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Huachuca Illustrated

A Magazine of the Fort Huachuca Museum

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca

The first of three issues

Military Events in the American Southwest from 1910-1916

Huachuca Illustrated: A Magazine of the Fort Huachuca Museum

Contents

Acknowledgements

If these volumes succeed in providing a mildly interesting diversion for a small readership, or even edify a broader audience, it is because several unusually bright people have donated their considerable talent to the project. Foremost among them is Orville Cochran, the first professional director of the Fort Huachuca Museum, who amassed a remarkable archives. After his death on the job in 1969, he was ably succeeded by Dr. Bruno Rolak who continued the foundation work for the emerging museum.

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The faithful general membership continue to give in relative anonymity. They may take justifiable pride in the achievements they make possible.

James P. Finley
Fort Huachuca, Arizona, 1993

Introduction

I am invisible, understand, simply because people refuse to see me. Like the bodiless heads you see sometimes in circus sideshows, it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass. When they approach me they see only my surroundings, themselves, or figments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except me.

—Ralph Ellison, *Invisible Man*.

Let us now praise famous men
of little showing -
For their work continueth.
And their work continueth,
Broad and deep continueth,
Greater than their knowing.

— Rudyard Kipling, *Stalky and Co.*, 'School Song'

This series of articles, which make up the "Buffalo Soldiers at Fort Huachuca" editions of the *Huachuca Illustrated* magazine, are about people, geography, ideas, and military operations. They try to convey what it was like to be a soldier along the Mexican border from 1913 to 1939, especially an African-American soldier.

At one time in Fort Huachuca's history, the border with Mexico was the focal point of U.S. military history, just as Vietnam and the Persian Gulf became so for other generations of soldiers. It was along this border that were mustered in 1916 upwards of 110,000 troops, the most Americans in uniform that had ever been brought together before, outside of wartime. The National Guard of 47 states (Nevada had no militia), the District of Columbia and the Territory of Alaska were called into federal service and rushed to the border. Many units of the regular army were also sent to reinforce those regiments dug in along the

Mexican line. Virtually every Army leader of both World Wars saw service on the border between 1911 and 1917. And few of these men doubted that war with Mexico was inevitable. The Punitive Expedition was the largest scale maneuver undertaken up until that time by the U.S. Army. It absorbed the complete attention of all of the politicians and Army brass in Washington, D.C. It was the final hurrah for the horse cavalry, the elite arm of the American Army, although not all cavalrymen would recognize this until decades later. For an American soldier in the second decade of the 20th century, this was where the action was.

Mexican Service Medal, Army, 1916.

The people involved are allowed to speak in their own voice as often as it is possible and it is through them that we get a more immediate feel for their experiences. The enlisted man is given few lines to speak in the drama of military history. Officers, by virtue of education, military training and careerism, are often equipped and inclined to report their observations about their experiences and make official their contributions. Enlisted men are less often moved to see themselves in historical terms. Instead they view themselves as protagonists.

This may explain why officers appear in biographies and histories and EM are the stuff of fiction by novelists like Stephen Crane, Norman Mailer, James Jones, and Tim O'Brien. The characters of this body of literature wallow in the trenches, love in the saloons, curse the officer class, and die in the foxholes. The generals provide the genius, the enlisted men provide the casualties.

Of the officers who speak to us from the early part of the 20th century are William Carey Brown, Frank Tompkins, Louis C. Scherer, John Brooks, Clarence Richmond, George Rodney, Paul Matte, Vance Batchelor, Edward Glass, Harold Wharfield, and Matthew H. Tomlinson. They all wrote down their experiences and their documents are on file at the Fort Huachuca Museum.

The same applies to the enlisted men who have left us their record. These are men like Vance H. Marchbanks, Henry Houston, George Looney, and James Clark. These men reveal their feelings and pride with an eloquence that comes of thoughtful self-examination. I am grateful that history has made them our comrades. There is much to be learned from them.

As I have said, these articles are also about geography, those mountains and high deserts which

dominate the American Southwest. The Fort Huachuca military installation is a plot of ground over which people have trod, built, wept, laughed, and below which they have been laid to their rest. In one sense, the land is the object of our history. People are the subject of this compendium; not any one race or gender, just people. True, most of them are military people, but that is because Fort Huachuca, our range finder, is a military installation.

Heraclitus proclaimed: "Geography is fate." Ralph Ellison wondered why has so little investigation been done on the affect geography has had on African-Americans. Emancipation was sought by escaping from the South into the unknown areas of young America. Ellison said, "…freedom was also to be found in the West of the old Indian Territory. Bessie Smith gave voice to this knowledge when she sang of 'Goin' to the Nation, Goin' to the Terr'tor',' and it is no accident that much of the symbolism of our folklore is rooted in the imagery of geography. For the slaves had learned through the repetition of group experience that freedom was to be attained through geographical movement, and that freedom required one to risk his life against the unknown."[1] Vance Marchbanks wrote about his enlistment in 1895, characterizing his decision as taking his "chances with the unknown."[2]

And, finally, this series of articles is about ideas; ideas like evolving weapons technology, changing tactics, and changing attitudes. There is one big idea that keeps elbowing its way into the narrative and that is the idea of racial equality (or inequality).

It is here that I wish to acknowledge my biases so that you may determine if you will find these volumes congenial. My own experiences both in the Army and as a civilian working for the Army have undeniably shaped my opinion of that organization. In an almost 30-year association, I have found a lot to admire in the soldiers of the American Army and in the institutional values they represent. I like the Army.

Likewise, I have known many African-Americans over my life and I have encountered their culture through the less direct pathway of historical research. I like them too. But I must confess to the vastest gap in my knowledge about the African-American experience. I have no complete way of understanding the experience of slavery or the toll its memory takes upon its descendants. So I turn to Sterling Brown who tried to express the hurtfulness of slavery to the enslaved, and filtered his verse through a fine anger.

They dragged you from homeland,
They chained you in coffles,
They huddled you spoon-fashion in filthy hatches,
They sold you to give a few gentlemen ease.
They broke you like oxen,
They scourged you,
They branded you,
They made your women breeders,
They swelled your numbers with bastards….
They taught you the religion they disgraced.
You sang:
Keep a-inchin' along
Lak a po' inch worm….
You sang:
Bye and bye
I'm gonna lay down dis heaby load….
You sang:
Walk togedder, chillen,
Dontcha git weary….
The strong men keep a-comin' on
The strong men git stronger.[3]

It may be enough to know, as James Baldwin knew, that "There is not a Negro alive who does not

have this rage in his blood—one has the choice, merely, of living with it consciously or surrendering to it."[4]

It is fruitless to try to introduce race as a differentiating factor in military life. The military experience transcends cultural, racial and national boundaries. Men have been exposed to the soldier's life over the ages of history and the uniqueness of that experience changes little from generation to generation, and from nation to nation.

What is worth investigating is how African-Americans performed their duty in a society which had recently enslaved them and now found it necessary to enforce the myth of racial inferiority. That society was represented within the U.S. Army by white officers. Some would say the black recruit had traded their slavemasters for new, commissioned ones.

One indication of the black soldier's feelings about himself was his unwillingness to accept injustice as he found it. And he encountered countless occasions of injustice during the course of his service in the U.S. Army. Some of the most publicized incidents were the 1898 rebellion of 25th Infantrymen and 10th Cavalrymen against Jim Crow laws in Chickamauga Park and Tampa on the eve of their departure for the fighting in Cuba; the 1900 assault by men of the 25th on an El Paso jail where the soldiers thought a comrade was being unjustly held; the 1906 march on Brownsville, Texas, by outraged members of the 25th, and the subsequent unjust blame laid upon the entire regiment; the San Antonio riot of 1911 sparked by the refusal of black soldiers to ride in the rear of a streetcar; the Honolulu protests of 1915 against racial movies and minstrel shows; and the 1917 riots in Houston, Texas, between the 3d Battalion, 24th Infantry, and Houston police arising out of a number of insupportable racial insults by the police and citizens of Houston. In the last case, nineteen soldiers were ordered hanged and 63 jailed for life by perfunctory courts-martial.

Also, while wearing the uniform, he was subjected to numberless humiliations by whites in both mufti and khaki. The black soldiers of the 24th Infantry, while escorting enemy prisoners of the Spanish-American War from Florida to Georgia, were jeered while southern belles handed out flowers to the white captives. A southern priest was heard to say, "It is an outrage that white men have been subjected to the humiliation of having Negro guards over them."[5] In 1906, "No Niggers or Dogs Allowed" signs were posted in Brownsville, Texas, not the first or last time such placards would be seen. In 1919 race riots, 10 of the 77 blacks lynched were veterans, some wearing their uniforms. Memorials to World War I dead had separate plaques for African-American killed in action.[6]

The unforgivable crime of the white officers, who carried the responsibility for the well being of their men, was the quiet acceptance of the kinds of incidents listed above. An officer, who expects men to die upon his orders, must give the soldiers under him unqualified respect and support. The record shows that most did. Those who did not come to the aid of their black charges when they were insulted by local bigots, failed both as officers and human beings.

It is important to avoid the sometimes tempting but always misleading generalizations; the kind that would allow a Fort Huachuca officer to decide that "The colored soldier's passive resistance is beyond description," in response to a soldier boycott of a Thanksgiving dinner. We are talking about a large body of men. There were 816 men authorized in a regiment early in the century and, later in 1921, as many as 1,464. There was always a smaller number at Huachuca, due to lag in recruitments and the dispatch of troops along the border and other posts in Arizona.

It should be remembered that the men of the 9th and 10th Cavalry, the 24th and 25th Infantry, were volunteers. They chose, in the words of one 19th century private, "to place themselves in virtual slavery for $13 dollars a month." When one accepts the life of a soldier, he subjects himself to military regulation and discipline, in return for a way of life that offers a sense of service. Veteran Vance Marchbanks recognized that and expressed it thusly:

…The Army is no place now for thieves, murderers or renegades from the talons of the law, but a place where young men can obtain a liberal education, and fit themselves for better citizenship. …[the 10th Cavalry] has built some fine men. I say built, because I have seen them come in the

rough—some from the city and some from the country, uneducated, uncultured—some almost hopelessly ignorant, and the writer assigns himself to the latter class. In three short years these boys not only straighten up but they improve in physique, manners, and education. They learn the importance of organization, and obedience to constituted authority. They learn to submit to discipline and controls.[7]

To ignore the painful victimization of the black soldier in the U.S. Army would be a mistake. The lessons learned about inhumanity need to be driven home over and over again. There are myths that can only be dispelled in the vast laboratory of human history. But it would be equally mistaken to dwell on the controversial at the expense of the celebratory. In addition to some incidents of hate and humiliation, there was much love, laughter and loyalty on the Fort Huachuca reservation. All of the men in the regular army black regiments that I have talked to or read about, speak with great pride of their service and their accomplishments and with unmistakable fondness for their Army experiences.[8]

Master Sergeant James Clark was one of the veterans that returned to Fort Huachuca and talked about his life. He acknowledged the presence of racial injustice in the Army of the 1920s, but could not recall, or did not want to discuss, specific cases. At the time of his interview, he was in his early 80s and was without rancor. In fact, he viewed his Army experiences affectionately. Speaking of white officers in his regiment, the 10th Cavalry, he said, "You'll always find someone who was honest." He said he was brought up to "look for the good." "I met some of the best and some of the worst. …If you characterize yourself like a man, they treat you like one. …I never hated anybody. …I could always smile and find some good."[9]

Clark's philosophical attitude, his willingness to overlook any painful racial incidents, and always "look for the good," was not unusual among visiting veterans to Fort Huachuca. It should be remembered that those men had voluntarily come back to Huachuca in later years because of positive feelings about the place. Those with bad memories would probably have no desire to visit and so their views remain undocumented.

The composite picture presented by the African-American enlisted men discussed above may be one-sided. They have many things in common. They were all high-achievers, had positive outlooks, and were proud of their chosen careers. They were professional soldiers. It is not until we look at those periods when blacks were drafted that we begin to see a record of bitter discontent, on the part of men less inclined to submit to Army discipline, especially when it was perceived as racist.

It would also be unfair to characterize the experiences and feelings of the "Buffalo Soldiers" as being from another time different from our own and therefore irrelevant. If we think of history as the explanation of change, then it is important to point out differences between their day and our own. Attitudes change, weapons improve, the uniform undergoes modification, but the man within changes little. He carries in his head the same hopes and fears from century to century.

This brings us to the importance of remembering; remembering both the good and the bad, "The disastrous and the marvelous."

Vance Marchbanks was a believer in the instructive power of history and quoted Patrick Henry, "We have no way of judging the future except by the past."[10] He was extremely knowledgeable about the history of black Americans serving their country and felt the compulsion to transcribe his own military experiences so that his life might become a part of the flow of history.

Ellison makes the point that ignorance of history, or the "discontinuous" American historical consciousness, leaves us open "to superstition, rumor, and the manipulation of political medicine men." He thinks the forces of historical consciousness are always at work in our psyches to offer up clues as to group identities. "Perhaps if we learn more of what happened and *why* it happened, we'll learn more of who we really are. And perhaps if we learn more about our unwritten history, we won't be so vulnerable to the capriciousness of events as we are today. And in the process of becoming more aware of ourselves we will recognize that one of the functions of our vernacular culture is that of preparing for the emergence of the unexpected, whether it takes the form of the disastrous or the marvelous."[11]

The history of the Buffalo Soldiers at Fort Huachuca has its share of disasters and much at which to marvel. These stories set about the job of self-definition.

Fort Huachuca: The Traditional Home of the Buffalo Soldier

The story of black Americans fighting under their nation's flag is older than the flag itself. First introduced as slaves by the British early in the 17th century, blacks served alongside their white masters in the first colonial militias organized to defend against Indian attacks.

By the time of the American Revolution, some freed slaves were taking a stand for independence along with the white colonists. A freedman named Crispus Attucks was among those eleven Americans gunned down in the Boston massacre of March 5, 1770, when they defied the British soldiery. When the war broke out, blacks like Peter Salem and Salem Poore were in the thick of the fighting. Salem was credited with shooting the British commander at Bunker Hill and Poore was cited for gallantry. A number of other blacks were serving in New England militia units in 1775, but when the Continental Army was officially formed in 1775, Congress bowed to the insistence of the southern slaveholders and excluded blacks, free or slave, from service. These regulations were soon overridden by the necessities of the desperate fighting and the need for manpower. Black veterans were retained and new recruits were accepted.

In all, there were approximately 5,000 blacks who served in the American Revolutionary War. Despite the fact that they continued to make real military contributions in the War of 1812 and in the Civil War, it was not until after that latter war that blacks were accepted into the regular Army.

"Dismounted Negro, Tenth Cavalry."

Title unknown, date unknown, black troopers guarding a settler's wagon, Frederic Remington.

"Saddle Up," Frederic Remington.

"The Sign Language," Frederic Remington.

"A Campfire Sketch," Frederic Remington.

"A Pull at the Canteen," Frederic Remington.

Lieutenant Henry Ossian Flipper. Flipper was the first African-American graduate (1877) of the U.S. Military Academy. The 10th Cavalry officer was dismissed from the service in 1882 after discrepancies were found in the post commissary funds of which he was in charge. Flipper maintained his innocence. He stayed on the Mexican border, serving as a mining engineer and publishing the Nogales Sunday Herald. He later became the interpreter for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations from 1919-1922, an assistant to the Secretary of Interior, 1922-1923, and an engineer with a New York oil company operating in Venezuela. He authored several books before his death in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1940 at the age of 84. U.S. Army Signal Corps photo.

Fort Huachuca, more than any other installation in the U.S. military establishment, was at the heart of half a century of black military history. It was here that black soldiers came to reflect upon their worth, to remember the part they had played in taming Comanche, Kiowa, Apache, and Sioux; in punching a hole through Spanish lines on a Cuban hilltop so Teddy Roosevelt and his Rough Riders could dash through it; and in winning the day against Mexican forces at Agua Caliente in 1916. If their white fellow Americans did not show them the respect they deserved, their foes in battle did. The Indians called them "Buffalo Soldiers." The Germans in World War I referred to them as "Hell Fighters."

Sergeant George Berry of the 10th Cavalry who planted the colors of the 3rd and 10th Cavalries on San Juan Hill, Cuba, 1 July 1898. He is holding those same colors and standing in front of the headquarters at Huachuca.

It was on Huachuca's parade field that they felt the stirrings of pride that only the soldier knows, and they marched with a growing sense of equality that their brother civilians would not be allowed to feel until decades later. Problems of discrimination were as widespread in the Army as they were in other parts of American society, but minority barriers fell faster in the Army where the most important measure of a man is his dependability in a fight.

In 1866 six black regular Army regiments were formed. They were the 38th, 39th, 40th and 41st Infantry and the 9th and 10th Cavalry. Three years later, as part of a reduction in the size of the Army, the 38th and 41st were consolidated to form the 24th Infantry and the 39th and 40th made up the new 25th Infantry. Officered by whites, these regiments went on to justify the belief by black leaders that men of their race could contribute mightily to the nation's defense. Some of the service of each of these regiments in the latter part of the 19th century is highlighted in the paragraphs that follow.

Portrait: General Benjamin H. Grierson in 1863. Grierson had earned a reputation as a daring cavalryman during the Civil War and was named the commander of the newly formed 10th Cavalry regiment, the Buffalo Soldiers, in 1866.

The 24th Infantry Regiment participated in 1875 expeditions against hostile Kiowas and Commanches in the Department of Texas. One of the engagements of this campaign saw a Lieutenant John Bullis and three Seminole-Negro Indian scouts attack a 25-man war party on the Pecos River. Sergeant John Ward, Private Pompey Factor and Trumpeter Isaac Payne were rewarded with the Medal of Honor for their exceptional bravery in this encounter.

The 25th Infantry Regiment spent its first ten years in Texas building and repairing military posts,

roads and telegraph lines; performing escort and guard duty of all description; marching and countermarching from post to post; and scouting for Indians. In 1880 the regiment was ordered to the Department of Dakota and stationed at Fort Missoula, Montana. It participated in the Pine Ridge Campaign of 1890-91, the last stand of the Sioux, and quelled civil disorders in Missoula during the Northern Pacific Railroad strike in 1894.

Men of the 25th Infantry warm themselves around a Sibley stove at Fort Keough, Montana, in 1890-91.

The 10th Cavalry Regiment, or "Buffalo Soldiers," is probably the most renowned of the black regiments. At its inception, the commander, Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson, was determined to fill the ranks only with men of the highest quality. Orders went out to recruit none but "superior men…who would do credit to the regiment." The 10th's record in several Indian War campaigns attests to the fact that Grierson achieved his goal. In 1886, the Buffalo Soldiers tracked Geronimo's renegades in the Pinito Mountains in Mexico and several months later ran down the last Apache holdout Mangas and his band.

In 1890 the Battle of Wounded Knee Creek, the last major fight of the Indian Wars, pitted the U.S. 7th Cavalry against Big Foot's Sioux. The 9th Cavalry Regiment also took part in this campaign and played a dramatic part in the Battle of Clay Creek Mission. Over 1,800 Sioux under Little Wound and Two Strike had encircled the battle-weary 7th. The situation looked grave until the 9th Cavalry arrived on the field and drove off the Indian force with an attack on their rear. For conspicuous gallantry displayed on this occasion, Corporal William O. Wilson, Troop I, 9th Cavalry, was granted the Medal of Honor.

The paths of all four of these regiments would intersect in a scenic canyon in southeastern Arizona, just twenty miles from the Mexican border. The place was called Fort Huachuca and it had played an important part in the Apache campaigns since its establishment in 1877.

The first black regiment to arrive at Huachuca was the 24th Infantry which sent companies there in 1892. During the next year, the entire regiment would come together at the fort. Here they remained until 1896, a year that saw some excitement for the troops who thought that the Indian Wars were ended. It was

in that year that Colonel John Mosby Bacon took Companies C and H, of the 24th Infantry out of Fort Huachuca to run down Yaqui Indians who had been raiding around Harshaw and Nogales. The search for these Mexico-based Indians proved inconclusive.

A squad room interior of the 24th Infantry at Huachuca around 1892.

Companies A and H of the 25th Infantry regiment took up residence in Huachuca Canyon in 1898, after returning from fighting in Cuba, and A Company remained there until the end of April 1899.



Company B of the 25th Infantry was stationed at Fort Snelling, Minnesota, from 1883-1888. They pose here in their full dress uniforms. U.S. Army Signal Corps photo SC 83637.

Troops of the 9th Cavalry joined the 25th Infantry at Fort Huachuca in 1898 and rotated its units in and out of the post until 1900. A detachment of the 9th would return briefly for a short tour in 1912.

Although the 9th Cavalry and the 24th and 25th Infantry regiments had all served briefly at Fort Huachuca during the 1890s, it wasn't until the 10th Cavalry, or the "Buffalo Soldiers," arrived there in December 1913 that the era of black soldiers began at Huachuca. (The nickname "Buffalo Soldiers" was first given to the men of the 10th Cavalry by the Indians of the plains who likened their hair to that of the buffalo. Over the years this name has been extended by veterans to include soldiers of all of the original black regiments.)

This proud cavalry unit had served in Arizona before, in the last century, rotating from one post to another in Arizona, New Mexico or Texas, wherever they were needed to track down Apache renegades. So the startling vistas were not new to many of the veterans. Nor was the relentless desert sun a stranger to these horsemen who doggedly followed the trail of Pancho Villa into Mexico in 1916. In Huachuca Canyon they found a home for the next eighteen years, the longest this mobile unit would stay at any one place since its formation in 1866.

Right after their arrival at Huachuca, in 1914, the men of the 10th were spread out at encampments along the Arizona-Mexico border from Yuma on the West to Naco on the east. They corralled their horses and stretched their tents at points in between like Forrest, Osborne, Nogales, Lochiel, Harrison's Ranch, Arivaca, Sasabe, La Osa, and San Fernando. Many would sweat it out under canvas for as long as ten months before being rotated back to their home station in the cooler elevations of the Huachucas.

They were picketed along the border, not as some training exercise, but to enforce neutrality laws. Mexico was experiencing political upheaval on a scale that alarmed statesmen in Washington, D. C., and they quickly legislated that there could be no encroachments upon American soil.

They were relieved in 1931 by the 25th Infantry Regiment. First arriving at the post in 1928, the 25th continued the tradition of black soldiering there. Like the 10th Cavalry, they had seen hard combat in both the Indian Wars and in Cuba. Also like the Tenth, they were to serve there for 14 years until 1942 when they were incorporated as cadre into the newly formed 93d Infantry Division.

The 93d and 92d Divisions trained one after the other at Fort Huachuca during World War II. The 93d, which would be the first black division to see action in the war, arrived in Arizona in 1942 and shipped out to the Pacific in 1944. Because its regiments, the 368th and 369th, were assigned to the French Army in World War I, the light blue French helmet became the division's shoulder patch.

The 92d too had regiments (365th, 370th and 371st) that could trace their lineage to some heroic fighting in France in 1918, but the division chose to reach back to the Indian Wars of the 1870s and 80s for their symbol. They chose for their shoulder patch the buffalo, recalling the "Buffalo Soldiers," as the black troops were respectfully called by the Indians of the Western plains.

To some blacks Huachuca was a mountain refuge far away from the immense struggle that was taking place in America's city streets and country lanes, a fight for equality. But for others it was a way to participate in the struggle, to take up a profession that offered dignity, service to country, and maybe a warrior's death. For whatever reason they joined the Army (the Marines did not admit blacks; the Navy had only a few openings for the menial job of messboy), Fort Huachuca would be an almost inevitable stop along their way. Some found it to be "a very fine place to serve." To others it was "an infamous place." For all it was, for a time, home. Black infantrymen and cavalrymen carved out a place in history there. If the sobriquet "Buffalo Soldier" has come to stand collectively for the black men who served in the four regular army regiments from 1866 to World War II, then Fort Huachuca has earned the distinction of being "Home of the Buffalo Soldier."

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The 10th Takes Up Station

After returning to the U.S. from the Philippines, the Buffalo soldiers of the 10th Cavalry were stationed at Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont, also known familiarly as 40th and Allen. This was the first time since its organization that the regiment was stationed east of the Mississippi. Late in 1913 the regiment received orders sending it west, to the border station of Fort Huachuca. Second Lieutenant John B. Brooks had just graduated from West Point and was assigned to D Troop. In a 1961 interview, he described the exchange of stations involving three regiments.

Maj. Gen. John B. Brooks, USAF Retired, poses in front of the Fort Huachuca Museum in 1961.

…The summer of 1913 we had spent at Winchester, Virginia, testing the new Cavalry drill regulations, and we had hardly arrived back at Ethan Allen in October when we learned of this movement which was to take place early in December. Hardly any one knew how to pronounce Fort Huachuca and nobody knew where it was. So there was a great scurrying around, especially among the junior officers to get atlases and find out where Fort Huachuca was and see if we could get the correct pronunciation, which we eventually did. As the Army was very short of funds in those days, it was decided to make this switch a three-way affair, and the horses, Government mounts, were to remain in place at all three stations involved. The only horses which accompanied us were the private mounts of the officers. The Second Cavalry, then at Fort Bliss, Texas, was designated to relieve us, but there was to be a period of approximately three weeks when there would be no Cavalry in the Fort. Prior to our departure, …a battalion of the Fifth Infantry, then stationed across Lake Champlain at Plattsburg Barracks, was sent over to be instructed how to water, feed and groom our horses because they had to be cared for until the Second arrived. This was done and the Infantrymen really enjoyed this to the extent that on the cut off day, when we turned everything over to them, they insisted on going out for horse exercise. It was early in December and the horses were feeling good because they hadn't been out of the corrals for a few days and it was cold and nippy and it was very amusing to see these

Infantrymen returning to the post anywhere from 12 o'clock noon to 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Some carrying their saddles and leading their horses, others leading their horses with the saddles completely turned around and hanging underneath them. As far as I know they never tried horse exercise the second time.

…We traveled by squadron. Each squadron had a freight train that carried all of the officers' household effects, all the permanent property of the troops, such as pool tables and things of that sort, and then we had a passenger train for each squadron for the personnel. The officers' and enlisted wives accompanied their husbands on this train. We left Fort Ethan Allen on the 8th day of December 1913 and we went directly to Weehawken, New Jersey, where we went aboard the old transport Kilpatrick, which dated from the Spanish-American War. We had about sixty private mounts and they had built stalls aft on one of the decks, an open deck for the horses. The men had to unload the freight trains and do practically all the stevedoring to put the cargo aboard the ship. We had a pretty rough trip down to Galveston, Texas, and I felt very sorry for the horses because it was very cold, windy and rough. But we got there and then the ship had to be unloaded by the soldiers. The freight put in the same system of trains and we were all together, as I recall it, three days in Galveston. Then we came directly to Fort Huachuca on the El Paso and Southwestern Railroad, where we arrived on the 19th day of December 1913.

…the whole regiment came here except L Troop, which went to Fort Apache and they made the entire move by train.…

…The Second Cavalry came to Fort Ethan Allan. They took over our mounts that we had left there. Then there was…the Fifth Cavalry that was in Huachuca. They went out to Honolulu. We took their horses and the Fourth Cavalry, which was in Honolulu, came to Fort Bliss and they took the Second Cavalry's horses and left their horses at Schofield Barracks.…

There were no troops here with the exception of the pack train. You will recall that up to 1912…the packers were all civilians. In 1912 the Quartermaster decided that this was too expensive and that they could enlist Quartermaster soldiers who could do all the packing, but they had to have experienced men and so the Packmaster and the one or two cargadors were old civilians, but the rest of the men were all soldiers and there was one pack company here which was left here and there was a nucleus of a post non-commissioned staff, such as the Post Ordnance Sergeant, Post Commissary Sergeant; they were here. Other than that there was nobody here.

As I recall it, the train came over the El Paso Southwestern from El Paso to Douglas to Lewis Springs and at Lewis Springs there was a spur that ran from there to the post.…[12]

Fort Huachuca looking northeast in 1915. Note the two new barracks (left center) completed in 1914. The lavatory in the rear was completed in May 1914. Not yet under construction are five more barracks, completed in January 1916, two-story administration building completed in June 1917, nor the radio station completed in July 1917. Most distant building in the center is the Fort Huachuca railway station. Photo courtesy Col. H.B. Wharfield, a lieutenant with the 10th Cavalry in 1917-18.

On 13 January 1914, a second contingent of the 10th Cavalry arrived by train at Huachuca siding seven miles north of the post. Among them was Captain George Brydges Rodney, a troop commander who would later in his life command the regiment and Fort Huachuca. In his published reminiscences, aptly titled *As a Cavalryman Remembers*, he described the extreme weather that greeted them.

> *We reached Huachuca on January 13, in a driving snowstorm. The troops, detraining at a little railroad siding, marched seven miles over a rocky trail to the Post and the ladies and children drove that seven miles through a howling blizzard and a driving snowstorm. On arrival at Huachuca we found one troop of the Ninth (colored) Cavalry that was caring for the horses of the Fourth (that we were relieving). Fires had been started in the empty houses but no other preparations for us had been made. That night we slept on bedsprings laid flat on the floor and ate such food as an impromptu Chinese mess could provide. As a result one of my children got pneumonia and several grown people were laid up.*

George B. Rodney, in his memoirs As a Cavalryman Remembers, left us with a vivid, and often humorous, picture of life along the border with the 10th Cavalry.

The next logistics problem that had to be sorted out was the assignment of officers' quarters, never an easy task in the face of an Army tradition that allowed seniors to "rank" or bump juniors from their housing, producing a chaotic ripple effect that frazzled the tempers of all of the wives.[13] Rodney explained the procedure:

To add to the confusion while the captains were caring for their men, a number of junior officers examined different houses and tentatively selected them as their quarters, and later when the captains (I was one) exercised their prerogatives and incontinently ousted the lieutenants from the chosen houses, some ill-feeling developed. In fact, I distinctly remember being told by one lady (?) details of my private life that I tried vainly to assure her were purely imaginary. However "All's well that ends well." Three days found us all again on speaking terms.

It was then that for the first time I realized the depth of feelings that cannot be plumbed when the wife of a junior officer is "ranked out of quarters" by a wife of a senior. That is an old Army custom and a junior has no more right to expect him to give up a part of his pay. It is a prerogative that he has earned by years of service during which he has had the same thing happen to him a score of times.[14]

With the officers and their families banking the fires in the parlors of their new quarters, although the houses were not always their first choice; the enlisted men bunked across the way, their pool tables unloaded and leveled; with the old 4th Cavalry horses spirited and well cared for by the 9th Cavalry comrades detailed to Huachuca for that purpose; and the snow melting off the branches of the Mexicans oaks of Huachuca Canyon, the regiment comfortably settled in to a 17-year tour of duty that would include border firefights, a full-scale combat maneuver into the mountains of Mexico, and the coming of age of the American Army.

Unidentified officers and lady at Huachuca in 1915. Photo courtesy Charles H. Grierson collection.

Uniforms: 1910-1939

The khaki and drab hues of the 1911 uniform models would be the distinctive coloring of the American soldier's dress for the entire 20th century, although slight variations in shade would proliferate and camouflage patterns would replace the solids. These earth colors blended well with the umber, sienna, and ochre faces at Fort Huachuca, but the uniforms were thought too workaday, to practical, insipid. They lacked the blaze of color and the plumage that had marked the 19th century cavalry uniform. Perhaps that is why the blue and gold full dress uniforms were retained for formal functions.

The service uniform of the 1911 pattern, which exhibited a decided British influence, consisted of olive drab breeches, shirt, and service coat with a stand-up collar.

Chevrons after 1911 were olive drab or khaki except on the dress uniforms which were still the color of the branch of service. Since 1902 they were sewn on the sleeves with "points up."

The M1911 service uniforms, made virtually of blanket wool, were worn without the service coat in the summer months, until a cotton material was prescribed for the summer. This coatless uniform was worn by the Cavalry that patrolled the border with Mexico and embarked upon the 1916 Punitive Expedition. The same uniforms, equipment, and weapons were used by the American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I. Men at Fort Huachuca continued to wear the 1905 "Montana peak" campaign hat. A hat cord on the campaign hat denoted the branch of service. Troops in France wore a steel trench helmet—a British "basin"-pattern helmet painted a drab color.

A wool OD "overseas" cap replaced the "Montana" campaign hat in 1917, and was worn in the rear areas of France. The new corps insignia disc was worn on the left side. Modelled after a French cap, the 1918 overseas cap was later to become the field or garrison cap and in 1940 it was authorized for wear in the U. S. Then a cord was added in the color of the wearer's branch of service. Officers wore yellow cords until 1940 when the cord was changed to a gold and black braid.

The enlisted infantry replaced their canvas gaiters with OD wool puttees or wraps. Officers continued to wear leather leggings. Cavalrymen during this period wore M1917 canvas leggings reinforced with leather. In 1918 divisional shoulder patches were authorized for wear. Also adopted in France by the American Expeditionary Force was the Sam Browne belt, again borrowed from the British. Made of russet leather, the M1921 officer's belt was a modification of the "Sam Browne" belts worn in France by officers of the American Expeditionary Force. It has a dress saber chain attachment (M1924), leather magazine pockets for .45 pistol clips, and a holster for the .45.

Enlisted men began wearing bronze collar disc insignia in 1907 to replace the crossed rifles, sabers, etc. they had worn on the collar since 1901. The 1907 pattern called for the letters "US" on the right collar disc and the branch insignia on the left, with the regimental number above and the company letter below. This style would last until 1917 when the regimental number was taken off the left disc and placed below the "US" on the right disc.

Capt. Charles H. Grierson on the steps of his quarters at Huachuca in 1915. Photo courtesy Charles H. Grierson collection.

"The American Soldier, 1918, Artillery Officer, Machine Gun Sergeant. France. Artillery Firing, Field Telephone Crew." Charles H. McBarron.

"The American Soldier, 1918, Red Cross Nurse, Army Nurse, Medical Officer, Military Police, Medical Troops, Ambulance." Charles McBarron.

Lt. Eddie Rickenbocker with two unidentified aviators after World War I.

During the 1920s at Fort Huachuca, troopers from the 10th Cavalry considered themselves to be the elite arm of the service, even though the firepower experienced in World War I would quickly make the horse Cavalry obsolete. The mounted soldier shown here is Pvt. Tom Prowl.

Enlisted man of the 25th Infantry posing in front of car.

Weapons: 1910-1939

The War with Spain in 1898 revealed deficiencies in weaponry and a lag in technology which the Army sought to correct in the ensuing years. The Krag-Jorgenson rifle, which had been adopted in 1892, was made obsolete by high-velocity, low-trajectory, clip-loading rifles which were capable of firing at a sustained high rate. The Krag-Jorgenson was replaced by the 1903 Springfield rifle which incorporated the latest innovations.



U.S. rifle, caliber .30, M1903. (From War Department Field Manual)

The M1903 Springfield was a .30 caliber bolt-action, magazine-fed rifle. The Spanish-American War made clear the necessity for the ability to deliver a high rate, sustained fire in the urgency to gain fire superiority. In 1900 the Ordnance Department recommended the adoption of a new arm based on the Mauser system. Manufacturing rights for this bolt action mechanism were purchased from the German Mauser patent owners for $200,000.

The Springfield rifle became the stalwart individual weapon for both infantryman and cavalry trooper. There was no carbine model for this rifle. After the introduction of the M-1 rifle just before World War II, the Springfield remained in service until it could be replaced and even then saw action as a sniper rifle. It was beloved for its reliability and accuracy and remained in some National Guard units beyond the Korean War.

Firing rifle from horseback. (From War Department Field Manual)

To supplement the stocks of the M1903 Springfield, the M1917 Enfield rifle was adopted in that year. It was the .303 P-14 that was made in the U.S. for Great Britain, but it was converted to .30 caliber.



U.S. rifle, caliber .30, M1917. (From War Department Field Manual)

The most important development in weapons technology was the machine gun. It was responsible

for 20th century tactics. Although the Army had employed manually operated Gatling guns in the Indian Wars and in the Spanish-American War, it wasn't until American inventors such as Hiram Maxim, John Browning and Isaac N. Lewis developed automatic machine guns that its impact was realized. Their designs became models for machine guns in all major armies. A Machine Gun Troop was added to the cavalry regiment which packed tripod, ammo box, and barrel on horses.

The M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle or BAR was a machine gun as well as a rifle and used in both World Wars. It was gas-operated, .30 caliber, air-cooled, magazine-fed, and fully or semi-automatic. It could be fired from the shoulder or, when used with a shoulder sling, fired from the waist. Stocks left over from World War I were used until loans to the British and new requirements necessitated the production of 168,000 BARs in 1943. These were only slightly changed from the 1918 design.

The M1928A1 .45 caliber Thompson submachine gun could be fired as a semi-automatic or fully automatic by switching a selector on the left side of the receiver. It was fed with a 50-round drum magazine or 20 to 30-round box magazine. Designed by Brig. Gen. John T. Thompson of the Ordnance Department, the gun became standardized in 1938 as the .45 M1928A1. It was used by the British, French, Canadian and American soldiers during World War II. Heavy and expensive to produce, the Thompson was replaced by first the M2 and then the M3 submachine gun.



Cross-section of Thompson submachine gun, caliber .45, M1928A1. (From War Department Field Manual)

Designed by John Browning, the M1917A1 Browning .30 caliber heavy machine gun was water-cooled, belt-fed and recoil operated. After an impressive demonstration of the weapon's capabilities by Browning himself, the Army adopted it in 1917 and with a slight modification, it was the standard ground gun until after World War II. It fires 450 to 600 rounds per minute at a muzzle velocity of 2,800 feet-per-second, and weighs 93 pounds with tripod and water-filled jacket. Its effective range was 1,800 yards. The

M1917 Browning heavy machine gun was one of the standard World War I weapons that was carried over to World War II and beyond. It was given new designations as it changed from water-cooled (M1917A1) to air-cooled (M1919A4). The .50 caliber Browning machine gun was redesigned in 1933 so that it could be mounted on tanks and aircraft or converted to antiaircraft use. Both Browning machine guns were world renowned. The .50 caliber aircraft gun performed unfailingly in cold or hot climate and contributed greatly to allied air victories.

The M1917 machine gun with tripod. (From War Department Field Manual)

The M1905 3-inch field gun was one of the models that accompanied American forces into Mexico in 1916 on the Punitive Expedition. The gun was patterned after the famous French 75mm of 1897 and remained in use throughout the 1920s. Common shrapnel, high explosive shrapnel, or steel shells were used as ammunition. It had a muzzle velocity of 1,700 feet per second and a maximum range of 8,500 yards. There were only 340 of these guns made.

The old rod bayonet had demonstrated in the 1898 campaign that it was too flimsy. It was replaced in 1905 with a knife bayonet which was sixteen inches long and weighed one pound.

Soldier in the "Guard" position with M1905 bayonet. (From War Department Field Manual)

The M1911 Colt .45 automatic pistol supplanted the .38 caliber revolver which had shown itself incapable of stopping a charging Moro warrior in the Philippines.

Automatic pistol, caliber .45, M1911. (From War Department Field Manual)
Illustration: Automatic pistol, caliber .45, M1911. (From War Department Field Manual)

Left side of pistol, M1911. (From War Department Field Manual)

Left side of pistol, M1911A1. (From War Department Field Manual)

The M1917 .45 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver was modified to accept the .45 cartridge used by the M1911 Automatic and produced to meet the wartime demands of the Army which ordered 153,000 of them. Many of the weapons survived into World War II. Another 150,000 modified versions of the M1897 were also purchased and became known as the M1917 .45 caliber Colt New Service revolvers.

Illustration: Colt revolver, caliber .45, M1917. (From War Department Field Manual)

Smith and Wesson revolver, caliber .45, M1917. (From War Department Field Manual)

Called the "Patton" saber after its designer George S. Patton, the M1913 cavalry sword is intended to be used as a thrusting weapon rather than a slashing saber. The saber and a webbed khaki scabbard are attached to the cavalryman's saddle. They were not worn with the uniform. It was discontinued as a Cavalry weapon in 1934.



The lunging move with Patton saber. (From War Department Field Manual)



Equipment: 1910-1939

The soldier would come to know well the personal equipment issued to him for use in the field, for each Saturday morning he would scrub it clean and lay it out on his bunk to be inspected by his squad leader, platoon sergeant, first sergeant and company commander. With the exception of the green recruit, each man knew precisely how the shelter half was folded so that one-half of its height equalled the length of a tent pin, and its full height matched the length of the tent pole; and how the comb, toothbrush, razor blades and razor were exactly centered on the flap of the haversack. It was an analog for their routine—precise and uniform. There was a clean sense of order in this regimentation; a place for everything and everything in its place. If the Army did not issue it to you, you probably did not need it. Even wives could be acquired only after the company commander approved of this extraneous baggage.

In 1910 the Army's Infantry Board developed its first gear for disbursing the weight of the soldier's equipment around the body. Made of khaki webbing and canvas duck by the Mills Company, this system would survive in its basic design style until the 1956 load-carrying equipment made its debut. Designed to carry 48 lbs. (50 lbs., or 1/3 the body's weight, was determined by studies to be the maximum to avoid exhaustion), the pack carrier with suspenders and cartridge (or garrison) belt were the basic components. To the pack carrier was attached the haversack and the long pack roll upon which was affixed the entrenching tool and the M1905 bayonet. In the haversack were carried rations, toilet articles, and the meat can or mess kit. The overcoat was rolled and strapped over the top of the haversack in a horseshoe shape. The blanket, poncho, and extra clothing were rolled up in the shelter half and tied vertically into the pack carrier. In its dismounted configuration, the cartridge belt carried a bolo, canteen cover, and first aid pouch. A garrison belt had a single cartridge pocket and a circular "US" fastening device at the front, with saber slings for officers and staff NCOs. Officers had an eagle coat of arms on the fastener. All of these equipments bore a M1910 model year.

Just as the Infantry had developed its M1910 equipment, the Cavalry Board did likewise with a M1914 series of personal equipment. Earlier the board had approved horse equipment which bore the M1912 designation even though it did not reach the field until 1913. Together referred to as the M1912/14 series, it incorporated some of the M1910 infantry gear. A ration bag folded into a knapsack. On the belt was carried the magazine pocket, tool frog, rifle belt ring, M1910 canteen cover, and M1912 holster with an M1911 pistol. The tool carrier could carry either a pick or a hatchet head, and horse shoes and nails. The M1912 garrison belt for cavalrymen was russet leather and had a cartridge pocket, rifle belt ring and rifle strap, two sliding frogs for the M1910 first aid pouch and the M1912 holster and the M1912 leather magazine pocket. A bandoleer for carrying additional ammunition was also part of the 1914 equipments.

In World War I a new series of equipment was issued and known collectively as the M1917/18 models. The M1918 dismounted cartridge belt had attached a 20-round magazine carrier, a M1917 trench knife with a steel, ribbed, knuckle guard for hand-to-hand combat, the M1910 canteen cover and first aid pouch. The Mk. I trench knife had a brass knuckle guard. The M1918 pistol belt could carry the M1917 revolver cartridge pouch, and M1917 revolver holster made for either the Smith and Wesson or Colt M1917 revolver. A M1918 pistol magazine pocket could also be attached. Other specialized equipment was the M1918 shotshell pouch for 12-gauge shells for the trench guns, the M1910 wire cutter and carrier, and BAR magazine and rifle cartridge pockets, as well as the BAR bandoleer, the ammunition carrier for the 3-inch trench mortar, bolo with scabbard, bugle, discharger for rifle grenade, dispatch case, record case, field glasses, clinometer for 3-inch trench mortar, clinometer for machine gun, compass case, gas mask, angle-of-site instrument, and combination flag kit.

New models of personal equipment appeared over the next two decades, like the M1923 magazine pocket, the M1923 mounted and dismounted belts, the M1928 haversack, with a short pack roll, the M1938 12-pocket dismounted cartridge belt, the M1938 wire cutter and carrier, the M1924 first aid

pouch, the magazine pocket for the M1928A1 Thompson sub-machine gun magazines, the M1936 musette bag, the M1938 dispatch bag also called a map case, the M1936 field bag, the M1936 suspenders, the M1936 pistol belt, the M1 holster, and the M17 binoculars case. The M1938 cartridge belt was adopted to carry ammunition for the new M1 rifle clips but was discontinued in the early 1940s and the M1923 stayed in use.

The M1904 McClellan saddle differed chiefly from the M1885 McClellan in color (1902 regulations changed all leather from black to russet), in the new quarter straps which buckled to straps affixed to the saddle tree, and in the straight sides of the tree. Although slight changes were made in 1928, this saddle was the basic model until the horse Cavalry was discontinued.

A development of the 1912 Cavalry Equipment Board, the M1916 officer's training saddle was designed solely for training at the Cavalry School. However, it was often purchased by officers and used until the M1936 Phillips saddle was prescribed.

An outgrowth of a cavalry equipment board convened in 1912, the M1917 officer's field saddle was used by all mounted officers in the field until 1936. It was in that year that the Phillips cross-country model was introduced for officers.

The R. F. K. Gas Mask was a box respirator modified from the British mask by Ralph R. Richardson, E. L. Flory, and Waldemar Kops of the Chemical Warfare Service. It was the first American gas mask. American troops wore French and British masks earlier in World War I. It consisted of a canister, a fabric face piece with nose clip, mouth piece, and hosetube, and a carrier for the two units. It provided adequate protection against the agents used on the Western Front, but was uncomfortable if worn for long periods.



The box respirator. (From 1918 War College pamphlet)

On previous page, from top to bottom:
The mounted trooper, near side.
The mounted trooper, off side.
Trooper standing to horse, basic saddle pack, near side.
Trooper mounted, basic saddle pack, near side.
Trooper mounted, basic saddle pack, off side. (From War Department Field Manual)

Display of basic individual equipment, rifle platoon cavalryman. (From War Department Field Manual)



The pack and cartridge belt, less overcoat and helmet. (From War Department Field Manual)



The infantry pack with full equipment. (From War Department Field Manual)



Equipment display for infantryman, 1918. (From War Department Field Manual)



Equipment display for cavalryman, 1918. (From War Department Field Manual)



"Method of Displaying Equipment at Shelter Tent Camp Inspection for 10th Cavalry." (From original drawing in Fort Huachuca Museum files.)

McClellan saddle, full pack, near side. (From War Department Field Manual)

McClellan saddle, full pack, off side. (From War Department Field Manual)

Equipment arranged for inspection. (From War Department Field Manual)

Shelter tent and equipment arranged for inspection. (From War Department Field Manual)

Individual equipment of cavalryman, including the M1903 Springfield rifle and the Patton saber. (From War Department Field Manual)

The McClellan saddle mounted on wooden training horses for cavalry recruits in 1918. (U.S. Army photo)

Strategy and Tactics: 1910-39

American military strategy during the first half of the 20th century was an outgrowth of the Civil War campaigns of Generals Ulysses S. Grant and William T. Sherman who brought superior force and resources to bear on the enemy, wearing them down by attrition. It was termed by historian Russell F. Weigley as a "strategy of annihilation," the purpose of which was to engage and exterminate the armies and resources of the enemy. It meant massive losses of men and material.[15]

As World War I began in 1914, the debate that raged in European military circles was whether advantage rested with offensive or defensive stances. The Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War, the first instances where the more accurate magazine-fed, small-bore rifles, and machine guns had been employed, had taught that even thinly held defensive positions could turn back frontal assaults with deadly effect. But not all military thinkers took that lesson to heart. Many clung to the idea of the offensive. N.P. Mikhnevich, chief of the Russian general staff from 1911 to 1917, wrote, "Offensive action reaps greater benefits, but can only be undertaken when the army has completed its strategic deployment, and is fully prepared with sufficient forces…. Thus time is the best ally of our military forces, and for that reason it is not dangerous for us to follow 'a strategy of attrition and exhaustion,' initially avoiding decisive engagements with the enemy on the border when the superiority of forces may be on its side." French Army regulations, the work of Grandmaison, were published promulgating that the key to victory was the offensive. Grandmaison wrote that "It is far more important to develop a conquering state of mind than to cavil about tactics." The French Regulations for the Conduct of Major Formations was published in October and affirmed, "The French Army, returning to its traditions, recognizes no law save that of the offensive."[16]

Clausewitz, since first having been translated into English in 1873, was the voice heard by most American officers. He would win increasing reverence and adherents as the 20th century rolled along. But that was for the classroom or for officer's club discussions of abstract theory. In his everyday life of drill

and maneuver, the Huachuca soldier was guided by his Army's manuals.

Field Service Regulations for 1914 contained in a thin, pocket-sized edition the fundamentals of soldiering in the U.S. Army, ranging from entries on Flank guards, Use of machine guns, Sanitary service, Requisitioning military railways, to Signals and codes. This article on "Combat principles" will serve to show the succinctness with which the lessons were set down.

Combat is divided into two general classes, the offensive and the defensive. The defensive is divided into the purely passive defense and the temporary defense, which has for its object the assumption of the offensive at the first favorable opportunity.

Decisive results are obtained only by the offensive. Aggressiveness wins battles. The purely passive defense is adopted only when the mission can be fully accomplished by this method of warfare. In all other cases, if a force be obliged by uncontrollable circumstances to adopt the defensive, it must be considered as a temporary expedient, and a change to the offensive with all or part of the forces will be made as soon as conditions warrant such change. [This would be the American position for the entire 20th century.[17]]

The following principles apply to both offensive and defensive combat:

Fire superiority insures success. [This was another favorite theorem of the American Army, which always emphasized obtaining superior firepower through technology rather than committing large numbers of men to the battle.]

Unity of command is essential to success. The regiment united in combat has greater force and fighting power than have three separate battalions. A battalion acting as a unit is stronger than are four companies acting independently. All the troops assigned to the execution of a distinct tactical task must be placed under one command.

The task assigned any unit must not involve a complicated maneuver. Simple and direct plans and methods are productive of the best results in warfare. [This principle has long been subscribed to by the American Army and was expressed in the latter half of the 20th century by the acronym "KISS" or "Keep is Simple Stupid."]

All the troops that are necessary to execute a definite task must be assigned to it from the beginning. Avoid putting troops into action in driblets.

Detachments during combat are justifiable only when the execution of the tasks assigned them contributes directly to success in the main battle or when they keep a force of the enemy larger than themselves out of the main battle. When combat is imminent all troops must be called to the probable field of battle. A force is never so strong that it can needlessly dispense with the support of any of its parts during combat.

Too many troops must not, however, be committed to the action in the early stages, no matter what be the nature of the deployment or the extent of line held. Some reserves must be kept in hand.

Use the reserve only when needed or when a favorable opportunity for its use presents itself. Keep some reserve as long as practicable, but every man that can be used to advantage must participate in the decisive stage of the combat.

Flanks must be protected either by reserves, fortifications, or the terrain.

Flank protection is the duty of the commanders of all flank units down to the lowest, whether specifically enjoined in orders or not. This applies to units on both sides of gaps that may exist in the combat lines.

Reconnaissance continues throughout the action.

The purely passive defense is justified where the sole object is to gain time, or to hold certain positions pending the issue of events in other parts of the field. Its results, when it accomplishes its mission, can never be other than negative.[18]

In the forward to the Army's Field Service Regulations for 1914, Army Chief of Staff, Major General Leonard Wood, said:

Success in war can be achieved only by all branches and arms of the service mutually helping and

supporting one another in the common effort to attain the desired end.

The basic principles of the combat tactics of the different arms are set forth in the drill regulations of those arms for units as high as brigades. It is the function of higher troop leading to so combine and coordinate the combat tactics of all the arms as to develop in the combined forces the teamwork essential to success.

While the fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor complex, their application may be difficult and must not be limited by set rules. Departure from prescribed methods is at times necessary. A thorough knowledge of the principles of war and their application enables the leader to decide when such departure should be made and to determine what methods should bring success.

Officers and men of all ranks and grades are given a certain independence in the execution of the tasks to which they are assigned and are expected to show initiative in meeting the different situations as they arise. Every individual, from the highest commander to the lowest private, must always remember that inaction and neglect of opportunities will warrant more severe censure than an error in the choice of means.[19]

So we see the Army's leader placing emphasis on combined arms cooperation, teamwork, flexibility in applying fundamental principles, independence of action down the chain of command, and initiative.

Drill regulations for each combat arm combined in a single volume all the soldier needed to know about tactical mechanics. Hugh L. Scott, Army Chief of Staff in 1916, declared that the War Department's Cavalry Drill Regulations were issued "with a view to insure uniformity throughout the Army." It was an instruction manual that included such topics as: Manual of the rifle, Saddling and Unsaddling, Forming, aligning and leading the squad, The rally, The Charge, The pistol attack, Reconaissance before combat, Inspections, Training remounts, Care of horses, Ceremonies, Marches, and Bugle signals.

In the 1916 edition, there were 269 such topics. Little was left to the imagination. But by today's standards, the soldier's common tasks of 1916 were comparatively few and straightforward.

Instructions in drill were to take place year round so that the regiment was "at all times…prepared to take the field." And, "the system must be such as to bring the regiment to a proper state of preparation for participation in the annual maneuvers or field exercises." The commander monitored the results by conducting personal inspections.[20]

After the first World War, American military leaders increasingly rejected the idea that maneuver could win battles. They stuck to the strategy of annihilation, calling for the defeat of the enemy's army, and prized courage and endurance more than strategic skill. In his 1928 textbook, *The Fundamentals of Military Strategy*, Lieut. Col. Oliver P. Robinson said simply, "War means fighting, it has only one aim, to crush the enemy and destroy his will to resist."[21]

For the first time in 1921, the American Army ennunciated the "principles of war" in War Department Training Regulations No. 10-5. These generalized premises were thought to be useful tools in simplifying the training of officers. They were: The Principle of the Objective, of the Offensive, of Mass, of Economy of Force, of Movement, of Surprise, of Security, of Simplicity, and The Principle of Cooperation. Principles would be added, subtracted, and combined over the years as part of the Army's *Operations* field manual, today called the Airland Battle doctrine.

In 1923 Acting Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. J.L. Hines, in the forward to the Field Service Regulations for that year, said virtually the same thing that Leonard Wood had said in 1914. But the General Principles of combat were expanded:

The ultimate objective of all military operations is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces by battle. Decisive defeat in battle breaks the enemy's will to war and forces him to sue for peace.

Concentration of superior forces, both on the ground and in the air, at the decisive place and time, creates the conditions most essential to decisive victory and constitutes the best evidence of superior leadership.[22]

Decisive results are obtained only by the offensive. Only through offensive action can a commander exercise his initiative and impose his will on the enemy.

A defensive attitude is never deliberately adopted except as a temporary expedient or for the purpose of economizing forces on a front where a decision is not sought in order to concentrate superior forces at the point of decisive action.

Numerical inferiority does not necessarily commit a command to a defensive attitude. Superior hostile strength may be overcome through greater mobility, higher morale, and better leadership. Superior leadership often enables a numerically inferior force to be stronger at the point of decisive action.

A strategically defensive mission is frequently most effectively executed through offensive action. It is often necessary for an inferior force to strike at an early moment in order to secure initial advantages or to prevent itself from being overwhelmed by a growing superiority in the hostile forces.

All combat action must be based upon the effect of surprise….

The necessity for guarding against surprise requires adequate provision for the security and readiness for action of all units.

Each unit takes the necessary measures for its own local security as soon as the next higher unit has developed for action.

Provision for the security of the flanks is of especial importance in combat.

The effect of surprise must be reinforced and exploited by fire superiority.

The attack can dispense with fire protection only when covered by darkness, fog, or smoke.

The defense can not ordinarily gain fire superiority through superiority in the means which it puts into action. It must rely for fire superiority on better observation for the conduct of fire, on the more methodical organization of its fire, especially its flankings, more accurate knowledge of ranges and the terrain, the concealment of its dispositions, and the disorganization, which movement and accessory defenses produce in the attacker's dispositions.[23]

Not everyone in the U.S. military establishment thought that principles or rules of warfare were worthy of the overemphasis they seemed to accrue. A distillation of World War experiences was prepared in 1939 for the *Infantry Journal* under the supervision of Colonel George C. Marshall. The handbook contained a caution that should be heeded by all those who expect from history detailed instructions for conduct in specific situations:

The art of war has no traffic with rules, for the infinitely varied circumstances and conditions of combat never produce exactly the same situation twice….

It follows, then, that the leader who would become a competent tactician must first close his mind to the alluring formula that well-meaning people offer in the name of victory. To master his difficult art he must learn to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its decisive elements and base his course of action on these. The ability to do this is not God-given, nor can it be acquired overnight; it is a process of years. He must realize that training in solving problems of all types, long practice in making clear, unequivocal decisions, the habit of concentrating on the question at hand, and an elasticity of mind, are indispensable requisites for the successful practice of the art of war.

The leader who frantically strives to remember what someone else did in some slightly similar situation has already set his feet on a well-traveled road to ruin.

…Every situation encountered in war is likely to be exceptional. The schematic solution will seldom fit. Leaders who think that familiarity with blind rules of thumb will win battles are doomed to disappointment. Those who seek to fight by rote, who memorize an assortment of standard solutions with the idea of applying the most appropriate when confronted by actual combat, walk with disaster. Rather, it is essential that all leaders—from subaltern to commanding general—familiarize themselves with the art of clear, logical thinking. It is more valuable to be able to analyse one battle situation correctly, recognize its decisive elements and devise a simple, workable solution for it, than to memorize all the erudition ever written of war.[24]

The American Army's call for the use of imagination, backed up by a knowledge of history, may well be what accounts for its repeated successes.

Lifestyles Along the Border: Pay

The one thing that absorbed the thoughts of the Huachuca soldier more than any other was his pay. As small as the amount was, it alone meant freedom from the confines of Army routine. It enabled him to afford the temptations of the community outside the reservation, to dream of parlaying his pitiful salary into an inconceivable fortune at the barracks craps or card games, or to carefully set aside a few dollars month after month to eventually claim some worthwhile stake in life. It was the reward, no matter how modest, for sweating out the rigors of a soldier's days on the Southwestern frontier.

May 1908 legislation enacted a new pay schedule which gave a private $15 per month, a cavalry sergeant $30, a first sergeant $45, a second lieutenant $1,700 per year, a captain $2,400, a colonel $4,000, and a lieutenant general $11,000 annually.

Second Lieutenant John B. Brooks remembered some of the perks a officer received and some of the extra pay that might be earned by an enlisted man in 1914.

A principal mount, at a cost through remount, of $151.10. Allowance for two horses, first mount; second mount, a polo pony. Forage furnished by the government. Allowance of $150 for the first horse, $50.00 for the second horse, total $200 per annum.

An orderly excused from most formations, $5.00 per month to take care of one horse; $7.50 for two.

A striker to take care of equipment at $5.00 per month. Mostly two orderlies each. The striker served table and his wife acted as a cook.

Lucious Smith was recommended for Medal of Honor as a result of having carried a badly wounded officer off the field at San Juan Hill under heavy enemy fire. The recommendation for Medal of Honor was not favorably considered by the War Department, but in lieu thereof they issued a Certificate of Merit, the equivalent of the present Soldier's Medal. This resulted in $2.00 per month extra pay.

…The private got $15 per month and every month 20 cents was taken away for the support of the Soldiers' Home. He got a net of $14.80, and then there were no privates first class in those days. An increased pay scale would come to the wagoner, each troop had one wagoner and he drew $18 per month. Then the next was the farrier. He was a very important man in a troop because the horses were constantly kicking each other and he had to look after all breaks and bruises and of course, they had two regimental veterinarians, but every troop had a farrier and he got $21 a month. They also had a horseshoer and he got the same pay as a farrier. Then the corporal got $24, as I recall it, and the sergeant got $30 and the cook—they had a rating of cook, and a man could retire on that rating, as cook he got the same pay as a sergeant. Of course, this was all subject to the regular longevity increases. Then the First Sergeant, who was the highest paid enlisted man in the troop, got $45 a month.

Sergeant Hamilton had $14,000 on deposit with the Quartermaster. …I of course wouldn't ask Sgt. Hamilton about it because it wasn't any of my business but I waited until Capt. Rutherford was well and I remarked about this. "Oh, yes," he said, "Hamilton used to be one of the best gamblers in the regiment. About six years ago when he was made First Sergeant, I called him in and told him I wanted to make him First Sergeant, but if he was going to continue his gambling with the men, I couldn't have him as First Sergeant. So he said he would give up his gambling, and I think he was glad because he was afraid he might lose this stake. You see they were all laying for him."[25]

The 1916 Defense Act gave all enlisted men a raise; $15 per month for those who made less than $24 a month, $12 for those who made $24 monthly, an $8 increase for those who made between $31 and $40, and a $6 raise for those who made $45 or more. So a private now made $1 a day.

In 1920 Congress granted another pay raise, about 20 percent for enlisted men, with annual increases for officers amounting to $600 for colonels and lieutenant colonels, $840 for majors, $720 for

captains, $600 for first lieutenants, and $420 for second lieutenants.

Pvt. Tom Prowl with his horse. Photo courtesy Prowl Collection, Fort Huachuca Museum.

In 1920 new pay grades were created. Enlisted men were graded from one, at $74 per month, to seven, at $30 per month. For each five years of service, they received an additional 10 percent until they reached a ceiling of 40 percent. There were six different classes of specialist ratings within grades six and seven and these ratings could bring from an additional $3 to $25 monthly.[26]

After the 1929 Depression, Army pay was reduced by 8.33 percent by mandating a payless furlough, and again in 1933 by 15 percent across the board.

George Looney, both a dependent and soldier at Huachuca in the 1930s, recalled:

In the summer teenagers earned $25.00 a month doing KP for the soldiers who would rather pay than do the job themselves. The soldiers' salaries were $19.00 a month. At the end of the summer the kids had $75.00 and they had been kept occupied.

If the soldier's pay was the most consuming of his concerns at the isolated post on the Mexican border, it was also, ironically, his least consideration when joining up. With the pay scales in the U.S. Army historically lower than the lowest economic rungs of civilian society, no soldier ever enlisted with the idea of getting rich. If money was important to the soldier, it was precisely so because he had so little of it. financial motivations did not play much of a part in the trooper's decision to make sacrifice a way of life.

Headquarters Detachment, 2d Battalion, 25th Infantry.

Lifestyles at Huachuca in the Teens: Reasons for Joining

The campaigns and battles of the American Army have undeniably changed the course of history. But the Army has had a profound influence upon American society, beyond providing for the common defense. More than any other American institution, it has touched the lives of citizens throughout history in an indelible way.

According to Peter Karsten in his book *Soldiers and Society*, military service has come to be a common experience in America with "nearly half of its households headed by veterans." What was the effect of that experience on these veterans? "It imparted greater self-confidence, self-control, and understanding to some; it broadened the horizons and opportunities of others; it comsmopolitanized certain localists." It stabilized some felons paroled into the military. It made other soldiers politically aware. It provided minority groups a greater degree of acculturation to the Anglo's system and increased their chances to move up in that system. The G.I. Bill educated many and the Veterans Administration provided loans and free health care services.

"Although the effects of military service on the lives of those who served are complex and often partially dependent on preservice values and experiences, it is still fair to say that the years in uniform were, for many, the most interesting years of their lives, and consequently it is not surprising that about one in every five joins a veterans' organization and attends various veterans' outings, Memorial Day ceremonies, and reunions."[27]

Why do men and women come into the Army" Some don't have much choice. They were conscripted under the Selective Service Act. Draftees made some of the best soldiers. Also some of the worst. The question is intended here to be asked of volunteers. It is they who have chosen the life of the soldier. Why?

The answers are several according to Karsten. A sense of duty to country plays a part in choosing military service, but *patriotism* is probably the least considered factor in electing a military career. Some enlistees are *influenced by family and friends*. This reason is present when family members have chosen a military career or when peers have enlisted. Others have the need to put their manhood to the test. This category Karsten calls "*self-challenge*," and this is often the reason for choosing an elite arm of the service. Closely related to the self-challenge movivation is the search of *adventure*. The pursuit of glory has been a dominant theme in deciding to pursue a military career. Far outweighing patriotism as a reason for enlisting was the need to find *security*. Surveys made in the 1960s showed that most high school seniors were looking to the Army to provide socio-economic opportunities or career training. For many minority groups the Army offered *social mobility*. Some blacks perceived the Army as a way out of the ghetto and a means to establish a place for themselves in American society.[28]

Vance Marchbanks, who first enlisted in 1895, claimed "the soldier bug" had gotten into his blood as a small boy, so when he was 19 and thought that his parents, well off farmers, could do without him, he took his "chances with an unknown world." He said, "I wanted to learn and was not satisfied just to grow up in the backwoods of Tennessee."[29]



Recruiting Office, U.S. Army, 1898, William Allen Rogers.

For James Clark, the 16-year-old son of a slave, who joined in 1918, the Army was "the best place I could find a position. …Jobs were hard to find, especially for blacks." The 30-year veteran said, "If I had to do it all over again, I would choose an Army career."[30]

George Looney describes his enlistment in the 1930s:

When I finished high school I had hoped to go to college and study music, but circumstances necessitated my getting a job to help support the family. Not prepared for anything in particular but well acquainted with the Army, I chose to enlist. The only hitch was no black could join the Army unless one was leaving; there was a strict quota system in operation. Luckily one of the buglers went permanently AWOL and I was allowed to join the Infantry at Fort Huachuca. I wanted to join the band but the older fellows advised against this if I hoped to move up in the ranks. They pointed out that the band was a one-way street; promotions and advancements did not exist. Since my instrument was a trumpet, they suggested I become a bugler. I would still be able to play my horn but would be a regular Infantryman. I took their advice. Being able to carry a forty-five instead of a rifle impressed me.

Besides, buglers did not have to work details in the afternoon; they withdrew to the drill field and practiced.[31]

Despite the drawbacks of military life, low pay, separations from family, unrelenting discipline, and possibly a warrior's death, few regretted their choice of careers and the sense of accomplishment that accompanied them. Like Sergeant James Clark, most would readily do it all over again.

The Situation in Mexico

A chain of political events and armed revolution led to the ouster in May 1911 of long-time Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz. He was replaced by reformer Francisco Madero. In the months prior, Madero's supporters in Chihuahua had recruited to their cause a bandit and sometimes operator of a butcher shop in Chihuahua City. He was Doroteo Arango, who adopted the name of a deceased and legendary bandit with whom he is believed to have ridden, Francisco Villa.

"Pancho" Francisco Villa on a white mule.

Villa raised and led an army of revolutionaries in the state of Chihuahua and, along with the rebel army of Pascual Orozco, defeated the government *rurales*.

In March 1911, President Taft ordered the massing of 30,000 troops along the Mexican border, ostensibly for large-scale maneuvers. The assembled units were organized under the "Maneuver Division," on 12 March, and commanded by the champion of a general staff system within the U.S. Army, Maj. Gen. William Harding Carter. In August the Maneuver Division was disbanded and most of the units sent back to their original stations.

In 1912 the 9th Cavalry was sent to Douglas, Arizona, and the 13th Cavalry took up station at El Paso, Texas, to meet the increasing depredations by Mexican rebel forces and to enforce the neutrality laws. By the end of the year there were 6,754 soldiers along the line made up of 6 cavalry regiments, 1 1/2 infantry regiments, a battalion of field artillery, 2 companies of coast artillery and a signal corps company. During that summer, 67,280 militia troops joined the regulars on the border for five different joint maneuvers.

"Protecting Douglas." U.S. Army Signal Corps photo.

Madero's reign was not to be long-lived in the struggles for power that ensued. Gen. Victoriano Huerta, an often drunk but successful field commander, staged a coup which overthrew Madero in February 1913. Madero was arrested and killed. Madero's recently appointed Minister of War and Marine, Venustiano Carranza, emerged as the chief opponent of the new Huerta regime and his resistance was characterized as the "Constitutionalist" movement.

Orozco, once a rebel leader fighting for Madero, now went over to Huerta and combined his men with the federal forces fighting in Chihuahua. Because of their insignia, they were known as the *Colorados*, or "Reds." They terrorized the Chihuahua countryside.

Francisco "Pancho" Villa, allying himself with Carranza and the Constitutionalists, formed the opposition to Huerta in Chihuahua. His army had grown to 9,000 men and was known by the grand title of the *Division del Norte*.

In a bloody showdown on 23 June 1914 at Zacatecas, the *Villistas* decisively defeated the *Huertistas* and forced the 15 July resignation of Huerta and his exile. Federal forces lost between 5,000 and 8,000 killed and wounded, while the Constitutionalists suffered 4,000 casualties. It was the zenith of Villa's military career. Much of his military success was owed to his advisor, Brig. Gen. Felipe Angeles, a career professional who had recently returned from France. He had been sent out of the country by Huerta, who

saw him as a threat to his own power and military prestige.

Villa's success in Chihuahua was paralleled by another amateur general in the state of Sonora. He was a former school teacher named Alvaro Obregon, a descendent of the O'Briens who had served in the Spanish Army in Mexico. Obregon soundly beat the federal troops, led by Col. Emilio Kosterlitzky, at Nogales on 13 March 1913 and followed up his win with victories at Cananea on 26 March, at Santa Rosa on 13 May, and at San Alejandro on 27 June.

Brig. Gen. Tasker Bliss, commanding the Southern Department from Fort Sam Houston, Texas, gave the perspective from the American side of the line.

On February 15, 1913, the situation in Mexico along the international boundary was for the moment comparatively quiet. But with the overthrow of the Madero government and the establishment of the Federal authority under Huerta, it soon became evident that the States of Sonora and Coahuila would not accept the new government and active military operations were promptly inaugurated in both States against the Federal authority. This movement accepted Gov. Venustiano Carranza, of Coahuila, as its representative head and the faction styled itself Constitutionalists. The operations rapidly spread to the neighboring border States, and it soon became necessary to extend the border patrol on our side of the line so as to include the whole border from Brownsville, Tex., to Sasabe, Ariz. 30 miles west of Nogales, Ariz., a distance, following the windings of the frontier, of some 1,600 miles.

* * *

There then followed a series of contests for possession of the border towns, some of which resulted in fighting on the boundary line.

On March 13 the rebels under Obregon attacked Nogales, Sonora, in force. The Federal defending forces composed of regular Federal troops under Reyes, and a force of gendarmeria fiscales, formerly rurales, under Kosterlitsky, were defeated and crossed the line to the American side of boundary and surrendered to our troops.

The American troops on our side of the line consisted of two mounted and three dismounted troops, Fifth Cavalry, under command of Col. Tate, and later under Col. Wilder. A number of shots fell on the American side, and one soldier of Troop G, Fifth Cavalry, was wounded, a bullet passing through nose and cheek. One Mexican boy, herding cows outside of town on the American side, was wounded.

The shots which came on the American side were accidental and apparently unavoidable in case of a fight between the contending forces actually on the boundary line.

Gen. Ojeda, in command of the Mexican Federal troops in Sonora, was in Agua Prieta early in March with a force of about 500 men, composed of Yaqui Indians and regular troops. The opposing rebel forces were assembling for an attack on the town, but on March 12 Ojeda evacuated Agua Prieta and moved to Naco, Sonora. The rebel troops occupied Agua Prieta the same day without opposition.

From Naco as a base, Ojeda operated for a month against the rebel forces assembling to attack him. He moved out of town and on two occasions attacked and defeated rebel columns advancing to attack him on March 15 and 20.

On March 17 the Yaqui Indians in his command to the number of 110 men with 32 women deserted and came across to the American side of the boundary and surrendered to our troops. Others deserted in the following few days until the total number of Yaquis reached 213.

Ojeda continued his defense of Naco with about 300 men, when he was attacked by rebels under Obregon on April 8. The fighting continued with aggressive return by Ojeda on the 10th, but finally the rebel attack assumed such proportions on the 13th that Ojeda was defeated and with his remaining troops crossed the boundary line and surrendered to our troops.

Col. Guilfoyle, with headquarters, machine-gun platoon, and Troops E, F, I, K, L, and M, of the Ninth Cavalry, was in charge of our forces. A number of shots fell on the American side in the town of Douglas, Ariz., and in the camp of the Ninth Cavalry during the fighting. Three soldiers and three animals of the Ninth Cavalry were wounded in the fight of the 8th.

In accordance with instructions from the War Department, Col. Guilfoyle notified the commanders

of both sides in advance of the fighting that they must not direct their fire so that bullets should come across the line. The rebel commander in return gave assurance that he would do all he could to prevent shots from falling on the American side.

In addition to the Yaqui Indians and Federals, a number of rebels crossed the line at different periods and the wounded of both parties were brought to the American side of the boundary, where they were cared for by our medical officers.

* * *

At Nogales, Ariz., after the capture of Nogales, Sonora, by the revolutionists on March 13, there surrendered to our troops: Mexican Federal officers 2, Mexican Federal men 101, of whom 1 officer and 43 men were of the regular troops and the remainder belonged to the gendarmeria fiscales.

At Naco, Ariz., between March 17 and April 13, there surrendered: Mexican Federals, wounded, 8 officers, 48 men; Mexican Federals, unwounded, 28 officers, 260 men; Yaqui Indians (deserters from Mexican Federal force), 213 men; rebels, wounded, 2 officers, 28 men. These Yaqui Indians were accompanied by a large number of women and children. [On April 18 the prisoners were released and allowed to filter back across the line.]

American sailors were arrested in Tampico, Mexico, by an increasingly hostile Mexican government. In April a landing force of 8,000 marines and soldiers led by Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Funston occupied Vera Cruz but were withdrawn when Mexican president Huerta resigned. To the soldiers along the border, the situation looked grave and many thought war with Mexico was inevitable. At Huachuca Lieutenant Jerome Howe entered in his diary on 18 April 1914, "Mexican situation pretty acute." Two days later, he wrote, "Huerta has not complied with U.S. demands for apology. Looks like intervention." On 22 April he exclaimed, "Vera Cruz taken!" By the 28th he thought "War apparently unavoidable." He was taking his K Troop to the range everyday to sharpen the marksmanship skills of his newer troops. A month later found him with his troop taking up station at Naco.[32]

Frederick Funston. U.S. Army Signal Corps photo.

A heliograph signalling station on the roof of the Terminal Hotel, Headquarters of the U.S. Expeditionary Forces, Vera Cruz, Mexico, 1914. U.S. Army Signal Corps photo.

Den yo' gets a shovel an' a big ole pick,
An' spend de afternoon makin' 'dobe brick;
Very nex' morning its de same ole thing,
An' yo' got seven yeahs to do it in.[34]

While the regiment's mission along the border was to enforce the Neutrality Laws, just how those orders were to be carried out was often less clear to the troops who sought scraps of shade under the occasional Blue Paloverde along a vast vista of Southwestern desert. How the orders from the policy-makers back east filtered down to the tactical level was described to a 10th Cavalry officer by a longtime observer of the Arizona scene.

You see, Captain, it runs like this— …The general commanding the department gits a letter from the Adjutant General and he says: "This office views with concern the fact that the troops under your command are not strictly enforcing the Neutrality Laws. You will at once take steps to see that this dereliction is corrected. Failure to do this will result in steps taken to ensure compliance with orders that have been frequently issued from these headquarters.

When the Ginral gits that he sets up. He's worried 'cause his wife's uncle's been elected to the Senate and he wants that uncle's aid in getting himself made a major ginral, so he sets down and writes to each colonel commanding a regiment and he says something like this: "The attention of the Commanding General has been called to the fact that the regimental commanders in this department have been guilty of neglect of duty in not seeing to a proper enforcement of the Neutrality Laws. This will be corrected at once. Any failure on the part of officers will be held to be the fault of their regimental commanders.

Now o' course that makes every colonel mad. It ain't hard to make a colonel mad anyhow. They don't write letters in this case. They just say to the Adjutant, "Tell Captain Jones I want to see him." Then Jones comes and the colonel's mad. He wants to be a Brigadier Ginral hisself and he can't if he gets in trouble over them damn Neutrality Laws so he starts in on Jones.

"Look here, Captain," he says, "you're going with troop on border duty. Part of that duty is to enforce the Neutrality Laws. That's the most important part. I only want to warn you that if you don't enforce those laws to the letter you'll find you've started something you can't finish. That's all."

Cap'n Jones goes out kind of in a whirl. He takes his troop to his station on the border and he reads his orders; then he calls in his Lieutenant and tells him just what the Colonel said on'y he puts in some words the Colonel forgot.

The Lieutenant takes his men to the hellhole where he's to stay and he calls his sergeant an' tells him: "You take ten men today, Sergeant, and ride the border from Point O' Rocks to Sadler's Wells. You'll take note of all activities on the Mexican side of the line, especially any movement of troops and above all you'll see to it that the Neutrality Laws are strictly observed. Understand that?"

The Sergeant looks kind o' dazed. He's heard the words but they don't mean nothin' to him. So he says, "Yes sir. I'd like to ask the Lieutenant a question. What are these Neutrality Laws that we're to enforce?"

"How in hell do I know what they are?" says the Lieutenant. "All I can say is, 'you enforce 'em.'"
"Yes Sir," says the Sergeant and passes the same on to his corporal.[35]

As laughable as their ill-defined mission of preserrving U.S. neutrality was to many of the men along the border, their presence was welcomed by the ranchers who repeatedly lost their stock, and sometimes their lives, to raiding Mexican gangs. It is unlikely, however, that the widely scattered picket line of the 10th Cavalry did much to inhibit the smuggling of arms from U.S. dealers to the several factions of Mexican malcontents.

A 1914 cavalry camp in the Huachuca foothills.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The Battle of Naco

Rival factions in the northern provinces of Mexico maneuvered their armies so as to pin their enemies against the border. American forces positioned along that line would unwittingly be anchoring some rebel leader's flank and more than occasionally be caught in a crossfire.

In early October 1914, entrenched rebel forces were besieged by federal troops in the border town of Naco, Sonora. To protect the U.S. border, Colonel William C. Brown, leading four troops of the 10th Cavalry, arrived on the scene during the night of 7 October. He was joined by six troops and the machine gun platoon from the 9th Cavalry, under Colonel John Francis Guilfoyle who took overall command. Brown deployed west of the town while Guilfoyle took the eastern sector.

John Francis Guilfoyle.

Captain Herman A. Sievert, Commanding Troop A, 9th Cavalry, near Naco, Arizona, on the Mexican border in 1913.

Naco, Sonora, Mexico. Panoramic photo by Dix Photo, Bisbee, Arizona.

Rebel sharpshooters on the Mexican border. Photo courtesy Col. James W. Fraser.

Federal trenches at Naco, Sonora, Mexico. National Archives photo.

Tents of Troop D, 10th Cavalry, at Naco, Arizona, around 1914 or 15. This troop was commanded by 1st Lieut. Orlando C. "Daddy" Troxel. Commanding the First Squadron of the 10th Cavalry at Naco was Major Elwood Evans. Photo courtesy Maj. Gen. John B. Brooks.

On 17 October 1914, two Mexican factions, a pro-Obregon force under General Benjamin Hill and a pro-Villa army under General Maytorena, became locked in combat at Naco, Sonora. On the U. S. side of the border, in Naco, Arizona, the 9th and 10th Cavalry dug in to see that the Mexican forces did not cross the line and violate the U. S. neutrality.

From their trenches and rifle pits, the men of the 10th and their comrades from the 9th Cavalry watched the fighting. It was a dangerous business; the Buffalo Soldier regiment had eight men wounded while the Ninth "had some killed and wounded." They also lost a number of horses and mules from gunfire straying across the border.

It became a kind of deadly theater of the absurd. One observer noted that the men had "great difficulty…in holding back the crowds of visitors from Bisbee and Douglas who flocked to see the 'battles,' in automobiles, wagons and horseback."

The men were under orders not to return fire, not an easy thing to do when the target for potshooters, and it was a tribute to the discipline of the regiment that they restrained themselves. For their "splendid conduct and efficient service" the men of the 10th were commended by the Secretary of War.

Brown later wrote of the affair:

> *…The Mexicans secured ammunition without limit from U.S. sources. …The fire, with the exception of a truce from October 24 to November 9, was continuous until December 18, being heavier by night than by day, and included fire from small arms, three-inch shell, shrapnel, Hotchkiss revolving cannon, rockets, land mines, bombs, bugle calls and epithets! Eight men were wounded in the Tenth Cavalry and the regimental commanders tent hit four times. As the situation became more grave,*

additional troops were sent, and as Mexicans paid little attention to protests against their firing into U.S. camps, the latter were abandoned at night and eventually moved about a mile north of the line, along which outposts only, and these in bomb proofs, were maintained. The provocation to return the fire was very great, but so far as known not a shot was fired by the Tenth cavalry in retaliation.[36]

Colonel Frank Tompkins, chronicler of the Villa campaign, noted the discipline of the troopers.

This high state of discipline called forth a special letter of commendation from the President, and the Chief of Staff in his Annual Report for 1915…, referring to the conduct of the 9th and 10th Cavalry, said: "During the siege of Naco, Sonora, which was carried on for two and one-half months, the American troops at Naco, Arizona, were constantly on duty day and night to prevent the use of United States territory in violation of the neutrality laws. These troops were constantly under fire and one was killed and 18 were wounded without a single case of return fire of retaliation. This is the hardest kind of service and only troops in the highest state of discipline would stand such a test."[37]

Privately, Brown was mad at the danger his men were subjected to and critical of his orders not to take action. He wrote to a friend in October:

About 12:25 a.m., on the 17th [Maytorena] made the most determined attack yet made—first from the west, then from the east and lastly from the south, the direction which would send the high shots into our camp and of which he had previously been warned.

On the night of the 10th four shots hit the little R.R. station where I had my headquarters; on the night of the 16th-17th, 14 shots hit the same building and I should say that the shots (probably several hundred) dropped in our camp in about the same proportion.

Fortunately nearly all men and animals had been moved out for safety but notwithstanding this our casualty list was as follows: Four troopers wounded, one will probably die, and another lose his eyesight. One horse and one mule killed, one horse wounded besides at least two natives shot on the U.S. side of the line.

It is a surprise here that the U.S. takes no notice of such an outrageous proceeding.

Does the U.S. Government propose to sit complacently by and allow such deliberate firing perpendicular to the boundary that our soldiers are shot in their own camps? This after repeated warnings of the effect of such firing.

If this be true I am having my eyes opened, and getting an entirely new idea of the protection afforded by the U.S. flag.[38]

With the battle over, the regimental historian wrote, "the troops were given a rest and a chance to see what Huachuca looked like. Some of the men, after ten months' service on the border, had not yet seen their home station."[39]

The cavalrymen had a number of skirmishes with bandits during 1915. On 22 August, Troop K intercepted a band of Mexican soldiers who had crossed the border to rustle some cattle. The Troop K patrols drove them off with no losses to either side.

It was in November of that year that Pancho Villa's "northern division" was soundly defeated by President Carranza's government forces at Agua Prieta. Colonel William C. Brown, commanding the regiment, was there on 3 and 4 November with Troops B, E, G and M. The 10th Cavalry looked on from their blocking positions in Douglas, Arizona, and directed searchlights into the Mexican night, a move Pancho Villa considered as American support for his enemies.

The action during the month of November was especially hot. A 24-year-old private from Illinois named Harry J. Jones, Company C, 11th Infantry, was killed on 2 November 1915 by a stray bullet from the Mexican side of the line where the forces of Villa and Carranza were fighting. The U.S. Army camp at Douglas, Arizona, was named for him on 28 February 1916. Then, on 21 November, two privates were fired on by Mexicans while manning an observation post near Monument 117. The next day a camp of Troop F on the Santa Cruz River was fired upon by five armed Mexicans. The detachment returned the fire but there were no casualties reported. Another Troop F outpost on a hill near Mascarena's Ranch was hit on the 25th. In this raid, one Mexican was wounded and made prisoner.

On 26 November 1915, a 30-minute firefight erupted in Nogales after Mexican soldiers fired at troops of the 12th Infantry on the American side of the border. Private Stephen D. Little, Company L, was killed along with an unknown number of Mexicans. The U.S. Army camp there was named for the 21-year-old South Carolinian on 18 December 1915. Meanwhile, on the western outskirts of Nogales, Carranza forces engaged in the siege of Nogales fired on Troop F, 10th Cavalry, who returned the fire, killing two of the *Carranzistas* and wounding others. Troop H was also being shot at during the siege of Nogales.[40]

"Type of Mexican Soldiers."

Timeline

In **1913** Army strength was 92,756. The Army opened a School of Musketry at the Presidio of Monterey, California. The Army organized the 1st Aero Squadron in Texas with eight Curtis biplanes. General Victoriano Huerta deposed President Francisco Madera, but was not recognized by President Woodrow Wilson, who aided the opposing Constitutionalists under Carranza by lifting an earlier arms embargo. Congress raised the amount paid to the widows of Indian Wars' soldiers to $20 per month. The 16th Amendment institutionalizing income tax was passed. Robert Frost published his first book of poems in England. Mack Sennet began producing slapstick movies. Ambrose Bierce went to Mexico to report on revolutionary activities and was never heard from again. He wrote to his daughter, "Why should I remain in a country that is on the eve of prohibition and women's suffrage?" The European avant-garde art of Gauguin, Picasso, and Duchamp was introduced to New Yorkers at the Armory Show. Fort Whipple was abandoned on 15 February. An eight-hour work day went into effect for women. Citizens of Douglas and Tucson were arrested for running guns to rebels in Mexico. On 5 March Lindley M. Garrison replaced Stimson as Secretary of War.

In **1914** the Army numbered 98,544. Dr. Robert H. Goddard patented his multi-stage rocket. The U.S. declared itself neutral. Warfare between striking miners and state militia at Ludlow, Colorado, resulted in federal troops being sent to "maintain a status of good order." Charlie Chaplin created the character of the tramp. Edgar Rice Burroughs published his first Tarzan novel. W. C. Handy wrote the "St. Louis Blues." Camel cigarettes were introduced by R. J. Reynolds Company. The Panama Canal was completed. Yellow fever and malaria were eliminated from the Canal Zone by Col. William C. Gorgas. Tom Jeffords, the former Chiricahua Apache agent and Fort Huachuca postmaster, died in Tucson on 19

February. On 29 July the first transcontinental telephone line connecting New York and San Francisco was tested. General Tasker H. Bliss was wounded by a bullet fired from the Mexican side of the international border as he inspected troops at Naco. Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary was assassinated in Sarajevo on 28 June, setting off a chain of events that culminated in the Great War. On 21 April Maj. Gen. William W. Wotherspoon replaced Wood as Army Chief of Staff. Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott replaced Wotherspoon as Army Chief of Staff on 16 November. Adolf Hitler enlisted in the Bavarian Army. After the first six weeks of fighting in France beginning in August, the French suffered 385,000 casualties, or about one in four. The lesson was that infantry could not be committed without considerable artillery support. Euday Bowman wrote *12th Street Rag* and *Kansas City Blues*.

In **1915** Army strength was 106,754. The epic movie *The Birth of a Nation* was produced by D. W. Griffith. The U.S. Coast Guard was organized. In May, the British passenger ship *Lusitania* was sunk by a German submarine, resulting in the death of 1,200 passengers. On 22 April in the second battle of Ypres the Germans became the first to employ chlorine poison gas in modern warfare. Major Van Deman, assigned to the War College Division, began organizing military information reports and campaigning for the establishment of an intelligence organization within the general staff. Carl Sandberg, who failed to graduate from West Point and became a private in the Army, published his first work, *Chicago Poems*.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: Villa's Raid on Columbus, N.M.

The skirmishes and wayward gunfire from across the border which had occupied the 10th Cavalry's first two years at Huachuca were only prelude to what was to be the Buffalo Soldier's biggest and most dangerous undertaking since the Spanish-American War.

In neighboring Mexico, revolution was fissuring into counterrevolution. Francisco "Pancho" Villa's onetime partners in seeking to overthrow the usurper Huerta, Alvaro Obregon and Venustiano Carranza, no longer had any use for him. Villa, a champion of the peasantry, did not fit into their plans for a government which would curry the favor of the landed gentry. Once the most successful commander in Carranza's Constitutionalist movement and a leading contender for the seat of government, Villa now found himself harried by *carranzistas* and cornered in northern Chihuahua. His once powerful *Division del Norte* had been smashed at the battle of Agua Prieta on 1 November 1915 and the Carranza government regarded him as an outlaw. And it was to his old ways that he now reverted, leading his remaining followers into the sierras of his native Chihuahua where he had ridden with outlaw bands as a teenager. The guerilla/bandito was in a desperate situation.

Adding to his sense of estrangement were the actions of the U.S. government which recognized the legitimacy of the Carranza government in October 1915. Villa believed, mistakenly, that Carranza had entered into a secret agreement with the U.S. that would make Mexico a protectorate of the U.S. The Americans, who once supported him and made much of him in their press, he now thought of as his betrayers.

Just as infuriating as the recognition of the Carranza regime, was the permission granted by the American government to transport *carranzistas* by U.S. rail. This happened several times in late 1915 and continued into 1916. One such occasion, which took place over October 29 and 30, saw 5,167 officers and men of the Constitutionalist army travel from Eagle Pass, Texas, to Douglas, Arizona, there to cross over to Agua Prieta to reinforce the garrison there. This move turned the tide against Villa. Agua Prieta was Villa's Waterloo and the U.S. had materially aided in his defeat. These Mexican troop movements by American rail stirred the revolutionary's resentment and were believed to have been a major cause of his attack on Columbus, New Mexico.

Villa's growing hatred toward the Americans did not take long to make itself apparent. On 10

January 1916, *villistas* stopped a train at San Ysabel, took off eighteen American miners and engineers who had been assured safe passage by the Carranza government, lined them up, stripped off their clothes, and executed them. Villa, through emissaries, sought to deny blame for the San Ysabel massacre and claimed he would punish his subordinates who were responsible for the killings.

Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing's headquarters at Fort Bliss, Texas, was receiving intelligence reports that Villa was near the border and intended to make an attack on U.S. territory that would cause the Americans to intervene, thus embarrassing the Carranza government. But rumors of anticipated border incursions were commonplace in those days and Pershing gave this report no credence.

In fact raids on U.S. soil from across the border had occurred with alarming frequency. From July 1915 to June 1916, there were 38 raids on the U.S. by Mexican bandits, which resulted in the death of 37 U.S. citizens, 26 of them soldiers.[41]

Colonel Herbert H. Slocum, commander of the 13th Cavalry garrison stationed at Columbus, New Mexico, was also hearing reports of Villa's movements south of the border. A foreman at a nearby ranch rode in on 8 March to report that he had seen Villa around Palomas, just six miles to the south. But other observers contradicted this report and it was not investigated.

But Villa, the Tiger of the North, was out there. He was in camp at Boca Raton with some 485 of his men. After two of his officers returned from a walk around Columbus, New Mexico, on 8 March and said they thought there were only thirty American soldiers on the post, Villa saddled up his forces. At 4:00 in the afternoon the column moved north and sometime after midnight crossed the border. Deploying his men around the sleeping desert town, at approximately 4:00 a.m., the battle cry of "Vayanse adelante, muchachos!" was sounded and the almost 500 *villistas* swept into its sand-drifted streets. Yelling "Viva Villa!" and, according to some, "Muerte a los gringos!" they completely surprised the town and the garrison.

Upon hearing the first shots at about 4:15 a.m., the Officer of the Day, Lieut. James P. Castleman, ran to the guard tent, shooting a *villista* on the way, and turned out the guard. He then joined up with his F Troop, 13th Cavalry, which had been formed up by Sergeant Michael Fody. The camp and town were under a general attack from two directions.

Minutes later, Lieut. John P. Lucas, who had just returned on the midnight train from El Paso where he had been participating in regimental polo matches, saw a horseman ride by his window. He was wearing a high-peaked sombrero characteristic of the *villistas*. Hurrying outside, he joined the attackers who were running toward the barracks, the darkness concealing his identity. Gaining the barracks of his Machine Gun Troop, he led his men to the guard tent where their weapons were under lock and key. Despite several incidents of the French-made Benet-Mercier machine guns jamming, the four gun crews managed to loose 20,000 rounds at the enemy.

With the American defense organized and stiffening, and the sun coming up on the battleground, Villa broke off the attack and ordered a general retreat at about 6:30. He left behind at least sixty-seven dead. About thirteen others would later die of their wounds. Five Mexicans were taken prisoner.

It wasn't until 7:30 a.m. that all of the *villistas* had cleared the town. Villa with thirty riflemen occupied a hill southeast of the town to cover the retreat. Major Frank Tompkins mounted a pursuit that dealt the raiders a telling blow and earned for him the Distinguished Service Cross.

American casualties in the 9 March attack on Columbus included 10 civilians and 8 soldiers killed, 2 civilians and 6 military wounded, for a total of 18 killed and 8 wounded. A block-wide area in the center of town had been torched and burned to the ground, including the Commercial Hotel belonging to Sam Ravel, the man said to have double-crossed Villa in a gun deal.

Newspaper headlines and unclear reports that followed the Columbus raid made it look like Villa had dealt a crippling blow to the surprised American garrison at this gritty little border hamlet. Major General Frederick Funston, commanding the Southern Department headquartered at San Antonio, Texas, felt it necessary to set the record straight in his 1916 Annual Report:

…Owing to the fact that a telegraphic report, filed by the District Commander, was lost by the

operator in the excitement of the day and the hysteria produced by the fear of a return attack, the first accounts of this raid were received from the press associations thus creating an unfavorable impression on the public and official minds; but when it is realized that a force of from 500 to 700 men attacked a force of about 330 men in the dead of night, and that the attacking party was repulsed and driven off after about an hour's fighting, that it was pursued for nearly twenty miles with a loss of nearly two hundred men, that all this was accomplished with the loss of only ten men, the Columbus raid cannot be otherwise considered than as a very creditable performance by the troops engaged.

Much has been said about whether or not this attack was a surprise. If there was any person in the country who was not surprised at such an attack by a large body of armed troops coming from a nation with whom we are at peace, that person must have been one of those residents of the immediate vicinity, who were alleged to have known of the plans for the attack, or to have guided Villa's troops in the attack.…[42]

Several motives have been attributed to Villa for his raid on Columbus. One theory holds that it was a deliberate move to invite American intervention in Mexican affairs thereby making Carranza look like a lackey of the Americans and at the same time drawing government troops away from the beleaguered *villistas*. Another story has an American merchant in Columbus, Sam Ravel, refusing to sell Villa arms, reneging on a deal made earlier, and keeping the money already paid. Some think that the sole purpose was to wreak his vengeance on the hated Americans for their betrayal of his revolution. All of these supposed motives may have played some part in Villa's action on 9 March 1916, but, judging by the military results, the raid would seem to have been prompted by Villa's need of supplies, money and munitions. The attack on this isolated, lightly garrisoned outpost yielded from the 13th U.S. Cavalry's arsenal and stables loads of rifles, machine guns, ammunition and a herd of more than a hundred horses and mules.

Columbus, New Mexico, in 1916.

Villista prisoners at Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916. Photo courtesy Col. James W. Fraser.

"One Grave for 63 Men After the Big Battle." Photo by W. H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.

A clock in Columbus, New Mexico, stopped by a villista bullet at 4:10.

Military camp at Columbus, New Mexico, 1916. Photo courtesy Col. James W. Fraser.

A camp at Columbus, New Mexico, in 1916.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: Organizing the Punitive Expedition

American reaction to the 9 March raid on Columbus, New Mexico, by Pancho Villa was immediate. A flurry of diplomatic notes made clear to Carranza that the United States expected the de facto government in Mexico to take steps to hunt down and bring to justice Villa and his Army so that the threat to the American border would be eliminated. But few in Washington or in the Southwest believed that the beleaguered Carranza government had the power to do so.

The day after the raid Major General Funston was wiring Washington recommending a pursuit be organized. Funston was of the opinion that "unless Villa is relentlessly pursued and his forces scattered he will continue raids. As troops of the Mexican Government are accomplishing nothing and as he consequently can make his preparations and concentrations without being disturbed he can strike at any point on the border…."

Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, new on the job, called Chief of Staff of the Army, Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, into a huddle and told him, "I want to start an expedition into Mexico to catch Villa."

Major General Hugh Lenox Scott.

According to Scott, "This seemed strange…and I asked: 'Mr. Secretary, do you want the United States to make war on one man? Suppose he should get onto a train and go to Guatemala, Yucatan, or South America; are you going to go after him?'"

"He said, 'Well, no, I am not.'"

"'That is not what you want then. You want his *band* captured or destroyed,' I suggested."

"'Yes,' he said, 'that is what I really want.'"

"And after his approval the…telegram was sent to General Funston…in which it will be seen that no mention is made of the capture of Villa himself."[43]

Funston received that telegram on 10 March. It gave him the go-ahead to organize the punitive expedition and named Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing as the commander.

Although the State Department was assuring the Carranza government that the expedition was being undertaken in a spirit of cooperation with the Mexican government to rid it of Villa's lawless element, Carranza was having none of it and he vigorously protested what he considered to be an intrusion upon Mexican sovereignty. The official resistance of the Mexican government would be another problem with which Pershing would have to contend and at a place called Carrizal it would prove to be a deadly one.

In Pershing's *Report of the Punitive Expedition to June 30, 1916*, he quotes a telegram from General Obregon, Secretary of War and Navy, to his commanders outlining an American-Mexican agreement for hot pursuit of bandits across the border. It was this telegram that the U.S. troops carried and showed to local commanders as the basis for their authorization to be in Mexico. It was dated the 13th of March and read:

Our government having entered into an agreement with that of the United States of the North, providing that the troops of either government may cross the border, in pursuit of bandits who are

committing depredations along our frontier, I advise you of same in order that you may in turn advise all commanders along the borders in order that they may make judicious use of these powers, taking care in each case to act in accord with the military authorities of the American army in order that the pursuit of these bandits may give the best results.

General Orders No. 1, published on 14 March 1916, organized the Punitive Expedition and enjoined "all members of the command to make the utmost endeavor to convince all Mexicans that the only purpose of this expedition is to assist in apprehending and capturing Villa and his bandits. Citizens as well as soldiers of the de facto Government will be treated with every consideration. They will not in any case be molested in the peaceful conduct of their affairs, and their property rights will be scrupulously respected."[44]

The President called up the militias of Arizona, New Mexico and Texas on May 9th, 1916. The Arizona militia was mustered in by May 19, Texas was ready by June 20, and the militia forces of New Mexico were completing their mustering in by August. Three weeks after the passage of the 1916 National Defense Act in late June, the National Guard of all of the states (except Nevada which did not have a militia), and Alaska and the District of Columbia were called into Federal service. There were as many as 111,954 guardsmen along the border at the end of August 1916.[45]

"Militiamen Breaking Outlaws." Photo by W. H. Horne Co., El Paso, Tex.

Douglas, Arizona, was one of the four assembly points for the guard units. The others were San Antonio, Brownsville, and El Paso, Texas. Stationed all along the Texas and Arizona borders with Mexico, none of the guard units ever crossed into the neighboring nation.[46]

Mexican railroads. Reproduced Army Service Schools, May 1914.

General Alvaro Obregon and General Frederick Funston in El Paso, Texas, 1916. Photo courtesy Col. James W. Fraser.

"Truck Co. #73 in Mexico." Photo by W. H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.

Troop Kitchen, 1st Arizona Infantry, on the border, Naco, Arizona, 1916. Photo courtesy Sergeant Paul Ballinger.

National Guard troops at Huachuca in 1916, replacing the 10th Cavalry which was in the field in Mexico. The 2d California Infantry from northern California was sent to Fort Huachuca with Lt. Col Scherer as regimental commander. The 2d went into camp on the target range north of the Main Post area while the 7th California Infantry[47] arrived from Camp Stephen D. Little to pitch camp in Garden Canyon. The regiments would exchange places during the year. The 2d Idaho Infantry arrived from Camp Stephen D. Little in August 1916 for rifle range practice and summer maneuvers.

1916.00.00.134 A camp of the 1st California Infantry at Fort Huachuca in 1916. This photo was available as a post card.

Mushroomed tents, Camp Harry J. Jones, Douglas, Arizona.

Camp Harry J. Jones, Douglas, Arizona, 1916.

The 1st Arizona Infantry at Naco guard post in 1916. The Arizona National Guard was called into active federal service on 9 May 1916, with Col. Alexander McKenzie Tuthill as regimental commander. Besides being stationed at Naco, there were elements at Ajo, Nogales, Fort Huachuca, Douglas and other border outposts.[48]

Bivouac of the 1st Arizona Infantry on the border near Naco, Arizona, 1916. Photo courtesy Sergeant Paul Ballinger.

First Arizona Infantry (158th Infantry) at Camp Kearny, California, in 1917. Photo courtesy Paul Ballinger.

"First Ariz Infantry Field Hospital." Photo by W. H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.

A posed bayonet drill by members of a National Guard unit stationed along the Mexican border during the 1916 Punitive Expedition.

American field headquarters, near Namiquipa, Mexico, 10 April 1916. The 6th Infantry resting after its long hike. U.S. Army Signal Corps photo 195554.

Roll Call: Black Jack—Gen. John J. Pershing

General of the Armies John J. Pershing began his service as a Second Lieutenant of Cavalry, serving in the Southwest and taking part in campaigns against hostile Apaches. In 1895 he joined the 10th Cavalry and his strong belief in the worth and the rights of the black soldier earned him the nickname "Black Jack." After several years of action in Cuba and the Philippines, he returned to the Mexican border where he led the force that pursued Pancho Villa into Mexico. Named by President Wilson to command the American Expeditionary Force, his leadership during World War I won a lifetime appointment as General of the Armies of the United States. Retiring as Army Chief of Staff, Pershing paid a last visit to Fort Huachuca in 1924, and returned in 1935 to review the troops of the 25th Infantry.

John J. Pershing. In 1901 Pershing reverted to his permanent rank of captain while in the Philippines. He was promoted to brigadier general in 1906 while serving as an observor with the Japanese Army during the Russian-Japanese war.

1916.07.21.001 Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing in a pensive mood, Colonia Dublan, Chihuahua, Mexico, July 21, 1916. National Archives Series 94-UM-203910.

Portrait: John J. Pershing as a 2d Lieutenant. After being commissioned in 1886, Pershing served with the 10th Cavalry in New Mexico for five years.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The 10th Cavalry Joins Pershing

Back at Fort Huachuca on the morning of 9 March, the news of the raid at Columbus interrupted the morning paperwork of Colonel W. C. Brown, the 10th Cavalry's commander. A telegraph operator saw an Associated Press dispatch go out over the wire and telephoned the Huachuca headquarters to relay the news.

1916.00.00.026 *General view of Fort Huachuca around 1916. U.S. Army Signal Corps photo (SC83539)*

Major E.L.N. Glass, the regiment's historian, reported the alert:

About 11:30 a.m. March 9th, the regimental commander, Colonel W. C. Brown, and Adjutant Captain S. McP. Rutherford were going over routine work in the old amusement room that served as an office, when the telephone rang and the hard working adjutant picked up the receiver with a bored expression which soon changed to one of intense interest as he called back: 'Call up Douglas and see if you can get any further details'; then turning to the commanding officer he said: 'Colonel, the telegraph operator phones that an Associated Press dispatch has just gone over the wires saying that Villa attacked Columbus [New Mexico] early this morning, burned half the town, and killed a lot of civilians and soldiers.' It was now the commanding officer's turn to wake up, and he ordered: 'Get that word around to troop commanders at once and tell them to hold their troops in readiness for orders,' adding, 'We'll get them soon enough.' These came about thirty minutes later from Cavalry Brigade Headquarters at Douglas, directing that the command proceed to Douglas at once equipped for field service.[49]

William C. Brown.

So troop commanders were already busy preparing their men for the field when the official orders came thirty minutes later from the Cavalry Brigade Headquarters at Douglas. These orders called upon the regiment to set out at once for Douglas, later amended to take them as far as Culberson's Ranch, fully equipped for the field.

The 10th lost no time in loading personal and troop gear and were in the saddle by 4 p.m. that same afternoon. There was no time to handpick men or mounts. As part of a tradition practiced during the Indian Wars thirty years before, the band played while the troops filed off the post.

Debouching from Huachuca were Troops A through I, K, and the Machine Gun Troop. Troop L would march from Fort Apache and join the Punitive Expedition in Mexico on April 28th. Troop M traveled from Nogales, Arizona, by train and entered Mexico from Columbus, N.M., on 16 March. All thirteen of the 10th Cavalry's troops would participate in the chase.

George B. Rodney was a captain in 1916 and had just arrived to take command of a troop at Naco, Arizona, when the regiment was ordered into the field. Sending his wife back to Huachuca on the train, the captain readied his troop, loading his two wagons with rations, forage, ammunition and horseshoes. An old campaigner with the 5th Cavalry, he ordered his First Sergeant to load double the number of horseshoes and four times the number of greased horseshoe nails. The Sergeant advised him that the Captain was

serving with colored troops now and need not worry about the details; they would be taken care of. Rodney agreed to leave matters in the sergeant's experienced hands but felt compelled to warn him that "if anything goes wrong you'll catch hell."

The top sergeant was unflustered. He muttered as he walked away, "Ah been ketchin' hell fo' thirty years now. Reckon I kin stan' a lil' mo'." (The dialect is rendered by Rodney.)

The main column from Huachuca made camp on that first night at Hereford, twenty-five miles from the fort. They then set out to pick up those of their regiment stationed along the border at Naco, Arizona. Rodney described the sight of the main body approaching the Naco outpost where he was waiting for them.

> *…The head of the Advance Guard came over a distant ridge and we saw the regimental standard bright against the sky. The regiment made camp, watered horses, ate, and left while we waited for our orders to catch up with the command, just as soon as we could be relieved. That relief, two companies of Infantry, dropped off a train in midafternoon and that night we got our orders.*[50]

From a letter postmarked "Naco, Arizona," dated 10 March 1916, Brown writes to his sister:

> *Here again! Left post about 6 P.M. March 9th. Arrived Hereford about 11 P.M. Unrolled my bed roll by a dirty corral and got a few hours sleep. Reveille at daylight this A.M.*
>
> *We are stopping at Naco today from 10 A.M. to 1 P.M. to rest and then in to Forrest Station and will arrive Douglas 11 A.M., Saturday the 11th. You will have seen from papers about the attack on Columbus garrison. Bert (Yellow) Slocum's regt. (13th Cav) much depleted. We have no authority as yet to go across the line. I have with me Cabell and troops A, B, C, I, E, F, K, H and the Machine Gun Troop—19 wagons.*
>
> *That fellow Villa is an enterprising individual even if he is a bandit. We hear that he lost heavily at Columbus.*[51]

On 13 March they reached Culberson's Ranch, in the southwest corner of New Mexico, having passed through Douglas and Slaughter's Ranch. Orlando C. Troxel, the First Lieutenant of H Troop was on the march to Culberson's and did not find the trek particularly severe, but in an article in the U.S. Cavalry Journal for October 1917, he noted that "the weather was hot" and

> *…only now and then did we have hay, watering facilities were always poor, the supply insufficient and frequently none except at our nightly camps, and the country was sand and devoid of grazing. We thus marched 160 miles before we entered Mexico. We lost several horses from sand colic and all horses had begun to feel the effects of the march.*[52]

Troxel, Orlando Collette, (1875-1917), Commanded Troop D, 10th Cavalry, Naco, 1915.

At Culberson's they rendezvoused with the other elements of the Second Cavalry Brigade and received orders to be prepared to move at once.

Amazingly, all of the troops for the Pershing Punitive Expedition were assembled along the border in just five days and on 15 and 16 March crossed into Mexico in two columns. The western column staged from Culberson's Ranch and was made up of the 7th and 10th Cavalry regiments and Battery B of the 6th Field Artillery. This was known as the Second Cavalry Brigade and was commanded by Colonel George A. Dodd. Pershing himself commanded this column, which numbered 16 officers and 1,501 men, on its march to Colonia Dublan.

The eastern column would move into Mexico from a base in Columbus, N.M., and consisted of the 11th and 13th Cavalry regiments, with Battery C of the 6th Field Artillery attached (the First Provisional Cavalry Brigade); the 6th and 16th Infantry regiments (the First Provisional Infantry Brigade); and these support units: Companies E and H, 2nd Battalion Engineers; Ambulance Company No. 7, Field Hospital No. 7; Signal Corps detachments, First Aero Squadron; and Wagon Companies No. 1 and 2. All told there were 100 officers and 2,100 men in this column. Both columns converged on the city of Colonia Dublan in Chihuahua, Mexico.

The cavalry intended to travel light, packing all their curb bits and overcoats in the troop wagons which were left behind. Rodney, who had served at Fort Huachuca earlier in 1913 and was familiar with

the clear cold nights of the Mexican border did not find the decision to jettison the overcoats a prudent one. "We were ordered to pack up all overcoats and load them into the wagons, for Mexico was a semitropical land and wiser heads than a captain's had decided that it was always hot in semitropical lands."[53]

The Second Cavalry Brigade discovered just how cold the nights could become when they swung into their saddles just after midnight on 16 March for the ride into Mexico. The 10th, bringing up the rear of the column, crossed the border at 1:15 a.m.. This marked the beginning of a year-long adventure that would be filled with hard marching, some singular military triumphs, and the loss of some brave comrades.

"U.S. Army Wagon Train Crossing the Rio Grande." Photo by W. H. Horne Co., El Paso, Tex.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The 10th Cavalry Marches into Chihuahua

The march into the northern reaches of the state of Chihuahua was set down by Captain Rodney who rode at the head of G Troop.

Moonrise at midnight found us formed in column moving silently toward the border miles away.

Daylight found us twenty-five miles out on the trail and as I glanced back at my troop I could not help laughing. For hours we had plodded along at a walk across a plain that was utterly devoid of water but was rich in white alkali dust that had settled like a blanket on men and horses, and the only spots on my men where I could see their original color were their upper eyelids when they winked. All else was white with alkali, and those eyelids stood out like flies in a pan of milk.

We found a little water, bad, at Carriza Springs, and that evening we reached Ojitas, fifty-eight miles south of the line. The next day's march was hard, no water and little food, and we reached Colonia Dublan, a little Mormon settlement. That march will always stand out as an example to me of what cavalry can do in cross-country marching, and to cap it all we made camp, if one can call it that, on a prairie that was covered with a dense growth of Johnson grass five feet high and as dry as tinder so that a single spark would have started a prairie fire and our herds would have stampeded. That night we spent fireless, each man with his horse picketed near him, waterless save for what little we had in the canteens that used to swab out the nostrils of our jaded mounts.[54]

Colonia Dublan, the Mormon village near which the Americans had pitched their first camp on Mexican soil, would become the field headquarters for the Punitive Expedition. It was only fifty-two miles

from the border and on the only rail line in the western part of Chihuahua.

It was there that General Pershing decided upon a plan to send three separate cavalry columns into the Mexican countryside. They were to push southward on generally parallel courses, like the tines of a trident, in the hopes of crossing Villa's trail and trapping his forces between their pincers.

The 7th Cavalry operated as one column, with Colonel James B. Erwin in command of the 29 officers and 647 enlisted men. The 2nd and 1st Squadrons of the 10th Cavalry, commanded by Colonel W. C. Brown and Major Elwood W. Evans, respectively, each composed the second and third columns. Brown's force, which included the Machine Gun Troop, numbered 14 officers and 258 enlisted men. Evans had 8 officers and 204 men.

Pershing requested that a train be sent from Juarez for use by his forces. While saving some of the cavalry's tired mounts, the commander felt that the use of rail would also be an advantage in swiftly interdicting Villa's movements.

The 10th Cavalry was selected to ride that train south into the heart of Villa country. It looked as if the regiment was going to get a break after marching 252 miles, 30 miles a day, from Huachuca. The 10th boarded trains in Colonia Dublan on 19 March with Brown and the 2nd Squadron heading for El Rucio and Evan's 1st Squadron making for Las Varas. From these points on the rail line they would march to their respective destinations of San Miguel and Namiquipa. Everyone remembered that train ride.

Lieutenant Troxel recalled: "Our troubles in patching and nailing up the cars, getting material for camps, collecting wood for the wood-burning engine and getting started late in the afternoon with the animals inside the freight cars and officers and men on top in truly Mexican style, were exceeded, if possible, only by the troubles in keeping the engine going by having the men get off and chop mesquite to burn in it, only to find that the wood must be used to send the engine some place for water, and so on ad infinitum."[55]

In Camp near San Antonio, Mexico, with the 6th Infantry. Carranzistas and United States troops. Carranzistas went through here on the way to different points along the railroad in search of Villa and his men. National Archives photo 94-UM-199912.

Captain Rodney said, "It was a train by courtesy, nothing else." He went on to describe their

journey.

> *Six cattle cars were hitched to a woodburning engine for which there was no fuel. Our first job was to rebuild the train, for great holes had been burned in the floors. Most of the cars had no doors and every time the engine moved the sides of those cars opened out just as the sticks in a fan separate. When we finally got the horses loaded we placed bales of hay along the tops of the cars so the men would not fall off when asleep; then we set to work with camp hatchets to cut a supply of fuel for the engine. In some way we finally got started, after demolishing a set of loading pens for fuel for which the Government later had to pay nineteen hundred dollars. Then we started, but it was only a start. From time to time a man would roll off the roof or sparks from the engine would set fire to the hay bales; then the engine would stop for water and we had to cut down telegraph poles for fuel and when we got the fuel the water was gone. It took us twenty-four hours to run twenty-five miles and we finally reached our destination about three hours after we would have reached it had we marched. At a little wood station called Rucio we finally got the horses off the train. As there was no ramp for unloading, the train was stopped in a railway cut and we got the horses out by the simple process of pushing them out of the open car doors. Then we started on our cross-country march to San Miguel rancho where rumor said Villa had been hiding.*[56]

Lack of fuel, water and ancient boxcars were only some of the problems posed by the rail journey. Railway employees, claiming they had no notice of the train's arrival, were unprepared to provide services enroute and the train's sleepless crew were kept at the job only by Colonel Brown's promise of fifty dollars in gold pieces if the troops were carried to their destination without delay. Clearly the 61-year-old Brown was a leader who left no details to chance. He rode up in the cab when the engine made a run, uncoupled, to Pearson for water.

Brown's detachment left the train at Rucio just before noon on 20 March and marched cross country, looking for news of Villa's whereabouts along the way. The latest intelligence placed the bandit somewhere just east of Namiquipa, a favorite haunt of Villa and where he had just skirmished with Mexican government troops under Colonel Cano. With a population of three to four thousand, Namiquipa was thought to be "the most revolutionary town in Mexico." By the afternoon of 24 March, Brown had rejoined Major Evan's 2nd Squadron which had stayed with the train as far as Musica where the engine eventually gave out.

If the trip south by rail proved to be for Colonel Brown's command a comedy of errors, for Major Evans 1st Squadron it was a disaster. After Brown and his men disembarked at Rucio, Evans' troops continued on the same train to their destination of Las Varas. At a place called Musica, two cars loaded with men, horses and equipment derailed and plunged over an embankment injuring eleven men, one of whom, Saddler Hudnell of Troop B, later died.

Evans sent the injured men back to Colonia Dublan on the next train in the care of his hospital corpsman and a civilian guide. As they were already three days behind schedule due to the slow train ride, Evans ordered a night march for San Jose de Babicora where he received a message from Brown telling Evans to link up with him.

Evans' squadron rode into Brown's camp at 2:00 p.m. on the 24th of May. The consolidated force now comprised the entire regiment, less Troops I and K which had been left at Colonia Dublan and would be attached to troops of the 13th Cavalry to form a provisional squadron under Major Frank Tompkins, and Troops L and M which were enroute to the theater from their more distant stations of Nogales and Fort Apache.

"Sketch Map of Route of Cavalry Troops, Punitive Expedition, 1916."

The 10th Cavalry on the march near San Antonio, Chihuahua, Mexico, on the Punitive Expedition, 1916. Capt. A. E. Philips leads the column on a white horse. Philips was in command of the machine gun troop of the 10th. The regiment was commanded by Col. W.C. Brown.

Capt. Henry A. Meyer, Capt. A. E. Phillips and Lt. D.R. Scott, Punitive Expedition, Chihuahua, Mexico, 1916. Note "sneakers" on Lt. Scott. National Archives Series, 94-UM-200072.

A trooper in 1916 with the Signal Corps buzzer.

Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing, and his aide Lt. James L. Collins, in Colonia Dublan, Chihuahua, Mexico, 1916. National Archives photo.

Pershing and his staff car in Mexico, 1916.

"Mexican Ambulance Crossing the Rio Grande River with Wounded." Photo by W. H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.

U.S. ambulance picking up wounded on the battlefield. Photo courtesy Col. James W. Fraser.

Vehicles bogged down in the mire during the 1916 Punitive Expedition.

American Field Headquarters, near Namiquipa, Mexico, April 10, 1916. The 6th Infantry resting after its long hike. 195554.

Mounted artillery in action during the 1916 Punitive Expedition. Photo by W. H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.

"Battlefield Scene in Mexico." Photo by W.H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.

10th Cavalry on the march in Mexico.

Capt. Pritchard and the 10th Cavalry regimental colors in front of his tent during the 1916 Punitive Expedition.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The Battle of Agua Caliente

March 31, 1916 found the 10th Cavalry deep in Chihuahua, Mexico. They were a part of Brig. Gen. John Pershing's expedition into Mexico after the bandit/revolutionary Pancho Villa. They had been scouting for signs of *villistas* for two weeks and were in camp at San Diego del Monte when a snowstorm struck, cutting them off from contact with headquarters and General Pershing.

Failing to receive any orders or information from his superior, Colonel William C. Brown, commanding the regiment, decided to move with the 2d Squadron toward the last reported action at Guerrero, leaving the 1st Squadron under Major E. W. Evans in camp. It was the right move. At 1315 on April 1st near the village of Agua Caliente, Brown's force encountered some 150 *villistas* under General Beltran at a ranch where they had taken refuge.

Captain Selwyn D. Smith's E Troop was on the point and at the first exchange of fire the *villistas* galloped away to the south. A running fight ensued with Capt. Orlando C. Troxel's Troop H and Capt. William S. Valentine's Troop F, both under the command of Major Charles Young, trying to cut them off from the east and Capt. George B. Rodney's Troop G and Capt. Albert E. Phillips' Machine Gun Troop

racing through the village.
Portrait: Selwyn D. Smith, pictured here as a lieutenant colonel.

The highlight of the fight occurred when some of the Mexicans took up a strong position behind a stone wall to pour fire on the Americans. Brown ordered Major Young to charge the position with troops H and F, and the soldiers, buoyed by the prospect of being part of the first real cavalry charge since the Spanish-American War, leapt to the saddle, drew their .45s, and swept down on the *villistas*' wall. As they increased their speed to the gallop, withholding their fire, they began to yell, and the Mexicans ran off into the woods to their rear.

10th Cavalry Machine Gun Troop in action, Mexican, 1916. National Archives photo 94-UM-204062.

Men of the Machine Gun Troop, 10th Cavalry, are shown in full charge during the 1916 Punitive Expedition.

The Machine Gun Troop, 10th Cavalry, at a gallop in Mexico in 1916.

Captain Troxel described the outcome of the clash:

…We never saw these Villistas as opponents again. …None of our men were hit and the horses were the only part of our command that had not enjoyed the skirmish. One horse was wounded, one of mine dropped exhausted, one died that night, we killed one the next morning, and one could just get along by being led. I do not know the loss of the animals in other troops.

…We captured several ponies and mules and part of their pack train. We know of three Mexicans killed, and reports from Mexican sources, as noted in American papers, gave their casualties as forty-two, but I doubt the number and do not believe any of our officers think we got that many. As they were never out in the open, and as it was a running fight, we had no opportunity to look for their casualties nor did we particularly care to do so.[57]

General Pershing was anxious for news from Brown's 10th Cavalry which had been out of touch for days. It was not until April 5th that Captain B. D. Foulois, Commander of the Signal Corps First Aerosquadron, located the column by air and landed to exchange written messages. In his official report

dated April 5th, Colonel Brown informed General Pershing of the fight at Agua Caliente.

…At a place called Aquas Calientes, where there are four or five ranches, we were fired on by Mexicans who, it was later found, were Beltran's band of about one hundred and fifty (estimated roughly), of villistas. After a few minutes firing they retreated over a rough wooded ridge to our left. Major Young sent troops H and F to attack them in flank, which proved a good move. The enemy made a precipitate retreat at once. Killed three; so reported by escaped Carranza prisoners, who saw them shot. We saw but two. No casualties on our side except an F Troop horse, which died on the 3rd.

…The enemy left at the site the pack outfit of a machine gun, and we learned next day that they still had one machine gun which was out of order. The running fight conducted mainly by H and F Troops in wooded mountains to southeast of Aguas Calientes and the command assembled after dark at a small ranch called El Mestina.[58]

During the next several days the 10th Cavalry followed the thinning trail. The *villistas* had broken up into even smaller groups when they left the mountains and the trail disappeared once again.

For Fort Huachuca's 10th Cavalry regiment, operating in the spring of 1916 in Chihuahua, Mexico, far beyond American lines of communication, logistics were a nightmare.

Much of the food for the soldiers and forage for the horses had to be bought from Mexican merchants and paid for by the officers in the regiment. The commanding officer, Colonel William C. Brown, had himself laid out large sums of his personal funds, as he explained in a note to General Pershing.

The greatest care has been taken to do no injustice to natives of this country. The chief difficulty from the outset has been to do this and still secure the necessary supplies from a country which has been raided in turn by Villistas and Carranzistas. To maintain my command on this expedition I have already advanced the Government over $1,453 of personal funds. Other officers have advanced several hundred dollars. How and when we will ever be reimbursed is problematical.[59]

As the squadrons of the regiment pushed deeper into the moun-tainous reaches of Chihuahua, communications with headquarters and the various flying columns of the punitive expedition became more tenuous. The Mexican telegraph service required all telegrams to be paid for in advance and the Americans were now short of personal funds, having spent it all on supplies. Brown sold his knife to a soldier for $2.50 to get enough money to send an official telegram. He asked Pershing to allow telegrams to be sent collect.

After his fight with *villistas* at Aguas Calientes, Colonel Brown arranged with Mexican officers to continue his advance and procured some much needed foodstuffs, flour, bread, coffee and sugar from the manager of the mining company. He was also able to exchange his personal check for silver and Cusi Mining Company checks in the amount of $1,100 which he turned over to the quartermaster of the column, after having first lent $10 to each of his officers.

With his new reserve of cash, Brown found it much easier to find supplies. Arriving at the town of Satevo on April 8th, Brown was able to wave his silver at the chief townspeople and one participant wrote about the results.

[Brown declared] "We pay for everything." The place had been raided until there was very little left, but when it became known that the hated "Gringos" were actually paying real money for the supplies, their astonishment knew no bounds; one native telling the interpreter: "Why, it is like seeing Christ come down from heaven, to see you pay for what you want."

The cash was the secret password all right, for the quartermaster was taken across the creek to a little adobe hut, and upon the door being unlocked a sight met his eyes which causes him, for the moment, to forget his troubles. For there were two rooms filled with corn fodder! It is needless to say that for once the hungry, tired horses got a good feed. The news that the Americans paid for things spread, and in the course of a couple of hours these hungry and weary men had more eggs and chickens offered for sale than they could buy.[60]

To add insult to injury, the Quartermaster General in Washington was scrutinizing vouchers for payment and had sent an official inquiry to Lieut. Reynald F. Migdalski, Brown's Acting Quartermaster, to

ask why the hides of slaughtered animals were not sold as called for by Army Regulations, and why the commander had purchased so much cheese at Santa Cruz de Villegas for his men.

A system whereby a U.S. officer would give a signed receipt for supplies received was simply no longer possible. Mexicans refused to accept these scraps of paper for their goods and a Cusihuiriachic merchant explained why.

> *You Americans pay for food all right, but you give receipts only. Now you buy a cow from a man who lives a hundred miles from any railroad. Even if that railroad were operating it would be six months before he could get his mail. You take that cow and you kill it and you give a receipt. He mails that receipt to the Quartermaster at San Antonio in Texas. It takes, maybe six months for it to get there, if it gets there at all. When the Quartermaster gets it he cannot pay for it. He returns duplicate vouchers to be signed. They take another six months to reach the man, and then he cannot write and he cannot speak English. If he can do all these things and signs in the proper place—even then he gets, about 18 months later, a check that he cannot cash.*[61]

In early April, Pershing established a sub-base at San Antonio. A pack train was sent from that forward base with horseshoes, nails, salt, money and other supplies. So the supply problem was relieved somewhat on April 20th when Captain Rutherford led Troop C and a 36-mule pack train into camp. Part of the load consisted of civilian trousers, a welcome issue for the veterinarian, Captain McMurdo, who's pants were so worn in the seat that he had wired to Fort Huachuca: "Send me a pair of trousers. Am getting sunburned." Rutherford also brought $2,300 and the first mail the troopers had received since entering the theater.



Officers in front of the Bachelor Officers' Quarters (BOQ) at Fort Huachuca in the Spring of 1914. Left to right: Dr. Oscar G. Skelton, Dental Surgeon, 1st Lt. Mike O'Donnel, 10th Cavalry; 2d Lt. Duncan Grant Richart, 10th Cavalry; 2d Lt. Henry Abby, 10th Cavalry; in the doorway reaching for his gun is Dr. Charles D. McMurdo, Capt. Veterinary Corps, about 26 years in the 10th Cavalry. Photo courtesy Maj. Gen. John B. Brooks, USAF Retired, who was stationed at Fort Huachuca as a 2d Lt. with the 10th Cavalry from 1913 to 1915.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The 10th Cavalry to the Rescue

The 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico, led by General John Pershing, met with hostility on every side. American troops, like the 10th Cavalry out of Fort Huachuca, were operating in the domain of Pancho Villa where many of the peasants held pro-Villa sympathies. The Mexican government officers likewise questioned the American's rights to be there. Even though American officers carried and distributed a proclamation by Mexican Secretary of War Obregon extending a vague permission to operate in Mexico, almost no Mexican official believed the expedition to have any legitimate right to be maneuvering through their territory.

And it became plain that Mexicans, from railway employees to Carranza's commanders, would do all they could to thwart American efforts to find Pancho Villa. Participants like Colonel Frank Tompkins felt that the active "treachery" of the de facto government officials was all that prevented Pershing's forces from capturing Villa, the pillager of Columbus, New Mexico. Tompkins wrote, "There was among the people a resentment toward us that was clearly shown in the brazen false news they disseminated. Practically all information from native sources was either entirely misleading, or if based on fact, located Villa's band at places several days later than the actual date. …Several Mexicans frankly said that they would consider it a national disgrace if the Americans should capture Villa."

The resistance to the expedition would make a dangerous shift from providing the Americans misleading information to actual attacks on their columns. On April 12th near the town of Parral, Pancho Villa's home town, Mexican government forces attacked a squadron of the 13th U.S. Cavalry under Major Frank Tompkins.

On hearing of the attack on Tompkins, Colonel William C. Brown raced his 10th Cavalry to reinforce him. Within minutes the Buffalo Soldiers were in the saddle and moving to Santa Cruz de Villegas where Tompkins was reported to be making a stand. An hour later, with darkness falling, the buglers of the 10th sounded some calls and a faint answering call let them know that they were at the American camp.

Frank Tompkins, shown here as a colonel.

It was obvious that the beleaguered Tompkins was glad to see the relief force come up. Captain Rodney was among those first 10th cavalrymen to ride into Tompkins' position and he recounted the scene.

The sound of our hoofbeats brought Tompkins to the gates and he gave us a warm welcome. He had been wounded in the arm and he had injured a leg by falling over some hasty entrenchments that he had been supervising, and he was glad to see us. As we splashed through the ford he shouted to us. I can hear his words yet.

Major Charles Young, one of the six Negro officers of the Army and our Squadron Commander, was riding by me at the head of the advance guard when Tompkins sighted him and called out, "By

God! They were glad to see the Tenth Cavalry at Santiago in '98, but I'm a damn sight gladder to see you now. I could kiss every one of you!"

Young grinned and called back. "Hello, Tompkins! You can start in on me right now."

There was no further talk of kissing….[62]

10th Cavalry on the march near San Antonio, Mexico, 1916. Major Charles Young is second from right.

Major Young with unidentified men in Mexico in 1916. U.S. Army photo.

On the morning of the 13th, Colonel Brown and Major Young led a party towards Parral to recover the body of Private Ledford, killed in the fight the day before. The body, stripped of outer clothing and shoes, was returned by wagon along with the little stray dog that had watched over him. In the afternoon a meeting under a flag of truce was held with the Mexicans. The Mexican commander at Parral, General Lozano did not show up, instead sending a civilian representative, Jose de la Luz Herrera, the Presidente of Parral. In the several hours of talks, Brown demanded an explanation for the attack and asked for the return of the body of Sergeant Richley who had fallen just outside of Parral. He also presented a list of provisions that would be needed for the American army and would be paid for.

Diplomatic protests were filed by the American government over the incident and the Mexicans responded by denying that General Lozano's forces had opened fire on Tompkins troops. The fight at Parral would be prelude to further animosity between the Americans and the Carranza government.

Roll Call: Colonel Charles Young—Black Cavalryman, Huachuca Commander, and Early Intelligence Officer

Kentucky-born (1864), Charles Young graduated from West Point in 1889, the third African-American to do so, and was assigned to the 10th Cavalry. His entire field career was spent in black regiments—the 9th and 10th Cavalry, and the 25th Infantry.

Young was an accomplished linguist, speaking Latin, Greek, French, Spanish and German. He served as Professor of Military Science at Wilberforce University, Ohio. From 1894-98 and during the Spanish-American War, he was with the 9th Ohio Volunteer Infantry. In 1903 he was superintendant of parks at Sequoia and General Grant National Parks in California.

Congress authorized in 1889 a system of military attaches that would be controlled by the Military Information Division (MID), the first official and permanent U.S. Army intelligence agency that had emerged in 1885 with a small office under the Adjutant General. Their job was to observe the training and exercises of foreign armies and make reports on their relative strengths and weaknesses. One of the first of these dozen or so attaches was Charles Young who, from 1904 to 1907 was military attache to the American legation in Port Au Prince, Haiti. During this time he made an extended military reconnaissance of the country and the neighboring Republic of Santo Domingo, producing maps of much of the terrain.

Following his service in Haiti, he reported for duty in the 2d Division of the War Department in Washington, D.C. The 2d Division was the designation given to that element of the newly created General Staff which had the responsibility for the collection and dissemination of military information (intelligence).

In 1908 Young was sent to the Philippines to join his regiment and command a squadron of two troops there. In 1912 he was once again selected for attache duty, this time to Liberia where he advised the Liberian constabulary and supervised the construction of new roads to provide military lines of communication. For his services there he was awarded the Springarn Medal, an award that annually recognized the African-American who had made the highest achievement during the year in any field of honorable human endeavor.

He was most renowned for his leadership during the 1916 Punitive Expedition which marched into Mexico in pursuit of the bandit Pancho Villa who had murdered American citizens. On 9 March at Agua Caliente, Mexico, Young, then a major, led the 2d Squadron in a cavalry pistol charge against the Villista forces, threatening to envelope the right flank of General Beltran. Beltran's 150 men were driven out with no losses to Young's aggressive squadron.

At the Hacienda Santa Cruz de la Villegas, 12 April, he was the hero of the hour when he rode with his squadron to the relief of Major Frank Tompkins, who was severely wounded while his 13th U.S. Cavalry squadron fought a heavy rear guard action. Young's reinforcement of Major Tompkins at this critical time is credited by many as preventing a war with Mexico.

Of the colonel, First Sergeant Vance H. Marchbanks said:

…He was a splendid man, possessed a wonderful personality, superb leadership and the men who followed him possessed almost sublime faith in his ability.

…An officer's school was started immediately at Fort Huachuca…by Lt. Col. Charles Young. This school was carried on about six weeks and then we were ordered to Fort Des Moines, Iowa, where we went through four months and fifteen days training before receiving our commissions.

…Col. Charles Young, one of the few Colored graduates from West Point Military Academy, was our instructor for a long time, even before the school started. He was a past master at the military game, a strict disciplinarian, and he knew all the answers to military problems.[63]

Young's brilliant and aggressive operations in Mexico won him a lieutenant colonelcy in the 10th Cavalry in 1916. A year later he was promoted to colonel and was briefly Fort Huachuca's commander.

He was medically retired in 1917 for high blood pressure and Bright's disease said to have been incurred during his African service.

Young was described by a fellow officer of the 10th Cavalry, Jerome W. Howe, as "a fine specimen of an athletic officer and a perfect gentleman." Howe "found him very likable. I often visited him in his quarters, and heard him play beautifully on the piano. He had a fine family, but never had them with him on a military post."

Anxious to command his black troopers in France in World War I, the 53-year-old colonel rode on horseback from his home in Ohio to the War Department in Washington, D.C. to demonstrate his fitness for duty. Young wrote about the experience:

> *…As soon as the school year was over, I rode on horseback from Wilberforce to Washington, walking on foot fifteen minutes in each hour, the distance of 497 miles to show, if possible, my physical fitness for command of troops. I there offered my services gladly at the risk of life, which has no value to me if I cannot give it for the great ends for which the United States is striving.* [64]

Charles Young was not wanted on the greater stage of World War I Europe. He would remain an understudy, not for want of talent, all of his comrades testified to his abilities, but because of the hue of his skin. An African-American leader emerging upon the world stage would invalidate the theory held by those of paler skin about the inferiority of people of color. It was a theory that had to be maintained within the United States to explain the continued denial of equality to the descendants of older victims of inhumanity. It was the great American untruth. Charles Young knew it. Most of his fellow officers knew it. This big lie would take many formulations over the ensuing years and, like any falsehood, it would deny possibilities. It was the untruth that would prevent the democracy from achieving its promise in the 20th century.

Denied the opportunity to get in on the fighting in Europe, he was later recalled to active duty to serve as Military Attache to Liberia. He died on 8 January 1922 in that post. At the time he was on a research expedition in Lagos, Nigeria. His body was returned to the U.S. and interred at Arlington Cemetery in Washington, D.C.

Charles Young married Ada Barr in 1903 and had two children, Charles Noel, born in 1907 and Marie, born in 1909.

Young, Major Charles, 10th U.S. Cavalry, on Punitive Expedition into Mexico, 1916. Earlier he had been one of the first officers to serve as a military attache, a post that was part of the U.S. Army's fledgling military intelligence establishment. Young held attache posts in Haiti from 1904-07, in Liberia from 1912-

1915, and Liberia again from 1919 to 1922.

Historian and NAACP founder W.E.B. DuBois wrote this memorial to Colonel Young in the February 1922 issue of *The Crisis*.

The life of Charles Young was a triumph of tragedy. No one ever knew the truth about the Hell he went through at West Point. He seldom even mentioned it. The pain was too great. Few knew what faced him always in his army life. It was not enough for him to do well—he must always do better; and so much and so conspicuously better, as to disarm the scoundrels that ever trailed him. He lived in the army surrounded by insult and intrigue and yet he set his teeth and kept his soul serene and triumphed.

He was one of the few men I know who literally turned the other cheek with Jesus Christ. He was laughed at for it and his own people chided him bitterly, yet he persisted. When a white Southern pigmy at West Point protested at taking food from a dish passed first to Young, Young passed it to him first and afterward to himself. When officers of inferior rank refused to salute a "nigger," he saluted them. Seldom did he lose his temper, seldom complain.

With his own people he was always the genial, hearty, half-boyish friend. He kissed the girls, slapped the boys on the back, threw his arms about his friends, scattered his money in charity; only now and then behind the Veil did his nearest comrades see the Hurt and Pain graven on his heart; and when it appeared he promptly drowned it in his music—his beloved music, which always poured from his quick, nervous fingers, to caress and bathe his soul.

Steadily, unswervingly he did his duty. And Duty to him, as to few modern men, was spelled in capitals. It was his lodestar, his soul; and neither force nor reason swerved him from it. His second going to Africa, after a terrible attack of black water fever, was suicide. He knew it. His wife knew it. His friends knew it. He had been sent to Africa because the Army considered his blood pressure too high to let him go to Europe! They sent him there to die. They sent him there because he was one of the very best officers in the service and if he had gone to Europe he could not have been denied the stars of a General. They could not stand a black American General. Therefore they sent him to the fever coast of Africa. They ordered him to make roads back in the haunted jungle. He knew what they wanted and intended. He could have escaped it by accepting his retirement from active service, refusing his call to active duty and then he could have lounged and lived at leisure on his retirement pay. But Africa needed him. He did not yell and collect money and advertise great schemes and parade in crimson—he just went quietly, ignoring appeal and protest.

He is dead. But the heart of the Great Black Race, the Ancient of Days—the Undying and Eternal—rises and salutes his shining memory: Well done! Charles Young, Soldier and Man and unswerving Friend.

Roll Call: Brig. Gen. William C. Brown, Regimental Commander, 10th Cavalry

Brown Parade, the parade ground on the old main post at Fort Huachuca, is named after Brigadier General William Carey Brown who commanded the fort and the 10th U.S. Cavalry as a colonel from 1914 to 1916.

The native of Traverse des Sioux, Minnesota, was born in 1854. Following graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in 1877, he was assigned to the 1st U.S. Cavalry at Fort Walla Walla, Washington, participating in the 1878 Bannock Indian Campaign in Washington, Oregon and Idaho. He was on detached service in 1879 at the Umatill Indian Agency, Oregon, in operations against Sheepeater and Bannock Indians.

He served as commanding officer of Troop C, 1st U.S. Cavalry, at Fort Assinniboine, Montana, in

the winter campaign of 1890-91 against the Sioux. Other assignments took him to West Point and the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893.

His service included time as cavalry troop commander at Forts Grant and San Carlos, Arizona, in the 1880s. Brigadier General Brown's days as troop and field officer included chasing the renegade Apache Kid in Arizona and commanding a troop in the Battle of San Juan, Cuba. He was instrumental in the development of the U.S. Army emergency field ration, the introduction of aluminum to lighten U.S. Army equipment, and other important inventions to improve weapons and equipment.

As colonel of cavalry he assumed command of the 10th U.S. Cavalry at Fort Huachuca on December 8, 1914, and deployed the regiment along the Mexican border to enforce U.S. neutrality laws during the revolution which then wracked Mexico. When Francisco "Pancho" Villa burned Columbus, New Mexico, on March 8, 1916, Brown led his regiment in the Mexican Punitive Expedition under General Pershing. There he distinguished himself in the last combat rides of the U.S. Cavalry, after rationing his men out of his own pocket.

Most prominent of his exploits was a forced march of the 10th U.S. Cavalry, led by him, which rescued the 7th U.S. Cavalry from siege of the *villistas*, at Parral on April 12, 1916. Later as a brigadier general, he was sent to France during World War I as inspector, Quartermaster Corps, General Headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces. There he saved the Army hundreds of thousands of dollars while supervising the receipt, storage, conservation, rehabilitation, and distribution of property and supplies, winning the Distinguished Service Medal and the Silver Star Medal for his work.

Brig. Gen. Brown died at Denver, Colorado, on May 8, 1939.

William Carey Brown commanded the 10th Cavalry and Fort Huachuca from 1914 to 1916, and led the regiment into Mexico during the Punitive Expedition. Later as a Brigadier General he would serve in Europe during World War I. The parade field on Fort Huachuca's Old Post is named for him.

Military Intelligence in the American Southwest: Pioneering Aerial Reconnaisance

The use of the newly developed military asset, the airplane, for reconnaissance missions was first undertaken in the Philippines and then along the Mexican border between 1913 and 1915. Later, during Pershing's 1916 Punitive Expedition into Mexico in pursuit of the bandit-turned-revolutionary Pancho Villa, the First Aero Squadron was deployed to support Pershing with aerial reconnaissance. Their purpose was thwarted however, when the planes were unable to reach the altitudes necessary in the mountains of northern Chihuahua. Instead the aviators were relegated to a role of flying dispatches from headquarters to the roving columns of cavalry.

One of the aviators who served with the 1st Aerosquadron during the Punitive Expedition was Lieutenant John B. Brooks, a former 10th Cavalry officer at Huachuca who transfered to the Signal Corps' aeronautical section. He left a description of his operations in Mexico.

The JN4's (or Jenny's) were the original planes that went into Mexico. The First Aero Squadron, which was the first unit of Aviation that we ever had in this country, was formed at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. They flew their eight planes from Fort Sill to San Antonio, Texas, for permanent station and that was the first unit cross-country flight that was ever made in this country. In the meantime they had built a field for them, just outside Fort Sam Houston. They had hardly settled down there when Villa attacked Columbus in March of 1916. Immediately they put their airplanes on flatcars. They came out to Columbus and they grubbed out a field there. They flew from there right into Mexico, right away. Well, there were a number of mountains down there, particularly Cumbre Pass that was eight or nine thousand feet above sea level, and these little airplanes with 65 horsepower engines didn't have the stuff to get up and get over those mountains. They were cracking them up right and left because they hadn't had experience and there were no fields down there. You had to find a place to set down. You wanted to land as close to the troops you could. So you might hit some sagebrush and bend a wing and you were out of commission for some time. So those original eight airplanes didn't last very long. I did not go in with the original group. I was still in training at North Island. But they saw that they're going to have to have a bigger more powerful airplane and they were going to have to have additional pilots, so they grabbed our class and graduated us a little bit early so we could go right down there. We were graduated early in June and sent right to Columbus and we arrived just about the same time the new airplanes arrived. They were known as Curtis B-2s and it was quite a wonderful airplane for that day and generation. It had a V8, 160 horsepower motor. It was the most powerful aviation motor that had ever been built in this country at that time, and the airplane was a fine, sturdy airplane, but like everything that's brand new there are always little buts in it that have to be worked out through operational experience. Our biggest trouble that had to be solved right away was the wooden propellers. There were no steel propellors. They were made of laminated wood with one layer right after another to build up the propellers with the proper curves. They were made at Hammons Port, New York. They came down here to Columbus, New Mexico, and it was so dry that, after they'd been in use for a little while, that lamination, the glue all dried out and the propeller would fly to hell and gone in the air. You got down the best way you could. So we had really quite a time with those planes and I operated in Mexico twice. They used to rotate us down there for about six weeks at a time and I served one six week period down at El Vaya and another one at Columbia de Blanco.

…We didn't have any machine guns mounted; we had no bombs. We were solely a reconnaissance outfit and most of the time used by General Pershing to bring back negative information. In other words, he was just as happy to know that the Carranzista troops were not at a certain place. His hands were tied by the State Department and he couldn't make war where he wanted to after the first couple of months. They had him surrounded by all sorts of regulations and the Carranzista troops were getting

more bold all the time and getting right in close to our front flank. He would get a bit of information saying that there were 250 Cavalry over at such and such a ranch. He'd send us out and we'd go over there and we would fly low around the corral of this ranch. If there were only five horses in there, why chances were that there weren't any Cavalry there.

We had message bags…and they had a long red streamer on them. They were weighed with shot and you could do pretty accurate hitting within fifty yards where you wanted to get them. The red streamer would call attention to the fact where they landed and you could then pick them up.[65]

Observation balloons were used during the Civil War, with negligible results. The first use of aerial intelligence gathering in its modern sense had its American beginnings in the skies of the American Southwest, an area that would be the site of training for aerial photo reconnaissance personnel and the development of unmanned aerial reconnaissance craft in the years to come.

Soldiers guard aeroplane in the 1916 Punitive Expedition.

A squadron of military aircraft used in the Pershing Punitive Expedition.

"Assembling an Aeroplane at Fort Bliss, Texas. Photo by W. H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.



Lt. Brooks flying over the 24th Infantry at Colonia Dublan, Chihuahua, on 5 July 1916.

Officers in front of the Bachelor Officers Quarters in the Spring of 1914. Left to right: 2d Lieut. Henry Abby, 10th Cavalry; 2d Lieut. Frederic John Gerstner, 10th Cavalry; 2d Lieut. Ray W. Barker, 10th Cavalry; and Dr. Oscar G. Skelton, Dental Surgeon.

2d Lieut. Frederick John Gerstner, 10th Cavalry, was detailed from Fort Huachuca to be a student officer at the Aviation Section, Signal Corps, in September 1914. He drowned on 21 December 1914 when his aeroplane crashed enroute from San Diego to Los Angeles. He was the 18th aviator to give his life in the interest of government aviation since Lieut. Selfridge fell to his death at Fort Myer, Virginia, in 1908 testing the first aeroplane for the Army. Photo from obituary contained in Annual Association of Graduates, USMA, 1915.

Buffalo Soldiers at Huachuca: The Battle of Carrizal

By the 19th of May, 1916, Huachuca's 10th Cavalry was in camp at Colonia Dublan alongside the 11th Cavalry. Here they would spend the remainder of their time in Mexico, with periodic scouting expeditions. The planes of the First Aerosquadron were out of commission, either wrecked or broken down, and could not be used for reconnaissance. So it was up to the cavalry to undertake the job of scouting.

One such scouting expedition was sent out on 16 June to check on the Mexican troop buildup around Ahumada. Captain Charles T. Boyd, in command of C Troop, with Hank Adair as his lieutenant, was given orders to recon in the vicinity of the Santa Domingo Ranch and to avoid any clash with Mexican

forces. Similar orders were issued to Captain Lewis S. Morey, Troop K. Captain George B. Rodney watched as Boyd's troop left camp and he counted the men as they rode past. "…Sixty-four men in column, joking and laughing as they filed out of camp; then his 'point' of four men shot to the front and he and Adair waved their hands to me in laughing adieu."[66]

"Hank Adair, 1st Lieut., 10th Cavalry, spent 10 hours working on his car for every hour he drove it. He owned one of the three cars then at Fort Huachuca." Photo courtesy Maj. Gen. John B. Brooks, USAF Ret., who as a 2d Lieut., 10th Cavalry, was a BOQ mate of Lieutenant Adair in 1914 at Huachuca.

The two columns converged on the ranch, about 60 miles east of Colonia Dublan, on the evening of June 20th. There they gathered intelligence on Mexican troops at Ahumada from the American foreman, but Boyd felt that his orders required him to take a look for himself. So the two troops left at dawn on the 21st for Ahumada via Carrizal.

Just outside of the town of Carrizal, Boyd found a Mexican government force, estimated at "several hundred" in battle position, awaiting his detachment. They were deployed behind a row of cottonwoods along a stream bed and in the town which was fronted by a barbed wire fence. Between Boyd and the Mexican defenses was an irrigation ditch filled with water. The Mexican commander and his entourage met him and informed Boyd that his orders were to prevent the Americans from advancing any further to the east. Boyd replied that his orders required him to pass through the town. Major Glass, 10th Cavalry

historian, picks up the narrative:

…A long discussion ensued, the Mexicans opposing the entry of the troops, the American commander insisting on his orders. It is reported that finally the Mexican commander offered to allow the two troops to pass through the town in column of fours, but fearing a trap this was declined. At any rate the discussion closed by the Mexican returning to the town and the prompt disposition for attack by the two troops whose combined strength was less than eighty men. The led horses were sent to the rear and troops were formed in line of skirmishers, Troop K being well to the right, with orders to protect the right flank. With this disposition the line moved forward.

As the line drew closer to the edge of the mesa where a barbed-wire fence edged the creek, fire was opened on them from two machine guns that the Mexicans had cleverly disposed under cover. The fire was returned, but the machine gun fire had already played havoc with the horses, stampeding several of them. C Troop, charging forward, lost Captain Boyd, who was shot first in the hand, then in the shoulder, and then as he sprang out of the irrigation ditch to lead his men he was shot in the head and instantly killed. Lieutenant Adair took the troop and carried it forward, storming the town. The two machine guns had previously been put out of action by the hot fire from Troop C. At this stage of the fight Troop K, on the right flank, came under a heavy flanking fire from some Mexican soldiers in a cottonwood grove, and a party of Mexican cavalry appearing at the moment on the right flank of Troop K, that troop fell back, leaving the right flank of Troop C exposed to the hostile fire. Lieutenant Adair, having advanced to the line of houses in the town, found that his men were short of ammunition and went back to get the belts from the wounded, of whom there were quite a few. As he came back he was shot while crossing the irrigation ditch. The bullet struck him just above the heart and he died a few minutes later. The troop having no officers with it, the men became confused and realizing that they were opposed by tremendous odds, and that they had no support, for K troop had retired, they retreated, but not until they had inflicted a loss of about eighty on the enemy, including their commanding general.

The horses of both troops, stampeded by the bullets that went into the herds, did not stop till they came to the San Domingo ranch where the men found them later. The two troops, losing all cohesion, dropped back to the ranch and got the horses. There were no officers for the men, for both the Troop C officers had been killed and Captain Morey had been wounded.[67]

A few months after Carrizal, Corporal H.C. Houston, Troop K, 10th Cavalry, wrote this account of the battle:

On the 18th day of June, 1916, "K" Troop of the Tenth Cavalry was notified that they were to pack and saddle up for a march of 5 days and to be ready as soon as possible, we were ready and leaving Ojo Federico at 10 a.m.; we rode 18 miles and arrived at a town called Sabinal at 2 p.m., camped all night and left next morning at about 7, rode 33 miles across a desert to Rio Santa Maria, the day was very hot and we were awfully thirsty when we completed that hike (and the water was the worst water I ever drank) after camping all night we hid some rations for us and feed for our horses in a large mesquite bush where they were not likely to be found by anyone else, for the wagon that had been with us was unable to proceed further because of bad ground we had to cross, our intentions were to recover the rations on our return to the Rio Santa Maria.

Next day which was the 20th of June we rode 50 miles to Santa Domingo ranch where we joined "C" Troop under command of Capt. Boyd who was superior to our Capt. [Morey] which placed Capt. Boyd in command of both troops. Camped at the ranch that night and was called at 3 a.m. the 21st of June. We cooked and ate our breakfast, fed our horses, packed and saddled up our mounts and left at 4:15.

We traveled about 2 miles to a ditch where we watered our horses, oiled and loaded our rifles and automatic revolvers. After everything was ready we left the ditch and rode 5 miles to the outskirts of Carrizal. Both troops after water were dismounted, and our guide (a Mexican named Jose) was dispatched with a message to General Gomez from Capt. Boyd. After about half an hour's wait a

column of Mexican cavalry was seen coming from the town. They deployed in a line of skirmishers about 1500 yds. from us and their Col. and his staff held a council with Capt. Boyd half way between the two lines…. After the council, both commanders returned to their organizations and Capt. Boyd addressed our troops as follows: Quote, "Men, we have orders to go East and reconnoiter Villa Ahumada and in order to do that we shall have to go through this town (Carrizal) and the Mexican Col. told me just now that the Gen. refused us permission to pass through the town but when I told him I was determined to pass through anyway he said for me to wait a few minutes and he would send our message for the Gen." About that time our Mexican guide returned with an answer to our message from the Gen. which also refused us permission to pass through the town but before we had time to form any plans the General himself was seen coming with his staff. Capt. Boyd then rode forward again and he and the Gen. held a council for about half an hour. After the council split up where we were he raised his head and said, Quote, "Boys, this looks fine, the General says the only direction we can travel is North, my orders are to travel East to Villa Ahumada which is 8 miles on the other side of this town and I am going through this town and take all you men with me."

When Capt. Boyd made the last remark all of our boys cheered and began singing phrases of spirited songs to show their willingness to accompany Capt. Boyd in his charge through town and to show their contempt of the Mexicans as foemen.

Then our commander gave his orders for our advance which were for the 1st platoon of "C" Troop and the 2d Platoon of "K" Troop to pass through town driving all Mexicans in front of them and for the 2d Platoon of "C" Troop to protect the left flank and for the 1st Platoon "K" Troop to protect the right flank.



Diagram of deployment into line of foragers. (From War Department Field Manual)

We started forward deployed in line of foragers, moved forward until we were within 500 yards of the enemy, then we dismounted and our horses moved to the rear and we moved forward, the Mexican cavalry started riding around both flanks and when we were about 200 yds. from the enemy, we received a heavy volume of fire from rifle and machine guns and we knew that the ball was opened then.

Men of the Machine Gun Troop, 10th U.S. Cavalry, dismantle a position in a tree during the 1916 Punitive Expedition. National Archives photo.

We then received the order to lie down and commence firing, using the battle sight (which is the way we aim our rifles when we are fighting at close range). All of our men were taking careful aim, and Mexicans and horses were falling in all directions but the Mexican forces were too strong for us as they had between 400 and 500 and we only had 50 men on the firing line, so even though we were inflicting terrible execution, they outnumbered us too greatly for us to stop their advance around our right flank.

At this stage of the game, the Mexicans were so close that it was almost impossible to miss them, they were even so close that it was possible to hit them with stones had we desired. After about 1 1/2 hours hard fighting they were about 30 yds. from our right flank, I tried to swing the left half of our platoon (of which I was in command) around so as to help out our platoon on the right, but it was impossible, about that time our Capt. yelled out to Sergt. Page, Quote, "Sergt. Page! Good God man, there they are right upon you," and Sergt. Page responded, "I see them Capt. but we can't stop them and we can't stay here because it is getting too hot." By that time bullets were falling like rain and the Capt. ordered all of us to look out for ourselves and our men moved off the field by our left flank. No one can truthfully say that our men ran off the field because they did not, in fact they walked off the field stopping and firing at intervals.

At the edge of the field is an irrigation ditch and upon arrival at this I saw our Capt. who had been shot, trying to get across with the aid of two men. I assisted in helping him across and we sat him in a dry ditch. Then I gave him a drink of water out of my campaign hat. Next I satisfied my own thirst. By that time the men were rallying for a final stand but our Capt. said, "I am done for Boys, You had better make your getaway."

And then we scattered each for his own self. One bunch started to go N.W., the direction from which we came and another bunch went S.W., but as I knew a person had a better chance for escape by himself than he would have with a bunch, I decided to go directly West to a chain of mountains which seemed to be about 12 miles away.

I had only gone about 200 yards when a bullet hit close behind me. I stopped and looked around to see if I could find the one who fired the shot and instead of finding an enemy I discovered Corp. Queen, a corporal of my troop, about 100 yards in my rear. I waited and Corp. Queen joined me. Then we started for the mountains.

I cautioned Queen to evade all soft places on the earth so as not to leave a track for the Mexicans to trail us by. We left the battlefield about 10 a.m. and reached the mountains about 1:30 that afternoon and it was the hottest day I have ever witnessed. We were both craving for a drink of water but there was none in sight.

We continued our march across the mountains all the rest of that afternoon and a little before dusk we arrived at the top of the last mountain we had to cross and to our joy we saw a group of trees which looked to be about 18 miles away, it was just in time too because a few miles more and we would have lost all reasoning and began to wander aimlessly around and we would have died of thirst there in the mountains.

But after seeing the trees (any place in this country one can find trees there is almost sure to be water also) we were refreshened with new energy so we continued on at a much faster gait.

Some time during the night Queen and myself parted, how I do not know, because both of us were staggering along half unconscious with only one thought in our minds and that was to keep going in the direction of the trees.

I wandered on by myself for a few miles further and then dropped from exhaustion and there I remained until daylight. By that time I had gathered enough rest to continue. After standing up I was very much refreshened to see that the trees were only 4 or 5 miles away.

After arriving at the trees which proved to be the La Salado Ranch, I again found Corp. Queen. I was fortunate enough to have some money in my possession with which we bought some food and a horse.

The distance we had covered on foot without water was between 50 and 60 miles in 24 hours. After resting a few hours we continued our journey to Ojo Federico. Queen was leading the horse which was packed with our rations and water and in this manner we hiked until 11 p.m. when we found that we had lost the road so we decided to camp right there until morning and find the road, for not only had we lost the road but there were three animals which we took for cows about 400 yards from us and anywhere there is cows it is a good sign for water.

Next morning while Queen was packing up I went over to investigate the cows and instead of cows found three "C" Troop horses. We rode them to Rio Santa Maria and had been there about one hour when "M" Troop arrived, and escorted us back to Ojo Federico where we made our report.[68] [69]

First Sergeant Vance H. Marchbanks, wrote this account in his memoirs:

One of the outstanding heroes of [the Carrizal] engagement was my friend and comrade Peter Bigstaff, who is now retired and lives in Lexington, Ky. He was at that time a Sergeant in Troop C. A finer man or braver soldier never lived. A southerner, John Temple Graves, a well known writer and newspaper man in the course of a tribute to the Carrizal fighters wrote: "The Black Trooper (Sgt. Bigstaff) might have faltered and fled a dozen times leaving Adair to fight alone. But it never seemed to occur to him. He was a comrade to the last blow. When Adair's broken revolver fell from his hand the

black trooper pressed another into it, and together shooting in defense they turned the swooping circle of overwhelming odds before them.

"The black man fought in deadly shamble side by side with the white man, following always, fighting always as his Lieut. fought. And finally when Adair, literally shot to pieces, fell in his tracks, his last command to his black trooper was to leave him and save his own life. Even then the heroic Negro paused in the midst of that hell of courage for a final service to his officer.

"Bearing a charmed life he had fought his way out. He saw that Adair had fallen with his head in the water and with superb loyalty the black trooper turned and went back to the hailstorm of death; lifted the head of his superior officer out of the water, leaned his head against a tree, and left him there dead with dignity when it was impossible to serve him any more.

"There is no finer piece of soldierly devotion and heroic comradeship in the history of modern warfare than that of Henry Adair and the black trooper who fought with him at Carrizal.[70]

Six enlisted men were killed, four others wounded, and eight were taken prisoner. K Troop lost four enlisted men killed, Captain Morey and six men wounded, and fifteen enlisted men taken prisoner. All the prisoners were returned to U.S. custody ten days later at El Paso, Texas.

Return of the 10th Cavalry men captured in the Battle at Carrizal, Mexico, 21 June 1916. In the center is Lem Spillsbury, 10th Cavalry guide, who was captured, and the other members of the unit. This photo is believed to have been taken on the International Bridge at El Paso, Texas. Photo courtesy Lt. Col. John Healy, USA Retired.

The Mexicans lost their commander, General Felix U. Gomez, and eleven other officers. Thirty-

three of their enlisted were killed and 53 others wounded. They were disorganized enough to lose their advantage and many of the American troopers avoided capture by escaping on foot into the countryside to be picked up later by rescuing troops.

Troop K, lost contact with Troop C at a crucial moment and did not support them, a fact that Major Frank Tompkins has written meant the difference between victory and defeat.

General Pershing officially mourned the loss of Captain Boyd and Lieutenant Adair. "The memory of the splendid bravery of these two officers, who lost their lives, and of the men who personally followed them is cherished by this entire command."[71]

Lieutenant Jerome Howe had been detached from Troop K to serve as aide to Colonel Dodd, commanding the 2d Cavalry Brigade. The news of the defeat of his old troop and his personal relationship to the men affected him strongly. "I had been serving with the 10th Cavalry and with Troop K since the beginning of my Regular Army life in 1912. I was strongly attached to my Negro non-coms and troopers, and I grieved for Boyd and Adair whom I had known well and admired."[72]

The American accounts of the action at Carrizal were set down by fellow officers who mourned the loss of two brave comrades. They rightly find a great deal of heroism in the American defeat. Because he gave his life, along with the lives of others of his command, he was spared the post-battle examination and criticism. It would seem that Boyd erred gravely by taking on the Mexicans. At least one officer was puzzled by the actions of the experienced Boyd. Lieut. Jerome Howe later wrote:

> *…Why should Captain Boyd, despite the contrary advice of Captain Morey, have insisted on an attempt to assail this obviously tough position, apparently without necessity? We of the 10th Cavalry considered him an able, shrewd, dependable officer. This action seemed unlike him. Our opinion was inclined to the view that General Pershing, perhaps uneasy over the forced inactivity, desired to bring on an incident that would justify him in moving over vigorously with a large body of troops of all arms and bringing on a war with Mexico which could easily be won, and by means of which his own reputation would be greatly enhanced. Pershing himself never offered an explanation.*[73]

The ranch foreman of the Santa Domingo Ranch, Mr. W. P. McCabe, said he overheard Captain Morey telling Boyd that he did not think it wise to force their way through the Mexican position but would obey Boyd's orders. Boyd "then made some remark to Captain Morey about 'making history' which I did not catch the rest of.[74]

Boyd's orders were to avoid a fight. The Mexicans were in good defensive positions, were in far greater numbers, and had the superior firepower offered by machine guns. Adair was an experienced officer who was probably familiar with Marshal Saxe's axiom that it is wiser to decline an attack unless you can make it with advantage. But he did not need textbook proscriptions to tell him the lethality of charging into the teeth of clearly superior firepower. He was undoubtedly aware of the devasting effect machine gun fire had on cavalry attacking defensive positions in both the Boer War (1899-1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05). But if some accounts are to be believed, Boyd was determined to have a fight and maybe in the process "make history." Perhaps a too highly formalized sense of honor prevented withdrawal in the face of an enemy considered craven and backward. It would seem then to be a misstep of arrogance. Make history he did. It was a tragic finish for the Punitive Expedition.

Portrait: Captain Charles Trumbull Boyd of the 10th Cavalry was killed in action while leading his troop at Carrizal, Mexico, on 21 June 1916.

First Lieutenant Henry Rodney Adair was killed in action on 21 June 1916 at the battle of Carrizal, Mexico, while leading an attack on Mexican forces.

Capt. G.F. Trevino of General Garcia's Staff (Carranzistas), Lt. Henry R. Adair, Lt. B.S. Fox, Lt. R.F. Migdalski. Trevino ultimately issued the Carranzista order for U.S. Troops to turn around and go home. Lt. Adair, along with Captain Charles T. Boyd, was killed by Carranzista Troops at Carrizal, Chihuahua on June 21, 1916. Streets at either end of Fort Huachuca parade ground are named for these two officers. National Archives Series 94-UM-200067.

Funeral of Captain Charles Trumbull Boyd, 10th Cavalry, who was killed in the Battle of Carrizal, Mexico, on 21 June 1916. The cortege is followed by survivors of Troop C. Photo courtesy Int. Film Service, from "Album of Pictures Somewhere in Mexico, Relating to U.S. Soldiers and Mexicans," copyrighted 1916, by J.D. Givens, San Francisco, Calif.

Events in Europe in January 1917 were drawing the United States into World War I and President Wilson was forced to order the withdrawal of the Punitive Expedition from Mexico. The troops marched out of Colonia Dublan on January 30th and recrossed the border at Columbus, New Mexico, on February 5, 1917. Colonel Brown was retired now and Colonel DeRosey C. Cabell now commanded the regiment. The expedition had accomplished its mission of dispersing the *villistas* and the attendant threat of raids on U.S. border settlements without having actually come to grips with Villa himself.



DeRosey C. Cabell

Men of the 10th Cavalry taken prisoner at the battle of Carrizal, Mexico.

When Carranza, the leader of the Constitutionalist regime, was assassinated on May 21, 1920, he was replaced by Adolfo de la Huerta who made peace with Villa and even presented him with a large rancho upon which to retire along with his remaining followers. Pancho Villa was assassinated in an ambush outside of Parral on July 23, 1923.

"Gen. Pershing Reviewing the Troops on their Return from Mexico." Photo by W. H. Horne, El Paso, Tex.

Apache Scouts in the Punitive Expedition

After Geronimo's surrender, there was less of a need for Indian scouts and, in 1891 the number of scouts apportioned to Arizona was limited to fifty. By 1915 only 24 remained in service. It appears that an additional 17 Apache scouts were enlisted to join Brig. Gen. John J. Pershing's Punitive Expedition into Mexico because in 1916 the number rose to 39, and in 1917 fell back to 22. Apache scouts from Fort Huachuca accompanied the 10th Cavalry and others from Fort Apache joined the 11th Cavalry on their long scouts into Mexico in search of the bandit/revolutionary, Pancho Villa.
Portrait: James A. Shannon.

During the Punitive Expedition in 1916, twenty Indian scouts were sent down from Fort Apache to

join the 11th Cavalry. They arrived too late to take part in the search for Villa which had been suspended due to the protests of the Carranza government about the U. S. presence on Mexican soil. But they did have ample opportunity to show their tracking skills. Captain James A. Shannon with the 11th wrote an article in the *Journal of the U. S. Cavalry Association* for April 1917, entitled "With the Apache Scouts in Mexico." He described their cautious way of operating.

> *The Indian cannot be beaten at his own game. But in order to get results, he must be allowed to play that game in his own way. You tell a troop of white soldiers there is an enemy a thousand yards in your front and they will go straight at him without questions. The Indian under the same circumstance wants to look it all over first. He wants to go to one side and take a look. Then to the other side and take a look. He is like a wild animal stalking its prey. Before he advances he wants to know just what is in his front. This extreme caution, which we don't like to see in the white man, is one of the qualities that makes him a perfect scout. It would be almost impossible to surprise an outfit that had a detachment of Apache scouts in its front. They do not lack courage by any means. They have taken part in some little affairs in Mexico that required plenty of courage, but they must be allowed to do things in their own way.*

The Apaches had a centuries-old hatred of Mexicans and it surfaced during the expedition. Shannon recalled an evening when they encountered some government troops.

> *…As we approached this outfit and opened a conversation with them, Sergeant Chicken (First Sergeant of the Scouts) fingered his gun nervously and gave vent in one sentence to the Indians whole idea of the Mexican situation: "Heap much Mexican, shoot 'em all!" There was no fine distinctions in their minds between friendly Mexicans and unfriendly, Carranzistas and Villistas, de facto troops and bandits. To their direct minds there was only one line of conduct—"Heap much Mexican, shoot 'em all!" They had to be watched pretty carefully when out of camp to be kept from putting this principle into practice.*

The Apache scouts proved useful in tracking American deserters and on at least one occasion located some of the *villistas*. They picked up the trail of some stolen American horses that were two or three days old. Shannon writes:

> *They started off on the trail and after going a short distance came to a rocky stretch where the trail was hard to follow. They circled out like a pack of hounds and soon one of them gave a grunt and all the rest went over where he was and started off again. After a while the trail seemed to divide, so the detachment split up into two parties following the two trails. After about an hour or so, one of these parties overtook the villistas in a very narrow ravine. They shot two of them, and on account of the narrowness of the pass, unfortunately shot two of the horses, one of which proved to be the private horse of Lieutenant Ely of the Fifth Cavalry. They recovered one government horse and got some Mexican saddles, rifles, etc.*[75]

First Sergeant Chicken, Jesse Palmer, Tea Square, Sgt. Big Chow, and Corporal C.F. Josh, in front of the adjutant's office at Fort Apache in 1919. Photo courtesy Lt. H. B. Wharfield, 10th Cavalry, commanding Indian Scouts in 1918-19.

New regulations were written to govern Indian Scouts in 1917. The main change from previous regulations were the period of enlistment. Heretofore scouts had been enlisted for at varying times for three months, six months or a year. Now they would sign up for a seven-year hitch like other soldiers. The new regulations provided:

479. Indians employed as scouts under the provisions of section 1112, Revised Statutes, and Section 1, act of Congress approved February 2, 1901, …will be enlisted for periods of seven years and discharged when the necessity for their services shall cease. While in service they will receive the pay and allowances of cavalry soldiers and an additional allowance of 40 cents per day, provided they furnish their own horses and horse equipments; but such additional allowance will cease if they do not keep their horses and equipments in serviceable condition.

480. Department commanders are authorized to appoint sergeants and corporals for the whole number of enlisted Indian scouts serving in their departments, but such appointments must not exceed the proportion of 1 first sergeant, 5 sergeants, and 4 corporals for 60 enlisted scouts.

481. The number of Indian scouts allowed to military departments will be announced from time to time in orders from the War Department.

482. The enlistment and reenlistment of Indian scouts will be made under the direction of department commanders. The appointment or mustering of farriers or horseshoers on the rolls of Indian scouts is illegal.

483. In all cases of enlistment of Indians the full Indian name, and also the English interpretation of the same, will be inserted in the enlistment papers and in all subsequent returns and reports concerning them.

Indian scouts Andrew Paxton, Charley Shipp, and Joe Quintero with Dr. McCloud at Fort Apache in 1918.

Colonel Wharfield, a lieutenant commanding scouts in 1918, would later describe how the Apaches were expected to be employed that year.

> *The Apache scouts were not trained or drilled to maneouver as the soldiers of the army. Their operations were in accordance with the Apache's natural habits of scouting and fighting. The only directions given by the military were general in nature for the requirements of the movements of the troops. On the march small groups of the scouts were out several miles on the flanks and in front, keeping occasional contacts with the main body. At night most of them came in, leaving a few of the scouts posted as lookouts. An Apache never wanted to be surprised, and all of their movements were based on that principle. They approached ridges and high ground with extreme caution, peeking around, looking as far ahead as possible, using cover, and keeping exposure to the minimum. In a fight they did not believe in charging and battling against all odds, which was the quality of many of the Indians of the Plains. Always they sought for an advantage over the foe, and retreated rather than expose themselves to gun fire. These characteristics made the Apache invaluable scouts in the field for operations with troops. Likewise it accounts for the fact that small numbers of hostile Apaches were able to thwart the efforts of the army in so many instances….*
>
> *During my service in 1918 at Fort Apache the scouts wore cavalry issue clothing, shoes and leggins, but some retained the wide cartridge belt of their own construction and design. An emblem U.S.S. for United States Scouts was fastened on the front of the issue campaign hat. The regulation*

emblem was crossed arrows on a disc with the initials U.S.S.; but I never saw such a design on the scouts' uniform nor in the Quartermaster supply room.[76]

Lieutenant Wharfield talked about some of the scouts who stood out in his memory.

At Fort Apache I had excellent relationships with Chicken. We hunted together for a few days on Willow Creek, a branch of the Black River. He was on a manhunt with me after a trooper, who went AWOL and was hiking southward toward Globe. The scouts successfully tracked the soldier. We apprehended him near the lower White River bridge, close to Tom Wanslee's trading store. In addition to those trips together, there were many other routine contacts at the fort. He, of course, did not handle the first sergeant's paperwork; that was done by white soldiers of the Quartermaster Detachment, but I always gave him the orders and other matters regarding the scouts for him to execute and pass along. He was a good leader, and a highly respected man at the fort.

* * *

During my tour of duty at Fort Apache in 1918…, old Billy was my favorite scout. He could speak only Apache and did not even understand pidgin-English. He lived by himself in a tin shack on the scout row just outside the east gate of the post proper. Frequently in the evenings when riding my mount around the post, I stopped at his place for a visit. We would squat on the ground, smoke hand-rolled cigarettes, and gaze at the evening sky without a word between us. When I got up to leave, it is my recollection that we always shook hands.

* * *

Upon retirement Charles Bones located in a little Indian settlement called Canyon Day, some four miles southwest of old Fort Apache. Here he opened a restaurant and served big meals for twenty-five cents. At that price many of the Indians ate there instead of purchasing more expensive food at the trader's store. Bones had a good trade but did not much more than break even. The old scout also kept a saddle horse and a good team. He exercised his horses by riding the saddle animal in front of the team hauling the wagon, using a lariat for a lead-line. By this method the old Apache was again in the saddle instead of jolting along on the wagon seat with the pony tied behind. Of course a stranger might wonder why the wagon was taken along, but Bones probably figured that was a method of keeping his team wagon-broke.

It is noted that the officer, who commanded the scouts in 1932, failed to have Sergeant Charles Bones advanced in grade upon retirement; such as was the custom of the old army in recognition of the long years of faithful service.[77]

The separate units of Indian Scouts which had existed since 1866 were discontinued on June 30, 1921, and since that time the Apaches were carried on the Detached Enlisted Men's List.

Military Intelligence in the American Southwest: Border Spy Network

During the Punitive Expedition into Mexico in 1916 led by General John J. Pershing, human intelligence (HUMINT) and signal intelligence (SIGINT) took on new proportions. Although an embroyo intelligence staff had been organized in 1903 as part of the Army's General Staff, in the field intelligence was often relegated to the Engineer as an extra duty. In the report of the "U.S. Army Southern Department" the Engineer complains, "In addition to the activities mentioned elsewhere in this report [i.e., reconnaissance, surveying, mapping, laying out camps, etc.] and to miscellaneous duties devolving upon this office, a considerable amount of intelligence work was performed. Prior to his relief from that additional duty, this work attained proportions to require about one-half the time of the Department Engineer…."

General Pershing realized that good intelligence was necessary if he was to track down the bandit/

revolutionary Pancho Villa. Pershing appointed an intelligence officer to his staff and started an "Information Department." Later, when five separate districts were established in the Mexican theater of operations, he instructed the district commanders "to organize [their] own agents and establish as far as possible [their] own service of information."

The records of the Punitive Expedition refer to "Agent A," "G," and "J," and "Messenger O." There were also references to three "scouts" named Suzuki, Sato and Dyo. These men were apparently part of a spy network that reported from Mexico. Two of Pershing's agents had penetrated Villa's camp in September 1916 and talked to Pancho himself. They noted that he was fully recovered from his leg wound and able to mount and dismount with no difficulty. They placed the *villista* strength at 800.[78]

General Pershing's "Report of the Punitive Expedition, July 1916 - February 1917" summed up the work of the "Information Department":

> *The Information Department was conducted by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Capt. W. O. Reed, 6th Cavalry, assisted by Capt. Nicholas W. Campanole, 6th Infantry. The …department had to interest itself in the movements of Villa and his forces, and likewise the movements, activity and intentions of the Carranzistas. There were a number of Japanese who offered themselves for service in this department and some were used but with very mediocre results, as they were not regarded as altogether trustworthy. A few reliable Mexicans were employed in the Secret Service with fairly good results.*
>
> *It was early observed that the Mexican authorities had no code in general use but that each commander had his own local code for use with higher authority or even subordinates. This department took up the study of code messages and soon was able to decipher any code used in Northern Mexico. Thereafter, by tapping the various telegraph and telephone wires and picking up wireless messages we were able to get practically all the information passing between the various leaders in Mexico.*

A Signal Corps Radio Tractor in the field, around 1918. U.S. Army photo.

On entering Mexico the question of guides and scouts was a serious one as there were but few relaible maps available. The scarcity of water at that season of the year made it necessary to depend upon guides familiar with the country. A number of cattlemen were obtained as guides and scouts, and while most of them rendered very valuable and efficient service, many others were found to be worthless. Lists of those known to be efficient, showing the country most familiar to them, has been compiled by these headquarters and copies furnished the district headquarters at El Paso for future reference.[79]

The lessons Pershing learned about the value of military intelligence during the 1916 Punitive Expedition caused him to place great reliance upon this tool during World War I when he commanded the American Expeditionary Force and organized a G2 section along French and British examples.



General Pershing in his staff car. In the front seat is his aide, Lt. J. Lawton Collins. U.S. Army photo.

[1] Ellison, Ralph, *Going to the Territory*, Vintage Books, NY, 1986.

[2] Vance Marchbanks enlisted for the first time in 1895 and spent most of his 43-year Army career at Fort Huachuca. In World War II he was commissioned a captain and after the war he rejoined the Regular Army at his old rank of First Sergeant. His reminiscences are in manuscript form in the Fort Huachuca Museum files.

[3] Brown, Sterling, *The Negro Caravan*, 1941.

[4] Baldwin, James, *Notes of a Native Son*, Dial, NY, 1985.

[5] Foner, Jack, *Blacks and the Military in American History: A New Perspective*, Praeger, NY, 1974, 76.

[6] Foner, 126.

[7] Marchbanks mss.

[8] These were regular army men, volunteers and lifetime soldiers, as opposed to the draftees that were inducted into an alien world against their will.

[9] Master Sergeant James Clark enlisted in the Army as a kitchen worker, a KP, in 1918 and served at Fort Huachuca in the early 1920s with Troop E, 10th Cavalry, and rose from KP to first cook to mess sergeant to cadre sergeant and, finally, to the rank of First Sergeant. Clark appeared in a series of videotaped interviews for the fort's television channel. The video interview is in the Fort Huachuca Museum files.

[10] Marchbanks mss.

[11] Ellison, 88-9, 144.

[12] Brooks, Maj. Gen. John B., USAF, interview. Typescript in Fort Huachuca Museum files. He served as a 2d lieutenant with D Troop, 10th Cavalry, arriving with the regiment on 19 December 1913. He left in December 1915 to enter the Air Service of the U.S. Army Signal Corps.

[13] Paragraph 1026 of 1913 U.S. Army regulations provided that: "…officers may make selection of quarters in accordance with their rank…. An officer may select quarters occupied by a junior, but will not displace a junior if there be quarters suitable to the rank of the senior available, with equal conveniences and accomodations. When an officer has made his choice he must abide by it, and shall not again displace a junior unless he himself is displaced by a senior."

[14] Rodney, George B., *As a Cavalryman Remembers*, Caxton Printers, Caldwell, Idaho, 1944, 236-7.

[15] Weigley, Russell F., *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1973.

[16] Pinter, Walter, "Russian Military Thought: The Western Model and the Shadow of Suvorov," p. 373, and Porch, Douglas, "Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare," p. 407, both in Paret, Peter, *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986.

[17] The wording in FM 100-5, Operations, May 1986, would be altered in style only. "The offensive is the decisive form of war—the commander's ultimate means of imposing his will upon the enemy. While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending, defeat of an enemy force at any level will sooner or later require shifting to the offensive."

[18] *Field Service Regulations, U.S. Army, 1914*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1914, 73, 97.

[19] *Field Service Regulations*, 1914.

[20] *Cavalry Drill Regulations, U.S. Army, 1916*, Military Publishing Co., New York, 1916.

[21] Weigley, Russell F., "American Strategy from its Beginings through the First World War," in Paret, Peter, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986, 442.

[22] This is the earliest articulation of the Airland Battle concept.

[23] *Field Service Regulations, United States Army, 1923*, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1924, 77.

[24] Weigley, 1973, 215.

[25] Brooks interview.

[26] Ganoe, William A., *History of the United States Army*, Appleton-Century, NY, 1924, 432, 464, 478, 480.

[27] Karsten, Peter, *Soldiers and Society*, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1978, 35.

[28] Karsten, 18.

[29] Marchbanks mss.

[30] Clark, Master Sergeant James, videotaped interview with Specialist Four Paul Moake, 1985, copy in Fort Huachuca Museum files.

[31] Motley, Mary Penick, *The Invisible Soldier: The Experience of the Black Soldier in World War II*, Wayne State University Press, 1975, 80-1.

[32] Howe, Jerome, diary page in letter to John B. Brooks, on file in Fort Huachuca Museum archives.

[33] Tuck, Jim, *Pancho Villa and John Reed*: *Two Faces of Romantic Revolution*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1984.

[34] Thisted, Moses N., "Mexican Border Songs and Ballads, 1916-17," *Military Collector and Historian*, Vol. XXVI, No. 3, Fall 1974.

[35] Rodney, 238-40.

[36] Brown papers in FHM files.

[37] Tompkins, Frank, *Chasing Villa*, The Military Service Publishing Company, 1934, 37-8.

[38] Brown papers in FHM files.

[39] Glass, Edward L.N., *History of the Tenth Cavalry, 1866-1921*, Old Army Press, 1921, 64-5.

[40] Annual Report for the Secretary of War, 1914.

[41] Funston's Annual Report, 1916.

[42] AR 1916.

[43] Scott, Hugh B., *Some Memories of a Soldier*, New York, 1928.

[44] Tompkins, 72-3.

[45] Tompkins, 228.

[46] One of the new second lieutenants sent to the border was Omar Nelson Bradley, 14th Infantry. From September 1915 to May 1916, he was at Douglas where he lived "in absolutely miserable circumstances." He kept busy operating the target range, coaching the regimental baseball team and "participated in an epic experimental 300-mile 'motorized hike' with a convoy of trucks." He was moved to Nogales from July to September 1916, and then to Yuma from September 1916 to 21 May 1917. He said: "Duty at Yuma was miserable. Clearly there was to be no war with Mexico; the situation had developed into endless verbal wrangling. Our official camp duties were routine and boring. Yuma was primitive and dusty. Our major diversion was the tedious round of formal calls on superiors for tea or coffee. A few weeks after Mary and I settled in, I applied for a transfer…. Any place seemed preferable to Yuma, Arizona." [Bradley, Omar N., and Blair, Clay, *A General's Life*, Simon and Schuster, NY, 1983.] Other young officers who were to gain prominence and who were stationed along the border were: Clarence Huebner (2d Lieut. at Douglas, AZ, in 1912), Matthew B. Ridgway (2d Lieut. at Eagle Pass, Texas, in 1917), Carl A. Spaatz (aviator with 1916 Pershing Expedition), Lucian K. Truscott (2d Lieut. with 17th Cavalry at Douglas in 1917), Jonathan M. Wainwright (Capt., 1st Cavalry, in 1916), Walton H. Walker (2d Lieut in Texas in 1914), Terry Allen (1st Lieut., 1912-17), Malin Craig (aide-de-camp to General Bell in 1915), William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan (with NY National Guard during 1916 Pershing Expedition), Hugh A. Drum (aide-de-camp to General Funston in 1914), George S. Patton, (8th Cavalry and aide-de-camp to General Pershing in 1916), Robert L. Eichelberger (Lieut. in 1911 with 10th Infantry, and in 1915 with 22d Infantry), Leslie J. McNair (with 1916 Pershing Expedition), George C. Marshall (a 1st Lieut in Texas Maneuver Division in 1911), Alexander McCarroll Patch (1st Lieut. in 18th Infantry in 1910), and George E. Stratemeyer (2d Lieut, 7th Infantry at Douglas in 1914).

[47] Later the 7th became the 160th Infantry, 40th Division, and it would be sent to France in World War I.

[48] On 5 August 1917 the 1st Arizona Infantry was continued in federal service by order of the President and was redesignated the 158th Infantry. It was sent to Camp Kearny, California, where it was brigaded with the 157th Infantry from Colorado in the 40th Infantry Division. The regiment served in France in World War I and was demobilized 3 May 1919 at Camp Kearny.

[49] Glass, 67-8.

[50] Rodney, 250-1.

[51] Brown papers in FHM files.

[52] Glass, 135.

[53] Rodney, 255.

[54] Rodney, 255-6.

[55] Glass, 135.

[56] Rodney, 257-8.

[57] Glass, 138-9.

[58] Glass, 123.

[59] Tompkins, 148.

[60] Tompkins, 151.

[61] Tompkins, 147.

[62] Rodney, 262-3.

[63] Marchbanks mss.

[64] Young, Charles, papers in FHM files.

[65] Brooks interview.

[66] Rodney, 276.

[67] Glass, 79-80.

[68] Henry Houston, whose account of the battle of Carrizal reveals the fighting quality of the 10th Cavalry soldier, also was commissioned a captain in World War I. He is quoted in Carroll, John M., *The Black Military Experience in the American West*, Liverwright Publishing Co., 1971, 499-502.

[69] On October 15, 1917, 1st Sergeant Henry Houston and Sergeant Howard Donovan Queen were commissioned captains after completing an officers' training camp in Des Moines, Iowa. Queen, the son of a 10th Cavalry sergeant who had fought in the Indian campaigns, rose to the rank of Colonel and commanded the all-black 366th Infantry Regiment, 92d Infantry Division, in Italy during World War II. After the war he became a high school principal in Parkersburg, PA.

[70] Marchbanks mss.

[71] Howe, Jerome W., "Campaigning in Mexico, 1916," *The Journal of Arizona History*, Part 1, Autumn 1966; Part 2, Winter 1966.

[72] Howe, 177.

[73] Howe, 178-9.

[74] Tompkins, 210-12.

[75] Shannon, James A., "With the Apache Scouts in Mexico," *Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association*, April 1917.

[76] Wharfield, Harold B., *Apache Indian Scouts*, published by the author, 1964, 22-3.

[77] Wharfield, Harold B., 1964, 86, 91-2.

[78] Clendenen, Clarence C., *Blood on the Border*, Macmillan Publishing Co., NY, 1969, 332-3.

[79] Report of the Punitive Expedition.