit Level Logistics System-Aviation (Enhanced) (ULLS-A (E)). However, since our ULLS-A (E) had no demands under the new mission design series aircraft to create a start point to begin to stock items, the tech supply officer gathered the demand analysis of our sister ARB and used their data to establish a baseline. The NGB transferred funds to purchase fire control radar (FCR) high cost repair parts for faults that maintenance officers identified during initial acceptance flights. The coordinated efforts of the ASB, the support operations section, and the brigade aviation maintenance officer allowed tech supply to complete integration of new parts, eliminate PLL duplicates, and using the ARB as a shell, fill our PLL to an appropriate level to allow us to sustain our training efforts.

Tools

The AMCOM released Aviation Maintenance Action Message (AMAM), GEN-16-AMAM-01 addressing property accountability of PGSE and STTE at a crucial time for the squadron. Leaders used the AMAM's PGSE and STTE listing to ensure that we received the correct tool sets required to facilitate proper maintenance. The ASB personnel, provided instruction on PGSE and STTE identification and use. The Delta Troop Commander then signed the tools to our aviation support equipment section and began teaming Kiowa mechanics with Apache mechanics to ensure the transitioning Kiowa mechanics understood the function of the new tools that they would work with on the Apache. As the specialized tool inventory grew, the new Apache mechanic's confidence and proficiency also grew, leading to a steadily increasing readiness rate.

Training

The squadron leadership emphasized at the outset that we needed to train ourselves out of our maintenance problems and empower the NCOs to train Soldier maintenance tasks to established conditions and standards. Project Manager Apache and AMCOM Electronics Logistics Assistance Representatives provided classes on troubleshooting the AH-64's modernized signal processing unit, FCR, and aircraft survivability equipment systems to improve proficiency in our armament section. The flight standardization section closely monitored the performance of MTPs in readiness level progression and worked closely with the brigade maintenance examiner (ME) to prioritize progressions and maximize training opportunities. The AH-64 ME provided classes to PC personnel on preparing and streamlining the *DA FORM 1352, Army Aircraft Inventory, Status, and Flying Time* reporting process. Personnel from Delta Troop worked with our ASB to train maintenance team leads to conduct 250-hour major maintenance events resulting in increased efficiency as each training repetition occurred. During the entire training process, unit leaders conducted weekly performance assessments to seek room for improvement and to recognize Soldiers for exemplary performance.

Time

The unit's time management goals were to provide Soldiers the opportunity to learn and perform to standard, establish realistic windows for each day and night shift to maximize the duty day and manage their workload to complete assigned tasks, and steadily improve the unit's operational readiness. We set realistic standards and asked our Soldiers to improve on each successive repetition. The day-night shift change brief gave realistic expectations and a contract for each shift to manage their workload. Each of these practices created a mindset that incentivized our leaders to seek efficiencies to return aircraft to duty quicker and improve readiness.

The P4/T3 process is only as good as the leaders using it. Our NCOs, PC personnel, technical inspectors, maintenance officers, platoon leaders, and commanders owned their challenges and were active agents of change in improving their piece of the organization. Soldiers in the unit often took initiative to develop more efficient and effective processes such as building aircraft tracking boards to assign specific aircraft parking locations – a seemingly small action that significantly reduced the time to locate the aircraft for maintenance actions. Friendly competition between each of the troops gave positive energy to our Soldiers. Amazingly enough, when we were at 30% and 80% mission capable, the Soldiers maintained the same positive Cavalry attitude, knowing they would accomplish their mission.

As aviators began to return from AH-64 transition training, the demand in availability for training aircraft continued to grow. The 1-6th Cavalry Regiment's ARI transition lessons learned demonstrated that the P4/T3 process, driven by engaged leaders and energetic, willing Soldiers will allow leaders to improve the performance of their maintenance, and optimize the training of their aircrews. A special thanks to the Soldiers of the Fighting Sixth for their hard work over the last year as we have rebuilt our airplane in flight.

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Acronym Reference

AMAM - Aviation Maintenance Action Message	**NCO** - non-commissioned officer
AMCOM - Aviation and Missile Command	**NGB** - National Guard Bureau
ASB - aviation support battalion	**NMC** - non-mission capable
ARB - attack reconnaissance battalion	**P4/T3** - problem, plan, people, parts, time, tools, and training
ARI - Aviation Restructuring Initiative	**PC** - production control
CAB - combat aviation brigade	**PGSE** - peculiar ground support equipment
DA - Department of the Army	**PLL** - prescribed load list
FCR - fire control radar	**PMC** - partially mission capable
ME - maintenance examiner	**STTE** - special tools and test equipment
MOC - maintenance operational checks	**ULLS-A (E)** - Unit Level Logistics System-Aviation (Enhanced)
MTP - maintenance test pilot	**USR** - Unit Status Report
MWO - modification work orders	**XO** - executive officer

Why are the Brigade Combat Teams in the Aviation Business?

By CW2 Miles E. Price and
1LTC Zelly L. Zim

Unmanned aircraft system (UAS) reconnaissance platforms help shape the battlefield using timely and accurate reporting along with long range sensors to quickly identify threats. These reconnaissance techniques must be second nature to the UAS operator in order to carry out missions in support of ground forces. Have brigade combat teams (BCT) been using their reconnaissance assets to their full potential? Are their crewmembers properly trained to carry out advanced scouting techniques? On the surface, the answer is yes. The BCTs are able to carry out collection plans and facilitate various strikes while deployed; however, during garrison operations, I see these platoons not being utilized properly and not training to standard to match their requirements when in theater. This results in a time-consuming "on-the-job" approach to training of critical skills once deployed. The BCT Shadow platoons assigned to Infantry brigades are losing valuable experience and training opportunities that are ingrained into the combat aviation brigade (CAB) heavy attack reconnaissance squadron (H-ARS) aero scout platoon's daily activities.

The H-ARS Shadow platoon crewmembers learn invaluable experience from personnel within their own organization as Apache and former Kiowa Warrior pilots mentor the UAS crewmembers on reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (scouting) tactics, techniques, and procedures. On the other hand, a BCT Shadow platoon lacks the training opportunities and enhanced aviation experience that the CAB-assigned Shadows can draw from. The BCT's Shadow platoon is an essential asset for providing critical intelligence information; however, if not trained properly on how to conduct or manage their training program, these platoons lose a significant amount of their potential impact, especially, early in the deployment - arguably the most critical and vulnerable time period.

I have had the privilege of serving in both the unmanned and manned aviation communities. Reflecting on what I have experienced, the gap in training, safety, and standardization emphasis between the CAB and BCT is enormous. Is an Infantry brigade really able to fully manage an aircrew training program (ATP) and properly utilize a platform that has the ability to conduct simultaneous missions involving reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition? Already encompassing many different military occupational specialties, the BCT has broad training requirements that it considers more relevant than addressing aviation-specific tasks. Aviation standards and doctrine associated with UAS operations cannot be trained if not deemed a priority by higher, and this training is not happening within the BCT.

The H-ARS UAS aircrews are properly trained to carry out reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition in much the same manner of the Kiowa Warrior aircrews they replace. Having marginal proficiency in simply "flying" the Shadow is not enough to operate in today's operational environment. Flying the Shadow is only the means to performing the mission, but it is a task that must be mastered. It is a task that requires proficiency if the essential elements of the mission are to be realized – collecting the information the commander requires to ensure success. The UAS aircrew must be taught and become skilled in doctrine and learn the tactics, techniques, and procedures to become effective aero scouts. Without that emphasis, the BCT aircrews are marginally effective at best – and this emphasis is not happening in the BCT.

It is clear that the organizations in question have been doing great things and positively affecting operations for quite some time now, but at what cost? The BCT Shadow platoons have been deploying and providing thousands of hours of coverage for over fifteen years but their UAS mishap statistics reflect a lack of understanding of training, safety, and standardization issues. During Fiscal Year 2014 (FY14) we see that RQ-7B Shadows had a total of twenty three mishaps. Thirteen mishaps occurred in FY15, which is more than double of all the other UAS platforms combined for that fiscal year. I expect these numbers to decrease in the coming years as more H-ARS receive their Shadow platoons. But what about the BCTs? They are still left with no aviation mentorship or standards upon which to build a solid aircrew training program.

Aviation standards are put in place for many reasons – regulation, safety, preservation of resources, and aircrew proficiency to name

a few. Without these roadmaps, we are free to interpret our own vision of what is right and wrong. A CAB ensures compliance of established aviation standards with personnel trained extensively in accredited aviation courses and curriculum and who have extensive aviation experience. A BCT does not have this experienced aviation chain to monitor and mentor their UAS platoons. The platoons interpret doctrine and manuals to the best of their ability without senior standardization personnel to conduct checks and balances on their aircrew training program.

The addition of a lieutenant UAS platoon leader to the BCT table of equipment and organization (TO&E) has helped bridge the training requirements with the brigade leadership but without a background in aviation, his knowledge of training, safety, standardization, and UAS employment is limited. As a result, he must play catch-up with little time to learn the intricacies of his aviation assets. An alternative would be to assign an Aviation branch officer to the BCT, but this becomes a career issue similar to that voiced for the Soldiers in the brigade aviation element.[1]

1st Lt. Matthew Chase, a mission briefing officer, and Spc. David Anderson, mission coordinator, huddle to review pre-mission conditions.

To alleviate these issues all together, moving Shadow platoons from the BCTs into the CAB is the best option. The CAB would attach a Shadow platoon to the BCT for unit training events and operational deployments ensuring that every possible UAS requirement was provided. The CAB would provide training, records maintenance, and UAS maintenance support and alleviate all BCT requirement except to support the CAB Soldiers while attached. Assigned to the CAB's heavy attack reconnaissance battalion, the UAS crews could gain valuable experience by receiving training as aero scouts in MUM-T operations when not supporting BCT missions.

Teaching the basics of reconnaissance is essential in developing the UAS operator to become an aero scout. A Soldier attending the 15W (Unmanned Aircraft Systems Operator) course performs an average of ten actual flight hours during training. Little training time is devoted to reconnaissance theory and tactics. As he arrives in the unit, the BCT Soldier is rushed through progression in order to fill a vacant TO&E position and never has the opportunity to learn the basics of reconnaissance before being expected to perform these important tasks on his first mission. He truly is learning his job in the school of hard knocks. The CAB's Shadow operators are taught techniques of area, zone, route, and aerial reconnaissance by former Kiowa Warrior aero scout and attack aviators and given the opportunity to practice tasks to proficiency. They participate in mission planning, contribute to the mission execution, and participate in the after action reviews – they are Aero Scouts.

These essential reconnaissance skills are usually pushed to the side in the BCT because of its high operational tempo. At some point just prior to the BCT's deployment, the focus becomes the mass production of aircraft commanders and UAS Readiness Level (RL) 1 aircrew members by performing mass launch and recovery operations to meet the iteration and flight hour requirements for the qualifications. Success is being measured quantitatively and cannot account for experience and lessons learned while conducting actual reconnaissance.

The turnaround in this military occupational specialty is very high as Soldiers leave the Army for lucrative civilian job opportunities aggravating the BCT's shortages of this critical skill. The BCTs are left grasping to obtain qualified personnel to fill their ranks. A high turnover of operators also means losing valuable experience available to train newly assigned crewmembers. While the ideal world would allow the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence to increase course curriculum to allow more training time on doctrine, basic reconnaissance, and other essential aero scout skills, those resources, in all likelihood, have been expended. The CABs have taken the challenge and have been exceptionally successful in training the new aero-scout.

With limited, or no, aviation expertise within the BCT, the oversight for training standards is often left to a single instructor operator with limited knowledge and experience who learned from a predecessor with even less experience. This self-perpetuating cycle continues until training tasks, safety, standardization, and mission effectiveness are marginalized. Multiple instructors, mentors in the form of manned aircraft crewmembers, and a community of UAS operators, (as present in the CAB), feed off of the diverse experiences that are critical to establishing a platoon of highly trained and able scouts.

During the development of the H-ARS, we have seen that Shadow maintainers (MOS 15E) have now been pulled into the quality control and production control shops. This decision to integrate Shadow maintainers with AH-64 maintainers is a demonstration of the mentorship and aviation structure that BCT platoons are lacking. Right now, instead, the BCT is entrusting maintenance of aircraft to a junior enlisted Soldier,

expecting them to comprehend running a safe and effective aviation maintenance program on which they were never trained in the first place.

Safety is an essential component of all aviation operations which must be evaluated at all echelons during the risk assessment process. There is no school trained aviation safety officer in the BCT. To mitigate the lack of this position, the BCT's safety program is often contracted out to civilian counterparts nested within the brigade – an acceptable solution if the civilian safety advisor is knee deep in day and night unit activities; acceptable if the civilian contractor is knowledgeable of aviation safety, standardization, and application of airspace control measures; acceptable if the civilian contractor safety advisor deploys with the BCT; and acceptable if the civilian contractor's advice is taken seriously by the BCT commander and equally important by the Soldiers in the brigade. This position in a CAB should be held by a senior safety tracked warrant officer with years of aviation safety experience and with the ability to counsel commanders on aviation safety and risk management. I question the effectiveness of the civilian contractor safety advisor when the RQ-7B leads and will likely continue to lead in accidents and mishaps for the UAS community. Reassigning all Shadow platoons into a CAB offers a solution for the safety mentorship and evaluation of RQ-7B operations during both training and contingency operations.

Soon, the UAS community will have the ability to operate outside restricted areas and into national airspace. Rated aviators within the CABs will provide invaluable mentorship in operating with multiple airspace agencies. Integrating Shadow platoons into the CAB has and will offer invaluable instruction and mentorship for the already under-manned UAS instructor operators as they teach their junior operators. Within this setting, safety poses an issue that cannot be ignored. From airspace incursions to midair collisions, safety must accompany all aspects of every mission. The UAS community has made leaps and bounds in safety but, in my opinion, are still not in line with aviation standards. While I understand that additional risks may be taken since no personnel are inside of a UAS, the fact remains that this aircraft will be operating in the same airspace as manned aircraft. Safety cannot be dismissed and must be applied to every step from aircraft maintenance to completion of mission.

My opinion, this paper, reflects what I have experienced in both H-ARS and BCT UAS platoons and what I've learned from other leaders within BCTs that I have had the privilege of sharing experiences with. There is no doubt in my mind that BCT assigned Shadow platoons have and will continue to make the mission happen for the BCT. But there has to be a more efficient way to train and sustain the proficiency of competent operators that are well-versed in reconnaissance while ensuring aircrew training programs are managed to standard and in compliance with existing regulations. Current guidance from the Training and Doctrine Command charges the CABs with the duty to assist the BCTs with UAS training and records maintenance.[2] From where I sit, this is not enough to solve the problem. Task saturation becomes an inevitable problem and priorities from the next higher level of command will eventually trump the CAB's attempt at mentoring the BCT Shadow platoon. Real training, molded by lessons learned, focused on progression from schoolhouse-level task through unit-level reconnaissance techniques, and supported by aviation awareness at every echelon of the unit – as is found in the CAB - will breed a community of competent and lethal UAS operators. Scouts Out!

[1] MAJ Gary Gonzalez, Assessing the ADAM/BAE Cell, July-September 2016 Aviation Digest. P42
[2] Forces Command, "Command Training Guidance for Fiscal Year 2016."

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Acronym Reference

ATP - aircrew training program
BCT - brigade combat team
CAB - combat aviation brigade
H-ARS - heavy attack reconnaissance squadron
RL - readiness level
TO&E - table of equipment and organization
UAS - unmanned aircraft systems



By CPT Gerald H. Gorss

The Army's Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback 360 (MSAF) Program does not maximize the intended effect as a leader development tool for many junior officers. Leader development within the Army suffers as a result. The purpose of MSAF is to promote self-awareness and individual development. It is intended to promote skill improvement, adaptability, and better performance, thus creating strategic leaders that can effectively operate in the ever-changing complexity of the current environment. Improved self-awareness and individual development grows through 360-degree feedback provided by subordinates, peers, and superiors to the leader. While MSAF accomplishes this to a degree, it does not meet its potential as a true leader development tool. The civilian sector reports huge success when implementing 360-rater feedback correctly. The Army can experience the same successes.

The MSAF does not meet its true potential as a leader development tool for three primary reasons - poor communication, lack of ownership or buy-in, and cultural barriers. First, MSAF is failing because a lack of communication exists as to its purpose, necessity, and importance. At the company and battalion levels, most officers do not know what 360-degree feedback is, let alone that the Army has a dedicated program for leader development. Additionally, most officers using MSAF are unaware that there are independent professional coaches dedicated to interpreting data who can aid in action planning from results generated during an MSAF event. This example illustrates that while there are personnel and materiel in place to support the program, most officers are ignorant to them because of a lack of messaging and information.

Secondly, the MSAF program does not have the adequate ownership and buy-in required to make it a success and meet its potential. In 2014, the Center for Army Leadership cited that developing others rated as the lowest-rated leader competency in the Army and the only one that did not meet the Army's benchmark.[1] Indeed, most officers using MSAF do not value the tool, minimize the importance of self-development and improvement, and do not respond appropriately to feedback. This could be attributable to many causes. Primarily, officers replicate the behaviors to which they observe. Many, if not most, junior officers do not get counseled let alone developed by their superiors. Moreover, junior officers have not embraced the importance of their own self-development. Indeed, in 2014, 66% of company-grade officers viewed the MSAF program as ineffective.[2] Self-development inherently requires deliberate intention and desire to improve. The Army unknowingly has created barriers to the intention of self-development.

Lastly, MSAF is failing because of cultural barriers that have grown in the Army over the last two decades. Bureaucracy within the Army has inundated Soldiers at all levels with administrative training requirement after requirement - most of them computer based. For example, the Global Assessment Tool, Command Climate Surveys, Operations Security, Insider Threat, Domestic Violence, Foreign Disclosure, Anti-terrorism Awareness, Army Values, and Cybersecurity Training reflect a small cross section of the seemingly endless ongoing computer-based training tasks placed upon Soldiers. Over time, these requirements increasingly become a nuisance, generating a culture of resistance and distaste towards computer-based training, surveys, and developmental tools. As a result, officers view MSAF as an administrative requirement, rather than a developmental tool that can be instrumental to a leader's future. This yields results that are haphazard, not well thought out, and ultimately inaccurate from the feedback providers. Additionally, it denigrates the MSAF's purpose for the developer and the developed. It has become another great intentioned item transformed into an annoyance for many officers because of the culture created over time, thus creating natural resistance for all of those involved in its execution.

Although MSAF is failing in its intended purpose for a majority of officers, a few modifications to the program can get it back on track to increasing leader development in the Army. First, from a

leadership and education perspective, training needs to educate our higher-ranking leaders on the positive direct, organizational, and strategic effects of feedback coupled with deliberate action planning and coaching. This starts by including instruction from such organizations as the Center for Creative Leadership, and the Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership at the United States Military Academy in the appropriate professional military education courses. At present, the Aviation Captain's Career Course discusses the Army's leader attributes and competencies briefly and nothing more. The two week long Aviation Pre-Command Course for future battalion and brigade level leaders does not breach the topic. Therefore, the two institutional development courses that immediately send out future commanders that have the most immediate and direct impact on junior officers in the Army is not educated or trained on MSAF. Before achieving true ownership of leader development, the senior leader must know what it entails. In the context of MSAF and leader development, individual coaching is the essential ingredient. This aspect links feedback to planning, execution, assessment, and eventually behavioral change. Therefore, we need trained leaders who know how to interpret feedback, help develop action plans, and are capable of coaching subordinates to reach their developmental goals.

Secondly, and although counterculture to the current trend, added requirements or initiatives to the MSAF program are necessary through the materiel perspective. They are necessary because it will promote a culture change and decrease resistance in the long-term. Specifically, requiring the creation of an individual development plan, a specific number of coaching sessions, and a conclusion-type event are needed additions to the requirement of simply initiating a MSAF. It starts with senior leaders and their inherent duty to develop subordinates. A leader will not get their Officer Evaluation Report (OER) until meeting these requirements. This is necessary because the feedback provided by the MSAF is useless by itself. Developing action-oriented behaviors through an individual development plan and coaching is essential to taking the feedback and creating a learning process and adaptation of behaviors. Moreover, the stipulation that an officer will not receive his OER until completing his development plan and coaching will add a layer of ownership from the subordinate. The materiel changes suggested are to create and add software for individual development plans and tailor each assessment to reflect the most recent changes in the OER. These software changes will go a long way to creating a more fruitful program. Furthermore, when feedback is solely in the hands of the individual in which the comments are intended, proper interpretation of the data becomes questionable, and accountability of implementing behavioral changes is unlikely. The MSAF process, therefore, requires a coach.

Lastly, a final recommendation to increase the effectiveness of the MSAF would be to implement horizontal and vertical coaching relationships. For example, in a combat aviation brigade (CAB), requiring the cavalry squadron commander to coach the assault platoon leaders would go a long way to sharing skills and knowledge, building relationships across the organization, and ultimately building a stronger unit. While the overall structure of the CAB would not change, the relationships would have positive impacts on the organization and personnel. For example, effectively using MSAF would encourage open communication, provide honest feedback, increase esprit de corps, and create stewardship. The MSAF process has the potential of being a a powerful trigger for changing climate, attitude or behavior, and promoting meaningful leader development.

In the end, the current MSAF program is ineffective because of endless mandatory computer-based administrative training and the failure of a deliberate and intentional leader development mentality among the lower ranks of the officer corps. This attitude is in part a result of replicating the attitudes and behaviors of senior officers. It is also because leaders at all levels lack training in what coaching actually is or what it entails. However, with minor changes in the realms of leadership/education, materiel, and organization in regards to the MSAF program, feedback and coaching can attain the significance it deserves and weave itself into the fabric of leader responsibilities. Implementation of an effective MSAF program will generate a vast improvement in leader development in the Army as it has in industry. The nature and complexity of today's operational environment does not allow the Army to ignore leader development or to allow leader development to develop haphazardly.

[1] 19. Ryan P. Riley et al., 2014 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings, Technical Report 2015-01 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: CAL, June 2015), 11, accessed 02 October 2016, http://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/2014%20CASAL%20Military%20Leader%20Findings%20Report.pdf.

[2] Ibid., 89.

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Acronym Reference

CAB -combat aviation brigade
MSAF - Multi-Source Assessment and Feedback 360
OER - Officer Evaluation Report



STRATEGIC THINKING:

A Battle Cry for Aviation NCOs in Afghanistan

"nature is everywhere the cause of order"
- Aristotle[1]

By 1SG Bryant Mcfarlane

Long gone are the days in which entire organic organizations deploy in support of global operations. With increased demands for multinational cooperation and interoperability, cultural understanding and organizational dynamics are imperative at all levels. At no point is this more imperative than at those levels traditionally identified as noncommissioned officer (NCO) roles. As the final manning level in organizations become increasingly more restrictive, leaders at all levels must seriously consider bringing not only the correct number of Soldiers to the deployment, but they must include the Soldiers that bring the most to the table. This selection process must be both thorough and broad in scope, as the traditional robust support mechanisms such as theater property and equipment and contract maintenance teams are centralized in the largest logistical hubs. What is necessary to ensure mission success in Afghanistan today is an inculcation by all leaders of the concept of Strategic Thinking.[2]

In order to engage in strategic thought, a level of introspective self-awareness is required. We all carry with us a set of values, norms, and mores that frame how we look at the world around us. In order to fully understand the problems presented in the modern battlefield of Afghanistan, an informed situational understanding is essential. Doctrinally defined as "scanning the environment for recurring, novel, and key cues that are integrated and used in sensemaking, predicting, and testing what exists"[3], situational understanding requires that one is actively questioning the world around them in a systematic and analogical manner.

Questioning the world around us is an innately human trait that can lead to false conclusions. Analogical thought is often responsible for these conclusions. A false conclusion is not necessarily a negative aspect of strategic thought provided that we can be honest with ourselves and receptively receive comment or critique on our conclusions.

Take for example the human interpretation of gravity. When Aristotle published *Physics* he determined that rocks fell to the Earth when dropped because they were of the Earth. Thus they were only returning to their natural state. An entirely reasonable conclusion based upon the evidence and cultural operating environment at the time. This Aristotelian logic stood for over 2,000 years before Isaac Newton saw an apple fall from a tree and revolutionized the world with *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica*. Newton's findings were accepted as law and were unchallenged until Albert Einstein would change the way gravity was understood a scant 268 years later by unifying Newtonian thought with his special relativity that described gravity as a geometric property of space and time. As recently as July of 2012, scientists at the *Conseil Européen pour la Recherche Nucléaire* (European Organization for Nuclear Research) have redefined, through the Higgs-Boson particle, how insanely small elements effect the mechanics of gravity. None of these people were wrong about their assertions; they were all shaped by the environment and cultural framing of the problem set before them. These examples demonstrate that we also must be willing to make corrections to our initial findings/conclusions in the evolutionary process of strategic thinking.

When operating in task force or smaller elements, the traditional static command relationships and roles compound and become increasingly dynamic. While providing the foundation for all seven aviation core competencies, the atypical definition of the senior NCO as an advisor, trainer, mentor, and standard bearer who provides the 'beans and bullets for the fight' is suddenly increased in scope and depth. Networking with joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational, (JIIM) partners both for tactical and operational needs that were traditionally performed at the staff level is increasingly the role of the NCO in locations throughout Afghanistan. This has particularly become the case in reference to the unique nature of aviation operations where company

and staff officers are counted as primary battle rostered crewmembers. The NCO is filling these roles.

The long held pejorative "strategic corporal" is rapidly evolving into a reality in the daily operations in Train, Advise, and Assist Commands across Afghanistan. Daily current operations in theater require Aviation NCOs to interact with American, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Multinational conventional and tiered forces. Without forethought and concerted effort required of strategic thinking, NCOs can cause immediate and negative effects in multiple aspects of fraternal relationships, security, air ground operations, and garrison efforts and fracture exterior command relationships with JIIM partners.

The modern operating environment in Afghanistan is not that dissimilar to the understanding of gravity. It is complex and dynamic - culturally, politically, and militarily. The modern operating environment is not that dissimilar to the world that Alexander the Great or Genghis Kahn faced; though the technology has changed, the people and their fighting spirit has remained relatively static for thousands of years. However, the dynamic shift in the use of Afghani tiered assets in both ground and air operations denotes an evolutionary leap of magnitudes likely not experienced in the country in decades. Understanding our JIIM partners, nonetheless the Afghani people, is an exercise in strategic thinking emphasizing both cultural empathy and self-awareness. One cannot simply define the operating environment through the framing of the American perspective and be effective.

One of the greatest resources available to the Aviation NCO is the recent popularity of the opening of Afghanistan to Western study. We can outwardly see how the Afghani population have returned to the flying of colorful handmade kites as a popular sport, but understanding the deeper cultural importance of kite fighting to the Afghani culture is but one example. Recognizing that western culture and social structure has poorly equipped the average American to understand the significance and cultural normative environment in Afghanistan through self-awareness, some self-development should take place. Widely available publications such as *The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight*[4], *Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban*[5], and *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*[6] formed a solid foundation for the author and allowed for a greater understanding of how the Afghan people view the operating environment. Professional education and skill training is available through the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. An essay on the program, "Achieving Leader Development through Strategic Broadening Seminars: The Red Team NCO Education Experience"[7], more fully explains the scalable iterative process used by the UFMCS.[8]

Educational opportunities aside, the best experience to be garnered is operational. Whether conducting support to Afghani organic, supported, or enabled operations; performing standard logistical operations; or working with JIIM partners, understanding that in the end we are all working toward the same objective of a free and independent Afghanistan will temper misconceptions and myths of JIIM operations. The only path to success in the current operating environment in Afghanistan is routine exercise of strategic thinking and an unwavering commitment to the team concept.

[1] Aristotle, Physics VIII.1
[2] U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 6-22 (Washington D.C.; U.S. Department of the Army, June 2015), pp. 5-6 – 5-8.
[3] Ibid. 5-6
[4] Johnson, Robert. The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight. Oxford University Press, New York, NY. 2011.
[5] Tanner, Stephen. Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban. Da Capo Press, Philadelphia, PA. 2009.
[6] Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ. 2012.
[7] SFC Roberts and MSG Rivera. "Achieving Leader Development through Strategic Broadening Seminars: The Red Team NCO Education Experience." NCO Writing Program. http://ncojournal.dodlive.mil/2016/05/02/achieving-leader-development-through-strategic-broadening-seminars-the-red-team-nco-education-experience/
[8] U.S. Department of the Army, Combined Arms Center. "University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies/Red Teaming." http://usacac.army.mil/organizations/ufmcs-red-teaming.

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Acronym Reference

JIIM - joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational
NCO - noncommissioned officer
UFMCS - University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies

A CALL TO ARMS:

Army Aviation Needs a Weapons School

MAJ John Q. Bolton

Since 2001, Army Aviation has altered its force structure, adopting the combat aviation brigade (CAB) as the primary unit of action, focused on team tactics and the small-scale air assault and, most importantly, became a full-fledged member of the combined arms team after having focused almost entirely on *deep operations* since the 1980s. The changes are profound, manifested in organization, doctrine, and aircraft.

Yet, Army Aviation's achievements obscure gaps in its enterprise structure that inhibit our ability to prepare for future challenges. The absence of failure does not equate to success; outstanding 20th century organizations are of little use in chaotic modern conflicts, where previously complicated challenges have given way to the complex.[1] Current efforts to "re-format the hard drive" are on the right track but insufficient. Army Aviation needs an integrated approach to educating our force, developing doctrine, teaching tactics, and evaluating units. Our training and dissemination paradigms are too distributed and overly focused on the individual. Aviators may be competent and experienced, but expertise is localized and limited across the force. We lack advanced training programs. As a result, we may fail to collect and promulgate tactical knowledge and over-value individual experience or "the way it's always been done." Collective training, however, "is where leaders learn to lead," and where units develop true experts in the war-fighting skills.[2] Amidst the challenges of budget cuts and a continually high operational tempo, Army Aviation can best use limited resources by investing in education in the form of a weapons school focused on doctrinal and tactical expertise.

"Take the mavericks in your service, the ones that wear rumpled uniforms and look like a bag of mud but whose ideas are so offsetting that they actually upset the people in the bureaucracy…

In 2015, I saw first hand how the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) use their weapons schools to produce tactically proficient aviators. These graduates are competent, tactical experts familiar with doctrine, tactics, history, as well as the application of joint tools to solve complex problems. Their models are worth emulating. To improve our force's tactical acumen and prepare Army Aviators for future challenges, we should adopt the model employed by not only our service counterparts, but also the British, Germans, and Canadians.

…protect these people, because if they are not nurtured in your service, the enemy will bring contrary ideas to you."

– GEN James Mattis

An Army Aviation Weapons School (AAWS) could integrate elements of the Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization (DES), the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD), the Capability Development and Integration Directorate, and other Fort Rucker agencies. A proposed AAWS would conduct intense training courses comprised of tactics, doctrine, history, and joint integration using a combination of live and simulated events. Creating this type of school would improve education, tactical expertise, standardization, and joint interoperability across Army Aviation. As opposed to our current system of specializing aviators by function, AAWS graduates would be tactical experts. The target audience would be mid-grade officers (CW3/CW4s and post-command CPT/MAJs). Most importantly, this proposal would help create a generation of Army aviators ready to win in the complex world described by the Army Operating Concept.

What the Weapons Schools Do

Air Force and Marine Corps' Weapons School Emblems

Air Force and Marine Weapons School graduates are considered weapons and tactics subject-matter experts (SME) for their platforms."[3] Upon graduation, these "patch wearers" serve as lead instructors, providing expertise, advising commanders, and, overall, improving unit effectiveness.

The weapons schools began after failures in Vietnam, where many pilots found themselves unprepared for the intensity of combat, particularly with developing situational awareness and effective maneuvering.[4] Consequently, lessons from World War II and Korea were re-learned in blood. The weapons school model revitalized attitudes towards training, emphasizing live-fire and realistic scenarios.[5]

The Marine Corps' Weapons and Tactics Instructor (WTI) course run by Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1) is an outstanding template for Army Aviation. Marines "get" air-ground integration because MAWTS-1 teaches it. Marine aviation battalions, supporting maintenance units, and an infantry battalion deploy to Yuma, AZ for twice-annual WTI courses. Lead by a selective cadre for 7 weeks, students endure a 6-day workweek gauntlet.[6] MAWTS-1 focuses on aviation's unique training requirements, augmenting Marine ground training.

At MAWTS-1, I learned more about threat avoidance tactics in those four weeks than I have in 14 years in Army Aviation. Not only did I learn tactical mission planning, employment of weapon systems, and integration of joint assets, but I also received invaluable detailed instruction on how to reduce my [signature] and defeat threat systems as well.[7] – CW4 Chad Ford



A typical class employs USMC assets along with joint and multi-national partners. After two weeks of academics and simulations, students conduct two live missions per week. Attack, reconnaissance, aerial refueling assets and electronic warfare officers work with each other in order to support a ground-tactical plan, typically a company or battalion air assault. Most events are live-fire, with ammunition totals close to an Army attack battalion's annual gunnery allocation. In a single iteration, I observed a British Tornado conduct close air support (CAS), AH-1W Cobras perform interdiction, a 7-ship V-22 air assault, and a 4-ship CH-53E artillery raid; each class has over a dozen events like this. The significant resources put into MAWTS-1, coupled with the enormous, largely restriction-free training area, make for phenomenal training. One Army Aviator who attended WTI said, "We should rush to fill every [WTI] slot available."[8]

Since MAWTS-1 conducts only two WTI iterations each year, instructors have time for reflection and curriculum adjustment. Instructors stay in touch with the operational units during breaks through after-action reviews, conferences, and instructor support.[9] This method ensures instructors remain current and competent.

Education and Doctrine

The Army has a wealth of knowledge and experience in its aviation corps, but the lack of a weapons and tactics 'center of excellence' prevents the Army from effectively harnessing and institutionalizing this pool of knowledge.[10] –MAJ Michael H. Johnson, USMC

Most Army Aviation institutional doctrine (aircrew training manuals/training circulars) focus on individual skills. Warrant officers have specialized tracks and, aside from limited avenues, commissioned officers have no additional aviation schooling after making pilot-in-command. Conversely, the weapons schools target mid-career populations, aviators with some experience but ready for advanced training. Attendance is selective; only the best attend, and not everyone graduates. Consequently, "patch wearers" garner institutional respect. Graduating WTI "carries one of the highest and most prestigious qualifications offered by the Marine Corps."[11] Moreover, graduates are not "tracked."

Responsibility for Army Aviation education is dispersed among several organizations at Fort Rucker. These include the DES, DOTD, and the 1-145th Aviation Regiment. There is no single point of reference for the education of Army Aviators, no place where ideas are tested or validated, no building from which Army Aviation expertise emerges.

Of course, some of this expertise can be found through senior aviators at various offices and courses like the Aviation Mission Survivability Officer (AMSO) Course. However, tactical expertise, specifically the employment of Army Aviation assets, and the development and execution of training plans, and contemporary operational environment has no single point of reference like MAWTS-1.

An example of our need for a doctrinal and tactical center is COL Robert Ault's article describing Task Force (TF) Brawler's deployment to Afghanistan. Ault illustrates the many disparate challenges aviation units overcome. For example, TF Brawler employed a support platoon in a combat role, conducted improvised explosive device interdiction, and supervised the building of a C-17-capable runway - all non-mission essential task list tasks for an assault battalion.[13] Task Force Brawler succeeded through engaged leadership, good staff work, and excellent relationships with supported and adjacent units. Tellingly however, Ault does not mention receiving any help from the aforementioned agencies at Fort Rucker, where doctrinal, tactical, and operational expert knowledge should reside. Additionally, consider that Ault's thoughtful summary was not disseminated through the United States Army Aviation Center of Excellence publications, but published in *Small Wars Journal*. Offices like DES or DOTD, under the aegis of a formal weapons school, should be the source for this type of information.



Ft. Rucker Organizational Structure

All things be ready if our minds be so

- Shakespear, Henvy V

We do not have a central repository of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that produces easily identifiable expert personnel or tactical publications. In short, while Fort Rucker is Army Aviation's home, no place can claim to be its soul. The lack of a single point of reference creates confusion and dilutes expertise. For example, the USMC's SMEs on CAS, air-ground integration, and air-to-air combat are at MAWTS-1 providing a single point of reference for these topics. During my visit, I witnessed a heated exchange between USMC officers regarding a change to Marine CAS doctrine. The salient aspects of the debate are irrelevant; the point is that there is a location outside of the Pentagon where debate can occur, informed by aviators and leaders as close as possible to executing units, and equipped with the requisite expertise. There are obvious advantages to informal debate among peers before procedures or initiatives move through official channels.

Likewise, the initial challenges faced by units during Desert Storm and early years in Iraq could have been at least somewhat mitigated through a sharing of TTPs and experiences from Afghanistan, or even Kosovo. Similarly, the failure of hovering tactics initially employed in Afghanistan and Iraq might have been mitigated through better training and knowledge exchange.[14] Tracking aviators segregates our knowledge base, meaning lessons learned are not collected and disseminated across the force effectively. Moreover, the dearth of acknowledged experts across the Aviation Enterprise creates confusion as to who has the right answers.

Through 2014, Army aviators deploying to relatively static conflicts had little doctrinal or tactical documents to reference. The 2007 hastily developed *FM 3-04.126, Attack Reconnaissance Helicopter Operations* mentioned *counterinsurgency* only once despite being specifically developed for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.[15] In 2007, five years into stability/counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, MAJ Lee Robinson observed:

> Little mention is made of the employment of attack aircraft in [COIN] even though attack aviation is ubiquitous on the battlefield. The Army's capstone field manual on COIN operations, *FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, does not provide much direction for attack aviation leaders… as it devotes a scant four pages to aviation assets in COIN.[16]

Instead, during this period, much operational knowledge was disseminated through relief-in-place handovers or previous experiences in theater. While dialogue certainly occurred, it was mostly ad hoc; no central location or repository exists. Those that do, *Aviation Digest* and the *Tactics Newsletter*, for example, lack distribution because there are no "patch wearers" using them as teaching tools. This is not a slander against Fort Rucker agencies—it is a criticism against the walls separating DES, DOTD, 1st Aviation Brigade, etc. All are working hard, but we may be "doing things right, but not doing the right things."[17]

Our turn-around from lessons learned to dissemination, let alone final doctrine, is too slow and does not garner the requisite respect from operational units. The best example of this problematic situation is *The Gold Book*, which served as doctrine for years despite being a unit-produced

standing operating procedure.[18] This is taking nothing away from *The Gold Book*—last year's *FM 3-99, Airborne and Air Assault Operations* borrows heavily from it—but an absence of doctrinal and tactical "source code" until recently is telling. Likewise, many battalions utilized *battle books* as substitutes for standardized Army Aviation doctrine and procedures. We have largely substituted experience from force-wide standardized expertise; a weapons school could mitigate this situation.

The recent creation of the Air Cavalry Leaders Course is a worthwhile effort toward resolving this situation. It is rigorous, varied, and has a variety of challenges for students.[19] However, the course is only two-weeks long, teaches planning and execution procedures, but not necessarily tactics (required against a thinking threat), and shortchanges the challenge of real-world friction.

Tactical Expertise

Being effective in today's world is less a question of optimizing for a known (and relatively stable) set of variables than responsiveness to a constantly shifting environment. Adaptability, not efficiency, must become our central competency.

–General Stanley McChrystal

In 2013, MAJ Jamie LaValley noted: "[Army Aviation has] no formal tactical flight-training course … Such training would help ensure Army pilots are able to defeat current and future threats."[20] Despite our enormous resources, Army Aviation has no "standardized tactical training program that teaches the employment of validated threat avoidance tactical flight maneuvers."[21] DES employs a laser-like concentration for evaluating formations, but does so through the lens of the individual, not the unit's collective effectiveness. Consequently, much of Army Aviation's knowledge base is highly localized. We over-value individual competence and rely heavy on experience to the detriment of collective proficiency and our institutional knowledge base. "This is not all bad, but these experiences should be cataloged and channeled into a formal certification program with standardized evaluation of procedures in a course that does not exist. Many of our experiences in threat avoidance tactics [are merely] disseminated from newsletters and PowerPoint presentations."[22]

Our dearth of formal, systematic processes for collecting and disseminating tactical knowledge decreases our proficiency as a branch. Long into their careers, many aviators have no tactical training save from flight school basics.[23] We must not confuse previous experience, which was largely homogenous and repetitive, with future threats and operating environments. "Too often training programs are not command supported or are ignored which can lead to ignorance of enemy weapons and tactics. Complacency, refusing to improve, and stagnant learning are greater enemies."[24]

One of the key documents produced by both MAWTS-1 and the USAF Weapons School are aircraft/weapon technique guides. These provide a bridge between each aircraft's training manual and service doctrine. They give aviators tools to employ their aircraft effectively, not simply fly it well. Though 2014's Army Aviation gunnery manual is a marked improvement in terms of detail, it remains a document focused on grading gunnery, not combat tactics.

An Army Aviation Weapons School graduate, rounded by experience and study of threat systems and doctrine, while possessing expertise in our own systems, could help ease the adoption of decisive action training techniques. Observations from training centers and recent warfighter exercises validate this need, demonstrating we are still welded to team employment and undervalue tactical intelligence.[25] At the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), "aviation task forces routinely fail to provide the attack or scout aviation support required to successfully execute the supported unit's ground tactical plan."[26] We overemphasize habit and drills, ignoring the utility of deliberate planning."[27] Having a school to teach fundamentals, along with in-depth tactical, doctrinal, and technical knowledge, would address these issues.

Lastly, an AAWS would provide a path for commissioned officers to continue enhancing their aviation skills. A weapons school could provide a much-needed, mid-career boost to an officer's doctrinal and tactical understanding while simultaneously offering an incentive for good performance. Having AAWS "patch-wearers" in S-3, executive officer, or command positions would similarly improve the performance of aviation task forces.

Standardization

Recent revisions to *Army Techniques Publication 3-04.1, Aviation Tactical Employment* and *Training Circular (TC) 3-04.11, Commander's Aviation Training and Standardization Program* make both publications more usable. Both discuss collective training; however, *tactical* expertise is missing from the descriptions of both instructor/standardization pilots and AMSOs. In many ways, Army Aviation has avoided teaching tactics, specifically threat avoidance tactics, because "there has been no one identified to teach them … at best, threat avoidance flight maneuvers are passed through the ranks by aviators with combat experience."[28] This confusion diffuses efforts at creating tactically competent aviators and units. Ironically, TC 3-04.11 advises AMSOs to attend MAWTS-1 or the USAF Weapons School.[29]

The DES could operate as a division of the AAWS responsible for standardization. However, the AAWS would assume responsibility for the tactical evaluation and advanced training. This would include functions similar to MAWTS-1: advanced training, tactical publications, doctrine input, and evaluation of emerging technology, doctrine, or procedures.[30] The AAWS teams, backed by the organizational and doctrinal authority of a weapons school could perform evaluation of Army Aviation units in an aviation-centric way that does not occur at the National Training Center or JRTC. Once established, AAWS cadre could easily link-in with the combat training centers and deployed units.

Joint Interoperability

The only excuse for aviation in any service is its usefulness in assisting the troops on the ground to successfully carry out their missions.

- Alfred Cunningham,
First Director of Marine Corps Aviation

Army Aviation's hesitation toward "jointness" primarily manifests in two areas: terminology and CAS procedures. Granted, the Army should retain control over its aircraft and Army Aviation must be able to "dial-down" to non-technical terms. Nevertheless, we should train with standardized, joint terminology in all operations, particularly weapons employment. Utilizing CAS procedures or operating in joint airspace should not necessitate additional training (though it often does); we should build it into our training from the ground up.[31]

An AAWS could also facilitate Army participation in joint forward air controller-airborne (FAC(A)) and CAS training, procedures that are used by most partner nations. The MAWTS-1 even endorsed an Army FAC(A) program in 2008.[32] As the largest service, with the most aircraft and broadest battlefield presence, Army Aviation is critical to joint operations. Therefore, all services would benefit from an AAWS through cross-training of SMEs.[33] In addition, the AAWS could provide much-needed training for aviators serving as brigade aviation officers (BAO). In most cases, Aviators receive no specific training prior to occupying BAO billets, despite the requirement to coordinate combined arms operations, joint forces integration, and, potentially, work with partner nations.[34]

Winning in a Complex World

There are fundamentally two choices here: trying to spend our way out of fog and friction by building hardware, or training our people to deal with fog and friction when it occurs. Focusing on [the human element] is much more achievable and likely to be more effective than a misplaced faith in developing machines that will magically eliminate uncertainty.[35] – COL Mike Pietrucha

Army Aviation has become phenomenally good at information collection and dissemination using both manned and unmanned aircraft. However, information is only as powerful as the minds we equip to process it. Sensors produce data, well-rounded individuals create understanding.[36] An AAWS could not only prepare our aviators for complex environments, but also provide a place to test concepts, doctrine, and technology. The answer to a complex world is not more systems or technology. We must focus on the people, making our aviators ready for the uncertain, dangerous challenges of the future.

COL Ault succinctly identified Army Aviation's leadership requirements:

"We must grow future leaders that can adapt to an ever changing operational environment and bring exponential combat power to the formations they lead to defeat their adversaries… These types of leaders will not grow themselves."[37]

An AAWS could be a place for disruptive thinkers—Army Aviation's future Robin Olds, HR McMaster, or Dick Cody. The school could act as the test bed for new ideas on doctrine and tactics while also hosting evaluations like the Howze board that created modern Army Aviation. This is a prescription for the contemporary environment, a focus on developing competent, capable aviation leaders - the kind who can operate in a complex world.

Conclusions & Recommendations

As the nation's "utility infielder," the Army "must be prepared to perform a wide range of tasks well. It must be able to transform itself from Retriever to Rottweiler, and back again."[38] The solution to this understanding is not technology, systems, or aircraft; it is to develop a cadre of competent leaders, capable of working through complex problems without perfect information. Education provides the best way to achieve both goals. An AAWS would allow Army aircrews to participate in joint training, improve our doctrinal processes, resolve standardization issues, increase joint interoperability, and prepare Army Aviation to operate in a complex world.

Military theorist and fighter pilot John Boyd advised, "You've got to challenge assumptions. Otherwise, what is doctrine one day becomes dogma forever." The status quo often gives a false sense of comfort; but, "few of us are criticized if we faithfully do what has worked many times before," even if a change is warranted.[39] We cannot allow our force to tout its accomplishment and strive for parochial achievements in "ignorant bliss."[40] Napoleon reminds us "the most prudent measures are almost uniformly the worst that can be adopted. True wisdom consists of energetic determination."[41] Despite Army Aviation's clear successes over the last 15 years, we must not double-down on processes simply because they worked once.

Army Aviation exists to support the point of decision - where boots hit the ground. Consequently, we owe our aviators the best training. Shaking up the Army Aviation Enterprise is the right way to really "re-format the hard drive." In an era when budgets are limited, this may seem like an extravagant expense. However, a better way to put the question is this: Why does the aviation service with the most aircraft, the most forward deployed aviation units, and most intimately involved with close combat not have a school dedicated to developing individual and unit tactical excellence? Furthermore, in a time with fewer CABs, more advanced, but limited aircraft, and forces in near-constant demand, can we afford not to make this investment in our future?

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Acronym Reference

AAWS - Army Aviation Weapons School
AMSO - aviation mission survivability officer
BAO - brigade aviation officers
CAB - combat aviation brigade
CAS - close air support
COIN - counterinsurgency
DES - Directorate of Evaluation and Standardization
DOTD - Directorate of Training and Doctrine
FAC(A) - forward air controller-airborne
JRTC - Joint Readiness Training Center
MAWTS-1 - Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One
SME - subject-matter expert
TC - training circular
TF - task force
TTP - tactics, techniques, and procedures
USAF - U.S. Air Force
USMC - U.S. Marine Corps
WTI - Weapons and Tactics Instructor Course



People Will Be What They Can See: A Case Study in Leadership

1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry, September 1994-September 1996

By LTC Joseph Kopser
and CPT Allen M. Trujillo

Editor's note. This article was published in the October-November 2013 issue of Armor and reprinted with permission. Many of the individuals mentioned in the article have advanced in rank or retired following successful Army careers. General (Ret) Robert W. Cone passed away on September 19, 2016.

Why Should We Study Successful Organizations?

Successful organizations are constantly examining their practices to determine what works. In the process, systems evolve over time and take new shape. In the U.S. Army today, there is renewed effort to examine leader development and assessment to ensure we are choosing the best leaders possible to fit each organization's mission and purpose. As we foresee future reductions in the force, it is more important than ever that we identify and retain our best leaders who have the greatest potential for creating a positive impact on our institution.

To examine the tenets of our organization, the Army began an in-depth analysis of the values of our profession and made this challenge: "As the Army transitions from a decade of war, this is an appropriate time for such a critical self-evaluation, so as to build upon our strength and confront our weaknesses. Such reflection, coupled with decisive action aimed at the professional improvement of the total force, will ensure we will always have an Army prepared to meet any challenge and defeat any foe."[1] It is important to look to our past for examples of best practices.

To create great units and still be good stewards of our resources, we must find and examine successful organizations that build high-quality leaders who go out and build more high-quality units. It is a better return on our investment in both human capital and fiscal capital. After all, "Soldiers are not in the Army. Soldiers are the Army."[2] Therefore, we must examine the long-term impact on our people when assessing successful leaders. We have all read stories of short-term success where a leader pushed his people too hard and caused more long-term harm than good for the organization. As the business world moves to a more responsible lifecycle cost of a resource, so too should leadership assessment. In fact, during a recent survey of more than 40,000 Army professionals, the overwhelming trend among respondents was that the Army needed to "enforce our standards and values, and integrate more Army culture into our unit activities."[3] People want to be part of healthy, productive organizations.

Members of 1st Squadron, 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) from 1994-1996 provide an example of this concept. Since their time together in 1994-1996, the squadron's leadership has remained in the Army at very high rates of retention and has provided a large number of key leaders across the Army. By almost every measure, Tiger Squadron was a successful unit with a command climate that produced a generation of successful leaders throughout the Army. These leaders emerged despite early exposure to some of the worst leadership in the Army at the time.

The authors surveyed 70 former members of the squadron. Among the survey's many insights, one of the most powerful was the impact of good leadership in repairing command climate through leadership by example; developing and mentoring subordinates; and replicating that success repeatedly throughout the Army via its alumni.

Thesis: People Will Be What They Can See

The impact of leaders on a unit and its legacy is as simple as one phrase: People will be what they can see. This phrase actually has several aspects representing different factors that potentially led to the long-term success of Tiger Squadron and the people inside its organization.

Leading by example and role modeling: the leader's traditional role. In the Army profession, role models provide inspiration to their followers, most especially in times of trouble. Over time, an organization's climate reflects the leader, creating great power to affect positive change. Or there can be a dark side of "people will be what they can see" if young and impressionable leaders see their leaders acting in a negative or toxic way and think that is acceptable behavior.

Mentorship and leader development. Long-term mentorship and career counseling allow the subordinate to visualize himself/herself in a certain role in the future, thereby increasing the likelihood of it happening. Laying out a roadmap or career timeline allows a person to set conditions now for future

success. Perhaps the most important question a leader can ask a subordinate is "So, what do you hope to do next?"

Set the conditions to replicate the success: stories, vision and social media. People in successful and healthy command climates are more likely to use the stories and anecdotes in describing to future team members what is possible as they develop their own teams down the road. The often-mentioned "war stories" play an important role as people say, "Do you remember how we used to …?" We should never underestimate the power of a story or anecdote in replicating quality leadership across the Army.

(The preceding factors are discussed in more detail, following.)

Leading by example and role modeling

Toxic leadership: background on Tiger Squadron before Fall 1994. When an organization turns around quickly and moves to top-level performance, it begs an important question. Was it good people or good leadership? Did good people cause the lasting legacy, or was the reason the presence of good leadership?

The story of Tiger Squadron serves as an example where good people were stifled by toxic leadership, then quickly transformed into a high-performing unit with a deliberate change in the overall climate. The plight of Tiger Squadron and its higher headquarters, 3rd ACR, before Fall 1994 was well known throughout the Army. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) not in the unit were being warned away from the unit and encouraged to change their orders.[4] Both the squadron and regimental commanders were known as abusive and self-serving leaders.

By Summer 1994, the climate was at an all-time low. Allegations of misconduct, excessive spending and improper relationships were eating away at the morale of the entire regiment and squadron simultaneously. It was not long before word spread of officers working weekends and briefing the colonel "pool-side" while he enjoyed his Sunday with his family. One officer commented that he learned more about leadership by seeing what not to do than he was able to from positive leadership. Fundamentally, both squadron and regimental commanders had undermined the unit's trust.

A change in leadership in Tiger Squadron. Remarkably, Tiger Squadron's leadership and culture changed in an instant when the regimental and squadron commanders were both relieved. In Fall 1994, the unit was operating with no lieutenant-colonel commander, and people were making plans to transfer out of the organization. Within weeks, the new squadron commander, LTC Robert W. Cone, arrived, and things began to change quickly for the better. In fact, a Tiger Squadron survey found that more than 85 percent of the respondents strongly agreed that Cone's positive leadership style led to a rapid turn-around in the unit. He seemed to genuinely be having

fun as a leader while building valuable relationships and making loyal followers of almost everyone in the command.[5]

Looking back at Tiger Squadron's success, three trends emerge and are supported by survey results. First, Cone led by example and demonstrated firsthand how to effectively train a unit. Second, Cone invested time in the leader development and mentorship of young officers, restoring their trust in the Army profession. Finally, he set the conditions for future success by constant storytelling that inspired the next generation of stories and anecdotes used by those who followed. He reinforced the importance of having fun and sticking together as a team. These three changes created the conditions that cemented a legacy of quality leaders who would go on to lead our Army through some great challenges.

Leading by example: training, recognition and socializing

Cone wasted no time after taking command to improve the climate. He led by example in three major areas: effective training, Soldier recognition and focus on "work hard, play hard." To do so, he used the unit's wartime mission as a vehicle to focus the squadron in a positive direction. Cone used the concept of group buy-in. He organized his subordinate leaders to cultivate a unified idea of the most important principles to use as a guiding force within the unit.

Soon after taking command, Cone organized a training conference to learn his leadership's perceived strengths and weaknesses. More importantly, he was there to gain buy-in from all members of the team. Cone asked his leaders to develop their own ideas of what key elements it would take to become a successful organization and compiled the most important tasks into what Cone called the "Big 5," a list of the top five training objectives that defined Tiger Squadron. This list of training objectives became the simple rules that described Tiger Squadron's vision. As the unit began to unify around these key ideas, they strived for the highest levels of excellence in everything they did, creating a high esprit de corps, which in short is "honor and pride for your unit."[6]

The training climate he created welcomed honest mistakes as a sign the organization was learning. In fact, it created confidence among young leaders that they could make honest mistakes (once) in a protected environment. As stated by LTC Jason Wolter (now a battalion commander himself), "We worked harder to not let LTC Cone down, and we worked hard to show constant improvement."[7] Tiger Squadron was constantly evolving and learning. Most of the unit members took that passion for development with them to their next assignments, extending that influence throughout the Army.

Another critical factor in the rapid improvement of Tiger Squadron's command climate was the emphasis on individual/team recognition and unit ceremony. Subordinates saw events as recognizing their value and contributions. Tiger Squadron did not fail to recognize its subordinates, and as a result, more than 95 percent of survey respondents agreed that "ceremonies mattered."[8] One respondent mentioned that "[Tiger Squadron placed a] great emphasis [on] ceremonies and traditions, [overall unit] esprit de corps," while another stated that ceremonies "reaffirmed our success. It was a way to let us know that we were accepted and doing the right thing."

The combination of promoting esprit de corps and recognizing excellence is essential to an organization's long-term success. People also enjoy the ceremony and social side of organizations because it links them to their predecessors. It is a kind of rites of passage and tradition that gives a larger sense of community.

Finally, in restoring a healthy and positive command climate, Cone did more than just focus on the unit's wartime mission. He took deliberate steps to restore the organization's social aspects. Recognizing that trust is stronger among friends than just coworkers, Cone never missed an opportunity to build connections among his team.

To foster those connections, however, requires a sincere interest in other members of the team. There are few ways to better foster a connection among a team than to socialize together as entire families. In restoring the climate, Cone worked hard to bring his leaders together outside the context of the strictly work environment. It is not only the moments that include just the adults around a keg of beer but the Saturday picnics, weddings or children's birthdays that begin to build those bonds. It's best described as "friends at work make work more friendly."

That was certainly true for Tiger Squadron. The parties and socials did something far more important than allow people to see each other. It brought together junior and senior officers and their spouses for conversations that ranged from the Army profession to the best brands of baby formula. Those exchanges were important on so many levels. Mostly, because when families know and respect each other, it is easier to get them to spend time together. The more they are together, the more they talk. The more they talk, the more they share ideas. The more they share ideas, the better the unit becomes and the richer their lives become. Something as simple as a chili cook-off hosted at the squadron commander's house was cited more times than any other single event as a defining moment in the unit's culture.[9] Never underestimate the potential of hosting a party at your house.

When asked, 100 percent of the survey respondents agreed that Tiger Squadron created a culture where it was as "important to play hard as it was to work hard." This critical component of leader involvement shows us that in extremely successful organizations, leaders go above and beyond in showing their subordinates

that having fun together is just as important as being successful together.[10]

Mentorship and leader development

Active and involved mentorship. One of the most important aspects of the Tiger Squadron renaissance between 1994-96 was Cone's career advice and coaching. His investment in his junior officers and NCOs provided an example for them to follow later in their careers – people matter.

Cone would often tell stories about his own development as a young officer growing up in the early 1980s. He would cite the influence of senior leaders (generals such as Eric Shinseki, Scott Wallace and "Doc" Bahnsen, to name just a few) who helped shape his style, personality and focus on training. In many ways, everyone under his command felt that connection to their "ancestors."[11] Squadron members began to visualize their own future in the long-term. Just as Cone had grown over the last 20 years, they could too if they maintained a long-term view of their lives and careers.

LTC Brian Byers described why Cone invested so much time in the mentorship and career development of his junior officers. He stated that Cone was "focused on building teams at the lowest level." Cone wanted the unit to know that the Army was a good place to work with good ideals and that it had been good to him. He didn't want them to walk away from an organization that had treated him so well and for them to not be jaded by their prior experience in the unit.[12]

Empowering subordinates. A significant aspect of Cone's unification and success within Tiger Squadron was his ability to empower his subordinate leaders as well as his unique ability to work beside them rather than over them. Cone took personal interest three levels down in the organizational hierarchy. He became a transformational leader, giving his subordinates both the ability to be leaders themselves as well as inspiring them to excel.

Another member of the unit, LTC Chip Daniels, who also went on to successful battalion command, stated, "Cone empowered his [junior officers] because he trusted us. This made me feel like my opinion and decisions were valuable to the Tiger Squadron team. He demonstrated this trust by allowing [us] to develop our own training plans, and even gave us full days to maneuver our [unit during training]. I know that a young [24-year-old second lieutenant] probably lacks the experience to fully maximize that opportunity. There was likely some short-term waste that could have been prevented if more senior officers had strictly managed what I did with that time, fuel and other resources. However, that opportunity fostered a sense of responsibility and ownership in me. I wanted to use the time to [train my team to accomplish our goal]. That is what we did. In short, there was a short-term cost in terms of fuel, time, etc., but the long-term gain in leadership development was vastly more important and enduring."

Within Tiger Squadron, evidence shows that Cone focused on allowing his subordinates the opportunity to exercise creativity and initiative in accomplishing their tasks. In the authors' survey, more than 80 percent of the respondents stated that leaders in Tiger Squadron did not micromanage their subordinates.[13] Furthermore, a remarkable 100 percent believed that subordinates were allowed the opportunity to learn from their mistakes. One respondent mentioned that "leaders were given a task and the freedom to execute within the commander's intent," and another mentioned, "I was allowed a lot of freedom to explore different ideas and implement several programs to try to increase readiness throughout the squadron."[14]

Cementing the Legacy: The Power of Stories

Restoring the command climate (both on and off duty). As Cone was restoring the unit's trust in senior leadership, it also helped considerably that he took time to explain in broad ways how the unit fit into the context of the much larger mosaic of the professional Army. It felt like he was letting them in on a secret. It was one thing to do just the job, but when he explained where the unit fit into the larger picture, it gave its members a much clearer sense of purpose. It allowed them to connect the dots in their understanding and career development (which later reinforced his points in the mentorship he provided). But more importantly, as he developed this learning organization – as Cone shared with unit members the much larger issues – it went a long way to create a sense among junior officers that they were "part of the club."[15] What he was really doing was instilling a connection to the Army profession in everyone.

Staying connected through social media. Part of the long-term success of the unit over time was the power of social media. Social media and today's technology makes it even easier for high-performing units to stay in touch and share news

of family, promotions, struggles and success. Email, mailing lists and Facebook aid not only Soldiers to stay in touch, but also their family members. In fact, when spouses stay in touch, this might be one of the most powerful connective forces of all. That allows two sets of eyes and ears to remain connected.

By leveraging the power of email distribution lists, Facebook and holiday-card mailing lists, the friends and families of Tiger Squadron stayed in touch. Almost two decades later, most officers and NCOs the authors interviewed commented that they routinely stay in touch with the people of Tiger Squadron. Even more impressive to see are the examples of Tiger Squadron alumni reaching back to start helping the children of their friends as they enter college, military service or their own careers.

This connection and network of former colleagues was able to stay better connected to help each other. In some cases, it was a simple case of sharing written products or example copies of standard policy letters. In other cases, it was a friend in another command or another country looking into a matter personally. Regardless of the context, it was through bonds and trust created in the beginning and then fostered through social media that kept the Tiger Squadron family together. Later, all those connections translated into career and professional functions that contributed to a healthier institution.

The stories we tell our teams now. In addition to keeping friends and family connected, the stories and visuals of Tiger Squadron continue to influence and improve our Army decades later. One of the most interesting findings from conducting the Tiger Squadron survey was the influence of the experiences from Tiger Squadron on its members. All the respondents said they use Tiger Squadron "as a teaching point" and believe this was "one of the most memorable times" of their Army career. The climate in Tiger Squadron helped define its members and created a sense that they "wanted to emulate its characteristics" everywhere they served. Leaders in Tiger Squadron routinely cited examples they saw in those two years that still influence them 17 years later.

Even more impressively, these future leaders took those very same lessons and are applying them throughout the Army today. Wolter, a former platoon leader in Tiger Squadron, said he used Cone's command philosophy (originally written in 1994) in 2012 when he wrote his own command philosophy.[16]

Conclusions and recommendations

Prior to Cone's arrival, Tiger Squadron was under the control of an underperforming leader. It was not until Cone arrived and changed the culture within Tiger Squadron that its members received a chance to realize their full potential. Because of his work, the people of Tiger Squadron were able to "see what they could be." What they became is impressive.

Now a four-star general and commanding general of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), Cone came from their ranks. Sergeant Major of the Army Ray Chandler, a former command sergeant major in TRADOC; retired CSM John Sparks; and general officers Robert Abrams and Paul Funk also came from their ranks. Other notables include a brigade commander, Scott Efflandt; a growing list of more than a dozen battalion commanders; five division G-3s; six special assistants to four-star generals; and a large list of sergeants major. Clearly, there was more than just a lucky convergence of quality people in the squadron.

This transition in leadership highlights the importance of the presence of a high-performing mentor in determining if in fact a good unit will produce good leaders. Cone appears to be just as responsible as Tiger Squadron itself in explaining the organization's success. Similarly, Cone was successful as a commander because of the exceptional personnel already present before he arrived. The highly selective nature of Tiger Squadron set conditions for leaders to excel. When analyzing both facts simultaneously, one can begin to discern the importance of both factors in the squadron's success.

When we asked survey respondents to name the most influential person in Tiger Squadron, as expected, a large majority specifically mentioned Cone and several members of his leadership team. However, one respondent stated that the most influential person was "[the regimental commander who was relieved due to the poor command climate]. The lifecycle pattern of [Tiger Squadron] then was very similar to E/1-506th in World War II. When Dick Winters was asked at the U.S. Military Academy in 1999 why Easy Company was so cohesive, he responded immediately with 'Captain Sobel.' The previous dysfunctional climate set the conditions that allowed exceptional leaders to excel."[17]

When looking at the success of a great leader in a great unit, one cannot forget the circumstances that surrounded their existence. For Tiger Squadron, the failures of the previous commanders set the stage for great changes to follow. In an email to a former Tiger Squadron troop executive officer in 2009, Cone acknowledged that had the previous commander not been removed in the dramatic fashion surrounding his departure, Cone would have inherited a "cancerous unit" and the chances of success would have significantly decreased. Cone himself realized the importance of this circumstance in his eventual success.[18]

Following situations of great organizational turmoil, it requires positive leadership to step in and set a new direction. Tiger Squadron's highlights from 1994-1996 are examples of the potential of such change. Through a focus on leading by example, powering down to subordinates, investing in leader development and then cementing those changes through fun and positive social experiences, great things can occur for the long-term health of an organization.

LTC (Ret) Joseph Kopser is a technology entrepreneur, thought leader in Smart Cities innovation, and the President of Grayline. Prior to starting a transportation software company in 2013, he served in the U.S. Army for 20 years earning the Combat Action Badge, Army Ranger Tab, and Bronze Star. Mr. Kopser is a graduate of West Point and has a Bachelor's of Science in Aerospace Engineering and a Masters Degree from the Harvard Kennedy School. In his free time, he works closely with The Bunker Austin, an organization dedicated to supporting veteran entrepreneurs. In addition, he volunteers as Chairman of National Security Technology Accelerator (NSTXL) working to improve U.S. Energy Security policy.

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[1] TRADOC annual report, "U.S. Army: Army Profession Campaign" April 2, 2012, http://cape.army.mil/repository/CY11ArmyProfessionAnnualReport.pdf.
[2] Creighton Abrams, quoted in A Better War by Lewis Sorley, Harcourt, Inc., 1999.
[3] TRADOC annual report.
[4] The author was in Germany on vacation in June 1993 a year before arriving and was warned by a sergeant in line at the airport not to go to the 3rd ACR, that the climate was terrible.
[5] Kopser, Joseph, and Allen Trujillo, Tiger Squadron unit survey conducted March 22-Aug. 1, 2012.
[6] Interview with LTC Doug Boltuc April 20, 2012.
[7] Interview with LTC Jason Wolter, April 20, 2012.
[8] Kopser and Trujillo.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Allen Trujillo, Kiara Ward, Leena Vazirani, Laura Rodriguez and Matt Brown, "Tiger Squadron, 3rd ACR – Team KALLM" research paper, April 30, 2012.
[11] Essay of comments about Tiger Squadron by LTC Chip Daniels, Jan. 6, 2012.
[12] Interview with LTC Brian Byers, April 27, 2012.
[13] Kopser and Trujillo.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Daniels.
[16] Interview with Wolter.
[17] **Editor's note:** CPT Herbert M. Sobel commanded Company E for the unit's basic training at Camp Toccoa, GA. A strict disciplinarian, he earned the hatred of many of his men. However, many of the company's veterans also credited the intense training he gave them with creating the finest company in 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment. Sobel was negatively portrayed as inept in the television series Band of Brothers, a television miniseries focusing on MAJ Richard Winters' experiences. Winters was one of the officers to succeed Sobel in command of Company E.
[18] Interview with LTC Michael Donahue, March 2012.

Acronym Reference

ACR - armored cavalry regiment
NCO - noncommissioned officer
TRADOC - Training and Doctrine Command

TURNING PAGES

~ book reviews of interest to the aviation professional

Selling War:

A Critical Look at the Military's PR Machine.

By Steven J. Alvarez. Lincoln: Potomac Books, an imprint of the University of Nebraska Press, 2016. 345 pp
Available in hardcover and Kindle formats.

A book review by COL John O. Payne

Through his provoking text, Steven J. Alvarez delivers exactly what the title implies "a critical look at public relations in the United States Military." Drawing from his experience as a public affairs officer during a 2004 deployment to Iraq, Steven Alvarez describes his personal and professional situation from varying perspectives, but primarily his own. In the preface to his tome, Alvarez sums up the wide-ranging scope of his book best, "this book is part memoir, part public relations handbook, part after-action review, part white paper, part catharsis, and a firsthand account of my yearlong mobilization to support Operation Iraqi Freedom as an Army public affairs officer and as the first Chief of Public Affairs for Multinational Security Transition Command Iraq." The central thesis of the book centers on the regrettable fact that public affairs in the American military is primarily a source of simple information. Alvarez alleges this is improvident. Drawing on his civilian background in public relations, Alvarez argues throughout the book that public affairs, and public affairs officers, would better serve the military as a dynamic strategic tool to influence the attitude of the local populace, the greater region, and the taxpayers back home.



Alvarez's primary criticism of the public affairs machine in Iraq is that it made no effort to communicate with the local populace through the local media. In doing so, the United States military clearly lost the information war. Though, Alvarez argues, through their actions or inactions, they did more than lose. Through deliberate inaction the American public affairs machine surrendered the dialogue to the enemy. In doing so, this inaction fed the insurgency. The U.S. Government took no opportunity to address collateral damage, reconstruction inaction, and the overall presence of the American military. The mission was further sacrificed through the lack of desire to describe the effect of the insurgency on the retraining mission or support to local civil authorities.

In support of his argument, Alvarez draws on his relationship with then LTG David H. Petraeus. Alvarez describes the potential of the link between strategic counterinsurgency and a clear public relations message delivered through the local media. He states the command should have spent more time aggressively managing information rather than reacting to it. General Petraeus is famous for describing counterinsurgency as "the corporal's war." In other words, the Soldier on the street has more impact on the outcome than the general outlining strategy. Alvarez argues, the same is true for the media—especially in an environment like Iraq.

The book is extremely well written and easy to read. For any Soldier who has spent time in a foreign nation during a conflict, Alvarez does a good job of combining the right mix of "tugging your heartstrings" on the personal side of a deployment with a recognizable "sense of duty" to his own personal assignment and the overall mission. He renews this theme throughout the book clearly displaying the "catharsis" he warned the reader of in the preface. I do not mention this as a criticism of the book, Alvarez' personal perspective adds significantly to the readability of the book. However, constantly returning to this theme may be distracting to a reader who from the title expected a deeper dive into the overall public affairs aspect of the varying command structures in Iraq. To his credit, Alvarez "stayed in his lane" through maintaining the scope of the book within his personal experience. And, although the book does not stray to a broader overall picture of the lack of strategic influence of the public affairs mission in Iraq, Alvarez does outline through his personal background in public relations the potential for public affairs in the military.

Alvarez's book should be included as a "must read" for young officers and senior leaders alike. Public affairs officers are usually only found in the Army at brigade levels and above. Typically, a Soldier's only interaction with a public affairs team is as the subject of an article. For a junior officer, "Selling War" is an outstanding introduction to the greater public affairs mission in the military. For senior leaders, Alvarez definitely provides thought provoking insight into the current role public affairs plays within a command. And, Alvarez delivers a compelling argument for the possibility of the role the public affairs officer should play in the strategic outreach of the military mission.

Aviation Digest 2016 Article Of The Year

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This year, the Aviation Digest, Annual Writing Award for 2016 was awarded to MAJ Tom McCarthy for his contribution in penning "Aviation Reconnaissance Battalion Support to the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons," published in Volume 4/Issue 4 (October - December, 2016, pg. 16). Read it online by clicking the image to the right, or read the whole issue at: http://www.rucker.army.mil/aviationdigest/images/AVN_DIG_2016_10-12.pdf

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Does the article have a purpose?

- Has the author identified an issue within the Aviation branch requiring command attention/action to improve existing procedures or operations?
- Has the author recommended revised TTP for commonly accepted operational practices that simplify and increase efficiencies?
- Has the author presented an article that improves audience knowledge of doctrine or other established operational procedures?
- Has the author related an experience that others may benefit professionally or potentially prevent an aircraft accident?

Does the author present researched, factual information to support the article?

- Has the Author recommended a realistic solution to remedy or improve those conditions causing a perceived deficiency?
- Has the author presented a discussion based on facts and not suppositions, generalizations, or vague innuendoes?

Does the author present his article as an organized discussion – introduction to the issue, background information, and meaningful presentation of discussion points, summary, conclusion?

- Was the article easy to read and follow the discussion points?
- Did you understand the author's message?

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Field Marshal Viscount Slim of Burma in the foreword to the first edition of the British Army Journal, later renamed British Army Review.

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