

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UNITED STATES ARMY
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LEADERSHIP

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About the Cover:

A U.S. Army Soldier with 3rd Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB), 1st Aviation Regiment, 1st Combat Aviation Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, runs to his helicopter during a combined air assault exercise at Babadag Training Area, Romania, February 28, 2019. The 3-1 AHB recently began a rotation in Romania to support Atlantic Resolve, a joint NATO commitment to build readiness and enhance the bond between ally and partner nations through multinational training. U.S. Army photo by SPC William Dickinson

The Command Corner

Army Aviation–A Committed Force

When I say that Army aviation is committed, it really means two things. First, at any given time, we are physically committed around the globe, to the tune of 83 % of Army aviation. This means that at any given time, 83 % of our force is either deployed, just returning from deployment, or getting ready for deployment. And while this level of commitment does not provide us with all the flexibility we would like to have, this demand for Army aviation is a direct result of the continued success we have had over the last 17 years of conducting air-ground operations as an integral member of the Combined Arms Team with our Soldiers, Joint Forces, and allies.

At the heart of the Combined Arms Team is maneuver–the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy. Make no mistake; as an asymmetric component of the maneuver force that provides both movement and fires, we are also 100 % committed to providing ground commanders what they need to execute successful operations. Our ability to execute maneuver that presents multiple dilemmas to our enemy, exploits the initiative, and achieves that position advantage on the battlefield, has become the hallmark of how our Army fights.

Our aviation missions revolve around seven core competencies the Army has established for us: provide accurate and timely combat information; provide reaction time and maneuver space; destroy, defeat, or disrupt enemy forces; air assault ground maneuver forces; air movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; evacuate wounded or recover isolated personnel; and enable mission command over extended ranges and complex terrain.

These seven core competencies have not changed significantly over the past 30 years, regardless of whether we conduct operations that are offensive, defensive, stability, or Direct Support to Civil Authorities, and these competencies are not likely to change as we modernize and transition the concept of Multi Domain Operations (MDO) into doctrine. What will change is how we develop, integrate, and apply those core capabilities as an integral part of the Combined Arms Team.

As we modernize, the challenge we face for our Combined Arms Teams across the Army is the synchronization of all the key systems and platforms, internal and external to our branch. In order to execute MDO, especially to conduct penetration, disintegration, and exploitation against the anti-access/area denial systems of near-peer enemies, we must be able to shoot, move, and communicate over extended distances against peer threats. This applies not only across the Army systems but across the Joint Force as well.

With these changes will come turbulence; however, it also brings the opportunity to excel. As is always the case when we bring on new systems, we will look for opportunities and processes that benefit our committed force and search for ways to engineer more flexibility into our formations. But there is no doubt that whatever the changes may bring, Army aviation will remain a force 100 % committed to the commanders and Soldiers on the ground. A force that will work hand-in-hand with all the other elements of the Combined Arms Team to ensure we modernize in step so that air-ground operations will not miss a beat or a target…

Above the Best!

David J. Francis
Major General, USA
Commanding

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U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Pierre-Etienne Courtejoie

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Authoritarian Leadership Over the Skies of Midway

By CW5 Christopher J. Braund

Lessons in history, like leadership, come in many forms. While we tend to concentrate on Army leaders and their traits to bring forward lessons, aviators can, and should, look at any example of leadership as our piece of the multi-domain battlefield is unique. This is a short study on authoritarian leadership and its disastrous results over the skies of Midway, June 4, 1942.

During one of the most pivotal battles of World War II, the Battle of Midway, one man demonstrated the disastrous effects of authoritarian leadership. As commander of the USS *Hornet's* Air Group Eight, Commander Stanhope Cotton Ring exemplified an authoritarian command style. In doing so, his actions directly contributed to the loss of all but one member of Torpedo Squadron Eight assigned to the *Hornet* and the combat ineffectiveness of the *Hornet* Air Group during the Battle of Midway.

A photograph of Commander Stanhope Cotton Ring. Photo credited to "Pilots and Propwash" blog

Stanhope Cotton Ring was a 1923 graduate of the United States Naval Academy. Throughout his early career, Ring maintained the "picture of the ideal naval officer" (Symonds, 2011, p. 247). Yet, this moniker only referred to his mannerisms; not his leadership ability. While he projected the perfect officer persona, his leadership seemed lacking, at best. Prior to the Battle of Midway, even before the onset of America's entry into the war, Ring established a reputation of leading by "authority rather than example" that made the pilots who served under him seethe with resentment (Symonds, 2011, p. 247). However, Ring impressed high-ranking officers, thus allowing him to move up the naval rank structure.

When Ring received command of the *Hornet* Air Group, his commanding officer, Captain Mark Mitscher, could be none the happier; however, the entire air wing had doubts of Ring's airmanship and even doubted his aerial navigation skills, leading to alarming questions about Ring's effectiveness as a combat leader (Wilson, 2006, p. 127). These questions even promoted some in the air wing to discuss the prospect of shooting him down before his arrogance and incompetence cost the lives of air wing pilots (Mrazek, 2008, p. 20). A rather prophetic thought!

The apex of Ring's leadership style came to fruition during the Battle of Midway. The *Hornet* air wing was comprised of four squadrons and made from three different airframes.[1] Each squadron had a lieutenant commander in charge, thus putting them one rank below Ring, a commander. On the morning of June 4, 1942, the Japanese fleet had been spotted by American forces, and the United States carrier forces were about to strike. Ring called all of his squadron commanders together for an impromptu planning session.

[1] It is worth noting that all of the planes, F4F-4 *Wildcat*, SBD-3 *Dauntless*, and TBD-1 *Devastator*, going against the Japanese on June 4 were older obsolete planes developed in the interwar years. They were inferior to the Japanese planes.

Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, Commander of Torpedo Squadron Eight. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute

The intelligence known at the time showed the current position, course, and speed of the Japanese fleet relative to the American fleet. Once all commanders assembled, Ring laid out his plan and flight route. All, especially Lieutenant Commander John Waldron, commander of Torpedo Squadron Eight, spoke out against the plan and route. Ring had plotted a course that every other squadron commander agreed was not based on the information provided and would not allow the air wing to intercept the Japanese fleet. The disagreement escalated to the point that Ring ordered the squadron commanders to follow his flight route. When the order did not end the argument, Captain Mitscher sided with his air wing commander and seconded the order to follow Ring (Mrazek, 2009, p. 113). In addition to the course argument, an additional argument erupted when Waldron requested fighter aircraft support for his lumbering TBD-1

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Devastator torpedo-bomber planes. His argument centered on the vulnerability of the aircraft, as it had to fly low to the water and was extremely slow to drop its payload. However, Ring ordered all fighters to cover the dive-bombers based on the dive-bomber to torpedo-bomber ratio. Ring would hear no argument on his logic for the fighter coverage and would not yield on his position.

Like good officers, even as bitter as they were, all the commanders left and manned their planes. The flight took off and the aircrews headed to their destinies on the debated westerly course. The dive-bomber and fighter planes flew at 20,000 feet, while Waldron and the torpedo-bombers flew unprotected at 1000 feet. However, Waldron was not going to go quietly. He was a determined fighter and wanted to hit the enemy at all costs. He believed the flight, numbering over 50 aircraft, was on the wrong track, still. Waldron called Ring on the radio to protest the route. Ring simply put it, "I'm leading this fight…you fly on us" (Symonds, 2011, p. 260). Waldron did not; he broke off his formation in the direction he believed the Japanese to be, based on the last given intelligence reports. He was right; Ring was wrong.

Shortly after 0900, Waldron and the 14 other crews of *Hornet's* Torpedo Squadron Eight found the Japanese fleet. With that, and because of Ring's uncompromising demeanor, Waldron and his squadron attacked the Japanese fleet without any cover at all. The brave charge from Torpedo Squadron Eight yielded no hits on the Japanese fleet and resulted in the loss of all of Torpedo Squadron Eight's aircraft and the death of 29 pilots and aircrew. All the while, Ring continued to lead the remainder of *Hornet's* air group on a "flight to nowhere."[2] In addition to losing Waldron's squadron, Ring's blunder



Map depicting flight route of *Hornet's* air wing given in the officer after-action report. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Naval Institute via the National Archives

caused the battle to be played out without the help of the remainder of *Hornet's* carrier air wing.

Ring continued on his course, even after it became obvious it was the wrong heading. Pride forced Ring to press on, even after every aircraft began to run low on fuel, turned back, and returned to the *Hornet*. Because of Ring, the *Hornet's* air wing, other than the ill-fated torpedo-bombers, never dropped a single bomber nor spent one bullet from their machine guns. He effectively erased the capability of one carrier when there were only three American carriers on hand.

Because the battle turned out as a victory for the Americans, Ring's actions never made it into the officer after-action report of the battle. No mention of the flight, the argument before the flight, or the confrontation between Ring and Waldron on the radio made it into official papers (Taylor, 1954, p. 138). Ring did not receive any disciplinary actions, and in a sad twist of fate he received an award for his part in the battle. His leadership, or lack of it in many ways, doomed Waldron and his men and erased an entire carrier air wing from the battle.

So what can we, as leaders, learn from this? There are a lot of obvious points laid out: from how Ring addresses his subordinates during the battle to his leadership traits prior to the battle. As Army leaders, we can scoff at this example and say it is outlandish or, "I will never lead like that." However, if examples like this did not exist historically and presently, why would the Army (and the military for that matter) invest so much time in developing its leaders? It is a simple matter of studying our past to avoid future mistakes or simplistically put, "What not to do!" Yes, the old cliché is correct; our past guides us. Driving it home further is a quote by former Secretary of Defense, James Mattis, in a 2003 email to a colleague that states, "It doesn't give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path…" (Ingersoll, 2013).

The application of history to doctrine for us is our own Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, "Army Leadership," (Department of the Army, 2012) and by glancing at the section titles such as "Applying Influence," "Situational Leadership," "Leader Attributes," and "Leader Competencies," and drawing a direct correlation from history to doctrine. Yet, the section that stands out more than others is when it

[2] Commander Ring's flight earned this term from the entire historical community when he failed to listen to any of his subordinates and flew the *Hornet's* air wing in the wrong direction, never contacting the enemy.

Torpedo Squadron Eight Pilots. The circle is around the only surviving pilot (Ensign George H. Gay, Jr.) from the 30 pilots and aircrew of *Hornet's* torpedo-bomber squadron. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Naval History and Heritage Center

comes to the application of history, the aforementioned story, and doctrine is "Command and Leadership."

Commanders in my past have often mentioned that command is a privilege, echoing the words in Army Regulation 600-20, "Army Command Policy" (Department of the Army, 2014), and the ones who truly believed in that thrived. Command gives leaders a lawful authority over subordinates, but it also places responsibilities on their shoulders. It places the responsibility "…for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel" (Department of the Army, 2012). Leaders, regardless of command or position, need to have the best interests of those below them at heart. If one of the responsibilities of command leadership is to develop "…disciplined and cohesive units" and to "…demonstrate genuine concern…" to build a "…positive command climate" then Commander Ring's actions at the Battle of Midway, his leadership in the air, and his authoritarian attitude is a classic example of "What not to do!" (Department of the Army, 2014, p. 2). Again, perfectly put by Mattis, "We have been fighting on this planet for 5000 years and we should take advantage of their experience. 'Winging it' and filling body bags as we sort out what works reminds us of the moral dictates and the cost competence in our profession" (Ingersoll, 2013). Leadership can and should learn from history.

CW5 Christopher J. Braund is a 19 year Army Aviator and currently serves as an Instructor of Military History at the United States Army Warrant Officer Career College. CW5 Braund holds a Masters and Bachelors in History.

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

CRAFTING A UNIT TRAINING PLAN FOR AVIATION HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY:

CHOOSING THE CORRECT TASKS TO TRAIN

It's April 2018, and a warm, spring day at Fort Polk, Louisiana. I've been in command of headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) a few months, and I've discovered that HHC is a strange beast. No experience I had as a platoon leader or on staff correlated into useful experience for an HHC command. I have never been "in the box" before and yet, I'm about to lead the battalion (BN) quartering party "into the box."

photo by SSG Brad Mincey, South Carolina National Guard Public Affairs

BY CPT OLIN H. KENNEDY

In my rucksack, I've brought all of the Training and Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs) from my mission-essential task list (METL) and supporting collective tasks (SCTs). I pulled out the T&EO for "Occupy an Assembly Area" to use as a checklist for what I had in my plan. I found that many aspects of the T&EO were either not applicable or not addressed adequately in my plan or the BN plan, especially aspects of the security plan. These deficiencies started an error chain eventually leading to the main command post (CP) along with half of the headquarters company, including all the field grades, being killed in action a few days later. We were taken out by a few measly squads of enemy special purpose forces. This took our BN out of the fight for some time. In an actual battle, nobody would have come back from the dead, and I took this failure very seriously. Protection wasn't our only problem at this joint readiness training center (JRTC) rotation. We also ran into sustainment problems where we ran out of food for a short period of time and were rationing water. What went wrong, and how could the company and I have done better?

After the JRTC rotation, I was reading the summer 2018 edition of Aviation Digest. In their article, "Force Protection and the Aviation Task Force," CPT Daniel Liebetreau and MSG Edward Keopuhiwa posit that, "...the [aviation] branch must adapt across all six warfighting functions" (Liebetreau & Keopuhiwa, 2018). While the article is principally about the protection warfighting function, it inspired me to conduct a renewed METL analysis through the lens of the six warfighting functions: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection (Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, section 4-19, pg. 4-3, 2017).

I reflected on the company's performance at the JRTC, and the training leading up to the rotation. The question I sought to answer is how could I have trained my unit better for the rotation? Did we prioritize the right tasks to be trained, and

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how did we measure performance? Did we measure performance using the correct standard?

For my METL analysis, I started with the mission-essential tasks (METs) and SCTs. I read through each T&EO and compiled a list of all prerequisite collective tasks and SCTs. Then, I repeated the process on the new collective tasks that I'd uncovered. This allowed me to build a comprehensive list of every collective task that I might be asked to perform and analyze by warfighting function where the training gaps were. What does my company do, and do the T&EOs capture this?

By conducting an exhaustive METL analysis and evaluating the list of collective tasks by warfighting function, I concluded that the Department of the Army (DA)-approved METL is not an adequate yardstick by which to measure readiness across all of the warfighting functions for a headquarters company, particularly in the protection and mission command warfighting function. With the exception of the fires warfighting function, every other warfighting function had gaps where key HHC capabilities were not captured in the T&EOs at either the BN or company level. Given the gap between the current DA METL for HHCs and what HHCs can be expected to do in a near-peer environment, I decided that I needed to build a Unit Training Plan (UTP) to cover this gap.

How do you develop a UTP? Per FM 7-0, "Train to Win in a Complex World" (2016), developing a UTP follows the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) steps. A simpler way to look at the analysis is this: Why does your unit exist? How does your unit accomplish this purpose? Is there an understanding of the templated operational environment (OE) in which enemy your unit will be fighting against? Do you need to develop a non-modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE)-specified capability because of the templated operating environment? As you find clarity by answering these questions, you've essentially completed the mission analysis portion of UTP development. From there, you conduct course of action (COA) development by choosing the T&EOs that both represent your unit's purpose on the battlefield and informed by your mission analysis. Lastly, COA approval comes in the form of a commander's dialogue.

The first thing I learned while conducting the analysis for the METL crosswalk and subsequent UTP development is that task selection and the detail in the T&EOs are important. As the Army moves toward Objective T, selecting the most correct and applicable T&EOs will become vitally important to training correctly. This is because selecting the correct task with the correct T&EO represents what we are training and how we are measuring readiness as commanders. For example, you wouldn't want to use a T&EO where half of the performance measures are "N/A or Not Applicable," because they are outside of the designed capability of the unit. This would suggest that the T&EO is not a good fit to the unit's actual mission. So during the UTP development process, it is important to identify tasks that fit the unit's capabilities and mission better and then develop a training plan around those.

This lesson is key because it informed all decisions made when I was building the UTP in the COA development process. My process for building the UTP was to start with the DA METL tasks, evaluate the gap between DA METL and what I believed my company needed to train, and then find the best T&EO possible to cover that gap. With the correct T&EOs, it then becomes possible to plan and shape training events in the future, and measure your unit's success correctly.

Considering the mission command warfighting functions, the corresponding HHC MET is "Operate a Command Post-Company" (07-CO-5135). From a top-level perspective, this is not the correct MET for an HHC to focus on because the key capability that an HHC provides is the BN CP and other command nodes (e.g., administrative and logistics center, tactical CP, etc.). The question I couldn't answer with this MET was why was the HHC CP con-

Soldiers from Bravo Company, 1-214th GSAB, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, executed a training exercise at Oberdachstetten Local Training Area, Jan. 30, 2018. The training event is aimed to provide added versatility to refueling operations for both aviation and ground units operating in and around global operations. It provides the CAB the ability to place a Forward Area Refueling Points anywhere on the battlefield with a suitable landing zone. The capability can extend the reach of any aviation mission. The FATCOW training validates the METL tasks performed during Forward Arming and Refueling at the platoon level. U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Georgios Moumoulidis, TSC Ansbach

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sidered essential to the BN fight? If we focus on what an HHC provides to the attack reconnaissance battalion (ARB), then we must select better tasks and T&EOs to measure ourselves against.

Luckily, in the Digital Training Management System (DTMS),[1] it is relatively easy to find and select different tasks to incorporate into a local UTP. In DTMS, you can search tasks based upon keywords, and then select the best task/T&EO for what is important. In this case, there is a "Conduct Command Post Operations for Battalions" (71-BN-5200) that better reflects what the HHC provides to the BN and how we should train/measure our ability to provide this capability. This T&EO went into the UTP that I developed.

Another reason we must select better tasks/T&EOs is that the tasks provided by Headquarters, DA, are not adequate to aviation HHCs or compatible with aviation doctrine. For example, the "Operate a Company Command Post" task is based upon maneuver doctrine. The doctrinal reference in the T&EO is Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-90.1, "Armor and Mechanized Infantry Company Team" (DA, 2016) and Field Manual (FM) 3-21.10, "The Infantry Rifle Company" (DA, 2006). The ensuing task list embedded in the T&EO then stems from this doctrine. Because the task stems from doctrine that does not apply to an aviation HHC, many of the tasks listed exceed the capabilities of an HHC to execute. I call this "task misfit." For instance, the "Operate a Command Post–Company" task lists out the troop leading procedures, but setting up a BN CP is always a BN mission as part of a BN assembly area. It is outside the scope of a company commander without staff to plan an entire BN assembly area. Another instance of task misfit is how the T&EO references reconnaissance execution and fires planning, both of which exceed the capabilities of an HHC to execute without external tasked assets. Whereas an infantry/armor company in any variant of a brigade combat team has fires internal to the BN, if not on the company level, an aviation HHC does not. This logic holds generally true with regard to reconnaissance operations, as well.

CPT Andre Williams, S-3 assistant officer in charge, STB, 1st Sustainment Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, at Fort Riley, Feb. 18-20 (bottom left) listens at the Unit Training Management course. Williams is going to be a training OIC one day, so he is getting up-to-date training on the Army's Digital Training Management System. Photo by U.S. Army SSG John H. Johnson III, public affairs, 1st Infantry Division

As part of this analysis, I was able to get creative with my BN commander to describe a "why" for the HHC CP. We borrowed from heavy combat brigade combat team doctrine to create a combat trains command post (CTCP) that doubles as a contingency command post for the BN. My headquarters combines with the Echo Company headquarters S1 and S4 to create a robust mission command node controlling all sustainment planning and coordination for the BN. This facility is also large enough to accommodate the surviving mobile command post (MCP) staff in case the MCP is compromised by direct or indirect attack.

To summarize my UTP for the mission command warfighter function, I chose BN-level tasks because the key component to HHC operations is staff operations to the BN.

In the protection warfighting function, the main task that HHC is given is to "Conduct Command Post Security" (19-PLT-2203), which is an SCT under "Operate a Command Post–Company." In this task, the reference doctrine is Training Circular (TC) 3-39.30, "Military Police Leader's Handbook" (DA, 2015) and ATP 3-91, "Division Operations" (DA, 2014). This means that the T&EO is written for a military police platoon or similar sized element to conduct security on a division CP. Once again, we have task misfit that doesn't suit the capabilities of an HHC. Simply put, HHC has neither platoons, nor platoon-sized elements to dedicate to the defense of the BN assembly area. For many of the tasks referenced in this T&EO, HHC does not have the MTOE manpower to accomplish.

However, the solution to this problem is the same as before: find the correct task to integrate into the UTP, and then train to standard. I propose using "Plan for Survivability Operations for Headquarters Battalions" (71-BN-3002). Similar to how I expanded company CP operations to BN CP operations in the previous warfighting function, I kicked this SCT up to the BN level

[1] Available via the Army Training Network (https://atn.army.mil/) with a valid common access card.

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in order to fit aviation doctrine and operations. Because the aviation BN typically operates out of a single BN assembly area, it makes sense to select a BN-level task to capture this warfighting function. After all, it requires a full staff to plan and prepare a mission to occupy/operate out of an assembly area that encompasses multiple aircraft, a forward arming and refueling point, and up to seven companies (including Gray Eagle) across all six warfighting functions.

Applying the same principles and reasoning as exercised above, HHC's second METL task, "Occupy an Assembly Area–Company" (07-CO-9014) is also inadequate and requires an upgrade to a BN-level task and T&EO. The DA-approved MET and the associated SCTs are written for an infantry or armor company occupying and defending a company assembly area and not for an aviation unit. A more appropriate task to measure this capability is "Occupy an Assembly Area–Battalion" (07-BN-5181) and "Plan Battalion Area Tactical Operations" (63-BN-4012).

"Occupy an Assembly Area–Battalion" addresses all of the MDMP and warfighting functions required to effectively occupy an aviation assembly area, while "Plan Battalion Area Tactical Operations" adds a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive and operations security component not addressed in the main T&EO. To me, incorporating this into the UTP makes sense.

The DA probably assigned aviation HHCs the MET of "Occupy an Assembly Area–Battalion" because it is standard for HHC commanders to lead the BN quartering parties, and this is referenced in ATP 3-04.1, "Aviation Tactical Employment" (DA, 2016). However, the new METs simply work better with how an aviation BN actually operates at a combat training center rotation or in a near-peer fight because of the MDMP required to properly plan and execute this mission.

In the sustainment warfighting function, my DA-approved MET is "Conduct Logistics Package (LOGPAC) Support" (63-CO-4546). However, this MET is not a good fit for aviation organizations because the forward support company distribution platoon typically runs sustainment for the BN. Additionally, this T&EO does not holistically capture the other side of the sustainment operations in the BN (e.g., administrative and medical support). It is better to use a T&EO that captures what the administrative and logistics operation center does: "Provide Internal Sustainment for Battalion" (63-BN-4878). This T&EO provides standards for the S1 section, flight surgeon, chaplain, and legal assistant, as well as the S4. Medical and administrative support are areas where the DA-approved METL does not measure those capabilities.

In the movement and maneuver warfighting function, the DA-approved METL provides me with a supporting collective task nested underneath the "Conduct Logistics Package (LOGPAC) Support" MET, which is "Conduct Tactical Convoy during Offense, Defense, Stability and DSCA Operations" (55-CO-

A UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter from the Joint Aviation Command, United Arab Emirates, conducts a live-fire assault on an objective during an air assault mission at the National Training Center during Decisive Action Rotation 17-09, Sept. 21, 2017. U.S. Army photo by SGT David Devich, Operations Group, National Training Center

4003). This T&EO adequately captures what is required of an HHC convoy when moving in a relatively secure area, such as the brigade support area. The decisionmaking process of the convoy commander in this T&EO is centered on sending spot reports and avoiding enemy contact when possible. This makes sense because training time required to become proficient in defending convoy elements is typically not resourced, and most vehicles are not armored or turret compatible. The HHC's energies are usually directed toward supporting aviation missions.

For Intelligence, there is no specific MET or SCT to represent this warfighting function. The S2 is referenced in many of the existing company and BN-level METs and SCTs; however, given the importance of intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) to almost every single operation an aviation BN might conduct, I believe it is worth adding "Conduct Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)" (34-SEC-3180), to the company UTP. By adding it to the company UTP, this provides the drive to deliberately train, practice, and measure this skill inherent to HHCs.

Additionally, if you have manning issues with your S2 Soldiers, selecting this MET is a good way to highlight to higher headquarters that you need help. Out of a five-person section, if you're short two people, you will get an untrained (U) assessment in IPB. This issue was close to my heart because my S2 went to JRTC with one officer and one Soldier. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield for the BN suffered.

In the fires warfighting function, I pulled the task of "Plan Fire Mission in Support of Aviation Objectives" (01-BN-5142) from the BN METL. This task was written with aviation organizations in mind and requires no change. In my UTP, I have simply added this task to the list.

To summarize up to this point, HHCs should build a UTP, choosing new T&EOs that better suit the organization and are all-encompassing of the warfighter functions. Additionally, the new T&EOs fully embrace the parts of the BN METs and SCTs that are HHC-centric and incorporates those into the UTP. I had a commander's dialogue with both the BN commander and brigade commander to discuss my findings and gain approval for my UTP. The next question becomes, how do you action this new and expanded UTP that includes BN-level tasks, especially as an HHC commander?

By developing a clear UTP and getting approval from the higher level commanders, the UTP and associated T&EOs can be used to shape training events and missions to accomplish training objectives. This was done at both the field grade level and the staff OIC level. This is really the level where the UTP in an HHC is powerful because the field grades and staff OICs, through their contact with brigade and higher headquarters, are able to shape the named operations, field training exercises, and other missions that the BN and BN headquarters are tasked to execute so that we can meet our own training objectives. This is powerful because with a high operating tempo, units cannot afford to waste training opportunities in the form of tasked missions and operations, so shaping our missions to accomplish our training is crucial. This is especially true as an HHC, because we cannot train in our headquarters role in the field without subordinate units present.

So, I view the key things that enabled an HHC UTP to be executed was mutual understanding and buy-in from the BN executive officer/S3 and other staff OICs. Because the staff does not work for the HHC commander, I needed to win over the staff and show them how the UTP and the specific T&EOs that applied to their shops could be useful to them in planning their own staff operations and training their Soldiers. However, once this was done and the staff was won over, multiple leaders in HHC shaped training events so that over time, we became a much more capable BN headquarters. Across all warfighter functions, we became more effective because of the UTP. And because the headquarters became more effective, every subordinate unit was able to become more effective as well. For example, because of better IPB and better MDMP at headquarters, our line units were able to plan and execute increasingly complex attack and reconnaissance missions.

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Leaders, Lead

By CPT Mark Holt

AN APACHE COMPANY COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE FOLLOWING AN OFFENSIVE TRAINING OPERATION IN A CONTESTED, LITTORAL BATTLESPACE

The 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade on the Korean peninsula is comprised of littoral pioneers for Army aviation. Subordinate commands regularly conduct rigorous, realistic training that consistently tests and evaluates the brigade's collective operational reach in all five dimensions of the littoral battlespace: the landward portion, seaward portion, overlying airspace, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum (The United States Marine Corps, n.d.). Certain focus areas aided the commander of the 4-2 Attack Reconnaissance Battalion in introducing unique training and leadership challenges to subordinate commanders, platoon leaders, and air mission commanders in a contested, littoral battlespace: nested training plans, evolving leader certification practices, simulation training devices, and the gradual increase in mission complexity through enhanced operational variables. Through my observations and experiences relating to this collective training event as an attack aviation company commander, it is imperative that platoon leaders and air mission commanders develop proficiency in 6000-series "Leader Tasks" to appropriately establish control for the commander. Building proficiency in these tasks creates fluidity and permits rapid adjustments to account for constantly evolving circumstances, especially when conducting operations in complex, contested environments.

LEADER TASKS

What is a leader task? Leader tasks are for company/troop commanders, platoon leaders, and air mission commanders. These tasks are designed to train and evaluate leaders on essential tasks directly related to planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of individual and collective aviation tasks (Department of the Army, 2018). The leader tasks are comprised of five specific tasks: conduct troop leading procedures, conduct air mission brief, conduct aviation mission rehearsals, conduct a mission, and conduct formal and informal after-action reviews. Aviation officers are introduced to all five of these in initial military training and basic officer courses; however, if we look at the art of command and science of control pertaining to Task 6003 of the leader tasks—conduct a mission—there is a significant experience gap for junior officers stepping into leadership roles with minimal flight time and no combat experi-

Reconnaissance over the West Sea of Korea (AH-64D). Photo credited to U.S. Army LTC Ryan P. Sullivan

ence. Conducting a mission entails many different variables requiring an extensive knowledge base to appropriately react to rapidly evolving circumstances.

The role of junior warrant officers and lieutenants are pointedly different following initial flight training. Lieutenants are generally placed in a platoon leader position that carries with it a level of authority and responsibility to train, lead, and evaluate. Prior to this, initial entry rotary-wing training is near identical for warrant officers and commissioned officers. The development of individual aviator skills and air mission commander competencies requires a balancing act: a pilot-in-command is the individual and overall controlling authority for an aircraft, but an air mission commander is designated by the unit commander to be the overall controlling authority for a flight of aircraft. The two are similar in nature but require a different practiced skill set in most circumstances, especially when dealing with complex missions above the team level. I believe introduction to the leader tasks at an earlier point in initial flight training would benefit aviation lieutenants and warrant officers alike. The added exposure would better prepare aviators for immediate contribution in collective training environments.

Company/troop commanders and command designated air mission commanders generally have far more experience when compared to aviation platoon leaders and junior warrant officers, but should incoming flight company commanders automatically qualify as an air mission commander? As operational deployments decrease and we continue to experience the paradigm shift in tactics from counterinsurgency to decisive action, junior military officers' experiences can vary drastically from one to another. Arguably, seasoned combat aviators with minimal exposure to decisive action training scenarios could create liabilities and gaps for commanders during large-scale combat operations and in complex, contested environments due to training deficiencies and a lack of understanding in Army doctrinal guidance. This statement strengthens the claim that platoon leaders and air mission commanders absolutely must understand their role and responsibilities as outlined in Training Circular 3-04.11, "Commander's Aviation Training and Standardization Program," to include a firm grasp on leader tasks (Department of the Army, 2018).

West Sea of Korea. Photo credited to U.S. Army LTC Ryan P. Sullivan

Current Army aviation doctrine states platoon leaders are responsible for crew and team training and in ensuring their aircrews are proficient in tactics, techniques, and procedures as outlined in the appropriate field manuals, training circulars, and aircrew task modules. This involves a level of credentialing in leader certification that can be difficult for some junior military officers to attain due to their lack of aviation experience and collective training opportunities. Platoon leaders need regular, recurrent training repetitions on leader-associated tasks to effectively lead teams and platoons, especially in complex, contested environments.

According to Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, "Mission Command," "Individuals learn through study, experience, practice, and human interaction as they develop their expertise and skilled judgement" (Department of the Army, 2012). Over the course of 1 year in command, I have realized it is my responsibility to develop a unit training plan incorporating widespread professional development and leadership opportunities allowing the company's junior officers to gain knowledge, practice, and valuable training repetitions. This, in turn, will develop the expertise and analytical judgment necessary for their success in collective training events and during real-world contingency scenarios. The initiative must be stressed. From experience, the necessity of this training quickly becomes clear when platoon leaders are charged to lead their respective platoons as part of a six to eight aircraft flight in a contested, littoral battlespace.

LEARNING THROUGH TRAINING

Training is just that—training—even when it's on the objective, and an evaluation is taking place. Zero de-

fect mentalities coupled with Type-A personalities can be counterproductive in developing competent, confident leaders. The Swedish psychologist, K. Anders Ericsson, posits that experts are developed through hours and hours of focused, intensive practice—10,000 hours to be exact (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993). I seriously doubt commanders, platoon leaders, and junior air mission commanders flawlessly executed training repetitions from the start. It is important to take this into account when training and evaluating platoon leaders and air mission commanders on the leader tasks.

With a deep-rooted background in high school and collegiate athletics, I naturally make the connection in military training to athletic practices and games. Our game—as military professionals—is engaged, armed conflict: anything less should be quantified and expressed through the lens of training. Personally, I have learned that I can do a better job of allowing those on my team to make honest mistakes and then to underwrite them as valued training iterations. Oftentimes, experienced aviators and team members step in to offload task-saturated leaders on demanding training missions to fill the experience gap and complete the mission. We must remain open to the idea that failing at certain points through training could facilitate enhanced teaching opportunities. When all is said and done, failure during training should equate to learning. It is absolutely essential that we learn and continue to grow because failure, come game time, is not an option.

CONCLUSION

Aviation platoon leaders and air mission commanders must get back into the business of leading in complex, contested environments. One way this can be accomplished is through proficiency in the leader tasks. Commanders must regularly develop rigorous, realistic training opportunities for aviation leaders and then coach and mentor them along the way. The contested, littoral battlespace presents unique challenges, but it is not the only unique battlespace where Army aviation leaders find themselves operating. The enhanced operational variables encountered in these complex, contested environments will undoubtedly place additional strain on Army commanders, platoon leaders, and air mission commanders; however, with focused repetitions and research, we can build familiarity and develop proficiency in the leader tasks.

Ultimately, developing competency in the execution of 6000-series leader tasks will better prepare us to face emerging, modern challenges and the consistently evolving future operating environment.

CPT Mark Holt received his undergraduate degree in Operations Management from the University of Alabama and is a former Alabama football student-athlete. His military education includes the Army Aviation Basic Officer Leaders Course, Initial Entry Rotary Wing (AH-64D) Course, and the Marine Corps' Expeditionary Warfare School. Mark's military assignments include Attack Platoon Leader (B/1-1 ARB), Logistics Officer (1-1 ARB), and Attack Company Commander (C/4-2 ARB). He has one operational deployment to Afghanistan in support of Operation Freedom's Sentinel in 2016–2017. Following command, Mark will be attending graduate school and subsequently serving as an instructor in the United States Military Academy's Department of Physical Education.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to Charlie Co., 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment "Wolfhounds," 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, wait for medical evacuation UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters during an air assault training mission on Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe, Hawaii, Aug. 21, 2018. The exercise maintains combat readiness in preparation for a Joint Readiness Training Center rotation later this year. U.S. Army photo by 1LT Ryan DeBooy

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LITTORAL ATTACKS

ARMY AVIATION'S FUTURE CHALLENGE TO ERASE THE SEAM BETWEEN MARITIME AND LAND-BASED OPERATING ENVIRONMENTS

An AH-64D conducting reconnaissance over the West Sea of Korea. Photo credited to U.S. Army LTC Ryan P. Sullivan

By LTC Ryan P. Sullivan

The Death Dealers of 4-2 Attack Reconnaissance Battalion are charged with an immediate, demanding, and versatile mission to safeguard the littorals of the Greater Seoul Metropolitan Area. The battalion prepares for this mission along three lines of effort: Readiness, innovation, and professional development. Our niche mission to support the Republic of Korea Navy in executing Maritime Counter-Special Operations Forces places us at the forefront of developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to address what the U.S. Marines classify as littoral operations in contested environments (Eckstein, 2017).

The U.S. Geographical Survey estimates that water covers nearly 71 percent of the earth's surface (U.S. Geographical Survey Water Science School, n.d.). Littoral operations are of particular importance here in the Pacific region. Why would we want to restrict our maneuver space to densely populated regions and compete for airspace with other entities? The rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) weapon systems presents a significant challenge to the ship-to-shore operations with which we are accustomed. In preparing for large-scale combat operations, we cannot assume that the U.S. will maintain naval superiority and continuous freedom of maneuver within striking distance or the deck space to stage a helicopter assault force preparing to support ground operations. The pursuit of Future Vertical Lift and Joint Multi-Role technology will extend operational reach and the speed in which we transit the battlespace, expanding our area of influence and increasing the effectiveness and likelihood of littoral operations. The Army must prepare to seize terrain to secure basing and facilitate extending operational reach. To prepare for those operations, units must introduce tough, realistic training scenarios that incorporate dynamic maritime environments, as well as the multi-domain challenges that arise from near-peer adversaries in large-scale combat operations.

To push the envelope of our training, we designed a scenario that focused on the seamless nature of maritime and land-based attack operations. Over the course of several weeks, the unit planned, rehearsed, and executed deliberate attacks at the company and battalion level, which tested our ability to apply traditional attack operations in a non-traditional operating environment, and by design, offer leaders options to present our adversaries with an unexpected dilemma in any stage of conflict. The operation improved our expeditionary deployment capabilities, enhanced our ability to operate overwater, stressed our ability to conduct mission command, and prepared us for transition to follow-on missions in support of the 2nd Infantry Division (ID)/Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Combined Division (RUCD).

DEFINING THE PROBLEM

How can an attack reconnaissance battalion project combat power and

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tactically employ aircraft to defeat enemy forces in littoral areas of operation with consideration given to electronic warfare (EW), aerial defense systems, maritime threats, and unpredictable coastal weather while inflicting minimal damage on civilian infrastructure and preserving combat power in a joint, multi-domain environment?

WHAT WE LEARNED

While attending the Pre-Command Courses at Fort Leavenworth, Army Vice Chief of Staff, GEN James C. McConville, addressed our class and asserted that it was not enough to shoot, move, and communicate. Rather, we must strive to communicate securely, maneuver into a position of advantage, and hit what we aim at. These notions are a point of emphasis for the battalion as we aspire to incorporate secure communications, maneuver, and lethality into all aspects of our daily operations and combined training events. Executing a deep attack in an unfamiliar littoral environment provided an opportunity to holistically assess our organization's preparedness, identify capability gaps, and develop a plan of action for the coming year—building off our lessons learned.

EXERCISE SECURE COMMUNICATIONS AT EVERY OPPORTUNITY

Based on our templated total distance and varying separation between formations, establishing over the horizon (OTH) communications and understanding our limitations for secure communication proved critical. Our communications section (S-6) spent a great deal of time conducting line of sight analysis and integrating Gray Eagle planners to better understand their retransmit capabilities. For this mission, successful mission command focused on *basing*, covered vulnerable periods of *phasing and transitions* between companies, and kept key leaders in continuous contact to assess and mitigate *risk*.

Focusing on those three elements of operational art, we employed three key command nodes:

- Standing tactical operations center (TOC) at home station;
- Forward deployed tactical command post (TAC), collocated, with various necessary logistics; and
- Battalion commander positioned with the lead company on the objective.

From these locations and throughout execution, we learned a great deal about our reliance on satellite-based communications (SATCOM) and Blue Force Tracker (BFT), the need for high frequency (HF) radios, and additional capabilities of Gray Eagle companies.

SATCOM and BFT Shortcomings. Communicating OTH in real-time to maintain shared understanding and enable disciplined initiative proved difficult. Satellite positioning on the horizon and lack of bandwidth forced SATCOM out of our communications plan altogether. Blue Force Tracker messaging proved reliable for air mission commanders (AMCs) to communicate, but planners must account for latency issues that could negatively impact event-based triggers such as fire support missions.

Embrace HF. Reliance on SATCOM in other theaters led to the removal of HF radios. Within the last 12 months, our unit reinstalled HF antennas, refurbished and reinstalled radio equipment on several aircraft, and borrowed base station parts from other units to test out our systems. Incrementally, through the hard work and persistence of our S-6 shop and a select group of warrant officers, we progressed in our abilities to communicate between aircraft and ground stations utilizing secure automatic link establishment to communicate between lead and trail companies separated by considerable distances.

Gray Eagle, More Than Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Organic to the battalion, Gray Eagle (MQ-1C) supported the mission with reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition. Aircraft positioning near the objective provided an opportunity to enhance communication between companies' AMCs, and provided inbound companies with the ability to monitor the mission and gain situational awareness prior to calling for the battle handover.

An AH-64D conducts aerial maneuver and target acquisition training. Photo credited to U.S. Army SSG Herman F. Sledge, IV

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Success during execution started several months earlier when an order came down prohibiting the use of unsecure frequencies for training. Reemphasis on rotor stables and exercising our equipment created muscle memory and empowered junior warrants to embrace the communication security officer role for their companies. It became a sense of pride for companies who, months earlier, struggled to fill frequency modulation radios. That's not to say we did not experience hiccups, but rather that companies better prepared themselves to rapidly respond and troubleshoot systems to the benefit of the mission

POSITIONAL ADVANTAGES IN THE LITTORAL SETTING REQUIRE CONTINUOUS MANEUVER

While our unit routinely flies overwater, we had never flown legs of these lengths before nor attempted to incorporate terrain to mask movements against an opposing force (OPFOR) equipped with active radar systems. Could our unit maneuver into a position of advantage against an OPFOR equipped with Avenger and Sentinel radar systems? How long would we remain undetected with OPFOR scattered throughout the littoral islands? How would we respond to delays or contingencies during execution? This mission emphasized the importance of tough, realistic training; control measures; and leader locations during the fight.

Tough, Realistic Training Expedites Growth. During our road to war, we recognized that contested environments provide unique challenges and require a greater depth of understanding regarding radar theory and EW capabilities. We identified critical gaps in intelligence that forced planners to face the harsh realities that A2AD environments may deny our ability to team with unmanned assets such as Gray Eagle. There are no shortcuts, and units cannot skip steps when implementing advanced training scenarios or training support packages. Focus on the fundamentals and assess where your unit is, not where it was or where you want it to be.

During company execution, haze due to poor air quality index (AQI) severely reduced weather visibility. Many of our aviators were not comfortable flying in 2–3 statute miles with haze, and I applaud those who spoke up when they approached the limits of their comfort level. The rise of megacities and potential for future conflict in and around dense urban populations necessitate that units consider the impact of pollution on the battlefield. Poor AQI is common in Korea, which frequently impacts flight visibility. In neglecting to train companies to operate in degraded visual environment (DVE) conditions, our unit was not prepared to enter collective execution in forecasted DVE. Like any good training program, introduce DVE in a controlled setting at the individual level prior to incrementally advancing to team, platoon, and company execution.

Control Measures are Essential to Drawing Down Risk. The means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-0, "Mission Command") (Department of the Army, 2012), control measures go beyond markings on a map. Leaders who identify and mitigate risk implement

An AH-64D conducts reconnaissance and concealment training from a masked location. Photo credited to U.S. Army SSG Herman F. Sledge, IV

An AH-64D conducting daytime live-fire rocket engagement training. Photo credited to U.S. Army SSG Herman F. Sledge, IV

control measures in varying forms. Map and route reconnaissance identified safe landing areas, hazards, and known points of reference. For routes in areas of little visual reference, known points provide mitigation against Global Positioning System degradation, and low altitudes capitalize on minimal terrain relief for masking over water. We implemented hard decks along the routes for crossing known hazards and to minimize the impact on populated areas within company airspace coordination areas (ACA). These slight increases in altitude significantly increased the audible signature of our aircraft within the littoral areas. While radar detection and acquisition were not affected, the OPFOR heard the helicopters long before they reached their battle positions.

Leaders Must Position Themselves to Best Influence Their Formations. Planning, briefing, rehearsing, and executing missions of this magnitude and complexity requires trust. Trust between leaders at all echelons and built over time through a combination of shared hardship and training repetition. That trust and understanding of commander's intent enables disciplined initiative, the essential ingredient for mission command. We need to allow leaders to lead, and that is especially true for our platoon leaders. Over the last decade or so in the counterinsurgency fight, we stopped letting our platoon leaders serve as AMCs. Following company-level execution, our unit had two significant engagements: 1) Company commanders met with the 2ID/RUCD leadership to discuss how they led their formations, and 2) a visit from the Director of Evaluation and Standardization. Both engagements caused us to take a hard look at ourselves and hasten our pursuit and implementation of a tiered AMC system. While our brigade standard operating procedure requires AMCs to achieve pilot-in-command status first, this mission set reemphasized the need for platoon leaders to train and lead their formations. Our battalion execution focused on company commanders maneuvering their elements (divided into platoons) and placing themselves in position to initiate and control fires on the objective. Platoon leaders served as AMCs for their respective platoons and were responsible for communicating to higher command. Leader certification is important, and we identified that serving as an AMC for a team mission is not the same as leading a company-level deep attack. Understanding of the rules of engagement and techniques, patterns, munitions, and range does not always translate to a firm operational understanding of *decisive points*, *center of gravity, end state/conditions*, and *risk*. Neither rank nor position warrants AMC status, but we must recognize the role our platoon leaders perform in their companies and provide them with the expectation and structure in which to achieve AMC and excel.

LETHALITY

It is not enough to simply shoot. Proficient aviators are decisive in action and accurate in engagements. Utilizing dry fire through simulation, and recording those engagements for review proved exceptionally valuable during our unit after-action review (AAR). During the first AAR, crews realized that the tapes capture everything, and going through the motions would invite public criticism. In observing the training and reviewing the tapes, we reinforced the importance of planning, direct fire distribution, utilization of external resources, and sustaining the fight in order to maximize effects on the enemy.

Laying the Foundation With the Plan. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield defines the operational environment (OE), the environmental effects, evaluates the threat,

and determines threat course of action. However, what happens when intelligence gaps exist, and A2AD prohibits persistent stares on an objective? Our aviators discovered that aerial perspective from the cockpit vastly differs from satellite imagery. Target identification took much longer than anticipated during daytime iterations. Accurately planning routes at prescribed airspeeds ensures synchronization of movement across the battlespace and simultaneity of effects on the objective. Calculation errors resulted in early arrivals, forced loiters at holding points, and inaccurate fuel consumption calculations. Each company experienced this to some degree but improved with each iteration. We limited each company to 10 minutes in their battle positions or ACAs to expedite their decision making process and manufacture stress.

Critical Nature of Direct Fire Distribution. Emerging from planning, companies briefed and thoroughly rehearsed their actions in platoon, company, and battalion rehearsals. Company commanders spent a great deal of time focused on where to best position themselves to initiate and distribute fires. Additionally, incorporating naval and land-based fires for support, commanders chose time-based triggers for initiation of preplanned targets. In the event that Gray Eagle was unable to relay, event-based triggers may fail due to message delays or BFT latency. Synchronized reviews of gun tapes allowed us to determine if crews engaged targets multiple times, and if control measures within the engagement area (EA) allowed for clear and concise distribution and delineation of responsibilities. Crews demonstrated understanding of cloud ceilings and weapon selection, but further discussions of DVE impacts on sights, lasers, and seekers is warranted. Clear destruction criteria for each EA, and timely and accurate reporting kept leadership apprised of progress and overall mission success.

Identify, Integrate, and Maximize Utilization of External Resources. Due to current airspace restrictions, the preponderance of our manned-unmanned teaming occurs overwater. This training event represented the first integration of Gray Eagle into a major exercise and provided aircrews the opportunity to pass targets and incorporate remote engagements. Due to inclement weather, Gray Eagle was not able to support each iteration, but its presence overhead prior to H-hour provided timely reporting on opposing forces' enabled rapid target identification and damage assessments. Operations in the littoral regions present a variety of maritime targets as well as personnel, vehicles, and equipment. With each iteration, crews grew more comfortable discussing weaponeering and demonstrated better understanding of our unit basic load and the impact on munition selection for maritime or land-based engagements. Finally, we were encouraged to hear innovative discussions concerning employment of EW and pursuit of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions to enhance mission effectiveness.

Anticipate and Coordinate to Sustain the Fight. Integrating logistics planners early and incorporating them into all rehearsals proved vital to success. Our distribution platoon leader is an aviator, a deviation from the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE), which continues to prove beneficial to our organization. Through each iteration, our forward support company (FSC) continued to utilize two 3-point configurations to establish the FARP. They eventually added a single point to facilitate observer-controller and personnel recovery aircraft. With more than 17,000 gallons in fuel capacity, the logisticians forecasted 12,000 gallons required to support each iteration. Utilizing logistics status reporting to higher command, division planners anticipated our requirements and programmed in resupply convoys. The ability to anticipate and forecast consumption rates stems from a thorough understanding of aviation operations, as well as timely and accurate reporting of expenditures or deviations from the plan. Our first iteration revealed delays in reporting from the TAC to the FARP, which could prove costly in the event aircraft land and expect preconfigured ammunition to be laid out for rapid rearming. This training focused on refuel operations, allotting 25 minutes per company through the FARP, but we anticipated that arming aircraft would require an additional 20 minutes (45 minutes total) per company–something we plan to validate in future training events.

THE WAY AHEAD

With a year under our belts, the command team and company leadership better appreciate the unique opportunity to train littoral operations. These missions enhanced our understanding of how to incrementally train, assess, and validate our formations in the coming year. The Dealers remain resolute in our pursuit of readiness, innovation, and professional development. The sustained emphasis on these lines will enable us to identify challenges/friction points, offer solutions, test, assess, and codify results for future training.

READINESS THROUGH NESTED TRAINING, ENHANCED INTEROPERABILITY, AND PARTNERSHIPS

The last few months afforded us focused training through culminating events where mission execution led to codified results through formal AARs and opportunities to pass on lessons learned and recommendations to the next group of leaders and Soldiers arriving in the summer of 2019. Predictability is essential for shared understanding, and we intend to lay out annual training guidance for fiscal year 2020 (FY20) to show the organization a desired end state and roadmap to achieve shared goals through nested training plans. Heavy turnover will shift our focus in the 4th quar-

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ter (Q4) back to building the team through leader certification and emphasis on training at the individual and team levels. Companies retain the freedom of maneuver to ramp up or pull back on training based on the assessed needs and readiness. However, as we end Q4 and move into Q1, they will understand the expectation is that they need to be able to operate at the platoon level, and continue building toward company-level execution. This is so that in Q2 and Q3 of FY20, the Death Dealers culminate with battalion and brigade-level exercises.

Throughout, the Dealers will continue to incorporate training events with our ROK partners to enhance interoperability and capabilities. Those relationships create opportunities for enablers and training resources, which are scarce or difficult to schedule on our own. As a result of continued engagement, we recently conducted deck landing qualifications for a number of crews and improved relationships with our allies.

INNOVATING TO MEET MODERN CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

The importance of innovation and creating an atmosphere encouraging collaboration and exploration of ideas is paramount. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, "Operations" (Department of the Army, 2017, p 3-14), notes that "Flexibility and innovation are essential elements of an operation as are creative and adaptive leaders. Army forces continuously adapt to changes in an operational environment. Such adaptation enhances flexibility across the range of military operations. Army forces require flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to succeed."

Look for quick victories and ways to spark interest in your formations. Highlight contributions, and emphasize that those with rank or position do not hold a monopoly on good ideas. Exposure to Army modernization initiatives, and challenges expected from near-peer adversaries will open the door to innovation beyond technology. How we engage our ROK partners, how we integrate with them, communicate with them, and operate in the same battlespace through enhanced interoperability is a large focus for us. Partnerships matter. We see further opportunities to test out new TTPs overwater, reorganize our manning, evaluate hub and spoke concepts, and of course, seek out new technology or ways to incorporate COTS into today's fight. We have several operational needs statements that we will pursue to enable airworthiness release for COTS devices that will enhance our ability to operate overwater. Embracing additive manufacturing continues to bear fruit as our catalog of registered products grows. Success builds off success, and we now see more and more Soldiers stepping forward with ideas as they recognize this organization is a learning organization encouraging adaptive thinking and alternative solutions for problems.

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT TO STRENGTHEN TRUST AND ENABLE MISSION COMMAND

There are opportunities to address both equipping and manning challenges as we look toward future OEs and challenges to Army aviation from near-peer adversaries. Our organizational structure does not allow companies to organically sustain operations in an expeditionary environment. This limits our ability to operate in a decentralized manner, which increases survivability and provides leadership with additional flexibility on the battlefield. We continue to test out hub and spoke concepts, attaching Headquarters and Headquarters Company, aviation unit maintenance, and FSC Soldiers to line companies as they deploy at the company level. Modifications to the MTOE could be one solution, but a continued conversation on command relationships provides a near-term option-to which we achieved limited success. Operating in a decentralized environment requires clear understanding of commander's intent, as well as the ability to communicate OTH and ensure that leadership retains trust in subordinate organizations to exercise disciplined initiative. Our efforts to reinstall and train our Soldiers on HF radio operations continue to build on earlier success, and we look forward to moving beyond point-to-point interface and expanding this capability within our theater of operation.

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WHY DOES THE ARMY NEED BRIGADE TACTICAL COMMAND POSTS DURING COMBAT TRAINING CENTER ROTATIONS?

By MAJ Nicklaus Franck and CPT Jacob Marck

The deployment and implementation of a brigade (BDE) tactical command post (TAC) during a Combat Training Center (CTC) rotation is an invaluable training opportunity and resource. The BDE TAC has the potential to exercise mission command systems organic to the combat aviation brigade (CAB) and replicate the environment encountered during large-scale combat operations. The BDE TAC validated that mission command systems, organically owned by the CAB, can be successfully utilized to link the organization across thousands of miles using soft crew access units (CAU), Ventrilo (voice over internet protocol software), Command Post of the Future (CPOF), and the new Army-developed software, Tactical Interface Tracking Application Node (TITAN). Its application during the National Training Center (NTC) rotation 19-07's deliberate Attack Out Of Contact (AOOC) for the 3-17 Heavy Attack Reconnaissance Squadron (HARS) provided multiechelon and joint coordination, allowing the squadron to successfully complete its live-fire exercise (LFX) and qualify crews on table XII gunnery. While there remains room for improvement, the deployment of a BDE TAC with the aviation rotational training unit (RTU) is a tremendous asset and should be deployed as a tool to enhance combat power for the rotational unit in future CTC rotations.

A BDE TAC is, "...a facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control portions of an operation for a limited time" (Department of the Army [DA], 2014, p 1-1). The 3CAB forward deployed the TAC consisting of 12 Soldiers (to include a representative from each of the warfighting functions [WfF]) with the intent of conducting the military decisionmaking process (MDMP) to develop and brief an order to the HARS for the deliberate AOOC. The idea perpetuated after the 3CAB conducted two previous CTC rotations with after-action review comments from the multifunction aviation task forces (MFATF) highlighting the challenges of "communication" with division as a battalion entity.[1] This suggests integrating the brigade TAC alleviates the squadron's requirement of joint coordination while providing the proper echelon of command between the division and squadron.

Utilization of CPOF and Ventrilo to illustrate the CAB's plan, while simultaneously sharing information with both higher and lower echelons of command was critical to the success of the TAC. "A defining challenge for commanders and staffs is creating shared understanding of their operational environment, their operation's purpose, its problems, and approaches to solving them" (DA, 2012, p. 2). Both systems provided connectivity with the 3CAB commander located at Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia, the 3-17 HARS located "in the box" at the NTC, and the division tactical operations center to facilitate the briefing of the operations order. The systems enabled two invaluable aspects in preparation for this mission allowing (1) The CAB commander to deliver his intent directly to the unit conducting the delib-

U.S. Army National Guard photo by CPT Gregory Walsh, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

[1] 1CAB was also a tremendous resource for best practices in preparation for the 3CAB's United States European Command (EUCOM) deployment.

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erate AOOC, and (2) the BDE staff to illustrate the plan and provide real-time answers to questions despite being more than 2000 miles away. During the execution phase of the operation, the TAC received real-time updates utilizing TITAN to battle track the units and soft CAU to monitor frequency modulation radio communications, increasing overall situational awareness for the entire organization.

While mission command systems are essential for streamlining communications, so too are the personnel who make up the BDE modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE). These personnel enabled the joint planning efforts for the deliberate AOOC to shape the deep area. Personnel proficiency within the TAC provided invaluable expertise during the suppression of enemy air defense and the destruction of enemy air defense, enabling rotary-wing assets to maneuver and destroy targets within the engagement areas. The CAB coordinated directly with the F-15E Strike Eagles to attack and destroy targets simultaneously with the electronic warfare (EW) and field artillery assets, all while deconflicting airspace for organic Gray Eagle, Shadow unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), and attack rotary-wing assets.[2] The integration of these aerial platforms is complex and requires deliberate planning from the BDE fires support officer, electronic warfare technician, UAS operations officer, and joint enablers to mitigate risk and amass combat power. Without input from key BDE MTOE'd experts, the aviation RTU's ability to set the conditions for the ground force commander and achieve effects in the deep area is degraded, making the TAC a key force multiplier during planning for cross forward line of own troops (FLOT) shaping efforts. One possibility to combine and integrate these different combat players would be the formation of a Joint Air-Ground Integration Center. This would allow the division the ability to deconflict and reorganize the staff to focus on the fight at a division level. In addition, it would allow for the joint integration and deconfliction of the airspace within the division's area of operation, while simultaneously providing the BDE TAC with the one stop shop for integration of their plan into the deep area.

In conclusion, deploying the BDE TAC presented a unique opportunity for 3CAB to conduct MDMP for each WfF, produce orders, and stress mission command systems to further prepare the CAB for the environment they may face in a near-peer fight while reducing the workload on the squadron.

As the 3CAB prepares to deploy in support of the United States European Command (EUCOM), U.S. Army Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and NATO Special Operations Headquarters while maintaining readiness for EUCOM contingency plans during Atlantic Resolve, success will be underpinned by how well the commander can conduct distributed mission command while maneuvering and commanding forces dispersed thousands of miles from the headquarters. This exercise was a phenomenal opportunity to replicate the environment while stressing and validating the systems that will be vital to a successful rotation.

In the future, the 3CAB team recommends all CABs send their TACs forward with the aviation RTU to enhance the training environment for all participating entities.

[2] The NTC 19-07 Rotation was the first rotation to successfully use four assets during a deliberate AOOC.

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U.S. Army SPC Xavier Palacios, assigned to Bravo Company, 44th Expeditionary Signal Battalion, 2nd Theater Signal Brigade, and U.S. Army SPC Trey Whitney, assigned to Bravo Company, 151st Expeditionary Signal Battalion, 228th Theater Tactical Signal Brigade, South Carolina National Guard, troubleshoot a Command Post Node switch, June 5, 2018, in Boleslawiec, Poland. U.S. Army photo by William B. King

PACIFIC PATHWAYS:

BUILDING THE KIND OF LEADERS THE ARMY NEEDS

By MAJ John Q. Bolton

We preach Mission Command, but we don't necessarily practice it on a day-to-day basis in everything we do.…If we're going to have to operate like that in warfare, we have to train as we're going to fight. We have to live and operate like that on a day-to-day basis… GEN Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army (Barno & Bensahel, 2017).

For the 2nd Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment, 25th Combat Aviation Brigade, 2018 to 2019 were challenging years. From July 2018 to May 2019, the battalion formed two separate task forces and concurrently executed a Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) train-up and rotation while planning for Pacific Pathways 19-01. Concurrently planning, then sequentially executing these major operations tested the battalion because of the high workload required for each, as well as the unique challenges of port operations (the JRTC vessel returned just 10 days before the Pathways vessel departed). After these trials, the battalion was able to compare a Combat Training Center (CTC) and Pathways, specifically regarding how each operation builds readiness.

Leaders executing Pacific Pathways often hear a common refrain—that the extended noncombat deployment reduces readiness because units cannot fully execute their mission-essential tasks with sufficient rigor to "maintain readiness." Informed by our experience over the past years, this article does not refute that assertion; rather, I argue that Pathways is an acceptable risk because the experience generates something more important to our Army's long-term health: leaders capable of executing mission command in an austere environment while working with strategically important partners and allies. Contrary to depleting readiness, if equipped with enough latitude, resources, and guidance, Pathways units can *improve* their readiness since Pathways is a real-world mission that provides the basis for developing leaders equipped with lifelong strategic mindfulness (Figure).

For the all-important development of well-rounded, strategically minded Army leaders, Pathways provides a unique, formative experience that should not be discounted simply because it is not a CTC rotation. A typical Pathways experience involves multiple site surveys and planning conferences, detailed planning at the battalion level, multiple port operations, intratheater movements, partnering with multiple foreign units, sustainment in austere environments without robust infrastructure, and mission command across multiple locations (and countries) for 4 to 6 months. Encompassing distinct training benefits, which range from cultural awareness to distributed operations to managing training, Pathways runs unit-level leaders through a mobility, mission command, and training management gauntlet, albeit one with strategic implications.

Figure. Pacific Pathways 2.0 concept, March 2019.

Consequently, the requirement that leaders exercise disciplined initiative and for commanders to articulate clear guidance is self-evident. Moreover, if designated for a Pathways mission early enough, unit representatives can set conditions during planning conferences. Since Pathways focuses on establishing partnership and interoperability at the strategic level, tactical actions (training) generally fall to battalions/squadrons (South, 2018). Commanders can set conditions to conduct readiness-building activities, including collective training such as battalion gunnery. Moreover, since the Pathways main force is typically an infantry battalion with a brigade mission command element, along with an aviation task force of six to 12 aircraft, company commanders can leverage brigade-level field grades as external evaluators. What other experience lets a maneuver unit partner with a dedicated aviation task force for such an extended period?

Combat Training Center rotations are crucible experiences, designed to replicate combat conditions. They improve readiness and provide an integrated, gated goal for unit training, spread over an entire year. These rotations, however, are manipulated to push their training audiences to execute certain tasks and to force commanders to make decisions. Pathways, by contrast, is

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often an "Amazing Race" situation—where commanders face unpredictable challenges daily. Combat Training Center rotations are also relatively short (though intense), while Pathways is sufficiently long enough to allow for retraining—a key step of the eight-step training model often neglected. Consequently, Pathways allows units to train, retrain, and validate their practices and procedures in a deliberate manner, outside the rush of a CTC.

> *"Instead of preparing for past wars, the Army should embrace forward positional and proxy engagement within integrated political, economic, and informational strategies to seize and exploit initiative"* Nathan Jennings, Amos Fox, and Adam Taliaferro (Jennings, Fox, & Taliaferro, 2018).

Pathways rotations may not replicate combat conditions like CTCs, but contain the same conditions that the Army would face in combat: remoteness, nonstandard logistical networks, and partnering with foreign forces. Simply getting to Pathways readies units for the challenge of combat, given the austere nature of some locations and the requirement to rely on local contractors and/or foreign military support. Consequently, Pathways is arguably more realistic than a CTC, since working with partnered forces across a complex geopolitical landscape is as representative of modern conflict as is force on force training (Jennings et al., 2018). Consequently, Pathways is executing a literal real-world mission, building critical strategic relationships, rather than "cutting their feet to fit the shoes" of a CTC rotation and its notional threats (Fox, 2017). Indeed, according to U.S. Army Pacific Commander, GEN Robert Brown, Pathways is critical to staying ahead of China in the Pacific (Brown, 2019). Additionally, Pathways arguably more closely resembles the past (and future) of Army operations—forward deployed, partnered, training foreign forces—as opposed to the intensity of a CTC, though the latter is obviously phenomenal training (Jennings et al., 2018). Moreover, building partner capacity is just another form of strategic readiness; after all, well-trained partners will fight better (Cancian, 2019).

> *"...it is the creativity of individuals, the teams we build with our allies and partners, and the ability for soldiers to make decisive and critical decisions in the absence of orders that have won the day"* GEN Robert Brown, Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific (Brown, 2019).
>
> *"You don't want to form relationships in a crisis"* GEN Robert Brown, Commanding General of U.S. Army Pacific (South, 2018).

25th Division Sustainment Brigade partnered with the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade Soldiers to conduct aerial delivery resupply missions. They accomplished this task by using the free drop technique in support of four companies of the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team during Operation Lightning Strike field exercise. Each free drop supplied 2-27INF, 3IBCT Soldiers with 390lb of meals and ammunition; approximately 1 day's worth from four UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to two locations simultaneously. U.S. Army Photo by SGT Sarah D. Williams

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Though a Pathways task force is forward-deployed, the garrison workload will not slow down. Consequently, leaders must develop and implement a battle rhythm that supports both forward and rear operations. Pathways leaders will have to effectively operate across the International Date Line to enforce the "small disciplines" like evaluations, awards, professional development, supply actions, and personnel metrics (Bolton & Wyant, 2015). Developing the ability to do so during a relatively calm deployment will enable units to understand how to leverage technology to provide mission command to distributed task forces, a capability explicitly called for by the Army's Multi-Domain Operations primer, "The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028" (Department of the Army, 2018).

The sum of these challenges (working with partners, distributed operations, austere environment) means Pathways can provide the most rigorous intellectual experience not associated with professional military education (PME). In fact, Pathways is an excellent supplement to PME because it forces Army aviation leaders to take the most important principles taught in PME, such as mission command, doctrinal knowledge, and team-building to operations in austere environments in conjunction with partner forces. Importantly, future Pathways rotations will be longer, allowing additional time to build readiness at tactical echelons while increasing interoperability with our allies (South, 2018).

> *"Combat operations are always a gamble and we need to rely on the gamblers, not the dice"* Col. Mike Pietrucha (Pietrucha, 2016).

During Pathways, leaders can (and should) "run with scissors" while executing mission command in support of a strategically important mission (Townsend, Crissman, & McCoy, 2019). What better leadership factory can the Army provide to develop tactical leaders at the company/troop and battalion/squadron levels? Unlike a CTC rotation, each Pathways experience is different–different locations, partnered units, and training goals. These diverse challenges force commanders and staff to conduct detailed mission analysis and implement different training plans prior to deploying. The resulting range of responsibilities, from planning tactical actions and operational logistics to managing strategic partners, means Pathways is helping the Army "...grow leaders who truly practice mission command..." (Pryer, 2013).

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

PREPARING LIFT COMPANIES FOR DECISIVE ACTION TRAINING:

How to Integrate With and Provide Timely Support to the Brigade Combat Team to Ensure Mission Success

By CPT Michael C. Mason

As a lift, assault, or medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) company commander, there is a constant struggle on how best to train your formation while simultaneously providing support to higher echelons or supported units. This issue is prevalent not only at home station but also during field training exercises (FTXs) and at combat training centers. With the myriad of competing requirements on a company and the constant stress of mission changes and personnel turnover, many commanders struggle to train their organizations to effectively conduct air-ground operations and consequently, fail to successfully support the Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 52 Infantry Division, during decisive action training.

C/2-3 Aviation Regiment "Witchdoctors" conduct hot refueling operations during National Training Center rotation 19-07. Photo credited to U.S. Army CPT Michael Mason

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There are no shortage of methods or processes that can make a unit successful, but for the purposes of this article we will focus on integration. Units should integrate early and often, both laterally across sister companies/troops and vertically through BCT and division entities. All elements can help a lift company commander train his or her unit and directly support the higher headquarters. Integration with the BCT and division means successfully accomplishing the seven core competencies of Army aviation: provide accurate and timely information collection, provide reaction time and maneuver space, destroy/defeat/disrupt/divert/delay enemy forces, air assault ground maneuver forces, air movement of personnel/equipment/supplies, evacuate wounded or recover isolated personnel, and enable mission command over extended ranges and complex terrain (Department of the Army [DA], 2015), synchronizing personnel across the six warfighting functions, and building and maintaining combat power.

Army aviation professionals regularly focus on "...habitual training, persistent liaison, collaborative planning and preparation, known standardized procedures, clear command and support relationships, and effective mission rehearsals" (DA, 2015). Successful integration across six separate but interconnected areas, can aid an aviation company commander in training his or her unit, while simultaneously and successfully supporting the ground force. These six areas are mission planning, airspace, training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs), common operational picture (COP), combat mindset, and communication (or MATC3).

The Table provides a summary of the MATC3 focus areas, concentrating on the theme of integration.

Table. MATC3 Focus Areas

M	Mission Planning	Ensuring all participants and enablers attend and contribute to all key meetings, rehearsals, and briefings produces an integrated plan.
A	Airspace	Understanding airspace and integrating the plan into all echelons is essential to successful training and deliberate operation missions.
T	Training & Evaluation Outlines (T&EOs)	Integrating the T&EOs into the planning and preparation phase helps to guide the overall process and provides a standardized checklist.
C	Common Operational Picture (COP)	Establishing and maintaining a fully functioning COP in the company command post (CP) ensures continuous/collaborative planning.
C	Combat Mindset	Focusing on a combat mindset helps ensure maximum unit readiness, as well as the commanders' ability to project maximum combat power.
C	Communication	Thorough and proactive communication results in superior integration at all echelons.

Table material credited to U.S. Army CPT Michael Mason

MISSION PLANNING

Most units arrive at the National Training Center (NTC) with a reasonable working knowledge of mission planning, although there are a few key areas that are commonly overlooked during the planning/preparation phase: rehearsals (to include contingencies), precombat checks (PCCs), and precombat inspections. Key leaders should ensure that their subordinates utilize a standardized checklist during meetings and should remain involved throughout all phases of the operation. The company commander, first sergeant, and/or platoon leader should prioritize which PCCs need to be conducted (i.e., class III supply, or radio fills) and ensure that those priorities are communicated to the lowest level.

During the planning phase, it is imperative to integrate with the supported unit and enablers early and often. Without the ground tactical plan, it is difficult to begin planning an air assault mission, but just as importantly, the task force intelligence officer (TF S2), fires representative, and brigade aviation officer should all be at the initial planning conference, air mission coordination meeting, etc., in order to effectively synchronize the planning efforts across all warfighting functions.

When mission constraints and personnel manning allow, having a knowledgeable representative (troop/company or battalion/squadron liaison) embedded with the supported unit or within the brigade aviation element can directly help to shape and manage the ground forces' expectations. This liaison can help to educate the supported units on the capabilities and limitations of the aviation task force (ATF) in realtime. For example, a common misconception from supported units is that if they have received an approved waiver for 'seats-out' operations or unique sling loads, they will be good to go...not knowing that the ATF must also procure proper approvals for any nonstandard mission sets.

After developing the initial plan, the importance of rehearsing the mission and then most importantly, rehearsing contingencies, cannot be understated. Leaders should make aircrews backbrief the air mission commander (AMC) on their specific

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A/2-158 AHB "Axemen" conduct mission planning during an air mission coordination meeting. Photo credited to U.S. Army CPT Michael Mason

actions when rehearsing contingencies and should strive to include the supported ground force during rehearsals. The more rehearsals the better and whenever possible, the use of a terrain model, map, or graphics of some sort to maximize understanding and synchronization for all participants can help to maximize shared understanding of the mission. Throughout the planning phase, the AMC or commander should reinforce the mission, end state, task and purpose, ground force scheme of maneuver, scheme of fires, and review any critical tasks associated with the mission.

Some important questions to frequently consider throughout the planning process are: Have we conducted a thorough map reconnaissance and landing zone/pickup zone (LZ/PZ) reconnaissance? Which actions are trigger-based or time-based? Will there be LZ preparatory fires? Do we have electronic warfare assets available? Will there be intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support? Has the casualty evacuation or MEDEVAC portion of a deliberate operation been discussed and rehearsed? Common friction points include not knowing the location, frequency, or call sign of the medical treatment facilities, casualty collection points, ambulance exchange points or where exactly the patient transfer will occur, or how the LZ will be marked, especially at night.

Many of these simple questions play an integral role in the initial route planning, and many could potentially constitute abort criteria for either the ground force or the aviation force. Which, if answered early in the planning process, would no doubt reduce headaches closer to mission execution. Above all, ensuring the right people are at the right meetings, and that the right information is covered in detail is a constant struggle but is necessary to gain the correct outputs and maximize a shared understanding between all participants.

AIRSPACE

Understanding the airspace is directly related to mission planning. Maximizing a shared understanding and knowledge of airspace is paramount to providing timely and valuable air support to the BCT and division. First, aviators need to be familiar with both Army and joint airspace publications. Integrating early and often with the ground maneuver force helps to ensure that air routes intended for use during a mission are templated onto the airspace control order (ACO). Aircrews that have a thorough understanding of position areas for artillery; restricted operation zones (ROZs); standard use Army aircraft flight routes; and immediate ROZs can avoid airspace violations, safety of flight instances, and grounded crewmembers.

One common oversight is for aircrews to disregard immediate ROZs while in flight. An immediate ROZ is any ROZ that was not submitted or planned for at least 24 hours in advance, which means it will not appear on the ACO. When an immediate ROZ is announced over the radio, aircrews are responsible to plot the ROZ on their maps, figure out the lateral and vertical distances, and ensure they remain clear of that airspace.

Commanders need to ensure that

B/2-227 AVN REG "Blackcats" performing tactical flight maneuvering during air movement missions. Photo credited to U.S. Army CPT Michael Mason

their aircrews understand the basics of airspace, conduct a thorough map reconnaissance before all flights, and utilize the TF or ground force S-2 and fires representatives to better shape their flight planning at the company level. The tactical air control party, fires cell, and unmanned aircraft systems personnel all have invaluable knowledge and information that should be integrated into the planning phase prior to departure. Ensuring these enablers provide input early and often will directly assist aircrews in gaining a much broader understanding of the ever-changing airspace, ultimately ensuring mission success.

U.S. Army Soldiers assigned to 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division load simulated casualties onto a HH-60M Black Hawk helicopter during Decisive Action Rotation 16-05 at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California, April 19, 2016. Decisive Action Rotation trains Soldiers in new improved battlefield techniques. U.S. Army photo by PFC Lisa Orender, Released

TRAINING AND EVALUATION OUTLINES

The new Army standardized company T&EOs provide the evaluation criteria for a unit's combat readiness, based on the unit's standardized mission-essential task (MET) list. However, commanders often struggle to integrate that criteria into daily operations in order to effectively train the unit while meeting evaluation requirements and simultaneously providing support to the supported force. One observed successful method to integrating the T&EOs into daily operations is to bring a copy of the T&EOs to key planning meetings and ensure that the critical performance measures have been addressed. Treat your T&EO just as you do the *Army Aviation Handbook* (Directorate of Training and Doctrine, 2018)[1]—as a checklist.

A commonly overlooked standardized checklist is the specific tasks mandated in the T&EOs that can help key leaders focus their training objectives and ensure that subordinates are concentrating their efforts on fundamental and crucial tasks. The subtasks outlined for each MET provide a quick azimuth check. For example, the troop leading procedures' (TLP) subtask for an air assault company are associated with each of their five total METs. The TLP subtask provides a checklist for the commander to use as a guide before, during, and after receipt of a mission from higher headquarters. Many of the considerations provided in the TLP subtask directly relate to the same guiding principles from the METs, and commanders can quickly reference and utilize the performance measures to provide guidance, issue commander's intent, and maximize shared understanding throughout the formation.

COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

A company CP that truly provides for information flow is critical to maximizing shared understanding. A graduate-level company CP allows for a unit to "…control operations, maintain situational understanding, inform the commander's decisions, and prepare and publish orders and plans" (DA, 2015). With the lightning-fast pace of a decisive action fight, trying to track all the incoming information can seem overwhelming. The systems and processes established (and refined) over the rotation can help make it easier for the commander to actually command.

A decisive action fight is a 24-hour operation, and mission changes happen constantly. The company COP should mirror that of the tactical operations center (TOC). Maximizing information knowledge across the company, including which aircraft are out flying, which aircrews are on mission, and which aircraft need fuel should all be posted and readily available. Additionally, any upcoming aircraft maintenance that could impact support for a BCT resupply route and the commander's critical information requirements are also important for everyone to know and understand in order to execute the commander's guidance and quickly assess and pass information. If something were to happen to the battalion/TF CP, would the company CP be capable of briefing aircrews prior to mission execution?

[1] This document is available with a valid common access card via Army Knowledge Online at https://www.ako1.us.army.mil/suite/files/42982618

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Some of the most important considerations necessary to a functional CP include: operation orders (OPORDs)/fragmentary orders, company battle rhythm (nested with the TF), digital and/or analog graphics used to track friendly units and enemy situational templates, airspace corridors and ROZs, and running estimates updated in realtime by the radio operator (RTO). The RTO should act as the company version of the TF battle captain or battle noncommissioned officer (NCO). The company RTO is the single point of continuity during 24-hour operations. Therefore, the RTO can be the single point of failure when the unit does not conduct thorough battle handovers during shift changes or utilizes a Soldier in that position who is not proficient on the radio.

A lift company CP should not only be able to establish and maintain constant communication and integration with higher headquarters, sister companies and supported units, but should also be able to predict future requirements and continuously track running estimates. The six warfighting functions detailed in Army Doctrine Reference Publication, "Operations," 3-0, sections 5-9 through 5-35 (DA, 2017), can help provide a framework with which to develop a company's systems and processes. These functions allow the company commander (and really anyone who walks into the CP) to effortlessly battle-track both internal and external assets and also allows for greater understanding. The idea is to increase shared understanding of the company, TF, BCT, and division missions and distribute this understanding across all echelons and levels.

COMBAT MINDSET (SECURITY/BASE DEFENSE/ UNDERSTANDING THE ENEMY)

A fully functioning CP also allows key leaders to project maximum combat power and maintain unit readiness. Establishing and maintaining a combat mindset in any formation requires continuous effort and emphasis from key leaders. One of the most obvious instances in which that deficiency is evident is base defense and security posture. One constantly overlooked element to unit security is establishing an internal company defense plan. This also requires that each company integrate into the TF base defense plan and work hand-in-hand with sister companies in the tactical assembly area.

B/3-227 AHB "Jokers" conduct air movement operations during NTC rotation 19-03. Photo credited to U.S. Army CPT Michael Mason

First and foremost, key leaders should encourage the TF to establish and issue a base defense plan so the companies themselves are able to understand their assigned responsibilities, left and right limits, and establish their own synchronized security plan. Key leaders should be able to posture support (aircrews and aircraft) and predict upcoming mission requirements while also providing personnel in support of the base defense plan. However, this becomes problematic if the companies are unaware of, or do not understand, the plan at the TF level. The best way to reduce this friction is through a protection OPORD so that the roles and responsibilities are clearly understood.

Secondly, units must beg, borrow, or (not) steal to have the right equipment to fight the enemy and maintain an appropriate security posture. How can a Soldier shoot, move, and communicate if he is unable to physically see at night? Often, flight companies do not bring or have enough night vision goggles or the appropriate helmet mounts for Soldiers to be combat-effective at night. Another common oversight is not confirming that there are working radios in the gun trucks. These radios are supposed to be communicating with the CP or the TOC whenever suspicious personnel are spotted. The right time for Soldiers to practice taking their fighting positions to pull security is not the first time they hear gunfire outside of the tent. Commanders and First Sergeants must ensure their Soldiers understand and are able to easily access their assigned M4s and/or 240s as needed and are not locked in a weapons rack to which only one person has the key. Key leaders should also ensure that Sol-

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diers carry out sector sketches and know their sectors of fire. Training and fighting in decisive action is not like your last deployment.

Lastly, having a thorough understanding of the Donovian 'Red Book' and the traditional/nontraditional hybrid threats (DA, 2015, p. 1-9), will enable aircrews to effectively identify enemy weapon systems and avoid committing fratricide. Pilots will be able to focus on flying tactically to avoid detection and prevent successful enemy engagements. In addition, aircrews will be better equipped to relay timely informational reports to the TOC, thereby better contributing to the fight when encountering or flying near enemy vehicles. In decisive action, everyone is a sensor and a scout. Regardless of the platform and assigned METS, UH-60 and CH-47 aircraft are often the most effective nonstandard ISR since they typically end up flying around the majority of the area of operations.

COMMUNICATION

The overarching issue of communication is directly related to aircrew reports. How often as pilots do we turn in a risk assessment worksheet to the battalion flight operations section or the TF TOC and say, "Here you go!" to the flight operations NCO/Soldier who is supposed to battle-track that specific mission? How well are we setting that individual or the TOC up for success? What happens when there are changes to the mission, and the TOC or flight operations didn't have a great understanding of the initial mission in the first place? The battle captain or battle NCO will be hard pressed to effectively brief or update the TF commander so that he or she can make an informed decision when the time comes.

If a pilot would take just 4 or 5 minutes to effectively communicate the mission to the TOC flight operations personnel, who the crews are, how many aircraft are participating, where the crews are flying, etc., these actions would immediately pay huge dividends. The TOC personnel could then take ownership of the mission, plot the route, track the crews, and have a greater understanding of the overall mission. This habitually overlooked piece of integration would directly set the TF up for overall greater success, especially when the BCT is requesting assistance from aviation assets in a busy, ever-changing environment.

This scenario is just one example of proactive communication and integration at echelon, which also leads directly to mitigating the risks of a lack of communication and highlights the idea of utilizing multiple means of synchronizing elements during a deliberate or routine mission. Ultimately, overcommunication is almost always preferred to a lack of communication. Integrating with supported units means establishing effective and reliable ways to talk and coordinate with them. Integrating with sister companies and higher headquarters denotes communicating with them early and often, by any and all means available.

SUMMARY

Army aviation exists to support the ground force, and one way company commanders can ensure they successfully support the BCT is through focusing on integrating themselves and their formation into the plan early and often. The six areas of MATC3 (mission planning, airspace, T&EOs, COP, combat mindset, and communication) can help provide key leaders a framework with which to guide their formation while maximizing the strengths and minimizing the weaknesses of their formation. The intent of this strategy is to help company commanders effectively train their unit while simultaneously ensuring successful support to the BCT and the division. All units can do this by proactively fighting for information instead of waiting to be told what to do. Ultimately, as aviation professionals, flight companies establish and maintain a mutual trust with the ground force by ensuring their mission success.

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C/1-52 "Arctic Dustoff" during NTC Rotation 19-05. Photo credited to U.S. Army CPT Michael Mason

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ADDITIONAL FIRE SUPPORT OFFICERS IN COMBAT AVIATION BRIGADES

By CPT Harrison Green

In recent years, potential U.S. military adversaries have put increased emphasis on strategic integrated air defense systems (IADS) that now pose the greatest threat to U.S. Army aviation. As a result, the branch and the U.S. Army have begun reevaluating and revising tactics and strategy, as well as reorganizing to meet the potential future challenges that the new IADS environment poses. In my 6 short years in the branch, I have seen dramatic changes in doctrine, training, and even a shift in the focus of conversation of leaders at all echelons; this trend likely will and should continue. The anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threat is complex and requires continued emphasis on changing and developing the force to overcome those complexities.

U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flight crews of Company B, 3rd Assault Helicopter Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, take off from a training area just outside of Varstu, Estonia with Estonian soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, Estonian Defence Force, onboard, May 9, 2018. Both countries worked together to conduct a rapid-response air mission during Operation Hedgehog, a multinational exercise held in Estonia to enhance readiness and interoperability between Allies and partners in the Baltic region. U.S. Army photo by SGT Gregory T. Summers / 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

In October 2017, the Army published its six modernization priorities, emphasizing lethality of fires and continued support for future vertical lift projects intended to enhance air assault and air movement capabilities (Milley & McCarthy, 2017). These are important goals and if achieved, will help prepare the Army and the branch for the near-peer fight we may face. However, if we do not integrate the lethality of fires and air assault capability now, we are at risk of failing against a near-peer threat. Field Manual 3-99, "Airborne and Air Assault Operations" states, "Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of ground forces" (Department of the Army, 2015). Simply put, air assaults are inherently risky missions that require careful synchronization and effective planning. Although the Army's modernization efforts are important, it will take time to prepare and implement these changes. In the short term, we can take small but important steps that will help prepare for a fight in an A2/AD environment, and consequently, help to facilitate the future success of the Army's modernization efforts. Specifically, the branch can make small but critical

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organizational changes in personnel and training in order to ensure proper planning and conduct of fires during air assault operations.

While assigned to the 3-227th Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB), I deployed twice to Europe in support of Operation Atlantic Resolve. Throughout these experiences and training in preparation for the rotations, it was evident that leaders at every level had to reassess how they would conduct air assaults in A2/AD environments. We quickly learned that we had to conduct thorough planning for suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) and integrate artillery into our tactics. As a result, these processes quickly rose to the top of our training priorities. Each air assault we planned, we attempted to organize a fires plan to support the maneuver. Despite our awareness of its importance, one problem continued to plague our assault battalion in every exercise we conducted: no one knew how to properly plan fires. During most exercises, officers with little-to-no experience attempted to fill the void. We sought assistance from fire support officers (FSOs) with sister units or the brigade staff and tried to develop plans that made sense, but no one had the training or baseline knowledge to understand what artillery could add to the fight or an understanding of how to plan and execute its integration and synchronization. Inevitably, we planned almost all of our fires in vicinity of our landing zones (LZs), and we often failed to understand what capabilities were even available to us. We did our best, but we did not have the tools consistently to get the best plan.

Though our unit improved over time at integrating artillery into our planning, it was only through trial and error, outsourcing requests for information, or sheer luck that we developed fires plans for our air assaults. Usually, our plans were simple: we would emplace smoke rounds near the LZs or an illumination round for a night operation. Very rarely did we conduct true SEAD planning and almost never planned to employ fires to facilitate our actual flight path. The FSOs within the brigade provided the best guidance available, but simply aided our planning as consultants rather than dedicated staff members. Ultimately, after each iteration of training, it seemed as though we were making it up as we went, and we quickly determined that the depth of knowledge and experience with artillery assets simply did not exist among our organic personnel. For one exercise, we were able to arrange to attach one of the FSOs from a sister battalion and as a result, found our greatest success in fires planning and integration. Though we had support from FSOs previously, it was not until we had a dedicated FSO on our aviation task force staff throughout all phases of planning and execution that we felt

U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter flight crews of Company B, 3rd Assault Helicopter Battalion, 227th Aviation Regiment, 1st Air Cavalry Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, land to conduct a rapid-response air mission with Estonian soldiers of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, Estonian Defence Force, at a training area just outside of Varstu, Estonia, May 9, 2018. The air exercise is part of Operation Hedgehog, an Estonian-led multinational exercise designed to enhance readiness and interoperability between Allies and partners in the Baltic region. U.S. Army photo by SGT Gregory T. Summers / 22nd Mobile Public Affairs Detachment

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most confident in our ability to conduct thorough and successful fires planning and integration with air assault.

Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, "Operations," states that, "Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information" (Department of the Army, 2017). It is a commander's staff that provides him the information to make these judgements. Though commanders often have a depth of knowledge and experiences to draw from, they are not subject matter experts in all warfighting functions (WfF). In the assault battalion, we had a staff officer or staff section that addressed each WfF to provide the commander with plans and running estimates, thus enabling him to mass combat power to accomplish his mission. Fires constituted the only WfF that had to be resourced externally to the battalion staff. Consequently, it proved the most difficult to plan, integrate, and execute and prompted us to seek support elsewhere. The current modified table of organization and equipment only provides the combat aviation brigade with five FSOs. Three are at the brigade-level staff, one is in the attack reconnaissance squadron, and the other is in the attack reconnaissance battalion. Neither the AHB nor the general support aviation battalion (GSAB) has an FSO or staff section dedicated to fires. Therefore, to provide AHB and GSAB commanders with adequate depth of staff support to conduct the planning and integration of fires that air assault doctrine prescribes, the aviation branch should seek to add FSOs or dedicated fires planning cells to these units.

Critics may argue that when planning an air assault, the supported ground unit should have an FSO to plan fires. Consequently, there is no need for the aviation unit to have one organically. Ground FSOs should be planning and integrating fires during the air assault planning process, but an FSO from a ground maneuver unit will inherently focus on the ground force commander's ground tactical plan. This is why most of our fires planning centered on the LZs; it was simply where the ground FSO's focus was. Additionally, Army aviation operations are unique, differing in many ways from ground maneuver. Most FSOs focus on the LZs and objective areas because it is within the scope of their knowledge and experience of combined arms maneuver. However, as the aviation task force staff, it is our responsibility to develop the plan to support ground forces' movement from pickup zone (PZ) to LZ. Field Manual 3-99 states that during an air assault, the air mission commander's headquarters is responsible for the planning and integration of fires to facilitate the air movement plan, that is, when the assault forces move from the PZ to the LZ (Department of the Army, 2015). Despite assigning this responsibility though, these headquarters do not have the organic personnel to accomplish it.

If Army aviation hopes to succeed in conducting air assaults in an A2/AD environment, it must have the ability to plan and integrate SEAD fires throughout the route of flight. The aviation branch, and specifically the assault community, needs a more broad-scale understanding of fires commensurate with our branch's extensive operational reach. Wherever we go, we need to equip our commanders fully to apply combat power, especially in a decentralized environment in which the enemy will degrade our capability to communicate. The best means of accomplishing this in the short term is by placing organic FSOs in the AHBs and GSABs who can train with the unit, understand its mission, and most importantly, adequately provide aviation commanders the ability to maximize combat power. Furthermore, we must continue to train and develop FSOs in these positions by consistently integrating the fires WfF into air assaults. This will enable air assaults in A2/AD environments while conducting austere and decentralized operations, and thus, will enhance our branch's support of the ground force commander and his mission.

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ARMY LEADERSHIP

BY 1SG KEVIN D. SHOUN



U.S. Army Acting Surgeon General MAJ Gen. R. Scott Dingle tours the smoke covered medical lanes during the CSM Jack L. Clark Jr. Army Best Medic Competition at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Washington, Sept. 24, 2019. U.S. Army photo by John Wayne Liston/ Released

Leadership and leader are terms and titles that are automatically bestowed upon our junior and senior service members throughout the Army. We assume, due to the rank on someone's chest or the position in which they hold, that they have the knowledge and desire to lead and train Soldiers. But what makes a leader? An even better question would be, what makes a *great* leader? Are great leaders created by simply placing someone in front of a formation and dubbing him or her the leader? While that may be how it works in most units throughout our fighting force, I question if this is the best way to create the quality of leadership that is required to make tough decisions in some of the most demanding environments imaginable. It is not my intent to discredit the Army nor how it builds leaders, because some of the most iconic military leaders have ties to our premier Army lineage. However, I do believe that the term "leader" is often overused and placed on the shoulders of less than capable men and women who are expected to lead formations with minimal leadership training.

ESTABLISHING RELATIONSHIPS

We do not place enough emphasis on the importance of establishing relationships and fostering a human connection with our Soldiers. We become so wrapped up in completing the 'mission' that we often completely negate the human aspect of our formation. The Army defines a leader as, "Anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization" (Department of the Army, 2012, p. 1). Routinely, the organizational and mission goals are conveyed down to the lowest levels possible from our leaders. However, how often do we as leaders take the time to become familiar with our Soldiers, their de-

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sires, and their career and life aspirations? You know, the people who are making the mission happen. I'm going to go out on a limb here and say, it doesn't happen too often; at least it rarely happened to me. I believe that by not establishing relationships with the Soldiers we lead, we ignore a critical aspect of leadership. I have learned that people will work harder, do more with less, and go further than you ever asked them to if they are simply treated as a person; rank immaterial. Some of the greatest leaders I have worked with established this type of professional relationship—not by drinking and fraternizing with their Soldiers—rather by initiating deliberate conversations with the formations and individuals they led. These leaders were outwardly positive, confident in their abilities, had a tremendous presence, were extremely humble, and did not have to reference their rank or remind anyone that they were, "in charge." They commanded their formations by being the type of leaders that Soldiers naturally wanted to follow.

CONSISTENT MENTORSHIP

We lack consistent mentorship. As we are all aware, the Army is a revolving door, and the majority of our fighting force is expected to move every 2 to 4 years. With such a consistent turnover of leaders and Soldiers, it can be difficult to establish relationships that enable effective mentee and mentor relationships to flourish. Leadership is a skill and process, which can be learned or taught, similar to a trade skill. But how much effort do we put into mentoring our junior and senior service members to become great leaders? For example, according to Electricianschooledu.org (2019), "To become a journeyman electrician, you must complete a rigorous course of education and training in the form of an apprenticeship consisting of between 500 and 1,000 classroom hours and between 8,000 and 10,000 hours (5–6 years) of supervised work experience and on-the-job training." Thankfully, the Army offers its service members outstanding Professional Military Education (PME) opportunities, which provide tremendous value for all who attend and apply themselves. Collectively, these courses exceed the example I provided. However, I think leaders heavily rely on PMEs to teach future leaders everything they need to know about leadership, oftentimes negating the importance that apprenticeship or mentoring has on the formations we lead. For example, how many years of mentorship and how much leadership training are junior service members given before leading unsupervised in the Army? For me, it was less than 2 years without any doctrinal leadership training or consistent mentorship, and there I was leading a squad element, responsible for the lives of three other human beings, expected to lead and mentor them. Was I

U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard senior leaders pose for a photograph during a visit to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait, Sept. 9, 2019. The senior leaders were in the U.S. Army Central area of operations to visit with deployed Soldiers and to receive updates on current operations. U.S. Army Reserve photo by SGT Jennifer Shick

ready? It's debatable. Did I receive consistent professional and leader development from my senior leaders? Hardly ever. In fact, throughout my 15 years of service, the vast majority of my professional development has been gained through my own efforts to self-educate and seek out leaders I respect. Even then, it has often been me pulling information from my senior leaders and mentors rather than them willingly sharing information with me and my peers. I believe a potential solution would be to keep organizational leaders and staff, at all levels, in place for at least 18 to 24 months and for brigade, battalion, and company leaders to establish mentorship programs. According to the Army Mentorship Handbook, "Mentors and mentees have an opportunity to expand their technical, interpersonal, and leadership skills through the mentorship relationship. More specifically, mentoring helps mentees identify and prepare for positions which best fit their needs and interests. This in turn, benefits the Army by enabling it to fill positions with the most capable, motivated personnel" (Department of the Army, 2005, p. 6).

COOKIE CUTTER LEADERSHIP

We have a cookie cutter approach to leader development. Throughout my career, I have had countless leaders preach that I must shape and adapt my leadership style to best suit the formation I am leading; one style does not always work. Yet, the Army has a predetermined career map for me and my commissioned and warrant officer counterparts. I have experienced great leaders and substandard leaders. The great leaders wanted to be out front, exemplified high standards of themselves, and expected high standards of others. They were not afraid to get in the trenches and dig a fighting position right alongside me. Substandard leaders spent more time complaining about their job and wished they had a staff job or a position in which they did not have to "worry about Soldiers." An effective Army listens to the desires of its people; if someone wants to stay out front leading, that's who should be selected to lead. Similarly, if someone wants to work a staff or operations position, an effective Army should, if able, accommodate that desire. In addition, I believe the STEP (Select-Train-Educate-Promote) Program, a talent-based promotion system, will significantly improve our junior and senior leader population. However, it is imperative for leaders at all levels to be honest brokers when closing out annual evaluations; not everyone should get a trophy. Most duty assignments are predetermined and filled by updating a human resources matrix via some detached career manager making a career decision for someone he or she has never met and usually without input from the service member. Should every Master Sergeant become a First Sergeant or Captain become a Company Commander? I do not believe so. I once had a "leader" stand in front of our formation before taking

CAMP BUEHRING, Kuwait - Soldiers from the 248th Aviation Support Battalion, Iowa Army National Guard, take the oath of re-enlistment at the Udairi Airfield, Camp Buehring, Kuwait, Feb. 4, 2018. The Iowa National Guard Adjutant General MAJ Gen Timothy Orr, officiated the re-enlistment during his visit overseas to support Soldiers while they are deployed in support of Operation Spartan Shield and Operation Inherent Resolve in the Middle East. U.S. Army photo by SGT Andrew Shipley, 248th ASB

the company Army Physical Fitness Test and say, "remember, you only have to achieve your minimums, strive for your minimums." Is that the kind of "leader" we should have leading Soldiers? Absolutely not! According to Wofford (2016), "Cookie cutter anything, when it comes to working with people, creates half-baked results. Though the case may be made for having a structure, a clear model and a definitive process, being married to one approach, when working with more than one person, doesn't work." We, as a fighting force, must place the right people in the right positions and remind ourselves that a successful career is in the eye of the beholder.

CONCLUSION

Mislabeling our service members as leaders can be detrimental to themselves and the Soldiers they lead. With that, it's imperative that we pour knowledge and experience into our junior service members, because great leaders are not created by accident. We must establish professional relationships with the people we work with and encourage a mentee and mentor relationship to be established. Rank has its place in the military, but the sooner we can get past the rank on someone's chest and see them for who they are—a person and not a rank—the sooner we can accurately depict where they are in their leadership journey. My opinion might be a little biased, but I think it's obvious; we need to place more energy into creating great leaders, those who will lead our Soldiers into battle to fight and win our Nation's future wars. So with all that, what makes a great leader? Although opinions may vary, I believe if leaders have the ability to connect with their Soldiers, consistently seek self-development and mentorship, and are able to professionally adapt their leadership style for personal and unit development, they have a firm foundation on which to become a great leader.

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Leadership of 1st Infantry Division and 1st Combat Aviation Brigade salute the colors during the 1st CAB Change of Command ceremony on 19 July 2019, Storck Barracks, Germany. U.S. Army Photo by SGT Patrick Jubrey

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

TOWARD A MORE COMPLETE VIEW OF LEADERSHIP

BY CW4 LEONARD MOMENY AND LTC MIKE GOURGUES

The military proudly declares leadership to be a hallmark of their greater organizational identity. In the military, a leader is known to both shape and cultivate his organization in such a way as to lead to mission success. Whether positive or negative, this experience influences our Soldiers' initial and enduring understanding of leadership. So what are the variables acting on the leader that informs his actions? Leadership has to be a result of so much more than the abilities of the leader. While one may be responsible for modeling the ideal form of leadership, he must do so within the environment he occupies and with the time available. If this is true, then leadership study and practice may have to rearticulate the process known as leadership. The following essay aims to discuss just a bit more about the reality of leadership, its variables, and how a leader's field of influence is propagated across an organization, thereby increasing the understanding of both the leader and the led in their role regarding a more desirable leadership outcome.

Army SPC Augustine Anukwu, left, distinguished leadership awardee, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, Task Force Spartan, leads the recitation of the Creed of the Noncommissioned Officer during the Basic Leader Course 19-707 graduation ceremony at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, August 1, 2019. Professional development courses such as BLC present the leadership building blocks Soldiers will use throughout their military careers. Photo by U.S. Army SGT Zachary Mott

LEADERSHIP DEFINED AND A COMMON UNDERSTANDING

Leadership is formally defined by the Army in the Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, better known as "Army Leadership and the Profession." Army Doctrine Publication 6-22 defines leadership as **"...the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization"** (Department of the Army, 2019, p. 1-3). Activity is a funny word for leadership, but the definition remains open to multiple variables with which to influence others. This, by extension, allows for activities subordinate to one-on-one communication, such as standard operating procedures and policy letters, to serve as vehicles of influence in a leadership capacity. If nothing else, most people in the Army craft their initial understanding of leadership through orderly transactions such as this. More precisely, "good order and discipline" begins its measure on the basis of how well transactional leadership methods such as these are executed.

As leaders advance in study and experience, some opt for a more mentor-like approach to their efforts. Modern study refers to this as transformational leadership (Northouse, 2019). Such efforts are typically well appreciated by followers, as there is a guiding sense of individualized attention and focus made palpable by the leader. Among many of the more popular approaches to leadership, this approach is most closely related with the coach or mentor who seeks to build himself and the team together. It requires emotional intelligence and deep care for people to execute properly. It is not simply caring for what people are doing today for your organization, but who they can potentially be and what they can do for organizations in the future.

REFINING THE POTENTIAL OF LEADERSHIP UNDERSTANDING

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Whether transactional or transformational in nature, positive and negative leadership behavior seems to hinge upon the individual leader. Why is that? First, the language of leadership is an abstract practice that is generally communicated through professional development sessions and book lists. It is difficult to describe "good" leadership in a vacuum without vignettes about the environment and the environmental factors that must be overcome to achieve success. Second, training in leadership is experiential and is unique to the individual's on-the-job-training, experience, and mentorship. It is a combination of these two limitations that forces us to communicate leadership lessons in hindsight, so much so that "you know good leadership when you see it" is about as predictive as we get. We must become fluent in the other variables to become predictive in our leadership discussions.

So let's look at what variables have outsized impacts on the quality of leadership. Once identified, we could inform future leaders of these variables and train them on how the variables will impact their leadership outcomes. Leadership study is not one-dimensional in the Army and in no way is this to be perceived as an effort to remove ultimate responsibility of leadership accountability, success, or failure from the position of the formal leader. Actually, this is meant to increase the understanding of all members of the organization as to their role and potential area of contribution with respect to achieving a more beneficial leadership experience for all. Perhaps this is already understood by some, but certainly not all, and formalization of variables at play as a part of the leadership process can only help us all to improve.

UNDERSTANDING ALL THE VARIABLES AT PLAY IN THE LEADERSHIP PROCESS

So what does it mean to say that there are variables at play within leadership as a process? Well, there was a psychologist from the early 1930s by the name of Kurt Lewin. Dr. Lewin was a brilliant man and created something called topological psychology. Thrust in the center of his creation was the only formula to be found in all of psychology. In notation, it is written out in the following manner:

$$B = f(p, e)$$

Since there are some who prefer to stay away from anything remotely close to mathematics, it should be noted that there is no need to populate the provided formula's variables with numerals. So please, if you are reading this, breathe easy. So how does it read? Lewin's formula, better known as his field theory, reads as follows: human behavior is a function of both the person and his environment. That kind of makes sense. However, let's make this theoretical prose a little more applicable to the current discussion. Let's replace a few of the items within the formula with more recognizable concepts to the topic of leadership.

Instead of B as representative of general behavior, let's replace that with the specific behavior of leadership (*LDRSHP*). Now, the specific behavior of leadership can be equaled to the function of the person and his environment. While there is no need to replace the variable for environment, the p (person) within the formula can be replaced with LDR (leader). After all, the leader is the person in question, at least traditionally when discussing the process of leadership. Still, these are not the only aspects of everyday life that dictate behavior...there is an aspect of time that must be accounted for to ensure that the final assessment of leadership is inclusive of all aspects related to behavior, to include its occurrence in both time and space. So a quick recap, and remember, there is currently no need to plug numbers into the following formulaic concept:

$$LDRSHP = f(LDR(E, T))$$ [1]

When read from left to right, we see that leadership is equal to the function or perhaps better put, the relationship shared between the leader, their environment, and time. If leadership is to be considered a process—or as the Army describes—an activity, then it should capture all aspects surrounding activity. There is almost no need for numerals within the context of the provided formula, as it does more than enough for our intellectual stimulation on the topic of leadership. Whether a seasoned leader or new to the Army, one can see that the "entire picture" is brought into view within the confines of this simplistic formula. Just the idea of understanding propagated through the study of the supporting variables allows people to see that everything does not simply fall upon the shoulders of the leader. There is so much more at play.

INCREASED UNDERSTANDING AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION

Even though we have presented a conceptual picture of leadership that is different than classically discussed, what is offered is an opportunity to refresh a potentially stale or at least inconsistent approach to leadership study and practice within the Army. Leadership remains as described within the original definition found in ADP 6-22. However, the process of everything arriving to the point of leadership experienced seems to be able to be more inclusive than previously imagined. The open-ended variables offer a tremendous amount of consideration when

[1] The orientation of the *T* variable within the formula was suggested to the authors by a colleague who entered the office while the work was being developed on a public whiteboard. The colleague's name is Clay Hopkins, hence the inclusion of time within the leadership-focused Lewin formula being named the Hopkins Amplification.

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discussing leadership study and education.

First, in our equation and in life, the leader remains a point of focus. However, we can now break out the ideal subordinate points that comprise the concept of the leader independent of his environment. For example, a leader should be intelligent, have experience, understand his craft, and be emotionally intelligent, etc. The variable of the leader is now wide open for discussion.

The environment variable represents additional utility, just as displayed within the potential of the leader variable. Think about the reasoning of the inclusion of the environment. If one is in garrison compared to combat then the stressors are exceptionally different, both personally and professionally. These sorts of concerns bear a burden on behavior, especially specific behavior. Also, an environment can be inclusive of concerns like surrounding organizations, internal and external networks of support, and budgetary concerns. This brings the burden of the environment to full light with respect to leadership analysis, study, and practice. This is easily a point of recognition for ready-made practical application by the modern leader.

Finally, time is always on our minds as leaders. Yet, time is rarely discussed within the confines of leadership discussions. It certainly impacts methods of communication, battlefield circulation opportunities, planning timelines, and familiarization with the problem set, etc. This reality can help mentors offer techniques and recommendations to confront the issue of time. Time is too critical a variable and must be included in the discussion of leadership study and practice.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

This essay was intended to advance the language of leadership. We aimed to draw more attention to the process of leadership and to break out the variables for more impactful discussions. As mentors, we must be able to articulate the art and science of leadership. As students, we must be able to identify successes, failures, and the variables that contributed so our own learning can advance. Leadership is a dynamic process involving an entire team of people and a host of environmental and time variables that ultimately impact the final experience of an organization. Our study and approach to leadership should be as rich and creative as possible.

As leaders, we hope this essay will give you pause to take in the whole of leadership and recharge your efforts, personal study, and practice. If we as professionals are willing to reconsider the role our environment and time plays with respect to the final outcome of leadership effort, then our respective organizations promise to benefit from the work. Additionally, efforts in meaningful reflection regarding leadership can only serve to improve education of our future leaders, ultimately creating a lasting change for the better. If there can be a refined understanding of the leadership process, ultimately producing refinement of roles and contribution, then it is our duty to pursue that new understanding.

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Students from Basic Leader Course class 19-705 line up before walking across the stage during their graduation ceremony held at Camp Buehring, Kuwait, June 8, 2019. The Basic Leader Course prepares junior Soldiers for leadership positions within their units while in deployed overseas. U.S. Army Reserve photo by SGT Jennifer Shick

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How to be Successful in Operations With a Maintenance Background

By SFC Brian A. Egesdahl



Having completed nearly 10 years in 3-160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne) as a crew-chief, maintainer, quality control technical inspector (TI), and platoon sergeant, it was time for me to move on to different things. I was offered an unknown position at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany. I jumped at the chance, knowing it was a well sought-after position with endless career opportunities. I reached out to the Falcon Team's Senior Enlisted Aviation Trainer, CSM James Etheridge, to inquire about which position I would be filling. I was told that I would be an Observer, Coach, and Trainer (OC/T) in the Falcon Team's operations section, observing Rotational Training Units during the planning and execution of training missions throughout Europe. Coming from a nearly exclusive maintenance background, I was horrified.

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A U.S. Soldier of Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC)(Operations Group) Falcon Observer Coach Trainer Team watches U.S. Army AH-64 Apaches of 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade maneuver to a tactical formation while conducting an aerial attack scenario during Exercise Griffin Smite at the JMRC in Hohenfels, Germany, Dec. 9, 2016. Griffin Smite trains Army attack and assault aircraft from Germany and the United States to operate effectively against ground and anti-air threats. U.S. Army photo by SPC Danielle Carver

Pulling me from the ledge, CSM Etheridge assured me that I would perform well, and he was placing me in operations as a, "professional development step in my career in order to make me a better leader, broadening my potential for battalion level positions in the future" (personal communication, December 2018). I had poured myself into becoming a good maintainer and TI and paid little to no attention to mission planning and execution. In this article, I will discuss the challenges I faced with a lack of operations experience and how I overcame that inexperience.

Now, having several rotations under my belt, I have found four distinct areas that have been useful in my journey to be successful as an operations OC/T with the ability to coach and train Soldiers of a Command Post (CP). The areas are formal education, doctrine, personal experience, and attitude. I will discuss what I learned to be important about each and how it can help you grow.

First, I learned there are several formal classes available pertaining to operations that would assist in learning how to be an operations OC/T. The battle staff course teaches battalion-level mission planning based on an operations order. It goes indepth into the military decisionmaking process, the warfighting functions, understanding Army decision methodology, and how to build a common operational picture. The joint firepower course takes it a step further, incorporating multinational and multiservice militaries into a theater-level planning process adding multiservice close air support, joint air attack teams, and land/marine FIRES. With the immense amount of information filtering through a tactical operations center, the knowledge management course would be a great tool, as it teaches how to deal with the amount of information in operations. The only problem with operations-specific formal education is that if we don't need it, why go? The answer is that as we all grow more senior, we need to have a better picture of what is happening behind the scenes and to understand what is going on.

Second, understanding what happens during planning and execution in the CP and why certain decisions are being made has been my main focus. Digging into operations doctrine is by far an extensive and daunting task. However, there are a few publications I found to be helpful in the beginning in conjunction with what I learned from school.

Opposite Page: U.S. Army AH-64 Apache helicopters of 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade fly in a tactical formation while conducting an aerial attack scenario during Exercise Griffin Smite at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, Dec. 9, 2016. Griffin Smite trains Army attack and assault aircraft from Germany and the United States to operate effectively against ground and anti-air threats. U.S. Army photo by SPC Danielle Carver

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The operations-based Army Doctrine Publications (ADPs), ADP 3-0, ADP 5-0, and ADP 6-0, are shortened versions of the much larger Army Doctrine Reference Publication. They offer insight on what is supposed to happen throughout the operations process "planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations" (Department of the Army [DA], 2019, p. iii). To understand the operations process, you first need to understand "Mission Command" (DA, 2019), and how the commander enables subordinates to make decisions based on his/her intent. "Operations" publication ADP 3-0 (DA, 2019), provides guidance and direction for the commander's staff to assist in conducting the flow of operations. "Command Post Organization and Operations" Army Techniques Publication 6-0.5 (DA, 2017), was also helpful in that it outlines CP positions, responsibilities, techniques, and serves as a guide for a unit to build and implement a standard operating procedure for CP operations.

Third, personal experience is our best teacher. It sticks with us better than schooling because when at school, you learn very quickly and may not use a large portion of this information for long periods. It is then forgotten and has to be relearned. If you take the time to involve yourself in different sections of your unit, you will be surprised at what you might be subjected to. I was an MH-60 maintenance technician and TI for the majority of my career and understand maintenance planning and the flight hour program very well. I had the ability to delve into planning if I so chose. However, I kept my blinders on and only focused on being good at what I was currently doing. In retrospect, I could have easily learned some of the things that would have made me more successful from the start as an operations OC/T.

I had the opportunity to have a discussion with SGM Christopher Boyle, Operations SGM with the 1st Combat Aviation Brigade out of Fort Riley, Kansas. He told me, "understanding capabilities and knowing your resources is a valuable asset coming from a maintenance background" (personal communication, April 2019). That being said, I have been able to use my own past experiences to understand how maintenance, manning, and aircraft capability affect the planning of a mission at all levels.

Finally, attitude. Attitude is everything. If you find yourself placed in an unfamiliar position and have a negative attitude, you won't be able to make the best of it. A positive outlook will help you learn the information necessary to be successful in operations if you don't already have the experience. Inject yourself into the planning process, learn as much from your leaders as possible, and show your subordinates that they, too, can succeed with a positive attitude.

In summary, a combination of formal education, doctrine, personal experience, and attitude are what make us good at any position we may find ourselves in. As we are growing our knowledge base during our career, we need to start thinking of the positions we could find ourselves in and prepare. It is hard to get out of our little boxes and look ahead. However, if we want to be relevant and successful outside of our comfort zones, we need to prepare to the best of our ability. Operations was never a section in which I thought I would find myself. With the skills I have attained over the years—past and most recent—I am succeeding in this position.

U.S. Soldiers of 1st Battalion, 3rd Aviation Regiment, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade are required to operate within a designated operational training area while conducting an aerial attack scenario during Exercise Griffin Smite at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Hohenfels, Germany, Dec. 9, 2016. Griffin Smite trains Army attack and assault aircraft from Germany and the United States to operate effectively against ground and anti-air threats. U.S. Army photo by SPC Danielle Carver

SFC Brian A. Egesdahl is a UH-60 helicopter repairer with 15 years in the Army. He currently serves as an aviation operations Observer, Coach, Trainer (OC/T) at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center (JMRC), located in Hohenfels, Germany.

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Department of the Army. (2019). *The operations process* (Army Doctrine Publication 5-0). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army.

WHAT'S STOPPING YOU FROM SUBMITTING YOUR ARTICLE TO AVIATION DIGEST?

BEING A PUBLISHED AUTHOR IS A GREAT WAY TO:

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- Expand your knowledge base
- Share learned information and experience
- Express relevant opinions to the aviation community
- Inspire participation from AD readers and the aviation community
- Accomplish personal goals

ALONG WITH ARTICLES CORRESPONDING TO OUR FOCUS TOPICS, WE ARE ALWAYS LOOKING FOR:

- Leadership
- Leadership Development
- Book Reviews
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Aviation DIGEST UNITED STATES ARMY

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Aviation Digest Archive Article

November/December 1991

Where Have All The Leaders Gone?

by Mr. John L. Wenrich Jr.

This article examines the impact that basic leadership traits have when molding the proper attitudes in the aviation/aviator recruit.

Recently, FLIGHTFAX published the account of an Army aviator who had been reported on many operational hazard reports as having performed dangerous, unauthorized flight maneuvers. Moreover, no one took effective, corrective measures against him. Therefore, while performing one of these maneuvers, he finally killed himself and almost killed his passenger.

More recently, another class A accident occurred when an aviator attempted an unauthorized aerobatic maneuver from which he could not recover. He crashed. The aircraft was destroyed. There were no fatalities, except for one possible permanently disabled crewmember.

In the latter case, the pilot had been observed performing dangerous maneuvers on many occasions. However, he was reported only once. The unit instructor pilot verbally counseled him. After he was counseled, peers, supervisors, and subordinates observed that he continued to fly unauthorized maneuvers that exceeded performance limitations. Yet, no one made any further reports or attempts to correct him. To further compound the problem, after the crash, no one, including those who witnessed the accident, came forward to acknowledge his previous infractions.

Nearly 2 months later, a crewmember admitted the maneuver had been pilot-induced, and nothing had been wrong with the aircraft control system. Later, other members of the pilot's unit confirmed these facts.

For the most part, pilots involved in these kinds of accidents usually are considered to be "good pilots." They have excellent coordination and flying abilities. However, it takes more than being a "good pilot" to be a professional pilot and a safe one. It takes honesty, integrity, loyalty, responsibility, discipline, attention to personal appearance, sound judgment, and many other associated leadership traits, to be a safe, professional military pilot.

As we look at today's aviation society, we see we have few true leaders left. Yes, we have many good managers and many "good pilots," but yesterday's leaders are gone, and gone with them are some of our basic military ethics.

Bureaucratic managers, waiting for another promotion for maximum pension, have replaced our leaders. These are harsh words; however, as leaders we have to be honest with ourselves, our superiors, and our subordinates. But we are not being honest. We are saying what the boss wants to hear, not what really happened when we talk about safety and accident prevention.

Aviation Safety Publications

Most aviation safety publications are devoted to human factors. Rightly so, because statistics continue to indicate that human factors are the cause of most accidents (85 percent). The percentage of accidents attributed to human factors has remained constant through the years. We keep pounding the issue in every safety article and safety publication. Thousands of words reverberate the human factors

role in aviation accidents. Yet, our publications appear not to have helped the human factors problems in accidents.

The Human Mold

We have corrected materiel failures and identified maintenance-associated problems with substantial, positive results. How can we make such strides in one area and achieve such poor headway in another? The reason is that human factors are simply that—human. We can change the design and materials used in building and maintaining aircraft and equipment, but the aircrew are more complicated to change. We can change the mold of physical things, but the mold of the human being is steadfast. To change the human mold we must do so early. The old saying, "a born leader" applies only to a few; we have to train the rest. We must not assume that pinning officer bars on a soldier automatically makes him or her a leader.

The human mold, once set, mandates all future potential. It determines one's capabilities and sets one's character and attitudes. To change any of the vital functions of the human mold requires a complete overhaul or rebuilding of the human system. That task is not easy, because it involves a psychological change.

We must get down to the basics of leadership and teach these basics early, either in Officer Candidate School or in flight training. Without the basic leadership traits, no foundation to nurture or build upon exists.

Unless the initial seeds of professional ethics, motivation, and attitude are planted firmly and permanently within the new recruit, the recruit is a prime candidate for a future accident. These ethics must be molded into the highest possible standards to sustain the recruit and they must prevail in the recruit throughout the his or her career.

A lasting desire to excel as a professional officer and aviator must be created within the soldier. That desire includes a safety consciousness that remains throughout the soldier's military career in all flight duties and tasks assigned.

Leadership Traits

What basic leadership traits are we talking about? They are the same traditional terms known to all military officers. We hear them mentioned in every leadership class. They appear prominently on officer evaluation reports. These traits have become more and more critical in the human factors role in aviation safety. These traits are prerequisites for being a successful and safe aviator. A discussion of these traits follows as well as the positive results they have in decreasing the human factors percentages in aircraft accidents.

Loyalty. True loyalty requires respect. The development of respect for others is an evolutionary process. Its roots lie in self-respect. If the young aviation cadet has no self-respect when entering flight training, the cadet may never develop respect and loyalty for others. Without this trait, the cadet will never become a leader nor a professional aviator having the proper attitude on safety.

The antonym for loyalty is betrayal, and betrayal cannot be tolerated within the aviation safety program. To equate this trait with the proper attitude on safety, one must relate it to its roots—self-respect. If we are unable to instill self-esteem in the soldier and the soldier has no respect for others or the aircraft he or she flies, eventually the soldier will become a statistic.

Personal Appearance. Aviators have traditionally viewed themselves as separate and unique, an elite fraternal group with a history of high standards. Standing tall and displaying pride in personal appearance goes hand-in-hand with being a military leader. Individual and unit pride are reflections of individual and unit attention to personal appearance, presence, and comportment. This trait is addressed on officer evaluation reports.

When an aviator's appearance is sloppy, we question his or her behavior. Is it purposely self-destructive? Are there underlying unconscious needs for failure? When we see an aviator/officer who is either obese, untidy, or in desperate need of a haircut, this aviator's behavior tells us that "something is wrong." Anyone who has been around

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aviation more than a day knows the standards for professional grooming. When an aviator forgets these standards, we must ask, "Why?"

A disregard for professional appearance is usually an insidious process indicating the aviator really does not care. Unprofessional appearance may represent a badge of rebellion against accepted standards. This behavior, in aviation safety terms, spells disaster.

Discipline. Discipline is more than an ability and obedience to perform a duty or task. Leaders must focus their energies toward the needs of the organization, instead of their personal needs. Leaders must instill confidence and display actions that contribute to achieving unit goals.

Safety discipline is the will to tell the truth, when the boss does not want to hear it. It is the ability to make decisions that will enhance accident prevention and to recommend the best course of action, not the easiest or most self-serving. Discipline is doing what is right, based on safety and organizational requirements and not based on personal gain.

Responsibility. Because they are always on display, leaders must seek and take responsibility for being role models. Their actions relate their true philosophy. Leaders must accept obligations and stand up for their subordinates to ensure that what their subordinates perceive is consistent with what the leaders intend to convey.

Leaders are responsible for themselves, their subordinates, and, frequently, their superiors. A close synonym for responsibility in the world of aviation is teamwork. Flight crewmembers are responsible for coordinating with each other; i.e., peers, subordinates, and superiors, to maintain the safe conduct of the mission. Accepting responsibility cohesively blends the other ingredients of leadership together. It establishes the trustworthy, reliable, and reputable traits necessary to be a professional military officer and safe aviator.

Judgment. Judgment measures the aviator's ability to perceive, balance, and distinguish relationships and alternatives. Judgment is the ability to take the initiative, discriminate accurately, behave appropriately, and develop plans and properly execute them. Judgment is simply good common sense.

In military leadership, a soldier who consistently places himself or herself in harm's way, using poor judgment, is doomed to failure. That soldier is further imperiled because he or she simply does not recognize his or her poor judgment. The soldier constantly places blame for his or her problems on persons or events beyond his or her control. In aviation safety terms, a lack of common sense forecasts a stormy future. Impaired judgment indicates a soldier's thoughts and actions are inconsistent with reality. The world of flying is a real, unforgiving world. A discerning superior suspects faulty judgment when he or she consistently observes odd or bizarre actions or speech. Officers and aviators should display good judgment in the early development stages. Without good common sense, a soldier cannot be a leader, nor can he or she maintain the attitude on safety required of a professional aviator.

Military integrity approaches a dedication to duty that is close to a religious devotion.

Integrity. Without integrity, all other traits are without direction. Are we allowing integrity to soften in today's military organization? Has this trait lost its fundamental importance?

By definition, integrity is "adherence to moral and ethical principles, soundness of character, honesty . . . to have a firm code or standard of values." Soldiers with integrity do not lie, cheat, or steal. But, in reality, integrity goes deeper than that. Military integrity approaches a dedication to duty that is close to religious devotion.

Field Manual 100-1 states, "A firm ethical base is the cornerstone of the Army." Integrity bonds

soldiers and units together, enabling them to sustain victory. If that capability is not nurtured, shaped, and maintained by leaders through proper example and standards, organizations will fail.

In essence, this fundamental trait of leadership is one of the most powerful weapons of war. Without this trait, battles are lost, and the same is true for officers and aviators. Without this trait, human factors will continue to be the main cause of accidents.

Measuring Performance

Where have the leaders gone? As technology continues to increase, we find ourselves in a changing environment. Integrity waivers with the arrival of more computer technology. Obviously, computers are useful tools for accounting, administrative tasks, and recordkeeping.

However, computer-aided tasks have caused some perfidious changes in our performance evaluation techniques at nearly all levels. Goals, milestones, and performance now are defined in terms of numbers, percentages, and ratios.

The personal side of performance evaluation, the human factor, can no longer be measured. It is losing its meaning. As the units compete to meet their goals, they naturally display their more favorable members. Statistical analyses play a role. Honest manipulation of figures, within limits, still yields an accurate picture of unit performance.

Problems arise, however, when goals become impossible to meet. Some units are greatly tempted to become more creative with figures. The numbers are faceless, nameless, and seemingly exist only on the computer paper, so why not be deceptive? The line separating reasonable numerical interpretation and deception is thin.

Frequently, we lose sight of our goals and primary mission. We are so engrossed in modern technology that we are slow to visualize an erosion of the basic leadership traits and the principles of integrity. We are losing the individual fiber that once bonded together soldiers and units. We are losing trust, honor, pride, and the principles of self-police. In the past, when a member blemished the organization by his or her substandard performance or conduct, the member was disciplined or expelled. Such performance simply was not tolerated. Without extensive intraorganizational police, the door is open for violation of integrity. The consequences are staggering in terms of poor safety standards and accidents.

Conclusion

If we must count numbers to account for what the bosses want, we must start counting the losses in leadership and address the real issue. As leaders, each and every one of us must stop procrastinating and start being honest. We must go back to the basic traits of leadership and regain our pride and honor. In today's dynamic and increasingly complex world, we must work harder to maintain these basic values. We must again start to make leaders out of men so we will not have to ask, "Where have all the leaders gone?"

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Aviation Branch Safety Office

Readers may address matters concerning aviation safety to: Commander, USAAVNC, ATTN: ATZQ-S, Fort Rucker, AL 36362-5000

Magnificent Desolation: *The Long Journey Home from the Moon*

Authors: Buzz Aldrin and Ken Abraham, June 1, 2010. Paperback, 352 pages, Three Rivers Press, New York, Reprint edition

A book review by MAJ (Ret.) Eric Comette



Be honest with yourself. Do you have what it takes to be an astronaut? How about what it takes to pilot a spacecraft designed in the 1960s—the days of slide rules and mental math—to the Moon, land it, and fly it back safely? Yeah, me either. Any intellectually honest person would agree that it takes a very special representative of humanity to do such a magnificent thing. A thing that, in addition to providing all of humankind with a concrete example of what we are capable of when our bodies, minds, and resources are set free, but also something that bequeaths Americans a particular reason to stand a bit taller before the world. To that, I would like to say in this book review: Thank you, Dr. Aldrin. I would consider the opportunity to grip your hand one of a lifetime.

In his book *Magnificent Desolation: The Long Journey Home from the Moon*, with coauthor Ken Abraham, Dr. Edwin Eugene "Buzz" Aldrin tells the eye-opening and humbling story of his life after he returned from humanity's first giant leap into the stars. Known as the second man on the Moon, Dr. Aldrin has survived what would have done most of us military fliers in and still accomplished more to promote future space flight than any other astronaut in our history. In fact, the book is dedicated to the crew members present and future of manned spaced programs. Most openly and without regard to the unjust stigma of mental illness, he takes us along with him through his post- Moon landing history as he struggled though alcoholism, depression, family history of suicide, and the politics of the Officer Corps in both the U.S. Air Force and at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. He shows us the human side of being famous and a figurehead of iron constitution. He is quick to convey that he is not a superman but just a human, like the rest of us, capable of the super and wondrous when we are free to achieve our highest possible state. He is a good man at his core and is the embodiment of the uniquely American attitude of not "who is going to let me…?" but rather "who is going to stop me…?"

In just a small testament to his efforts, even if you cannot picture his face while you read this, it is safe to say that you have probably seen him before. The famous photograph of a human bootprint on the Moon is his. The astronaut by the U.S. flag that Music Television uses as its logo is him. He even has a very famous cousin—maybe you have heard of him—Buzz Lightyear.

In a professional direction, while reading *Magnificent Desolation*, aviators will gain an appreciation of the similarities between Moon flight and our current missions when Dr. Aldrin details some of the more interesting procedures used to fly to and from the Moon. For instance, the first action the astronauts took on the Moon's surface was to run through the checklist and practice an emergency ascent should something happen. An aviator will certainly see the "what if, what if, what if…?" mentality needed for space flight and instantly connect with this book.

I cannot recommend *Magnificent Desolation* highly enough. Buzz Aldrin's contributions to the United States, and thus to all of free living humanity, will be with us forever. Not only has he walked on the Moon, he has made contributions to the space shuttle program and also given us a way to efficiently cycle spacecraft around the Earth and Moon, as well as Earth and Mars—known as the "Aldrin Mars Cycler." Remember that name; you will hear it again. Perhaps your children and grandchildren will ride to the Moon and Mars on one. I truly believe mine will. Aldrin tells us, "As long as I am here on Earth I want to be contributing to the present and I want to stride confidently into the future."

Dr. Buzz Aldrin closes his book with, "I believe mankind must explore or expire. We must venture outward and one way or another when men and woman first set foot on Mars I will be there weather watching on my flat screen television in my Los Angeles home or looking down from the stars."

After reading his book, it is easy for me to say that Dr. Aldrin is a National treasure…no, more than that. He is a treasure to all of humanity that is most assuredly human.

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2020 Topics and Themes

JANUARY-MARCH: AVIATION AND EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS

Areas of article interest could include:

- Logistical Challenges Specific to Aviation During Expeditionary Operations
- Expeditionary Operations Training
- Expeditionary Operations and Professional Military Education (PME)
- Concerns and Conceptualizing Expeditionary Operations Specific to Aviation

APRIL-JUNE: DENIED, DEGRADED, AND DISRUPTED SPACE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS (D3SOE)

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- Contextualizing D3SOE for Army Aviation
- D3SOE and Aviation as a Stopgap for the Brigade Combat Team Commander
- Tactics and D3SOE
- Mission-Planning Challenges and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace During D3SOE

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- Expanding and Rethinking UAS Roles in LSCO
- UAS and the Deep Fight

**Large-Scale Combat Operations

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- Intermediate-Level Education and Refocusing Senior Officer Training for Advisory and Mission Planning Needs in LSCO
- Warrant Officer Tracking and LSCO-Driven Educational Needs

General Topics Always Appreciated:

- Leadership
- Professional Book Reviews
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- Training Center Rotation Preparation
- Other Similar Article Topics

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***January–March 2020*: Aviation and Expeditionary Operations-issue articles due December 1, 2019**

***April–June 2020*: Denied, Degraded, and Disrupted Space Operational Environments (D3SOE)-issue articles due March 1, 2020**

***July–September 2020*: LSCO** and Unmanned Aircraft System-issue articles due June 1, 2020**

***October–December 2020*: LSCO** and Professional Military Education-issue articles due September 1, 2020**

***Large-Scale Combat Operations**

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